

The background of the book cover is a 3D digital illustration of a classical Greek temple. Four large, fluted columns with Corinthian capitals support a pediment. The view is from inside the temple, looking out through the columns. Outside, there is a bright blue sky with soft white clouds. In the distance, a body of water is visible, and on the right, a classical city with a prominent temple and tiered seating is built into a hillside. The overall style is clean and modern, with a warm, golden-brown color palette for the architecture.

JUAN SEBASTIÁN CÓMEZ-JERÍA

TEXTS OF
NATIONAL
SOCIALIST
PHILOSOPHERS

VOL. I
ALFRED
BAEUMLER

JUAN SEBASTIÁN GÓMEZ-JERIA

TEXTS OF NATIONAL SOCIALIST
PHILOSOPHERS

VOL. I. ALFRED BAEUMLER

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In the Beginning was the Word (Hoyer).



Contents.

Farewell to Hitler.

Preface: Some words.

Chapter 0. Prof. Dr. Gerhard Lehmann: Political Philosophers in Germany, 1943.

Chapter 1. Alfred Baeumler: Nietzsche and National Socialism.

Chapter 2. Alfred Baeumler. Nietzsche, the philosopher and politician.

Chapter 3. Alfred Baeumler: Selected articles from the book 'Education and Community'.

Chapter 4. Alfred Baeumler: Bachofen and Nietzsche.

Chapter 5. Alfred Baeumler: Nietzsche as an existential thinker.

Chapter 6. Alfred Baeumler: The Solitude of Nietzsche.

Chapter 7. Alfred Baeumler: Hellas and Germania.

Chapter 8. Alfred Baeumler: Alfred Rosenberg and the Myth of the 20th Century.

Chapter 9. Alfred Baeumler: Aesthetics.



Farewell to Hitler.

He once said: *'I wish nothing on my gravestone other than my name'*. Even his name will probably not stand over his grave, for we know that he must have perished while fighting bitterly in the Reich Chancellery. We know that the enemy will be able to find a body in the ruins caused by countless artillery shells and countless flame throwers, and that they may say that it is the Führer's body, but we will not believe it. If the enemy says that, we will not believe it. That his body is dead we believe, what is mortal of him has perished, has passed away, but he has fulfilled his most beautiful oath, this affirmation: *'The most valuable thing God has given me on this world is my people. My faith rests on it, I serve it with my will, and I give my life to it'*. His life is fulfilled. He began by fighting for his people, and he ended that way. A life of battle.

Now the world will attempt to explain him. Books will be written about him, some praising, others cursing him. People will criticize him; people will pray for him. A great one has left this world, and where a strong, bright light is extinguished, creatures suddenly appear in the twilight that had hidden from the bright light. That is all foreign to us, far from our way of thinking. For this we affirm: We swore an oath to this man and his teachings, we pledged ourselves to him during our people's dark days, we rose with him to the heights to which he led our people in the brief, beautiful years of peace, and like all good Germans, we stood by him in battle. The world should not appear small and shabby to us because the victors can rejoice. We can confidently leave his judgment to world history. Today we cannot decide it.

But will posterity be able to understand him fully? It is hard for contemporaries to pass judgment about someone of their own era, particularly if it is one as unique as Adolf Hitler. Posterity sees the great from a distance, reads his words, reads our words, but it cannot

understand the world of our day in all of its breadth. One can only hope that they believe the great words of the great man. *‘One could give me whole parts of the earth, but I would rather remain the poorest citizen of this state. I am not so crazy as to want war. I was a worker in my youth and have remained one in my inmost being. We are not fighting for theories, nor for dogmas. It makes no difference whether or not we live. The only thing that is important is that our people lives!’*

How will these words sound to posterity? Will they be able to understand why a whole people, in the midst of its deepest poverty, affirmed this man? We may only hope so, for we know that world history will then truly understand this man, his teachings, and our age. We see that more clearly today than ever before, we see it proven by the immeasurably hard battle that our people has withstood so bravely, we see it in the silent unspoken loyalty of the poorest sons of our people that Adolf Hitler gathered as a lens that focuses all light on a single point; the most beautiful virtues, the most fervent desires, the noblest longings, the beautiful will of our people, the longing for the Reich, the drive for social justice, the will for freedom, for clear leadership, our people saw that all united in Adolf Hitler and his idea. That little mind darkened the image of his clear will, that traitors and bad counselors deserted and betrayed him, that finally he was overcome by a great superiority of steel and money, that cannot change the image of him that is in the deepest heart of our people. The present hour may perhaps dim that image, the enormous sacrifices, the sorrow and misery, may distort it, but when one day the senses clear, when thoughts are once again free, he will appear once more even to the last people’s comrade as he did in days in which the whole nation joyfully affirmed him.

The man is dead. He fell fighting. *He remained loyal to himself.* He wanted the best for his people, which is why it loved him so much. We know that he will continue to live in our land not as a war hero in the form of a metal statue, but rather as a child of the people whose pure will the people understood, and whose most beautiful words will remain a memorial for us, his words that in a people’s deepest need, one must love his people more than himself.

(Hermann Okraß, ‘Abschied von Hitler’, Hamburger Zeitung, 2 May 1945, p. 1. With permission).

Preface: Some words.

The essential purpose of the innumerable tortures and executions of 'heretics' is clearly mentioned by Nicolas Eymerich, Inquisitor General of the Inquisition in the Crown of Aragon, in his book *Directorium Inquisitorum*: '*... for punishment does not take place primarily and per se for the correction and good of the person punished, but for the public good, in order that others may be terrified and turn away from the evils they would commit*'. That infamous book is one of the bad products of Gutenberg's invention.

'I've been waiting thirty years to write 'Blueprint'. My excuse for not doing it sooner is that more research was needed to document the importance of genetics, and I was busy doing that research. In hindsight, however, I have to admit to another reason: **cowardice**. *It may seem unbelievable today, but thirty years ago it was professionally dangerous to study the genetic origins of differences in people's behavior and write about it in scientific journals*. It could also be dangerous to stick your head above the parapets of academia to talk about these issues in public. Now, the change in zeitgeist has made it much easier to write this book' (Plomin, 2019).

As Richard Bauman mentions, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae is the first case of asebeia (ἀσέβεια, impiety or godlessness) in the special form of attacks on philosophers (Bauman, 2013). One of the versions of this trial states that Anaxagoras was prosecuted by Cleon on a charge of asebeia, the factual basis of which was that he had declared the sun to be a mass of red-hot metal and the moon an inhabited world, and he had attacked the popular belief in Zeus' thunderbolts (Bauman, 2013; Hershbelle, 1982). Neville Woolf cites some 'results' of Anaxagoras' works: '*The Sun, the Moon, and all the stars are stones on fire The Moon is an incandescent solid having in it plains, mountains and ravines. The light which the Moon has is not its own but comes from the Sun. The Moon is eclipsed through the interposition of the Earth, The Moon is below the Sun and nearer to us. The Sun is eclipsed at the New Moon through the interposition of the Moon. The Sun exceeds the Peloponnesus in size. We do not feel the heat of the stars because they are at a great distance from the earth; the Earth is flat in shape Air . . . supports the Earth which rides on it*' [These last two, and a few notions such as of 'dark' objects in the sky were apparently from Anaximenes] (Woolf, 1995). Anaxagoras seems to be the first known scientist to get into trouble for a conflict between science and religion (Woolf, 1995). Happily, Anaxagoras escaped the death penalty (Socrates did not).

A more recent case is Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), burnt alive at the stake for heresy (with a metal plate clamped over his tongue to prevent him to speak). All of Bruno's works were placed on the Index of Prohibited Books. One of this proposals is this one: the universe is not a finite globe composed of concentric spheres. Instead it was an infinite, homogeneous expanse

populated by an infinite number of solar systems like our own (Boulting, 1916; Maifreda, Rosenberg, & Valtz Mannucci, 2022; Yates, 1964).

The topics we present in this book are not inscribed on any known and public list of 'forbidden subjects', but reality says that it is better not to cross paths with the hidden pack waiting to destroy some idealist who believes that the love of knowledge and ideas cannot be restricted.

Ideas are confronted with ideas and not with laws forbidding some of them. All ideas are resilient. Most of the time the persecutors of ideas are only ignorant packs; but some of them appear sobbing, disguised in the cloak of some virtue. These are the worst. Some of them falsify different aspects of reality (King, 1999).

A few years ago I discovered that many aspects of the topics of this book had not been appreciated and understood correctly, and still are. The novelty of these things rightly understood, as well as some of the consequences which were derived from them, are in contradiction to the notions commonly held by academics and the vulgar. The men who were well versed, and who are still very few, were happy as soon as they received the first message because they knew they were not alone. There were others who denied those truths, others who didn't care, and others who remained in doubt just because they hadn't yet had the opportunity to study them for themselves. These latter men will gradually be satisfied.

It was necessary to discreetly prevent the increase and diffusion of this way of understanding some truths because they stimulate research and not their diminution or destruction. We were forced, without even noticing, to cling to certain opinions and interests and not to the whole truth. These distorted and grotesquely amplified 'truths' were presented in an extremely persistent and crushing way (film, radio, TV, books, the Web, etc.) in order to keep the lucid thinker distracted from worse events that were happening and are still happening. In order to deny and refute these new views, accusations and numerous vain arguments were hurled at them peppered with half-truths that were adequate to maintain distraction. Unable to directly deny the truths because there is no way, the defenders of lies now take refuge in stubborn silence but seek new ways to harm those who have been able to see the correct truths, with the sole and ultimate goal of silencing them. And, unfortunately, these liars are always shown whining and disguised in lawyers' robes, ermine robes and all the 'respectability' that money can buy. We have forgotten that we must always maintain our respect for moderation and must not believe anything recklessly. The passage of time will reveal all these truths (text taken and modified from: *Recueil d'opuscules de Galilee*, Bibliothèque Nationale de France. Département des Manuscrits. Dupuy 390, 1601-1700. John Elliot Drinkwater Bethune. See also *Life of Galileo Galilei*. Boston: W. Hyde & Co, 1832).

We have done everything necessary to try to ensure that these translations are

as close as possible to the originals. However, there are possibilities that errors have been made. We apologize. This book must be something like the origin of successive texts that are increasingly more accurate and contain a greater amount of new material.

The editor has to thank the invaluable and generous Ramón Bau F., who was able to pass on his enthusiasm and will to many generations. C&F Juan Pablo Almonacid-Parra is gratefully acknowledged for his artistic contributions.

The beehive called 'Glowing Neurons' must be mentioned and thanked for its silent and tenacious work. **As someone said: we should be happy to know that the future is entirely ours.** The motto remains: 'the sun will go out and we will still be here' (2003).

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
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JPA

Chapter 0.

Prof. Dr. Gerhard Lehmann: Political Philosophers in Germany, 1943.

During year 1943 Dr. Gerhard Lehmann published a book entitled Contemporary German Philosophy (Lehmann, 1943). It is a very interesting book citing and commenting the investigations of, among others, Franz Brentano, Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber, Rudolf Carnap, Max Scheler, Oswald Spengler, Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Carl Gustav Jung. Chapter IV of the third part deals with political philosophers. After noticing that many of the ideas exposed in this chapter deserve further exploration and deepening by the interested friends of knowledge, I present the first English translation of this material. I made all possible efforts to keep the original meaning intact.

Chapter IV of part III of the book Die Deutsche Philosophie Der Gegenwart from Prof. Dr. Gerhard Lehmann (Lehmann, 1943).

The political philosophy of the present, with which we are now dealing solely and ultimately, differs so substantially from the directions of contemporary thought that it is necessary to assume these differences. It has assumptions which, if not denied by the 'unpolitical' philosophy, are considered too narrow and merely factual, historically coincidental. On the contrary, *it itself criticizes most sharply the prerequisites of traditional philosophy.* It is historically concrete, insofar as it gives expression to the ideological decisions and objectives of our time, and no earlier one, even if it has dug itself deeply into tradition. Precisely this seems to lead to a narrowing of problems, to a renunciation of timeless truths, finalities, at least to the separation of certain areas in which, although (as in mathematics, logic) such truths are recognized, they are recognized only as formal, not as politically relevant. *As a 'political' philosophy, it seems from the outset to exclude something like a philosophy of nature, of consciousness, of religion, but which nevertheless belongs in the systematic approach of a philosophy as a doctrine of the 'whole world'.* Thus, it seems to concede to 'unpolitical' philosophy not only a realm of formal knowledge, but also a larger realm of substantive objectivities, from which, however, it is itself, as philosophy, unable to detach itself.

These and more gross objections, which relate primarily to the established route and to the attachment to a politically determined worldview, could be completely reversed if only that was our task to describe and present the political philosophy of the present in its specificity. But this task, however important it is, remains subordinate. The most urgent demand of the present is neither merely to 'describe' nor merely to 'understand', but to re-enact and participate. Anyone who believes they can avoid this gains no access to

contemporary political philosophy; this does not, of course, mean that re-enactment and participation as such are already sufficient to achieve the peculiar way of reflecting that belongs to every philosophy. To be sure, one thing would already be made clear by the description: that political philosophy by no means restricts or narrows itself territorially in its systematic claims, but on the contrary takes up all the positions of traditional philosophizing insofar as these can be politically legitimized. Whereby this claim to totality is rooted in the essence of the political just as much as criticism of any detached philosophy of objects and problems.

Then there must be serious misunderstandings that already distort the image of political philosophy.

And on closer inspection, it is easy to see that it is the relationship between philosophy and politics, the philosophical concept of the political itself, from which they arise. There is a history of political thought, rich in constructive designs, intellectual planning, revolutionary and conservative ideas. Should philosophy have taken no notice of this? On the contrary. *All accounts of the history of philosophy are filled with reports on state-philosophical, socio-philosophical, cultural-philosophical thoughts of the past.* But that is precisely what is characteristic: the political appears here as an application area of philosophy; its concept appears as a variation, fulfillment of meaning of the philosophical concept. What philosophy itself is, and how it makes it possible to influence practical action and political objectives, is not considered in advance: the philosophical basic problems certainly include the question of the nature of philosophy. *And in dealing with this question, political factors, one thinks of Plato first and foremost, play no small role.*

Nevertheless, in determining the essence of philosophy within the traditional history of philosophy (which by no means coincides with its real 'history', but is 'historiography'), political reflection negates itself in the idea of a 'politics' to be based on philosophy, so to speak: it places concrete communal action in the service of realizing timeless truths, ethical demands, religious salvific teachings, 'ascetic ideals'. This turn from the temporal to the timeless, from the historical to the absolute, is certainly not accidental, although we do not find it in all thinkers who were also politicians, and certainly not in all politicians who were also philosophers. At the very least, it is no coincidence that the selection process, the precipitate of which precisely forms the philosophical tradition and historiography, brought only such 'ascetic' thinkers to recognition.

Where philosophy did not grant religious, theological authorities a right which undoubtedly belonged to them in long eras of Western intellectual life, it made itself the highest authority. Political cognition, which is supposed to have something specific within a specific sphere of action as its 'object', had to be oriented towards philosophical cognition, which is directed at the universal. It had to measure, judge, condemn or, in democratic-humanitarian eras, approvingly evaluate itself by it. The possibility that the political itself

contains sources of cognition which are not only unreachable for philosophical insight, but which are even binding and obligating in this unreachability had to be rejected by tradition as an absurdity. *In fact, it is easy to demonstrate that politics as 'cognition' (not as experience which first has to be cognized) is merely a 'case' of possible cognition and as such cannot claim to determine 'the' cognition in its possibility, conceptual structure, essential structure.* If one wanted to deny this, one would still have to presuppose it as correct in the act of denial and thus acknowledge it. Or does a 'politically' justified relativism have any advantage over any other?

However, like all seeming self-evident truths, this one too is only a 'self-evident' subreption and tautology. It is no surprise that dogmatists who breed cultures of problems pass by such a fundamental problem: after all, it is their own will to power that risks foundering here. With all their might they want to support the traditional concept of truth, from which the idea of the philosophia perennis always followed and follows. *This is the inertia of self-preservation, which does not want its beloved activities and pursuits to be challenged. Even if genuine philosophizing were first and foremost to develop from this challenge.*

Things are different for the historian. For him, the turn to political philosophy in contemporary thinking, initially only understood as a turning away from the handed down, supposedly 'unpolitical' way of thinking, is at least prepared by the fact of that 'nationalization' of philosophy, which can be dated very early chronologically, but which only becomes clear in its real, and that means political, problematic in the 19th century. Philosophizing, formerly no less rich in national differences, now for the first time becomes expressly, and indeed with reference to the common philosophical tradition, appropriated to the respective polis. The blanket of supranational, European, Christian-Western commonalities becomes thinner and thinner; all countries stake their claims to an autogenous philosophy, an independent tradition. On closer inspection, the facts of the nationalization in philosophy do not turn out to be so simple a consequence of the intensification of national self-consciousness. Is this nationalization, as has already been suggested, almost everywhere under the sign of a reception of German philosophy: of German idealism, Kant, Hegel? *German philosophy is the connecting, the common, thought text on which the different countries only differently imposes their own traditional elements.* That one defends oneself against Germany's cultural hegemony, requites the reception of 'German' ideas with political enmity, arises on the one hand from the historical situation, on the other hand from the general law of the inevitable loss of power of any realpolitik ally uncovered, purely ideal-factor-based hegemony.

Nevertheless, this political state of affairs, precisely because German philosophy has overriding philosophical significance, does not yet seem to effect a real politicization of thought. But German philosophy itself abandons German classical philosophy, even before it begins to gain acceptance abroad.

For 'contemporary philosophy' (the concept of which then begins to catch on), German idealism becomes non-binding as past thought. Thus arises the familiar fact to every historian that a history of 19th century philosophy encompassing individual countries must of necessity incorporate political (national) differences into its approach, because our own philosophy has withdrawn from its national (and that means, in this case: from its international) validity.

What thus appears as an emergency remedy becomes recognizable in its central significance when one decides to search now also for political motives in the thought formation of German idealist philosophy itself. In earlier contexts we have attempted to outline the internal relationships of 19th century German philosophy to politics: in the German movement from Herder to Hegel, in the philosophy of Restoration, in Young Hegelianism and the radical movement, but also later in the struggle for the autonomy of science, for the 'scientific' representation of philosophy, in the dissolution and substitution of metaphysics by a social science, sociology, which even where it does not enter into a connection with socialism, is determined by political presuppositions and aims. This is not to be repeated here. *In any case, it is clear that there can be no question here of 'external' relationships to politics, but that politics and philosophy are connected in the most intimate ideal manner.* Indeed, seen in this way, contemporary political philosophy could be regarded precisely as a continuation and above all a raising to consciousness of the connections elaborated in the 19th century.

Certainly, this view is justified. But it is not enough. Contemporary political thought differs very essentially from that of the previous century. And it is precisely for this: that only today is a political philosophy possible, i.e. a philosophy that relates not merely to political contents, objects, but has as it were incorporated the political into its structure, it is of the greatest importance for this difference.

In the 19th century the concept of politics is conceived, if not throughout at least by most theorists dealing with it, first, statically, related to the state, and second, regionally, related to a specific area of culture, of social life, of values and value-setting. Of course, the statism of 19th century 'politics' is by no means merely an extension of the state doctrines of the old authoritarian state: the German movement of the Wars of Liberation, which was a popular movement; idealist philosophy, which places itself at least initially in the service of the German unification movement; German liberalism of neo-humanist provenance, and it too with the claim to procure right and representation for the 'people' vis-à-vis the state, all this lies in between. Even in Dahlmann's Politics (1835), 'traced back to the basis and measure of given conditions', the concept of the political is in a certain sense a national one, and not at all colored by the state, even if, quite neo-humanistically, the 'great common work of mankind' as a 'higher order' superior to any individual state and all states together is placed first and made the measure of the political: the

life of individual states merely accomplishes the 'preparatory work' for this 'common work'.

Hardly any more examples are needed for the later state-centering of the political. Almost every textbook on 'politics' in the second half of the century can serve as an example. Of course, the greatest example, Hegel's philosophy of law with its deification of the state, which is declared to be the manifest (revealed!) ethical 'spirit', substantial, self-thinking and knowing will, still belongs to the idealist movement itself. It is here that the reversal of the national into the state concept becomes most obvious; as is well known, in the second edition of the 'Encyclopedia' (1827) Hegel replaced the word 'people' from the first edition (1817) with 'state': but the change of word alone does not account for it, what matters is the change of meaning, and that becomes most visible in the Philosophy of Law.

One thing, however, cannot be said of Hegel, the Organicists, the Restoration philosophers and of course also the 'radicals': that they would have bounded the political region. Of course politics was a state doctrine. For Hegel, the state was the earthly God. Of course it was not the absolute spirit itself. It was the last synthesis of 'objective' spirit. But for that reason it was not separated from the Absolute: Hegel's metaphysics of spirit knows no such separations. The moment when on the one hand the absolute spirit, i.e. the Absolute itself as the central unity of meaning disappeared, and on the other hand philosophy dropped anchor in the harbor of the individual sciences, legitimating itself 'epistemologically', the 'repetition' of the philosophy of objective spirit (in Dilthey and the 'human-scientific' philosophy of neo-idealism) had to lead to that separation of the political which is so characteristic for the last third of the previous century. Economy, law, state, politics, culture, religion, science, etc., all of them became 'fields' which one sought to trace back to individual sciences, each already of a finished character. The typological elaboration of this human-scientific approach still belongs, for example, to the requisites of present-day 'cultural psychology'. *We are only interested here in the fact that the turn to political philosophy in the present means a re-centralization of the political itself.*

Of course this is not to be understood simply in terms of the history of concepts: that one has now decided to give the concept of 'politics' a new content, no longer to relate it to the state, to a particular cultural value, to a particular field of 'objective spirit', but to the national community, to the whole of the polis. It is to be understood historically and therefore itself politically. *Contemporary political philosophy is of course in this respect itself the expression of that reorganization of our social and state structure, effected for the first time by National Socialism as a national-political movement.*

How far academic philosophy still stood apart from the recent past and was only seeking ways and detours to appropriate the present in an understanding way is well known. Much more important is likely to be the other thing: that

what takes on ideological form in National Socialism breaks out as problematic from within, so to speak, in the development of contemporary philosophy. If this coincidence did not exist, if rather it was simply the case that National Socialism had 'influenced' philosophy and that the latter was only trying to follow the impulses it had received, then 'political' philosophy in the present would certainly be an important contemporary factor, but not really a section of modern philosophy history. And National Socialism itself, would it not be historically rootless in ideological terms if it could not refer to intellectual-historical prerequisites which must also have influenced the development of contemporary philosophy in another form?

The history of the ideas of National Socialism points first and foremost to a movement which was already politically global: the populist movement of the Bismarck era, in which, first of all, the concept of race, in its then imperfectly fixed scientific form, is linked to national demands and aspirations, which had to remain unsatisfactory in the small German, national-liberal (which here should not mean party, but structure) Second Reich.

And thereby, only thereby, it refers back to the literature and philosophy of that time: to H. St. Chamberlain's, rather aesthetically than politically determined, neo-idealist philosophy of culture, which stands in transparent relationship to R. Wagner's mythological irrationalism; to Nietzsche's cultural critique, revaluation doctrine and realistic philosophy, which in a certain respect forms the counterpole not only to Chamberlain, but also to neo-idealism in general at that time; to Lagarde's conservative yet not merely 'conservative' program of renewal, which very energetically frees the political from the clutches of the 'state', subordinates mechanical ties in the state to an organic structure in the people, anti-socialist, aristocratic, as it finds powerful expression above all as an educational program in the German Writings (1880).

This and much else belongs to the history of ideas of National Socialism, without it making sense to stamp these men as 'precursors' of the National Socialist movement; for what is essential is missing everywhere: the political synthesis of nationalism and socialism. This is to be referred exclusively to the work of the Leader himself as idea and deed.

Alongside this line of intellectual history, and today more clearly distinguishable from it than a few years ago, runs that other one, leading right into the crisis period, characterized above all by Möller van den Bruck's continuation of Lagarde's nationalist-conservative critique and Oswald Spengler's philosophy of culture. If the ideal synthesis given by van den Bruck in *The Third Reich* (1923) was conceived as an antithesis to Spengler's seemingly fatalistic (but compared to his models Gobineau and Nietzsche, far from matching in visionary power) doctrine of the decline of culture, and was also effective as such, it cannot be overlooked that Spengler had far more concentrically and unliterarily anticipated van den Bruck's political approach in his unforgettable writing *Prussianism and Socialism* (1919). Here lies what

they have in common. What separates them lies in the fact that in van den Bruck's idea of the Reich the universalism of our idealist tradition is alive and brought to bear as an historical potency, whereas Spengler, mostly perceived as a naturalist, demands a radical turning away from any universalistic emotional and contemplative outlook.

If one compares this with the development of contemporary philosophy into political philosophy itself, it is of course not enough to point to that series of thinkers, determined overall by neo-idealism, whom we got to know as representatives of a national and also nationalist sentiment!. For although there is a relationship here to politics or to a nationalist worldview, the political problematic does not arise directly from the philosophical. As long as the concept of philosophy in its traditional definiteness remains unchallenged, the relationship to the political is a discourse that concerns only the mentality of the speaker, not the matter itself. It is also historically readily apparent that the roots of contemporary political philosophy must be sought in the same critical contemporary situation into which the National Socialist movement itself enters in order to overcome it: those are the postwar and transitional years which accelerate the decay of the old philosophy and compel a radical reflection on the essence of philosophy.

Apparently, what remains concealed from traditionally universalist thought is the problem that here cannot meaningfully even be posed: the problem of human existence and existentiality, as well as that to which the dynamic pressing towards the political in our time testifies most strongly. We pointed out two roots and forms of modern 'philosophy of existence': idealist (Kierkegaard) and realistic (Nietzsche). But it should be clear that one cannot simply place them side by side. Perhaps in retrospect. But not when one looks to the present. Almost everything that takes place in German academic philosophy since the turn of the century takes place in the idealist sphere. And (idealist) philosophy of existence is initially only a self-contradictory attempt, based on idealist premises themselves, to draw boundaries and demolish systematic seeming assurances. It is entirely no coincidence that the social, indeed in the narrower sense sociological problematic stands in the foreground here.

We have elaborated this! and here need only point back to the fact that for Heidegger, for example, essential to the Being of existence is 'being-with others', that the world of existence is precisely not 'world' pure and simple but is with-world: 'being-in' is 'being-with' and inwardly objective being-in-itself is 'being there with'. Or that for Jaspers empirical existence is protected from the contingency of its merely individual (self-willed) existence through the 'experience' of communication: this is neither simply community nor conscious community, but rather the lived 'revelation' of the existential ground of community.

As insistently as one political moment here presses forward: community, in a form deviating from neo-idealism (e.g. Eucken's 'socialism', Natorp's 'social

idealism'), by community no longer being thought of as idea, image of action, ethical model, but being ontologically or metaphysically tied to the enactment of 'possible' existence (which of course does not exclude ethical content as such), so much the other political moment retreats: that which Humboldt called power, energy, Nietzsche will to power. For as with idealism in all its nuances, with neo-idealistic philosophy of culture and also still with Spengler's culture-morphological turn towards the realistic, community for idealist philosophy of existence is, one might almost say more than ever, subordinated to a universal system of reference. And directly subordinated at that. In place of the Humanum, Spirit, Being, the 'All-encompassing' has entered. But that does not improve matters. For this ontologization or transcending of the political leads, as an immediate one, directly to individualism, whether one admits it or not. Just as, politically seen, every religious-metaphysical approach, and that is the approach derived from Kierkegaard adopted by idealist philosophy of existence, is individualistic.

It would have to be hopeless to want to correct something there. Nietzsche could have shown the way. But of course not the Zarathustra-Nietzsche with his transcendental surrogates. And he is the one who, despite Baeumler's radical revaluation of the traditional Nietzsche image, is still taken seriously alone in philosophy today. The other Nietzsche still applies without exception as a 'naturalist'.

The correction in contemporary thinking came from another side. In a short piece on the 'Concept of the Political' (1927 as an essay, in book form 1931, revised 1933) Carl Schmitt, the Berlin professor of constitutional law, had introduced that initially formal ('categorical') factor which at one stroke transforms the universal community into a political one: the 'distinction' between friend and foe. Since Schmitt's attempted conceptual definition of the political has become significant for contemporary political philosophy, both because of its content and because of the criticism it provoked, it must be examined somewhat more closely.

The numerous other historical, legal, and directly topical, contemporary historical works of Schmitt (Dictatorship 1921, Political Theology 1922, Constitutional Doctrine 1928, Guardian of the Constitution 1931, State, Movement, People 1933, Legal-Scientific Thinking 1934, Leviathan 1938, Positions and Concepts 1940, etc.) can be disregarded here. They are of great interest, rich in thought and illuminating of the situation. Schmitt did not become known solely through them. In the notorious trial Prussia v. Reich of 1932 he represented the Reich before the State Court and refuted with great skill the legally masked arguments of the former Braun-Severing government (When the Reich President appoints a provisional state government, he acts as 'guardian of the constitution by virtue of the essentially political decision placed under his political discretion,' it said in the concluding speech of October 17).

Emerging from an argument with (Anglo-American) pluralist state theory

(primarily J. Laski's), Schmitt's thesis is characterized by three moments: by the rejection of liberal-pluralist lines of thought coordinating the state with other groups, grasping the political as a partial sphere of the 'social' ('associative'); by the emphasis on the totality of the political unity ('community'); by the existential determination of the friend-enemy antithesis, which as a political one always presupposes an extreme 'intensity' of a connection or separation or the real possibility of physical annihilation of the enemy (war).

The state is neither a special kind of society nor the 'product of a federalism of social associations' (umbrella association). A 'pluralistic', i.e. dominated by a plurality of different parties, state is of course not unpolitical, but politically disempowered. It is a political entity without the power of overriding political unity that would relativize contrasts between parties. Schmitt's fight was directed against the pluralist state in this sense: the method of political will formation in the multi-party state is 'daily compromise', its danger 'open or latent civil war.' The pluralist system must lead to the politicization of all domestic institutions; it is based on the 'primacy of domestic politics'.

By contrast, the political unity or community, whose 'possibility' belongs to the essential determination of the political (thus also remains a presupposition in the pluralist system), is a unity going beyond the merely social-associative, something 'specifically different' from social groupings. Such an overriding unity is the community insofar as it has the power, by its own decision and at its own risk, to make the 'distinction between friend and foe.' It is existentially political as this power. Schmitt thus closely ties the determination of the friend-enemy antithesis to the concept of political totality. No obligatory (authoritative) friend-enemy distinction without political unity; no political community without power over life and death.

This certainly does not facilitate understanding of the starting point. If it looks as if Schmitt teaches not only a superordination of the political over the social, but also a fundamental determination of all social (human) contents by political categories, this is at least questionable. The friend-enemy antithesis is coordinated with other antitheses; it is supposed to be just as original as the antithesis between good and evil, beautiful, and ugly, useful, and harmful. That would be a regional characterization. Furthermore, the political grouping is supposed to derive from the social one: 'connection' and 'separation' are only supposed to become political from a certain point on. The antitheses of confessional, economic, moral nature exist; the political is no 'corresponding subject area' to them, but a 'phenomenon' that occurs when they reach a certain intensity. Political are 'groupings determined by the eventuality.' The 'eventuality' is thus the measure of intensity. It is at the same time the situation within which that intensification (of the initially non-political antitheses) manifests itself.

The eventuality is the existential threat. Only where there is a totality of

people who 'at least potentially', i.e. 'really possibly' must fight for their existence, only there does the category enemy (or friend) apply. This real possibility must always be thought through to the end as the ultimate consequence whenever political concepts are thought. It is not merely war, but already the friend-enemy grouping itself that 'includes the real possibility of physical killing'.

The existential struggle includes the existential decision. That it lies with the community and only with it shows that Schmitt's concept of existence is in any case not meant individualistically. But then the formal framework of the friend-enemy distinction is too narrow. In fact, Schmitt seeks 'to take the words friend and enemy ... in their concrete, existential sense, not as symbolic or allegorical phrases', i.e. to distinguish the enemy from the opponent, antagonist, competitor, in general from the private 'enemy'. Enemy is always a 'totality of people struggling for their existence, which faces a similarly total opponent'. The friend-enemy distinction thus requires a further 'distinction' in order to qualify it as political. Existence cannot be individual ('spiritual') existence of the individual, but only national existence.

It is clear that, failing to recognize this complicated state of affairs, one will reject this doctrine of the political as inadequate, indeed as liberalist. This is the case with Otto Koellreutter, who has repeatedly argued with Schmitt (People and State in the Constitutional Crisis 1932, German Constitutional Law 1935, etc.). According to Koellreutter, Schmitt does not orient the essence of the political towards a community. He constructs the type of 'formal-political human being who becomes a political beast of prey without actual political substance'. He sees the essence of the political in foreign policy ('primacy of foreign policy') and considers war to be the actual political condition. These are distortions of the wording of Schmitt's thesis.

Nevertheless, a real contrast is concealed behind this, and what matters is to determine Koellreutter's own conception. It is 'substantialist' in the sense that Koellreutter asks primarily for the substance of the political and finds it in the community or people. 'All political affairs are community regulations,' the political sphere is the 'sphere of community life', community understood as a spiritual phenomenon held together by living ideas, although the 'earthly possibility of shaping' these ideas also belongs to the definition or limitation of the political. While Schmitt only determines the 'dualism of our sphere of life' (private - public sphere), Koellreutter wants to specify inner and outer political criteria of the political, define it not abstractly or formally but concretely. Politically inward, equalization of the polarity between individuals and community is the political task; outwardly, the 'last principle' is not struggle but likewise 'equalization and unification'.

The essence of the political is concretely defined by its ties to the national order of life of the people. The state-centrism present at least in part in Schmitt, Koellreutter would like to eliminate completely and see the people as the 'primary', which 'feels and shapes itself politically in the state as a

whole'. He is also eager to assert the connection between right and authority, respectively the fundamental difference between authority and power, allegedly overlooked by Schmitt. From here a clarification of the concepts of 'total' (power) state and 'authoritarian' state emerges: the authoritarian state knows genuine representation; its authority is to be understood as the 'spiritual connection of the people with the state as a whole'. The total state, the consistent implementation of national democratic power state ideology, on the other hand consists in the nationalization of all areas of life and in 'dictatorship borne by intense instruments of power'.

Decisive is that Koellreutter seeks to separate right and power sharply, to detach legal value and political value from one another, to distinguish the norm idea of 'just right' and the 'objective sphere' of law from positive law: only the authoritarian state can accomplish the transposition of just law into positivity and the legitimation of state power. Consistently in Koellreutter, this recourse to natural law justification of politics combines with its moralization: the justification of state authority lies 'in the ethical realm, namely that of an autonomous political ethics which flows only from the idea of the whole of people and state'.

These approaches to political philosophy are no more philosophically developed in Koellreutter than in Schmitt. Only in Kurt Schilling (*The State* 1935, *History of the Philosophy of State and Law* 1937) is such a development, referring to Koellreutter, attempted, systematically on the one hand, incorporating the philosophical tradition on the other. In a number of works that cannot be dealt with here (*Aristotle's Conception of Philosophy* 1928, *Hegel's Science of Reality and Its Sources* 1929, *Nature and Truth* 1934, *Kant* 1942), Schilling had forged his own approach to tradition and also outlined the prerequisites for an interpretation of existence and doctrine of life approximating existential philosophy. These prerequisites form the basis of the theory of the state; *for the state 'is not an end in itself...rather, it is merely a means for preserving life in time, and it would receive its meaning only from the way in which it is able to exercise its function of preserving life'*.

Everything living is individual, the 'temporal form of connecting past and future into the unity of existence'. Its 'systematic nature' consists in spontaneously representing itself as a temporal whole in each case by anticipating its own future or asserting itself against disturbances. Human life differs from this general form of life by the emergence of a new means: consciousness (as cognition, memory, utilization of experience, self-responsibility, self-determination), and a new mode of association: genuine socialization in language and tradition (although consciousness is supposed to be the 'more original existential concept' vis-à-vis community).

If one asks how the state arises from here, Schilling gives the answer: 'The birth hour of the state can only lie where a general task is also consciously undertaken by a group of people and made the basis of their existence'. The state is 'the place where life alone is confronted with the task of determining

its actions on the basis of a more comprehensive consciousness of the whole'. (But this more comprehensive consciousness is not collective consciousness: consciousness and will are never pervasive, but always bound to the individual as 'mine').

The state or political community (political existence is 'simply human' existence) has its essence in human unity of will: this is 'sovereign', i.e. decisive over the whole sphere of life, and 'open' with regard to purposes. Individuals are bound 'in consciousness of their indissoluble community' not to individual temporal aims, but to any possible aim. Like Koellreutter, Schilling also comes close here to natural law thinking: the state must be 'treated in analogy to an existential contract' as the superior existential unity of will, whereby an 'existential' contract should be one (like the marriage contract) containing the obligation not to specific individual services, but to a 'common goal setting in every situation in life'.

The elaboration of these thoughts up to the concept of the constitutional state, constitution and form of government need not be pursued here. Only one point is important, because it is decisive for the historicity of the state: the possibility of a 'decay' of political consciousness, grounded in decay potential of life itself. If life, which 'consists only in establishing, never in a concrete established task', persists in an already realized condition and leaves the 'position of the newly arriving future unoccupied', it outlives itself, finds no more future and 'decays'. Against this decay potential of life the state is a protective measure, originally meant to stop the 'natural' decay of life. *But it can itself decay by ceasing to realize its 'formative power' in the 'acknowledging consciousness and free will of individuals', by degenerating into police state or dictatorship.*

The individual then withdraws from his political ties. In place of the political form of life steps the 'form of life of enjoyment', the unpolitical existence. The individual and his self-interest become the 'ultimate unconditional value'. To this 'reversal of the structure of life' Schilling also counts the isolation of the individual in religion, especially in Christianity. 'It is always concerned (Christianity) with the salvation or ruin of the individual soul between birth and death'. From this follows the statelessness of the medieval empire as well as the statelessness of the Roman empire in the post-Scipionic era. 'Middle Ages' acquires the 'full meaning of a time lying between other times in which the state has been the actual form of human existence'.

If one accepts this conclusion, the concept of the political is narrowed down in a no longer tenable way. It becomes impossible to understand the whole man in his historicity politically. The same results from the use of a concept that makes the difference between 'doctrine of life' and political philosophy very clear: the pre-political. Since one can only speak of state when 'the subordination of the will of a group under the commanding will has already occurred' (constitution), both the process of 'subjugation' and the first constitutive power are 'pre-political'. This means a narrowing down of the

political to the currently stately which reverses Carl Schmitt's significant step from state to the category of the political and leaves the whole field of 'social doctrine' free.

The difficulty here is apparently only to be solved by a doctrine of man which is not simply doctrine of life, but political anthropology. 'That the task is increasingly falling to anthropological research to administer and continue the philosophical heritage is already suggested by developments since Schopenhauer' (August Vetter). In fact, the 'undeniably existing change in philosophical cognition' is to be understood as a change of accent: the 'commemorative metaphysics' of antiquity and the 'expectant metaphysics' of modern times are replaced, as Vetter puts it (*The Philosophical Foundations of the Human Image* 1942), by the 'knowledge of man attitude' of the present, even if one sees in it anything but a restoration of 'psychology'. The horizon of 'philosophical anthropology' remains a theological one ('care' as meaning of existence remains the subject of 'pastoral care') until the step from man in general to the concrete political community has been taken.

It must be left to the subsequent presentation to demonstrate the attempts themselves that point towards a political anthropology. Here only the point of transition is to be indicated, the reversal from the traditional spiritualist-dualist anthropology to the political one, because in it not only an already several times emphasized turn in contemporary thinking emerges, but also a very specific problematic of matter in political philosophy: the problem of the structure of action in the political field. We tie on to a work that has been described as a 'work of weight' (Nicolai Hartmann) and whose 'masterly guidance' has been praised: Arnold Gehlen's 'Man, His Nature and His Place in the World'.

This is still not political but defective theological thinking that voices itself here. Four years later, when Gehlen had obtained a chair in Königsberg, Feuerbach's step from theology to anthropology had been re-enacted, albeit not so thoroughly that Gehlen had completely stripped 'spirit', about whose 'reality' he had already inquired earlier (*Real and Unreal Spirit* 1931), of its extra-biological, metaphysical functions. He just no longer speaks of it. But the question What is man? still finds here the answer: a 'world-open' being that creates a 'culture' for itself as a 'second nature', a being of 'self-disclosure' that objectifies the environment by 'putting' things there, Scheler's answer, then, who distinguished man and animal not gradually but in principle.

Yet it would be wrong to apply a systematic standard to Gehlen's anthropology, which does not want to be a system of philosophy or even part of one. The significance of the work lies in the close cooperation with the special sciences, in the meaningful, ingenious grouping of our knowledge about man, not least in the working up of the results and viewpoints of Anglo-American pragmatism, instrumentalism, behaviorism, a task already undertaken before him by Eduard Baumgarten (*Pragmatism* 1938, Kant's

Doctrine of the Value of the Person 1941). That Gehlen ties in with Herder, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche in the process is more important than his connections with Dilthey and Scheler (He dealt especially with Schopenhauer's 'results' in anthropology as well as philosophy of religion in 1938).

What the numerous drafts of a philosophical anthropology from Eucken to Häberlin lack is not so much the material from individual sciences as the right, immediately centrality-leading approach that avoids all speculative detours and roundabout ways. That is different with Gehlen. He is not concerned with interpreting the essence of man, compiling it from real or supposed basic properties, but with beginning with a precise question: the question of the structure of human action. Not the alternative spirit or animal is important. Rather, anthropology has 'to adhere to a structural special law which is the same in all human peculiarities and which must be understood on the basis of the blueprint of a being that acts'. *One 'acts'. He acts differently than the animal. The animal produces accomplishments that look like actions but are not actions. It is just 'instinctive actions'.*

Does man act consciously? Is consciousness the specific difference between man and animal? Gehlen does not ask that way; he turns the conventional question around: Not action is to be understood from consciousness, but consciousness from action. To give it away at once: The function of consciousness is not a positive but a negative one. Consciousness is 'inhibition' of drives by counter-drives. Consciousness is a 'relief system.' Of course it is also a 'guidance system.' But as such it proves itself only from the structure of action, not before itself, before introspection, self-knowledge.

The action differs from instinctive action by the characteristic of 'non-establishment', by an 'unfinishedness' that belongs in the biological blueprint of man. Man on the one hand is non-adapted, a deficient being, weaponless, instinctless, unspecialized; on the other hand he is 'flooded with stimuli', has a surplus of 'drives' to process, is placed in a 'surprise field' that forces him to caution and providence (planning). So in order not to perish he must distance himself from his drives. Needs must be inhibited, bracketed, deferred: A gap (hiatus) between drive and action opens up, which is so to speak the place and origin of the 'soul' as 'inner outside world', as a world of images, epitome of what has not yet become action. The fact that biologically this distancing is a source of danger shows itself in the possibility of autoeroticism (in the widest sense): discharging energies inward instead of outward, thus destroying them.

The inhibition of needs is one thing, their 'forming' is another. Man is a being that must keep and lead himself in discipline, and as such, not according to his substance, a being with a will.

He creates for himself 'a supporting and invisible skeleton of spiritual life, which keeps the commitment to action in shape and in turn is kept in shape by it', character as 'a system of meaningful drives, enduring interests, needs,

resulting needs, etc. distributed throughout the world'.

It is not necessary in our context to further elaborate on this.

Gehlen's anthropology, rich in detailed discussions (on perceptual structure, the connection between perception and movement, the roots of language, imagination, silent thinking, fantasy and 'primordial fantasy,' etc.) as well as in perspectives on other (epistemological, developmental historical, ethical) questions, wants to be an 'elementary' anthropology. As such, it is essentially a structural theory of action. But action is not a free-floating construct. The community belongs to the action, in which the 'active mastery of life' takes place and can only take place. The 'leadership system' belongs to the shaping of action, as the form in which the community itself 'establishes' itself, holds itself in existence. To address this, Gehlen thinks, would 'far exceed the structure of an elementary anthropology'.

However, this reservation is inadmissible. Either the community belongs to the prerequisites of the act of will and then it also belongs to the 'elements' of elementary anthropology. Or it only results from the actions in their relationship and intertwining: then elementary anthropology is individualistic and essentially unpolitical. In addition, the difference between community as a field of action and community ideology as a system of action or leadership is not thematized. The 'three achievements' of the 'leadership systems,' outlined at the end of the work: 'concluding world orientation,' 'shaping of action,' 'overcoming the limits of human powerlessness,' are residues of Dilthey's objective mind and his school; Dilthey's structural psychology, too, proceeded from the 'achievements' of the soul. Gehlen is quite right not to incorporate religion and worldview into elementary anthropology in this sense.

But with the field of action it is different. It belongs to the structure of action and is not a complex of any elements. It is (as a field of power) the factor that qualifies actions as political. To disregard it means to remain in the vestibule of political anthropology. What is characteristic here is not only Gehlen's struggle against the traditional body-soul-spirit trinity, but also his tendency towards sociological analysis (Wilfredo Pareto and his 'new science' 1941) that is indicative of his effort to emphasize the community's share in the structure of action. Indeed, in a lecture on Schelling's interpretation of Descartes (Descartes in Schelling's Judgment 1937), he provides the cue for overcoming personalism of consciousness: the word of the 'open person' as the 'idea of a person of objectively indeterminate, not comprehensible in self-consciousness boundary', which is better suited than any other to mark the transition from the individual acting subject to the collective subject of the community. Nevertheless, it is no coincidence that the outline of his elementary anthropology as a contribution to 'pre-political' ontology could be misunderstood.

Every further step would lead us into political anthropology and anticipate the fundamental problems of the thinkers to be dealt with immediately. Only one point still needs to be pointed out, because it does not come up again later: the

relationship of a structural theory of action to political realism, as it is increasingly embodied for us today in Clausewitz's classic theory of war or in its philosophical prerequisites, which still have to be gradually elaborated. At the same time, the basis of Carl Schmitt's investigations into the concept of the political is reached again. It is the merit of W. M. Schering, in several works (*The Systematics in Clausewitz's Philosophy of War* 1935, *Clausewitz's Doctrine of End and Means* 1936, *Philosophy of Defense* 1939, *Mind and Deed, Selection from Clausewitz's Works* 1941), to have recognized Clausewitz not only as a 'realistic supplement to the exclusively considered contemporary idealistic line from Fichte, Schelling and Hegel' and as a forerunner of Nietzsche, but also to have brought to light the 'doctrine of acting man' underlying the doctrine of war (1832).

In doing so, Clausewitz's thoughts combine for him with a philosophy of action of his own, which starts from the juxtaposition of acting and observing man (*Watching or Acting?* 1937) and culminates in the crucial insight that action is a source of knowledge. 'The actor is concentrated on what he wants to do'; he is pure thinking will. The observer deals with processes, sequences, events, to which he 'imputes his own trains of thought'. The demand to take the 'standpoint of the actor' corresponds to the other to fundamentally distinguish action and event. The difference is an ontic one, that being or that positing of actual existence which is first realized as a 'vital-ethical unity' (unity of life and striving in the community) through action.

The dynamically conceived worldview thus substitutes for the means-end context the structure of action of decision and achievement. The decision relieves action of the given reality; the achievement realizes action in a reality that is no longer 'the same' as the reality in which the decision arose. The 'bond of actions' differs from the 'chain of events'; whereby achievement is not merely the realization of the decision, but fusion of action and event. In any case, Schering defends himself against dividing reality into a real-causal and an unreal-purposive one. He compares the relationship between will and action to inhaling and exhaling: 'In inhaling, the will absorbs reality into itself, it fills itself with the atmosphere of living reality, so to speak, then the reversal takes place, and the will breathes itself out into the actions. The reversal is the moment when the will responds to stimulus and danger'.

That the political factor in action, community, and field of action, stands out more strongly in Schering than in Gehlen, already follows from the approach. For war (and defense) is community action, and the philosophy of war (and defense) is community philosophy. Community is not to be explained relationally, from relationships between individuals, but to be a bipolar, 'organic' and 'organizational' unity. He describes the principle of community action: that the community contracts as it were in the face of a threat in order to give birth to itself anew *in actu*, as the 'law of self-finding force'.

In the impossibility of any individualistic solution to the problem of action, we can in fact see the impetus for political philosophy: the problem of action,

posed by philosophical anthropology, must be solved by political philosophy. To be sure, it only forms the initial problem: the path leads from here to the more comprehensive and deeper problem of the existence of the people. The thinkers whom we select and deal within the following (of course the circle of philosophers belonging here is much larger, especially if one wanted to particularly emphasize the relations to racial biology and psychology, whereby researchers like Kolbenheyer and Claus, Grunsky and H.F.K. Günther would have to be addressed), are very different in conceptual formation and assumptions. But it is no coincidence that the existence of the people forms the central theme for all. To understand the concept of the people as a political concept and the political as a form of existence of the people, both are important at this point in the historical and conceptual movement today. What in National Socialist ideology has a symbolic meaning as blood precisely for the community bond already predetermined by the racial soul, refers in philosophical theory to the concept of the limited community on the one hand, to that of existence in the polis on the other. The danger of depoliticizing the concept of the people, a danger not because it could not also still be meaningfully treated in objective form, but because any such treatment (in folk doctrine, folklore, 'folk sociology,' etc.), if held to be sufficient, blocks access to the political from the people, is just as great here as the other danger of missing the existential dynamics of the political in and with the concept of community. *This is all the more necessary to indicate, as the impression should not be given that the thinkers to be dealt with have conclusively and definitively formulated what we, especially today as a task for the future, may rightly call 'National Socialist philosophy' in the deepest sense.*

Alfred Rosenberg.

The spiritual form of National Socialism, shaped by the Führer, has undoubtedly found its most concise expression in the work of Alfred Rosenberg; here it has also received the presentation that comes closest to actual philosophical, i.e. conceptual-systematic presentation.



Figure 1a. Alfred Rosenberg and Reich Commissar Erich Koch visit St. Sophia Cathedral. Kyiv, Ukraine, April 1942.



Figure 1b. Alfred Rosenberg in Chotitza, near Zaporizhia, Ukraine.

We therefore start from Alfred Rosenberg's 'Myth of the Twentieth Century' (1930). This book is a book of struggle. It wants to revolutionize, overthrow false tables of values; it wants to shake up and point the way forward. It is a highly personal book, brave and passionate. It is not a text about National Socialism, Rosenberg expressly emphasizes that he does not set out program points of the movement but wants to make a personal confession, but a vivid expression of the National Socialist movement itself. It has nothing to do with 'literature'. Nor with academic philosophy.

But if we understand National Socialist philosophy to mean the attempt to make visible the ultimate ideological prerequisites and motivations, the intellectual and intellectual-historical roots on which the 'essential structure of National Socialism' is based, then this work arose from drafts of 1917; Rosenberg (born 1893 in Reval) was still a student at the Technical University in Moscow at that time. In 1922 its content is thematized as 'Philosophy of Germanic Art', in 1925 it is given the title 'Race and Honor'. In 1928 it receives the final form as 'Myth of the 20th Century, an evaluation of the spiritual-intellectual struggles of our time'. About this, as about the spiritual physiognomy of the man, an essay from the anniversary year 1943 by Alfred Baeumler: 'Alfred Rosenberg and the Myth of the 20th Century', informs us, already in 1942 the 'Myth' had reached a circulation of one million. This first presentation of Rosenberg's philosophy, created from a related intellectual attitude, should be referred to all the more as it contains crucial insights and formulations that are indispensable for the study of the work (such as the definition that the myth of blood itself has as its subject the 'primal ground of all mythological imagery', not a new mythology or religion).

'The Myth' does not stand without tradition and reference in the philosophy

of the present, but rather has a well-characterized 'location': if it is not that of a school, it is that on which the greatest German thinkers stand. *In Rosenberg first it will become clear to us how much National Socialist philosophy is particularly obliged and committed to Kant.* And if Rosenberg owes nothing worth mentioning to any contemporary systematist, he has nevertheless not arrived at philosophy without guidance: it is the philosophical work of H. St. Chamberlain, which is to be continued and completed in the 'Myth'.

A political attitude, active, purposeful, disciplined, and ready to decide, necessarily contrasts with that philosophical contemplation which accepts ultimate contexts of meaning as they illuminate for it, and which refrains from any willful access. That the two attitudes do not have to exclude each other, indeed that they can and must complement each other, is most clearly evident in Rosenberg's 'Myth'. And also the nature of the man becomes clearest from the combination of these two 'attitudes': 'But the greatest and most gladdening thing amidst today's chaos is a mythical, delicately powerful awakening, is the fact that we have again begun to dream our own primal dreams'. To experience a myth, to create a human type, to build state and life out of it, this is the combination of philosophy and politics, pre-thought in Plato's Republic, as Rosenberg also seeks to realize.



Figure 2a. Kiev, Ukraine, 1942. Alfred Meyer, Erich Koch and Alfred Rosenberg.



Figure 2b. Alfred Rosenberg speaks to the French National Assembly, 1940.

From here, the basic idea of the work can be most easily clarified. We live in a soulless, desecrated world, ripe for decline, if we cannot succeed in gaining a foothold in life again. What has become brittle, and dead cannot help us to do so. With our intellect we cannot create a new faith, found a religion, not even build up a philosophy; for the intellect, which no longer recognizes any inner ties, is itself a symptom of decay. We also cannot wait to see if a new meaning enters our life, what is to emerge must emerge through ourselves and not be carried in from outside. We cannot wait because our plight is that of our people, and because every moment of idle expectation can bring about the complete collapse of this people. For it is not insignificant what worldview a people has and where it sees its values: 'A people as a people is lost, is as such actually dead, when reviewing its history and examining its will to the future it no longer finds any unity. No matter what forms the past may have taken: once a nation comes to genuinely and really deny the parables of its first awakening, it has thereby denied the very roots of its being and evolution and condemned itself to infertility.' If we stand at such a point of ideological failure, which is always also a political failure, no appeal to 'eternal' truths and 'absolute' cognitions will help us. For that is precisely the tragedy of 'mythless times', that these words have lost their meaning and become abstractions. Completely soberly and without any illusion we must ask ourselves whether there is still something that empowers us to act: we are looking for a fact, an ultimate given, something real that can become a parable for us. Rosenberg calls this ultimate given race. *Whatever may be meant by it, in any case race is something real, visible, shaped, withdrawn from any construction.* However race may be conceptually defined, what is decisive is the radical reversal of perspective and turning away from an observation based on ideas, free meanings, cultures, and values 'in themselves' to a realistic observation of history as racial history. If we do not know what race is, we do know that it influences the life of groups, peoples, and cultures:

anthropology, biology, sociology are in complete agreement on this; only on the manner of influence, its scope and dependence on other social determinants there are differences of opinion. *But then one should first of all dare to write history with a view to the racial constituents and their relocations; then one should examine the fates of cultures under the influence of foreign blood infusion, no one will doubt the grandeur and necessity of this task.*

Racial history as a critique of 'world history', this is the theme of Rosenberg's book. Following Gobineau and Chamberlain, this theme is treated not 'objectively', in the pseudo-scientific sense and so to speak for fun, but subjectively with the seriousness of one interested in the fate of his own race. Four years before the appearance of the 'Myth', Rosenberg in particular presented the yield of Chamberlain's research on race in a monograph on this thinker (Houston Stewart Chamberlain as a herald and founder of a German future): there are three scientific deeds of Chamberlain's that every German, every European without exception should commemorate over and over again, the 'conception that with Germanicism a new creative man of a definite race took the destiny of the world into his own hand, the constructive idea that an epoch inserts itself between ancient Hellas and ancient Rome and matures a sediment of humanity that we now generally call the chaos of peoples, and the presentation of the rise of the Jew together with a description of his appearance in Western history'. By deepening Chamberlain's historical picture, Rosenberg at the same time contrasts it most sharply with modern cultural philosophy: racial history as a critique of the 'objective mind', that is one consequence. Racial history as a critique of the morphological view of history, that is the other.

Spengler had also fought idealism in cultural philosophy. But what he substituted for it, the morphological view of history, suffered from the same error of a merely culturally immanent observation. Since the word 'development', Rosenberg thus criticizes this view of history, 'had in time nevertheless become suspect, new interpreters of history invented the so-called theory of cultural circles. A new term which is just as devoid of content ..., because the creators of cultural circles were spoken of just as little as they were in the works of the popes of evolution of the 19th century. Such an Indian, Persian, Chinese or Roman cultural circle one fine day occupied an area and, thanks to this magical contact, caused a complete change in the same human beings who previously, untouched by it, practiced certain customs'. This precisely hits the point which, as we saw earlier, forced Spengler himself to further develop his theory of culture. But what did this further development look like? It proceeded along the lines of an extreme individualism and led again to a history 'of' man, a bloodless abstraction that Spengler had previously rejected with utter determination.

Both contradict that 'organic' concept of truth which Rosenberg seems to share with Spengler. We will soon ascertain what this community means and

what it does not mean. Rosenberg by no means refuses to grant immanent cultural observation the right due to it. 'These teachers of the shapes of history', it says, continuing the Spengler criticism, 'quite rightly represent causality and fate as two non-coinciding ideas. They furthermore renounce, likewise, agreeing with the Germanic nature, openly and plainly the Semitic fatalism which recognizes all events as unalterable. But they now locate the idea of fate in the so-called cultural circles which can certainly be historically verified without, however, and here the dangerous error arises, examining the racial-organic origin of these cultural circles and their demise'. And that is what matters: to advance from the immanent cultural laws to the cultural carrier, who does not live by the grace of a 'cultural soul' and is also no vagabonding beast, but in his soulness unseals the culture-creative powers of blood and race. From the cultural soul to the racial soul, that is the upshot of Rosenberg's critique.

And that leads us to the concept of race. *Race is something real, irreducible; but it is not a mere aggregate of somatic 'characteristics'*. As the concrete form of man it belongs to the phenomenal manifestations; '*race*' includes '*soul*', and *soul* includes *race*. 'Soul', formulates Rosenberg, 'means race seen from within. And conversely, race is the outside of a soul'. Race is the formal principle of the soul: every soul has 'its own inner and outer architectonics, its characteristic phenomenal form and gesture of lifestyle, and only its own relation between the forces of will and reason', race is at the same time the material principle of culture, which, as Rosenberg acknowledges, has its own form; for what is given form in culture, what carries and sustains the edifice of culture, is racial substance. Culture is 'the consciousness-form of the vegetative-vital of a race'. If this substance is weakened or poisoned by miscegenation, the downfall of culture is inevitable. We asked whether in times of cultural decline there is still something that empowers action, and we arrived at an ultimate given, a 'final, unreachable phenomenon behind which we are no longer permitted to search and inquire': race. It is now understandable in what way the development of racial consciousness is able to break through the circle of the cycle of cultures: theoretically speaking, 'racial consciousness' is not a function of culture, not cultural consciousness, but in an analogous way a prerequisite of possible cultural consciousness, just as race itself is a prerequisite of possible culture. Times with an unchallenged racial substance need no racial consciousness, because for them the values of the race are objectified in the culture itself. Where racial consciousness needs to be awakened, there the unity of culture has already become problematic and cultural consciousness has been lost. There indeed, reflection on the racial soul is the last path still open.

But what kind of reflection is it? It is a conscious correction, orientation, and breeding, the bringing out not of a new faith, but of that motive on which the innate faith ignites itself anew, 'to give to the will, erratically flickering today, a motive corresponding to its primal ground', that is the cultural-political task

Rosenberg sets himself. Reason and will are to be brought back into accordance 'with the direction of the psychic-racial current of Germanicism', and, as Rosenberg adds, 'if possible with the current of that Nordic tradition which has come down to us from Hellas and Rome still unadulterated'. *So by 'myth' is to be understood a motivation of our will intelligible to our nature, representable in imagery, but no longer conceptually penetrable.* 'The values of character, the lines of spiritual life, the colors of the symbols run alongside each other, intertwine, and yet yield one human being. But only then in full-blooded abundance when they themselves are consequences, births from a center lying beyond what can be empirically researched'. This incomprehensible summation of all the directions of the I, the people, indeed any community, constitutes its 'myth'.

Now by what is our will 'addressed' and brought to self-unfolding? Is there a primal motive intelligible only to the Nordic human being? Rosenberg calls it honor and shows that German history in the end is nothing but the struggle for the preservation of this value. Honor is a value. But not one, among others. There is no universally valid hierarchy of values into which we would have to classify the value of honor. There is 'no equal validity side by side of different, necessarily mutually exclusive, supreme values'. Honor as the supreme value is not a value 'in itself,' but an index of a life system experienceable only by the Nordic human being. What is racially and mentally related can be integrated, the alien must be separated out, not because it is 'false' or 'bad' in itself, but because it is foreign to the species and destroys the inner structure of our being. It is the tragedy of German destiny that alien life systems were able to gain a foothold on German soil because the German also remained loyal where hostile powers forced their way into his existence, because he was magnanimous and generous enough to 'always assume the same code of honor'. This applies especially to Christianity with love as the supreme value, love in the sense of humility, mercy, submissiveness, and asceticism. Rosenberg speaks here of the 'Roman' system and shows that it represents a fusion of Syro-Etruscan magical beings with Jewish elements (creation from nothing). This Roman system has reshaped the Germanic divine figures, falsified Germanic mores, and most severely endangered the organic development of a Germanic-Nordic culture: all the great deeds of this culture have arisen despite Christianity and have been wrested from the Church.

In this critique of Christianity running along Nietzsche's lines, however, one must not overlook that for Rosenberg there is also an indigenous Germanic Christianity. Just as the figure of Jesus basically has nothing to do with the Roman system, so too the value of love embodied by Jesus finds a place in Germanic religiosity. Only here it has a different character than in the Christianity of the Church. In German mysticism, especially in Master Eckhart, world-transcending love becomes the power to become one with God and thus acquires a heroic character. In general, German mysticism is the

‘finest ramification’ of the German nature; honor, personality, freedom, nobility, the German fundamental values, experience in Eckhart their ultimate metaphysical foundation: they are not external qualities, ‘but timeless and spaceless essences forming that ‘fortress’ from which genuine will and genuine reason undertake their sorties into ‘the world’. Either to conquer it, or to use it as an expedient for the realization of souls’.

From the presentation of German mysticism it becomes clearest what Rosenberg's own philosophy aims at: an irrationalism of ‘life’ which combines faith in the power of blood with the view of reality as realization of God in and through us. The life of a race, of a people, ‘is no philosophy logically developing itself, also no process unwinding itself according to laws of nature, but the formation of a mystical synthesis ...’. In order not to misunderstand the meaning of this statement, two of Rosenberg's presuppositions must be specially considered: his criticism and his concept of polarity.

Rosenberg takes over Kant's criticism initially in the theoretical respect: the purpose of the critique of reason is to bring to consciousness for us the formal prerequisites of any possible experience; *the world, given as a causal unrelated juxtaposition of images in space and sensations in time, is endowed by the intellect with a causal connection, by reason with a unity of the manifold by positing guiding ideas. This is the ‘formal basis of all life’*. About the ‘inner nature and manner of the use of the mental and rational faculties’, however, nothing is thereby settled. Rosenberg also follows Kant in calling ‘any philosophy going beyond a formal critique of reason’ confession, no longer cognition. And he follows Kant even more so in the practical respect: freedom as self-obligation, autonomous personality, moral autonomy are basic components of the Germanic concept of honor. ‘Everyone has made the law for himself. That he created this law is the freedom of his personality. This insight agrees exactly with the teaching of Master Eckhart’.

But also the concept of polarity dominating the philosophical sections of the ‘Myth’ is developed from Kant. ‘The fundamental fact of the Nordic-European mind is the consciously or unconsciously undertaken separation of two worlds, the world of freedom and the world of nature. In Immanuel Kant this primal phenomenon of the method of thinking of our life attains the clearest consciousness and must nevermore vanish from our eyes’. But as a primal phenomenon it is an ultimately metaphysical contrast: ‘I’ and ‘universe’ stand ‘as two final polar conditionalities opposite each other, and the center of gravity which a soul places on the one or the other (with subconscious recognition of its own opposite) helps determine the nature, color and rhythm of worldview and life’. And encompassed by this primal contrast polarities confront us everywhere in nature and spirit: good and evil, true and false, divine and satanic, ‘out of the ever-existent contrariety of yes and no, all life, all creative arises’. Every abstract monism founders on the ‘twofold nature of all being’. We can see spirit only in the mirror of body,

body only in the mirror of spirit.

This is an attempt to connect the two peaks of German worldview, Kant, and Goethe. If through the problem of polarity Rosenberg comes close to romantic metaphysics, it is all the more important to highlight his difference especially from the neo-romantic hermeneutic metaphysics of the present. Like Klages, Rosenberg also teaches the difference in essence between consciousness and bodily soul: here (in the soul) an uninterrupted stream of images, there (in consciousness) an intermittence of acts. As the 'consciousness-form of the vegetative-vital of the race', culture too is integrated into this contrast. According to Rosenberg, national cultures are the 'great 'spiritual pulses' amidst the eternally flooding life and death and becoming'. The fact too would belong here that Rosenberg finds in the races the 'rhythm of life' and sees in the rule of intellect the end of a culture. Already here, however, the difference begins: even if Klages attributes an anti-vital direction to reason and will, is this really a metaphysical cognition, is it not rather a confession that belongs to a system of life other than the Germanic one? The reversal from 'nature-sighted' existence to the broken, life-destroying one is only possible on Semitic-Oriental soil; it is alien to the Germanic nature. 'One can see right at the starting point how close and at the same time how alien our racially psychic world view and the new psycho-cosmogony stand in relation to each other'.

In fact, this psycho-cosmogony is opposed to a political-national worldview, and it is one of Rosenberg's most important achievements that on the basis of historical material he attempts to refute the chthonic world interpretation of Bachofen and the Romantics, i.e. the glorification of the feminine principle, the nocturnal side of nature, the dark powers of earth and underworld. Here, as in his attitude toward cultural morphology, as well as in his attitude toward metaphysical universalism, which supposedly considers itself superior to individualism but in truth is its 'twin brother', it is ultimately Rosenberg's criticism that protects him from metaphysical aberrations. To be sure, enough open questions remain for Rosenberg too. But no claim is made to provide a systematic philosophy. *Rosenberg's 'Myth' is the avowal of a new and yet old, powerful, responsible, in the deepest sense 'political' feeling of life, of a worldview that organically connects action, emotion and comprehension. In this sense Rosenberg himself speaks of an 'organic' philosophy.*

Ernst Krieck.

differences, its formalistic method, was fought by everyone. Agreement could be found in the negative. In the positive, disagreement remained.

At that time, the name Ernst Krieck became a concept for the young generation. Ernst Krieck was born in 1882 in Vögisheim (Baden Black Forest). He attended high school in Müllheim and teacher training college in Karlsruhe. In 1900 he entered the Baden elementary school service; in 1904 he was transferred to Mannheim. Since 1910 he began a literary activity, starting with his inaugural work on 'Personality and Culture', which from the outset pursued higher than purely specialized pedagogical aims. This was shown above all by a 1917 book on the 'German Idea of the State', a history of the concept of humanity with the demand for its re, and further development, a discussion with the philosophy of German idealism and a program of that great 'national self-education' in the German state which was to become and remain the basic theme of all of Krieck's writings.

Soon afterwards Krieck became acquainted with Möller van den Bruck. While the 'German Idea of the State' already contains the expression 'Third Reich', albeit still in a purely intellectual-historical sense, as designation of the realm of ideas of the German movement, of German national consciousness, which was destined to replace the other two 'realms': the realm of the antique idea of humanity and that of Christianity, after the collapse of 1918 this cultural-philosophical observation was activated. In 1920 Krieck's 'Revolution of Science' appeared; science not as an instrument of politics but as a function of the will to community, whose ideal task it is to give this will an ought, a norm, and a goal.

In the following year (1921) Krieck began, in the programmatic writing 'Education and Development', building his theory of education which he elaborated in a number of systematic works. The most important of these is 'Philosophy of Education' (1922), for which he received an honorary doctorate from Heidelberg University. He declined a call to the Technical University Dresden (1924); in 1928 he accepted a call to the newly founded Pedagogical Academy Frankfurt am Main. He complied, but in 1931 was subjected to disciplinary proceedings for political reasons and transferred as punishment (to Dortmund).

In the meantime, in two books, 'Formation of Man' (1925) and 'Educational Systems of the Cultural Peoples' (1927), the former dedicated to the Heidelberg Faculty of Philosophy, he further developed the phenomenological approach of the 'Philosophy of Education' into a theory of types supported by group sciences. A small 1930 work, 'The Natural Right of Corporations to Education and schooling' (next to the study on Education and Development most informative for the development of his thought) leads a bit further into sociology. At that time Krieck came closest to Spann's universalism. The people, as the primal and perfect form of community, is structured into associations and corporations which, unlike the people itself, are not self-sufficient but 'one-sided in themselves' and aimed in each case only at a

single function or a group of such individual functions: 'the right of the whole takes precedence over the right of the individual members, the right of the higher-order member over the right of the lower-order member'.

Krieck drew the consequence of founding education on metaphysics in his 'Philosophy of Education' of 1930. But since 1932 the real political moment has been increasingly emphasized: 'national political' education, and in the post-1933 writings idealism is increasingly replaced by realism. Krieck, Professor at Frankfurt University since 1933 and then at Heidelberg University, where he also held the rectorate, introduced his philosophical main work, the 'Ethnopolitical Anthropology' (3 vols., 1936, 1937, 1938) with the words: 'Already several times I have made an advance in the direction taken here: with the basic chapters of the 'Philosophy of Education' and 'Philosophy of Education'. Only with the upheaval have I succeeded in breaking through'. In any case, this turn is most evident in a work on 'Science, Worldview, University Reform' (1934) which stands in a similar relation to this main work as 'Education and Development' does to the 'Philosophy of Education' of 1922. Often the smaller writings of this agile and combative researcher contain stronger impulses than his larger attempts at systematic overall observation do. This also applies to numerous essays in his journal 'People in Becoming'. which he founded in 1932 in service of the movement.

At the inauguration of the House of German Education in Bayreuth in 1936, Krieck emphasized that the whole announcement of a revolution in science originated from German educational science, which in turn stood in closest connection with the National Socialist movement. 'Educational science was in the foreground before the renewal of philosophy, before the renewal of medicine, before the renewal of legal science was introduced by the National Socialist movement'. In any case, this applies to Krieck himself: his political philosophy has emerged from pedagogy. Krieck's theory of education must therefore be addressed first.

In the heyday of pedagogical 'reforms,' pedagogical theory also flourished. At that time, lacking any possibility of preventing the dangers of an anarchy of education, people made all the more effort with the 'concepts' of education and upbringing. After the fruitless dispute between 'social educators' and 'personality educators', a 'cultural pedagogy' had taken over the leadership, claiming Kant, Dilthey and Hegel as its foundation. *It was Krieck's merit, with his characteristic radicalism, to pose the essential question: can pedagogical insights be derived from others, or are they fundamental and irreducible in themselves? Is there an eidos of education? Does pedagogy, like any other science, have a 'fundamental idea', and is it possible, on the basis of this idea, to construct a pure (autonomous) science of education?*

What is new in Krieck's approach becomes clear when one realizes that the question here is no longer about any kind of educational standards. For Krieck, a normative science is not a science at all. 'Our principles are a

supplement to our existences', with this word from Goethe he wants to prove that there is science only ever of being, not of ought. So what is asked about is the 'being' of education. What is to be understood by this? An unconscious life function, Kriek replies, which is effective in any community of human beings, a form of being for one another that precedes any educational influence. *'Pedagogy made the mistake of closely tying educator and pupil to empirical persons and conceiving the educational process as the reflected, i.e. technical purposive activity of the educator on the pupil'. This mistake must be avoided in order to get at the original 'being' of education.*

But is not such a disregard for all conscious educational activity necessarily an abstraction? Within the framework of a 'phenomenological theory of education,' as Kriek sought to develop in 1922, such a procedure does not have a generalizing character, but is precisely what phenomenologists call ideation: against the background of actual processes and phenomena, their 'idea' is brought to intuition. Admittedly, Kriek does not immediately attain this vision of essence, but first takes the path of abstraction. The usual contrast between education and development, it says in the work on 'Education and Development' (1921), is false: there is no development without education; because 'any spiritual influence belongs to education, no matter whence and for what purpose it may originate, which conditions and influences spiritual development'. Only in instruction is there the pupil/educator schema; everywhere else, the educational function is distributed among a multitude of those educated, who in turn are educators, and of educators, who in turn are educated. All educate all, that is the consequence of this observation. And from this it follows that in the end the community, the people as a whole, educates itself in its members: 'in the self-education of a people ... the specific structure of the consciousness of people and community takes care of the educational function'. But, and here the weakness of this abstraction is revealed, since a collective consciousness comparable to individual self-consciousness cannot be demonstrated, it must be demanded: *'The education of a people presupposes that the spirit, consciousness and will of the people truly exist, and are not mere mythologies, metaphors and abstractions'.*

It depends on the meaning of this 'true existence': what Kriek really demonstrates is the holistic character of education as an original function of communal life, its non-derivability from a sum of individual educational processes. And with that the transition from generalization to ideation is completed. To be sure, the approach to a phenomenology of education is still not developed here in the manner of the phenomenological school itself, Kriek's whole mental make-up stands too far from this kind of analytics for that; it was much closer to him to elaborate the historical forms of education and educational systems in a typifying consideration.

All the same, the phenomenology contained in the 'Philosophy of Education' is more than just a program: Kriek endeavors to remove three 'layers' of educational events, and this demonstration of the 'dimensionality' of

education follows from the essence of the idea as such. An idea is 'living', i.e. it is efficacious: what enters the sphere of its formation is adapted, melted down, 'educated'; 'every spiritual effect shapes human nature according to the law of its origin within its domain'. This shaping is either from unconscious effects (1st dimension) or from 'spiritual effects which, while stemming from conscious purposive activity, do not yet arise from deliberate educational activity' (2nd dimension), or from fully conscious educational intention and systematic educational activity (3rd dimension). From this an exact foundation of the specific educational process (pedagogical planning) results, which is necessarily a mere surface phenomenon: it is based on the 'system of spiritual basic functions and ideas,' on the 'system of types of community and life forms', on historical life itself in the multiplicity of its 'individual forms'. In his 'Philosophy of Education' (1930), without fundamentally abandoning the claim to an intuition of essence but also without further pursuing essential analysis, Krieck emphasized even more strongly the universalism of his pedagogical system: 'Education originally proceeds from and works into the whole, and the educational process taking place between individual human beings and groups is always only a partial phenomenon of the educational function and educational events of the whole'. Functional education becomes rational education by splitting itself: such a 'splitting of the original educational unity' is, for example, the division into an education of body and soul (the gymnastic-musical educational system of the Greeks). On the 'rational level' there occurs a separation of the methods of vocational training, moral discipline, and education in the narrower sense. But what is always involved here is a spin-off, not a disintegration: the original education continues to be effective 'between and beneath education that has become a rational task as the carrying function; it is not eliminated but supplemented, heightened and perfected in technical education'.

Although Krieck here, as always, sees in the ethnic communal organism precisely that articulating whole which 'unites the natural and spiritual sides of life within itself, and joins and binds all individual human beings together as members of a super-personal unity', such a simplifying metaphysical concept of the whole could not 'bear the burden of the concept'. It remains to be shown how, under the influence of the increasingly distinct political situation of the time, Krieck is pressed toward a revision of his universalism. This 'revision', if one wants to speak of such a thing, is characterized by one word: people-becoming.

National Socialism is not simply an expression and result of historical 'development'. No organic thinking can ignore the fact that through the National Socialist revolution a disintegrated or at least decaying 'organism' is put back in order by a mass movement of the greatest extent. National Socialism, says Krieck, 'by means of its methodology of mass arousal wants to awaken their racial consciousness, direct them toward the great national goals and political tasks, and imprint a corresponding attitude on mankind'.

National Socialism, he concludes further, 'has to expand the elemental means and methods of the mass movement, applied on the basis of the instincts of its leaders, into a general discipline, a system of training which awakens racial values in the whole people ...'. 'National political' education, i.e. education in the spirit of National Socialism, will thus, at least for the present, be distinguished from any ethnic education in general by the fact that it considers the mass factor, which is not holistic: forming people out of mass, that is the task of such an education.

To form people out of mass means, for us Germans who have always been 'people', to become ripe as a political people. Indeed, from this point of departure Krieck also rejects any 'folk doctrine' or 'folk science' that wants to examine the people 'in itself': 'It should and must not happen that a separate science of the people emerges which then claims to be a basic science for the other sciences. Rather, only the sciences of language, religion, law, custom, politics, economy, art, etc. together and in interaction are to constitute ethno-political overall science'. Just as little, of course, can there be any question of a primacy 'of' the political as such: what matters is not power as such, but its meaning. And this meaning lies in the creation of new, plastic form 'that meets the needs of the people and the times'.

Thus a peculiarly new concept of political totality emerges, which is to outline the National Socialist idea of the people: '*The focal point of real time is the present; therefore the present is also the focal point of real history*'. Such real history is had only by 'the unities of human life', life not in the biological sense, which examines only one sector of life, namely organic life, but in the sense of the life of a people, to which belong not only the membered individual human beings, but 'all necessary spheres and functions of life in which the becoming and meaning of individual life is fulfilled'. The 'call of God' goes out to this people: the leader perceives it; in the leader the whole possesses and maintains its center; the leader passes on the call, kindles, guides, and leads the historical movement. 'Thus from blood and destiny history arises; thus power arises, the motor in history'.

Krieck designates his 'interpretation of the world and of life', which he sharply distinguishes from all academic philosophy and also clearly separates from neo-idealism and the idealist tradition, as racial-ethnic-political anthropology. The 'life' to be interpreted here is for him an ultimate: there is nothing before or above it from which it could be derived. A 'philosophy of life'? Krieck speaks of 'universal biology' and distinguishes the worldview (universal) concept of life from the biological-scientific one. Life in this sense is primordial givenness, primordial phenomenon, 'beginning, middle and end'. But does this make the meaning of life any clearer? Life is supposed to provide a foundation; yet it receives its meaning only from man, from the life of a people. The fact that the totality of the life of a people contains everything that is vital for the growth and maturation of the integrated individual, this is Krieck's fundamental proposition of an ethnic worldview.

This totality is determined by natural factors: race is the inner, soil the outer 'constant component' in the life of a people. But this is only the one, the biological life-pole. The other is the historical one. Only unities of human life have history because they know destiny, presence, fulfilled time. Because for them alone there exist decision and action. Thus, after such preliminaries, which do not cover the title 'Reality' which Krieck gave to his first volume, 'Action and Order', the ethnic-political anthropology, only now begins with the second part.

Action is doing and as such is rooted in the self-activity of all that lives. Action is human doing and has its prerequisite in membership, the community bond of the individual. Action is human doing in the particular form of regulating, not regulated doing (the latter is work). As such it is historical. 'The historical movement is the sequence of action itself together with its effects in the various spheres of life'. And this movement then has its dialectic in the fact that action as history-forming means a break with the found community law and posits new goals against an 'exhausted order'.

Thus action emerges as political: politics is community-forming purposive action, for which there are no instructions for use, no technology, no 'practical science'. Political action is so to speak the maximal concept of action; it refers primarily not to the state but to history, not to a sphere of life, an objective order, but to the people as a whole and the 'inner movement' of the body politic (After this holistic exposition of action Krieck then goes back to the membership types of action: professional action in the particularization of the 'primordial occupations' physician, judge, teacher).

The third volume of ethnopolitical anthropology, not coincidentally the most extensive, has 'cognition and science' as its subject. Krieck begins with a 'critique of the theory of knowledge', which by its dismissive treatment of Kant, to come to terms with Kant today means to distance oneself from him, can easily give a false picture of Krieck's real attitude toward Kant: in reality he takes over Kant's doctrine 'of the active, formative character of cognition' (and from here criticizes modern ontology which, alongside 'universal mechanistics' and the dualism of nature and spirit, is the third great obstacle on the way to 'living totality'), as he takes over Kant's doctrine of intuition 'in which reality is grasped and shaped, not merely suffered'. Indeed, he emphasizes that 'the epistemological basic attitude of Kant' retains its validity from the standpoint of living cognizing man. Also the center of Krieck's doctrine of consciousness, the concept of the 'center of consciousness' with its 'spontaneous power,' is nothing other than a deformalization of the Kantian concept of transcendental apperception.

This third volume is certainly the most thoroughly elaborated and impressive one. However, it is composed of components of unequal value: *doctrine of consciousness*, *doctrine of movement*, *doctrine of levels*. The doctrine of consciousness strives away from the isolated, abstract cognizing subject and seeks to incorporate the 'unconscious' within itself. The 'center of

consciousness' is intended to designate the point at which consciousness and corporeality merge, but beyond that gains religious-mystical significance: the center of consciousness is the center of life and as such holistic; it is the 'place in which God's call is heard, conscience where one's fellow man is perceived, spirit'. The center of consciousness is the mover and helmsman of cognition, the transformer of unconscious instinctual life into conscious action.

The doctrine of movement and the doctrine of levels are Aristotelianizing and proceed more along the lines of traditional philosophy than can initially be expected. They interlock insofar as it is precisely 'movement' which gives the levels of reality their distinct nature. *As the first 'level of reality' Krieck designates the scientific-physical, as the second the scientific-biological, as the third that of the immediate life or experiential reality.* Here movement is social and historical, on the second level of reality it is growth and development, on the first level of reality, in the realm of the 'isolated, abstract and highly typified' reality of physics, it is mechanical movement. It corresponds to Krieck's panbiologism that on the one hand he seeks to devalue the independence of physical objectness or to derive the physical world of things from the reality of life, and on the other hand to biologically define community as the third level of reality, as 'communal life'.

As far as his position on the formation of concepts in physics is concerned, he outlined it even more precisely in a book complementing anthropology about 'Nature and Natural Science' (1942). Nature as universal life, wholeness even in the inorganic, typology, rhythm, polarity, the formation of reality without external teleology, these are the fundamental concepts of German cognition of nature. They are obscured and made unrecognizable by the Galilean-Newtonian, 'nature-denying and nature-destroying' mechanistic physics. But after the 'end of Newtonism' and its consequences: theory of relativity, formalism, mathematization, ontologism, they will arise again and usher in a new epoch of German natural science (of course Krieck does not want to relinquish the 'technical' categories of physics, but he does not succeed in connecting or deriving them from his 'pure' cognition and explanation of nature).

In any case, this philosophy of movement, and with it ethno-political anthropology in general, runs out into a philosophy of interpretation or meaning: 'cognitive movement' runs between description and interpretation; but the meaning of cognition (and consciousness) itself is 'self-guidance and self-formation of life'. It is certainly no coincidence that here Krieck comes closest to Weinhandl's 'analysis of form'. After all, like the latter he appeals to Goethe and Goethe's method of 'archetypal science'.

Alfred Baeumler.

Alfred Baeumler is one of the leading political thinkers of the present as a philosopher of history, educator, and epistemologist. 'To teach politics', he said in his inaugural lecture in Berlin in 1933, *'does not mean to politicize or call for politicization from the lectern, but to draw a picture of man that*

corresponds to reality. I will replace the neo-humanist picture of man with the true picture of political man, I will redefine the relationship between theory and practice, I will describe the life-orders in which we really live, I will impart my insights, but I will not dabble in politics'. Seven years later, in a speech at the Hans Schemm House in Halle, Baeumler emphasized once again this anthropological approach of political philosophy: *'We must begin with ourselves as we are. Without concerning ourselves with what kind of 'being' that is, we begin with man, not with reason, not with the rational soul, not with a higher being called spirit, but just as little with nature, with the mere living creature, but with real man as we know him from our experience. In adhering to this approach lies the philosophical'*. This is Baeumler's realism, his anthropologism, his turning away from 'imageless' (abstract) idealism.

Baeumler was born in 1887 in Neustadt an der Tafelfichte (Sudeten German). He studied in Munich and received his doctorate there in 1914 with a thesis on 'The Problem of Universal Validity in Kant's Aesthetics'. After participating in the World War, he qualified as a university lecturer in 1924 in Dresden on the basis of a work on Kant's Critique of Judgment (1923), which was to be continued in a study on the 'Problem of Irrationality in Critical Philosophy'. At the Dresden University of Technology he became associate professor in 1928, full professor of philosophy in 1929. The revolution brought him to Berlin in 1933: a chair of political pedagogy had been established for him, in conjunction with a political-pedagogical institute, of which he became director. He now had to cope with a multitude of tasks: scholarly, organizational, and party-political. Since 1936 he has published the journal 'Worldview and School'. Another pedagogical journal, 'International Journal of Education', has appeared under his editorship since 1935.

Baeumler's thinking has been and continues to be decisively determined by Kant. Baeumler himself confesses that he owes his philosophical education to the third critique, the 'book of fate' (as opposed to the Critique of Pure Reason as the 'basic book') of criticism. Already then it is a 'picture' of man that he wants to draw: the classical character. The classical, understood as lifestyle and humanity, was embodied by Goethe, and thought by Kant. 'The Critique of Judgment and Goethe, that is the thought and its existential expression'. It is clear that this approach, even if in terms of content it initially has to do with the history and background of the Critique of Judgment, indeed of criticism as a whole, nevertheless necessitated a new interpretation: an interpretation from the standpoint of the concepts of totality and individuality in Kant. 'If the combination of a critique of taste with a theory of knowledge of biology ... in a book is to be more than an old man's whim ..., the real meaning of the last critique must be sought neither in aesthetics nor in the doctrine of the organic, but in that higher concept which unites the objects of aesthetic and teleological judgment under itself. This supreme concept is individuality'. Thus, even if in terms of subject matter Baeumler's exposition initially has to do with the history and background of the Critique of

Judgment, it nevertheless leads into the systematic.



Figure 4a. Prof. Dr. Alfred Baeumler.



Figure 4b. Immanuel Kant.

But is not this ‘classical character’ precisely that picture of man which Baeumler afterwards wants to dethrone and replace with the ‘true picture of political man’? Has he himself accomplished the turn which he describes, the turn from a past apolitical order of life to the present? Two years after assuming the Berlin office, Baeumler gave an analysis, in a speech on the 100th anniversary of Wilhelm von Humboldt's death, of the neo-humanist picture of man, culminating in the statement that this ‘unpolitical’ picture too is a ‘political’ one, political, that is, for the time in which it arose. No longer for our time, whose social structure is a different one. Humboldt's concept of ‘Bildung’, by combining the concept of power (Leibniz) and that of individuality (Kant), is the document of the ‘classical’ character. It fulfilled a political mission: in the reform period, the nobility could no longer provide the political leadership; the bourgeois stratum powerfully aspired upward. ‘In this situation of mobilization of all forces for the formation of a new political being, everything depended on finding a basis on which those who felt within themselves the vocation for a higher career beyond economic life could be united and educated’. Had Humboldt established, in place of the neo-humanist

‘university,’ a scientific polytechnic, ‘then precisely the most important political effect could not have occurred’.

Here one characteristic feature of Baeumler's nature is immediately apparent: his ability to think in concrete historical terms. The way in which he makes the Kantian age, the philosophy of the 19th century, his own in his personal development is no less characteristic. Already in the introduction to his Kant book he concludes with a reference to Hegel (‘the presentation of the Critique of Judgment will directly lead to Hegel's philosophy in terms of the content of the concepts’), he first deals with Hegel, again from aesthetic points of view; then with Kierkegaard, then with Bachofen, then with Nietzsche. These are not mere external stages of his research; they are not just the fruitful encounters that ignite his philosophizing; at the same time, and this is the characteristic, it is the stream of history that fertilizes contemporary thinking. With a sure instinct, Baeumler closes himself off to everything that does not carry this ‘pointer to the present’; and if the principle of history for him is not consciousness or spirit, but will or force, this is not yet any systematic hypothesis, e.g. in the sense of that ‘irrationalism’ which he set out to describe, but simple experience of historical effectiveness. But there is even more that characterizes this line of development: that actual turn from idealism to realism, which represents Baeumler's most important systematic decision and determines his thinking. The introduction he wrote for a selection he edited from Hegel's writings on social philosophy (Part I: Philosophy of Spirit and Philosophy of Law 1927) lies right on the breakthrough line. As Hegel, so it says here, underestimated egoism in the practical sphere, so too in the theoretical sphere he underestimated the concept of law. Hegel, it further says with Kierkegaard's accents, did indeed see the struggle of will-atoms, but he did not take this struggle seriously. In general, he ‘did not take the particular, accidental and natural seriously enough’. ‘Inwardly’, this too is very characteristic of Baeumler's turn, nature is completely eliminated in Hegel: real subjectivity has not been recognized at all in its problematic nature. In spite of all dialectics, Hegel's system remains dualistic like Fichte's: it is a system with ‘two peaks’. So Hegel the metaphysician does not know real development either; everything is simultaneous: ‘the mood of Hegel's metaphysics does not express becoming but being’. The meaning of what Baeumler calls reality has yet to be discussed.

Initially, two further points are to be singled out from Baeumler's history of philosophy, because they are highlights of that ‘existential’ understanding that characterizes his historical works: his image of Bachofen and his image of Nietzsche. He has dealt with both thinkers several times. In a smaller work (Bachofen and Nietzsche 1929) he has contrasted them plastically: the symbolist and the psychologist, Bachofen, the calm observer of antiquity, the citizen who at the same time embodies the strongest ‘anti-bourgeois power’ in the 19th century; Nietzsche, the fighter, who recognizes his agonistic drive in

the 'heroically veracious' existence of antiquity, who does not want to observe antiquity but live it, enemy and despiser of bourgeois 'security', whose 'boldness as a psychologist', however, was only possible 'against the background of the bourgeois system to which he himself still belonged as a protester' (only later did he then recognize the essentially instrumental character of Nietzsche's 'psychology': Nietzsche's psychology is not a disintegrating subjectivism, but a means, a weapon).

Bachofen is to be understood as a philosopher of history, not as a 'timeless symbolist'. Bachofen, says Baeumler against Klages, and a Swiss work by G. Schmidt published three years after Baeumler's 'Introduction', in which all text passages are carefully checked, gives him right in this, 'interpreted by an anti-historical and anti-Christian spirit, is no longer Bachofen'. However, he is a philosopher of history in that he 'wants to write 'human history', human history not as universal history, but as history 'from the point of view of the relationship between the sexes'. If Bachofen starts from matriarchy, this legal concept is inessential, indeed misleading for what he strives for and achieves: for the exploration of the 'experience-prehistory' of history. It is equally misguided for the interpretation to understand the concept of matriarchy as a glorification of the female principle per se: 'The deepest source of 'matriarchy' is not the abstraction of the mother in her quasi a posteriori relationship to the children of her womb, but the original relationship of mother and son. Only as mother's son is Bachofen to be understood; but also only as his mother's son'. This thoroughly shifts the accents of the (idealist) interpretation by Klages: 'The idealist's alternative, the question of the *a priority* of day or night, is meaningless for Bachofen. The day is born from the night, as the son from the womb of the mother.' And from here the meaning of the somewhat hidden basic thesis in the book immediately follows: that the mythical and the revolutionary imply each other. 'The man who wants to understand myths must have a penetrating feeling for the power of the past, just as the man who wants to understand a revolution and revolutionaries must have the strongest consciousness of the future'. As the future belongs to the past, so the revolutionary belongs to the mythical.

But myth is rooted in the people, not in the individual: the mythological thinking of the Heidelberg Romantics, to which Bachofen's philosophy of history refers back, is at the same time a *völkisch* thinking. It is the breakthrough of a new sense of life, a view of reality alien to the 18th century. The concept of the people of the Heidelberg Romantics, its stages of development are clearly outlined in the Bachofen introduction, is not idealistic like Herder's, Hegel's, the Jena Romantics'; it is 'naturalistic' in the sense that the people is understood as a second and higher nature, as *physis* in a sense not yet biologically or even physically objectified.

Reference has already been made to Baeumler's Nietzsche research. In addition to a 1931 monograph (Nietzsche as Philosopher and Politician), an 'introduction' is also to be included which Baeumler wrote for a Nietzsche

edition he edited (1930). Here the focus is entirely on Nietzsche's personality, while the other presentation is more concerned with the content of his teaching. *The key to Nietzsche's personality is Dionysus, not a Greek god, but himself a hieroglyph, behind which an experience is hidden.* Dionysus, pseudonym for Antichrist, earliest formula for the will to power, is 'a symbol of the ultimate and highest intensification of life, where preservation no longer applies, but waste'. Dionysus means 'that unity of pleasure and pain that the living thing feels when in the supreme moment of its existence it becomes creative in a victoriously destructive way'. But the Dionysian is not unambiguous; Dionysus has two faces: Dionysus philosophos has entered into Wagner's music, and this corrupts his figure; philosophy and music, the two powers between whose tension Nietzsche's life unfolds, are forced together into the 'impossible concept of the tragic-musical myth'. To undo this impossible combination, to separate the philosophical and the musical, is the effort Nietzsche undertakes. 'When life goes astray, when it has combined with a music hostile to life, then the will must become the advocate of life'. But Baeumler digs even deeper: the musical and the philosophical lines themselves are only the reflection of two 'lines' whose intertwining determines human destiny at all: the lines of death and life. How 'can music become the servant of philosophy', how can death be made subservient to life? That is Nietzsche's problem, for which 'Zarathustra' (in contrast to 'The Birth of Tragedy') then gives the 'existential Dionysian' solution.

What then is the actual content of Nietzsche's 'Heraclitean' philosophy? The shortest formula for this is that of a heroic realism, theoretically developed 'as it were from a transcendental aesthetics of the body'. It is precisely from here that the conception of the 'Will to power' gains its meaning: the will to power is not a subjective phenomenon, not an effort or excitement of the will; Nietzsche has done away with previous philosophy of consciousness. The will to power is something objective, the 'unity of force' (instead of the unity of consciousness), well-ordered existence as life reality. With consciousness, responsibility also falls away; if one realizes this clearly, an alternative sharply emphasized by Baeumler becomes understandable: 'Either the doctrine of eternal recurrence or the doctrine of the will to power'. For Nietzsche, both cannot be equally essential; for one cancels out the other. One has to decide from which point one wants to interpret. The doctrine of eternal recurrence is 'moral'. It is static and ultimately devalues the, justified by modern physics, as Baeumler seeks to demonstrate, Heraclitean approach.

Baeumler's thinking is not systematic in the explicit sense, i.e. in the sense of a concept system resting in itself. But his position on Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Bachofen, Klages, the way of his philosophical-historical interpretation contains an implicit systematics, which is occasionally clearly emphasized by him himself. If one follows these references, a rich complexity of problems opens up, in particular by including the aesthetic sciences, with whose origin, history, and critique Baeumler dealt monographically in his

‘Aesthetics’ in 1933. Aesthetics has the special feature that it ‘is not kindled by the phenomenon of art, but by the phenomenon of the beautiful’, metaphysics of the beautiful and theory of art gape apart so much that the philosophical fundamental problem of ‘being as form’ is precisely corrupted by the so-called ‘aesthetics’. Plato and Plotinus absolutize beauty; the image becomes the manifestation of the idea, and aesthetic subjectivism leads to the system of imageless idealism, which leaves reality behind. Baeumler's struggle is directed against this ‘system’. His efforts for Dionysus and Zarathustra, for the myth in Bachofen, for the concept of style in art (‘the phenomenon of art cannot be derived from experiences and from expressive efforts’, it says in the Aesthetics 1933, ‘Art can only arise from the will to immortalize a content, and the expression of this will is style’), find their continuation in the fact that Baeumler is the first to undertake to philosophically exploit the pictorial content of National Socialism. Familiar with the archaic pictorial language and what sociology previously investigated in a more positivistic sense as ‘collective ideas’, he sets himself the task of interpreting the symbols of our time: symbol and word, image and concept are antagonistic; the word is eloquent, the symbol silent, the word is disempowered, the symbol has power over us: ‘for that is the peculiarity of the images of our soul, that they demand the stake from us’. The path of culture leads from the symbol to the word, certainly. But where the word becomes powerless, culture unproductive, there a regeneration can only take place from the deeper layer of wordless symbolism. The National Socialist revolution stands under the sign of this regeneration. ‘We agree on the symbols, we do not yet agree on the word’. It would be false romanticism to grasp the symbols of our time solely from feeling or experience; it would be reactionary to seek the right word for the new content in the past. ‘We are not romantics, we are on the way to the word, and the way to the word is the way to classicism’. Baeumler also defends himself against irrationalism, against the hostility to spirit of neo-romanticism. The philosopher has the office of interpreting the symbols towards the word, ‘the most difficult work of the spirit is nothing other than the interpretation of symbols’.

The work is difficult because it is a cognition of reality. The symbol does not stand as an allegory for something subjective above reality, but it is concrete: it is the historical-political factor of effect, it separates and connects, it is the incarnation of that ‘real we’ which is never found on the level of mere community of sentiment.

What is reality then? Since the turn of the century, modern physics has been in a foundational crisis concerning the nature of causality, the absolute determinacy of the world, the position of the observer vis-à-vis the object, the validity of statements about reality. Should this be just a separate matter of a ‘discipline’, or should it not rather be an expression of a historical process that affects all science and philosophy? Thus Baeumler finds that the foundational crisis of physics is closely connected with the collapse of the ‘humanistic

system' (whereby 'humanistic' has a twofold meaning for Baeumler: a positive one referring to the 'altitude', a negative one referring to the breadth or 'extension' of 'man'; the former meaning refers to the 'great form' of the classical character, the latter to the formlessness of undifferentiated man 'in general'): this system was a system of 'absoluteness', within which an absolute world corresponded to the absolute spirit. The sense of the universal causal law was rooted in this claim to absolute cognition; equivalence of temporal phases, fundamental calculability of the future, absolute 'security' are the characteristics of the causally determined reality. And now the strange thing: by giving up the absolute system of nature oriented toward 'repeatability', 'recurrence of everything equal', physics gains greater proximity to reality. Today's physics is 'more realistic' than classical physics. The same in the realm of spirit. The humanistic system of absoluteness, which was regarded as the system of 'the' theoretical man, contained the pretension of an absolute standpoint. 'Consciousness as the center of a neutral frame of reference, the free, self-determining I, autonomous man, all ideal cases fitting the ideal cases of classical physics!' By giving up this standpoint of absolute objectivity and 'innocence' and realizing that the knower and the known 'are not separated by an infinite distance, but that a finite distance lies between them, by stating that only the whole man cognizes, the man who 'has' consciousness, not 'had' by a 'pure' consciousness, have we arrived back at a cheap relativism, or are we not much closer to reality?

It is the mistake of relativism to take the concept of truth too lightly. To 'overcome' relativism means nothing other than to restore the primacy of formal logic: and that is also the point at which Baeumler's own 'logic' sets in. However, it is chiefly Hegel's speculative logic (dialectic) vis-à-vis which Baeumler emphatically asserts the primacy of formal logic. Self-consciousness, which is not a particular 'mode of being' and does not contain any particular access to the absolute (from 'within'), must be conceived as the point of reflection of a thinking arising within the circumference of our human frame of reference, a thinking that recognizes its limits and transcends them. Thus Baeumler's formal logic applied to cognition is transcendental logic. But precisely applied to our human cognition, not to a fictitious pure cognition. Moreover, it is easy to see that absolutism and relativism imply each other. If the absolute frame of reference, the absolute truth (idea) falls, then relativism as a world view also falls. The traditional theory of ideas, which wants to justify reality and give it a 'meaning' that it has first taken away from it and transferred to another 'world': that of values, spirit, this always pathetic, priestly doctrine of two worlds becomes pointless when the idealist scheme of interpretation is seen through. To decompose reality into form and matter, to destroy it in order to be able to 'construct' it, to shape its disfigured elements, torn from intuition, into a 'picture of the world' by a subsequent act, that is the old spiritualistic approach for which the factual, 'positive' requires glorification through values and bestowals of meaning in order to be 'saved'.

If, on the other hand, one decides to recognize reality itself as the 'ground and measure of all forms', not to subordinate it as mere factuality to a 'higher' reality, then philosophy becomes realistic. It becomes a 'philosophy of reality' which is absolutely unpathetic, merely indicative, 'indicative', and leaves behind both the traditional contrast between positivism and idealism as well as the contrast between relativism and absolutism. For such a philosophy of reality, reality is neither 'realization' nor the site of realization of something unreal. Even the idea takes on a different, human-political meaning for it. 'The idea itself originates from reality; it is the image that reality produces of itself through man'. There is only one reality, whose depth is inexhaustible, unfathomable. There is an original relationship to reality: to look at the world and take from the intuition the guiding images for one's own actions. There is an 'indication' of reality which does not presuppose the absolute distance of the 'pure' consciousness from its objects, but which is fundamentally practical, political. Here one does not irresponsibly talk about things. Rather, the reality in which the speaker stands, his existential situation, is indicated responsibly.

This situation is political as such, i.e. it encompasses man as a personal unity in the community and committed to the community. Just as there are political actions only within the framework of a field of action, a system of action, so too our political existence is a being placed into a fateful real coherence, through which we are connected as personal unities with the past and the future, into a coherence of blood and race. Race is thus the fundamental political-anthropological concept: race is anthropological insofar as man's racial determinacy is not an external-accidental but an essential determination; race is political insofar as it is the center, the deep center of those 'actions and reactions' which find expression in political action and determine our attitude. Thus race is also a fundamental concept of political pedagogy, whose structure falls within Baeumler's Berlin years, and whose premises, problems, tasks he seeks to clarify in several recent works (*Männerbund und Wissenschaft* 1934, *Politik und Erziehung* 1937, *Bildung und Gemeinschaft* 1942). Here above all the basic lines of the implicit systematics of his philosophizing emerge. *For 'political pedagogy' is not an 'application' of politics to education (let alone an application of philosophy to politics), but political activity itself, directed toward the future and placed in the service of shaping the future of our people.*

Without going into details, we only emphasize the moments that characterize the novelty of Baeumler's approach: education as formative education and physical education.

The two concrete forms of community: family and men's association (clan and retinue) condition two different life forms of educational influence: family education and school education. Here as there it is the community that educates, the path from the family to the people and the fatherland is the fateful path of every individual. Formative education itself is not school

education in the former sense determined by the historical (neo-humanist) form of the German school, but rather its political foundation and orientation. Formative education is education for and through the state, education in the 'men's house', as it was called in 1930, when the bourgeois life form and its 'societal' educational system were still a reality to be fought. In the meantime, this male-bond educational system has found its place and political safeguarding in the formations of the movement.

But physical education is not only a prerequisite for formative education, but also a basic condition for all 'education' as the development of individual talents and abilities. Its approach arises from the relationship of the individual body to the collective body of the people: 'The body is a political issue, that is the first consequence we have to draw from the idea of the people'. And just as the body is, so too is character a political issue; all physical education is primarily character education. To develop the body's predispositions into a type is the function and significance of the concept of race for realistic anthropology and pedagogy. In contrast, the school is the site of education bound to the means of instruction, an instruction that is addressed to the head and intellect, but which is nevertheless not imparted 'in the empty space of reason', but rather presupposes the racial community as a principle of life.

Baeumler describes his philosophy as a philosophy of reality, realism. But he has also spoken of a 'heroic rationalism', and it is worth pointing out lastly. This rationalism is heroic in that it does not presuppose reason as a fixed possession but dares to struggle for the order of the spirit. From here Baeumler's formula of well-ordered existence as life reality also acquires a fuller sound: from the beginning life proceeds in rhythmic order, 'but only man is able to present the rhythm of the universe in self-created orders'. This 'presentation' is truly no mere depiction of a reality 'in itself'. *For we ourselves live in images, primordial images, symbols, visions, and figures. That is our reality. But in it we do not live as disinterested observers, it only appeals to us if we behave actively.* If we dare to create order anew, not in the security of revealed truths, but as finite, blood-bound existences, then we have realized the vital tendency effective in us, the 'Will to power', which is itself an order. It is important to recognize that Baeumler's philosophy of culture, in contrast to the philosophy of culture of idealism, does not 'sublate' natural philosophy but only supplements it; for that is the hallmark of his 'rationalism'.

Prof. Dr. Hans Heyse.

The implementation and reception of existentialist and existential-ontological issues in a völkisch worldview or in the ideological structure of National Socialism is of not just paradigmatic but conclusive significance for contemporary political thought, and thus at the same time opens up new ways of philosophizing. We have characterized this in general terms. To characterize it in particular means addressing the philosophy of Hans Heyse, which, not to highlight it over similar but differently oriented efforts, but to

underline its intention lying entirely in this direction, we place at the end of our individual elaborations. It should be noted right away that for Heyse it is a matter of a connection between idealism and philosophy of existence which is not external but aims at a new determination of the problem of existence through a deeper understanding of the idea, of reason, of logos as an attitude of being, and that this determination is directed from the outset at the idea and reality of the Reich.

Hans Heyse was born in 1891 in Bremen. In 1919 he received his doctorate in Bern (where he had been interned after returning from French captivity) with an 'Introduction to the Theory of Categories' (1921). He then went to Berlin, where he was close to A. Riehl, whose 'Philosophical Criticism' he published in final form (2nd edition) after Riehl's death in 1925 (together with E. Spranger). In 1925 he habilitated in Breslau on the basis of his book 'The Concept of Totality and Kantian Philosophy' (1927). In 1932 he was appointed full professor in Königsberg, where he held the rectorate from 1933 to 1936 and published his main work in 1935: 'Idea and Existence'. In 1936 he came to Göttingen as a full professor.

Heyse's philosophical development grows out of an independent confrontation, not really influenced by any school, although initially proceeding within a neo-Kantian framework, with the basic motives of contemporary thought. He finds his own approach in recourse to antiquity, to the philosophies of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. Already his 'Theory of Categories' seeks to show that Kant's intentions need to be radicalized. It cannot stop at the questionable nature of the 'metaphysical deduction' and the unclarified relationship between thinking and intuition. Rather thinking, which possesses its basic categories in identity, difference, continuity, must be related to intuition in such a way that its categories prove to be necessary and sufficient principles for the axiomatic penetration of the space-time complex. Thus the theory of categories passes over into a space-time axiomatics. On the other hand, and this is significant for the later thematics, consciousness cannot be regarded as an independent state of affairs 'outside and apart from its contents and their relationships', but is the positedness of a state of affairs, i.e. a peculiar being in states of affairs. Consequently, the categories themselves cannot be grasped starting from consciousness, explained as determinations of consciousness. Rather, they are lawfulnesses that 'equally include concept and judgment'.

The problems of logic and theory of categories thus outlined undergo a further determination in Heyse's work on the concept of totality and Kantian philosophy (1927). Here he first appears as an independent systematist; it is the system of a 'regional logic and theory of categories' which stands out against the background of a new conception of Kant. Eight years later, however, he expands this framework once more by incorporating his own systematics into a historical survey which, in accordance with the thesis already indicated earlier, not to understand Plato through Kant but Kant

through Plato, sees the fundamental philosophical decision of Western philosophy in the, properly understood, Platonic theory of ideas. In particular, Plato's theory of the state then becomes the model for that ideological-political synthesis which Heyse demands as the 'unity of idea and existence' and asserts with passion.

Let us first address the basic question of the book on the concept of totality.

It is states of affairs, objectivities in general that we want to survey in ordered fashion when we try to comprehend reality through theoretical forms. This (reminiscent of Driesch's 'theory of order') starting point of Heyse's above all means that order is not an addition of thinking, not a shaping of form, but something inherent in the objects themselves, 'pervading' them. Given this, it remains just as self-evident that we also have to establish order in thinking. It does not just fall into our laps. Even when we 'perceive' something ordered. And here, according to Heyse, there are two paths of cognition (cognition understood as 'illumination' of ordered contexts): we can obtain what is common to a 'totality of particulars' through abstraction or from the relation of its 'elements'. In the first case, we extract the common 'characteristics' or 'properties'. In the second case, we advance to the 'generating law' of the whole (for example, the Linnaean system classifies plants according to common characteristics. The 'natural' system classifies them according to 'systematically differentiable relations of material characteristics', i.e. according to developable basic relationships and functions such as: reproduction, oxygen absorption, etc.).

Heyse distinguishes these two paths as abstraction concept and system concept. The former leads to neglect of the particular, only the latter leads to determination and full comprehension of the particular. And what is general, which is obtained, can be termed abstract-general in the first case, following Hegel, and concrete-general in the second case. The unity of a 'system-conceptual' totality is an integral one; the unity of an 'abstraction-conceptual' totality is, cautiously put, not yet an integral one. With this characterization, Heyse introduces a concept into logic that has previously encountered us mostly in other areas: precisely the concept of totality.

The introduction of totality into logic is closely bound up with the significance intuition has for logic according to Heyse. We saw that for him the inner unity of thinking and intuition signifies the principle of comprehension, of theoretical evidence, and that intuition is the actual whole-giving moment here. The whole of reality is the actual object of philosophical cognition; 'pure reason' is nothing other than the idea 'of the whole of objectivity'. And in the end the 'system concept' differs from the 'abstraction concept' in that in the former the particular is grasped completely, in the latter incompletely, fragmentarily, in that abstraction levels the whole into the 'general', while system relation, on the other hand, renders it perspicuous in its dimensionality (stratification in depth). Precisely for that reason, abstraction is also a path to the 'system'; the abstraction system only does not fulfill the claim of integral

systematics, it remains a preliminary stage.

However, the emphasis on intuition does not signify any approximation to phenomenology (Husserl's). Our 'finite' reason does not recognize the whole of objectivity: 'it approaches it asymptotically in incessant historical work'. This reservation is still initially along the lines of neo-Kantianism; later it signifies Heyse's turn to existential philosophy. And as against phenomenology, Heyse also distinguishes himself from ontology: the deficiency of ontology is its unstructured concept of being; ontology is based on the 'abstraction concept'. If it is to lead further, then it must grasp being as a developable, internally structured whole: ontology must be transformed into logology, i.e. into a logic of system relations. Phenomenological and ontological methods, so Heyse concludes this critique., are not suitable for solving 'the problem of the system concept oriented toward the wholeness of the state of affairs'. This can only be done by the eidological method: it relates not to 'objectivity in general' but to specific objectivity, as the 'representative' of reality graspable through theoretical 'forms'.

Without probing deeper into the problems raised here, we only emphasize one point: the idea of the 'articulation of being into different spheres of being'. For from here derives the justification of the eidological method as regional logic. *Similar to N. Hartmann, Heyse also assumes that reality is structured differently; it is divided into 'regions'.* But for him, the determination of the region does not proceed from the in-itself-existing 'object', but from the 'law of form' of the areas: region is 'the totality of those real states of affairs which are grasped by the methodical means of one and the same pure system concept or system structure, respectively'. These pure system concepts, which apply to specific objectivities, are categories in the proper sense, categories of areas. Those forms of order, however, which apply to all system concepts are eidological 'basic categories'. They are 'pre-regional'.

In his book on totality, Heyse attempts with great astuteness to unite two tasks: to combine the idea of totality with the notion of different layers of reality into the unity of an 'ontological' theory of categories, and, to present Kant and antiquity (Plato, Aristotle) in their inner coherence. The one is a systematic, the other a historical-philosophical task. But comprehension of the world of objects also belongs to the object of philosophy: this is historical, and historical time is a moment of a whole encompassing 'nature' and 'sublating' it. Thus systematic philosophizing is also not possible without constant reference to the history of philosophical concept formation. With this turn (and also at other points) Heyse comes close to 'philosophy of life' (Dilthey's and Bergson's): the historical time system becomes the framework of that life which unites the multiplicity of regions of being; the system concept of historical time is the 'most adequate form of reality' that the modern spirit 'only now ultimately strives to conquer'.

In the concluding sections of the work, what determines the further development of this philosophy of totality stands out: the existential

significance of the idea (as 'original spiritual attitude') in contrast to the mere 'concept', the false simplification, unification of differentiations of being into the 'unity of a single conceptual coordinate system' ('univocity' of the concept of being and of the corresponding consciousness of reality associated with it), the misapprehension of our historical modes of existence by tradition, whereby also modern philosophy (since the Renaissance) finds itself in considerable ignorance concerning the ultimate existential and ideal motives of tradition.

When Hans Heyse assumed the rectorate in Königsberg in 1933, he gave a speech on the 'Idea of Science and the German University' in which he considerably sharpened the earlier demand for an 'upward purification of modern life' and gave it a new, more radical version. 'Modern' philosophy (and science) is the form of modern existence. But this existence is not an integral one, but a 'broken' existence, 'which as a true existence necessarily leads to catastrophe'. The catastrophe Heyse has in mind here is the collapse of modern culture, that crisis of existence which finds its expression in the 'world-historical situation' of the world war and the German revolution. The previous modes of existence have not only become questionable by no longer being able to support and shape our existence, but with and in this questionable nature it has become clear that they also did not truly shape life earlier, that they concealed our (Germanic) fundamental values, the true (political) life orders, 'the basic constitution of life' itself. What is this basic constitution? Why can we not progress steadily and continuously, as it seems possible only historically, in 'upward purifying' modernity? Why is our consciousness of reality revolutionary, and why does the self-reflection to which we were called in the war demand a radical dissolution of the traditional life forms?

These are the questions Heyse seeks to answer in his 1935 work on Idea and Existence. His answer appears as a philosophy-of-history conception, but has a number of systematic prerequisites, which of course relate first of all to the relation between idea and existence itself and diverge from the prerequisites of the earlier work. The change consists chiefly in the more decisive emphasis on the difference between Greek philosophy, as understood on the basis of Aeschylus and Sophocles, especially Socratic-Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy, and its fundamentally altered Christian-Western form, i.e. the Christian-Western tradition as such. This is theologically determined; it is the universal 'theoretical' form of redrawing, accepting the ultimately divinely predetermined Christian-Western conception of being (God, soul, world): its existential meaning is thus dissolved and replaced by the principle of faith. In general, Heyse's concept of existence now emerges for the first time in a more precise form, admittedly related to Heidegger's existential ontology but also distinguished from it. The 'modern' philosophies of existence and history are not revolutionary (i.e. political); precisely 'Western and especially modern existence-consciousness' is 'to be questioned in a depth and radicality that is

still unfamiliar but unavoidable'. As we shall see, the approach and justification of this critique follow from Heyse's own philosophy of history. But first: What does existence, human existence, have to do with the idea at all? Idea is not concept, representation, norm, but 'solely and alone the expression for reality as a totality, for the relation of reality to its own order, for the oscillation around its own axis'. Idea is the 'original expression of the order of being and existence itself', being as a whole. Idea is 'the form in which being as being, human existence in the midst of being, is experienced, actualized, striven for and willed'. This connection between idea and existence is a metaphysical one; indeed, it itself is the actual meaning of 'metaphysics'. For metaphysics does not have to theoretically cognize transcendent objects, it is not 'theory' at all in the modern sense. Rather, metaphysics is illumination of existence; it is a 'way of existing' and has to be 'newly effectuated in every moment of existing from the original substance of existing'.

Then, however, there must also be another way of existing. Idea and existence can be conceived and connected inadequately; the order of being can be concealed, hidden. The ideas are then ideologies, expression of 'unreal, fragmentary sham existence'. Man has the 'fundamental possibility' of existing in truth or untruth, i.e. in the order of being (cosmos) or in illusion (chaos). He can affirm and fulfill the orders of being or violate them and perish. 'Human existence knows of this fundamental possibility. In affirming it, it experiences truth of life in struggle and sacrifice. That is why the basic constitution of life is heroic, heroic-tragic existence'. For only in 'resoluteness' of existing can man advance to his possibilities of being; only in existing itself as resolute and courageous life-attitude can he 'know' (experience) that there are 'metaphysical forces of being'.

So metaphysically existing means, Heyse seeks to illustrate this by means of Greek tragedy, to be placed before the fundamental possibilities of being, i.e. to become aware in deeper knowledge of the order, the cosmos, the being and to live this order, or in not knowing to miss it and bring about chaos. Precisely in this the 'parousia' of true, divine being shows itself, that it destroys inauthentic, untrue existence. Cosmos and chaos manifest themselves as metaphysics of historical existence, whereby indeed their even more comprehensive significance is only hinted at in the work itself. *Accordingly, 'openness' or 'concealment' of the order is to be characterized primarily as adequate or inadequate attitude of knowledge or non-knowledge.* Heyse places all the more emphasis on this, as it is precisely here a matter of the necessary dependence of the Aryan-European, especially the Germanic-German existence on the deeper knowledge: he sees in this the only possibility to renew the idea of philosophy as well as science and to connect it inwardly with the destiny of the German and European human. But the systematic prerequisites for the connection between idea and existence are not yet exhausted with that. If the connection between idea and existence is to

have a primarily political meaning, then the polis, the community, or the state, must be contained in the original approach. The 'binding of existence to the primal law of being and life itself' can be understood neither from individuality nor from subjectivity alone but is determined from an idea of its own, the idea of the 'Reich'. The 'Reich' demarcates the space 'within which the union of idea and existence, spirit and life, is possible'. The individual, thought of only for itself, just an abstraction, attains to true existence only in community, in the state, in that state 'which understands itself as 'Reich' on the basis of the idea of totality'.

And this is decisive: that the idea of the Reich contains more than a sum of 'life circumstances', that it signifies more than an existential 'situation', that it brings the state as a concrete historical totality (unity of spirit and power) into direct relation with 'the divine manifesting itself in the world law'.

In Heyse, however, these statements do not stand in an originally speculative, metaphysical context; they want to elucidate and designate those historical contexts that form the actual content of his book. Just as Plato's Politeia becomes fruitful for the concept of the 'Reich', just as the concept of original and 'essentially tragic' existence is developed on the basis of Greek tragedy, whose principles are grasped by Socrates-Plato as the 'true principles of historical existence' (whereby Heyse sharply distinguishes himself from Nietzsche), so the theme of Western intellectual history in general is the fate of Platonic philosophy. Through Christianity, which proves itself to be the secularization of the new philosophy and science, the ancient bond between idea and existence has been torn, Christianity has replaced philosophy with faith, withdrawn truth from the 'beholding spirit of courageous life' in order to find it guaranteed as 'promise', Christianity has transformed Greek values by substituting existential truth with revelation; above all, Christianity has coined an opposition that to this day remained fundamental for Western concept formation: the opposition between immanence and transcendence.

Heyse seeks to understand the 'Western world age' from the 'antithetical-synthetic' relationship between antiquity and Christianity: by no means, as he seeks to show, is new ground gained in the Renaissance with the overcoming of medieval patterns of thought. On the contrary: the 'natural system of the humanities', the constructivist-idealist philosophies from Descartes to Hegel, psychological empiricism, and positivism as well, all these nuances of Western tradition reveal as their 'secret and hidden ground' the 'anti-Christian determined understanding of being'. This even applies to Kant, even though something new is emerging here: a turn that refers directly back to Plato and to the starting point of the theory of ideas as transformed in the Western world age.

For Kant, whose philosophy culminates not in his transcendentalism but in that 'metaphysics of experience' which in the light of the critique of practical reason proves to be 'man's experience of himself as existence-shaping existence', has, in an attitude akin to that of the Greeks, made the 'form of

existing' and the primal phenomenon of limit, of 'being-measure', into a problem: in the *mundus intelligibilis*, the noumenal world, he recognized the reference to totality of the sensory world; both worlds stand in a 'founding coherence', and the second is 'included' by the first as a 'specific mode' (as the plane is by space). Of course, this Kantian turn does not lie so openly on the surface that it can be found without a special interpretation. Kant, so understood, has become effective neither in idealism nor in neo-Kantian epistemology. In general, the politically existential commitment of the new philosophy, which seeks to establish the idea of the new Reich on the basis of the driving forces of the National Socialist revolution, can be derived neither from the available 'philosophies of existence' nor from the mere demand that philosophy and science must become 'political'. Was liberal, materialistic science unpolitical? Did not humanitarian cosmopolitanism contain the concept of the political to the 'highest degree'? Yes, does not Christianity, in and with the transformation of Plato's Politeia into the Civitas Dei, the City of God, precisely accomplish that momentous 'Christian-theological revaluation of the Greek concept of existence' as something political?

It would therefore be necessary to show wherein the difference of the new political philosophy also conceptually consists from the political conceptions of the 'Western world age'. Two aspects are at any rate characteristic for this: *The genuine community of a people*, for which we struggle and want to realize, in 'every moment of its existence is faced with the question of being or chaos'. This actual 'question of existence' is exempt for the divine state based on promise and grace. And likewise it is exempt from that actual 'care' for the 'future' which Heyse immediately translates into the attitude of brave resolution. The 'Reich' is in constant crisis of decision. This crisis has nothing to do with existential anxiety. But it also knows no 'priority of the future' and calls for no eschatology, it is the expression of a political activism which in no way devalues the idea into an 'ideology' but grasps it as Heyse grasped it from the beginning: as totality, as the principle of order of our existence.

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Chapter 1

Alfred Baeumler: Nietzsche and National Socialism.

Introduction.

Alfred Baeumler (19-11-1887 - 19-3-1968), was an Austrian-born philosopher, pedagogue, and prominent National Socialist ideologue. From 1924 he taught at the Technische Universität Dresden, at first as a Privatdozent. Baeumler was appointed associate professor in 1928 and full professor a year later. Member of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP, or 'Nazi' as Dr. Goebbels used to say). From 1933 he taught philosophy and political education at the University of Berlin as director of the Institute for Political Pedagogy. After 1945, Baeumler was interned for three years in concentration camps in Hammelburg and Ludwigsburg. He was one of the few Nazi professors who did not return to a university post because he had not yielded an iota in his political positions.

It was Baeumler who first introduced Nietzsche as a philosopher in the late 1920s. His analysis presents Nietzsche as a philosopher of National Socialism. Baeumler himself says this: *'It was I who first introduced into the critical literature on Nietzsche these two theses: I. Nietzsche is a philosopher; II. Nietzsche's theoretical universe is unitary'*. These two theses later gave rise to several books by other authors. It is enough to review the texts and their publication dates to realize this. But after 1945 it was decided to de-Nazify Nietzsche (the funny thing about all this is that he never was a nazi and remember that during the Third Reich the judgments on Nietzsche were not unanimous). *Baeumler is then denied having been the first to see him as a philosopher since he connected part of Nietzsche's thought with National Socialism.* This oblivion occurred only for ideological reasons and in all possible areas. Above all, an attempt was made to create and present a Nietzsche 'washed with detergent'. Others, such as Montinari accuse of forgery the one who first discovered Nietzsche as a philosopher. As Marianne Baeumler said, *'we cannot ignore the fact that Baeumler 'Germanized' Nietzsche (deducing it, albeit univocally, from Nietzsche's own writings), just as we cannot deny that he understood Nietzsche's anti-Christianity as a significant historical event. Both aspects are constitutive of the general historical-philosophical vision developed by Baeumler during the time of National Socialism, and therefore can only be analyzed and judged through an objective approach. Baeumler prepared himself for this task by writing his unpublished writings, and therefore his thought can only be evaluated by the criterion of the analytical and philological method.* But Montinari prefers to descend to the lowest level of political defamation (using the *ad hominem* fallacy)(M. Baeumler, 1977). I suggest to read on this subject something written at the end of volume IV of the Collected Works of Nietzsche (in Spanish(Friedrich Nietzsche, 2018d)). It is a text full of disqualifying adjectives that indicate the twisted path that the intriguer wants the reader to

follow. And an aside of mine that I will expand in another text: it is enough to understand, even mediocrely, what the 'superman' of Nietzsche is, to be clear that he could not have been a National Socialist, nor a worshipper of the Golden Calf or anything that resembles something existing even today.

Another level of lack of understanding of the work of various philosophers was created out by the physicist Mario Bunge through verbal paroxysms (*'they say that Heidegger was a Nazi philosopher. No, it is not true, he was not a philosopher, he was a charlatan, a servile of Hitler', '... nor a nihilistic philosophy, like Nietzsche's, which denies everything, everything good: it denies that benevolence, cooperation, mutual aid exists, it is a philosophy of war, it is a philosophy of aggression', 'Many of those who call themselves leftists rant against science and are anti-scientists without reason. They spread the stupidities of Heidegger, of Habermas, of Nietzsche, who has been refloated when we had sunk him forever in the darkness of Nazism'*, etc. All an excess of an hysterical verbiage with touches of positivism, scientism, and lack of information; together with zero arguments since the works of all the just mentioned cannot be reduced to set theory or to a couple of 'logical statements'). Political defamation is not an argument, let alone the use of *the Reductio ad Hitlerum*.

After reading the six volumes of Nietzsche's correspondence (Friedrich Nietzsche, 2005, 2007a, 2009a, 2009b, 2011, 2012a), the four volumes of his works (Friedrich Nietzsche, 2014a, 2018a, 2018b, 2018d) and the four volumes of his posthumous fragments (Friedrich Nietzsche, 2008a, 2008b, 2010a, 2010b), to the most I dare to call myself a Nietzsche enthusiast. Of exegete, nothing. The only thing I can say is that, like many artists and philosophers, Friedrich went through several stages (his personal journey). That allows many ideologies or groups of ideas from the right, left, above, below, front, and back, to declare that they are 'Nietzschean'. Recall that Hitler was only 11 years old when Nietzsche passed away. The link that Baeumler makes between Nietzsche and National Socialism goes through the experience of The Great War (1914-1918). That experience was horrendous (the trenches and chemical warfare, initiated by the German Jew Fritz Haber, who was indicted as a war criminal for violating the Hague Convention and for his responsibility as the 'father of chemical warfare').




Figure 1a: Adolf Hitler contemplating the bust of Nietzsche.



Figure 1b: Elizabeth Nietzsche with Adolf Hitler.



Figure 2: Adolf Hitler at Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche's funeral in 1935.

Text of 'Nietzsche and National Socialism' (Bauemler, 1934, 1937).

If the German revolution were simply an internal process within the German bourgeoisie, and if this revolution only involved a revision of already existing ideas, the topic 'Nietzsche and National Socialism' would have no relevant meaning.

But the 'y' in the title does not mean that in this case more or less close connections should be established between certain ideas of Nietzsche and certain ideas of National Socialism. Rather, it indicates a deeper connection between these two great entities. Nietzsche lived and thought like a loner, voluntarily departing from the German bourgeoisie, and fighting from his extreme position against the bourgeois condition as a whole. For its part, the National Socialist movement has a point of origin external to the bourgeois world. It is not born within the German bourgeoisie and its tradition but is the creation of a single man who has been deeply influenced by his political experience and the Great War.

National Socialism in its early days did not originate directly from Nietzsche. After World War I, no one thought to associate the new movement with Nietzsche. Back then, few really foreshadowed the true significance of the uprising of the German people that began on August 1, 1914. The event of the year 1933 opened the eyes of many, as it marks the beginning of a new world era. For us, the Great War produces an effect similar to that caused by the summits of the highest mountains: at first, they are only glimpsed in the distance.

But those who have before their eyes the Great War see Nietzsche and National Socialism simultaneously. Therefore, National Socialism was born of the fire and blood of the Great War, it turns backwards, towards the powerful community of our people dedicated to action and sacrifice, the great event of our history. Meanwhile, Nietzsche, from the perspective of his time, looked forward to this event. Among his contemporaries, he was the only one in Germany who foresaw the earth trembling and glimpsing the impending catastrophe.

With the assurance of a seer, he predicted nihilism, 'the most disturbing kind', and announced the state of confusion, lack of faith, the transvaluation of all values and the deterioration of all forms of life. In modern democracy, Nietzsche perceived the historical form of the end of the state, pointing with keen discernment at distinctive features of modern man: all those tendencies that over the years have opposed Hitler's victory: in order, the neutrality of the intellectuals, the opportunism of the ruling class and its need for peace and security, the alienation of German man towards nature and historical tasks. The lack of 'political guidance' during the First World War means nothing other than the disappearance of the German bourgeoisie from world history.

To his contemporaries, and even to his friends, Nietzsche was considered an eccentric, and even a madman, because he opposed everything hitherto considered valid. He was the critic, the denier, he didn't have any 'positive projects'! The same accusation has been constantly levelled at the National Socialist movement. In this accusation is expressed especially the distance that the great men of action, the precursors, those who propose the impossible, establish between themselves and those who only consider possible the existing. It was hard to believe that this Weimar Republic, this constitution, this bourgeois state structure, based on defeat and the unwillingness to overcome it, meant nothing, while showing itself in its effective reality through bans, dismissals, arrests, and beatings.

However, it was crucial that there was a man capable of nullifying and undoing all this. This man could not foresee what would happen in a year; In fact, no man of action could have predicted it. But he knew that all this was ripe for his decline, and that it was necessary to kick what was falling.

If we translate the position taken by Hitler towards the Weimar Republic into a solitary thinker of the nineteenth century, we get Nietzsche. In declaring war on the Weimar Republic, Hitler was also faced with a secular, and even millennial, evolution. At the same time that he undertook the critique of the formation, culture and politics of his century, Nietzsche also began his struggle against a millennial evolution. However, there were always those who saw in Hitler only the liquidator of the Weimar Republic, without understanding its true meaning.

Those who see only in Nietzsche the nineteenth-century liquidator also understand little. Both Hitler and Nietzsche are at decisive points in this important movement in our history, which we can call the 'Northern movement'. Along the political line of this movement are the monarchs by right of peace and war of the high Middle Ages, as well as the founding of Prussia, Bismarck, and Hitler. Along the spiritual-religious line of this Ghibelline movement are Germanic paganism, Eckhardt, Luther and Nietzsche.

Nietzsche and National Socialism go beyond the tradition of the German bourgeoisie, but what does this mean? In recent centuries, the great

intellectual currents that have shaped the German bourgeoisie have been Pietism, Enlightenment and Romanticism. Pietism was the last authentically Reformed religious movement on Lutheran soil. It led people to withdraw within themselves from a hopeless political reality, wrapping themselves in small private spheres. Pietism represented a religious individualism that enhanced the inclination towards psychological introspection and the study of biographies. Among the German Pietists, any non-political and hostile tendency to the state found its support and sustenance. In the same direction acted the radically different individualism of the Enlightenment. This individualism was neither religious nor sentimental, but rational and rationalistic; it turned out to be 'political' only in an anti-feudal sense, but incapable of building a lasting political system, although it paved the way for the capitalist economic system. In that case, man was represented as an autonomous individuality, detached from any original order and bond, as a fictitious subject responsible only to himself.

In opposition to this, the Romantics reconsidered the human being within their own historical-natural connections. The romantics opened our eyes again to power, to the past and the ancestors, to myth and the Volk (the people). The movement from Herder to Goerres, the Brothers Grimm, Eichendorff, Arnim and Savigny, is the only spiritual movement still alive. And it is the only one on which Nietzsche has fought.

It is no coincidence that romanticism remains the most unknown movement in our history. The German bourgeoisie did not accept it in its entirety, but adopted only what suited it in its salons. The real acceptance of romanticism was countered by the legend of Weimar classicism, created by the liberal-conservative bourgeoisie. Basically, this legend was built by merging illuminist elements with other constituents, such as romantic elements. Thus a broad political sphere was drawn that retrospectively embraced the entire era of the German spirit, within which Herder and Lessing, Schiller and Goethe, Humboldt and Hegel were inserted into a single perspective, assigning to this structure the function of configuring a 'cusp' of German history. But thus the most important thing of the time was ignored: the Ghibelline spirit that continued to live in it. Above all, it was not understood how this supposed 'classical' era did not have autonomous roots. It was composed of Enlightenment humanitarianism and the spirit and tenacity of exceptional men. There is no such thing as a 'Goethe's zeitgeist'; there is only one great loner named Goethe, along with an artistic synthesis called classicism. With the dissolution of the German bourgeoisie, this synthesis dissolves itself, revealing again the great loners: Lessing, the courageous opponent of orthodoxy; Herder, the noble precursor of the Romantics; and next to them, but far surpassing them, the great loners: Winckelmann, Goethe and Hölderlin. If we want to mention Nietzsche's predecessors, these are their names. All of them share an original and authentically German link with Greek antiquity, something absolutely unthinkable in other peoples: a

relationship that not only has a formal and aesthetic aspect but is nourished by Greek reality and religiosity.

When we define National Socialism as a *Weltanschauung*, we mean not only that the bourgeois parties have been annihilated, but that the very ideologies of those parties have been liquidated. Only those who act in bad faith come to affirm the need to deny what comes to us from the past. We, on the contrary, want to sustain the need to relate in a new way to the past, freed to contemplate the significance that has been hidden by bourgeois ideology; in short, the need to discover new possibilities of understanding the German essence. And it is at this point that Nietzsche preceded us. In the face of romanticism, we situate ourselves differently from Nietzsche. But what was his most personal and exclusive legacy, the total rejection of bourgeois ideology, has now become the possession of an entire generation..

Here I want to offer an example of what so-called German classicism has cost. If the German bourgeoisie had not gloated in the shadow of the classical ideal which it itself invented, then there would be the possibility that the fundamental concepts of romanticism would be transformed into political ideas. But the political character of the main concepts of romanticism has remained in an embryonic state. The German bourgeoisie has proved incapable of arriving at an overall vision. Bismarck's political leadership did not coincide with any ideal leadership of the bourgeoisie. As confirmation of this statement resonates a name: Treitschke. For all his great temperament, Treitschke failed to overcome the legend of Weimar classicism (which shrouds his political doctrine like a fog), nor could he explore the world of power with a free gaze.

Beyond the oppressive ideology of classicism lies Nietzsche's blunt assertion: 'God is dead.' This statement has been interpreted exclusively as a historical observation: faith in God has disappeared. God is no longer the power in our lives. Nietzsche no longer 'struggles' with the Christian God and is unaffected by his death. He is far from denying that there are still Christians, in fact, he bows to those few remaining Christians, finding in them a type of person far superior to that, for example, he can see among the artists of his time. In short, he is completely free from the resentment of the fighter who wants to break free. For Nietzsche, having knowledge of the death of the Christian God does not mean a fully developed 'idea', Nietzsche does not desire the death of the Christian God but a vision of the end of faith in the Christian God, the end of the Middle Ages in Europe.

'I have no knowledge by direct experience of real problems in the religious sphere. It completely escapes me the sense of why I should be a sinner...' We feel the hatred in the words with which Nietzsche evokes his impressions of youth, recalling the pietistic-romantic Christianity and the hypocrisy of Naumburg. 'We, precisely we who were children in the swamp of the fifties, can only be pessimistic about the notion of 'German'; We can only be revolutionaries, we will never admit a state of affairs in which servile

flattery prevails'.

Nietzsche criticizes Christianity as to its historical reality as he has known it. Before him, he perceives a disconcerting phenomenon: the more faith in God disappears, the more the image of a morality founded and existing by itself grows. This is a distinctive sign of the bourgeois condition: morality rather than religion. The content of this morality presumably corresponds to the content of what might be called Christian moral doctrine. The transition from one to the other is performed (at least in appearance) without fractures. 'It is believed that it can be fixed with a moralism without religious background; But this necessarily opens the way to nihilism'. 'The Christian-moral God is no longer sustainable, and as a consequence we have 'atheism', as if no other kind of divinity could exist'. 'Deep down, we have only surpassed the moral God'. 'Christianity has become something very different from what its founder has done and desired'. 'Precisely what is Christian in the ecclesiastical sense is from the beginning anti-Christian: simple facts and persons instead of symbols, mere stories instead of eternal facts, mere rites, formulas, and dogmas instead of a practice of life. Christian is the perfect indifference to dogmas, worship, priests, the Church, and theology'. 'And it is an unparalleled prevarication that these configurations of decadence and forms such as the 'Christian Church' and the 'Christian faith' are designated by those sacred names. What has Christ denied? Everything that today is called Christian'. These words would even be subscribed by that great Protestant of the North, Kierkegaard!

However, it might be objected that the road leading to the Church was necessary. Nietzsche would answer thus: let us recognize that the path that goes from the Good News to the Church is the same path that enters history with its orders and laws, that is, the path that leads to politics. Nietzsche does not refute the Christian in his individuality: 'Christianity is possible as a form of absolutely private existence [...] A 'Christian state', a 'Christian policy', on the other hand, is an impudence, a lie, just like a Christian military command that ultimately regards the 'God of hosts' as a chief of staff'. 'Christianity is still possible at any moment [...] Christianity is a practice, not a doctrine of faith. It tells us how to behave, not what to believe'. Once the Christian dissociates himself from the people, from the State, from the cultural community, from the judicial system, he rejects training, knowledge, education, the acquisition of goods, action, becoming apolitical and anti-nationalist, neither aggressive nor defensive. A Christian should be one who does not want to be a soldier, who is not interested in justice, who does not ask to join the police, who endures any suffering to ensure inner peace. Nietzsche mocks those who believe they can overcome Christianity through the natural sciences. 'Christian value judgments are not at all overcome by this; 'Christ on the cross' remains the most exalted symbol'.

Nietzsche is completely alien to the principles of Christian morality: religious individualism, awareness of sin, humility, concern for the salvation

of the soul. He opposes the idea of repentance: 'I don't love this kind of cowardice in the face of what has been done; one should not succumb to a sudden feeling of unexpected shame and remorse. Extreme arrogance must stand firm on this point. And, ultimately, what good is repentance?! No action can be cancelled simply because you regret having committed it...' Nietzsche does not intend here to attenuate responsibility, but rather to intensify it. In this case, the one who knows how much courage and pride are required to assert oneself in the face of fate speaks. From the perspective of his *amor fati*, Nietzsche speaks disparagingly of Christianity 'with its perspective of bliss'. As a man of the north, Nietzsche does not understand why he should be 'redeemed'. The Mediterranean religion of redemption remains completely alien to its Nordic nature. Nietzsche understands man only as someone who fights against fate: he finds incomprehensible a way of thinking that sees only punishment in struggle and action. 'Our real life is a false, rejected and sinful existence, a punitive existence...' Pain, struggle, work, death is assumed as objections directed to life. 'The innocent, idle, immortal, happy man: it is necessary to criticize first of all this vision that stands at the top of all our desires'. With particular vehemence, Nietzsche rages against the monastic contemplative life, against the Augustinian image of the 'Saturday of Saturdays'. He praises the fact that with Luther the contemplative life has come to an end. At this point, the Nordic tonality of the struggle and activity resonates loud and clear. The tone with which we utter these words today we first hear from Nietzsche.

Nietzsche is for us the philosopher of heroism. But this is only a half-truth if we do not also understand him as the philosopher of activism. Nietzsche perceived himself as Plato's historical antagonist. The 'works' do not arise from contemplation, from the recognition of transcendent values, but are the result of exercise, of a doing repeated again and again. In order to make it understandable, Nietzsche uses a well-known antithesis. 'The works, first and foremost! This means exercise, exercise, and even more exercise! The faith inherent in it will arise by itself, be assured of that!' In contrast to the Christian proscription of the political sphere, and especially of the sphere of action, Nietzsche presents the phrase with which he overcomes the opposition between Catholicism and Protestantism (faith-works): 'One must exercise oneself not in the strengthening of the feeling of value, but in doing; One must above all be capable of something.' With this, he restores the purity of the sphere of action, of politics.

'Values' in the Nietzschean sense do not constitute an afterlife and therefore cannot be converted into dogmas. In us, through us, values compete for supremacy: they exist as long as we support them. When Nietzsche urges us in this way: 'Be faithful to the earth!', he reminds us that the idea is rooted in our strength, without waiting for its 'realization' in a distant beyond. But simply mentioning the 'hereafter' of values in Nietzsche is not enough, unless one intends to refute at the same time the idea that 'values are realized through

action'. There is always something subordinate in the 'realization' of values, whether immanent or transcendent values.

Through the risk inherent in action, values arise from a force of their own on which any true ordering among men is built. Prominent forms of historical life will never be realized by an individualistic morality, even if it has an individualistic-religious foundation. According to Nietzsche, common morality has paralyzed the spirit of action, making it impossible to establish historical orders. As a consequence, there are only individual souls and no community that does not have only a provisional value, or types or 'forms of homogeneous activity of long duration'. However, the individual is not given the opportunity to assert himself as such, so everything becomes a staging. *'Therefore, everything is transformed into a mise-en-scène. Modern man lacks the sure instinct (consequence of forms of homogeneous and long-lasting activity in a certain human type); hence the inability to accomplish anything; He never fixes on his shortcomings as an individual.'* We are absolutely far from the perfection of being, doing and wanting. *'The effort of will that extends over a long period of time, the choice of conditions and valuations that give the possibility of disposing of the coming centuries, that is truly the anti-modern in the highest sense of the term. Dissolute principles give our epoch characteristics such as the redundant development of intermediate areas, the decline of rates.* On the other hand, National Socialism means the recovery of organizational principles and selective discipline.

Nietzsche regards the 'staging' of modern man fundamentally as a result of the morality of 'free will'. This morality is closely related to the generalized overvaluation of conscience. *'How wrong it is that the value of an action should depend on what precedes it in consciousness'. 'All perfect actions are unconscious and involuntary; conscience expresses an imperfect and often sickly personal condition. The degree of consciousness makes perfection impossible... a form of staging'. 'As a soldier trains, so man must learn to act. In fact, this unconsciousness belongs to any kind of perfection: even the mathematician unconsciously uses his own combinations...'. Unconsciousness, exercise, perfection. 'We must seek perfection where consciousness is least acquired... Righteousness and cunning stored up by generations, who have never become aware of their principles or have even felt a small shudder in front of them.* And this is something very different from the liberal doctrine of 'personality' which possesses a) principles and b) an individuality capable of being stronger than its own principles. Nietzsche starts not from principles, but from value evaluations corresponding to a certain human typology and useful for its conservation, where this 'conservation' should not be understood too quickly: with this term, Nietzsche refers to the conservation of the human typology together with all its values. *'All assessments refer to a specific perspective: the preservation of the individual, of a community, of a race, of a State, of a Church, of a faith, of a culture'. Nothing exists that, without relating to an existence, has value in*

itself. Values express existential conditions. Therefore, false values are not eradicated by principles: existence confronts existence.

The Nietzschean determination of values, which is Nordic and warlike, is opposed to the Mediterranean and priestly determination of values. The Nietzschean critique of religion is a critique of the priest and starts from the position of the warrior, at the moment when Nietzsche demonstrates how even the origin of religion is within the realm of power. From this follows the disastrous contradiction of morality based on the Christian religion. *'For moral values to reach dominion, it is necessary that they be put at the service of immoral forces and affections. The birth of moral values is, therefore, the work of immoral affections and considerations'*. Morality thus turns out to be the work of immorality. *'How to bring virtue to predominance: this treatise concerns the great politics of virtue'*. Here this doctrine is expressed for the first time: *'It is possible to achieve the predominance of virtue by the same means by which one is generally mastered, in any way, not by virtue.'* *'It is necessary to be very immoral in order to become moral by action...'*. Instead of bourgeois moral philosophy, Nietzsche establishes the philosophy of the will to power, that is, political philosophy. If he becomes a praiser of the 'unconscious', the latter should not be understood in the sense of depth psychology. Nietzsche is interested not so much in the unconscious impulses of the individual, but in the 'unconscious' understood as 'perfection' and 'potentiality'. In addition to this, the unconscious means life as a whole, the organism, the 'great reason' of the body.

Consciousness is only a tool, a particularity in life as a whole. Nietzsche contrasts the aristocratism of nature with consciousness. However, for millennia, a morality hostile to life has opposed the aristocratism of the healthy and strong. Like National Socialism, Nietzsche perceives in the state and in society the 'great agent of life', who must be accountable to the very life of any failed life. *'Humanity wants the decline of the unsuccessful, the weak, the degenerate: but Christianity opposes all this as a conservative force...'*. At this point we find the fundamental antithesis: it originates either from a context of natural life or from the equality of individuals before God. On this last statement is based, in the last analysis, the democratic egalitarian ideal, while the first contains the fundamental features of a new politics. In the desire to found the State on race lies an unprecedented audacity. A new order of things must result. It is this order that Nietzsche wanted to erect in opposition to the existing one. But what about the individual? Become an individual in a community again. The instinct of the herd is very different from the instinct of an 'aristocratic society'. In the latter reappear those strong and natural men who do not let their primal instincts wither away for the benefit of utilitarian mediocrity, men who cultivate their passions instead of weakening or annihilating them. On the other hand, the individual cannot comprehend all this. It takes a long time for affections to be 'tyrannized', and this can only be achieved by one community, one race, one people.

The justification of passion, of the body, of nature is, in the first place, a justification of reality. By imagining a creative subject, an author of total reality, Nietzsche perceives the 'innocence of becoming'. The Nietzschean task is to reintegrate the two spheres: that of reality and nature, on the one hand, and that of history on the other. They are the same spheres and the same reintegration undertaken by National Socialism. Instead of absolutely artificial antitheses based on the scheme of good and evil, in this case the hierarchical order of the best and the worst intervenes. And in light of this natural hierarchical order, history takes on a new meaning.

The manly era, the age of soldiers and craftsmen, heralded by Nietzsche, is about to begin. Each civilization redefines in its own way the relationship between man and woman. While the role that men will assume in the next era is clear, that of women is not yet clear. Women too must find their place in the new context. In this regard, read what Nietzsche wrote about the Greek woman.

The Nordic approach, realistic and virile, expresses first of all its distrust of 'happiness', 'bliss' and 'leisure in contemplative states', finding itself now in the vision of a loved one (in 'love'), now in the vision of the work of art. Man does not seek pleasure or avoid pain. Following the will to power, Nietzsche teaches that he seeks conflict, since the will to power is the will to overcome fate. 'How the maximum degree of endurance must be continuously exceeded to stay on top! This is the measure of freedom for both the individual and society: that is, freedom understood as positive power, as the will to power'. The upper type grows where maximum resistance must be constantly overcome. *'One must impose oneself to be strong, otherwise one will never be'*.

If there is an authentically German expression, it is precisely this: 'We must impose ourselves to be strong, otherwise we will never be'. We Germans know well what it means to overcome adversity. We fully understand the 'will to power', although in a completely opposite sense to what our adversaries assume. In this sense, Nietzsche has also said something very profound: *'We Germans want something that is not yet required of us, we want something more!'*

When we see German youth marching under the swastika badge today, we are reminded of Nietzsche's Untimely Considerations, where this generation is evoked for the first time. Our supreme hope is that the state will open up to these young people today. And when we greet this same youth with the cry of 'Heil Hitler', it is as if at the same time we are addressing our greeting to Friedrich Nietzsche.

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Chapter 2

Alfred Baeumler. Nietzsche, the philosopher and politician.

Introduction.

Je tente de me servir de ma plume comme d'un fusil (Bokov & Ligny, 2019).

We present here what we are almost sure is the first translation into English of Baeumler's masterpiece 'Nietzsche, the philosopher and politician' (A. Baeumler, 1931). A must for the serious scholars.

The order of this translation is the following: Preface, Introduction, I. The Philosopher. 1. Realism. 2. Being and Becoming. 3. Consciousness and Life. 4. Perspectivism. 5. The Will to Power. 6. The Heraclitean World. 7. Dionysus. The Eternal Recurrence. (Note). II. The Politician. 1. Germanic Basic Attitude. Relationship to Rome. 2. The Antichrist. Protestantism and Catholicism. 3. Rousseau. Against Democracy and Socialism. 4. Culture and State, Hegel. 5. Bismarck. Against the Christian 'Reich'. 6. The Good European. (Epilogue). *Note that all unattributed quotes are from Volumes IX-XIV of the large octavo edition of Nietzsche's works. The citation of pages refers to the original text. We expect that the next edition will be in the form of a book, and, at that moment, these citations will be revised.* Some footnotes in the original 1931 text were inserted inside the text as 'Original footnote'.

Preface of the text.

In this writing, Nietzsche is treated as a thinker of European rank and put alongside Descartes, Leibniz and Kant. He himself read neither Descartes nor Leibniz nor Kant properly: he grasped the systems of these thinkers solely in their context with the Christian tradition and opposed them. It is not about the precision and richness of his historical knowledge, but about the greatness and significance of his historical existence that comes to terms with those systems. One will miss in my portrayal the colorful play of colors that one is used to from other depictions. But here it is not about the poet and writer, but about the philosopher and politician Nietzsche. He who tries to put the varying statements of the writer on one level and then seeks to unite them again within one level of interpretation, he can only arrive at a unified picture by making Nietzsche into an inconsistent one. The real unity of this well-hidden Nietzsche and work reveals itself only to him who knows how to distinguish foreground and background, polemics and philosophy. I believe that through my interpretation I make some key concepts clear and thus say something seminal about the last of the great European thinkers.

The two perspectives of 'philosophy' and 'politics' do not indicate arbitrary cross-sections through Nietzsche's work, but they are the necessary starting points for a methodical interpretation of the overall phenomenon. In the section 'Philosophy' I restrict myself essentially to epistemology and metaphysics; I am not concerned with fullness, but solely with making the unity of the train of thought visible everywhere. The application to the individual areas of the human-historical world, such as lifestyle and

upbringing, art, psychology, philosophy of history, would be a task in itself.

I have tried to lay bare the ground plan of a buried temple and roll some column drums on top of each other. I hope others will undertake the reconstruction of the complete building.

Dresden, January 1931.

Introduction.

Nietzsche has so far always been understood, and misunderstood, from the standpoint of Christianity. He was taken as the perfecter of Master Eckhart or Luther, he was conceived as a prophet, a believer or at least as one struggling for faith. Even his atheism and his enmity towards Christianity were only seen from there: he was just an apostate, and the more vehemently he declared himself against everything Christian, the more one thought to be certain of his inner confession to the faith of the fathers, which he only wanted, could not get away from. The pious regarded his life as the passion of a godless man, his suffering as the consequence of his unbelief. The men of the world, on the other hand, found this suffering inspiring, the outbursts of the recluse intoxicating.

The misunderstandings to which Nietzsche's life work has been exposed cannot be gone into here. The reason for the improbable extent of these misunderstandings lies partly in the nature of the work itself. *Nietzsche's published writings indeed show very different faces, and for an observer who only knows them, it is difficult, even if not impossible, to see the unity of the life's work. But if one adds the unpublished writings, the unity of Nietzsche's production becomes very clear very quickly.* One perceives a writer who from the very beginning goes his way with the greatest certainty, without knowing it himself. At first glance it may seem as if he was enthusiastic about art one time, science another time, the Greeks another time, the French another time, always extreme, always fickle, equally vehement in grasping as in condemning. As if the man who exemplified loyalty to a great task like hardly any other had played the not seriously meant role of a lyrical-ecstatic Judas! What does reality look like? While in the period of his most exuberant hopes for Wagner and the coming German culture, the young Nietzsche writes down for himself alone in his sharpest pen the harshest psychological truths about Richard Wagner, a few years later, during the period of his psychological and skeptical aphorism books, which are so cold and dismissive outwardly, he does not give up his highest hope. *Nothing progresses one-dimensionally in him, he is never merely a mood character, someone who experiences aesthetically.* A hidden will directs all his steps. Every single work that he publishes is not the naive expression of a particular state of his soul, but each of these works pursues an intention, with each individual one the author wants to strike and convince certain people, evoke a specific effect. Therefore each of the works has a different tone, a different sound and style. *Each book is an artistically stylized action, it turns against someone, against something, and can only be properly understood from this goal.* One cannot therefore simply

take Nietzsche's 'views' from these works. *Exactly as the intention demands, the author creates light and shadow: he praises where in truth he knows himself superior, yes he even praises the enemy; he stabs and ridicules those with whom he runs on one track.* But this never happens senselessly or arbitrarily, everything is determined by the one task. What he really wants he only ever lets one guess. What he gives immediately is always foreground; he is a master of the foreground. He can be so because he is unshakably certain of his background. Nietzsche writes under pseudonyms: Schopenhauer, Wagner, Dionysus, the free spirit, Zarathustra are his masks.

Nietzsche knows how to make extraordinarily effective use of moods of the moment and ideas, impressions and experiences. But what always leads is the hidden pathos of his being. There is something uncanny about the art with which he knows how to hide himself, with which he creates foregrounds around himself. *Sometimes he himself becomes anxious about 'this whole uncanny hidden life' that he leads.*

Many colorful lights and colors play over such a work. This colorfulness has its basis in the sensitivity of its author. But at the same time it is also evidence of art and will. The colors are distributed and chosen with wisdom; a closedness of being, a oneness of will, as is otherwise only found in active natures, hides behind it. *He who does not see the matter around which Nietzsche's whole life revolved, for him his phenomenon dissolves into lyrical fragments and aphorisms.* But for him to whom this matter has become visible (here lies the difficulty), the event Nietzsche is also clear. *Nietzsche and his matter are one; unity, not multiplicity is the character of this life.*

For centuries Europe has been under pressure. It is as if since the end of the Middle Ages it has been looking for something that it cannot find: a form of life, a lost unity and certainty of existence. This Europe calls itself Christian; but alongside it, it is all kinds of other things: Greek and Roman, Indian and Chinese, philosophical and aesthetic, scientific and technical, martial and commercial. Properly considered, it itself does not really know what it actually is, and therefore it anxiously and restlessly seeks forms and concepts in all ages and cultures. The people of this Europe live out their lives in a thousand uncertainties and contradictions. *Everyone tries to come to terms in their own way: one kneels before the sacraments, as people did in the Middle Ages, another tries to freshen up his Protestantism with modern ideas, others throw themselves into the arms of the arts or ascetic science.* Political and social 'problems' arise, no one surveys them anymore, no one knows the way in or out anymore.

From the sun-bathed crowd, standing out against the dark cloud wall of an uncertain future, working, chatting, and enjoying, a man detaches himself. Just one sentence comes from the lips of this man with the far-seeing eye: 'God is dead'. *He does not get up and say: there is no God. He says: God is dead.* He says: God is no longer believed in. Modern man is chaos, he no longer has a unified soul, if he believed in God, this chaos would not exist.

But it does exist, therefore God is dead. No one pays attention to the speaker; his closest friends consider him a fool. *'The greatest events have the most difficulty reaching human feeling: for example, the fact that the Christian God is dead, that in our experiences no heavenly goodness and education is expressed any more, no divine justice, no immanent morality at all'*.

That is terrible news, which will still take a few centuries to reach the feeling of Europeans: and then for a while it will seem as if all weight has gone out of things. That is Nietzsche's experience: things have lost their center of gravity. And that is his horror: no one notices, no one sees the fearfully gaping void. The old values have received an additive that makes them worthless, but that does not disturb the citizens. *They only note that values have become 'problematic'*. Everything turns into a problem, God himself becomes an idea, sometimes even a problematic idea. The less one believes, the more one speaks of God. In place of a silent belief in God, an eloquent religion or even a garrulous religiosity has emerged. Then someone appears who is too proud to turn unbelief into a 'religious problem'. He has the courage to look into the void, he has the power to ask: What now? What unspeakable foolishness in the face of this unique situation to speak of a 'prophet', as if there could be a prophet without a God whom he proclaims. Certainly, the temptation to become a creator god brushed past Nietzsche at times. He invented Dionysus: Dionysus against the Crucified. But he also found the role of the prophet ridiculous (*'As for me, who occasionally feel in myself the ridiculousness of a prophet ...'*) and must therefore be strictly separated from the short-winded myth-inventors from his 'Dionysian' poetic entourage.

If one wants to historically characterize Nietzsche's phenomenon, then one must say: *it signifies the end of the Middle Ages. Only with Nietzsche is the Middle Ages really at an end, and the fact that this has not yet come to consciousness is what all the misunderstandings are based on that the phenomenon of Nietzsche still encounters.* What follows the end of the proper Middle Ages, considered in depth, are only two events: the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. What connects to these two movements, and what seemingly brings up a 'new age', the Enlightenment and Romanticism, only repeat these two movements: the Enlightenment is a daughter of the Reformation (with a predominance of the enthusiastic element), Romanticism in turn means the revival of the Counter-Reformation (Here I am not speaking of that almost pagan 'Heidelberg Romanticism' that I described in my Bachofen introduction, but of Romanticism as a spiritual-political movement in Europe that had and has the restoration of the Christian state as its goal). One should not cite the German classics: this classicism is only a moment between Enlightenment and Romanticism, a subjective event, not a spiritual-political one, an event of form, not an event in the reality of things, hence also without consequence and transformative power. The German bourgeoisie, which took this event for a real and historical one, is not coincidentally collapsing today... *That Nietzsche signifies the end of the Middle Ages means:*

he is neither Enlightener nor Romanticist. He stands beyond the parties and is therefore understood by neither the epigones of the one nor the other. The adherents of Romanticism, the defenders of the Christian-Germanic state, feel him to be an apostate and agitator, at best a tragic revolutionary; those belonging to the party of the Enlightenment claim him for precisely that reason as their own, as a standard-bearer of progress, as a European stylist and freethinker. But if anything can be proven with every touch upon his work, then it is this, that both are wrong: he is neither an arbitrary denier of God and revolutionary, for that his awareness of the historical moment is too sharp, his realistic prudence too great, nor is he an Enlightener in any form, moralist, humanist or pacifist. He forcefully opposes aesthetic and political romanticism. In democracy, however, he saw not his actual opponent. *For here he recognized under the guise of scientific and political slogans the more modern and therefore more dangerous form of Christianity.*

As far as Christian Western culture reaches, so far also reaches the official validity of the concept of love and the concepts derived from it of pity and tolerance. The significance of the Enlightenment rests on the fact that through it the concept of caritas was transferred into the secular realm. Against Rousseau, against the 18th century with its intellectual-moral optimism, with its sentimental belief in the harmony of reason, virtue and happiness, with its tendentious philosophy of tolerance, Nietzsche fought most vehemently all his life. Basically, according to a note in 'The Will to Power,' we good Europeans are waging a war against the 18th century (Will to Power, 117). But this war against the 18th century is only the negative side of the philosophy of the will to power. *So far the foreground of destruction has been observed too one-sidedly, Nietzsche's position as a fighter has been seen in isolation, without reference to the tremendous metaphysics of the background. Even Zarathustra was supposed to be only a preparation for the metaphysical main work!* This main work puts the world before us in precise visions. 'The Will to Power' is a genuine philosophical system, a strict context of thoughts, but 'strictness' is not to be sought here in the logical concatenation of the parts among each other, but in the internal coherence and consistency of the whole. *Nietzsche thought intuitively, each of his ideas is an intuition, each of his concepts comes from the heart, each of his thoughts is a spark from one and the same glowing center.* Nietzsche's work consisted in collecting such sparks. *When he returned from his lonely walks or was on the way, he wrote down his intuitions in flying pen strokes.* What remained was only redaction. Nietzsche did not know problems that are locked in cages and fed every day to be observed. If one wants to judge his work, one must perform for oneself the logical work of piecing it together, for which he had no time. For judging, formal perfection cannot be decisive, but only the inner coherence of the concepts. The pre-Socratic philosophers also left behind no elaborated systems. *What must be crucial is that the coherence of concepts is present and can be made logically clear at any time.*

This philosophy is unknown, even its name is unknown. It was natural for Nietzsche himself to speak of a 'Dionysian' philosophy. *But his philosophical main work and his teaching are more fittingly named after a Greek philosopher who really lived than after a god whom a philosopher invented in distress; we call the image of the world that Nietzsche envisioned not Dionysian, but Heraclitean.* This is a world that never rests, that is change through and through; but change means struggling and conquering. Heraclitus of Ephesus, from whom comes the saying: 'War is the father of all things', was from the beginning the thinker whom Nietzsche felt to be a primal kinsman, whom he venerated above all others at all times in his life. *To see the world and man in the Heraclitean way means for him to see them as they are: inexhaustible and inexhaustible, creating and giving birth from the depths of the unknown, producing shapes that emerge from the mixing jug of existence according to a law of eternal justice, battling each other, asserting or perishing themselves in this battle.* If one wants a formula for this worldview, one might call it heroic realism.

I. The Philosopher.

1. Realism.

'Once one said God when one gazed upon distant seas; but now I taught you to say: Übermensch.

God is a surmise; but I want your surmising not to reach any farther than your creative will.

Could you create a god? So keep silent before me about all gods! Well however could you create the Übermensch'.

(On the Blessed Islands).

Here is the first great philosopher of realism. One should not think here of any conceptual realism, nor of any empiricism or sensualism of whatever kind, how far behind Nietzsche does Feuerbach lie!, it is a realism of its own origin, a realism with which a new section in European philosophy begins. This realism stems from the deepest depths of Nietzsche, hence from where also the concept of the Übermensch stems. For the Übermensch is a realistic conception, he gives the earth a meaning. *'The Übermensch is the meaning of the earth'* (Zarathustra's preface). This concept should lead us back from 'otherworldly hopes' into the realm of life and creativity. 'The heart of the earth is of gold' (Zarathustra, Of Great Events). The concept of the Übermensch is a formula for the attitude of heroic this-worldliness, an attitude that is not yet characterized when one says: 'to love this life with all its suffering'. The heart of the earth is of gold: with this the great confidence in existence, the faith in the world is expressed that is always only the mirror image of an individual's faith in himself and his historical mission.

The this-worldliness of Nietzsche's philosophy must be seen as one with its heroic determination. Therein lies Nietzsche's Germanicism, which is expressed in him not only in the political sphere: this philosophy is heroic and this-worldly at the same time. Nietzsche is no freethinking atheist: he knows

the 'god-forming instinct'; indeed he admits that this instinct occasionally comes alive in him 'untimely' (Will to Power, 1038). He denies himself this instinct. There is something in him that forbids him today to speak of God. *God: today that means the degradation of man, the forfeiture of his will, the abrogation of all virtues.* That is why Zarathustra must be godless: because the earth must be won back. 'There are a thousand paths that have never been trodden, a thousand states of health and hidden islands of life. Man and human-earth are inexhaustible and unfathomable. Watch and listen, you loners! Winds with secret wing beats come from the future; and good tidings rise to his ears. Dead are all gods: now we want the Übermensch to live' (On bestowing virtue).

To battle for the earth Zarathustra sets out, his undertaking is heroic, his soul heroic. *'What qualities one must have to do without God, what one must be oneself to feel such a decide justified: strong, courageously self-assured, boundlessly rebounding, iron, mighty...'* (Beyond Good and Evil, section 164). For this heroic deed, this liberation from transcendence into life, Zarathustra remains alone. He says farewell to the people: doubly alone he travels into the mountains. He knows: 'The least solitary are the great creators. The legacy they left behind and the company they keep still today testify that Godliness was in this, that they knew how to be alone' (Beyond Good and Evil, section 164).

'What qualities one must have in order to do without God, what one must be oneself to feel such a decide justified: strong, boldly self-assured, boundlessly resilient, iron, mighty...'. For him, in the age of science it is a man's honor not to believe in God; conscience, decency demand it of him. The European morality that grew out of belief in God itself turns against this belief at its height.

Nietzsche's realism is a consequence of truthfulness and courage. Written on its banner is: Error is cowardice (Will to Power, section 429). Like a hero, like a lonely fighter who has been placed by fate on a post that all considered lost, Nietzsche finds his philosophy. There was perhaps only one among his contemporaries who felt similar to himself, not by chance did the philosopher of the new realism struggle with this One as hardly with any other. In the notes that Nietzsche's friend, the church historian Franz Overbeck made, in which he sought to demonstrate the incompatibility of Christianity with modern scientific culture, there is also a section on Bismarck's religion. There we read: 'About his religion Bismarck has as a rule and with the loyalty to himself characteristic of great men proudly kept silent, most eloquently in his Thoughts and Memories'. A hint of this hidden religiosity Overbeck finds in the letter Bismarck wrote to his wife upon entering the diplomatic service (1851): 'I am God's soldier. Where He sends me, there I must go, and I believe that He sends me and cuts my life as He needs it'. Here we can look into the roots of his religiosity, Overbeck adds, '...his religion lay in the soil of his self-esteem...' (Franz Overbeck, 'Christianity and Culture', posthumously

published by E. H. Bernoulli. Basel 1919, pp. 153 f). It is the self-esteem of heroic natures, which is one with the feeling of fate. From the same self-esteem and self-consciousness Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo' emerged.

'The humanitarian God is not demonstrable from the world known to us: thus far one can today drive and compel you, but what conclusion do you draw from this?' 'He is not demonstrable to us': *Skepticism of cognition*. You elders fear the conclusion; 'From the world known to us a completely different God would be demonstrable, one who is at least not humanitarian and, in short, you hold fast to your God and invent for Him a world that is not known to us' (Will to Power, 1036).

It is the pathos of cognition that drives Nietzsche to proclaim the 'true God'. The world in which we live, and the Christian God are in contradiction with one another, so the world and cognition must yield, concludes modern man. So the idea of God must yield, Nietzsche concludes. He wants to free the world from the curse that lies upon it. Through the philosophers this curse has been brought to the formula: the world we have to deal with is a world of deception and illusion; behind it lies the world of things-in-themselves, the true world. The former is a world of the senses, of stone and of becoming, the latter is a world of reason, of truth and of being. To expose 'the true world' as a fiction that is Nietzsche's concern as a philosophical thinker.

2. Being and Becoming.

The restoration of the real world, a *restitutio in integrum* in every sense, is the task. Nietzsche fights Eleaticism, whose greatest propagator was Plato. '*Christianity is Platonism for the people*', says the preface to Beyond Good and Evil. Of the older Hellenes Plato is separated by the lack of 'courage before reality'. '*Plato is a coward before reality, consequently he takes refuge in the ideal*' (Twilight of the Idols). Since Plato, the philosophers have lacked a sense of history, i.e., a notion of becoming. They see everything rigidly, fixedly; they think they are paying honor to a thing when they 'dehistoricize' it, endeavor to observe it sub specie aeterni, in short, when they mummify it. That is their 'Egyptianism'. Plato strayed from the Greek basic instincts, he succumbed to Oriental influences *by making the philosopher into a 'concept idolater'*, i.e., a kind of priest. The senses, 'which are immoral anyway', deceive us about the true world: therefore the philosophers posit a world of ideas in its place (Twilight of the Idols).

'With the highest reverence I set aside the name Heraclitus when the other tribe of philosophers discarded the testimony of the senses because they showed multiplicity and change, he discarded their testimony because they showed things as if they had duration and unity'. Heraclitus too thereby did wrong to the senses: the senses do not lie at all. It is we who first place the lie into them, e.g., the lie of the unity, of the thing-like, of substance, of duration. It is precisely 'reason,' of which we are so proud, that is the cause of our falsifying the testimony of the senses. The senses show us becoming, passing away, change, but that is reality. So they do not lie. 'But with this Heraclitus

will be eternally right that being is an empty fiction. The 'apparent world' is the only one: the 'true world' is merely added on...' (Ibid).

Nietzsche takes the side of the 'error' of the senses and of becoming against the truth of reason and of being. It has infinitely harmed his magnificent conception that in presenting his fundamental thought he did not get away from this opposition. For this led to him always speaking of 'error' where he meant truth. This circumstance is to blame that one could see a skeptic, a relativist, a philosopher of the 'as if' in him. Whoever wants to understand his philosophy must be able to abstract from the polemical form of some key concepts. When Nietzsche sides with error, he means 'error', i.e., what idealistic philosophers declare error is meant. But that is precisely the truth! Through our senses we have access to the world-in-itself. Our body takes in things as they are in themselves, because it itself is a thing-in-itself. In countless passages of his works Nietzsche pointed to the anti-Christian, anti-Platonic, anti-idealistic basic character of his teaching. Our whole philosophy, he says, has theologians' blood in its veins. Everywhere theologians' instinct and theologians' arrogance are at work where one claims a right 'to look down on and estranged from reality'.

'The idealist, just like the priest, has all the great concepts in his hand and now plays them out against the senses and knowledge' (Antichrist, 8).

Christianity is a form of hostility to reality (Antichrist, 27; also 30; 47).

Idealism is the heir of Christianity: the idealist flees from reality (Ecce homo, Why I Am a Destiny). It is the morality stemming from Christianity, the 'Circe of the philosophers', which leads the thinkers astray. They were always concerned with saving the freedom of the will, making man responsible, behind this wish lurks an 'instinct for punishing and judging', the psychology of free will is an invention of the priests. It is based on a false interpretation of what goes on inside us when we 'want' something. We believe we are the cause when we want something, we think we are catching 'causality in the act'. But for the doer, we credit our consciousness, the 'mind', our ego, the 'subject' (Such an assertion would of course presuppose that our will, our consciousness, can set something in motion).

But that is an error! The will moves nothing, it merely accompanies processes, it can also be absent (Twilight of the Idols). If this is not recognized, then all processes are interpreted as an act (an act of man or God), all events become a doing, i.e., consequence of a will and thus lose their innocence. In place of the actual flow of events we now believe we see 'things', which are only figments of our consciousness, which externalizes its own identity into the flow of events, creating 'things' that do not even exist. The resting, 'existent' thing is a fiction, a fiction of consciousness. There are no identical things, everything is in flux. Consciousness, identical with itself, creates these things in its own image. It is we who have created the thing, i.e., the ever-identical thing, the subject and the predicate, the deed and the object, substance and form. 'The world appears logical to us because we first made it logical' (Will to Power,

Fundamentally, this is Kant's doctrine: the intellect prescribes laws to nature. But with one crucial difference. Kant believed that the flow of events was disorderly, meaningless and worthless, that only the categories of the intellect give form to the sensory material grasped in space and time, thereby creating meaning and order. Nietzsche, on the other hand, seeks to prove the logical processing we perform on the world as a necessity posited with our existence, as a kind of fiction of our imagination. The logical elaboration of reality is merely a condition for us to be able to live in this world, to be able to find our way around in it. Indeed, Kant is not very far from this opinion either: in the 'Critique of Judgement' he repeatedly emphasizes that it is solely 'our' (human) intellect of which the critique speaks. But the contrast lies in the fact that Kant seeks all cognition on the path away from the senses, while for Nietzsche the senses, the body, are the real organon of cognition. Therefore, while he can acknowledge the logical articulation of the world as our achievement, he must evaluate this achievement differently from Kant. Consciousness, says Nietzsche, presents us with a 'world of identical cases', but thereby it removes us from reality. In thinking, we do not freeze the 'true' world as an interconnection of concepts, genera, forms, purposes, laws, but in so doing we merely construct a world in which our existence is made possible. 'In so doing, we create a world that is predictable, simplified, comprehensible, etc. for us'. Forms, genera, laws, ideas, purposes are fictions; we must beware of imputing a 'false reality' to them. For then we imagine that events 'obey' these forms, laws and ideas, whereas they are in fact self-willed and innocent! We introduce an artificial division into events, a division between that which does and that to which the doing conforms, but this separation of the what and the to which does not correspond to any factual state. It is invented so that we can see something permanent in the events, for form, law is regarded as something permanent and therefore more valuable.

But form is merely invented by us, beneath all forms life flows on incessantly, and no matter how often 'the same form is reached', this does not mean that it is the same form, but something new always appears (Will to Power, 521).

This aspect must be maintained: there is nothing permanent in the real world that we could cling to, the stream of events rushes past us and by us unceasingly. This world is a world of decay. It takes strength to endure the sight of this happening. An image of a world filled with permanent, 'existent' forms springs from a slackening of this strength. He who feels the strength within himself to assert himself in the great becoming and passing away, by organizing the piece of world around himself, can endure the gaze into the becoming. He who does not feel this power within himself attempts to place a meaning inherent in the becoming, for then he does not need to create it. The Heraclitean world is thus the opposite of a strong will: 'He who is unable to place his will into things, the will-less and impotent one, at least places a meaning into them, i.e., the belief that a will is already inherent in them. It is a

measure of the power of the will, to what extent one can do without meaning in things, to what extent one is able to live in a meaningless world: because one organizes a small piece of it oneself' (Will to Power, 585).

From this peak we take a look at the farthest peaks of Nietzsche's thought landscape. As a student of Heraclitus, he has destroyed the world of being; he has demonstrated that assuming an inherent will or purpose in events indicates a slackening of the constructive force, that assuming a God who gives meaning to events reverses all values; he has affirmed, deified the becoming, the 'apparent world' as the only real one. What then is truth, the will to truth? Truth cannot be an awareness of something that would be inherently fixed and determined, which we would only have to absorb and comprehend. *There is truth only for us, insofar as in the eternally flowing we make something firm, create limits, define.* 'The will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable, a bringing out of the human eye of that false character, a reinterpretation of it into the existent. 'Truth' is therefore not something that would be there and would have to be found or discovered, but something that has to be created and that provides the name for a process, even more for a will to overwhelm that in itself has no end: to impose truth as a processus in infinitum, an active determining, not an awareness of something inherently fixed and determined. It is a word for the 'will to power'. Life is founded on the presupposition of a belief in something permanent and regularly recurring; the more powerful life is, the wider the seemingly existent, as it were painted world must be' (Will to Power, 552).

3. Consciousness and Life.

What are we to imagine under an 'active determining', an 'overwhelming' and 'creating'? The question leads into the center of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge. Not consciousness determines and creates, but the body. It is of nobler descent than consciousness, also with regard to cognition. All errors of previous epistemology are based on the fact that the cognitive function has been attributed to the unity of consciousness, while it actually belongs to the unity of the body. Man feels himself as a unity before he becomes conscious of himself as a unity. *If I have a unity in myself at all, says Nietzsche, then it certainly does not lie in the conscious I and in feeling, willing, thinking, but somewhere else: in the preserving, appropriating, excreting, supervising cleverness of my whole organism, of which my conscious I is only a tool.* The I-feeling must not be confused with the 'organic feeling of unity'.

The order which we produce through our concepts must not be confused with the much older order that arises around us through the activity of the animated body. 'We were creative beings long before we created concepts'. The concept is later than the form, abstraction is preceded by the image. *'Man is a creature that forms shapes and rhythms; he is skilled in nothing better, and it seems he takes more pleasure in nothing than in inventing forms'.* Our perceiving is an original appropriating; the essential happening therein is an action, indeed a forcing into form. We are thoroughly active to the very

ground of our perception, 'only superficial people speak of 'impressions'. Man perceives in a rejecting, selecting, shaping manner. 'There is something active in the fact that we accept a stimulus at all and that we accept it as such a stimulus. It is characteristic of this activity not only to set forms, rhythms and sequence of forms, but also to assess the created structure in terms of incorporation or rejection. Thus arises our world, our whole world'; and to this world which belongs to us alone, first created by us, there corresponds no in-itself of things, but it itself is our sole reality. Cognition is an expression of the organic basic function of the drive of assimilation. *The essence of abstraction does not consist in an omission, but rather in an emphasizing, highlighting and intensifying.*

Nietzsche does not deny the activity of consciousness. He also describes it in a way that makes the difference between this activity and the basic cognitive function clear. Logic, he says, is tied to the condition: 'given there are identical cases'. From this, however, Nietzsche does not draw the conclusion that there is another kind of active determining, overwhelming and shaping besides the organic-sensual one, but rather lets himself be carried away to the assertion that through this presupposition reality is being 'falsified' (even sensual image creation could be called a 'falsification'! The word makes no sense since there is no 'true' world anyway). Here Nietzsche is seduced by the wish to completely suppress the consciousness that other philosophers have so immoderately overvalued. He would have to acknowledge two kinds of abstraction, two kinds of unity, two different basic functions of cognition. But he brushes up against the insight that thinking is an analysis as opposed to 'shaping' yet does not arrive at it. Instead, he tends to conceive of 'small reason', i.e., what we ordinarily call intellect or reason, as emerging from the 'great reason' of the body. *Accordingly, the unity of consciousness would only be a derivative of the organic feeling of unity. Among other things, I trace this fallacy back to the tremendous impact Darwin had on Nietzsche.* This fallacy is the source of his biologism, i.e., the tendency to trace everything, including consciousness, back to vital processes. *Consciousness, however, is not to be understood as a function of life, it is of a different kind than life.* Only if consciousness is something other than life, only if it opposes the stream of events, can there be any cognition at all. Nietzsche also brushed up against this idea but did not develop it. His whole concern is to recognize the significance of the body, including for cognition. 'Whoever has gained some idea of the body, how many systems work together at the same time, how much is done for and against each other, what subtlety there is in the equalization etc., will judge that all consciousness, by comparison, is something poor and narrow: that no mind comes anywhere near being sufficient for what would have to be accomplished here by the mind ...'. Therefore, he concludes, we must reverse the order of rank, everything conscious is only second-rate, the mental is only a 'sign language of the body'.

The world of the spirit would thus be a symbolic representation of the world of the body. In addition, Nietzsche has another conception according to which the spirit is seen as a means and tool in the service of higher life, the enhancement of life (Will to Power, 664). Two thoughts confront each other here: the mental as a symbol and the spirit as a tool of the body. Only in the second view does that emerge which Nietzsche is really concerned with: the degradation of the conscious spirit in favor of the unconscious activity of the body. This tendency culminates in the statement that all conscious action is more imperfect than the unconscious one. 'All perfect action is precisely unconscious and no longer willed; consciousness expresses an imperfect and often morbid personal state' (Will to Power, 289).

This theory of knowledge is characterized by the turn against consciousness. *Consciousness has been overvalued by some philosophers; in Nietzsche there is no overlooking but rather a turn against consciousness.* He lets another unity take the place of the unity of consciousness and actually carries through this basic idea. Behind the turn stands his whole world view, his transvaluation of all values. This realistic theory of knowledge is directed against the 'priestly and metaphysical falsifications' of the senses (Will to Power, 820), which puts the whole human body in place of Kant's 'unity of apperception'. This body is more than a work of art, it is an artist, a unity that creates forms and rhythms. Nietzsche develops the entire theory of knowledge as it were out of a transcendental aesthetics of the body, transcendental logic recedes completely into the background. But one should not think that one can therefore dismiss this theory of knowledge as an aestheticism! What connects the body's perceptive creativity with art are the senses and shaping. From this it does not follow that cognition is 'only' an artistic process (although Nietzsche's relegation of logic could lead to such a conclusion), but rather that in the structure of the body, in the activity of the artist and in the activity of cognition the same organizing force manifests itself. Nietzsche clearly and loudly expresses his sympathy for artists, but only because they are more right than idealistic philosophers have been so far. 'In the main I side more with artists than with all philosophers so far: they did not lose the great path on which life moves, they loved the things 'of this world', they loved their senses' (Will to Power, 820).

Seen from the history of philosophy, Nietzsche's turn against consciousness represents the most emphatic attack on the Cartesianism of modern philosophy (also in this respect Nietzsche resumes Ludwig Feuerbach's struggle). *Descartes is the progenitor of idealistic philosophy; since him, the proposition holds: the idea we have of our soul is more certain and more distinct than that which we have of our body* ('Princ. Phil.' I, 8). Kant does not maintain this distinction, but he goes even further in the direction taken when he puts external, bodily appearances on the same level as internal psychic ones, insofar as both are only phenomena and say nothing about the nature of things in themselves (Critique of Pure Reason. 2nd ed. p. 68 f). *The*

distance that Descartes had placed between soul and body is now placed by Kant between the soul and the body on the one hand and things in themselves on the other. Without knowing it, Nietzsche follows Kant's critique by putting inner and outer world on the same level and emphasizing the phenomenality of the inner world (Will to Power, 477). Only for him the word 'phenomenality' no longer makes sense, for he is no idealist. Basically he only wants to say: the inner world has no advantage over the outer one, there is no distancing from things in themselves, for there is no more self that would separate us from the body and from the world. Where there is an I, there is also a 'body' as something alien to the I. Not by chance, however, Nietzsche does not speak of the body but of the living body. The body is the inanimate body, opposite which stands the abstract unity of consciousness; the unity of the living body, on the other hand, is the will to power. Only since Descartes founded the philosophy of consciousness have philosophers had a 'body'. Nietzsche abolishes the philosophy of consciousness and restores the doctrine of the unity of the living body, which is basically Greek. 'Essential: to proceed from the living body and use it as a guide. It is the far richer phenomenon which allows for clearer observation. Belief in the living body is better established than belief in the spirit' (Will to Power, 532).

Nietzsche's theory of knowledge is the most important achievement of anti-Cartesianism in modern philosophy. Anti-Cartesian trains of thought have certainly been voiced before him; basically all empiricists are enemies of Cartesianism. However, Nietzsche is no ordinary empiricist. *His realism is not based on the assertion that all our knowledge begins with experience, but on the proof that the body is a unity superior to consciousness.* The empiricist is refuted by Cartesian philosophy before he begins. Nietzsche, on the other hand, takes hold at a point that Cartesian philosophy does not reach. Of course, he has not always escaped the danger that threatens all anti-Cartesianism. When the 'soul' is detached from its connection with 'God', when consciousness no longer occupies the dominant position given to it by the idealist, then man falls back into the cosmos. *The task would be to define him as a cosmic being without letting him perish in the all, to see him in connection with nature without being misled by the idea of his 'smallness' in comparison to the size of the world outside him into false conclusions.* For quantity is not decisive after all. For the idealistic philosopher, man's outstanding position within the corporeal world is secured in advance by the qualitatively different, incorporeal consciousness. But as soon as the standpoint of consciousness is surrendered, the question arises as to what still distinguishes man from other beings. He, who just a moment ago was the 'lord of creation', is now swallowed up by the abyss of things, by the cycle of becoming and passing away.

At a very early date, Nietzsche became aware of this consequence of anti-Cartesianism. The posthumous fragment entitled 'On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense' (1873) begins with the characteristic words: 'In some

remote corner of the universe poured out into innumerable solar systems, there once was a star on which clever animals invented cognition. It was the most arrogant and mendacious minute in 'world history'; but still only a minute'. All the consequences resulting from the relativity of man to a cosmic being are drawn here with merciless consistency. Since the intellect is regarded only as a 'means' for the preservation of the individual, the drive for truth appears as a riddle. The riddle is solved by Nietzsche defining that to be 'truthful' means to lie in a style that is binding for all. *Truth is defined as a 'sum of human relations'*. It is disputed whether the conception of the world that man has can be called in any way 'more correct' compared to that of the lizard or the insect, since every standard for this is lacking. *We produce the ideas of space and time with the same necessity with which the spider spins its web; we do not know a world other than our own*. The equation of man's conception of the world with that of any random animal seems to be the necessary consequence of every anti-Cartesianism. This consequence has never been extensively refuted by Nietzsche. From his middle period there is that expressive aphorism (Wanderer, 14), in which rings the sigh: 'Our haste in the world! Oh, it is a far too improbable thing!', and in which the drop of life in the world is called insignificant for the overall character of the immense ocean of becoming and passing away. Indeed, even the phrase about the 'eruptive skin disease' of our planet can be found here. 'Perhaps the ant in the forest imagines just as foolishly that it is the purpose and intention of the existence of the forest, as we do when we almost involuntarily connect the extinction of mankind in our fantasy with the end of the earth'.

The nihilism that speaks from these statements is of course not based on a failure of Nietzsche's intellect but is more deeply grounded. What is at issue here is the cardinal problem of philosophy, the question of man: how is this question answered by a thinker who keeps his gaze fixed on the eternal becoming and passing away? You see, the adherents of Cartesianism will cry, man and truth perish, Nietzsche's philosophy refutes itself! Such a conclusion would be premature. Let us not forget that Nietzsche's theory of knowledge is before us only in fragments. If we want to come to a judgment, we must examine these fragments for their exploitability: such an examination shows that relativistic conclusions by no means necessarily follow from Nietzsche's starting points. His main thoughts can be accepted without man perishing in the flood and the concept of truth losing its meaning. From a posthumous note dating from the time of 'The Gay Science' and marked with the catchword 'Main thought!', it is evident that Nietzsche, in some moments, raised himself to a height of objective thinking where every relativistic tendency died away. *In the first part of the note in question, the thought is repeated that there is no individual truth, only individual errors, indeed the individual itself is called an error*. Nietzsche then continues: 'But I distinguish: the imagined individuals and the true 'life systems', of which each of us is one; one throws both into one, while 'the individual' is only a sum of conscious sensations and

errors, a belief, a little piece of the true-life system or many little pieces thought together and fabricated together, a 'unity' that does not stand up. We are buds on a tree, what do we know about what we can become in the interest of the tree! But we have a consciousness as if we wanted and should be everything, a fantasy of the 'I' and all 'non-I' Ceasing to feel oneself as such a fantastic ego! Learning step by step to discard the supposed individual! ... Beyond 'me' and 'thee'! Feeling cosmically!

From this juxtaposition of 'imagined individuals' and 'true life systems' a different conception of man follows than the relativistic one, which always has the individual in view. The concluding words 'feeling cosmically' also point to this. 'Magnificent discovery: not everything is incalculable, undetermined! There are laws that remain true beyond the measure of the individual!' The tracing back of all human doing and driving, all acting and inventing to vital processes must not be a conception that annihilates man, it depends on what one understands by 'life'. Life viewed as a cosmic fact would resist any relativization. If one grasps it only as an empirical fact, as the biologist does, then Nietzsche's philosophy must appear as one single tremendous biologism. Such an interpretation, however, becomes altogether unlikely when one considers what significance the concept of 'life' has in Nietzsche's work as a whole.

As is evident from countless passages, for Nietzsche 'life' means not an empirical-physiological but a metaphysical, indeed even a 'Dionysian', i.e., divine phenomenon.

4. Perspectivism.

If there is a thinker besides Heraclitus to whom Nietzsche's philosophy comes close, then it is Leibniz. The system of the will to power is erected on a monadological basic view: the world consists of a sum of force units; from whose conflict an equilibrium arises at every moment. Each of these points of force conceives the world according to its own force quantum, there is therefore no 'truth' that is universally binding. The static truth for all is replaced by a general dynamism and perspectivism. Truth dissolves into an immense abundance of perspectives of individual force centers on a whole. Even Leibniz's definition of the monad as a 'miroir vivant' is applied by Nietzsche at one point (admittedly without acknowledging the borrowing): 'we are living mirror images'. In the 'Nachlass', one finds a characterization of Leibniz in which he appears almost like a doppelganger of Nietzsche: he is called dangerous, a true German who needs foregrounds and foreground philosophies, daring and mysterious.

Leibniz is the originator of the system of pre-established harmony: every monad is a substance in itself and yet from the beginning integrated into the universal system of supreme wisdom and goodness. It is entirely active force, yet there is never a struggle between these individual forces, for the substances do not touch each other: they stand in a preordained harmony to each other.

In Nietzsche, by contrast, struggle is the only reality; equilibrium, harmony, is the problem. His system is monadological, but not harmonistic. It signifies the tremendous attempt to understand all happening, all movement, all becoming as 'a settling of force- and power-relations, as a struggle' (Will to Power, 552). In this respect, Nietzsche's doctrine stands at the opposite end of the diameter from Leibniz's doctrine as the last great attempt to philosophically justify the Christian God.

We have to distinguish two kinds of relativism. *Biological relativism speaks of the 'environment' of a particular living being or species; it relates the individual being and its world to the existing greater world. This relativism is also found in Nietzsche, but it is suspended by a deeper and more fundamental relativism according to which the whole world is nothing other than a totality of actions.* The organic being thus no longer stands helpless and small opposite the immense soulless universe, but its life represents a special case of what happens in the world at all. Thereby the possibility opens up that a peculiar dignity accrues to organic life: it is conceivable that in the organism the universal essence of the world attains its most perfect representation. From this consequences for the theory of knowledge would also have to be drawn. Nietzsche did not draw these consequences; his theory of knowledge is a torso.

Since we only know the world from our individual standpoint, we fall into error upon error when we take our perspectives as 'true', i.e., as universally binding. 'Our world' is sheer appearance, it is something produced by the creative in us. All that lives has such a creative center, and everything that is its 'external world' merely represents the sum of its evaluations. But these evaluations stand in some relation to its existence-conditions, they are 'physiological requirements for the preservation of a certain kind of life' (Jenseits, 3).

Each individual being is surrounded by an 'apparent world' created by its evaluations. The philosopher still recognizes even this world as real, i.e., as belonging to total reality. Consequently, for him the distinction between a 'real' and an 'apparent' world loses its meaning [Original footnote. *It has been established that Nietzsche adopted the concepts of real and apparent world, perspectivism and semiotic cognition from the book of the philosopher Gustav Teichmüller entitled 'The Real and the Apparent World' (cf. H. Voss, 'Zeitschr. f. Philos. u. philos. Kritik' 1913, p. 106 ff). From this, however, one should not conclude a dependence of Nietzsche on Teichmüller in terms of content. The book in question appeared in 1882. As early as 1873, in the fragment on truth and lies in an extra-moral sense, Nietzsche sketched a relativism that contains in germ the later perspectivism of Nietzsche's. Undoubtedly Nietzsche owes Teichmüller's book a sustained stimulus, in terms of content he comes to opposite conclusions. His references to Teichmüller's formulations will not surprise one who knows Nietzsche's way of working: he is always related to someone, always in struggle]. Every*

single existence with its perspectives constitutes 'the world'.

'Every force-center has its perspective for the rest, i.e., its quite determinate valuation, its mode of action, its mode of resistance. The 'apparent world' thus reduces itself to a specific kind of action upon the world that starts from a center. Now there is no other kind of action: and the 'world' is only a word for the total play of these actions. Reality consists precisely in this particular action and reaction.....of each particular against the whole... No shadow of right remains here to speak of appearance...' (Will to Power, 567) .

The existent is that which has effect upon us, which proves itself by its effect.

'To exist' means: I feel myself affected by it as existent.

'Appearance' is thus for Nietzsche only a word for the reality related to a subject, i.e., but for the 'real and only reality of things'. *With the word appearance nothing further is expressed than the inaccessibility of this reality for logical procedures and distinctions.* Appearance is appearance solely in relation to 'logical truth', which is possible only in an imaginary world.

The concept of appearance is therefore a consequence of Nietzsche's realism for him. 'I do not see 'appearance' in contrast to reality, but on the contrary take appearance as the reality that resists transformation into an imaginary 'world of truth'. A specific name for this reality would be 'will to power', namely designated from within and not from its elusive Proteus nature'. 'The will to power' creates the world anew in every moment, interprets it anew in every moment. It appears most powerful in organic beings: 'The essential thing in organic beings is a new interpretation of events: the perspectival inner multiplicity which is itself an event'.

'The interpretive character of all happening. There is no event in itself. What happens is a group of phenomena selected and summarized by an interpreting being'.

The reality that concerns us is thus the result of an interpretation. Kant's epistemological critique ultimately arrives at the same conclusion. But in Kant, it is reason that interprets; in Nietzsche, it is the living force. This does not signify a difference in degree, but one in kind. For reason is unitary, and to this one reason corresponds the one world of science. Nietzsche, on the other hand, seeks to understand the manifold world, and he finds that there is no world without specific forces, each of which has its own specific way of reacting: a world without action and reaction would be just another word for nothingness (Will to Power, 567).

But how is knowledge still possible in such a world? Does everything here not dissolve into the actions of specific, i.e., unknowable, forces? Every being is sheer action, every being interprets from out of itself, and is thus blind to the others: do we not on this path fall into the abyss of agnosticism, which is the necessary consequence of animal limitation?

We stand before the core question of the philosophy of 'will to power'. The fragmentary nature of the work is felt here to be particularly painful. Nevertheless, with the help of the other Nachlass, an answer by Nietzsche can

be reconstructed. *One should never forget that also in the seemingly so lifeless field of epistemological critique Nietzsche always has an opponent in mind.* If this opponent is logical idealism and optimism, relativism must be brought out by Nietzsche. This relativism does not arise from a despair of the possibility of knowledge but is a reaction of probity to the falsehoods of consciousness philosophy. The philosophy of consciousness has logicalized the world, it has laid a net of concepts over reality and thus concealed reality from our sight. *In place of eternal becoming it has posited a fictitious, rigid being. In the logically rectified world there exist only relations-in-themselves, relations of dependence, which find their formulation in the so-called 'laws of nature'.* When two phenomena follow each other unchangeably, we assume a lawful relation between them, and unnoticed this relation, this 'law', takes the place for us of the reality of these two phenomena and their succession. We substitute for reality a relational formula and now believe the next time on the basis of this formula to see the 'same phenomenon'. But with that we have robbed real happening of its unrepeatability and uniqueness; we have interpreted it from without, not from within. An 'external' behavior we call a mechanical one: what is only 'mechanically' regulated is precisely externally regulated. As 'externally regulated' the whole mechanistically interpreted world presents itself to us. Nietzsche, the philosopher of will to power, who sees the world from within, must become the opponent of the mechanistic explanation of the world. *Indeed, here lies the tremendous significance of his system: it is the first philosophical system that overcomes the mechanistic worldview dominant since the Enlightenment.*

All interpretations, all phenomena, all laws, it says in the 'Will to Power', are symptoms of an internal happening (Will to Power, 619). The 'law,' which formulates regular happening, says nothing about the reality of the whole phenomenon: it only raises the question of where it comes from that something repeats itself here, it is a conjecture that a 'complex of forces that are initially unknown, and force-triggering' corresponds to the formula (Will to Power, 629). To accept that forces here obey a 'law' would mean to rob happening of its innocence, for the expression law 'has a moral aftertaste'. It is about something completely different from obedience: 'The invariable succession of certain phenomena proves no 'law,' but a relationship of power between two or more forces' (Will to Power, 631). 'The degree of resistance and the degree of overpowering, which is what all happening is about ... There is no law: every power draws its ultimate consequence at every moment. Precisely that there is no alternative, on that rests calculability' (Will to Power, 634).

Nietzsche thus does not deny the possibility of a certain predictability of happening, he only denies the existence of 'laws'. For in the concept of law one thinks of a lawgiver who demands obedience, and of one who obeys as if it were out of deference to the law. The law further corresponds to a rigid, uniform world: nothing new is possible under the law. But real happening

brings something new at every moment: 'At no moment is oxygen exactly the same as in the previous one, but something new: even if this newness is too subtle for all measurements...'. *There exist neither fixed forms nor fixed qualities*: 'The tree is something new at every moment: we assert the form because we cannot perceive the finest, absolute motion: we introduce a mathematical average line into the absolute motion...'. So instead of the law not lawlessness steps in, but the 'average line,' instead of 'truth' comes 'probability': 'There are as few 'things' as there can be 'absolute cognition'. In place of basic truths I posit basic probabilities, provisionally adopted guidelines according to which one lives and thinks. These guidelines are not arbitrary but corresponding to an average of a habituation. Habituation is the consequence of a selection that my various affects have made, all of which wanted to feel good and preserve themselves in the process'. According to the above quoted aphorism 634 of the 'Will to Power' we can extend this thought beyond the sphere of the organic being: for the total happening there are indeed no basic truths, but basic probabilities, i.e., happening does indeed not obey any 'law' but still always the same uniform outcomes arise because every power 'draws its consequence' at every moment. We may only not assume that now 'the same thing happens' a second and third time: the outcome is in fact always new.

Life, the will to power, makes a new throw at every moment. The individual events do not follow one another like the links of a chain but succeed one another freely like the throws when playing with dice.

When Nietzsche replaces truth with probability, he does not put an indeterminate chaos in place of order but replaces a false concept of order with a more correct one. His philosophy rejects the concept of an exact calculability of what happens, it claims that our cognition of nature is only a prediction of probable outcomes. It thus puts in place of an allegedly causally determined world a world of events that succeed one another independently, purely 'coincidentally', just as do the throws when playing with dice. We know that this coincidence also has its order: with the observation of this order we enter into the vast and wonderful realm of probability calculation. Nietzsche did not know probability calculation, but his philosophy points to it. Among the indications that allow us to expect that the longest period of misunderstanding his philosophical system is over belongs the fact that modern science more and more frees itself from the shackles of the causal worldview. Considerations and calculations of probability await an ever-growing importance, and with that the insight into the significance of that thinker who already made this turn decades ago on the basis of his metaphysical premises may also grow.

In modern natural science, probability calculation is applied to happening for the same reasons for which Nietzsche already combatted the mechanistic interpretation of the world. One has discovered the world of the infinitesimally small, which lends itself to neither calculability nor

logicalization in the classical manner. There only remains to posit 'average lines'. *Average values, probabilities take the place of 'exact' determination.* With that precisely what Nietzsche demanded has happened: the world becomes free from the compulsion of the 'law'. The divestment of the causality concept for our cognition is the widely visible expression of this process. The causal relation between two processes seems always the same, something here 'repeats' itself. The number, however, which designates a probability result, leaves open precisely the possibility on which for Nietzsche everything depends: that the event progresses a little differently each time because it indicates each time the outcome of a struggle that has just taken place. Nature is always a different one, 'there is no second time'.

From this perspective it first becomes understandable what high significance accrues to Nietzsche's rejection of 'causalism'. 'Two successive states, one cause,' the other 'effect', is false. The first state has nothing to effect, the second nothing has effected it. *It has to do with a struggle between two elements unequal in power: a new order of forces is achieved, according to the measure of power of each one.* The second state is something fundamentally different from the first (not its effect): the essential is that the factors engaged in the struggle emerge with different quantities of power' (Will to Power, 633). Happening is neither effected nor effecting, the 'cause' is fabricated in addition to happening. The basic presupposition thereby is the belief in the recurrence of identical cases. The causal interpretation is thus a consequence of the logicalization of the world based on the standpoint of consciousness. *Reality knows no identical but only similar cases. Through logicalization the character of life, i.e., of will to power, is robbed from the world.* 'All struggle, all happening is a struggle, needs duration. What we call 'cause' and 'effect' leaves the struggle out and thus does not correspond to happening'. In the causally determined world, identical cases seem to be subjected in lasting obedience to the 'same law'; real, living happening, however, is nothing but an unceasing process of power quantifications. The organism would be definable as a *'lasting form of processes of power quantifications, where the various antagonists for their part grow unequally'* (Will to Power, 642).

The individual center of force, as was said earlier, interprets the world from out of itself. We can now describe the kind of 'interpretation' more precisely. That which interprets is the will to power. *To 'interpret' is just another word for a means to become master over something.* Sheer differences in power that existed could not feel themselves as such. 'There must be a something that wants to grow that interprets every other something that wants to grow according to its value'. This something that wants to grow, the will to power, is what demarcates and determines rank, which posits differences in power at all in the first place (Will to Power, 643).

On the basis of the necessary perspectivism, every center of force constructs from out of itself the entire remaining world, but to construct means: to

measure, feel, shape at/on itself, at/on its own power (Will to Power, 636).

5. The Will to Power.

Nothing has stood so much in the way of understanding Nietzsche's philosophy as the title of his main philosophical work. One believed to know what 'will' and what 'power' is and interpreted the title accordingly. In truth nothing is so difficult to understand and paraphrase as what Nietzsche actually means with the words 'will to power'. Understanding starts in the moment when one gives up linking the concepts 'will' and 'aim/goal'. The will to power is not a will that has power as its aim/goal, that 'strives' after power. The will is also not directed at 'something', all these conceptions falsify the reality of willing. Insofar as aims and goals exist, they are posited by the will, stand in its service and hence cannot be something outside of it, toward which it 'strives'. It itself does not strive toward any goal, it itself is eternal becoming that names no goal. This becoming is a struggle.

What then is willing? Nietzsche explains: 'Willing as such is the same as wanting to become stronger, wanting to grow, and also wanting the means thereto' (Will to Power, 675). Strength is no goal of the will because it is the will itself. The will thus 'wants' only itself: so far the explanation gives no offense. The 'growth,' however, could be understood as a passive process, then Nietzsche's image of the world would be fundamentally misunderstood. Growth is no 'process': by growth Nietzsche understands rather a doing, it is nothing other than a consequence of victories. Causalism is rejected by Nietzsche because it conceals the world as struggle; for the same reason he turns against teleology: the seeming purposiveness in happening is merely the consequence of will to power: every victory sets an order; 'becoming stronger involves orders that seem similar to a purposiveness-design' (Will to Power, 525).

The will has no goal that would lie outside of it, it is not at all 'for itself': 'will' is only an expression for the respective overall state of a being. In humans it looks like this: willing is commanding, but commanding is an effect, and this effect is a 'sudden explosion of forces'. The path of the will is marked by nothing but explosions of forces. What we understand by 'willing' in the narrower sense, conscious will, is only an accompanying phenomenon of the essential, which is an outflow of force. 'Willing is only incidental'. Conscious will accompanies the actual will which always has the infinite before it and hence is 'free'. It is thus not 'free' because it 'sets itself goals', but on the contrary, because it has no goal, because, seen from consciousness, it always goes into the dark. To want something does not mean to 'strive for' a goal, but it means: 'to do an experiment in order to find out what we can do; about that only success or failure can instruct us'. All willing is thus in truth a being-able-to: it is an attempt of power. With that, traditional theory of will is abandoned, and Nietzsche can say: 'There exists no will at all, neither a free nor an unfree one. Under certain circumstances an action follows upon a thought: together with the thought arises the effect of commanding, to it

belongs the feeling of freedom that one commonly localizes in the 'will itself' (while it is only an accompanying phenomenon of the will). That which is called willing is a prejudice: fact is solely that something happens through us. The regularity of this happening leads us to the belief: what we do regularly is what we 'will'; therefore we are free. 'The fact is: 'in this or that case I tend to do this'. The illusion is: this or that case has arisen, I now want to do this'. When someone is surprised by his own actions, as in the case of passion, then he doubts his freedom, and one speaks perhaps of demonic influences. In such cases our superficial psychology of will fails. The question is: out of what is action taken? The for what? Where to? is something secondary. Action can be taken out of pleasure, i.e., out of overflowing feeling of power, or out of displeasure, i.e., out of inhibition of the feeling of power. But in no case is action taken for the sake of happiness or benefit or in order to ward off displeasure: 'rather a certain quantity of force expends itself and seizes upon something in which it can vent itself. That which one calls 'goal', 'purpose', is in truth the means for this involuntary explosive process'.

From this follows a strictly anti-hedonistic conception of the essence of real willing. Pleasure and displeasure become something secondary: they are the oldest symptoms of all value judgments, but not their causes. Above all, pleasure does not arise from the 'satisfaction' of willing. Since there exists no 'goal' of willing, there exists also no final state in which willing could satisfy itself. Nothing was more hateful to Nietzsche's Nordic-tense nature than the Oriental idea of blissful repose, the concept of the 'Sabbath of Sabbaths' of Augustine. *His doctrine of will is the most perfect expression of his Germanism.* 'Happiness ('pleasure') as the goal of action is only an intensifying means of tension: it must not be confused with happiness that lies in the action itself. Final happiness is quite specific; the happiness in the action would have to be designated by a hundred such specific images of happiness'. The 'in order that' is an illusion: the agent mirrors a happiness for himself that he wants to reap and over that forgets the actual driving force. The imagined goal is only there in order to heighten the desire for discharge to its highest point. 'An overflowing charged feeling of power exists: the imagined goal of the action anticipates the release and thereby excites even more to discharge: the subsequent action gives the actual release'.

We say we want 'something'; in truth something wants in us. This something mirrors an image, a goal to us that now works as motive, in truth it is always only the force that 'urges'. *All our actions, all our thoughts come unconnected, each one separately, out from the same depth of our self.* Consciousness only looks on. 'Everything that enters consciousness is the last link of a chain, a conclusion. That one thought would be directly cause of another thought is only apparent. The actual connected happening plays itself out below our consciousness: the appearing rows and successions of feelings, thoughts, etc. are symptoms of the actual happening! Under every thought hides an affect. Every thought, every feeling, every will is not born from one

specific drive, but it is an overall state, an entire surface of the whole consciousness and results from the momentary power constellation of all the drives that constitute us, thus of the currently reigning drive as well as of those obeying or resisting it. The next thought is a sign of how the overall power situation has shifted in the meantime'. Every action is separated by an infinity from the 'pale conscious image' that we have of it during execution. 'Purposes are signs, nothing more'. 'Whereas otherwise the copy is inferior to the original, here, in contrast, the lived, in the feeling of power, freedom, pleasure that goes with it, is vastly different from any picture that can be made of what has been lived'. While consciousness believes it makes the decision and directs, from its viewpoint, really the commanding comes from somewhere else: 'it decides only that whatever decided steps into consciousness. The one who commands is in turn commanded'.

One must gauge at this decisive rejection of the pleasure-displeasure principle the worth of the Nietzsche interpretations in which the philosopher of will to power is opposed to the pessimist Schopenhauer as Dionysian hunter of pleasure. Nietzsche's philosophy moves beyond the pleasure and displeasure principle and thus also beyond the contrast between optimism and pessimism. To the model the copy usually follows; here, in contrast, a kind of copy precedes the model. In truth we never fully know what we do, for example when we want to take a step or want to utter a sound. Perhaps this 'wanting' is only a pale shadow of what is really already in becoming, a following depiction of our being able and doing: sometimes a thoroughly false one, where we do not seem able to do what we want'.

Into the most everyday notions the concept of purpose and will corrupts all reality for us. Everywhere we find a purposiveness of nature, but that which we 'will' and that which we do are something different. No bridge leads across. 'I eat in order to sate myself', but what do I know of what satiation is! In truth, satiation is reached but not willed, the momentary sensation of pleasure at every bite, as long as hunger is there, is the motive: not the intention 'in order to', but an attempt at every bite whether it still tastes. Our actions are attempts whether this or that drive takes pleasure in it, up to the most intricate, playful expressions of the urge toward activity that we misinterpret and misunderstand through the theory of purposes.

There exists only a terminological, not a factual contradiction when Nietzsche sometimes wholly denies will and then speaks of will to power after all. What he denies is conscious, goal setting will that belongs to the fabricated beings of the 'inner world'. The basic principle of his psychology therefore is: 'Sensation and thinking are sufficient here. Willing as something third is an illusion'. *Will to power is not a willing but a being-able-to; it is the really working unity in whose place idealism allows consciousness to be active.* The mistake of previous philosophers was to ascribe to the unity of consciousness what in reality, as Nietzsche calls it, the unity of power effects. In the concept of will to power modern anti-Cartesianism reaches its high point. Therefore

the main work also bears this concept as title.

The 'monstrous errors' of idealism can be systematically summed up as follows (Will to Power, 529). *The basic mistake is the 'nonsensical overestimation of consciousness' from which a unity, a being has been made that feels, thinks, and wills.* This being is called 'spirit'. Everywhere purposiveness, system, coordination appear, this spirit is assumed as 'cause'. Consciousness emerges as the highest kind of being, as God. Everywhere that there is effect, the effect of a will is assumed. The true world appears as spiritual world and thus is only accessible through the 'facts of consciousness'. Cognition is grasped as activity of consciousness. From these basic assumptions, consequences of decisive importance are drawn. These consequences are: Every progress lies in the direction of becoming conscious; and becoming conscious is retrogression; one approaches reality through logic, one removes oneself from it through the senses; approaching 'spirit' means approaching God; everything good must stem from spirituality, must be fact of consciousness; progress toward the better can only mean progress in becoming conscious.

Like Ludwig Feuerbach before him, Nietzsche sees in the philosophy of spirit from Descartes to Hegel a daughter of Christian theology. His critique of consciousness and will is simultaneously a critique of the Christian interpretation of the world. The idealistic conception of the world is only a 'philosophical-moral cosmology and theodicy'. It proceeds from highest values and goals that life serves, but with that a means ('spirit') is misunderstood as purpose, while life is degraded to a means for it in reversal. Everything is judged from the conscious world of spirit. Yet the 'conscious world' cannot serve as starting point of values: an 'objective valuation' is necessary. Not spirit can form the starting point of all our evaluations because spirit, as doer (e.g., in our thinking), is fabricated. Our thoughts, too, stem from the depth of the overall unity that we are. What steps into consciousness is always already something derived and often something deceptive. Reality spreads out in immeasurable depth beneath the surface world of consciousness. It is no chaos but the well-ordered realm of will to power. 'In view of the immense and threefold interworking back and forth, as the total life of every organism represents it, its conscious world of feelings, intentions, value estimations is a small corner. We lack all right to posit this piece of consciousness as purpose, as why? for that total phenomenon of life: *becoming conscious is evidently only one means more in the unfolding and enhancement of life. Therefore it is foolishness to posit pleasure or spirituality or morality or some particularity of the sphere of consciousness as highest value: and perhaps even to justify the 'world' out of them*' (Will to Power, 707).

Nietzsche treats the theological, moral, and hedonistic judgment and justification of life as on equal footing: they are 'fancies in interpretation' that measure life with factors of consciousness ('pleasure and displeasure,' 'good

and evil'). Instead of understanding consciousness as tool and particular in the total life, the relation is reversed, and a spiritual world is applied as standard of life. All real acting coming from the depth of being appears distorted and falsified in this optics: instead of struggling vital unities one believes to see an imaginary world of consciousness unities moving straightforwardly, determined by spiritual values. That is the faulty perspective from a part upon the whole from which the tendency of idealistic philosophers emerges to imagine a 'total consciousness', a 'spirit', or a 'God'. *Thereby meaning is displaced out of life, existence becomes a 'monstrum', something that must be condemned.* 'Precisely that we have eliminated the purposive and means-setting total consciousness: that is our great relief... Our greatest reproach against existence was the existence of God...' (Will to Power, 707).

From this point Nietzsche's whole philosophical system can be surveyed. The unified basic thought of his theoretical as of his practical philosophy becomes visible here. The struggle against consciousness, against the subject, will, spirit in the theoretical sphere corresponds to the struggle against distinguishing 'good' and 'evil', against 'guilt', 'bad conscience', and moral 'responsibility' in the practical sphere. Nietzsche must combat the Christian conception of God because through it the character of existence as he recognizes it is suspended: *'As soon as we imagine someone who is responsible for our being thus and so (God, nature) and hence attribute our existence, our happiness and misery to his intention, we corrupt the innocence of becoming. We then have someone who wants to achieve something through us and with us'* (Will to Power, 552).

The secret of the struggle Nietzsche wages against the concept of God is thereby spoken out. A fleeting note of the Nachlass reads: 'The refutation of God, properly only the moral God is refuted'. So it is only the priestly concept of God against which the struggle is directed, the God of the priests is dead. In our thinking there can only exist a God who leaves existence, eternal becoming its innocence. As if carved in hard stone stand here the words that circumscribe his religion of fate: 'No one is responsible for the fact that he exists at all, that he is thus and thus constituted, that he exists under these circumstances, in this environment. The fatality of his being is not to be disentangled from the fatality of everything that was and will be. He is not the consequence of an intention, a will, a purpose, the attempt is not undertaken with him to achieve 'an ideal of man' or 'an ideal of happiness' or 'an ideal of morality', it is absurd to want to unload his being onto some purpose' (Twilight of the Idols, the Four Great Errors). There exists no 'critique of being', for this would presuppose that we have a firm standpoint outside of being from which we can evaluate it. But in every evaluation itself this being is still there, whether we say yes or no to existence, we always only do what we are. All value estimations are only consequences and perspectives in the service of will to power (Will to Power, 675). But will to power is only another word for the innocence of becoming.

From this central concept Nietzsche elucidates his own will to philosophy and the paths of this will, he interprets himself with the help of a fundamental concept of his system:

‘How long has it been now that I have been conscious in myself of demonstrating the perfect innocence of becoming! And what strange paths have I pursued toward that goal! Once this seemed to me the right solution: that I declared, ‘existence, as something of the nature of a work of art, is absolutely not under the jurisdiction of morality; morality itself belongs much more to the realm of creation’. Another time I said, ‘all concepts of guilt are entirely worthless objectively; subjectively however all life is necessarily unjust and illogical’. A third time I gained denial to myself of all purposes and felt the unrecognizability of causal connections. And what was all this for? *Was it not to create for myself the feeling of complete irresponsibility, to place myself outside all praise and blame, independent of all before and now, in order to run toward my goal in my own way?*”

When Nietzsche made his first reflections about the work that was to become his actual philosophical main work, for which Thus Spoke Zarathustra was to mean only the ‘vestibule’, he wrote down for himself among other things also the title: ‘The Innocence of Becoming. A Guide to the Redemption of Morality’. A more active, more highly charged one has displaced this title. But nothing is better suited to let what is essential be understood in its philosophical significance than that title which could never be misunderstood, that first draft title. This title wants to say: As soon as we posit a being independent of and above becoming, reality is robbed of its meaning. It becomes an ‘apparent’ world beside the real one, it becomes superfluous. The hypothesis of a ‘true’ being thus stands in the service of slandering the world. Becoming is in truth ‘equal in value at every moment... expressed differently: it has no value at all, for something is lacking by which to measure it’ (Will to Power, 708). There exists no counterpart of life from which existence can be reflected upon; there exists no instance before which life could be ashamed: therein consists the innocence of becoming. Life has no judge above it: ‘one must recognize the absurdity of this existence-judging gesture’ (Will to Power, 675). To determine what is, how it is, seems to the realist something infinitely higher, more serious than any ‘it should be thus’ (Will to Power, 333). ‘A man as he should be: that sounds to us as absurd as ‘a tree as it should be’ (Will to Power, 332). Morality contains nothing but desiderata, but precisely when man dreams up ideals for himself does he become small. ‘One cannot have enough respect for man as soon as one views him with respect to how he manages to struggle through, endure situations, turn circumstances to his advantage, defeat opponents; in contrast, when one views man in terms of his desires, he is the most absurd beast...’ (Will to Power, 335). In all desiring there is something feminine: it is as if man ‘needed a refuge of cowardice, pettiness, weakness, sweetness, subservience to rest from his strong and manly virtues’ (Ibid.).

From a philosophic point of view, the exclusion of any ideal end state by the concept of 'innocence' is particularly noteworthy. The presence of the present belongs to innocence: the 'present must never be justified for the sake of a future or the past for the sake of the present'. Therefore, it is necessary 'to deny an overall consciousness of becoming, an over-God, in order not to place what happens under the perspective of a sympathizing, jointly knowing and yet wanting nothing being' (Will to Power, 708). If such a being has once been imagined, if then the belief in the 'real' world behind the actual one, the belief in morality, the highest values and purposes of life has refuted itself by the logic of things, then a state is reached in which that fundamental error breaks out everywhere like a pathogenic agent that was inoculated into a healthy body, then we face the phenomenon of nihilism, the treatment of which the main work was to begin with (Will to Power, 1 ff). *Nihilism means that the supreme values devalue themselves, nihilism is the logic of our ideals thought to an end* (Will to power, Preface).

It is commonly thought that Nietzsche did nothing more than register the fact of European nihilism, that he was essentially a critic, a mere destroyer who left it to others to build up. It is with these accusations as with the cheap findings of his 'atheism'. Nietzsche revealed nihilism on the ground of modern culture, he mercilessly unmasked the chaos of the modern soul; but he also erected a new image of the world and man in pure greatness. *His significance does not consist in the fact that he did what so many did before him, he also had weary hours: that he formulated 'new' values, 'new' ideals, but rather that he allowed us to look deeper into the depths of reality than any thinker before him.* He did not coldly and impotently describe the world of ruins that surrounds the man raised by idealism, but he also allowed the order to be seen that was always there and always will be. This demonstration of the eternal order of the world, which constitutes his actual philosophical achievement, is closely connected with his belief in fate. He only distorted the false order of consciousness to put the true order of the 'will to power' in its place in the realm of our thoughts, just as he denied the moral God the right to exist without fighting God.

6. The Heraclitean World.

Philosophy, which begins with the subject, the 'facts of consciousness', ends with the assumption of a collective consciousness or a world of spiritual values. Every philosophy of 'objective value judgment' culminates in the statement that there is a 'total phenomenon of life', a unity of life from which all our thoughts and actions emerge. The will to power is just another name for this unity.

So under this will we have to understand not a subjective phenomenon, an effort of will or excitement of will, but something objective: the good order as the reality of life. The unity of the organism and the entirety of life, indeed of existence in general, are thereby regarded by Nietzsche as identical in essence. The immense difference that exists between the human body and the

cosmos does not matter when we consider in both cases the structure that follows from the basic nature of the will to power, because both, body and cosmos, are infinitely articulated multiplicities, constituted by the will to power. 'We can take our body apart, and then we get exactly the same idea of it as of the starry sky, and the difference between organic and inorganic no longer catches the eye' (Will to Power, 676).

The 'soul', from which finally the 'subject' of the idealists emerged, may have been an attractive and mysterious idea, but perhaps, says Nietzsche, what we are now learning to exchange it for is even more attractive and mysterious (Will to power, 659). [*Original footnote: Similar words of Novalis, which mean the opposite: 'The external is only an internal raised to mystery status'. Novalis starts from the inside, the outside is valid for him only as a symbol. His thought therefore presupposes that the inner is closer to us than the outer. Nietzsche thinks the other way around. Peace is no novel. To bring him into this context means to dispute his fateful position in the history of Europe and to deprive his philosophy of its meaning*]. 'The human body, in which the whole farthest and nearest past of all organic becoming comes alive again, through which, over which and beyond which an immense, inaudible stream seems to flow: the body is a more astonishing idea than the old 'soul''. 'Following the guide of the body' he wanders through the realms of nature and history. *The body is the most perfect illumination of the will to power, it is that phenomenon in which we find all the features of this will most purely pronounced. Basically Nietzsche's philosophy is a Hymn to the Reality of the Body. It is the philosophy of a genuinely Hellenic instinct.*

But what is the body? It is a political structure, an aristocracy (Will to Power, 660). Not in subjective ideas and moods, not in accidental volitions and motions does the will to power manifest itself, but in the 'structure of domination' that we call body. 'The greater complexity, the sharp demarcation, the juxtaposition of the fully developed organs and functions with the disappearance of the intermediaries, if that is perfection, then a will to power emerges in the organic process, by virtue of which commanding, shaping, governing forces continually increase the territory of their power and constantly simplify it again within that territory: the imperative growing' (Will to Power, 644). Life, as we have seen, is to be defined as a 'permanent form' of processes of power determinations, where the different fighters themselves grow unequally (see above p. 46).

This explanation is continued by Nietzsche in such a way that the political character of the organism becomes completely clear: 'Insofar as there is also resistance in obeying; self-authority is by no means given up. Likewise, in commanding there is an admission that the absolute power of the opponent has not been defeated, not incorporated, dissolved. 'Obeying' and 'commanding' are forms of the struggle game' (Will to Power, 642).

The struggle to which the philosophy of the will to power reduces all events is therefore not a meaningless rage of forces against each other. It bears an order

within itself, and it is necessary to understand the idea of this order if one wants to understand Nietzsche's philosophy.

Again, the lack of closure of the system is painfully noticeable. But in the posthumous works there are pieces with which we can close this gap. In the organic being, says one record, not an iron being, a subject wants to preserve itself, but the struggle itself wants to preserve itself, wants to grow and become conscious. *'What we call 'consciousness' and 'mind' is only a means and tool by means of which not a subject, but a struggle wants to preserve itself.* The human being is the testimony of what immense forces can be set in motion by a small being of multiple contents (or by a perennial struggle concentrated on many small beings). Beings that play with stars', so there is still something besides the struggle: it is that which lets the struggle 'perenniate', which makes possible the 'enduring form' of the living, which builds up the 'dominion-structure' of the body, that which prevents the combatants from destroying each other and the end from occurring. This can be nothing that lies outside the struggle, this assumption does not fit a system that wants to depict becoming 'from within'. It cannot be a 'law' that prescribes rules to the struggle, it can only be the equilibrium that establishes itself in and through the struggle itself, and thus maintains the struggle. 'The struggle as the means to equilibrium' is indeed the wording of one of the notes. The context of the 'will to power' demands that this proposition retain its meaning even when reversed; equilibrium is a means to struggle.

In the quoted sentence and its inversion, in my view, culminates the philosophical train of thought of the 'will to power'. When we read elsewhere that an equilibrium has never been reached, proving that it is not possible (Will to Power, 1064), this does not constitute an objection. For under the 'equilibrium situation' stagnation is to be understood ('if stagnation were possible, it would have occurred'), *the word 'equilibrium' here thus has a purely mechanical meaning. On the other hand, the proposition of struggle as a means of equilibrium has a metaphysical meaning.*

To make this clear, it must be said what Nietzsche understands by struggle. Nothing stands in the way of understanding Nietzsche's philosophical system with such stubbornness as the prejudice, born of inadequate interpretation of his writings, that he 'changed' several times. *In truth, in the whole history of philosophy there are few thinkers who have pursued a single idea with such certainty from youth onward as Nietzsche.* One must not be deceived by the difference in mode of expression; in the following section this in itself completely enigmatic change of 'attitudes' will be explained: Nietzsche's writings are the works of a fencer; each individual work is to be understood from a respectively determined fencer's position. Behind the change of position remains the basic conception of the Heraclitean world unchanged. As it dawned on the youth, so the man presented it in the 'Will to Power' with the unfolded powers of his whole being. The agreement is so complete that we can even use sentences about Heraclitus from the fragment on 'Philosophy in

the Tragic Age of the Greeks' in the interpretation of the Will to Power. With truly wonderful determination the young Nietzsche knew how to keep himself free from the moral ideas of his time. From the very beginning he had access to a world that lay before him in pure clarity, untouched by the mendacious and effeminate concepts of bourgeois humanity. The youth sees a thunderstorm. Then he writes to a friend: 'What was that eternal 'you shall', 'you shall not!' How different the storm, the hail: free powers without ethics! (to v. Gersdorff on April 7, 1866). Not the form of eternal symbols: the joy of fighting and winning, the candid view of the world as an eternal struggle of forces alienates him from bourgeois morality. World more directly and deeply than the mystical-musical youth work on tragedy leads the little fragment on Börne's championship into his conception of life. To him, the championship seems to be 'the noblest Hellenic basic idea'. As he recognizes, the Greek genius allowed good Eris to prevail, nothing separates the Greek world so much from ours. How barbaric, how deeply bourgeois, but how true it is when he defines in that fragment: 'the cruelty of victory is the pinnacle of the joy of life'. One does not understand Nietzsche's life and writings if one does not observe what value the experience and concept of struggle and victory have for him. In the later preface to the writing that separated him from Wagner (Human, All Too Human), the most significant event of his life shines before us as an event of victory: '...a mysterious question-rich questionable victory, but still the first victory ...'. In the preface to 'The Gay Science', any philosophy that values peace higher than war is interpreted as a symptom of illness. And in 'Twilight of the Idols' (Morality as Anti-Nature) it says: '...One has renounced the great life if one renounces war ...'.

In bourgeois-humanitarian society, struggle is treated as something that should not be, at best, as something to be excused. In this society, love is considered the highest, a feeling, then, a state of mind, something subjective in any case, and above all something ambiguous, which can be understood as Eros, as sexus or also as love of God. Nothing reflects the ambiguity, i.e., the inwardness of the bourgeois personality better than this slippery concept. Where amor and caritas clasp hands in the shadow of banks, that is the place of this society.

A single word from the young Nietzsche illuminates harshly the historical relativity of this theoretically constituted by 'love', practically by lies world: 'Envy is much more strongly pronounced among the Greeks. The concept of justice is much more important than with us: after all, Christianity knows no justice'. What does this word signify? Nietzsche must be quite at home in the depths of another cosmos in order to be able to utter it at all. After all, the Christian God is portrayed as the just judge, the life of the Christian is delimited by an act of divine jurisdiction, the Last Judgment.

*Iudex ergo cum sedebit,
Quidquid latet apparebit,
Nil inultum remanebit.*

How does Nietzsche come to deny Christianity justice? Because he lives entirely in the Heraclitean idea of justice. Ultimately foreign and incomprehensible to him is the idea of a rewarding and punishing justice, indeed the idea of judgment in general, whereby there is a morally accused, an enthroned father and an objective verdict. This juridical way of thinking only paves the way for judgments according to the criteria of 'good' and 'evil'. *It belongs to a kind of people who are not active, who merely react.* The reactive human, the human of resentment, ultimately derives demands on others from 'justice'. But to be righteous is always a positive behavior: 'The active, attacking, overreaching human is still placed a hundred steps closer to justice than the reactive one' (Genealogy of Morals, II, 11). The attacking human is closer to justice than the reactive one, because justice can be anything except what the reactive human would like to make of it: a means to abolish struggle, to equalize opposites, to peace. A legal system that would not be 'a means in the struggle of power complexes', but a means against all struggle, Nietzsche calls a life-hostile principle, a destroyer and dissolver of man, a sign of fatigue, an oblique path to nothingness (Ibid.). It is morality that teaches us to take this oblique path, the morality of the 'good and just', with whom lies the greatest danger for all human future (Zarathustra, Of Old and New Tablets, 27). Strictly speaking, justice becomes the virtue of the last humans: 'And when they say, 'I am just', it always sounds the same as, 'I am avenged!'' (Zarathustra, On the Virtuous). The vindictive human, the human of resentment, wants all humans to be equal. But Zarathustra teaches: 'For no human child is equal: so speaks justice' (Of the Scholars).

Inequality and struggle are the prerequisites of justice. This justice does not rule over the world, not over the turmoil of the combatants, it knows no guilt and no responsibility, no trial and no judgment: it is immanent in the struggle. Therefore it is not possible in a world of peace. Justice can only exist where forces freely measure themselves against each other. Under an absolute authority, in an order of things that knows a divine lord, in the realm of *Pax Romana*, there is no more justice, because there is no more struggle. There the world congeals into a conventional form. Nietzsche, on the other hand, sees: justice is reborn anew from the struggle itself every moment, struggle is the father of all things, it makes the lord the lord and the slave the slave. So Heraclitus of Ephesus speaks. But that is also ancient Germanic view: in the struggle it turns out who is noble and who is not; through innate courage the lord becomes lord, and through his cowardice the slave becomes slave. Therein is also expressed the eternal justice: it structures and separates, it creates the order of the world, it is the originator of all rank.

Thus from the core idea of Greek-Germanic metaphysics arises Nietzsche's great doctrine: that there is not one morality, but only a morality of masters and a morality of slaves (Beyond Good and Evil, 260).

Justice is not restored by a forensic act, which is externally, but it establishes itself through the deeds by itself. If Schopenhauer's main work bears the title:

‘The World as Will and Representation’, Nietzsche’s work could bear the title: ‘The World as Deed and Justice’ or shorter, expressing the latter: ‘The World as Struggle’. This latter is just another version of the innocence of becoming. *The ‘innocence’ consists in the fact that with all doing there is no doer, but that something happens, that there is no ‘subject’, no purposes and no causal connections.* But ‘doer’ means the same as responsible agent. The real deed is thus actually excluded, for the real agent is a fighter, a power quantum that draws all consequences from its own power every moment. A power center is no responsible ‘subject’. The decisive thing is the elimination of consciousness and responsibility: in this idea all the lines of Nietzsche’s philosophy intersect. From it follows the non-forensic consideration of human existence. There is a judge of life only if there is a ‘spirit’. The spirit not only confronts life, but it is above it and it is precisely by this that the innocence of the struggle is abolished. The struggle is now no longer decided by the struggling, but by a transcendent power for which not strength but ‘good conscience’ is decisive. If consciousness falls, so does the idea of responsibility and judgment, life regains its innocence.

Nietzsche’s warlike nature manifests itself not only in his polemical writings, in his agonal relationship to Schopenhauer, Wagner and Bismarck, in the reckless courage with which he attacks the oldest and most revered; his warrior nature also determines the character of all his thoughts. The exclusion of forensic thinking is a necessary consequence of the fact that Nietzsche is a warrior down to his instincts. For it is warlike to live constantly in the face of an ‘other’, to constantly feel tension towards certain forces. *Force against force, which is the character of life.* On the other hand, it is priestly to judge and evaluate life from an absolute standpoint above life. The priest appeals to God, and thus he is released from the struggle. By virtue of the special relationship with God which he claims, he is right without having won.

The type of the priest thus stands directly opposed to that of the warrior. It is no coincidence that peoples like the Germans and the Greeks do not know priests in the sense of Mediterranean cultures. If the priest takes up the sword, he does not thereby become a warrior, but he becomes a crusader, a defender of the highest God, a fanatic. He fights for the Absolute, which wins in any case; if it does not win through him now, it will win later. It is clear that with such an appeal to the Absolute, the idea of justice or fate is impossible. For the warrior there is no Absolute; he knows only his own strength and fate. The priestly and the martial system exclude each other.

Throughout his life, Nietzsche has lain in battle against two historical worlds: against the priestly-romantic and against the rational-enlightenment (Cf. above). His Heraclitean system gives us information about the profound necessity of the line management of these fronts.

The world of the priest and the world of the Enlightenment have in common that genuine struggle and justice do not occur in them. The priest judges and then wages wars of annihilation to execute the judgment he has declared

divine. How different the world of the Enlightener appears in contrast, and yet an absolute is also worshiped here. In place of the genuflection before the Holy steps the embarrassed bow before reason. In both worlds the free struggle of forces is banned with a great spell. Forces and their opposites are not recognized at all by the Enlightener. He knows only rational beings with feeling and taste, subjects whose judgments can be corrected, educated, everything else is 'crude' nature. His highest concept is a harmony that excludes serious contradiction, real struggle. In place of the struggle of forces among themselves comes the reasonable and moral struggle of enlightened minds against the superstition, stupidity and malice of men. That is no longer struggle in the sense of the born warrior: *how could one fight if one knows one is right from the start?* how could one fight in a world where there is no struggle, where there are only degrees of understanding, enlightenment and education! Every power has its perspective, and it fights within this perspective. So there is no struggle for reason, for happiness, for progress. Victory has already been won, good is on one side, on the other is only evil. In this respect, the Enlightener is a secularized priest: as the latter stands in the light of God, so he stands in the light of reason.

But the Enlightener considers himself higher than the priest, he even surpasses him in orthodoxy. Which is possible because he has one thing ahead of him: the idea of tolerance. In his fanaticism the priest has greatness; he is able to become a hero in contradiction to his doctrine. That is why Zarathustra passes by the priests. Only the crusaders spoil the decent game of combat with their faith, they know nothing of justice.

But justice is killed with its smells by the enlighteners. The idea of tolerance is the opposite of justice: it abolishes the contrast, it confuses the order of things, because it calls the struggle itself something to be condemned. The priest invented the guilty conscience and morality in order to win and rule, he fights against the unbelievers because he believes himself to be in grace, while they dwell in damnation. The Enlightener pretends no longer to want to fight, conquer and rule, he serves morality alone. He is too enlightened to still erect stakes, he erects 'chairs of virtue'. He is content to have a good conscience and to teach that his opponents do not have one. He calls this tolerance: the denial of opposites, so that he can rule without the trouble of fighting. And that is philosophy to him: the reduction of everything alive and powerful to pendulums of consciousness, to 'reason' and 'will'. Thus he makes the great small and the small great. The priest fights for the cause of God. But when the enlightened bourgeois wages war, he must invent a 'good cause' worth fighting for, because he only ever fights with a good conscience in principle. 'You say it is the good cause that even sanctifies war? I tell you: it is the good war that sanctifies every cause' (Zarathustra, On War and the Warrior People). But the moralism of the Enlightener must end with the complete rejection of war. The unheroic existence, life without great goals, the 'miserable fuss' is finally presented as a moral duty, war, which unleashes

heroism, is damned.

Modern history has two epochs: the epoch of priestly values is followed by the epoch of moral values.

Nietzsche's psychology of the priest (of resentment) in 'Genealogy' is the continuation of the struggle against morality begun by 'Dawn'. Despite the distance that speaks in favor of the priest, the servants of the Holy and the servants of reason are of the same kind: they rebel in the name of the Absolute, they condemn, they curse instead of fighting. But at the same time they make use of human, all too human means to enforce their ends. *In order to achieve victory, morality must become immoral. 'For moral values to come to power, all sorts of immoral forces and affects must help'* (Will to Power, 266). The Enlightener cannot tolerate this contradiction. He lacks the honesty and courage it takes to fight a state of affairs founded on contradiction. The Enlightener can stand it amidst the lie of Christian civilization, he has a good conscience even in the lie. But that is the psychological formula for anarchy. The order based on the rule of consciousness is only an apparent one: it is not based on the essence of things, it contradicts reality. When people believe in a fictitious harmony, in a world without forces and opposites, then chaos sets in. Nature is not chaotic; it is the realm of strict justice. The world of men becomes chaotic when they try to emancipate themselves from the justice that lies in the essence of things, when they deny the will to power.

Nihilism, chaos is the necessary consequence of the belief in a harmony without struggle, an order without opposites. The true order arises from the domination relations produced by the will to power. Human, we add, is a world in which the order of rank prevails, not a world in which moral concepts call the shots. Only chaos is inhuman. The rule of tolerance and moral ideas, of reason and pity, in short of 'humanity', leads to inhumanity.

If one wants to get an idea of the unity and consistency of Nietzsche's thinking, then one must read the section on Heraclitus and the concept of justice in the segment on 'Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks'. Surrounded by quotes from Schopenhauer's main work, which stand without inner connection to the communicated vision, one finds here the fundamental thought of the 'Will to Power' in wonderful clarity. An 'awful and deafening idea' is called the eternal and sole becoming, the complete inconstancy of all actuality. Heraclitus has understood that all opposing qualities in the world are chained together 'like two wrestlers', of which now one, now the other gets the upper hand. The world is a mixing bowl that has to be constantly stirred. *'Out of the war of opposites all becoming arises: the definite and enduringly appearing qualities merely express the momentary predominance of one fighter...'* And yet there is something lasting in the eternal conflict, the mixing bowl is indeed stirred 'constantly'. Mere conflict would undo itself. To Heraclitus, the Greek, this conflict reveals eternal justice. 'It is a wonderful idea, drawn from the purest well of Hellenic thought, which regards strife as the ever-present activity of a unified, strict justice tied to eternal laws. Only a

Greek was able to find this idea as the foundation of a world view; it is Hesiod's good Eris transformed into a world principle, it is the competitive idea of individual Greeks and of the Greek state, transferred from the gymnasiums and wrestling schools, from the athletic contests, from the struggles of political parties and cities with one another into the most general, so that now the wheelwork of the cosmos revolves in itself. As every Greek struggles as if he alone were in the right, and an infinitely precise measure of judicial verdict determines every moment where victory inclines, so struggle the qualities with one another according to unbreakable laws immanent to the struggle and standards. The things themselves, whose existence and duration the narrow human and beastly mind believes in, have no real existence at all, they are the glitter and sparks of swinging swords, they are the flashing of victory in the fight between opposing qualities'.

All decisive positions of Nietzsche are contained herein germ: his rejection of the philosophy of the subject, teleology, the concept of causality, his struggle against optimism, moralism and progress. The worldview of the will to power is anticipated here, and the concept of justice as the deepest concept of this worldview is revealed. Where has this concept gone later? Why does the 'Will to Power' contain no section on justice?

In the world of thought of the young Nietzsche, justice plays an important role. It appears not only as a main concept in the characterization of Aeschylean tragedy (*The Birth of Tragedy*, 9), but also forms the ideal centerpoint of the two most important 'Untimely Meditations'. In the second 'Untimely One,' he who possesses the drive and the 'power for justice' is designated as the most venerable specimen of the human species. Justice is contrasted with objectivity, 'objectivity and justice have nothing to do with each other' (*On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life*, 6). By objectivity is meant the 'cold and contemptuous neutrality of the so-called scientific man' (*Schopenhauer as Educator*, 4). The power for justice enables man to overcome 'common empirical truth' in recognizing history through a deeper and more just perception of things. The historical world does not reveal itself to scientific curiosity and objectivity: only from the highest power of the present can the past be interpreted. Justice includes not tolerance and allowance to pass, but strength and greatness.

If we follow the hints given to us by the 'Untimely Meditations' with their decisive coordination of the concepts of justice and cognition, then we receive an answer to the most difficult question in Nietzsche's philosophy: the question of the possibility of cognition. In the face of the problem of cognition, the philosophy of the 'Will to Power' is in a dangerous position. Here idealism has its strongest position, here every relativism is doomed to failure. A metaphysics of justice certainly could not be relativistic, justice precludes relativism. The question therefore has to be: is there a connection between this concept and the philosophy of the will to power?

According to the doctrine of the will to power, all human doing and thinking

can be traced back to drives. Even the will to truth can only be a drive to power: the greatest part of conscious thinking, even of philosophical thinking, belongs among the instinctive activities (Beyond Good and Evil, 3). How would an 'egotistical' drive to power be connected with pure cognition? Yet there is no pure cognition if one understands by it the cognition of an 'uninvolved', cold subject observing objects, for there is no such subject. Cognition must be relative to the cognizer. But since the cognizer is a quantum of power, cognition must have a relation to the power of the cognizer. All thinking is a form of the will to rule, every drive that makes use of consciousness for thinking 'wants to get somewhere'. In the long history of *Homo Sapiens* all fundamental drives of man 'have already practiced philosophy once'. Each individual would only too gladly present precisely itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and as the 'united master' of all other drives. 'For every drive is imperious: and as such it attempts to philosophize' (Beyond Good and Evil, 6).

If one conceives the world of the will to power as a chaos of wildly clashing forces, then cognition is impossible. However, the world envisioned by Nietzsche bears an eternal order within itself: only by the more powerful can the weaker be overcome, there is no arbitrariness; the formula of the will to power is the formula of a law, a 'law' different, to be sure, from what has been known so far. With this, no 'law' above things is denoted, no general law beyond, to which everything on this side counts merely as a 'case', but the law is in the things themselves, in their prevailing and succumbing, in the way they relate to one another. It is nothing other than the lasting relation of the struggling forces themselves in change. This relation, this equilibrium, is what Heraclitus understood by eternal justice.

Nietzsche's doctrine of cognition follows from this concept of justice. The transcendent concept of the 'law' corresponds to a transcendent subject of cognition hovering neutrally, uninvolved, 'disinterestedly' above things and therefore called 'pure'. From the immanent concept of law, however, it follows that every drive, every organizing center of power, can only bring its cognition as far as its 'will to power' extends. Only insofar and as strongly as the individual participates in the struggle is he able to cognize. This struggle is conducted with all means, also with the aid of consciousness. In the intoxication of victory Nietzsche conceded too little to this means. But his basic view remains: what cognizes, what philosophizes, is the will to power and not consciousness. It depends on the pathos, on the thinker's power, how far he gets in cognition. He who has the most widely stretched will, the highest power, also has the highest justice, and he also comes closest to the truth. For there is justice only where there is power. There is no justice without power, but there is also no true power without justice.

Only the superior, only the ruling one is able to establish 'justice', i.e., set up a standard by which things are measured; and the more powerful he is, the further he can go in 'letting-be'. This is what we read in a note from the time

of the 'Will to Power'. And similarly: 'Justice as sanction of a widely surveying power; which looks beyond the small perspectives of good and evil, thus has a wider horizon: of advantage, the intention to preserve something that is more than this or that person'. Justice and power thus stand in a necessary relation to one another. But what can the highest power be other than the power of the whole? Justice is only another word for the existence of this whole, for the self-preservation of this whole which, in order to be power for all eternity, keeps itself in balance for all eternity, and which only keeps itself in balance in order to affirm itself in the struggle of all qualities against one another for all eternity.

The will to power is therefore only another expression for the highest justice. Man does not cognize because he has consciousness, consciousness is only a means, but he cognizes, i.e., he has a relation to the whole, because in him the will to power reaches the highest point among all beings, because he comes closest to eternal justice.

That our interpretation is on the right track is shown by a brief sketch of tremendous import: 'Justice as building, separating, annihilating way of thinking, emerging from the valuations: highest representative of life itself'.

If justice can be called the 'highest representative of life itself', then the definition of truth that corresponds to the philosophy of the will to power also reads: truth is the highest representative of life itself.

7. Dionysus. The Eternal Recurrence.

At its height, the philosophy of the will to power, the philosophy of eternal becoming, passes over into the concept of Being. Becoming is (this 'Being' is not a being beside or above becoming, rather, this 'Being' is merely an expression for the duration, self-preservation, immanent order, and justice of becoming itself).

The problem of the transition from becoming to being occupied Nietzsche strongly. *Among the most famous passages of his philosophy is the doctrine of eternal recurrence, which objectively is nothing but an attempt to round off the image of eternal becoming and put an image of eternal being in its place.* Here, too, the will to power is decisive, except that it appears not as immanent power, as highest justice, but as the decree of an individual: Zarathustra. 'To imprint upon becoming the character of being, that is the supreme will to power... That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to that of being: the peak of contemplation' (Will to Power, 617).

In these sentences the thought of eternal recurrence appears connected with the fundamental thought of the system. Or more correctly: the thought of eternal recurrence seems to be there in order to suspend the system. As the concept of eternal recurrence appears, the Heraclitean character of the world disappears: 'I teach you the redemption from the eternal flux: the stream always flies back into itself, and you always step into the same stream, as the same ones'. Obviously, we are facing a contradiction here. Only one can be valid: either the doctrine of eternal recurrence or the doctrine of the will to

power.

It is known that the thought of eternal recurrence goes back to a shock experienced by Nietzsche, recovering in the solitude of the Engadine, in August 1881. At the end of the 'Joyful Science', the thought is voiced for the first time, proclaimed by Zarathustra. It is not surprising that it particularly attracted attention and that one was inclined to assume the philosophical depth and significance of this thought had to correspond to the insistency with which it was presented. In truth, from the standpoint of Nietzsche's system, this thought is insignificant. We have to regard it as an expression of a highly personal experience that stands in no connection with the fundamental thought of the 'Will to Power', indeed, if taken seriously, it would blow up the context of the philosophy of the will to power. Only externally a relation to the will to power has been established in the cited sentences: the character of being is imprinted upon becoming by an individual. It arises through the action of a subject. *But the will to power is not a designation for an experience or event, but a formula for what happens in general.* This formula has an objective meaning, hence its inner relation to the concept of justice. Through the thought of eternal recurrence everything is turned to the subjective. Nietzsche himself, as a unique person, appears religion-founder-like at the center of world events: for mankind it is always the hour of 'high noon' when this thought appears. Here it is less a matter of the value of the thought itself than of the effect it is supposed to have on mankind. It denotes a turning point in history: those who do not believe in it must die out. 'Only he who holds his existence to be eternally recurring remains behind: but among such a condition is possible that no utopian has yet reached'. He who incorporates this 'thought of thoughts' will be transformed by it. 'The criterion for everything I do: is it so that I want to do it countless times? that is the greatest weight'.

What Nietzsche, through the thought of eternal recurrence attempted to express objectively, the innocence and purposelessness of existence, the justification of life through itself, is expressed much more perfectly by his system. It must not be overlooked that the conception stems from a time when Nietzsche was still on the way to the system of the will to power. The idea of recurrence is the germ of the Zarathustra idea; however, it was not Nietzsche's intention to always want to remain Zarathustra. Zarathustra was merely a call intended to bring him companions. The integration of the Zarathustra idea into the later system is perhaps only due to the fact that this call went unheard. A factual integration of the idea of recurrence into the system is not possible: the former idea is a religious conception, the latter, however, a strictly philosophical context of thought; with the former the question of truth cannot be asked, here, however, it must be asked; there everything depends on the possible effect, here it is a matter of the immanent profundity of a new image of the world.

The religious fundamental character of the idea of recurrence lies open and

has also been emphasized by Nietzsche. 'Let us impress the image of eternity upon our life! This thought contains more than all religions which despised this life as fleeting and taught to long for an indefinite other life'. 'The great noon' is a religious vision; Nietzsche appears to himself as a teacher of eternal recurrence similar to a savior: 'I teach you the redemption from the eternal flux...'. He reproached Plato for his 'Egyptianism': Plato dehistoricized the world by considering it *sub specie aeterni*. Now the religion-founder Nietzsche also accomplishes an Egyptification of the Heraclitean world. There is nothing in his philosophical system that this mummification of the becoming could be connected with, the idea of eternal recurrence stands alone in the 'Will to Power', an erratic boulder. There is no philosophy of eternal recurrence, there is only a religion of eternal recurrence. In yielding to the inspiration of the moment, Nietzsche for an instant succumbed to the god-forming instinct within himself. The surest indication that here we no longer have to do with the philosopher Nietzsche is the 'Hymn and Seal of Eternity' related to recurrence, with which the third part of 'Zarathustra' closes, and which with its emphasis on the concept of love ('For I love you, O eternity!') stands in contrast to all the philosophical positions of Nietzsche.

A number of drafts for the main work indicate that Nietzsche also wanted to entitle the last chapter, 'The Eternal Recurrence', 'Dionysus. Philosophy of Eternal Recurrence'. Alongside these are drafts in which this last book contained no reference to the idea of recurrence. 'The Great War' it is entitled once, another time 'Struggle of False and True Values'. The editors of 'The Will to Power' have placed at the end *an aphorism that contains the most intimate connection of the concepts Dionysian world, eternal recurrence and will to power*. It is that prose masterpiece that begins with the words: 'And suppose you could look into my innermost soul, assuming I had one; do you believe you would find there that "thing-in-itself" called "world?" In the consequence of my train of thought lies the proof that this fragment does not present the ideal formula for Nietzsche's philosophical worldview, as has hitherto been assumed, but rather that one only has the choice either to regard the 'Will to Power' as Nietzsche's actual system, or to reject this system and declare Dionysism Nietzsche's actual philosophy.

The only concept common to the aforementioned aphorism and the system is that of force. Here the world is described as a 'play of forces and wave motions,' as a 'sea in itself storming and surging of forces', as something changing and always running back into itself. Eternal recurrence is interpreted as a symbol of the self-affirmation of this force. It gives eternal becoming the character of a movement 'that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness', it lends it the character of happiness whose symbol is the circle. The becoming, whose concept we gained in the previous pages, arises from the opposition of forces, and is only another word for the general struggle of forces against each other. Both conceptions agree in that there are no fixed things, no permanent conditions; but the system does allow laws of probability that permit

foreseeing the outcome of the struggle in individual cases. The laws of nature are 'formulas of power relations'. Something corresponding would not be conceivable in the Dionysian world. This world is not cognitively accessible at all, and when it is to be characterized, only aesthetic concepts prove adequate: it is a world that always finds its way back from dissonance to harmony, 'returning home from fullness to simplicity, back from the play of contradictions to the joy of harmony'. Such a world can never be philosophically presented, and it is impossible in this Dionysian world of 'eternally self-creating, eternally self-destroying, this secret world of double voluptuousness', to recognize again the world as struggle as we described it above, that world of opposition and tension dominated by the strict law of unity, of justice, resulting precisely from this tension. 'Dynamic quanta in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta' (Will to Power, 635), that is Nietzsche's formula for the world. *On the basis of this formula he constructed a physics and physiology, a psychology and an ethics. He could never have done this with the aid of his Dionysism.*

The question suggests itself whether the entire Nietzsche understanding of recent decades, lured by the pipes of the Dionysian piper, has not taken a false path. Again and again one has sought and found Dionysus in Nietzsche, and thereby overlooked the philosopher, the true friend of the Greeks, the pupil of Heraclitus. But when Nietzsche himself retrospectively asks himself by what paths he attempted to prove the innocence of becoming, he does not name Dionysus at all. Before himself he is the thinker of the Heraclitean world, not the disciple of Dionysus. The name Dionysus is only a sign for the countermovement initiated by the young Nietzsche against Christian morality; as a mask of the 'Antichrist' Dionysus is characterized in the later preface to 'The Birth of Tragedy'. For how else could he effectively name that 'revaluation': 'As a philologist and man of words I baptized it, though not without a certain liberty, for who knew the right name of the Antichrist?, with the name of a Greek god: I called it Dionysian'. *Founders of religions, fabricators of myths tend to be enthusiasts*. Nietzsche conceived the philosopher as the antitype of the enthusiast. 'There is nothing in me of a founder of religion' (Ecce Homo, Why I Am a Destiny). But just as the unforeseen solitude of this singular life brought with it that the pupil of Heraclitus had to become the poet of 'Zarathustra,' so too the struggle against Christian Europe brought with it that the philosopher grasped after symbols in order to be able to say more clearly what no one wanted to hear. How grateful he was for every sign that made communication possible for him. So he invented 'Dionysus versus the Crucified'. With this contrast the self-portrayal closes. But not in this form is what Nietzsche has to say against Christian Europe and for its salvation to be sought, that is to be found in the 'Will to Power'.

Note.

With this presentation I complete the critique of Nietzsche's concept of the Dionysian that I began in the introduction to my friend Manfred Schröter's edition of Bachofen. One has otherwise perhaps sought to approach Nietzsche's world of thought via the concept of myth. In contrast, I have presented evidence that 'The Birth of Tragedy' reveals no deeper relation to the religious-mythical sphere, but rather clearly reveals its origin from the spirit of modern music ('The Myth of Orient and Occident'. 1926. Pp. CCXLI ff) [*Original footnote: My delineation of the contrast between Bachofen's and Nietzsche's worlds has prompted Thomas Mann to also make efforts to defend Nietzsche in 'Parisian Accountability' and elsewhere. It is not worth engaging with his polemics: they are likely to be among his fruitless endeavors*].

After Nietzsche's relation to myth had been presented, his other Greek writings could be properly appreciated; I identified the concept opposed to the mythical, that of the agonale, as the root of Nietzsche's German-Greek basic conception ('Bachofen and Nietzsche' 1929). The present text contains the elaboration of what I indicated in 'Bachofen and Nietzsche'.

In the introduction to the pocket edition of his works (Kröner Publishing

House), I have attempted to construct Nietzsche's life and figure from two opposed fundamental drives: a philosophical and a musical one. *My particular concern here was to make transparent the exceptional position of 'Zarathustra' in Nietzsche's life as well as the unique nature of the form of this special work.* One will find again the dualism of 'philosophy' and 'music' that I established in the contrast between the Heraclitean and Dionysian worlds. For the doctrine of eternal recurrence is music, we would know it even if Nietzsche himself had not told us with the words: 'Yet know this! Transitoriness sings its early song ever anew, and to hear the first verse only makes one die of longing for it to be forever over'. So Dionysus therefore has two faces: seen from music, from Wagner he looks Greek, appears as Dionysus philosophos; seen from Heraclitus he reveals himself to be a musical phenomenon. Because of this ambiguity of the 'Dionysian' an understanding of Nietzsche is not possible via this concept. On this path one only arrives at the confusing problems of Nietzschean existence.

II. The Politician.

1. Germanic Fundamental Attitude. Relation to Rome.

The key to understanding all of Nietzsche's concrete demands and goals lies in his view of the state. *Though he has not elaborated it in a coherent way, we can reliably reconstruct it.* Here, too, there is no question of contradictions and vacillations: from the beginning to the end this view remains the same.

Nietzsche's basic concept of the state is Germanic and not German if by German we want to understand the final form of what has grown on Germanic soil under Christian-Roman influence in the course of our history. The enduring tension in which Nietzsche finds himself with respect to 'Germany' rests on the fact that he goes back to the Germanic substrata of Germanness with an inflexibility and power like no one before him.

The domain of the German does not coincide with that of the Germanic. There are still other peoples who participate in the Germanic. But wherever the German reaches a historical apex, there the Germanic element strikes through with particular strength. Such high points are marked by the time of the Saxon, Franconian and Swabian emperors, the Reformation under Luther, the conjunction of Bismarck and Nietzsche in the 19th century. Germany's destiny can be seen from the following facts: up to the death of Henry VI we are the politically leading power of Europe at the strongest time of the High Middle Ages, but we do not found an enduring state. We carry out the tremendous Reformation that ends the Middle Ages, but we leave the benefit thereof to the Papacy and the Romance peoples. At last a statesman unites a large part of the German tribes, but the state he founds lacks inner truth: when finally Luther and Henry VIII stand side by side, they do not recognize each other. The old Germanic defiance that sets itself against the state is overcome by Bismarck; but at the same time this defiance lives just as strongly as a thousand years before in Nietzsche and enters into opposition against the new state.

In his book 'Ecce homo' Nietzsche called himself 'the last anti-political German'. He felt himself to be the last German who protested against the state with power and emphasis. His aversion was directed not only against the German state, but against the state per se, from his youth on. His speeches 'On the Future of our Educational Institutions', which he gave in Basel in the winter of 1871-1872, were directed against the 'uniformed state culture'. And in one of his last works he says: culture and the state are antagonists, 'cultural state' is only a modern idea. 'The one lives at the expense of the other, the one thrives to the detriment of the other. All great eras of culture were eras of political decline: what is great in terms of culture was unpolitical, even antipolitical...' (Twilight of the Idols). It is obvious to suspect an aesthetic motive behind this emphasis on 'culture,' to assume that it was the artist in him who revolted against state-regulated education, in general against all state centralization. In truth, the reasons for this opposition lie in another depth: the Germanic need for freedom, the pride and defiance of the Germanic warrior in Nietzsche, alive when he defends himself against the state, which he perceives as an un-German, a Roman institution.

In the 'Expeditions of an Untimely Man', this most important section of 'Twilight of the Idols', Nietzsche develops his concept of freedom in a few succinct sentences. Freedom, he says, is not an institution, there are no liberal institutions, no liberal state. 'Liberal institutions cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: later on there are no more terrible and thorough corrupters of freedom than liberal institutions'. *Such institutions lead to leveling, make people small, cowardly and sanctimonious.* As long as they still have to be fought for, however, the same institutions produce completely different effects: it is war that produces these effects.

War educates for freedom. *For war educates for self-responsibility, it opens up distances between those who prove themselves and those who do not, it accustoms one to hardship, harshness and deprivation, it makes one indifferent to life and leads one to be willing to sacrifice people for one's cause, not counting oneself.* In a word, freedom means 'that the masculine, warlike and victorious instincts have dominion over other instincts, for instance over that of 'happiness'...The free man is a warrior'. Freedom is measured in individuals as well as peoples by the resistance that has to be overcome, by the effort it costs to remain on top. Neither individuals nor peoples ever become great under liberal institutions: danger makes something out of them. 'One has to have need to be strong: otherwise one will never be so'. In 'aristocratic societies' like Rome (as a city) or Venice, man becomes strong; the state, on the other hand, is only an institution for breeding herd animals.

That is clear enough: Nietzsche affirms war but denies the state. This comes to sharpest expression in 'Zarathustra', where the speech 'On War and the Warrior Folk' is followed by the speech 'On the New Idol', by which the state is to be understood. 'One can only keep silent and feel when one has arrow

and bow: otherwise one chatters and quarrels... *War and courage have accomplished more great things than charity*', so speaks Zarathustra. But then he says, 'State means the coldest of all cold monsters'. The state signifies the lie among peoples, everything about it is false, it is the idol of ruin. Zarathustra does not always speak well of the people, but here, in the face of the state, he praises the people: 'Where there is still a people, there the state is not understood and hated as the evil eye and sin against morals and rights... Every people speaks its own language of good and evil: the neighbor does not understand it. It created its language in morals and rights. But the state lies in all the tongues of good and evil'. Isn't it strange to see Zarathustra as a defender of the people's rights? Why has there never been a firmly established German state? Because according to the Germanic conception the king is not emperor, but merely leader of the army and guardian of law. The German only recognized a leader in danger, not a master.

In peace the king had the right to protect the people, no more. What genuinely Germanic sentiment speaks out of Zarathustra's defense of the people against the state, of the warrior against the official! Nietzsche is not aware here that he is expressing the secret of German history; he does not even speak from historical knowledge, but from the immediacy of instinct. From the same immediacy the young Nietzsche had already contrasted Germanic and Romanic, Greek and Roman essence.

The state as we know it is an invention of the Orient. The Romans adopted it from the Orient and developed it; the *Imperium Romanum* (to be clearly distinguished from the 'aristocratic commonwealth' of republican Rome) signifies the consummation of the entire Mediterranean culture. That all-embracing system of order which we have since called the 'state', with its imperial center, its centralized administrative apparatus, its claim to subjugation and obedience, is something alien to the North. The life of the Germanic peoples is founded on clan and army alliance, law and war are the two sides of this life; law and war are not merged into a unified, universal structure. And the same aversion to the universalism of the state that we observe among the Germans, we find among the Greeks, related to the Germans by blood, for whom Nietzsche had the most enduring love. The Greeks created the mightiest war epic in the world; but no Greek state corresponds to the 'Iliad'. There are only Greek small states, city-states, which live in incessant feud with one another, with what delight Nietzsche's gaze rests on the spectacle of this incessant struggle, on this 'bloody jealousy from city to city, from party to party, the murderous greed of those little wars, the tiger-like triumph over the corpse of the slain enemy, in short the incessant renewal of those Trojan battle and horror scenes'. There was a people, which was the tremendous experience of the young Nietzsche, who allowed the existing urge for power and victory to prevail and considered it justified. 'The struggle and the cunning for victory were recognized: and nothing distinguishes the Greek world so much from ours as the resulting coloring of

individual ethical concepts, for example that of Eris and Nemesis'. The Christianized world knows envy only as an evil or petty emotion; in the Greek world envy signifies the urge to self-assertion, to power, to victory. It is this urge that Nietzsche presented in his philosophical main work as the ground of the entire world (See above, p. 64). In praise of the Greeks he says lastly in the 'Twilight of the Idols': 'I saw their strongest instinct, the will to power, I saw them tremble before the unbridled force of this drive, I saw all their institutions grow out of protective measures to make themselves safe from one another against their inner explosive'. On this drive rests the life form of the Greek human being, the life form of agon, of incessant struggle 'to be the best and superior to the others'. This is precisely the meaning of the Germanic princely state: for prince is not he who heads an office apparatus, but he who is first in danger and battle.

Nietzsche recognized the contrast between Greek and Roman nature in relation to the state with decisive clarity. In his Greek book a unifying glance falls on the Roman state: the Roman imperium is equated with the 'utmost secularization', called its most magnificent but also most dreadful manifestation (Birth of Tragedy). We read in the preliminary works for 'The Will to Power' of a nonsensical state expansion of the *Imperium Romanum*, and also there of an abuse of power by the Roman emperors, through which the morality of the powerless attained victory. For Nietzsche, the system of world struggle with its squandering of all forces stands higher than the system of the state with its thrift, which regards any agonistic squandering of power as 'useless' (he makes this observation explicitly 'against the Romans'). And how sharply Nietzsche expresses himself in the middle of his career when in 'Human, All Too Human' (442) he writes: 'Crude Roman patriotism is now, when quite different and higher tasks are set than patria and honos [fatherland and honor], either something dishonest or a sign of backwardness'. How primeval Germanic is this saying! The image of the Germanic hero, as the best connoisseur of the Nordic soul, Andreas Heusler, teaches us, completely lacks the superpersonal. For these struggles there is no fatherland and no homeland; even the hero's battle most highly admired by the people on the move, the last battle of the Ostrogoths under King Teia, was according to this witness no struggle 'for freedom and fatherland'. 'That one asserts oneself in some extraordinary situation and in courage, self-control, defiance of death maintains one's warrior honor, which is what matters'. With such words, which could have been spoken by Nietzsche, *Heusler describes the nature of the German. In the Icelandic sagas the same scholar finds the perfect, realistic representation of what Nietzsche meant by his master morality, which is warrior morality, as opposed to slave morality, which is servile mentality.* In the epilogue to 'The Case of Wagner' Nietzsche actually speaks of the Icelandic saga as the 'almost most important document' of master morality. The Old Norse language had the word '*mikilmenni*', meaning 'man of great size', master man. What is magnificent in the will to power as well as

in giving and helping is thereby designated. 'The *'litilmenni'* stands in contrast to it: the 'little man', who is anxious about everything and regrets the gift'. This is as if it were taken from the 'Genealogy of Morals'. And sounding as if originating from the 'Antichrist' is Heusler's sentence: 'In order to denominate the new virtue of humility in Germanic terms, one had to resort to word stems that meant the lowly or the servant; *humility was in fact, according to the older conception, servile mentality*'. And like a motto finally for Nietzsche's struggle against the morality of pity and pacifistic humanitarianism it looks when Heusler says in general characterizing terms: 'Instead of the universal human duties there ruled the great division into friends and foes'.

It could be objected that in 'Twilight of the Idols' Nietzsche judged the Romans and Greeks quite differently. Here, in the section 'What I Owe the Ancients,' he praises Sallust and Horace as those writers from whom he learned how to write. 'One will, right into my Zarathustra, recognize in me a very serious ambition for Roman style, for the *'aere perennius'* in style'. To the Greeks, he adds, I certainly do not owe any similarly strong impressions, they cannot be for us what the Romans are. To be sure, Nietzsche in the same breath praises Thucydides in the highest terms. The passage is completely misunderstood if one refers to the Romans outright: only the Romans as literary models are meant, as masters of noble form, of perfect literary posture. From them, there is no doubt, Nietzsche learned something essential. To this school he owes the polished, chiseled quality of his style, which stands in a certain contrast to what constitutes the content of his philosophy, but never can Nietzsche's attitude toward Roman literature lead to the conclusion that he was unsure in his Germanic-Greek instincts. *The substance of his doctrine is un-Roman, indeed anti-Roman, this is most strongly expressed in his hostility toward the state as an institution.*

Incidentally, there is no lack of references indicating that Nietzsche was aware of this deep kinship with the Nordic-warrior world, just as he in general demonstrates uncanny genius in tracing what is related or opposed to him. At a time when the Icelandic sagas were still unknown to wider circles, he characterizes the 'noble man', the mighty man, in connection with the saga as the one 'who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and be silent, who practices severity and harshness against himself with pleasure and has reverence for all that is strict and hard' (Beyond Good and Evil, 260). He further speaks of the German nobility as a 'Viking nobility at bottom' (Antichrist), and also in his literary remains there is found a reference to the Vikings. They are juxtaposed there with the people of the Renaissance. Instead of speaking of Nietzsche's 'Renaissanceism', one should rather speak of his Germanism, which coincides with his Greek agonistic ethics and agonistic metaphysics. Moreover, the nobility in the Upper and Middle Italian city-states, which in their feuds produced that type Nietzsche admired, very probably stemmed from Germanic blood. His admiration was sparked not by

Renaissance art, but by the warrior-agonal human type of the epoch. Aesthetes and writers focused on aesthetics have brought forth and put into circulation the view that Nietzsche's admiration for power and the warrior essence was born solely from experiences of a longing dreamer, a cultivated enthusiast who, conscious of his own powerlessness, intoxicated himself with sublime images of force and cruelty. A famous textbook on the history of philosophy says about this admiration with inimitable seriousness: 'It is the nemo professor who would like to be a wild tyrant'. *An interpretation of this kind that psychologizes overlooks that Nietzsche does not glorify power subjectively, but rather describes types, life forms that were real in history, discipline systems on a natural basis.* In his insights something breaks through that slumbers in the depths of our past, traces of which can also be found elsewhere. It is an objective efficacy, working under all epochs and coming alive again in Nietzsche, which led him to his deep insights. Aesthetic enthusiasm does not have such results.

2. The Antichrist. Protestantism and Catholicism.

If one wants to properly understand Nietzsche's relationship to Christianity, one must never lose sight of the fact that the decisive statement 'God is dead' signifies a historical observation. The Christian churches and Christian doctrine are not combated by Nietzsche with the fatal subjectivism of the know-it-all critic, but with realistic arguments: it is shown what things actually look like in 'Christian' Europe. The critique of slave morality, the destruction of priestly values, is inseparable from a realistic view of history. The historical perspective on things belongs to any true realism; in the view of events as fatefully necessary the Heracliteanism is perfected. Theology is separated from the philosophy of history. Inseparable from the question about Christianity is the question about the history of Christianity. Here, too, in the final and deepest layer, we encounter a Germanism in Nietzsche. From the North comes the doctrine of the twilight of the gods. 'I believe in the primeval Germanic word: all gods must die', we read in the drafts for 'The Birth of Tragedy'. If one juxtaposes this word of the young Nietzsche with the statement 'God is dead', one sees Zarathustra's mission. This is his calling: out of Germanic substance to proclaim the death of the Christian God. Zarathustra signifies the fulfillment of the presentiment contained in the word: all gods must die. Only from here does the tremendous gravity visible over and understandable in Nietzsche's work and figure.

In the 'Birth of Tragedy' the young Nietzsche opposes the 'foreign myth' of Christianity with the 'native myth', which alone could educate. Half a human lifetime later, during a major retrospective on his work, he says about the same youthful writing: 'In this book the transplantation of a deeply un-Germanic myth, the Christian, into the German heart counts as the actual German calamity'. Not only for understanding the person Nietzsche is this statement decisive, but it also elucidates the secret of the relationship with Wagner so important for the human being Nietzsche. 'I just want to confess',

says a note from the time of 'Human, All Too Human', 'I had hoped that Christianity, gone stale for the Germans, could be made quite distasteful to them through art, German mythology as nauseating, habituating to polytheism, etc. What horror at restorative currents!' The fact that with 'Parsifal' Wagner became Christian was the last straw, led to the final break. In 'Parsifal' Nietzsche sensed the spirit of the Counter-Reformation. To him it seemed the abyss of mendacity that the same man who had conceived the figure of Siegfried finally sank down before the cross and the priest. In an extensive posthumous note from a later period Nietzsche relates the 'hysterically erotic trait' which Wagner especially loved in woman and set to music to French Romanticism, and he predicts that the Parisians would inevitably convert to Wagner at some point, one of the numerous predictions with which he was proven right. He feels that hysterically erotic trait as thoroughly un-German and therefore doubts that Wagner is a German artist. But something in Wagner is German, he broods further, perhaps only his strength and audacity, or that toward himself he was stricter and for the longest part of his life lived in the German way, on his own, as an unrelenting atheist, antinomian and immoralist, or that he invented the figure of a very free human being, Siegfried, 'who in fact is too free, too hard, too cheerful, too un-Christian for Latin taste?' The Latin taste, the Romanic world has a profound affinity for Christianity, this is one of Nietzsche's key insights. In the modern culture dominated by the Romance peoples he sees the 'feeling of Protestantism' extinguished, establishes an actual predominance of Catholicism. Even decidedly 'anti-Protestant movements' like that to which Wagner's 'Parsifal' belongs are no longer perceived as such within this culture. And with a sudden turn to the depths Nietzsche continues this train of thought: 'The entire higher intellectuality in France is Catholic in instinct; Bismarck has understood that there is no longer any Protestantism' (Will to Power, 87).

This is the fundamental aspect under which Nietzsche sees Protestantism: as a movement against Romanism, as something that comes from the North. We will soon get to know the other aspect; beforehand his image of the Romanic world should be completely outlined. Decisive for this above all is an aphorism from 'Dawn' (192). Here Nietzsche speaks under the title 'Wishing Oneself Complete Opponents' about the French. The aphorism is composed from that wonderful chivalrous mood in which the fighter honors an opponent, because he knows that he is thereby doing himself the greatest honor. 'One cannot deny the French that they have been the most Christian people on earth...', this magnificent characterization begins, and it concludes with the observation that this people of the 'consummated types of Christianity' also had to produce the consummated opposites of the un-Christian freethinker.

A brief foray into the realm of Nietzsche interpretation now becomes necessary. Under the title of 'freethinker' Nietzsche wrote several of his books: 'Human, All Too Human', 'Dawn', 'The Gay Science', 'Beyond Good

and Evil'. The way in which he poses this type against German clumsiness and dishonesty has led many to see in this turn to a French type, connected with an adoption of French idioms of expression, an abandonment of German intellectuality, indeed an inclination toward Romanism in general. The type of the freethinker is un-German; 'free spirit' is after all just a translation of the French expression 'libre penseur'. This type presupposes a different culture than the German one, it is the counter-image to the most perfect types of Latin Christianity, as precisely Nietzsche teaches us.

People have given themselves much trouble to prove Nietzsche's Romanism. The veneration on the part of the author of the books of aphorisms for the French moralists, especially La Rochefoucauld, plays a large role. If we do not overlook, however, that this veneration is by no means without essential reservations. The Christian origin namely of the moralism of a La Rochefoucauld, and recognizing this origin always signifies an objection for Nietzsche, has been very clear to Nietzsche from early on: La Rochefoucauld belongs with Pascal to his opponents. Both 'have all the Greek taste against them', La Rochefoucauld 'exposes according to the guiding principles of Christianity' the ugliness of man. A conversion to Romanism, even in its freethinker-moralizing form, would always have had to signify for Nietzsche at the same time an apostasy to the Christian, the consistency of which the proponents of his 'Romanism' have not made themselves plain. They have not recognized that the inclination toward the Romanic in Nietzsche is essentially an antithesis, an effective mask, in order to goad, ridicule and horrify the satisfied Germans of the 'Reich'.

In the moment when one attempts to explain Nietzsche's hostility toward Christianity with the help of the concept 'freethinker', one loses the path to the real reasons for his anti-Christianity. From Bernard to Fénelon and Chateaubriand, French Christianity is sentimental, this word taken in the most objective sense. The counterthrust against Romanic, feminine Christianity therefore always occurs from the side of reason: the freethinker fights emotional religion from the position of reason. One would therefore, if one really wanted to conceive Nietzsche as freethinker, also have to call him a rationalist at the same time. He is not that. We completely disregard his irrationalistic metaphysics: even the attack on Christianity which he wages is decisively misunderstood if one sees in it merely an attack in the manner of Voltaire. With a certain pity Nietzsche sometimes thought of the anti-Christianity of this man, whom at the time of 'Human, All Too Human' he had expressly set up as his champion; with cutting clarity he felt that his own position was infinitely more daring, infinitely more dangerous than that of the most audacious rationalistic opponent of the Church in the 18th century. It is not with cool, mocking superiority, not out of luxury and skepticism that Nietzsche approaches Christianity. He comes to it with faith in fate in his heart: all gods must die. That is not the faith of a freethinker! *A freethinker does not say, 'God is dead', he says, 'If God did not exist, he would have to be*

invented'. Everything freethinker-like, everything mocking and skeptical is in Nietzsche only means to an end. Behind the mask of the freethinker stands the tremendous earnestness of one who sees hovering over the world in which he lives a destiny, and who knows himself appointed to be the first to name this destiny.

We complete this proof of Nietzsche's anti-Romanism by saying: it is not Latin freethinking, but Siegfried that stands behind the attack by Nietzsche on Christianity. The Nordic heroic epic is the immense, dark substratum from which the bold fighter against Christian Europe emerges. He sees Christianity truly rooted in the Latin races. 'It seems that Catholicism belongs much more intrinsically to the Latin races than all of Christianity in general does to us northerners...' (Beyond Good and Evil, Aphorism 48). In Catholic countries, unbelief therefore signifies 'a kind of rebellion against the spirit of the race', while for us it is rather a return to the spirit (or un-spirit) of the race. This insertion 'or unspirit' is very characteristic, for in this case Nietzsche means that 'we northerners', compared to the inhabitants of Romanized regions, are truly barbarians. With what force does his barbarian blood stir at the language of the sweetish Renan, how he immediately discovers there our 'probably less beautiful and harder, that is, more German soul'. The illness of the will that has overcome Europe as a result of Christianity shows itself greatest and most manifold there, Aphorism 208 of the same work goes on, where culture has longest been at home; the will is therefore most badly diseased in present-day France, for here we are farthest from Nordic barbarism.

Of all the problems of understanding Nietzsche, his concept of Germanness undoubtedly contains the greatest difficulties. Nowhere in his work does one find oneself faced with such an abundance of contradictory judgments. So might those in fact be right who deny that Nietzsche has a unified understanding precisely in essential questions? No! All the judgments that seemingly contradict one another can, with careful and patient investigation, be derived from a unified basic view. One must only always consider Nietzsche's personal situation, above all the situation after the publication of 'Zarathustra', and secondly one must not overlook that in the problem 'German essence' all the main lines of his thinking intertwine. For millennia Germany has been exposed to Romanization, in which Nietzsche as a Nordic man sees a disaster, and furthermore it is part of Christian Europe, against which he rose up as a fighter. The intertwining of the 'German' with the 'Christian' must be observed above all. All-important determinations about the Germans are made by Nietzsche under the viewpoint: what role do the Germans play in the process of Christianization of Europe?

'Let us not forget that the names of peoples are originally abusive names. The Tatars for example by their name are 'the dogs': that is what they were called by the Chinese. The 'Germans': that originally meant the heathens'; thus the Goths called, following their conversion, the great mass of their unbaptized tribal relatives, according to the clue of their translation of the Septuaginta, in

which the heathens are denoted by the word that in Greek means 'the peoples'; see Ulfilas. It would still be possible that the Germans subsequently made for themselves an honorable name from their old abusive name, in that they would become the first un-Christian people of Europe: a possibility for which Schopenhauer credits them much honor. Thus Luther's work would come to completion, he who taught them to be un-Romanic and to say, 'Here I stand! I cannot do otherwise!'

The main lines intersect here: it is un-Roman to say: 'Here I stand! I can do no other!' The way the individual here bases himself on himself, on his fate, does not fit with the Latin universalism, with the state consciousness of the Roman human being, who always knows himself bound to an institution, integrated into a reasonably governed whole, upheld by norms and traditions.

The anti-Roman, anti-state tendency of Zarathustra has an inner relation to his hostility towards the Church, this 'last Roman building'. 'Church? What is that then?, Church? I answered, that is a kind of state, and indeed the most mendacious one' (Zarathustra, On Great Events). It is not a fleeting coincidence when Nietzsche relates Church and state to each other from his point of view. Rather, this identification goes back to the deepest ground of his Germanic awareness of freedom and fate. The premise of the state, so Nietzsche's opinion goes, states: 'The measure is there'. The principle of the state is a principle of shaping that hinders the freedom and growth of the individual. The state modeled on the Roman example and the Church, which has most perfectly realized this example, is in his eyes a means of making uniform the still unformed human being, of alienating him from his fate. I give this interpretation to the passage from the preparatory works for 'The Will to Power', which states: 'Presupposition of the state hitherto: man is not to develop himself; the measure is there! The Catholic Church (the oldest of all state forms in Europe) now best represents the old state!'

If this is recognized and acknowledged, then it is clear: no figure in German history can be more appealing and provocative for Nietzsche than Luther's.

CE. Hirsch has shown that Nietzsche's image of Luther depends on the portrayal that Jansen gave in his 'History of the German People'; Ch. Anblér has demonstrated how Ranke influenced Nietzsche's idea of Protestantism. One cannot expect an image of Luther drawn from the sources; in this regard every theology student is superior to the author of the 'Antichrist'. Nietzsche does not speak of Luther out of historical knowledge, but he speaks about him from a related historical situation: as a man who stands at a corresponding place within German, indeed European events.

In 'Dawn' (88), Luther is celebrated as the 'great benefactor'. because he shook the way of life of the monk, the Christian *vita contemplativa*, in its esteem and thus made the path to an un-Christian *vita contemplativa* accessible again. But Nietzsche's task does not allow him to indulge what Luther brought: after all, the Reformer only replaced the structure of the Catholic Church, that noble Roman building, with another, coarser and more

modest church building. That old building rests on a foundation that can also be characterized this way: it rests on a southern freedom and broad-mindedness of spirit and equally on a southern suspicion of nature, man and spirit, it rests on a completely different knowledge of man, experience of man than the north has had. The Lutheran Reformation was in its full breadth the indignation of simplicity against something complex; to speak cautiously, a crude, decent misunderstanding, of which there is much to borrow, one did not understand the expression of a victorious Church and saw only corruption, one misunderstood the noble skepticism, that luxury of skepticism and tolerance, which every triumphant, self-confident power permits itself... (The Gay Science, 358). The aphorism from which these sentences are taken bears the title: 'The Peasant Revolt of the Spirit'. The Reformation is meant; it is held responsible for the degeneration of the modern scholar, for the German philistinism in matters of cognition, in short for the plebeianism of the last centuries.

The more violently Nietzsche rages against the Germans, the more sharply he speaks about Luther and the Reformation. The quoted aphorism belongs in the fifth book of 'The Gay Science', which was written at the same time as 'Beyond Good and Evil' and is already completely overshadowed by the mood from which the writings of the last year of creativity emerged. 'The Case of Wagner', 'Twilight of the Idols', 'The Antichrist', and 'Ecce Homo' are at their core nothing other than attacks on Germany. Part of this attack is also a partisanship for the Catholic Church, against which the new Germany (in the Kulturkampf) has just lost a battle. It is also not difficult to see what enables Nietzsche to advocate for the Church: in any case, it is a structure of power of the greatest style, and as such it can be admired. For the same reason, after all, the Imperium Romanum is occasionally acknowledged in the last writings. But the admiration for the 'noble skepticism' belongs in any case to Nietzsche's arsenal against the German spirit, which is incapable of skepticism.

However, how ambiguous the text immediately becomes when Nietzsche begins to praise the Church is evident from that little sentence in the Peasant Revolt aphorism: 'It seems the Germans do not understand the nature of a church'. Indeed, according to Nietzsche's own premises, they cannot understand it. In this context, praising can only want to express reproach, but in this mouth it means praise in any case.

The sharpest polemic we know from Nietzsche is found in 'The Antichrist' and 'Ecce Homo', and in both cases it is directed against the Christianity of the North as well as against the Germans. For Nietzsche, the mere fact that there is a Christianity of the North, a Protestantism, is enough. If there must be a Christianity at all, then it belongs to the peoples among whom it arose and first spread. It is a product of the Mediterranean world and was therefore alien to the Germanic north from the very beginning. 'If one wants to claim that the German was predisposed and predestined for Christianity, one must

not lack impudence. Because the opposite is not only true, but also palpable. Whence should the invention of two distinguished Jews, Jesus and Saul, the two most Jewish Jews who may have ever existed, appeal more to the Germans than to other peoples?' This is how Nietzsche wrote at the time of 'Dawn'. Europe, he says, has allowed an 'outgrowth of oriental morality' to proliferate within itself.

And in the eyes of the young Nietzsche, accustomed to the clear circumstances of the Greek world, the drama of the Occident is reflected as follows: *'Greeksdom weakened, Romanized, coarsened, become decorative, then accepted by weakened Christianity as an ally, decoratively spread by force among uncivilized peoples, that is the history of Occidental culture. The feat is accomplished, and the Greek and the Priestly brought together'*.

That this view of the contrast between Mediterranean culture and its religions and the spirit of the Germanic north remained vital in Nietzsche until the end is attested above all by his most important late writing, the 'Genealogy of Morals'. Its basic idea is: Mediterranean culture reaches its climax in the type of the priest, which corresponds to a way of life in which pathos and resentment unite, priests are the best haters and know how to give solemn expression to their hatred. The warrior way of life of the German, related to the Greek, is of the opposite kind, after all, the Greeks play such a uniquely important role in the history of the Mediterranean peoples because, in contrast to the Romans, they never succumbed to the influence of the Orient. A small, fleeting juxtaposition by Nietzsche vividly brings the two worlds before our eyes: 'The heroic human being, crying out from battle and hardship and hatred and ashamed of pathos, and there the priest!'

Nietzsche's last writings are devoted to the psychology of the priest: the Genealogy and the Antichrist. In the attack on the type opposed to that of the warrior, in the analysis of the human being who dares to bless and curse in the name of the highest God, Nietzsche's work is completed. In the priest he sees the inventor and guardian of the consciousness of guilt, the human being who rules by taking possession of the bad conscience of others. In an attack of unheard-of force, Nietzsche defends the heroic way of life to which he confesses as a philosopher. Let no one say that he should have psychologically portrayed the ideal of the hero; if the heroic human being mattered to him, he could not portray him psychologically, because all psychology debases. For Nietzsche, psychology is always only a weapon. The fact that the warrior type is characterized by him only occasionally and briefly allows poor readers not to notice what it is about at all. But whoever does not understand the 'Genealogy of Morals' lacks the key to Nietzsche's final insights.

Two sentences from 'The Antichrist' culminate in the unification of motifs in this late period. 'I cannot understand how a German could ever have Christian feelings...' and 'If one does not get rid of Christianity, the Germans will be to blame for it...'. After what precedes these exclamations, one hears the voice

overlapping itself in the last one, explain themselves.

Everything Nietzsche has said against Luther, against the Reformation, against the Germans, it always comes back to the one reproach: they prevented the downfall of Christianity. 'Cesare Borgia as Pope' would have been the end, Luther's peasant fury did not allow that: the Reformation only enabled a new ascent of the papacy, made the triumph of the Counter-Reformation possible. 'The Germans robbed Europe of the harvest, of the meaning of the last great age, the Renaissance age, at a moment when a higher order of values, where the noble, life-affirming, promising-of-the-future values had achieved victory over the opposing values, the values of decline, penetrating into the instincts of those ruling there! Luther, this fateful monk, restored the Church and, what is a thousand times worse, Christianity, at the moment when it was defeated... The Catholics would have reason to celebrate Luther festivals, to put on Luther plays...' (Ecce Homo).

Almost everything Nietzsche says about the event of the Reformation is negative. It is precisely from this fact that we recognize Nietzsche's historical position. *For he does not want to go back behind the Reformation, but beyond the Reformation, and this will must express itself in negations. From his point of view, the Reformation was only retarding.* He conjectures a possible dialectical course in which the papacy would have abolished itself through its worldliness, which of course is only a highly questionable assumption. In any case, it is enough to determine Nietzsche to take sides against the Reformation. In this way, those notorious judgments come about which at the same time read like condemnations of the German spirit. But anyone who surveys the context will see with utter clarity that for Nietzsche it is solely a matter of antitheses, not of a partisanship for the Mediterranean priesthood and the old Church that would be impossible for him. A parallel to this is offered by the evaluation of the Imperium Romanum in the last writings. As soon as Nietzsche charges with full force against the priestly system, even the political system of the Romans shines in transfigured splendor. In the 'Genealogy' (I, 16) the Romans are juxtaposed as the strong and noble to the Jews: 'For the Romans were indeed the strong and noble, as they had never yet been on earth, even in their dreams had never been imagined so strong and noble; every leftover from them, every inscription enraptures, provided one guesses what is written there'. Over against the Jews and Christians, Greeks and Romans are placed on the same level (Antichrist, 59). Even old opponents must get along in the face of a stronger opponent, thus even the *Imperium Romanum* itself receives the highest praise: '*Christianity was the vampire of the Imperium Romanum... Do people still not understand this? The Imperium Romanum... this most admirable work of art in the grand style, was a beginning, its structure was more eloquent, intending to prove itself for millennia, until today nothing has ever been built like it, not even dreamed of, to the same extent, sub specie aeterni!*' (Antichrist, 58; cf. Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes, 39).

3. Rousseau Against Democracy and Socialism.

It will one day become effective as one of Nietzsche's deepest and most momentous thoughts in the observation of history, that modern democratic ideals, insofar as they aim at the happiness of the majority, the welfare state, are of Christian, indeed Roman-Christian origin. Nietzsche did not investigate the origin of English liberalism, Calvinism lies outside his field of vision, but with the greatest interest he pursued that process of transformation of Roman-mystical religiosity into a political theory which finds its conclusion in Rousseau's teachings. *Rousseau of Geneva, revolutionary politician, optimistic pedagogue, sentimental novelist, enthusiast and rhetorician, the famous author of The Social Contract and Emile, is Nietzsche's most intimate enemy.* This enmity must be clearly distinguished from that between Nietzsche and Plato or Nietzsche and Pascal. Such men are not equal opponents with whom he competes; Rousseau, on the other hand, belongs to the other type: spiritually, he is a priest. He knows all the tricks for establishing oneself in the right without fighting, he knows how to kill an opponent spiritually. For that one does not need sacral spells of excommunication, moral concepts suffice. The moral defamation of the opponent is Rousseau's most effective invention, he is the master of resentful moralizing. The private person as priest, blessing and cursing, praising and condemning in the name of reason, goodness, virtue, humanity, to this day this seductive model has an effect.

Nietzsche attacked Rousseau again and again, like a fencer he circled around him. One could compile one of the most complete psychological portraits contained in his work with regard to Rousseau. *He hates the Genevan for his false, effeminate, mawkish concept of 'nature,' for his mendacious morality.* 'I still hate Rousseau in the Revolution: it is the world-historical expression for this double-being of idealist and scoundrel' (Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes 48). Voltaire with his pessimism, his skepticism and his moderation is infinitely closer to him than the distrustful optimist about whom the apt sentence is found in Nietzsche's posthumous writings: 'There are people whom everyone would like to compel to a Yes or No with regard to their entire person: their megalomania stems from their distrust of themselves'. For the characterization of the priestly nature of Rousseau's doctrine, only one sentence from the masterful exposition in 'The Will to Power' (95 ff) is quoted: Against Voltaire's pessimism, the goodness and providence of God is defended by Rousseau. Nietzsche remarks on this: 'He needed God in order to be able to cast the curse on society and civilization' (Will to Power, 100).

What Nietzsche fights above all in Rousseau is his pity, his feminism. 'Rousseau, in his veneration of the poor, women, the people as sovereign, moves entirely within the Christian movement: all slavishly servile faults and virtues can be studied in him, as well as the most unbelievable mendacity (he wants to teach justice!). His counterpart Napoleon, ancient, despiser of mankind'. Nietzsche would feel the modern concept of the citizen, which

politically equates woman with man, to be a consequence of Rousseau's premises.

From the Christian doctrine that all human beings are equal before God proceeds by necessity the demand for political equality in modern democratic states. For Nietzsche, this doctrine contains a disorganizing principle: it not only abolishes natural differences, but also destroys all traditions. The democratic ideal is based on the recognition of the equality of persons, on the belief in the ultimate triumph of truth, love and justice. But such a belief is life-destroying, it prevents an 'order of rank of forces' from establishing itself, in which commanders are recognized as commanders, and obeyers as obeying (Will to Power). *It leads to the badly turned-out, the inferior, the actors taking possession of the big words freedom, equality, justice, and setting up a kind of Jesuit regime. A social condition arises in which the 'handlers and intermediaries' play a role; literati and 'representatives' become dominant. A press develops which has the task of directing ears and senses in a false direction, while all great political events 'stealthily and veiledly sneak onto the stage'. The much-vaunted parliamentarianism is simply a means in the service of parties; as 'public permission to choose between five basic political opinions', it is defined by Nietzsche (The Gay Science, 174). Woman becomes masculinized and thus abolishes the position she occupies in great and healthy times.*

In socialism, Nietzsche sees, with truly world-historical insight, a brother of despotism, for like the latter it desires a fullness of state power, indeed it surpasses all the past by striving for the literal annihilation of the individual. The human being in his peculiarity appears to him an unjustified luxury of nature; he is to be 'improved' into a purposeful organ of the commonwealth. Meanwhile, Nietzsche clearly sees through the peculiar situation in which socialism finds itself in relation to the state: socialism wants the state, it wants 'the most obsequious prostration of all citizens before the absolute state'. but at the same time it works toward abolishing all existing states. That is to say, let us add, socialism is hostile to the state insofar as state means a legal structure, but it is in favor of any state omnipotence insofar as the state adapts itself to its purposes.

To achieve its goal, Nietzsche continues, socialism 'hammers the word 'justice' into the heads of the half-educated classes like a nail, in order to completely rob them of their reason... and to provide them with a good conscience for the evil game they are to play' (Human, All Too Human, I, 473). The conclusion of the train of thought is: 'Socialism can serve to teach the danger of all accumulations of state power quite brutally and impressively, and in this respect to arouse mistrust of the state itself. When its harsh voice joins in the battle cry: 'as much state as possible', the clamor first becomes louder than ever; but soon the opposite also emerges with all the greater force: 'As little state as possible'.

From these sentences, which are of programmatic significance for Nietzsche's

political views, we must gather that for him the state means a mass of private individuals with small, egoistic interests, held together by acts of violence. Here the concept of the state is determined by the notions: commercial state, police state, educational state. It is not the great historical type of the state that Nietzsche turns against, in this field he has strikingly little experience and knowledge, rather it is state-regulated society with its need for commerce and employment, enjoyment and education, security and peace that he has in view when he rejects the 'modern state' with contempt. 'To make society secure against thieves and fire and infinitely convenient for all trade and commerce, and to transform the state into providence in the good and bad sense, these are low, moderate goals not absolutely indispensable, which one ought not to strive for with the highest means and tools available...as they exist at all...' (Dawn, 179).

The book 'Human, All Too Human' is very revealing about Nietzsche the politician. Here already one finds that basic formula for the modern state which remains valid until the end: 'Modern democracy is the historical form of the decay of the state' (I, 472). This sentence is derived at the end of a long historical observation, whereby the relation of 'religion and government' serves as the starting point. The state, it says there, surrounds itself for its own advantage with the splendor of religion, for by the help of priests a government makes its power 'legitimate'. In the concept of authority, divine and human authority merge; custodial government and preservation of religion go together. *But what happens when the people are sovereign, religion a private matter? Then society dissolves, the concept of the state is abolished, the contrast between private and public disappears.* 'The contempt, decay and death of the state, the unleashing of the private person (I avoid saying individual) is the consequence of the democratic concept of the state; herein lies its mission'.

The subtlety of the little treatise lies in that Nietzsche approves of this development, the mission of the democratic concept of the state, which is. If democracy has fulfilled its mission, then a 'new page' will be unrolled in the story of mankind, and cautiously the author intimates that then the time will begin which he hopes for: the prospect resulting from this certain decay 'is not a thoroughly deplorable one for every respect'. The old state passes away with religion and the priests; the new state, insofar as it has democratic ideals, is of Christian origin and by necessity steers toward anarchy, for Nietzsche these are two acts of the same drama. Perhaps one may interpret his historic-philosophical construction further: where there is still a state, there is also still the Middle Ages. The democratic state is the successor to the state governed by authority and religion. Only when this form of state too will belong to the past have we left the Middle Ages, only then is Christianity no longer a determining power.

'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' is directed against the democratic and socialist ideals. The Übermensch is the counterpart to the 'last man,' i.e., the

functionary of the democratic-socialist society. This political meaning of 'Zarathustra' becomes particularly clear through the explanatory writing composed by Peter Gast, which is conceived entirely from out of Nietzsche's world of ideas.

4. Culture and State in Hegel.

It was recently noted by a wise observer that the opening sentences of the first 'Untimely Meditation' inaugurate a 'new historic-spiritual situation in Germany': here begins the opposition of the mind, especially the artistic mind, against the 'Reich' (Westphal, *Enemies of Bismarck*. Munich 1930. p. 124). The word 'culture' has taken on a magical splendor for many through Nietzsche. Few definitions of the young Nietzsche have been as fortunate as that of the first 'Untimely One': 'Culture is the unity of artistic style in all the vital expressions of a people'. Weisphal has drawn the conclusion from this concept of culture that Nietzsche belongs with that sociological, psychological and aesthetic opposition of the Bismarck Reich whose catchword was not 'state' but 'society,' an opposition whose intellectual leader may be called Dilthey. It seems that Nietzsche, with psychology and art, also fought state and science; his slogan was for culture, against the state.

But as far as Nietzsche himself is concerned, this construct does not correspond to the facts. The reasons for his opposition lie much deeper than the aesthetic motive reaches; the situation is much more complicated. Precisely the social condition whose spirituality is analyzed so rightly by Weisphal, precisely that psychological aesthetic 'culture', is the enemy Nietzsche has in mind when he says culture. To be sure, he has another enemy in mind too: the national and Christian state whose creator and leader Bismarck was in his day. But to see his relation to this state rightly, one must first know what the young Nietzsche actually meant by culture.

Indeed, it seems as if it is already the juxtaposition of Potsdam and Weimar when in the first 'Untimely One' we read that the victory of 1871 contains an enormous danger within itself: it could turn into a complete defeat, a defeat, indeed eradication of the German spirit for the sake of the 'German Reich'. Already here the Reich appears before us in those insidious quotation marks that henceforth always accompany the word when Nietzsche uses it. Bravery seems to him the most important characteristic of the German, uniform and lasting bravery in contrast to the pathetic and sudden impetuosity of the French. But this natural bravery and perseverance, plus strict military discipline, superiority of leaders, unity and obedience among the troops has as yet nothing to do with culture. Discipline and obedience are something different from education; they also distinguished the Macedonian armies from the incomparably more highly cultivated Greek armies. So in 1871 we have by no means won a victory over Romance culture, still the German reality is formless, still a false 'erudition' rules with us instead of genuine cultivation, an erudition for which the new work by D. F. Strauss which is the target of the attack of the first 'Untimely' is an example. A German, original culture does

not exist, in all matters of form we still depend on Paris as before, and it will still take a long time before one can say that we were barbarians.

The Macedonians are of course the Prussians, and the more cultivated Greeks correspond to the aesthetic Weimarans; even the catchword 'barbarians' is not missing. Whoever does not know Nietzsche must assume a devotee of French culture is speaking here, but in truth Nietzsche only wants to tell the Germans: given the prevailing European cultural conditions you will never amount to anything, here the French will always be ahead of you. You are destined for something else! The partisanship for Paris is the genuinely Nietzschean means of provocation appearing here for the first time: the antithesis is meant pedagogically. The second 'Untimely Meditation' already provides evidence of this: that erudition, namely, to whose downfall Nietzsche would like to help, corresponds to a 'decorative culture', i.e., a culture in which there is an 'exterior' and an 'interior', a form of life, then, based on conventions.

This concept of culture, however, is a Romanic one for the young Nietzsche; the Greek concept stands opposed to it, according to which culture 'is a new and improved physis', and means a unity between life, thought, appearance and will (conclusion of the second Untimely Meditation). The judgment on all decorative culture is that it is ripe for destruction, funeral orations should help it to its downfall, by no means is it to recommend Romance culture to the German as a model. Everything is measured by the Greek concept of culture.

The juxtaposition of Romance versus German culture may well stem from Wagner, even the contrast between grand opera and music drama may lie behind it: new and strikingly peculiar is the depth that the young Nietzsche gives to this contrast. In it lives, darkly and vigorously, the idea of a German way of life that is higher, more mature and more powerful than all past ones. He has this future constitution of the Germans in view when he speaks of the 'German spirit', of an 'orientation derived from the Germanic essence through art'. He has anything but a social condition with a highly developed dwelling culture, good theaters and an artistically receptive public in view. Only from the notes of his literary remains does one learn what that definition, 'culture is the unity of artistic style in all the vital expressions of a people', actually wants to say. The offensive and decisive word 'artistic' can only be understood there when one senses the barb against science. Nietzsche comes from the work of the scholar; he experiences daily the dangers inherent in the pure drive to knowledge. *He notices: pure cognition, left to itself, leads to ruin.* It has proved impossible, he notes, to build a culture upon science. 'Scholarly culture' is the most dreadful thing. True culture requires a unity that science cannot provide. There must be something there that also tames science itself. Where else could the young Nietzsche seek this taming element except in art, to which he owes the highest moments of his life, whose greatest master also calls him friend as well as being a true tamer of life. 'The taming of science now takes place only through art'. Veneration of art understood here thus does not mean escape into the aesthetic, idolatry of pure form, but

precisely the opposite: return to life. In this sense, a strengthening of the aesthetic instinct appears to the young Nietzsche a 'salvation of the German spirit'. The turn to art is a turn to truthfulness and unity. 'To be completely truthful, glorious, heroic delight!... Now art takes on an entirely new dignity. By contrast, the sciences have lost one degree'. The emphasis in the quoted definition of culture lies on the word unity. 'The culture of a people reveals itself in the uniform taming of the drives of that people'. In this passage from his literary remains we have before us the more correct version of that definition.

When the young German speaks of art, he is not as far from the idea of the state as it seems, and it is no coincidence that in the notes the concepts 'the tragic work of art, the tragic human being, the tragic state' are mentioned together. The 'Birth of Tragedy' is certainly devoted to an aesthetic problem: but the problem of culture behind it is anything but unpolitical. It is only owing to Nietzsche's friendship with Wagner that his thoughts on the Greeks did not take on another tendency. Because ultimately everything had to lead to Wagner's artistic endeavors, the friend was in danger!, the planned 'Greek Book' appeared in a purely aesthetic attitude (see my essay 'Back Oven and Nietzsche'. Zurich 1929. p. 35). A large section on the Greek state had to be omitted. In this there was certainly a deeper necessity as well, for the reflections on the state would probably have connected better with the fragmentary book remaining on the pre-Socratic philosophers. *After all, Nietzsche saw in the early Greek philosophers a philosophy of statesmen alone!* Without a doubt, the Greek state played a major role in the field of vision of the young Nietzsche. The tendency of the young Greek enthusiast is not to grasp the state according to the categories of an aesthetic culture, but conversely, to view culture under the categories of the state. This tendency must have been all the stronger since the word of the Enlightener Schlosser, which he had heard in Burckhardt's lectures, continued to resonate in the soul of the young Nietzsche: power is evil in itself. Accordingly, in the aforementioned fragment on the Greek state, the origin of the state is 'horrible', and yet the hearts swell involuntarily towards 'the magic of the emerging state'. Even the subjugated no longer care about that terrible origin, fervently the state is regarded as the goal and apex of the sacrifices and duties of the individual. One would think that devastated lands, destroyed cities, brutalized people, consuming inter-ethnic hatred must estrange us from the state forever. And yet: 'The state, of disgraceful birth, for most people a constantly flowing source of hardship, in frequently recurring periods the devouring torch of mankind, and yet a sound at which we forget ourselves, a battle cry that has enthusiastically inspired countless truly heroic deeds, perhaps the highest and most venerable object for the blind and selfish masses, who even in the tremendous moments of state life have the perplexing expression of greatness on their faces!'

This passage is perhaps the most remarkable in Nietzsche's entire early work.

It shows that his thoughts could well have led to the state. The 'will to power' would then not have become the work of a loner, a connection between Nietzsche's heroism and German state reality would have come within tangible reach, Bismarck and Nietzsche would not have become enemies... One need only think through the idea to realize that in truth we are not dealing with possibilities here at all. We have to precisely portray the unbridgeable abyss. In doing so, let us firmly grasp that Nietzsche does not belong to the 'aesthetic-cultural' opposition of the new Reich.

The concept of culture of the young Nietzsche is characterized by the absence of any aesthetic or ethical coloration. The genius, this remains until the end, is the goal of all-natural development and all human effort. Everything else, including the state, belongs only to the 'necessary auxiliary mechanisms and preparations' of this ultimate goal. Culture exists where everything is subordinate to the production and dominance of genius. Whoever removes this idea from the context in which it grew up will find it easy to read an anti-political aestheticism into it. But how far it is from an aesthetic concept of culture, when as the first prerequisite of his genius-state he immediately cites slavery. So he has the real Greek culture in mind, not some dreamed-up ideal social condition. Culture, he says unambiguously, is not at the discretion of a people; here reign ineluctable forces that are law and limit to the individual. Cruelty is also inherent in the essence of culture, creation, life and death are one, with a blood-drenched victor we can compare glorious culture ('The Greek State'). What a barbaric, amoral picture Nietzsche presents! To be sure, the state is only a means to an end: it is the conqueror with the iron hand, but by this hand he leads 'the splendidly flourishing woman' of Greek society.

Art is the goal, the path to this goal leads through the state. *For a modern 'philosopher of culture' this would mean: state reality has to be reshaped in accordance with the aesthetic goal until the condition is reached that corresponds to the 'goal,' i.e., until the condition of an aesthetic-pacifist cultural community is realized.* For Nietzsche, the sentence has the opposite meaning: the reality of the state with all its horrors is the enduring prerequisite for the birth of the redeeming work of art. This merely hovers like a vision above the whole: if one takes away that reality, this vision also disappears, arising as it does from the conflict and understandable only from the contrast. Demonstrating this is indeed the purpose of the aesthetic main work, the 'Birth of Tragedy'. Accordingly, Nietzsche states that the strength of the political drive provides a guarantee that the soil from which individual geniuses alone can arise is not inhibited in its fertility. At this point, the idea of education that dominated the young Nietzsche comes into play: in order for the great work of art to arise again and again, the concentrated will of the state is needed as a 'magical force' to force the selfish individuals into the sacrifices and preparations that are the prerequisite for the realization of great artistic plans. To this belongs 'almost first and foremost' the education of the people.

So it is that, looking precisely at the 'single solar height of their art', we have to imagine the Greeks as political human beings par excellence. Only the people of the Renaissance can be compared to the Greeks with regard to this 'unleashing of the political drive, such an unconditional sacrifice of all other interests in service of this instinct for the state'. The secret of the Greek concept of culture, and thus also of Nietzsche's concept of culture, is the connection that exists between 'state and art, political greed and artistic creation, battlefield and work of art'. State and society are two sides of an eternal, all-encompassing reality: the state is the 'iron clamp,' it forces the individual to serve genius, it wages its wars, it robs and murders, but in the moment when a standstill occurs, when there are 'some warmer days', the shining blossoms of genius spring forth. Thus the condition of society as a cultural community does not succeed the condition of the state, but society can only exist because there is a state.

The further features of what Nietzsche calls the secret doctrine of the connection between state and genius are only to be hinted at: the original founder of the state is military genius, which evokes the primal state through separation and order. It immediately pushes back the family in significance: the man lives in the state, the child grows up for the state and by the hand of the state. It is precisely in this way that woman gains her efficacy: as the being more closely akin to nature, as the eternally equal and tranquil being, she broods for the state what sleep is for man. She does not step forward, she lives as mother in the darkness, because political drive, including its highest purpose, demands it. In modern times, on the other hand, with the 'complete disarray of the state tendency', the family becomes an expedient in place of the state, and accordingly the artistic goal of the state is immediately degraded to a domestic art (house music instead of tragedy!) .At the same time, the education of the house poses as it were as the only natural one, which tolerates that of the state only as a questionable encroachment on its rights, and rightly so, insofar as the modern state is concerned.

Only now are we able to demonstrate the basic outlines of Nietzsche's actual relationship to the real state of his time. We have seen that this relationship cannot be characterized on the basis of the first 'Untimely Meditation' as an opposition of the 'spirit' to the militaristic power state. It is not coincidental or conditioned by the time of writing that in the preface to 'The Birth of Tragedy' Nietzsche writes to Richard Wagner about the 'terrors and sublimities of the war just ended' (1871), that he sees his problem in a deep connection with the turbulent events. Westphal assumed a reversal between this statement and the beginning of the first 'Untimely Meditation'. We will show that the fundamental idea remains the same not only between 1870 and 1873, but also later on.

The fragment on the Greek state, which together with 'Homer's Contest' and the fragment on the pre-Socratics gives a purer representation of Nietzsche's image of the Greeks than 'The Birth of Tragedy', contains a brief digression

in the middle. Out of the proliferation of the political world of the Hellenes, Nietzsche casts a glance at the present and says in what phenomena he believes he can recognize 'equally troubling atrophies of the political sphere for art and society'. What then is the standard by which he approaches the state of the present here? In the 'Untimely Meditations' it is called 'culture', and because one did not know how to interpret this word, one understood it aesthetically and believed that Nietzsche confronted the modern state as a 'critic of culture'. But it is the phenomenon of war that provides him with the standard. He distinguishes two concepts and conditions of the state: one in which war is an impossibility, and another in which the state is not based on the 'fear of the demon of war'. The state in the former sense appears to him as a protective institution of selfish individuals, the decision about war and peace is left here to 'the egoism of the masses or their representatives', while in the other case it is entrusted to 'individual powerholders'. In the 'currently prevailing nationality movement', in the spread of universal suffrage, Nietzsche therefore sees 'effects of the fear of war'. Nationalism, democracy and pacifism form an inseparable unity for him. But in the background he sees the liberal-optimistic worldview, which has its roots in the doctrines of the French Revolution, 'that is, in an entirely un-Germanic, genuinely Romance, flat and unmetaphysical philosophy'. *The real cowards, however, are 'those international, homeless anchorites who, owing to their natural lack of a state instinct, have learned to use politics as a means of the stock exchange and to misuse state and society as enrichment devices for themselves'.* Against the diversion of the state tendency into a money tendency that is to be feared from this side, he says, 'the only antidote is war, and war again...'. *The dangerous characteristic of the present political situation is therefore the use of revolutionary ideas in the service of a selfish, stateless financial aristocracy: all ills can be traced back to this, and 'so one will have to approve an occasional paean to war from me', Nietzsche concludes.*

An even more direct political consequence of the ideas reproduced here is drawn in the first version of the preface to 'The Birth of Tragedy' addressed to Richard Wagner. On February 22, 1871, Schopenhauer's birthday, Nietzsche writes: The only productive political power in Germany has come to victory in the most tremendous way and from now on will dominate German being down to its atoms. 'This fact is of the utmost value, because something will perish on that power which we hate as the actual opponent of any deeper philosophical and artistic contemplation'. This opponent is liberalism. 'That whole liberalism constructed on a dreamed-up dignity of man, of the generic concept man, will bleed to death on that rigid power hinted at before; and we want to gladly forgo the little charms and kindnesses that cling to it, if only this actually anti-cultural doctrine is cleared from the path of genius, for what else should that rigid power serve, with its centuries-long birth out of violence, conquest and bloodbath, than to clear the path for genius?'

Nietzsche places his hope on the military force of Prussia, it will let liberalism

bleed to death in itself, but he rejects the national state. We can guess his reasons for this when we read in the notes: 'The principle of nationalities is a barbaric crudeness towards the city-state. In this limitation genius shows itself, which cares nothing for masses, but experiences more in the small than barbarians in the great'. The state, as he sees in the example of Rome, which cannot reach its ultimate goal, swells to an unnatural size; the expansion of the Romans is therefore nothing sublime compared to Athens. But it is the same with the unity of the nation as with the unity of a church: there are disadvantages associated with it. 'Blessing of struggle', Nietzsche adds to this observation. In the unification of Germany, he ultimately sees a quantitative, not a qualitative change; for him it is the 'unification of the German governments into a state'. He must be an opponent of this unification because it only endangers the goal of engendering genius.

At the time of 'Human, All Too Human', Nietzsche becomes sharply opposed to rationalism: rationality as a dogma directly demands narrow-mindedness: all higher culture can now only fence itself in with national boundary markers to its own detriment. In the preliminary work for 'The Will to Power' we find a rejection of the 'national passport' and the remark that to be national in the sense now (1880s) demanded by public opinion would not only be an ignominy but a dishonesty for more spiritual people, with a sigh over 'this homogeneous rationalism' behind which no thought lies. Aphorism 748 of 'The Will to Power' begins with a sigh over 'this homogeneous rationalism', behind which no thought lies. Nietzsche points to the mutual melting together and fertilization, in which lies the real value and meaning of 'present-day culture' and predicts the economic unification of Europe to come; the 'peace party' appears in reaction, which will be a party of the oppressed for a while, but soon the great party. The aphorism ends with the incomplete sentence: 'A war party, proceeding in the opposite direction with the same basic severity against itself'. Nowhere is the national state attacked because of its tendency towards warfare, rather Nietzsche seems to move away from his earlier view that democratic states must be war shy. But for him, the nationalist state is already a democratic one because of universal suffrage. In the aphorism from 'The Will to Power' just quoted, for this very reason another contemptuous glance is cast at the Bismarckian Reich: 'And the 'new Reich', founded once again on the most worn-out and despised idea: the equality of rights and votes'.

We therefore concluded: Nietzsche did not empathize with the national movement that accompanied the founding of the Reich, just as he faced the Wars of Liberation without understanding and rejecting them. If he finds only bad things in the national state, this is not because he looks at it with the eyes of a pacifist, but because he considers such a democratic colossus incapable of preparing the people for the engendering of genius. This rejection was already expressed in the sharpest terms in the fragment on the Greek state, where the modern concept of rationality is called ridiculous in the face of the Pythia and

the Roman concept of the state is rejected with the words: it is an unvoiced wish to want to see a nation equipped as a visible mechanical unity with glorious governmental apparatus and military pomp.

We have shown that the young Nietzsche cannot represent the antithesis: spirit versus power state, because he represents another one through which it is excluded; it follows from this that, despite those introductory sentences in the first 'Untimely Meditation', he is not on the side of art and education against the 'Reich'. He is not the representative of an aesthetic opposition, but he is in opposition to a politicizing aesthetic education. The philosopher of that 'culture' which unthinkingly participated in the founding of the Reich, the representative spirit of the German bourgeois intelligentsia in the 1870s is still Hegel. D.F. Strauss is ultimately disposed of by Nietzsche as a Hegelian; the lectures on the future of our educational institutions are directed essentially against Hegel; for the Hegelian philosophy was foundational for the new 'general state education'. But when Nietzsche mocks the 'apotheosis' of the state, he is not thinking of the militaristic power state, as whose theoretician Hegel can also be seen, but with the right instinct he takes the Hegelian total state to be the cultural state. It is the state as a total concept, as it is developed in Hegel's philosophy of right, it is the spirit of Weimar concretized into the state, that Nietzsche fights against. However strongly the young Nietzsche feels the personal greatness of Lessing and Schiller: he has not listened for a moment to the liberal-bourgeois culture that is baptized with their names. He can therefore not be counted as part of an opposition in any phase of the development of this culture, one that opposed the state with the help of the 'spirit'. That Nietzsche's writings supplied weapons to such an opposition cannot be denied. Nietzsche himself and his work have nothing in common with it.

5. Bismarck Against the 'Reich'.

In the historical epoch that Nietzsche experienced as an observer, the leading layer of the German bourgeoisie was liberal and national. *Rational liberalism, ideologically founded by Hegel, was the latest form of that synthesis of Enlightenment and Romanticism which Nietzsche was called upon to dissolve. The fundamental flaw of spiritual national liberalism lay in its lack of originality, its 'idealism'.* A bold, new idea was missing, the realism, the contact with what was really moving in the depths of the century was missing. It was precisely this lack of realism that had to have fateful effects, because the nation believed it had just awakened to reality, thought it was successfully making the transition from daydreaming to 'real politics'. In truth, there was only one real politician, the leading statesman, and one realistic philosopher, the unknown Nietzsche. The question of the epoch was: will Bismarck have the power to lead the German bourgeoisie out of national liberalism, or will the same bourgeoisie, which had not had the power to create the Reich, subsequently take control of the gift that had fallen into its lap? What the Untimely sensed in 1873 happened afterwards: the history of the Reich

became a history of Bismarck's intellectual defeat. Before the horrified opened eye of the other great realist, this process took place: the commercial bourgeois became master over the statesman, liberalism and romanticism alternately made policy, but above all, good deals were made. The Reich flourished, but it was an illusory blossoming, and the philosophy that accompanied it ('ethical idealism') was a sham philosophy. In the World War, the ostentatious romantic-liberal structure collapsed, and at that same moment the two great antagonists of the past became visible.

The documents in which Nietzsche's relationship to Bismarck is characterized are not easy to read (the statesman took no notice of Nietzsche).

We have before us a whole number of passages in the works, as well as statements in letters and notes, which mention Bismarck's name. He is also meant in many places where his name does not appear, everywhere we read 'Reich' or 'great politics' or simply 'Germany'. Just as furthermore the phrase 'the artist' almost always refers to Wagner, 'the statesman' always means Bismarck. Let us now pursue how Nietzsche's relationship to Bismarck developed!

Behind the statement in a letter from 1868 (on February 16 to v. Gersdorff): 'Bismarck gives me immoderate pleasure', we can surmise more of a human than a political sympathy. From 'The Birth of Tragedy' he deleted a passage during printing that mentioned the 'leading statesman' of Germany and the 'creative artistic genius' (Wagner) side by side. In January 1874, in connection with his criticism of Wagner, Nietzsche notes the sentence: 'Whether he (Wagner) was right with his great confidence which he placed in Bismarck, a not-too-distant future will teach'. In 'Human, All Too Human' he deals with Bismarck under the titles 'In the Service of the Prince'. 'The Apparent Weather Makers of Politics', 'New and Old Concept of Government', 'The Helmsman of Passions' (445, 449 f., 453, 458). There is still something tentative in these characterizing rather than evaluating sections. Even sympathy speaks from the aphorism 'Comfort for Hypochondriacs' (615). In between, however, initially still in interrogative form, under the heading 'Great Politics and Its Losses' (481) an aggressive tone appears: a people which is preparing to engage in great politics, becomes eager for political laurels, no longer belongs to its own cause as completely as before; the daily new questions and worries of the public good devour its strength, and the question arises: is all this bloom and splendor of the whole worth it, when for this 'coarse, shimmering flower of the nation' all the nobler, more delicate, more spiritual plants and growths have to be sacrificed? Here speaks that fundamental aversion to democratic nationalism whose reasons we know. The aphorism stands in an ideal relationship to another one in the same volume (235, 'Senile and Ideal State in Contradiction'), in which the same objection is raised against the socialists. The socialists, it says here, want to produce a prosperous life for as many as possible. But if the perfect state they have in mind were really achieved, the soil from which the great

intellect and the powerful individual in general grows would be destroyed by this prosperity. The wise man must resist the 'extravagant wishes of unintelligent goodness,' because in the perfect state only exhausted individuals would have a place.

So Nietzsche takes sides equally against Bismarck's direction as well as against his opposition, and his contradiction is ultimately grounded in the rejection of the democratic state. One must always keep both parallel actions in view, only then does one gain an idea of how deeply Nietzsche saw through the bourgeois society of his era. The endeavors of the two opposing parties, the socialist and the nationalist, are characterized throughout Europe as 'envy and laziness in different directions'. 'They are worthy of each other' (Human, All Too Human, 480). Under the title 'Subversive Spirits and Possessive Spirits' in the Mixed Opinions and Maxims (304) there is something that still has validity today for bourgeois culture in Europe. In a few pages the new bourgeoisie is characterized there, which differs from the socialists only in terms of property. 'It is you yourselves you must first overcome, if you are somehow to prevail over the opponents of your prosperity'.

It is indicative of Nietzsche's fairness towards the two parties that the sharpest expression he used for nationalism ('national heart spasms and blood poisoning' [The Gay Science, 277]) is already found here in connection with the other party: the popular disease of 'socialist conjuring craze'.

One recognizes with what subtlety and caution Nietzsche knows how to initiate an attack from the aphorisms 323 and 324 of the 'Mixed Opinions and Maxims'. 'To be very German means de-Germanizing oneself', is the phrase with which the great attack on the 'Reich' is introduced. The intensification of the situation that occurs with this section consists in the 'turn towards the un-German' being called a characteristic of the most capable people of our nation.

Here no longer speaks the aversion against the class, here speaks malicious intent. The leading statesman, next to Wagner the only contemporary who is recognized by Nietzsche as an equal, appears more and more to the ruling stratum as the leader of the nation. This leader is a representative of the national principle, reason enough for Nietzsche not only to attack this principle as before, but to strike at it in an even more refined and deeper way.

The fact that this takes effort is not important here, we are in the middle of the fight! (by the way, there are still plenty of means to nonetheless hunt the truth, and after all an author who is counting on Europe's best readers should not make things too easy for the intelligence of his readers. The famous statesman runs neck and neck with the lonely thinker down the same track, both are Germans, Germans of a kind that only return after intervals of centuries. For the true competitor, the cause and the person are inseparably intertwined: Nietzsche's genius consists to a good extent in taking the personal so seriously that it becomes the 'cause'. He hits the leader of Germany, the Germany that actually he, Nietzsche, should be leading, right in the heart, if he is right about

this: being properly German means de-Germanizing oneself. Because the other does nothing for de-Germanization, he Germanizes as much as he can. But that makes him un-German! That takes him away from our tradition, from the most capable of our people! So Bismarck no longer belongs among the most capable of our people! Don't overlook the honest sound of these last words: they clearly indicate the dual nature of the aphorism. When in these years would Nietzsche speak of 'our people'?

The aphorism that immediately follows contains a concise critique of German weaknesses, under the pretense that a foreigner is speaking. Here Bismarck is betrayed: that Germany's greatest statesman does not believe in great statesmen. So Bismarck is being negated here (he does not believe in himself), on the level of irony exactly the same thing is happening that the preceding aphorism intends in all seriousness (subtleties of this kind are nothing unusual for Nietzsche).

With the strongest accents Nietzsche tends to speak of Goethe's anti-nationalism (how wrong he is in this is shown by the wonderful conversation of the Wise Man with Luben on December 13th 1813). When he wanted to expose Bismarck as the nation's leader, he had to play Goethe off against him. Therefore Goethe has to be 'an interlude without consequences' in the history of the Germans, 'who would be capable of pointing to a piece of Goethe for example in German politics of the last seventy years!' And shortly before that in the second book: 'Look at the best of our statesmen and artists from this perspective: none of them had Goethe as their educator, they could not have had' (Wanderer, 125, 107).

How consciously and carefully Nietzsche works can be seen from the following: it would be unthinkable for one of his published writings to have Bismarck's name appear alongside Napoleon's. That is forbidden by the struggle for pre-eminence. Napoleon and Goethe strictly belong together as 'Europeans', Bismarck stands on the opposing side. But in the notes of the posthumous papers Bismarck is mentioned no fewer than four times in the same sense together with Napoleon, once he appears alongside Goethe, yes, once, together with Frederick the Great, even above Goethe. Here it is not a matter of 'contradictions', here it is a matter of a system.

That envy, good Eris, the desire of the Western fighter is decisively involved here, is made clear beyond doubt by aphorism 167 of 'Dawn'. It deals with 'Unconditional homages'. And who are the examples? The most widely read German philosopher, Schopenhauer, the most listened-to German musician, Wagner, and the most respected German statesman, Bismarck. Just placing him alongside Schopenhauer and Wagner says a great deal, Nietzsche had no higher personal distinction to bestow. Here there would be, he says, 'a magnificent spectacle' to see three times over, but in all three cases one could not be of the same opinion. Bismarck comes off worst: he is not even of the same opinion as himself! For he is 'a movable spirit in the service of strong basic drives, and for that very reason without principles'. In a statesman that

would be nothing unusual, but listen, ‘unfortunately up until now it has been so utterly un-German’! Nietzsche as eulogist of the German past, Nietzsche as advocate of principles in politics, Nietzsche as one who objects to a person because he has strong basic drives, anyone who does not perceive the tendency here cannot read. These books have not yet been read as Nietzsche himself wished them to be read, precisely as stated in the later preface to the book in which the quoted aphorism appears. ‘To read well, that means to read slowly, deeply, cautiously, with afterthoughts, with open doors, with delicate fingers and eyes...’.

But we are not yet done with the quoted aphorism, it is a masterpiece of agonistic malice. How much one would have to forget about these ‘three greats of the age’, Nietzsche says in conclusion, in order to be able to be their worshipper in one fell swoop from now on! It would be more advisable, he says, to try something new, namely, to become ‘honest’, to learn that unconditional homages to persons are something ridiculous, and that it does not depend on the persons but on the matters. This conclusion would be weak if it only depended on the thought, for it is surely meager, in the face of three men revered by their nation, to say: it does not depend on the persons but on the matters. But this truth is not stated by Nietzsche in German, but in French. And he who the saying stems from stands at the end like a bronze statue opposite the false greatness of the day that is Bismarck: ‘This saying is like that of him who spoke, great, brave, simple and silent, entirely like Carnot, the soldier and republican. But is one allowed to speak like this now from a Frenchman to Germans, and a republican at that?’ Who still doubts here the conscious art: a Frenchman, a republican, a silent one, and there Bismarck, the German, the monarchist, the man with the long parliamentary speeches! Nietzsche makes use of the same means in aphorism 95 of ‘The Gay Science’. In a section on Chamfort, Mirabeau is introduced and, suddenly, it continues: ‘Mirabeau, who as a person belongs to an entirely different rank of greatness, than even the foremost among the statesmen greats of yesterday and today’. Here again the point lies in a Frenchman being played off against Bismarck. Exactly as Nietzsche plays La Rochefoucauld off against German philosophy, Bizet against Wagner, as ‘ironic antitheses’, as he himself writes to a musical friend in Bizet’s case, exactly so he shoves Carnot and Mirabeau, random figures, in front of Bismarck.

Only in passing (Dawn, 190), in a characterization of the education of the Germans, ‘which they no longer possess’, is the political and national madness spoken of which they have exchanged it for: a direct attack against the one who is to blame for this exchange. It is characteristic that although Nietzsche seeks to give the impression, Bismarck’s sake, that the disappearance of that education was a loss, at the same time he describes this education truly devastatingly: as presumptuous and naive, as soft, good-natured, silvery shining idealism etc.

In ‘Dawn’ finally (201) the violence of the attack is reached which from now

on characterizes the measure or rather the excess in Nietzsche's relationship to Bismarck. An unconnected train of thought about the future of the nobility concludes with the sudden words: 'In the end: what should the nobility busy itself with from now on, when it appears more and more each day that it is becoming indecent to be involved in politics?' Only if one relates the word to Bismarck does it make sense: it is a stab. And as if satisfied, a little further down (262) Nietzsche adds the Lutheran verses 'Though they take our life, Goods, honor, child, and wife: Let all these be gone, They yet have nothing won' and comments: 'Yes! Yes! The 'Reich!''. The mockery continues at the end of the great aphorism in 'The Gay Science' (357) which bears the title: 'On the old problem: what is German?' Schopenhauer is praised here as a 'good European', of course not as a German. His pessimism was an exceptional case among Germans, in whom everything testifies to the opposite of pessimism: 'Our brave politics, our cheerful patriotism, which is decided enough to view all things from a slightly philosophical principle ('Germany, Germany above all')...' (is there a more grotesque juxtaposition than Bismarck's 'cheerful' philosophy with the main clause 'Germany, Germany above all' on one side and Schopenhauer's pessimism on the other? No matter what well-founded objections Nietzsche can otherwise raise against Schopenhauer's pessimism, no matter that he has just named Schopenhauer, Wagner and Bismarck together, here the old pessimist is good enough to be played off against the 'Reich'. Such turns are then placed by clueless readers under the heading 'Nietzsche's contradictory attitude to Schopenhauer', while they belong under the heading: Nietzsche's consistent struggle against Bismarck).

As if summarizing, there is the beautiful aphorism at the end of 'Human, All Too Human' (377): 'We homeless'. It is dedicated to the opponents of Bismarck, the 'Europeans of today', those homeless who can see neither a goal in 'founding a Reich of justice and concord on earth' (because under all circumstances it would be the Reich of the deepest mediocrity and philistinism), nor speak up for nationalism and racial hatred either. These homeless live on mountains, out of their times, in past or coming centuries, only so that they can avoid the silent fury to which they would feel condemned as eyewitnesses to a politics 'that makes the German spirit barren by making it vain and is petty politics besides'. Nietzsche describes his own way of life here; he reveals why he cannot live in Germany. There one makes 'petty politics'. But what does Nietzsche do? Clearly the opposite: great politics. 'Great politics' is the watchword of the coming years in the struggle against the 'Reich'.

In the concepts of 'good European' and 'great politics' we recognize the weapons that Nietzsche used in his final battle with Bismarck. This battle is fought in the works of 1888, everything held back breaks out there. But before the final battle there is still a phase in which the struggle continues in the old, indirect manner. The eighth main chapter of 'Beyond Good and Evil' is titled

‘Peoples and Fatherlands’. The first aphorism (240) deals with Richard Wagner. It is that incomparable prose piece on the Mastersingers’ overture which concludes with the words: the Germans are from the day before yesterday and from the day after tomorrow, they do not yet have a today. Do not overlook that thereby that Germany which Nietzsche expelled is denied existence! Wagner is followed immediately by Bismarck; the aphorism dedicated to him is in no way inferior in the art of vilification to the previous one. It is extremely clever how Nietzsche here distributes contrasting opinions between two old men and thereby reserves for himself the possibility of hovering above the Bismarck problem and pronouncing the definitive judgement, one cannot defeat a rival in a more profound and thorough manner...

The main speaker gives the impression of defending German narrow-mindedness. There is talk of the German’s shyness and delight in standing aside, of his fondness for foreign lands and secret infinitude. And a statesman who reversed this, who made the spirit of this people narrow, its taste national, he would be great? He may be strong, strong and mad, but certainly he is not great. The whole aphorism actually has the concept of greatness as its subject: the ‘great politics’ to which Bismarck has condemned his people is contrasted with the ‘great thought’ which gives greatness to an act and cause. A particular subtlety is that Nietzsche does not name the statesman, just as he does not name the one who brings the ‘great thought’, while Wagner is named without hesitation in the previous section. In place of the name there is a characterization of Bismarck which says everything in two words: ‘He knows and holds as much of philosophy as a peasant or student fraternity member, he is still innocent’. Do you understand now what is held against Bismarck? That he overlooks Nietzsche, that he believes he can lead the German people while next to him the deepest, most revolutionary thoughts are being thought without him noticing anything about it. Bismarck is personally held responsible by Nietzsche for the fact that he is not taken seriously by the Germans, for whom he produces work upon work. Anyone who wanted to find this personal attribution to Bismarck ridiculous would reveal that he sees the whole thing only morally-psychologically, not symbolically. Of course Bismarck was not to blame for Nietzsche’s lack of effect, but he was guilty nonetheless, because he did after all allow the German bourgeoisie to become master over his work, over the Reich founded by him, the same bourgeoisie for whom Nietzsche, the author of ‘Zarathustra’, was, in the eyes of his friends, merely a rich but deranged spirit. Franz Overbeck allowed his friendship with Nietzsche to founder because of the latter, and yet he understood nothing of the friend’s world-historical significance, as his notes movingly demonstrate. Seen from a world-historical perspective Nietzsche was in the right when he held Bismarck, and no one else, accountable for his own fate: the great man is liable symbolically, not morally.

‘A stronger one becomes master of the strong’, the aphorism concludes, what

Christian consolation from a Nietzsche! And for the intellectual shallowing of a people there is compensation, 'the deepening of another one'. Which other people is meant here is mostly hard to guess, moreover it is said in the same main chapter (254). In Germany, the great statesman leads his followers right into the 'restlessness, emptiness and noisy devilry' of politics, in France on the other hand people of taste hold both ears closed 'before the raging stupidity and noisy claptrap of the democratic bourgeois'. Despite a certain Germanization and vulgarization of taste the French have been able to maintain all their cultural superiority over Europe. They are after all a 'halfway successful' synthesis of North and South and therefore protected against the ghastly northern gray on gray, against the German disease of taste, 'against whose excess one has presently prescribed blood and iron, which is to say: 'great politics' (according to a dangerous healing art, which has taught me to wait and wait, but until now still not to hope)'. For the born intermediaries, for the 'good Europeans' (among whom Nietzsche counts himself here), the artist of music has created a piece 'South of Music': Bizet.

The Bizet episode is spun out a little more in the following aphorism (255), but then the main thread continues again (256): the theme France and Germany is brought to the strangest conclusion. Europe, Nietzsche begins, wants to become one. The politicians 'of shortsightedness and hasty action', who are dominant today with the help of nationalist madness, know nothing of this; their politics can therefore only be 'between-acts politics'. All deeper and more receptive people of this century try out the European of the future in advance, only in weaker moments, for instance in old age, do they belong to the 'fatherlands'. Napoleon, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heine, Schopenhauer, Wagner are cited as examples. The connection between Wagner and late French romanticism is particularly interesting here. Wagner's German friends should reflect on whether his art does not come from non-German sources and impulses, although of course precisely Paris was indispensable for the development of his type.

Up to this point Nietzsche has driven disguise and antithesis, now he suddenly breaks off and says something completely unexpected in honor of the German nature of Richard Wagner. One must read the passage: it negates everything said before; suddenly everything is there again that represents Nietzsche's real opinion. In everything Wagner made it 'stronger, harder, higher' than a 19th century Frenchman could make it, thanks to the circumstance that we Germans are still closer to barbarism than the French. 'Perhaps the most noteworthy thing that Richard Wagner created is, for the whole late Latin race, inaccessible, unfathomable, inimitable for all time and not only for today: the figure of Siegfried, that very free human who may well be far too free, too hard, too cheerful, too healthy, too anti-Catholic for the taste of all old and weary cultural peoples'. Nietzsche's romanticism, his inclination for the south, his good Europeanism have so often been cited, but anyone who can write a sentence like the one above is only a very ironic admirer of French

culture, for precisely the fact that Latin culture is old and weary can only be felt by those who bear the youthful force of the Germanic essence within themselves. Nietzsche's 'Germanism' is therefore not weakened in the slightest by his tendentious predilection for the south, for the Mediterranean, for the Mediterranean taste of the Latin peoples. Freedom, toughness and daring, the virtues he values most highly, still appear to him in the figure of Siegfried.

The Siegfried idea is central for Nietzsche. We remember encountering it before (see above p. 99). Now it is given a sharp point against the romantics, who will one day find the way to Rome. The recollection of the 'anti-Roman Siegfried' is followed by the well-known Parsifal poem, which concludes with the words: 'For what you hear is Rome, Rome's faith without words!' We know that in Nietzsche's view the Romance peoples are closer to Christianity than the Germanic races, we know what that means for him. According to that we have to gauge what the conclusion of this main chapter on 'Peoples and Fatherlands' wants to say: it restores the balance in favor of the north.

In the spring of 1888 Nietzsche steps up to his final battle: it is against German culture, i.e., Wagner, and against German politics, i.e., Bismarck. To properly understand this last phase one must know the letters in which Nietzsche bemoans the ineffectiveness of his existence. Since the publication of 'Zarathustra', that call to supposed comrades which was met with stunned silence, he has been extremely sensitive. It was not his nature, it was the times, it was the intellectual narrowness of the German bourgeoisie that isolated him. Already in 1885 he writes to his sister: 'It is most eerie to be so alone', and two years later he speaks to Overbeck of the 'soundless, now thousandfold solitude'. In 1886 we read in a letter to his sister: 'It is hard, truly mad, that a person born for the richest and most extensive effectiveness who could lay down and plow in his best into unexplored souls is condemned to making literature with his half-blind eyes, just to be able to have any effect at all'. His books are fishhooks to him; 'if they do not catch me a few people, they have no meaning!' 'Get me a small circle of people who want to hear and understand me, and I will be healthy!' (to the same.)

That it was Wagner who 'took all the people from him on whom having any effect at all in Germany could have meaning', had already become clear to him in the summer of 1882. Now, in 1888, he sets about realizing what he had always hoped: to become Wagner's heir. His attack on Wagner is meant to bring him into possession of the inheritance by force. The 'Case of Wagner' is the first of the eruptions of the last creative year. In it Nietzsche wages war on Wagner and 'incidentally' (i.e., in reality principally) on German taste. Such a falsity as that of Bayreuth, it says at the end of the explosive pamphlet, is today no exception. 'We all know the unaesthetic concept of the Christian junker, this innocence between opposites, this 'good conscience' in the lie...'. Here too we will probably have to think of Bismarck. Numerous passages

from the letters let us recognize that Wagner and Bismarck now mean only two names for the same obstacle. Nietzsche no longer wants to live in secret. He wants to rule Germany, he wants to stand beside Bismarck. 'Even a member of the Reichstag and adherent of Bismarck (Delbrück)', he writes to Gast after Wagner's death, 'is said to have expressed his extreme displeasure that I do not live in Berlin, but in Santa Margherita!!'

The letters to his friend v. Seydlitz especially allow the situation to be clearly recognized: here Nietzsche, there Bismarck! 'Between ourselves... it is not impossible that I am the first philosopher of the age', he writes to v. Seydlitz at the beginning of the fateful year 1888, 'yes perhaps even a little more, something decisive and fateful, standing between two millennia'. And this consciousness of world-historical significance sees itself opposed to 'our dear Germans'! In Germany, Nietzsche continues, they have not yet managed even a moderately respectable permanent review of his books. Eccentric, pathological, psychiatric are the terms applied to them. No one protests, no one feels insulted when this philosopher is insulted. 'Under these circumstances one has to live in Nice... God, with the cynicism peculiar to him, allows his sun to shine more beautifully over us than over the so much more respectable Europe of Herr von Bismarck (with feverish diligence works on his accoutrement and completely presents the aspect of a heroically attuned hedgehog)' [*Original footnote. One year earlier on the same: 'For this present Germany, however much it may bristle with armaments, I have no more respect. It represents the most stupid, stunted, mendacious form of the 'German spirit' that has existed up to now...'*]. Also to v. Seydlitz in the autumn of the same year on the 'Twilight of the Idols': 'I humbly opine that the 'Spirit', the so-called 'German Spirit' has gone for a walk and is residing somewhere in summer quarters, certainly not in the 'Reich', rather already in Santa Margherita...'

Contrary to expectation, the section of 'Twilight of the Idols' with the title 'What the Germans Lack' is quite moderate. The new Germany is even praised: it is not a high culture that has become dominant with it, but it has 'more manly virtues' than any other European country can boast of. However, there is one objection: it is dearly bought, becoming powerful; power stultifies. Politics devours all seriousness for really spiritual things, 'Germany, Germany above all, I fear that was the end of German philosophy'. Bismarck devours everything, he is Germany. This is expressed with bloody mockery: 'Are there German philosophers? Are there German poets? Are there good German books? I am asked abroad. I blush; but with the courage that is characteristic of me even in the most desperate cases, I answer: Yes, Bismarck! If only I were permitted to concede what books are read today... The cursed instinct of mediocrity!'

It goes without saying that in this context France receives high praise once again. 'At the very moment when Germany rises up as a great power, France gains a transformed importance as a cultural power. Even today much new

seriousness, much new passion of the spirit has emigrated to Paris; questions like pessimism for example, the question of Wagner, nearly all psychological and artistic questions are reflected there incomparably more subtly and thoroughly than in Germany, the Germans themselves are incapable of this kind of seriousness. In the history of European culture the rise of the 'Reich' means above all one thing: a displacement of the center of gravity. It is known everywhere already: the Germans no longer come into consideration in the main thing, which remains culture'. With precise chronological determination it says in the 'Maxims and Arrows': 'German spirit: a *contradictio in adjecto* for the past 18 years'.

Nietzsche expresses himself even more sharply in his last work 'Nietzsche contra Wagner': 'Even now France remains the seat of the most intellectual and refined culture of Europe and the high school of taste: but one must know how to find this 'France of taste'. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung for example, or whoever has it for his mouthpiece, sees 'barbarians' in the French, as for my person I seek the black continent, where one ought to emancipate 'the slaves', in the vicinity of the Norddeutsche...'. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was Bismarck's official organ, among the 'slaves' we have to understand those who rendered him allegiance, i.e., the Germans.

The antithesis: German spirit-German Reich completely dominates the late Nietzsche's production. But this is not a theoretical antithesis, a contemplative observation, an assertion that might be true; it is a means of combat. The desire of the competitor, the wrestler for the highest prize, carries Nietzsche away with it. He leaves the realms of philosophy, he jumps over all dividing lines: if Bismarck does not act, Nietzsche will act. Nietzsche will become a politician. The 'great harvest time' has arrived: the plan of the theoretical main work, 'The Will to Power', is to be reforged into a new passionate, aggressively attacking work of four books which will bear the title: 'The Revaluation of All Values'. The first book is finished, it is called 'The Antichrist'. Almost simultaneously 'Twilight of the Idols' appears. About it Nietzsche allows himself terrible clarity in one of his last letters to Overbeck. One must know the passage completely: 'As I go into it quite honestly with the Germans, you will not have to complain about 'ambiguity'. This irresponsible race, which has on its conscience all the great atrocities against culture and had something else on its mind at all the decisive moments in history (the Reformation at the time of the Renaissance; Kantian philosophy when a scientific mentality had just about been achieved with difficulty in England and France; wars of liberation at the time of experiencing Napoleon, the only one so far strong enough to make Europe into a political and economic unity), has 'the Reich' in mind today, this recrudescence of petty statism and cultural atomism, at a moment when for the first time the great world question is posed. There has never been a more important moment in history: but who would know anything about it? The disproportion that emerges here is completely inevitable: at the moment when an unprecedented

height and freedom of spiritual passion takes possession of the supreme problem of mankind and conjures up the decision for its fate, the general pettiness and obtuseness stands out all the sharper in contrast'.

This is not enthusiasm: it is the clear-sightedness of genius. Of course, these extreme formulas only become meaningful for someone who observes the concrete situation to which they are aimed. It is not about 'mankind': that is a hyperbole. It is about Germany. But it is about Germany in all seriousness: Nietzsche is planning a political attack on his homeland. 'We must drive the Germans mad with esprit...' (to Fuchs). The word shows the direction of attack: once again the Romanic antithesis is to have its say, but it is not only to have its say. It is conscious treason when Nietzsche writes to Laine in Paris: 'I am unhappy to be writing in German, although I write much better than any German ever wrote. In the end, the French will hear from the book (he is referring to *Twilight of the Idols*) the deep sympathy they deserve, and I have declared war on Germany in all my instincts (p. 58, a separate section 'What the Germans Lack'). One must look the facts in the face: Nietzsche specifically draws a Frenchman's attention to the section directed against the Germans. That is something fundamentally different from sending the book containing that section: it is an act. High treason as an act is then also announced in the penultimate still clear note to Overbeck: 'I myself am just working on a memorandum for the European courts for the purpose of an anti-German league. I want to lace the 'Reich' into an iron shirt and provoke it to a war of desperation'.

'What a moving high point! He, who had allowed himself to be provoked into a war of desperation by Bismarck, wanted to provoke the 'Reich'.

In the last weeks of his conscious life, Nietzsche was carried by a sense of destiny as never before. He repeatedly assured Overbeck that there was no more coincidence in his life. *Amor fati* had always been his true religion, now he was living in it. What does it mean to feel completely under fate? It means: becoming one with the power that appears in events, it means: overcoming the tension between oneself and the world. The personal becomes universal, the universal personal. Everything that happens is meaningful, symbolic, typical. There is nothing isolated anymore: everything, every word, every person has a mysterious relation to our life and its ultimate goal.

Out of an extremely heightened state of this kind, Nietzsche's autobiography emerged, which was given the title 'Ecce Homo'. Shortly before the end, with the dawning awareness of this end, Nietzsche tells the story of his life. From this fiery written book shines the torment, first experienced by Nietzsche, of living as a world-historical human being in the sharpest light of consciousness, having to name himself, his position in the context of things exactly, without yet having the power to change anything now, without even having as much influence as to convince the closest, most friendly people that one represents a turning point in the history of Europe. This must be made clear: 'Hear me! For I am so and so. Above all, do not confuse me with

anyone else!' (Preface). In two words of the preface Nietzsche gives the most succinct, exhaustive characterization of his thinking: 'Error is cowardice' (A martial word. It is spoken by one who feels himself a warrior of the future in contrast to a tired, late civilization moving towards dissolution).

'Ecce Homo' is not really an autobiography: it is a polemical writing in the form of a self-portrait. Therein lies the demonic: that the portrayal of the most personal life automatically becomes an attack on a whole world.

Nietzsche immediately introduces himself as 'the last anti-political German' (Why I am so wise). He believes that in doing so he is being 'more German' than present-day Germans, 'mere Reich Germans', could still manage to be. Of course, he mentions in passing the tale of his Polish ancestors, though not without strongly emphasizing the German core of his family. The whole writing breathes a spirit of struggle against the 'Reich', but only at the end, in the section dealing with 'The Case of Wagner', does Nietzsche let loose. He wants to tell the Germans 'a few hard truths': they have on their conscience all the great atrocities against culture for the past three centuries, and always for the same reason: 'from their innermost cowardice in the face of reality, which is also cowardice in the face of truth, from their instinctive untruthfulness, from 'idealism'...'. They could never make up their minds, they always tried to reconcile opposites, smooth over contradictions. This neutrality and selflessness, 'this lack of partisanship between opposites!' Everything great becomes small with them; they do not know what is great and small. 'German' is an argument for them, 'Germany, Germany above all' a principle, the Germanic peoples the 'moral world order'.

But all these attacks have a completely personal reference. 'And finally, why should I not give words to my suspicion? In my case too, the Germans will again try everything to give birth to a mouse from a tremendous fate. They have compromised themselves with me so far, I doubt that they will do better in the future. Ah, how I long to be a poor prophet here! ... My natural readers and listeners are now already Russians, Scandinavians and French, will they not be so more and more?' What more could be added to this revelation?

One who does not want things to be as he says. He says the worst about Germany that can be said, so that he is heard! Germany is regarded as 'Europe's nightcap' ('Twilight of the Idols', What the Germans Lack); one never gets to the bottom of the German, he has none; the word German should be minted internationally as currency for the desire for lack of clarity about oneself, for this 'psychological degeneracy' in short. 'At this moment, for example, the German Emperor calls it his 'Christian duty' to liberate the slaves in Africa: among us other Europeans that would then simply be called 'German'...'. Nietzsche goes so far as to say that it is part of his ambition to be regarded as the par excellence despiser of Germans. 'Germans are impossible for me. When I think up a kind of person that goes against all my instincts, a German always comes out'. The Germans lack any concept of how vulgar they are: '...but that is the superlative of vulgarity, they are not even ashamed

to be merely German...'. One must always keep in mind here that it is a question of the Germans' ability or inability to understand, to read, to appreciate. They have 'no fingers for nuances, no esprit in their features'. In vain he looks in his life for a sign of tact, of delicateness that he would have experienced from Germans. 'From Jews yes, never from Germans'.

Finally, he recalls that it was a foreigner, a Dane, who first had the subtlety of instinct and courage enough to give lectures on his philosophy. Nietzsche knew that this Dane, Georg Brandes, was a Jew. He was deeply averse to the Jews, in whom he saw the true priestly natures, and even the flattering treatment he received from them could not change his opinion. But just as he plays off French culture against German, so he plays off Jews against Germans. The antithesis is of particular sharpness here because for him Judaism and Christianity are essentially one ('The Christian is the Jew all over again', *Antichrist*, 44). 'The Jews are the priestly people of ressentiment par excellence' (*Genealogy*, I, 16).

We know: all this is not really Nietzsche's thoughts about the Germans, nor is it only exaggerations in the heat of battle. Everything is said deliberately. But what does Nietzsche really think of the Germans? Why does he fight against the 'Reich', against Bismarck?

It must be investigated at some point what characteristics of the Germans Nietzsche actually perceived. He knew about the intricacy and depth, about the unfathomability and comprehensiveness of the German soul. Above all, he very sharply perceived the contrasting qualities of the German, his 'diversity'. But beyond everything, one thing was certain to him: the Germans are not yet exhausted, an enormous power still sleeps within them. All around them everything is in decline (with the exception of Russia): the culture of the West is old, over-refined, skeptical, tired. The English are not to be considered. But the Germans have not yet had a culture of their own. The young Nietzsche believed in this emerging German culture, the man fought for it, and he did not give up believing in it until the end.

We hear his undisguised voice when in 'The Will to Power' (108) we read his testament to the Germans: 'The Germans are still nothing, but they will become something; thus they still have no culture, thus they cannot yet have a culture! They are still nothing: that means they are all sorts of things. They will become something: that means they will someday cease being all sorts of things. The latter is basically only a wish, hardly yet a hope; fortunately, a wish one can live on, a matter of will, work, passion, discipline, as much as a matter of abstinence, longing, deprivation, discontent, even bitterness, in short we Germans want something of ourselves that has not yet been wanted of us, we want something more! That to this 'German as he is not yet', something better is due than today's German 'culture'; that all those 'becoming' must be enraged wherever they perceive a satisfaction in this domain, a brazen 'sitting back' or 'self-glorification': that is my second proposition, about which I have also not yet changed my mind'.

Everything stands in this, it also stands in it that hope can become a matter of displeasure, discomfort, even 'bitterness'.

From the beginning, Nietzsche praises the courage of the Germans. The will is least diseased in the north, Germany has more manly virtues to show than any country in Europe. But where there is still will, courage, determination, there are also still hopes for the future, 'He who can command, finds those who must obey: I am thinking for example of Napoleon and Bismarck' (The Will to Power, 128). The German threefoldness and duality also had another side: there is a strong German type. Handel, Leibniz, Goethe, Bismarck are characteristic of it. 'Living unconcernedly among opposites, full of that supple strength which guards against convictions and doctrines by making use of one against the other and keeping freedom for itself' (The Will to Power, 884). This type is far from the hereditary vice of the Germans, the inclination to sentimentality, false geniality, obscurity and that 'secret infinity' which Nietzsche praises in the Germans when he wants to belittle them. Even Wagner and Schopenhauer, whom he likes to play off as 'Europeans' against the Germans, cannot be counted among them. 'A good number of higher and better endowed human beings will, I hope, finally have enough self-overcoming to get rid of the bad taste for poses and sentimental obscurity and turn against Richard Wagner as much as against Schopenhauer. These Germans corrupt us, they flatter our most dangerous qualities. There lies in Goethe, Beethoven and Bismarck a stronger future prepared than in these aberrations of the race. We have not yet had philosophers'. There can be no doubt that in this posthumous note Nietzsche sees his own philosophy as the philosophy that belongs to the same 'strong type' whose representatives he also counts Bismarck among.

This philosophy is the 'Dionysian', or rather the Heraclitean. It is the philosophy of a man who must either take Christianity seriously, but then he can no longer be a European of today or must put new values in place of Christian ones. The Christian era has run its course. 'Christianity is possible as the most private form of existence; it presupposes a narrow, withdrawn, completely unpolitical society, it belongs in the conventicle. A 'Christian state', on the other hand, a 'Christian politics', is shamelessness, a lie, like a Christian military leadership, which in the end treats the 'Lord of Hosts' as chief of staff. Even the papacy has never been able to conduct Christian politics... and when reformers like Luther pursue politics, one knows that they are just as much adherents of Machiavelli as any immoralists or tyrants' (The Will to Power, 211). By their unpriestly, brave, warrior nature, the Germans are destined to lead the Europe of the new epoch. A German cannot really feel Christian, Nietzsche thinks. And yet next to him lives a German statesman of the 'strong type', who does not understand the unique, world-historical opportunity, the enormous task that now presents itself.

There is much to praise in him: he is 'as far from German philosophy as a peasant or corps student. Suspicious of scholars. I like that about him. He has

thrown away everything that the silly German education (with grammar schools and universities) wanted to instill in him. And he obviously loves a good meal with strong wine more than German music: which mostly is only a more refined, womanly hypocrisy and disguise for the old German male inclination to intoxication'. In other respects: he is not at all genial, close, thank God, he is no German 'as he appears in books', he even understands parliamentarianism as a new means of doing what one wants. But what does this statesman do?

Nietzsche has two objections to make: they go to the heart of the matter. Bismarck is no Christian, but he leads a 'Christian' state. And Bismarck delivers Germany up to the democratic movement.

The first reproach is as serious for Nietzsche as the second, both are fundamentally a single reproach. Already in 'The Dawn' (92) we find an aphorism indicating how Nietzsche thinks precisely about the most Christian Bismarck. 'At the Deathbed of Christianity' are the few sentences headed, which one would have to consider unimportant and not corresponding to the weight of this title, if a special meaning were not behind it. But the beginning reads: 'The really active men are now inwardly without Christianity...'. Whom else could Nietzsche have counted among the 'really active' men of his time but Bismarck? It is certainly no coincidence that in the same book in which the systematic attack on Christianity (on the 'morality' of Christianity) begins, the planned attack on Bismarck is also opened (see above p. 143). 'The Dawn' thus reveals itself as the work in which Nietzsche begins to undermine Christian Germany, the 'Reich', behind everything Nietzsche undertakes, and even more behind what he undertakes against Germany, stands his anti-Christianity. It has been assumed up to now that Nietzsche gave expression to his attitude toward Christianity only theoretically. We must unlearn on this point. Nietzsche introduced a new way of philosophizing. His eminent literary talent enabled him to think and put his thoughts into action at the same time. He is an 'existential thinker', as Kierkegaard would put it, the inventor of a new kind of 'practical philosophy', he is one who always at the same time does what he thinks. He teaches an unchristian philosophy of struggle, so he also fights, by living it, against Christianity.

But he fights not only against concepts, but also against the powers that represent Christianity in his time. Among these powers, the 'Reich' stands first. That in the leading statesman 'realism and Christianity' are combined, that is not his objection. 'The madness of nationalities and the boorishness of fatherlands are without charm for me: 'Germany, Germany above all' sounds painful to my ears, basically because I want and wish more of the Germans than... Their foremost statesman, in whose head brave realism and Christianity are compatible with a ruthless opportunist politics, arouses my ironic curiosity'. In Bismarck's politics, in his 'old-fashioned guise', his ruthlessness in combining realism and Christianity, Nietzsche sees something reactionary,

a remnant from the beginning of the 19th century. This pretense that nothing has happened, this sneaking past the real spiritual situation of Europe fills him with disgust. 'Whither has the last feeling of propriety gone, of self-respect, when even our statesmen, otherwise a very candid type of person and antichrists indeed through and through, still call themselves Christians today and go to Communion? ... A young prince at the head of his regiments, magnificent as the expression of his people's selfishness and arrogance, but, without a shred of shame, professing himself a Christian! ... What then does Christianity deny? What does it call 'world'? That one is a soldier, that one is a judge, that one is a patriot; that one defends oneself; that one upholds one's honor; that one wants one's advantage; that one is proud...' (Antichrist, 38).

Now we understand the deeper meaning of that sharp word in 'The Dawn': it is becoming indecent to concern oneself with politics (see above p. 143). Nietzsche connects a very specific sense with this word 'indecent'. *Rome, the home of Western Christianity, is for the poet of 'Zarathustra' 'the most indecent place on earth'*. In the section of 'Antichrist' just quoted, there is the sentence: 'What was formerly merely sick has today become indecent, it is indecent today to be a Christian'. The word thus denotes a combination of the incompatible, an inward untruth: it does not befit Zarathustra to dwell in Rome, it does not befit a military leader, a statesman, to live in Christian forms.

In summary: Nietzsche fights against the 'Reich', not because it is German, but because it is German and Christian. With its Christianity, Germany, to which Nietzsche through his philosophy would like to provide spiritual leadership in Europe, commits itself to those tendencies that lead to ruin. In vain he has shown how corrosively Christianity in its modern, dissolved form works in all areas of life and spirit. He has demonstrated in the field of political life the fateful consequences of the concepts of equality and justice, but the German spirit, which just now still had the will to rule over Europe, the power to establish Europe, is 'under the pompous pretext of founding an empire making its transition to mediocrization, to democracy and 'modern ideas'...' (The Birth of Tragedy, later preface). 'So far goes the decadence in the value instincts of our politicians, our political parties: they instinctively prefer what dissolves, what accelerates the end'. (Antichrist, 39). The German Reich is only one of the 'half-measures' of modern democracy. In order for there to be institutions, there must be a kind of will, instinct, imperative, 'anti-liberal to the point of malice', but in place of the 'will to tradition, to authority, to responsibility for centuries forward and backward to infinity', to solidarity of chains of generations, the new Germany has the will to ruin: it is liberal.

Basically Nietzsche as a politician has only one concern: 'the rise of democratic man and the consequent stultification of Europe and diminution of European man'. He does not think in German national terms, because he stands above the national and democratic mass state. But he thinks in a new,

bolder and more far-reaching way German: Germany is again to become leading in Europe. With Nietzsche this is of course not meant in the old 'idealistic' sense. He does not want to make Germany again the people of thinkers and poets, he does not speak of a kingdom of the German spirit or of a Christmas tree of the German soul. Nietzsche knows that any spiritual rule also includes legal relations and power systems. He does not want to make the Germans unpolitical; he does not want to found a German 'culture state' which ironically superior neighboring peoples can use as a domain of good business and recreational travel, but he wants the Germans to lead Europe in great politics. For this it is necessary that they overcome national self-satisfaction, narrow-mindedness and spiritual narrowness, the dangers of the nation state. They have no reason to settle down and congratulate themselves. 'If Germany does not want, represent, embody something that has more value than any other previous power represents', then there is in itself only one great state more, one absurdity more in the world. 'Can one be interested in this German Reich? Where is the new idea? Is it only a new combination of power? So much the worse if it does not know what it wants. Peace and laissez faire is no politics I have respect for, ruling and helping the highest idea to victory, the only thing that could interest me in Germany. What do I care that Hohenzollerns are there or not there?'

What Nietzsche reproaches the Bismarck era is that it does not set itself against bourgeois-liberal conditions in the slightest. 'The Bismarck era (the era of German stultification). The exclusive interest that is now given in Germany to questions of power, commerce and trade and, in the end, 'good living', the rise of parliamentary imbecility, newspaper reading and literati meddling by everyone in everything, the admiration of a statesman who knows and values philosophy about as much as a peasant or corps student' etc., with this characterization the form of life is designated, to which Nietzsche from early youth was in contradiction, and at the same time his whole epoch is summarily described from his own position: the era of German stultification or the Bismarck era. With what contempt he portrayed in 'The Dawn', in 'Human, All Too Human' and in 'Beyond Good and Evil' the bourgeois way of life. He saw behind the morality of modern 'commercial society', which is based on the principle 'moral actions are actions of sympathy for others', a social drive for timidity at work, which wants life to be stripped of all danger. Only actions that aim at the common security and sense of security of society may be called 'good' (Dawn, 174). Thus a 'culture of the commercial' is emerging, whose soul is commerce just as personal rivalry was for the culture of the ancient Greeks. In that commercial culture the question of questions is: 'Who and how many consume this?' Everything is calibrated to the needs of consumers, not to the most personal needs of the creator. The merchant understands how to calibrate everything without making it; he constantly applies this valuation, including to the products of the arts and sciences, peoples and parties (Dawn, 175). But not understanding

commerce is noble (Dawn, 308). Characteristic of that culture are modern meals, as they are already enjoyed by scholars as well as bankers, after which one seeks to drive out the heaviness in stomach and brain again by means of stimulating drinks. One wants to represent with such meals. But all that still gets represented is money, for money is 'power, fame, dignity, influence' (Dawn, 208).

In the 'industrial culture', which no longer knows any estates, Nietzsche sees 'the most common form of existence that has existed so far'. The worker seeks to sell himself as dearly as possible, but the employers lack 'all those forms and insignia of the higher race which first make people interesting'. Nobility cannot be improvised. The 'manufacturers' vulgarity with red, fat hands' gives the common man the idea that only chance and luck have raised one above the other here. 'Well then,' he concludes, 'let us try chance and luck once! Let's throw the dice once! and socialism begins' (The Gay Science, 40). The book in which these sentences stand was published in 1882. One must always keep in mind the impartiality and acuity of this characterization if one wants to assess Nietzsche's relationship to Bismarck correctly. The philosopher saw what remained hidden from the statesman: the actual justification of the socialist movement, which lies in the fact that the ruling class, while de facto in possession of power, i.e., in possession of money, no longer really rules. For rule requires a superiority that finds its natural expression in the 'noble form'. But what bourgeois society called 'noble', Nietzsche rightly considered just another expression of plebeianism. He foresaw the downfall of the class that was no longer inwardly but only outwardly ruling and was infinitely superior to Bismarck in this regard.

But the quoted aphorism goes further. Nietzsche is not deceived by the militarism of the Reich: he sees that the industrial spirit is much stronger than the military spirit. This is precisely what the lack of noble form is based on. 'Soldiers and leaders still have a much higher relationship to each other than workers and employers. At least for now, all militarily founded culture still stands high above any so-called industrial culture'. Submission to powerful, frightening, even terrible people, to tyrants and army leaders, is felt far less painfully than 'submission to unknown and uninteresting people, as all the greats of industry are: in the employer, the worker usually sees only a cunning, exploitative cur of humans who speculates on every trick, whose name, figure, manners and reputation are completely indifferent to him'. In this impersonality of the relationship, we add, Nietzsche sees the actual reason for the evil, because this relationship necessarily lacks responsibility. Every personal relationship, even that of the tyrant to the subjugated, stands higher, because the tyrant is still personally liable for what he does. Tyrannicide is an expression of this liability. A class that has power in the form of money in its hands always rules irresponsibly: no one is to blame for what happens, because behind the impersonal system the individual disappears. In private life, the employer is often a harmless Christian and family man and feels

completely innocent. No one thinks of murdering him, and yet the existence of these more or less innocents weighs like a fate on the whole and generates that dull pressure, that gloominess of the atmosphere which is the expression of the inner crisis. With what scorn Nietzsche would have answered the attempt to alleviate this condition by demanding, without changing anything in depth, 'social responsibility' from money givers and entrepreneurs!

If modern bourgeois society is based on the instinct of timidity, then in it the need for security and peace must grow more and more and eventually lead to a state of affairs in which war as such is abhorred and finally morally condemned. The culture of industrial society ends in pacifism. Nietzsche also anticipated this development; he already established it as a general tendency in the 'Reich' (which later proved unable to take political action in a war). That is why he did not tire of pointing out the necessity and significance of wars from 'Human, All Too Human' on. The ideas belonging here all stem directly from the views on state and culture which he set down in the fragment on the Greek state. War is indispensable. 'It is mere enthusiasm and beautiful soul to expect much more (or even: first of all much more) from mankind when it has unlearned how to wage wars'.

The rough energy of the field camp, the common organizing bloodlust in the destruction of the enemy, the proud indifference to great losses and one's own existence can 'for the time being' still be imparted to souls through nothing other than great wars. Even in the dangerous voyages of discovery, navigations and climbs undertaken for scientific purposes, the desire for adventure and danger is expressed. A highly cultivated and therefore necessarily weak humanity needs periodic relapses into barbarism so as not to lose their culture and their very existence to the means of culture (Human, All Too Human I, 477). In times of security man does not grow in height. The secret of reaping the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment from existence is called: living dangerously! 'I welcome all signs indicating that a more manly, warlike age is beginning, which will above all bring honor to bravery again!' Heroism must be brought into cognition, wars must be waged 'for the sake of thoughts and their consequences' (The Gay Science, 283).

Here the concept of great politics springs forth: What drives great politics forward is the need for the feeling of power, which gushes forth at intervals from inexhaustible sources not only in the souls of individuals but also in the lower strata of the people. The hour always comes again when the masses are ready to stake their lives, their property, their conscience, their virtue. Then the pathetic language of virtue is spoken. 'Strange deity of moral judgments! When man feels powerful, he feels and calls himself good: and it is precisely then that the others, upon whom he must vent his power, call and feel him evil!' (Dawn, 189).

Against the increasing equalization, mediocrity and diminution of the European human being there is only one antidote: danger and war.

Nietzsche likes to use the word war also in the general sense of struggle. He is

too far removed from the doctrine of life for the sake of life itself and too hostile to the moral-humanitarian ideology spawned by Christianity to fight war between peoples as reality. Pacifism belongs for him to the herd ideals; it is a form of slave morality. Since real wars require peoples and states to wage them, but Nietzsche's national, democratic mass state is negated because of its leveling tendencies, we find in his work passages like the one quoted above justifying wars between peoples, but at the same time we see how he shifts emphasis more and more to the spiritual struggle for power. This struggle is waged first for predominance in Europe. If bloody wars arise from this, Nietzsche does not shy away from justifying them.

Thus his politics culminates in the idea of a European struggle for the 'power' of the greatest thought. The European human being strives for the condition represented in 'Zarathustra' by the type of the last man. 'Übermensch' is the formula for overcoming this type. The Übermensch is supposed to free the world from the 'last man', i.e., from the final result of Christian-democratic development. 'A fight in the arena for the deployment of the power which mankind represents. Zarathustra calls for this fight in the arena'. The 'revaluation of all values' is meant to initiate the struggle. In 'Ecce Homo' the final and actual goal is stated in the words: 'The concept of politics has then completely gone into a spiritual warfare; all power formations of the old society have been blown into the air, they all rest on the lie: there will be wars such as there have never been on earth before. Only from me on will there be great politics on earth' (Why I am a Fate).

Let Europe, we read in a posthumous note from the time of 'The Will to Power', let Europe soon 'produce a great statesman, and he who is now celebrated in the small age of plebeian shortsightedness as 'the great realist' will stand small there'. The global contest is over. Nietzsche is the victor.

6. The Good European.

One word remains to be said about that concept which alone of all political concepts tends to be known as Nietzsche's at present. This is the concept of the 'good European'. In order to determine the value of this concept, we do best to start from the most representative place where it appears: that is the preface to Beyond Good and Evil. In Europe there now exists 'a magnificent tension of the spirit such as has never existed on earth before: with such a tense bow one can now shoot for the most distant goals'. This tension, however, is felt as distress by the Europeans, and attempts have already been made twice to relax the bow, once through Jesuitism, the second time through the democratic enlightenment with the aid of freedom of the press and newspaper reading. The Germans, it says at the end, invented gunpowder, all praise to them!, but they gave it up again, they invented the printing press. But we, Nietzsche continues, 'we who are neither Jesuits nor Democrats nor even German enough, we good Europeans and free, very free spirits, we still have it, the whole need of the spirit and the whole tension of its bow! And perhaps also the arrow, the task, who knows? the goal...'. With the 'bow' Nietzsche

alludes to the struggle for Europe. The antithesis is clear, besides: 'good European' is the opposite concept to a person who is only German. *The good European is a freethinker, a free spirit, and therefore well-disposed to the French, a lover of the Romance cultures, a friend of the Mediterranean and a 'music of the south'*. All minds belong to the good Europeans who understand form, artistry and psychology, people who have a feeling for nuances, mocking, superior minds who live homeless on high mountains. Occasionally Schopenhauer and Wagner also belong, of course never Bismarck or other Germans. We have seen how quickly Nietzsche drops the designation when it comes down to it: it does not adhere to an entity, to a substance, it has solely a function, a purpose, the purpose of insulting the Germans and creating a kind of sphere around the lonely one who is not recognized by them.

The concept of the good European first appears in a meditation of 'Human, All Too Human' (475), in which the increasing intercourse is (falsely) concluded to lead to an 'annihilation of nations'. Here the good European, to which the German is supposed to be particularly suited through his talent as an interpreter and mediator, is seen as the European of the future (let us recall how Nietzsche thinks about the 'mediator'. See p. 116 above). In an aphorism of the 'Wanderer' (87), everyone who is 'well-disposed to Europe' is required to learn to write well and ever better: it is no use, Nietzsche adds here, 'even if he himself was born in Germany, where bad writing is treated as a national prerogative'. The actual purpose here is to prepare that as yet distant state of affairs 'where the great task falls into the hands of the good Europeans: the leadership and supervision of the entire culture of the earth'. Whoever is against good writing and good reading shows the peoples a way to become even more national, because it hinders understanding, and is consequently 'an enemy of the good Europeans, an enemy of free spirits'. In his rejection of national differences, Nietzsche goes so far in the 'Wanderer' as to play off fashion against national costumes as something European (215). This train of thought reaches its conclusion in aphorism 292 of the same work, in which the 'victory of democracy' is predicted. The provisional outcome of the spreading democratization will be 'a European league of peoples, in which each people, delimited according to geographical expediences, occupies the position of a canton and its special rights'.

The good European as he appears in these sections is obviously identical with what Nietzsche in 'Zarathustra' calls the 'last man' and in 'The Will to Power' the 'future European': he is the result of completed democratic leveling, 'the most intelligent slave animal, very industrious, basically very modest, infinitely curious to the point of vice, manifold, spoiled, weak-willed, a cosmopolitan chaos of intelligence and senses' (Will to Power, 868). This is undoubtedly not the good European Nietzsche means when he says in 'Ecce Homo': 'it costs me no effort to be a 'good European' (Why I am so Wise). The good European in this latter sense is undoubtedly again that free spirit who belongs to a small elite of European minds.

However, there is yet a third concept of the good European. This latter is no longer merely a freethinker, but a martial spirit. He is far from being an enlightened concerned with the dissemination of good reading and good writing, but rather he fights against the century of enlightenment, in which people knew so well how to read and write: 'Basically we good Europeans are waging a war against the eighteenth century' (Will to Power, 117.). These good Europeans are described in detail in aphorism 132 of the 'Will to Power': they are the people of Nietzsche's philosophy. They are 'the legislators of the future, the masters of the earth'. A posthumous note reads: 'Principle: 1. To create a kind of being that can replace priest, teacher and physician (The conquest of mankind). 2. An aristocracy of spirit and body that breeds itself, constantly taking in new elements and distinguishing itself from the democratic world of the botched and the half-botched' (The Masters of the Earth.). For this type we also find the name of the 'higher European', who is called a forerunner of great politics (Will to Power, 463). It is the people of this type to whom Nietzsche calls out at the end of the preface to the second volume of 'Human, All Too Human' in September 1886: 'You, whose comfort it is to know the way to a new health, ah! and to walk it, a health of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, you fore-ordained ones, you victorious ones, you time-overcomers, you healthiest ones, you strongest ones, you future ones!'

Epilogue.

It would be in Nietzsche's sense if one defined: rule of the spirit is another word for anarchy. That the politicizing 'spirit' could once appeal to Nietzsche belongs to the irony of history. The error is ultimately based on Nietzsche's wrong relationship to the state and on the hard to eradicate legend of his 'individualism'. In his world, the individual always seems to be right in contrast to the masses and the people and the state. It should give pause to say that this individual is a ruler, Nietzsche's world cannot be so completely without relation to the state after all. But this relation is obscured: nowhere does his time make itself felt as clearly as here. That the realm of the political lies in shadow for Nietzsche is not conditioned by the matter itself. In the 'Politeia' of his great opponent Plato stands the sentence: 'The greatest punishment is to be ruled by an inferior, if one does not make the resolution to rule oneself'. This state-founding word could stand as the motto above 'The Will to Power'. To prevent the inferior from ruling, because the better withdraw in disgust. that is undoubtedly one of Nietzsche's goals.

Nothing seems more difficult than finding the transition from the individual to the collective in Nietzsche's world. And yet the collective necessarily lies on the path that is traced 'along the guiding thread of the body'. The philosopher of the will to power clearly heard that soft rushing of the stream flowing on under the ages, from which the individual emerges into the light. The conscious connections made by humans through the times are usually considered the most important, 'while in truth the real connection (through

procreation) pursues its unknown path' (Will to Power, 676). The individual, the individuum is only an error: 'We are more than the individual: we are the whole chain too, with the tasks of all the chain's futures' (Will to Power, 687). 'The isolation of the individual must not deceive, in truth something flows under the individuals' (Will to Power, 686). Whoever thinks along the guiding thread of the body cannot be an individualist; likewise, whoever thinks historically cannot be an individualist. In Nietzsche's relation to the great commonalities there is just as much of a break conditioned by time as in his relation to history. How little he thought individualistically within the historical realm is proven by the 'Genealogy of Morals': not individuals, but generations, races, peoples, estates and the contrasts between them, the pathos of distance, are for him the starting points of all historical existence. It may look sometimes as if he was only interested in the 'future of mankind'. But the realist knows too well that there is no such thing as a 'human species' as a historical unity. The collective from which the individual human being springs is never humanity, but always a concrete unity, a race, a people, an estate. 'Preservation of the community (of the people) is my correction, instead of 'preservation of the species'. 'The various moral judgments have not yet been traced back to the existence of the 'species man': but to the existence of 'peoples', 'races', etc., and indeed of peoples who wanted to assert themselves against other peoples, of estates who wanted to sharply delimit themselves from lower strata'.

By the individual taking on the demands of a people, his strength grows; by participating in the tensions that exist between the world-historical unities, he travels the path to greatness. For all active natures, this path leads through the state. Nietzsche's work does not contain a doctrine of the state, but this work has opened up all paths to a new doctrine of the state. How could the philosopher who conceived the body as a 'dominion structure' not be a teacher of the state? 'As little state as possible!', this cry of disgust was directed at the Romano-Christian degenerate form of the state, not at the political form of life. The posthumous writings contain a passage about the state which suggests what Nietzsche could have taught about the state in another historical situation: 'It was not considerations of prudence but impulses of heroism that were powerful in the emergence of the state: the belief that there is something higher than the sovereignty of the individual. There the reverence for the lineage and the elders of the lineage takes effect: the younger brings them his sacrifice. The reverence for the dead and the ancestral statutes handed down by the ancestors: the present brings them his sacrifice. There is the homage to a spiritually superior and victorious one takes effect: the rapture of encountering his exemplar in the flesh: this gives rise to vows of loyalty. It is not coercion nor prudence that sustains the older forms of state: but the outpouring of noble emotions. Coercion could not even be exercised at all, and prudence is perhaps still too little developed individually. A common danger perhaps provides the occasion for coming

together, and the feeling of the new common power has something ecstatic about it and is a source of noble resolutions’.

The state as a heroic phenomenon, as a dominion structure, as an outpouring of all greatness, as a means and expression of the struggle for the highest power, which is never merely physical or economic, this is a Germanic idea of the state. It is this that lives in Nietzsche, even there, indeed precisely there, where he talks against the state, and precisely where he attacks Germany. It is this too that lives in Hölderlin's hymns. Where there is no struggle for the highest form, there can be no state. In the Italian journeys of the German emperors lives the spirit of the state of which the German is capable. This spirit of the state does not aim at an economic and financial securing of power, it has a dangerous contempt for all static thinking, it is purely dynamic: the state exists where greatness is, where a bold leader rules over martial men and pursues far-flung goals. There is state where courage and death, boldness and strength are, where goals and tasks beckon. In the youthful era of the European peoples the heroic idea of the Germanic state made an enormous impression; the neighboring kings voluntarily bowed to the emperors of the Saxon, Salian and Swabian dynasties. Since the 13th century, the great century of the Church, this is over, and the fall is so deep that not even in Germany has a memory of the heroic era been preserved.

Nietzsche awakens this memory in us again. His attack on the ‘Reich’ springs from the feeling of the world-historical task awaiting us. He wanted to know nothing of the state as an ethical organism in Hegel's sense, but he also wanted to know nothing of Bismarck's Little Germany based on Christianity. Before his eyes stood again the old task of our race: the task of being the leader of Europe. German politics is inconceivable in the future without an element of Hölderlin and Nietzsche: the future of Europe depends on Germany's youth. For the youth of the other European peoples, the state is no problem; for German youth, it is the problem. What would Europe be without the Germanic north, what would Europe be without Germany? A Roman colony. How rightly our enemies perceived the Germanic in Nietzsche during the World War. They saw in his work an attack on ‘Christian culture’, i.e., on a proven combination of gospel and business; they felt this honest and courageous spirit as a negation of the civilization that waged war under the banner of the cross, they felt the Siegfried attack on the urbanity of the West. The irreconcilable opponent of that Western civilization which declared war on us in 1914, that is Nietzsche. For this civilization is the Christian-Romanesque ‘Occident’, whose illusions he destroyed in ‘The Will to Power’. Across the millennia the spirit alien to Rome, akin to the Greeks, has come alive again in him. For him, the Christian-Germanic state of the Romantics and the ‘realpoliticians’ is just as much an aberration from the spirit of the North as the civilizing welfare state of the West. He occasionally hints at a foreign policy that points radically eastward. In Russia he sees a power that has duration in the body, which can wait and promise something. ‘Russia, the

antithetical concept to the miserable European pettiness and nervousness, which has entered into a critical condition with the founding of the German Reich... The whole West no longer has those instincts from which institutions grow, from which future grows...' (Twilight of the Idols, Expeditions, 39). Under the signs of the coming century Nietzsche sees the Russians entering into culture: 'A grandiose goal. Proximity to barbarism, awakening of the arts, magnificence of youth and fantastic madness and real will power'. These words were spoken at a time when there was no Soviet Russia yet, can one conceive of a better anticipation of its nature than is contained in these lines? And is there a clearer rejection of Western politics than the words: 'We need an unconditional rapprochement with Russia, and with a new common program that does not allow English schemas to rule in Russia. No American future!'.

Germany can only exist world-historically in the form of greatness. It only has the choice of being the anti-Roman power in Europe, or not being. If it subordinates itself to the civilization of the West, it submits itself to Rome; if it forgets its Germanic origin, it succumbs to the East. The creator of a Europe that is more than a Roman colony can only be the Nordic Germany, the Germany of Hölderlin and Nietzsche. Nietzsche does not belong next to Bismarck; he belongs in the era of the Great War. The German state of the future will not be a continuation of Bismarck's creation but will be created out of the spirit of Nietzsche and the spirit of the Great War.

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Chapter 3.

Alfred Baeumler: Selected articles from the book 'Education and Community'.

Introduction.

In order to have a broader vision of Alfred Baeumler's thought, we present here several of his texts on education, translated into English for the first time (Alfred Baeumler, 1943).

These texts were selected because some of them show a fresh view of how education should be. In a world where it is considered almost a crime to implement the Latin quote '*mens sana in corpore sano*' and where the 'need' to trample on anyone in order to climb the economic and/or social pyramid is taught, subtly and not subtly, we must remember that once this ignominious tide reaches its peak, it will go back down. And those who understand the historical phenomenon will be able to enjoy these texts.

Texts.

Race as a Fundamental Concept of the Science of Education.

In what strange situation would an astronomer find himself today if he were expected to express himself once again in the formulas of the old Ptolemaic world view? He would be able to regard these venerable formulas, if they were to be connected with the magnificent lawfulness of the stellar sky known to him, only as a facetious mummery, a masked dance. An astronomer is in this situation within the historical sciences today, to whom the idea of race and heredity has dawned in all its greatness and significance. He thinks Copernican, while around him calculations are still being made on the basis of the Ptolemaic system; he cannot possibly feel the formulas of the old environmental thinking as anything other than a dance of masks around the cenotaph of the Enlightenment's concept of man.

At the center of the science of education stands the concept of human malleability. If man were not capable of development and molding, there would be no culture. The malleability of man, who does not come into the world with fully developed instincts like animals, is the prerequisite for civilization. It will always remain the most important concern of pedagogy to define the concept of malleability correctly. The first thing that racial thinking has to achieve in the field of educational science is therefore to prove that the concept of malleability has so far been wrongly conceived.

*The main prejudice of environmental thinking with regard to the educational process is **intellectualism**.*

Intellectualism assumes: 1. That man comes into the world as a pure, i.e. indeterminate disposition (*tabula rasa*), 2. That the environment has the power to write on this slate what it wants, 3. That the organ with which man

relates to the world is the intellect, 4. That human action is guided by the intellect and can therefore be decisively influenced by influencing the intellect.

In the science of education, the concept of **unlimited malleability** arises from the intellectualistic basic assumption. Finally, it is no wonder that educators felt flattered by a theory by which the development of the individual human being is handed over exclusively to their influence.

Intellectualism claims that everyone can be brought to everything through upbringing. It spares itself the effort of getting to know people as they really are; reflecting on the historical character of educational goals costs it no effort, because it derives the goal of education from reason. *Its science of education is 'autonomous', i.e. it does not care about history; its educational goal is a human being in itself, which has never existed and never will exist.*

The less intellectualism deals with the goal of education, the more eagerly it turns to the **means**. The success of education seems to him to be guaranteed if the means he recommends are correctly 'applied'. Thus intellectualism becomes methodism. The prerequisite remains the raceless, i.e. 'general' humanity that is not directed in certain directions by any original dispositions.

It could not remain unnoticed that the practical result did not correspond to the expectations raised by this theory. How did one try to explain the appalling 'arrears' of this apparently so ideal procedure? The answer is embarrassing because it can give no information other than ignorance and ill will. If a tendency deeply inherent in man did not constantly counteract the well-intentioned efforts of the educators, then the unlimited malleable soul could be shaped according to infallible recipes in such a way that finally an ideal human being would be able to eke out his idyllic existence in an equally ideal environment. *Only by borrowing from highly questionable ideas about human nature is 'autonomous' pedagogy thus able to do justice to historical reality, which means, however, that it is unable to do justice to this reality.*

History has proven and proves daily anew that man can be brought to nothing through precepts, exhortations or punishments, nor through other environmental influences, that he is not originally in the core of his being. *Realism in the study of man does not consist in attributing evil tendencies to man, but in recognizing that everything man is capable of ultimately comes from himself, from his **dispositions**.*

It cannot be overlooked that intellectualism has a certain foundation in the facts. It is a fact that intelligence is the human faculty most strongly influenced by the environment. *If man were only intelligence, then intellectualism and environmental thinking would still not be right, because the degree and kind of intelligence always remain determined by hereditary disposition, but the extravagant hopes of rationalist schoolmasters would at least not have to be entirely relegated to the realm of fable.* Anyone who

wants to say something about the significance of race for upbringing must first make clear what human character means. Racial thinking makes the mostly overlooked but surely indisputable assumption that man is most profoundly character, and that in the end the achievements of intelligence also depend on character. *It is precisely the deep layers of human personality, the layers in which the decisions of human existence are rooted, and which determine the life curve of the individual including his achievement, which are independent in their basic orientation from the environment.* This has been irrefutably proven by recent character research, especially by studies of identical twins (Plomin, 2019).

All educational theory is groundless and unfounded if it does not build on the secure foundation of a scientific study of man. The opponents of a vitalistic and racial science of education are still working today with a study of man that leaves aside the research yields of fruitful decades. Only when the relationship between intelligence and character is correctly determined can there be a realistic theory of education.

It might now seem as if the recognition of the fundamental importance of innate character had something discouraging for the educator. For what is education if everything is predetermined by disposition? *However, it is an unfounded and tendentious assertion that with the recognition of the persistence of the innate it is at the same time stated that man is inflexible and unchangeable. Dispositions are possibilities, not predetermined fixed quantities* (J.S. Gómez-Jeria, 2023). The disposition merely determines the **direction** of flexibility. The fundamental error of intellectualism is to assume that flexibility is conceivable at all without a directed disposition. *In truth, genuine flexibility always presupposes a disposition that is not aimless.* He who possesses only learned things (i.e. things stemming from the environment), Pindar already knew, is an obscure man, soon enthusiastic about this, soon about that, sampling a thousand arts, with aimless sense, never appearing with steady foot (Nem. 3). If there were not an original directedness in man that chooses and separates, persists and acts, education would not be possible at all. Directedness of disposition does not exclude education but is rather its necessary prerequisite. The acquired is always an immense diversity. Unity and consistent action can only stem from a character rooted in something innate; **unity** can never be learned.

*This having been said, there is nothing of greater importance than the formation of character and intelligence. Racial thinking does not oppose the principle of unlimited malleability with the principle of limited malleability, but it **first discovers** the true principle of malleability. Without unity there is no human existence.* But the unity of character is not static-resting but dynamic-moving. It is a unity of direction. Education can always only connect to this pre-given unity; it can never produce this unity by way of intellect and environment. But since it is not a rigid, immovable unity, but a relatively indeterminate **unity of direction**, the great task of education arises here: to

bring what urges fluidly to its own highest form. In the human sphere, the living does not attain perfect form by itself. It requires upbringing in the community. Only through the forming influence of others does the soul attain itself, does it become what it is. In the beginning stands the innate but still indeterminate direction of character, at the end the clear definite form in which character fulfills itself. We call this form the **type** to which the individual is educated by the community.

Thus, with the insight into the impossible concept of 'unlimited education', the concept of any 'limitation' by educational measures also disappears. Limitation is not an invention of racial science of education, but an essential characteristic of man. Only where man is recognized in his reality and educated according to this reality can the science of education arise in a permanent form.

National Socialism and 'Idealism'.

The discussion of fundamental pedagogical questions suffers in our day above all from the fact that the main concepts of the science of education originate from a time which was completely foreign to the revolution in our thinking brought about by the concept of race. Thereby, in every theoretical-pedagogical treatise today, the danger of misinterpreting the fundamental is almost acute. It would undoubtedly be unfair to make the reproach to the science of education of National Socialism on the basis of the fact that it has not yet provided even the conceptual apparatus necessary for understanding. *For clarification cannot occur by publishing a dictionary for all relevant questions; it is not a matter of a new organization of old material, but of a conception and interpretation of the world, of a philosophy which still silently underlies the new pedagogy.* It speaks more for than against the National Socialist science of education that it disdains to feign the presence of a world interpretation to be won only in long work or too hastily anticipate a philosophy. *In some way, the philosophical is contained in every individual investigation arising from inner necessity.* In investigations on community and type, comradeship and attitude, etc., we can discover this philosophical element. Nevertheless, on the basis of manifold experiences today we are also already in a position to present results of fundamental considerations. Reference should be made above all to the essay by Albert Holfelder on autonomous pedagogy.

A discussion of the relationship in which National Socialist science of education stands to pedagogy built on the theory of idealism must be preceded by a remark of a terminological nature. *When we juxtapose National Socialism and idealism, then by idealism is to be understood only that philosophical doctrine which was developed in Germany around the turn of the 18th to the 19th century and which found its most magnificent expression in Hegel.* We do not claim that all sides of Hegel's rich philosophy are denoted by the concept of idealism. But at least what constitutes the nerve of his thinking and what has worked most stubbornly in his system is

characterized. Philosophy, and with it pedagogy, remained 'idealistic' in Germany until recently in the sense of that theoretical idealism whose central concept is 'spirit'. Something entirely different from this philosophical theory, which we consider to be overcome, is meant by that much wider concept of idealism which is in general use in the German language. *This wider concept does not denote a philosophical doctrine but a practical attitude. Idealistic means the opposite of materialistic, it means a practical attitude toward existence which subordinates one's own comfort and finally even one's own life to higher, universal purposes.* We do not use the term idealism in this practical-popular sense in this essay. The attitude toward the world which we are trying to describe would have to be called idealistic in a practical respect, although it cannot be grasped by the intellectual means of theoretical idealism.

What confronts us today in philosophical terms as decisive about theoretical idealism is its fundamental character as **spiritualism**. Since we are considering philosophical idealism here in relation to the science of education, we restrict ourselves to emphasizing its spiritualistic character mainly in the field of historical study of man.

The derivation of idealism from the two-world doctrine as it was developed during the Christian era of Europe under the influence of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism is unmistakable. According to this doctrine there is a higher and a lower world, which relate to each other as form and matter; in the supersensible world the forms are prefigured which we find realized in earthly matter or realize ourselves. The philosophical elaboration can be very diverse, it can proceed in a dualistic or monistic way, the systems confront each other apparently abruptly, but the contrast between soul and body, form and matter always prevails decisively. *It was a bold act when Fichte contracted the supersensible world into the I. From now on, not two 'worlds' confront each other, but the I confronts its world.*

By no means can Fichte's mighty deed be derived solely from the spiritualistic tradition; we see in it the break-through of the Germanic personalism which had already been effective in Luther. But once again this personalism, which is completely without admixtures from a supersensible world, is put in chains by spiritualism. The bold philosophy of the I does not bring liberation but impresses spiritualism into a new, seductive and coercive form. In this form it embarks on its triumphal march through all the humanities.

Through the Germanic personalism, to which idealism owes its momentum and methodical fruitfulness, the old two-world doctrine has been freed from its ontological and thus at the same time static character. Something new has arisen thereby, and all controversies in the historical interpretation of idealism ultimately come back to the correct or incorrect understanding of this new element. The dynamization of the concept of the world which Fichte initiated is regarded by some philosophers as a new

beginning. It is overlooked here that the contrast static-dynamic is not decisive, but the answer to the question of whether the contrast of the sensual and supersensual world has been overcome. Idealism has set the entire human-historical context in motion, so to speak, and thus taken an immense step beyond the old view of the world; it has given the contrast between sensual matter and supersensual form a peculiar turn, but it has retained this contrast. That is the reason why its fate was fulfilled so quickly in it. Under the influence of form-matter thinking the philosophical problem of reality cannot be mastered.

The failure of idealism manifests itself in Hegel's relapse into ontology, indeed into the ontological proof of God. One can hardly admire enough Hegel's realism in the philosophical penetration of social life and art, the state and history; but through the spiritualistic basic tendency of his system all this is finally deprived of its original meaning.

The great master in the art of making opposites fluid also understood how to set in motion the contrast between the sensible and supersensible world. But however comprehensive Hegel's dialectical method may be, however well it may really unite and dissolve opposites and thereby achieve surprising effects, it always moves within the tension of the sensible and supersensible and thus remains completely within the spiritualistic tradition. Precisely in this boldest deed of German idealistic thinking, the constraint of this tradition can also be most clearly recognized. We can call Hegel's dialectic realistic, realism belongs essentially to it, and yet we thus fail to grasp the meaning which its originator himself attached to it.

The idealistic dialectic proceeds from bottom to top; but at the end it is revealed that this path was in essence a path from top to bottom. *The creative principle was already effective at the beginning, historical happening is placed in a logical context, reality is robbed of its uniqueness and unfathomability, the individual form loses its independence and self-groundedness, the 'spirit' consumes everything singular in its fiery-fluid universality. In the method of dissolving reality into the dialectical process of spirit, Western spiritualism reaches its climax.* The greatest proximity to reality and the greatest remoteness from reality coincide in Hegel's system. The imperishable magic of this system rests on the coincidence of the incompatible.

The magic has held until our time. The properly Hegelian heritage consists in the transformation of the spiritualistic way of thinking into a **procedure** that we can characterize as the method of penetrating a lower by a higher. No field of matter is excluded from this procedure; the penetration proves itself anew in any material. In the last phase of Hegelianism, the contrasts face each other once more, very faded, as the world of facts and the world of values. The question of the penetration of the world of facts and the world of values becomes the philosophical question par excellence. Under a strange compulsion, thinking repeatedly posits some residual stock of

factuality in opposition to something other, something higher. The positivism of the factual is continually 'overcome' by the idealism of values.

Viewed from the other side, the basic relationship presents itself thus: positivism is inseparable from idealism and follows it like its shadow. Theoretically idealistic trains of thought will always reveal themselves (at least in the last phase of Hegelianism) in that some factual appears in them which needs transfiguration. The ingenious dialectical method, seemingly constructed from bottom to top, has transformed itself into a procedure of justification which could be called a procedure of making sense of the senseless. The separation of idea and reality, which Hegel believed to have suspended forever by the dialectical method, completely dominates the thinking of the epigones. One has neither the courage to entrust oneself to the idea, as Hegel did, nor does one stand in the right relation to reality: the 'reconciliation' of idea and reality in the sense of an indeterminate penetration of factuality and value is the only grasp of thinking of which this epigone philosophy is still capable.

The worldview revolution of National Socialism took the ground out from under theoretical idealism. It is characteristic of National Socialist thinking that it knows nothing of the separation between positivism and idealism, which ultimately has its ground in the fact that the two-world doctrine, from which that separation emerged, is foreign to it. *For this thinking there is only **one** reality, and everything that happens rises up out of the one inexhaustible depth of reality.* There is no mere factuality in need of transfiguration by 'values'; a bestowal of meaning on the meaningless is an unfeasible idea here. The idea itself stems from reality; it is the image that reality produces through man. A making-equivalent of idea and reality in the idealistic-positivistic sense cannot be spoken of here. The opposition of matter and form has lost its significance. The elements are not shaped into an image of the world by a subsequent accomplishment; rather, there is an original relation to the world, and in this 'intuition' given with its meaning is rooted man's ability to design an image of the world as well as guiding ideals for his own actions. Reality is not a mere factuality that receives its form and value only from a form foreign to it, but the ground and measure of all form. *In the end, all phenomena are measured against reality.*

Where there is a lack of insight into the full-blooded reality, which has not yet faded into mere factuality, there the attitude of the individual, from which he creates and acts, is grounded in an idea, without it ever becoming apparent where this idea comes from. National Socialist thinking knows the significance of ideas, without which education and life are not possible, but it does not for a moment forget that guiding ideals do not descend from above to transfigure a mere factuality or to inspire a dead body, but that they themselves stem from reality. Thus, however much the concrete attitude of a human may depend on the images that were presented to him in early youth, however much a culture may for a time be dependent on foreign traditions,

still always decisive remains that original attitude, out of which alone man possesses the power to create images, take them in and judge them.

The unspoiled human being draws the impulses for his activity from himself and has no need of being oriented in his striving by enlivening images of foreign origin. And the same holds for the community. The truly living community of those of the same race also needs no 'idea' first of all in order to receive meaning and aim. It is no dead body into which an idea would first have to breathe life, but an enlivened body. If one must talk of enlivening a community at all, then the life of that community is no longer primeval and robust. A community does not become historically powerful through enlivening ideas of some origin but only through the will of a leader that it itself engenders from itself and who newly and grandly places before its eyes the sensuous-moral guiding ideal of its existence.

The attitude of the individual and the life of the community are grounded not in a spirit estranged from their blood but first and last in themselves. That is the philosophical meaning of the concept of race: race always refers us to what we **are**. In that respect, the racist worldview has opened up the way to a new philosophy, which no longer knows the old opposition between factuality and value.

The opposition between something that 'is' without bearing a value in itself, and something else that does not 'exist' but, as an idea, inspires what exists ('holds as valid'), includes not only a scheme of interpretation that can be applied to all happening, but is also the source of a pathos in speaking which has always won the theoretical idealism many friends. To speak of the 'idea' is dangerously easy and lends speech, without any personal effort needing to be connected with it, a touch of the higher. The wholly other relieves the one who knows to speak of it of any personal responsibility and immediate truthfulness. Just speaking of something so lofty is already considered a merit, and finally the longing speech about the idea takes the place of philosophical thinking. The philosopher transforms himself into a priest and gazes pityingly or arrogantly from his lofty watchtower of ideas upon the 'workaday'. Thus theoretical idealism returns to its beginning, the two-world doctrine, and spiritualism reveals itself, in spite of all protestations, as its truth.

The philosophy of reality is absolutely not capable of such a pathos. Its language can only be that of simple indication; it is not edifying and exhorting but 'indicative', to use a term of Albert Hofelder. This indicative philosophy is as far from positivism as from idealism, for indicative does not mean here fixing on factuality, but indicating reality. In accordance with the National Socialist concept of the world ('worldview' [Weltanschauung] as a basic concept precludes the separation of the one beholding from the world), such an indication cannot occur outside the responsibility of the one indicating. In place of irresponsible speech of a wholly other, indicative-responsible speech of reality itself enters, in which the speaker himself stands

and in which he intervenes shapingly through his deed and word. Such speech, too, can have its pathos; however it is no longer the priestly pathos of one who believes to have found a point outside the 'world', but the pathos of the fighter asserting himself and his value in reality.

In no other field has idealism in its last phase worked with such success as in that of the science of education. This observation is not to be understood as if German science of education of the last hundred years were essentially a product of German idealism. Precisely those who gave the strongest impulses to development stood outside the idealistic movement or kept their distance from it: Pestalozzi, Jahn, Herbart. But in the atmosphere of intellectual fatigue that characterizes the end of the 19th century, and against which Nietzsche protested in vain, all deeper realistic approaches died off. *Idealism and positivism, enemies in appearance, brothers in their derivation, dominated the field.*

The idealistic theorists doffed their hats to the men of practice, the positivistic methodologists, who for their part occasionally also greeted the theorists. A mild gentle pathos, tempered by consideration for the necessities of didactics with Platonic highlights, was finally regarded as scientific pedagogy. The core of this science, whose practical effect was based more on the ostentatiously displayed benevolent attitudes than on insights, was a theory of education, which in turn was divided into a more positivistic and a more idealistic part. The former contained child and adolescent psychology, the latter the theory of the teacher's personality. So psychological-didactic positivism on the one hand, an all-transfiguring professional idealism on the other, and hovering above everything the pedagogical idea, the Holy Grail, from which one receives the necessary strengthening when one looks up at it from the work of the schoolroom.

The pathetically presented ideology of the priestly teacher, the demands for an animation of the 'everyday' and the harmonization of idea and reality are just as harmless as all spiritualistic postulates. For they are the expression of an unreality of the school, which is all the more fateful as it is no longer felt. It is a delusion to believe that a school can somehow arise around a personality in empty space. Certainly, the personality of the teacher is ultimately decisive in the end. *'A school is only worth as much as the educators who work in it'*, says the justification for the school reform of Reich Minister of Education Rust. But where there is no school, one could continue, there is also no teacher possible, because the school does not consist through the teacher, any less than it consists through the child, but through the order which it has from the community to which teacher and child belong together. If this order is not clearly given, even strong and good teachers consume themselves without tangible success. The value of the school depends on the personalities who work in it, the school itself is based on the clarity and determination with which the community issues its school-founding mandate.

Only in an unreal school must the 'animation' of everyday life be

called for. But no ideal construction of the teacher can restore the unity of education and life once it has been lost. That was the fundamental error of idealistic autonomous pedagogy, that it believed it could achieve or at least strive for the unity of education and life from the school. When will the politicians finally follow the schoolmasters? Autonomous pedagogy ran out into this half delusional, half comical idea. Idealism overshot itself in it. Many now believe that by turning the sentence around one obtains the pedagogy of National Socialism: today the schoolmasters must follow the politicians. With this principle, it is believed, the disempowerment of the teacher, the emptying of his actions, the loss of independence of his profession is given. The teacher now only has to follow directives, pedagogy becomes a dependent variable of politics. The new school is thus still imagined according to the scheme of idealism-positivism, only that positivism has become political, and idealism is omitted. In painting such an unimaginative political positivism, the imagination knows no bounds. The conclusion to be drawn can only be that even the former didactic positivism would have been better for the school.

If National Socialism proclaims the primacy of politics over education, then this principle cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by such critics who are still caught up in the juxtaposition of idealism and positivism. The National Socialist worldview has broken through the barrier that was once placed around the world. Reality has regained its soul. The concept of the political must be newly understood from the National Socialist concept of reality, not from positivistic views about the state. The primacy of politics over education does not mean a subordination of creative forces to dead regulations, but the integration of education into the national order. Politics is the action of the Führer directed at establishing the national order, in which every individual participates in loyalty to the Führer at his own position on his own responsibility. According to the political pedagogy of National Socialism, therefore, the teacher is not a mere executor of directives from political bodies, but he is the one who carries out the political mandate which the school has received from the Führer on his own responsibility. Once he has understood and assumed the political mandate, he is free.

Out of the political sense of reality that fills the Germans in Adolf Hitler's Reich, every task that arises in the vast space of the nation is tackled. The most difficult task has perhaps fallen to the teacher: he is supposed to help educate the new type and at the same time help wrest the new educational content for the school in the work of the school. *He sees himself placed right in the middle of the struggle of the centuries, the future lies open, immense possibilities stand before him.* He needs no 'pedagogical idea' to transfigure his 'everyday life' for him: in his schoolroom he stands in the midst of his people, taking part in the struggle for the emerging Reich. And if the task sometimes seems too difficult for him, then he comforts himself with the sentence from the 1938 school reform: 'The National Socialist era will also produce the school that is the spirit of its spirit, but we must be aware that we

stand at the **beginning** of the new education’.

The Path to Achievement.

According to an old saying, we do not learn for school but for life. Unfortunately, the thought in this sentence is incompletely expressed: school is indeed contrasted with life, but the essential thing about the contrast between school and life remains unspoken. The sentence leaves the school in the shadow of negation, it only hints at the positive relationship between school and life.

School and life belong together, even though they are distributed on different levels of our existence. So what the old saying actually means is: although school and life do not obey the same law, we still learn in school for life.

There is a superordinate concept of life in which the difference between school and life is also suspended. It would be good if, in all discussions about education, one would always keep in mind that the school is an invention of life, but that at the same time it somehow stands opposed to practical life, which is what that old saying has in mind. Pedagogical thinking is distorted and destroyed from the ground up by nothing as much as by the transformation of the difference in structure between school and life into an imagined value opposition of theory and practice.

Then on one side stands ‘life’ and on the other side lifeless theory; but upon the school falls the abysmal suspicion of being only the site of theory. One loses all impartiality towards it and the power to vigorously rejoice in it as one of the finest inventions of life. One forgets that, although the school has a different structure than practical life, it is precisely this difference that is indispensable to life. For life is not an undifferentiated but an articulated unity, encompassing structural laws of different, indeed opposite kinds.

Life demands from us at specific times and in specific places a precisely circumscribed achievement. From this the conclusion is drawn: so we must learn to accomplish something specific. *The path to achievement is imagined, in adaptation to certain original activities (peasant and artisanal), as a straight line: from the very beginning one learns to do something definite.* The process we get to know in apprenticeship training, where the apprentice is trained in and for practice, is straightforward. Here life educates directly for life. The integration of the apprentice into the work process as an apprentice leads on to journeymanhood and mastery. Leaving aside that even in this process ‘instruction’ has a place, and that it proves useful here, too, to systematically break down the originally unified process, which introduces a certain distance from ‘life’. So the apprentice, too, partakes of discipleship. Hence the difference between apprentice and pupil remains: the former stands in ‘life’, the latter does not; the former is trained through practice for practice, the latter is supposed to be trained through something that is not life for life... Now many simply cannot get over this. In view of this inhibition one might even hit upon the idea that erroneous thoughts are also innate to humans. One

of these thoughts is that only the straight line can lead to the goal, while nature confronts us everywhere with the opposite. How surely nature reaches its goals, and what strange detours it takes! If the straight line prevailed in the human world, then one could count on nothing more surely than on the success of a moral sermon. As we know, one can count on nothing more surely than on the failure of a moral sermon. It is precisely the reverse of what the quick judges like to claim: in the human world, the detour is in most cases the shortest connection between two points. This may contradict elementary geometry, but it corresponds to the logic of life.

The school is the detour that life itself invented in order to achieve certain accomplishments. To reach its goal, life seems to contradict itself; it creates the school, which in its structure is not 'life', and precisely thereby serves life.

So you want a lifeless school, say the incorrigibles here, who live by shortcuts. Oh no, we only do not want to establish the connection between school and life by leveling the difference between them, destroying the school and damaging life. If we cling to the fact that in its structure the school is not practical life, we are thinking of what makes the school a school, purposeful instruction. We know that there is a school life, and that this life, community in work, play and celebration, can never be lively enough. But we also know that instruction can get so lost in 'life' that it is no longer instruction, whereby the school loses for what it is there.

All genuine instruction is not planned for the moment, but for the long term. Life demands achievement from us now and here; but the school achievement never coincides with the particular achievement of this profession and this moment, indeed in many cases it stands at a wide remove from it. It is precisely this distance which is lamented by the unfruitful theorists of life. Closer to life, they cry. One cannot get close enough!

We do not want to claim that the reversal of this sentence is correct: one can certainly distance oneself too far from life in school. It was once possible to construct a school that was completely removed from life. But that is no longer the danger today. The school that knows nothing of life has been overcome. We no longer tolerate arithmetic books and physics notebooks in which we encounter only examples that definitely never occur in life. Our school stands in the midst of the community of our people, from it the school receives its tasks as well as its materials. But this connection to life must never lead to the school eventually being everything imaginable, only no longer a school. If we want to serve the living community, then we must assert the school as a school.

The school imitates life in a false way when it wants to lead to the achievement directly and without any detour. The achievement demanded by life is in each case limited. We need certain hand movements and a certain sequence of activities to produce these machines, these materials and structures. But whoever only sees the individual achievement as such misses

the most important thing: a whole fabric of interlinked and interconnected activities is needed for the eventually visible achievement to be possible. To shape and improve this overall context of activities, to keep it going and increase it, is the actual achievement. The deeper we look into the working world of our people, the more clearly it becomes apparent to us how impossible it is to pre-train the next generation in the manner of craft apprenticeships for the immense variety of productive activities. *What is needed is a general pre-training that enables each individual to get to work here or there, to apply his strength at this or that point of the overall process. The site of this general pre-training is the school.*

If the school did not exist, we would have to invent it out of the vital necessities of our people, because there must be a place that is so far removed from life and its practical demands for achievement that the world of achievement can be set in motion from there. Give me the point outside, says the teacher, and from there I will set the entire working world in motion. One can be trained for individual grips, but the national context of work does not consist of individual hand grips. It is a whole, which the strength of the people, newly collected in its children and adolescents, in turn faces as a whole. The national work achievement emerges from the encounter between the fresh forces and the demands that arise from the national existence in each case. In this, it is of the highest importance that as few people as possible remain at the level where only one hand grip is performed. It is crucial for us Germans in particular that we have as many high-quality workers as corresponds to our innate potential. Therefore, the school must be structured in such a way that it enables the individual to fulfill the most diverse tasks, i.e. to work and act independently. It must not train and drill, but it must educate.

The one who is properly educated through the school does not externally imitate a grip that has been demonstrated to him, but is able to solve the individual task reflectively, i.e. from a general principle. He gets to the bottom of things, i.e. he understands the individual and particular from its general reason. It is this intellectual attitude towards a task that the general education of the elementary school and, with a view to specific achievements, the secondary school produces.

The school does not educate for individual, prescribed achievements, but rather for achievements to be accomplished at all under given conditions. What one learns in a good school is not a specific action, but the ability to act. One learns to behave appropriately to the circumstances and the matter, i.e. correctly, in a given situation. Knowledge is only one, albeit essential precondition for such ability.

The contrast between school and life stands out most sharply in the struggle for the time allotted to the school. Practical life, as the master of time, likes to regard every moment not consecrated to it as lost. *The general compulsory schooling of adolescents up to the age of 14 is one of the greatest victories won by life over mere practice.* Naturally, there can only ever be a

balance between school and life, since both are in the right. The tension between them only becomes unproductive when the right of the school is unintelligently disputed. Above all where a longer training period is required by the matter itself, there tends to be a certain objection to any time devoted to the school and thus 'withdrawn' from practice. Through the reform of the secondary school, the school period has been reduced to eight years; but this shortening did not affect the structural law and the aim of the secondary school. Life and school have come to an understanding about a necessity. It is quite another matter where questions of pre-education are examined fundamentally and partially from the point of view of 'practice'. *Such fundamentalism must lead to the destruction of the school.* The intricate structure of our working world can be easily destroyed by appealing in the wrong place to the beauties of apprenticeship training. Length and path of education can only ever be understood from the purpose, assuming that, in the overall context of our national existence, higher, more specialized achievements can only be attained via higher, more specialized schools.

The longest and most difficult paths to achievement are those that lead through the universities. In the universities, youth is kept the longest and 'withdrawn' from practice the most, so they experience the most thorough dislike of school. We have produced a large number of universities with various structures. Anyone who has once grasped what a school is and what a shorten in g of the path to achievement a university education signifies has also understood that in times of need one can take all passable paths, but that a fundamental destruction of the factual relationship between path and goal, pre-education and achievement must lead to the most severe damage to the life of the whole.

Team and Achievement (Political Physical Education).

1.

For decades, the 'gymnastics teacher' stood in the shadowy corner of the humanistic schools. Today he is moving into the center. He is, if he understands his existence correctly, a political teacher in a special sense. Until recently, attempts were made to boost the self-confidence of the physical education teacher by relating him to sciences like physiology or psychology. Such borrowings from the sciences are no longer necessary today. The teacher of physical exercises stands on his own two feet. At the moment when he grasps that physical education is political, he no longer needs props and crutches. It must be demanded of him, however, that he is clear about his own existence and his tasks. He cannot be exempt from worldview and political pedagogy, because without them he cannot understand himself. But no matter what other science he may deal with, he remains first and foremost always a teacher of physical exercises and as such has his place, originally and not merely as a fief, in the overall educational system of the German people. And on this his self-confidence is based.

From such a self-confidence a new teacher type must grow. No matter

where this teacher stands, whether within the school or within the Hitler Youth, the SA or the scope of tasks of the National Socialist League for Physical Exercise: he always remains aware that he is not a mere specialist who 'can do' this one thing and nothing else, but that he moves in a space charged with high energies. *The notions of the limited 'gymnastics teacher' and pure 'sports teacher' belong to the past.* They were only possible in a time when the sphere of the political had been so narrowed that nothing was left of it but what belongs to the 'state', according to which the teacher of physical exercises could at best be connected with politics through a state employment contract. Only the restoration of the political sphere in its full purity and its full extent, which has been accomplished by National Socialism, has made the teacher of physical exercises possible as a political teacher, who is something other than a state functionary. Liberalism had disembodied and desouled politics, it had transformed the living human being into a legally recognized 'citizen'. No one has more reason to reflect on what the transition from the citizen principle to the national comrade principle means than the teacher of physical exercises, who owes his new existence to this transition.

The breakthrough from the individualistic statist to the national worldview is taking place not only in the realm of ideas but is a real event in the soul of our people. For the first time in its history, our people as a whole is committing itself to a common worldview. Everyone participates in this event in their own position; but teachers have the duty to also think through their participation in this happening. They must know who they are and what they have to do, they must know the meaning that accrues to physical education in Adolf Hitler's state. To many, the phrase 'political physical education' (which tells us approximately what the word 'gymnastics' said to the ancient Greeks) still sounds strange. It will be the task of German teachers of physical exercises to conquer this word and fill it with life.

2.

The body is a political issue, which is the first conclusion we must draw from the idea of the people. The citizen has a body at his disposal, with which he can do and not do whatever he wants. Since the citizen as such is defined by private property and treats everything according to the scheme of private property, he also regards his body as his private property. The national comrade, on the other hand, knows himself to be connected to the collective body of his people through his own body. To preserve the purity of the national body, to strengthen its health and might, is the primary task of national politics. In this, the state can prevent much through its legislation and supervision, but it cannot provide the vital incentives. *State politics in the old style was exhausted in prescriptions and admonishments, national politics develops drives and instills habits.* The former relied on commands and punishments, the latter builds on custom and upbringing. From the perspective of national thought, an individual's bodily care, exercise and discipline are no longer a matter for a private person concerned about his personal well-being

but fall under the aspect of health and strength of the whole. *The individual is no longer left to decide whether he wants to be healthy or not, whether he wants to make demands on the development of the strength of his body or not.* How high he manages to advance in the training of physical dexterity is no longer left to his subjective discretion. If he wants to participate at all in the national education, then he must adapt himself into the system of demands which the state as the representative of the whole people has established.

Bodily care and exercise, across the now-political body, enter into the great context of national being and the unfolding of national strength. The state with its means and organizations no longer subsequently takes care of the perfection of the body begun by individuals, it no longer just emerges in individual places as a promoter, as was previously the case, but from the beginning it takes the whole into its protection. The National Socialist National League for Physical Exercise is not the successor of the old National Committee for Physical Exercise, but a new creation. Whoever only sees an organizational change here sees nothing. In terms of meaning, the 'National League' is as little a successor to the former organization as the state under Adolf Hitler is a successor in terms of meaning to the Weimar Republic. *They follow one another in time, but what they follow from are different worlds.* The old National Committee may have been a useful umbrella organization for sports clubs and their endeavors, necessary for its time. It was an attempt to organize the sports society within the German borders in order to make certain common undertakings possible for it. It was an association formed for a purpose which, like other such associations, was supported by the state without having a direct political function as such. Such a function was quite impossible for it because, although the liberal state knew citizens engaged in sports who formed the sports society when united in clubs, it did not know the living people which is one body and one soul. But the body of the people has its honor just as the soul does. That the body must be nurtured as much as the mind, this consideration of utility has long since been entertained by liberal thought. Finally stop refuting the philosophy of physical exercise with this banality. National thought shows that we are not speaking of the body as such, nor of the body of the individual as an individual, but of the body of the individual in relation to the collective body of the people. And this body has its honor. No association formed for a purpose is able to preserve this honor, only the state itself can do this, to whose political leadership the honor of the nation as a whole is entrusted. When the German state transformed itself into a national state, the old sports society also disappeared.

The state incorporated sport into itself, the simple and clear relationship denoted by the formula 'sport and state' took the place of the vague and undecided unity of earlier times. In the National League for Physical Exercise, the old sports federations are not merely summarized under a new title but have been assigned a new task. The whole structure expresses the new responsibility that arose from the recognition of the body as a

political reality. The body of the German people forms a unity and has its honor. Raising the physical strength and proficiency of the German people in all its limbs to the height corresponding to this honor belongs among the most important tasks of the German state leadership. Thus sport becomes political.

The sportsman tends to isolate and absolutize the world of sports. There is an inauthentic cult of the trained body, a sports philistinism, which is nothing but a deviation from unpolitical philistinism. Within the old sports society, an effective fight against this philistinism was not possible. Now that sport has stepped into the space of the state, training philistinism is dissolved by the same agent as beer philistinism, whose apparent opposite it was. The recognition of the political character of our body at the same time precludes any absolutization of the body. For the word 'political' refers to the total existence of our people. The honor of the body is part of the total honor of the nation.

The phrase 'the mind is as German as the body!' must be opposed to the sportsman who deems himself superior to any intellectual achievement. The finally recognized unity of the body must not cause the unity of soul and mind to be forgotten. It was once necessary to defend the body against a false spiritualization. But the rejection of intellectualism must not lead to a disparagement of mental work. Does not the old saying already speak of a healthy mind in a healthy body? Let us translate this into our language. Then it applies not to the individual but to the nation, and it means: One body - one mind!

3.

To bring the health, strength and fitness of the body to the pinnacle of perfection is the goal of political physical education. But it is not enough just to keep this purpose in view. Physical education itself is a part of the overall national education system. But all true education is education of character. Political physical education is therefore not only education of the body, but education of the whole human being starting from the body. *Character proves itself only in service to and sacrifice for the community. Education of character and education of community are one and the same.*

We must view political physical education not only from the political nature of the body, but also from the political nature of character. At its center we find the character traits of readiness for action and courage.

No community can exist unless the readiness of its members for commitment is firmly and deeply founded in their hearts. This readiness presupposes not only the strength, but also the courage to use that strength. In this sense, one could say that every community is founded on the courage of its members. There is no community of cowards. Cowardice, lack of commitment ability, dissolves the community. If we call what preserves the community virtue, then the saying applies: *'No virtue without courage'*.

The school of physical exercise is a place of genuine character education above all because it is the elementary school of courage. In this

school one learns not to shun dangers and at all times to really do what one can do by exerting all one's powers. Courage is not one virtue among many, but the mother of all virtues. It is what makes both self-assertion and sacrifice possible. Of course, only the elementary schooling of the will and courage takes place in the sphere of physical exercises.

Nothing surpasses the first steps here; then automation sets in quickly. From a certain point on, most exercises cease to really tax the will. 'The child's first independent step, its first jump into the water were deeds that required a great expenditure of willpower and thus exercised it. The following ones, however, visibly lose this value more and more and are carried out very soon without any effort of will. With that, the mental element disappears from the bodily movements; they become automatic' (Konrad Koch).

This loss of stimulating power for the will with advancing practice must be counteracted. Konrad Koch's formula remains always worth considering: *'Every physical exercise should also be an exercise of courage'*. The most important means, applied from time immemorial, against the devaluation of exercises through automation is the proper sequence according to degree of difficulty. But beyond that, the principle formulated by Konrad Koch must prove itself in the nature and manner of the exercises and in the conception of their essence. For this purpose, above all the subjectivist conception of the past must be overcome, according to which the exercise has the 'purpose' of increasing the individual's ability to move. The exercise is not undertaken immediately to promote the health of the individual or to increase his dexterity. That is only the result, which is not striven for in itself. For what would the immediate pursuit of this success mean for upbringing? The atmosphere of education for courage would be completely destroyed. The practice of 'body culture for hygienic reasons' has shown this abundantly. Immediately, every physical exercise may only arise from the task of making oneself, through one's body and its forces, master of the surrounding space. The conquest of space is the general task at which courage is put to the test. All individual tasks are derived from this comprehensive task.

The 'free exercise', which is not unmotivated but has no object, has rightly fallen more and more out of use. *Either game, or an effort directed towards overcoming a specific object: that is the principle of modern physical exercises. 'Every exercise wants to have its object', says Toni Sandner. And he goes on: 'Does the boy want to learn the jumping movement, perhaps? No, he wants to cross ditch or plank in a courageous jump. Or is he trying to practice the climbing movement? No, he wants to be on top of rock and tree. Or is the boy thinking of what is healthy and useful when he romps about in wintry nature? No, he wants to enjoy all the pleasure that gliding on skis or skates provides, and the joy of the fast, space-traversing glide when he races across ice and snow'.*

It comes down to overcoming something, winning a victory. Jahn also saw and acted correctly in this respect. For what is gymnastic equipment other

than an artificially created 'object of resistance', a purposefully constructed obstacle, intended to practice one's strength in overcoming obstacles? The most general 'object' is space itself and what fills it: earth and water, rock and tree, abyss and height. Modern sports have only just opened up this entire huge realm for us: that is its historical achievement.

It is a refinement of resistance when time takes the place of the sensuous object in space, i.e. when it is a matter of a performance whose evaluation depends decisively on the time used for it. The path leads from space to time, from the simple performance of visible overcoming to the compared, measured performance. It is the path from boy to man, from simple movement to great competition.

Sandner has described very beautifully how the boy still lives entirely in space, how he is still entirely concerned with the concrete conquest of the here and now, with the present victory. Endurance is not yet his affair, the time he has objectively taken does not yet concern him: 'His race is still purely physical measuring with his opponent, not tied to a certain distance, but ending in the start or escape. He is not interested in the time it takes him, as long as he was the first at the post or on the hill'. *At this stage, man measures himself against things, he takes possession of space by conquest and defeats the obstacles that stand in his way. The competition is already there, but hardly separable from the game.*

But then he measures himself systematically with other people, whether directly in combat or indirectly by way of comparison. With the development into youth, an expansion of the horizon sets in. The objective standard comes to the fore, the individual achievement moves into the tremendous context of all achievements once possible. The climax on this path is the consideration: this was once possible to achieve, it must also become my personal best. Courage and willpower receive a new incentive. The opponent is no longer the one who happens to stand opposite me, but the achievement once reached in general. With that, the opponent has become gigantic, and ambition, too, can now take the gigantesque turn. The world of competition opens up, and with it begins the ultimate allure, but also the greatest danger of sports. This danger consists in the fact that sports life degenerates into a comparison of absolute achievements. The only thing that matters is reaching a certain line in a certain time. The supreme goal becomes beating the existing record. The achievement is treated in the manner of a physics experiment, within an apparatus of exactly prescribed, highly artificial conditions: the movement takes place, the deflection is observed, the number is written down.

It is cheap to rail against the craze for records and to 'reject' the record mania. All blame and admonition remains in vain, because these are not arbitrary excesses, but phenomena that are necessarily linked to the nature of physically practiced exercises pursued as sports. The objective standard of achievement cannot be dispensed with without taking away all the seriousness

and harshness from the exercises. One must not trivialize the value expressible in numbers if the whole thing is not to revert to mere play again. *The level of achievement once attained must be maintained and, if possible, surpassed.* Anyone who abolishes this hard principle of sports abolishes sports itself. On the other hand, the downright deadly effects of this principle are evident: *record mania and 'sports business' take the place of healthy, joyful life. It is as if a curse lay over sports.* When the early phase of the first tests of courage and conquests of space has been passed through, when time first emerges dominantly in the form of precise time measurement and exact time comparison (symbol: the stopwatch!), then innocence and joy are gone, the prose of the cinder track is there, and the danger of organized sports becomes acute.

4.

One tends to point to the sports team in defense of athletic activities oriented towards absolute performance and means to refute the accusations of individualism and soulless objectivity, which are not without reason raised against this operation, by pointing to the collaborative work, discipline, and team spirit of the sports teams.

But I have pointed out elsewhere that the pure sports team has an entirely impersonal character and therefore cannot be regarded as a team in the political and educational sense at all. It is formed from the point of view of achievement and sees itself exclusively from this objective point of view. I have called it a 'temporary performance comradeship'.

By team we understand something quite different. Belonging together of the members that does not depend on the technical purpose to be achieved immediately is part of the team. The sports team, on the other hand, is a technical association, and the purer it is in this respect, the better it is for sports. It would be quite erroneous to conceive this association, assembled if necessary for days or hours, as a special kind of team. If the purpose which effected the combination ceases, the 'sports team' disintegrates. The spirit of a real team, on the other hand, would not be destroyed by the disappearance of the immediate goal; it would then prove itself all the more. The team does indeed only become real through a task felt and recognized in common, that distinguishes it from merely personal circles of friends, but by no means is that which welds it into a unity the accomplishment of a specific performance. Here, rather, the achievement appears only as the means of testing who 'belongs' and who does not, as the matter of course that happens almost incidentally. *Not the achievement is the really real, but the life of the team itself. The achievement of the individual naturally receives an entirely new meaning as soon as the individual himself is seen from the team.*

From the perspective of living together and working together, which is not limited to just passing moments, the selection also takes place within the team. The deciding factor is character, the ability to be a comrade. The standard of the team is character, not performance. In the sports team,

ultimately the relationship of the individual to an abstract performance is decisive; in the real team, it is the relationship of the individual to the team itself that is decisive. It is a fiction that character quality in the sense of genuine comradeship and qualification for top performance must necessarily coincide.

Finally, we must remind ourselves of the position of the leader. The leader of a team is neither to be compared to a trainer, nor is it necessary that he exhibit top performance in a particular respect. *Leadership quality is a quality of its own kind, and it can only be understood in relation to the team. It is assumed that the leader must be able to 'do' something, also in the sense of objective performance; but it is not the ability, but rather being a leader that matters. This quality cannot be replaced by any ability, just as little as the living reality of a team can ever be replaced by the best-functioning performance camaraderie.*

Sport, as has been understood so far, knows the team as a technical expedient form, but not as a political form of life. There is no harmony between the performance principle and the team principle as previously assumed. The tension that arises here must not be obscured by equating the temporary sports team with the genuine team, or by acting as if a general will to top performance is sufficient. In the form that each individual must get the best out of themselves, this will is one of the general prerequisites. But such a will, even if it is shared by all, does not yet establish a community. Formed groups of individuals who feel committed to athletic peak performance do not yet constitute those closed teams under a leader, within which alone real character education is possible. Political physical education as character training cannot therefore be based on the purely athletic performance principle. Rather, one must start from a principle that lies outside the purely performance related. We see this principle in the politically oriented team.

With this we have gained the fundamental insight basic to founding a political sports pedagogy. Before clarity and agreement are reached on this, the discussion about fundamental issues must remain fruitless. It is more useful to think through the problem to the sharpest opposition between achievement and team than to reassure oneself prematurely with an apparent solution.

Two tendencies are opposed: Either priority of achievement is absolute, then achievement also provides the principle for organization, and the formation of the team and the educational aspect are secondary. Or priority belongs to the team, then the possibility also exists that the principle of achievement will be decidedly rejected. The team's interest in its own self-assertion can lead practically to an anti-achievement tendency, even if in principle (theoretically) the principle of achievement is recognized.

5.

To justify the principle of abstract achievement and the record and star system connected with it, the following consideration has been made. It is

quite wrong, it is said, to consider the top achievement by itself. Whoever beholds the winner does not see at the same time the host of those with whom he has trained and who have also striven for victory. And yet this host belongs with it. Every great success rests on a broad basis of competing efforts. If one considers this whole, then the top achievement loses its provocative isolation, it fits into a larger context and proves to be meaningful not only in itself but also in relation to this context.

Precisely such a consideration, correct in itself, reveals what matters. It makes visible the question of the principle according to which the whole of physical exercises is structured. It is indeed a matter of the connection of the top achievement with what precedes it. But does this involve a connection of abstract achievements or that of human beings? The consideration from which we started can be understood in the one as well as in the other sense. The principle of structure is completely different in both cases. The principle of the pyramid corresponds to the abstract principle of achievement: achievement upon achievement falls behind at the base until finally only the pyramidal 'top achievement' remains. The units of which this pyramid is composed are achievements. That, in order to attain these achievements, joint practice, practice in teams is also necessary, is willingly conceded. This subsequent recognition, however, means nothing for the structure of the whole. Try to introduce a gradation of team circles into this abstract scheme, it is impossible. One can draw a line of separation somewhere, but one cannot structure it. Any attempt to extract a principle of gradation from the performance pyramid itself is doomed to failure. This principle can only be added inorganically, that is, from the outside. Just as inorganically, political education is added to the pure sports system oriented towards achievement. It is not contained in its starting point.

The structural principle of German physical exercises can only be taken from man, that is, it can only be the team. Thus a completely different picture takes the place of the performance pyramid: a system of closed circles by which the team units are represented. This structural principle is from the outset simultaneously educational and political. In place of the abstract element 'achievement' steps the unit of structure 'team'. *Living structure is the first thing, not the pyramid of achievements.* If one starts from absolute performance, then the team structure is also seen from the performance, and the living, educational team spirit dies away. If, on the other hand, one starts from the team, then one also looks at the top performance from the team's point of view, and that alone is right!

Must the principle of achievement necessarily suffer harm on this occasion? The answer is: No. For the team structure cannot be projected into the performance pyramid, but the performance pyramid can be projected into the team structure. Once the team structure exists, it is possible, by means of a system of demands, to bring the 'will to maximum achievement' in the individual units to the right degree. What is lost through the wrong, anti-

structural approach of the abstract principle of achievement, on the other hand, can never be made up for. There is no objection in principle to be raised against the scheme of the performance pyramid. This scheme will always have to be applied where competitions are concerned. This scheme must be rejected merely as a principle of structure for the reason given: not abstract achievement, but only the living human being can provide the principle of structure.

It is decisive where the individual comes from, from isolated work on his top performance or from the team? One will notice where everyone comes from. The attitude that life in the political team gives the individual is irreplaceable and cannot be obtained in any other way. The lonely athlete standing in no man's land belongs to the past. The future belongs to the team and those whom it releases to top performance from within itself. Isolation and solitude will always be necessary when the utmost is to be achieved through practice and effort. But now this necessary isolation no longer appears as a principle, but as a transitional moment. Previously, isolation was the symbolic expression of the abstractness of the pure principle of achievement. Now it is something that the person who is capable of entering the Olympic circle of achievements from the team takes upon himself.

6.

One cannot characterize the 'Olympic idea', as propagated by those who conceive sport in principle as apolitical, more sharply than by calling it the climax of the abstract idea of achievement. While 'national teams' do indeed appear in the Olympic competitions, while flags wave and anthems sound, for the sports-minded person all this is only an external garment. What matters to him is the body and its performance. Every memory of the broad, structured basis of teams from which the individual competitor and the individual competition team emerge is banished. From the abstract principle of achievement and its individualism there is a straight line to internationalism.

A real team is the symbolic representation of its people, not, like the isolated individual or the mere sports team, only the representative of an achievement. If one sees only achievements, one also sees only representatives, neutral performers of the achievement. Individualism, otherwise rightly distrusted, has suddenly merrily arisen again and basks in the light of the 'Olympic idea'.

But to see an Olympia in this way means completely missing its meaning. There is no absolute place from which one could look at an Olympia. Only from the nations does Olympia become visible. *There is only an Olympia of nations, as formerly there was only an Olympia of Hellenic cities.* It is meaningless to separate the individual achievements (as it were by cross-sections) and unite them into an abstract Olympic pyramid. One must visualize these achievements in their relation to the national units (as it were in longitudinal sections). The athletic life of the individual nations emerges,

perfecting itself and surpassing itself, in the Olympic achievement. But it is not the individual nation that receives its meaning through the Olympic wreath, but every Olympia receives its meaning from the fact that on it the teams of the nations prove themselves. Just as the individual team does not receive the meaning of its existence through the achievement of the individual but carries this meaning within itself, the achievement in its objective and in a certain sense accidental exactitude is only the wreath that the strength and courage of this community winds for itself.

The proud structure of German physical exercises rises in three stories. The lower stories support the upper one, but at the same time each has its perfection in itself. Let us designate the three stories with keywords: Basic training - competition - struggle for Olympic achievement. *From an abstract-athletic point of view, basic training is uninteresting; from the point of view of education it is of the highest importance. For it is here that the elementary schooling of strength and courage takes place, which is of crucial importance for the overall life of the nation.* Only when one no longer succumbs to the fascination of absolute achievement can one become aware of the independent life and the independent right of this lowest and broadest sphere. Goals are set here that everyone can achieve. The popular gymnastics rise slowly into the athletic achievement. Hiking, swimming and cross-country skiing form the poetry of this sphere, so to speak.

On the second level, the struggle for achievement emerges with full force. With it also begins the specialization which makes visible the moment of danger that lies in the principle of achievement. Competition and team reach their prime here. The National Sports Badge indicates the level of achievement that is to be attained at least.

On the third level we find the small group that enters the Olympic competition. The idea of competition reaches its highest peak at the same time as the idea of achievement. It was the purpose of our exposition to bring to clear recognition: that this peak can indeed be rightly seen from the broad basis of popular and team physical exercises, but that it leads to dissolution and empty athleticism if one tries to construct from this peak, schematically according to the principle of performance, the sphere of popular life and political education.

The Concept of Community in Rousseau, Fichte and Pestalozzi.

The more one deals with the practical effectiveness and doctrine of Pestalozzi, the more magnificent appears the breakthrough through individualism accomplished by him. With the blindness of genius, out of his own abundance of soul, the Swiss achieved something similar in his field to what the East Prussian Herder achieved. Just as Herder freed us from the individualistic thinking of the Enlightenment and taught us to feel and recognize culture as a product of peoples, so Pestalozzi taught us to feel and see education not only for but also through the community.

In this sense we can call Pestalozzi the Herder of pedagogy.

Humanism and Enlightenment are rightly called 'pedagogical' currents. Our present interest in school, learning and teaching, instruction and education stems essentially from these intellectual movements. *But that narrowing of the pedagogical problem also comes from them, which makes the stretches of the theory of education one of the most unpleasant and unfruitful chapters of the humanities. By their origin in Humanism and Enlightenment, the theory of education suffers from a false approach.* Erasmus and Vives, Comenius and Ratke are indeed reformers of the school and bold innovators in didactics, but they leave the essential questions untouched. *Pestalozzi, on the other hand, is not a mere reformer of the school, but a revolutionary of education. He frees pedagogy from its overgrowth by didactics and puts it on its own feet. His discovery of community as the basis of all education means the detachment of pedagogical theory from the fetters of individualism and the attainment of the only possible fruitful approach to the science of education.*

To this day, however, it is not Pestalozzi but Rousseau who enjoys the fame of this liberation. In 'Emile' one sees the basic book of modern pedagogical science. Here one believes to find the ideas that have not only had a revolutionary effect on their time but have also determined the approach to the pedagogical problem down to the present day. The education of the individual into a 'human being' through the systematic development of the physical and mental powers slumbering within him up to his integration into human society, this is supposed to have been the program of all education and the key to pedagogical theory since Rousseau. This has been repeated countless times, countless times people have thereby sinned against the genius of Pestalozzi. For it is not Rousseau but Pestalozzi who is the real revolutionary in the history of the science of education. Through Rousseau only one side of the Enlightenment is overcome; precisely at the decisive point the author of 'Emile' remains completely caught up in the Enlightenment. Pestalozzi penetrates to the depths and destroys Enlightenment thinking at its root.

Through Rousseau, education has been freed from the guardianship of the book; the right of childhood and youth has been recognized and affirmed by him; as has the right of the body and manual labor. These may be important discoveries in the field of education. But we are concerned with the principle. Is Rousseau the explorer of the true realm of education, as has been presented to us again and again by liberal historiography, or does his pedagogy merely represent the climax of Enlightenment individualism in its final phase brought about by him?

Rousseau's historical significance is based on the fact that he put an end to the rationalism of the Enlightenment. It is usually assumed that rationalism and individualism are so closely connected that the end of one must also mean the end of the other. This is not the case. *There is a rationalistic and an irrationalistic individualism.* Rousseau does not abandon

Enlightenment's individualistic thinking when he puts feeling in the place of reason. What is achieved by this is merely individualism in a new, more dangerous form. The place of rationalistic individualism is taken by irrationalistic individualism, the strict rule of reason is replaced by the anarchy of a heart that feels only itself and impetuously desires its happiness. Reason still has its standards and forms; the unleashed heart, however, knows only itself and its formless arbitrariness. The 'liberation' through Rousseau does not lead to a new, deeper commitment, but to dissolution. That is why Rousseau was able to become the philosopher of the French Revolution, which did not find the measure in itself, but had to be brought to a halt from the outside by General Bonaparte.

Rousseau's philosophy is without binding principle, so how could his 'Emile' contain the right pedagogical approach? *Irrationalistic individualism takes the place of rationalistic individualism, and the former is even more dangerous than the latter!*

In 'Emile', three different kinds of education are distinguished. The individual is educated by nature or by human beings or by things. The education provided by nature does not depend on us, that provided by things only to a certain extent, and that provided by humans is also only conditionally within our power. The true educator is the connection between nature and things. The pedagogue does not have to educate, but only has to ensure that nothing is done to interfere with the educational work of nature. With the word 'nature' every notion of natural human community must be dismissed. 'Nature' merely means the nexus of forces and events into which humans are placed; the result of education should be that in the end one finds oneself in a right relationship to nature.

Rousseau's 'nature' is a completely impersonal educator; the connection between nature and things, through whose reactions one attains knowledge of one's own strength and weakness, is an inhuman one. The human community is contained in Rousseau's approach in no form whatsoever.

Emile is an orphan; he stands outside all relationships and bonds. The only human relationship in which he is shown from the beginning, that to his educator, remains completely vague, shapeless and cool. This educator stands beside the actual happening, he only supports and explains what happens by itself. Neither the family nor the men's association have any influence on Emile. The other human being only becomes significant for him at the moment when his sexuality awakens. He encounters him in the figure of the beloved.

The detailed description of puberty therefore marks the decisive turning point in the structure of the whole. In principle, however, nothing more is changed by the appearance of Sophie. The education is complete. Emile, who has been formed into a 'human being' without human beings, becomes husband and father and in this way a citizen.

Emile has grown up not only in external solitude and silence, but also in complete inner solitude, as if it were in a socially empty space. If nevertheless he ends up as a citizen in accordance with the demands of Rousseau's main political work ('The Social Contract'), this is, considered purely intellectually, no contradiction, because life in human society remains the goal of education for Rousseau after all. His Emile is educated away from human community, but still for life in community. Herein precisely lies the peculiar paradox of Rousseau's philosophical-educational approach: only outside the community (of today) can one educate for the community (of tomorrow). Education for the true, future community is to be made possible by separation from the corrupt, present community.

The question remains unanswered here whether it is at all possible to educate a human being for the community outside the community life. *How is a human being who has never had the experience of community supposed to grow into the community?* Through marriage the isolated egotist can become a family egotist, but not suddenly a human being in the community. *Without the experience of community from an early age, an education for the community is not possible.* Rousseau's system is the system of consummate egotism. All his appeals to the sympathetic heart cannot disguise the fact that individualism here reaches its peak and refutes itself. The complement to this extreme individualism is an equally extreme collectivism, as we find in Rousseau's concept of the state.

From the same metaphysical assumption that the present is completely corrupt, Fichte draws a completely different pedagogical inference. Although he does segregate the generation to be educated in the spirit of a new era from the older one, he does after all let the children grow up under the guardianship of their teachers in an institutional community.

But Fichte's significance for theoretical pedagogy is not to be sought in the conquest of the concept of community for the science of education. *Fichte approaches the problem of education from the point of view of the ideal task set for the new generation. In this way he finds and shapes the concept of the nation as a historical community of descent which at the same time is a community of pure spirits, whereby what matters to Fichte is to demonstrate the spiritual character of this community, but not to demonstrate the independent significance of a concrete community as such.* And there is no talk of an educational effect of the community. Finally, in Fichte too education is more an education for the spiritual community than an education through the community. Of the two concrete forms of community (family and men's association or clan and entourage [Gefolgschaft]), not one appears in Fichte's system of education. In their place stands the pure rational construction of an educational institution that unites children of both sexes under the supervision of teachers.

Originally and before all education, so Fichte believes, there lies in man that which makes education at all possible. Morality cannot be instilled

into the child if it were not already in him beforehand. But the purest form of this morality is the drive for respect. Not sensual childish and parental love, as Pestalozzi assumes, but *the drive for mutual respect is for Fichte the basis of all moral education.*

Accordingly, man does not develop in life within the community into a complete human being through mutual give and take, but coexistence with others is only the consequence of a morality that is ready-made and as it were preformed within us. The drive for respect has no real development, its content is always the same. It changes appearance, but not essence.

Thus Fichte does assume the relationship between human being and human being as the basis of all moral education, but for that very reason he does not understand man as a being developing morally within the community. As a consequence, the community as the prerequisite for moral development recedes completely into the background in pedagogical theory. Surprising as this may sound to us today, Fichte does not derive the concept of the nation from the concept of community. Fichte knows nothing of the fact that man first grows into a real human being in community. Mutual respect is a great thing, but human relationships within a living community are by no means exhausted by mutual respect. Much more elementary processes than that of mutual respect form the fundamental layer of the life of the community. Because Fichte leaves all these processes unconsidered, he is unable to build up his concept of the nation from the bottom up but has to construct it from the top down.

Pestalozzi in turn does not know Fichte's concept of the nation. *His concept of the people is merely a social one. For Pestalozzi, 'people' quite indefinitely means the 'lower' people who must be helped, not the political people, the closed nation.* Pestalozzi's path to pedagogy does not lead via the philosophy of history and the historical phenomenon of the nation, but via the experience of youth education. And that means for him: via the experience of the living community.

It is the narrow community of the house, the family, parental and filial love that Pestalozzi has exclusively in mind here. His concept of community never detached itself from this narrow starting point. The contemporary nature of this peaceful-idyllic concept of community is easy to recognize, and criticism of it can be given without difficulty in the age of the great nation states. But for pedagogical theory, the decisive thing is not which sub-area of community Pestalozzi started from, but first the fact that he started at all from the real community of the family, that was a real revolution, and second, the way in which he conceived his approach.

In the consciousness of posterity, Pestalozzi lives on as the creator of the method of elementary instruction, that is, as a didactician. A tragic misunderstanding! It was precisely that which lies before all didactics that mattered to Pestalozzi the practitioner as well as the theoretician. He found it difficult to give adequate expression to his greatest and most important idea,

and perhaps only today can we fully understand how simple and correct the approach of Pestalozzian pedagogy is.

It was a very simple insight that Pestalozzi wanted to express. All instruction, however successful it may be, is without value and meaning if it does not take place within the framework of a living community. Training of intellect and will leads to nothing but a thousand empty skills if man does not at the same time unfold morally. But he does so only under the breath of love. 'The error was great and the deception immeasurable', says Pestalozzi, 'in believing that I seek the formation of human nature through one-sided development of the head, that I seek it through the one-sidedness of arithmetic and mathematics; no, I seek it through the many-sidedness of love'. The life of the heart precedes all correct knowledge and skill, and without the development of the powers of the heart, all development of mental abilities is of no avail. Therefore the child can only be morally educated within the circle of domestic life. *The child loves and believes before it thinks and acts, and the influence of domestic life stimulates and raises it to the inner essence of the moral powers which presuppose all human thought and action.*

The point at which Pestalozzi starts is thus that layer of elementary experiences and events which connect the child with mother, father and siblings. The 'love', into which word Pestalozzi summarizes all these experiences, is not about one-time early experiential states, but about something that is permanently essential to humans, about what actually first makes them human. The educator's task is to never detach methodically guided instruction from such situations through which the loving power of the pupil is challenged. Only in a continual exchange of loving giving and taking can the child unfold as a moral being. Nothing would be more disastrous than a didactics which, without this elementary education through love (which we can call emotional), would undertake to educate people. It would result in a mechanical doll, not a living human being. Faith and love is the A and O of natural, and consequently elementary, education towards humanity. *Mental education and artistic education are only subordinate educational means to it and are only able to contribute their share to the harmony of our forces and to their equilibrium among one another in this subordination.*

Pestalozzi is the first pedagogue who understood humans not as isolated, finished individuals, but as those still developing in community. He is the first who considered a real circle of life, a communal reality as the first and most important thing in all education and teaching. He turned to the questions of didactics with true passion and got lost in the strangest trains of thought. He never underestimated the significance of questions of teaching methodology. At the same time, however, he assigned a place for all time to instruction where alone it can unfold its beneficial effect.

Instruction must always be embedded in a living community, this is Pestalozzi's decisive insight, the doctrine he left to the generations of teachers after him. Only if the 'basic forces' that make the coexistence of people in the

family possible are alive and active can intellect and will unfold without harm. Pestalozzi's pedagogy therefore distinguishes the means of unfolding the human basic forces from the means of training and directing towards knowledge and skills.

The means of unfolding the basic forces are always equal to themselves and proceed from eternal laws; the means of training and directing are as diverse as the objects of the world to whose cognition and use our forces are applied. These are subordinate and adapted to the former. This means not only the priority of the irrational over the rational, of the heart over the intellect, but it means the priority of the reality of life over all instruction and over all knowledge and ability of the individual. But the deepest meaning of the priority of life's reality over method is the priority of community over the individual.

This priority is not to be understood as if community and individual were separable from each other and the former had to be valued more highly than the latter. That would be an externally mechanistic notion. *Community and individual belong together and form a whole. Priority of community means (in Pestalozzi's language) priority of love, which means: priority of the forces which establish the immediate life of the community over all abilities and achievements of another kind, even if they constitute the pride of the individual.*

Philosophy.

The philosophical thinking of the West has been most strongly determined by German philosophy in recent centuries. Names like Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel designate high points of the global influence of the German spirit. The precondition for this effect was that German philosophy moved along a line (Kant did so exclusively critically) that had been outlined by the ancient scholastic theory of ideas. *The European propagation of this handed-down doctrine created the prerequisites for the success of German theoretical idealism.*

A single thinker dared to oppose the idealism named after Plato and to design a German (and at the same time pre-Socratic Hellenic) philosophy independent of tradition: Friedrich Nietzsche. It will always remain the fame of this fighter against his time that he had the courage to measure the doctrine of ideas of the past against his own inner self and made the bold decision to put something new in its place. The philosophy of the will to power was never completed, but it will still be alive when the closed systems of the idealist tradition have been forgotten.

The intellectual and political upheaval, of which Nietzsche had a premonition, was indeed brought about in a different way than he imagined by National Socialism. In a struggle of unprecedented violence the parties were annihilated, and the Reich was won. The traditional world of ideas sank along with the parties. The handed-down world of ideas had not been able to save the nation at the decisive moment, it had not freed people's hearts for reality,

but had pushed itself between human beings and reality. Now it met its fate. The new experience of community, born out of the upheavals of the World War, shaped by genius, did not measure its own reality against the doctrine of ideas, but the doctrine of ideas against its reality. *Thus, at the beginning of what will one day be called National Socialist philosophy stands a new experience and a new conception of reality, a new worldview. Our first task is to recognize what distinguishes the worldview of National Socialism from the 'philosophia perennis'.* From this results a standard for judging all subjectively well-intentioned attempts at a National Socialist philosophy. The danger of a restoration of the handed-down doctrine of ideas is still very great. Let us remember that once before a national awakening of our people was brought by a great thinker (Fichte) to the spiritual formulas of the old doctrine of ideas and thus robbed of its revolutionary thrust. If today many would like to see the author of the Addresses to the German Nation as the first National Socialist thinker, that is less harmless than it looks. *What is at stake is nothing less than the self-assertion of the new sense of reality as the source of a future philosophy vis-à-vis all attempts to strike a compromise between National Socialism and theoretical idealism.*

If National Socialist ideology gives the word 'idea' pride of place in its dictionary, it does so in a sense that is completely contrary to tradition. For here the idea is related to the HUMAN BEING who produces, recognizes and realizes it. It is not simply the idea as such (the absolute idea), but the idea for me. In the language of the traditional doctrine of ideas, this means: the idea is relativized by being defined on the basis of an individual and personal 'frame of reference'. The crucial twist now consists in the insight that the concept of relativization only makes sense in relation to an absolute. If there is no reason to assume an absolute, the opposition between absolute and relative also disappears. National Socialist consciousness of reality no longer knows the problems of the old doctrine of ideas, which was obliged by its point of departure to contrast the relative with the absolute, the conditional with the unconditional, the finite with the infinite.

The philosophy corresponding to this consciousness has its problems elsewhere, namely where the question of general communicability arises. The traditional doctrine of ideas includes absolute logic. From the point of departure of National Socialist philosophy arises the problem of a logic which, although arising within the compass of our frame of reference, at the same time transcends it. All the questions raised by the National Socialist worldview are theoretically and practically insoluble in principle from the absolutist and universalistic point of departure of the traditional doctrine of ideas. *This is because in both the dualistic and monistic systems of philosophy the 'idea' always has the HUMAN BEING before it as an individual.* The misconception of personality contained herein has been eliminated by National Socialism through the recognition of the commonality and persistence of racial character. To be sure, man is a personal unity, but this

personality is not an absolute one confronting or encompassed by an absolute idea; rather, as a person we are at the same time non-persons in that we only arrive at ourselves by finding ourselves in a fateful real connection with our ancestors and descendants.

On Theology and Science - For the 1937 Descartes Congress.

Zum Descartes - Kongreß 1937 (Völkischer Beobachter 30. 7. 1937).

The almost unmanageable problematic nature of recent philosophy does not have its cause, as is sometimes assumed, in the particular vanity of individual philosophers who seek to surprise the world with new systems, but in the highly intricate process of the emergence of Western philosophy as such. *Philosophy among the Germanic and Romance peoples has emerged just as little unmediated from the original inclination of these peoples toward cognition as has art and poetry. What a philosophy would have looked like that had sprung unmediated from the at once brooding and daring spirit of the northern tribes without the mediation of Greek conceptual formation, we do not know.*

Western philosophy, which has entered a new stage in recent decades, was determined by an overpowering tradition. The terminology and systematics of this philosophy are dependent on the mighty context of thought reaching from the pre-Socratics to Proclus. However, the torn state and confusion that make philosophical understanding so difficult for us would never have occurred if, yet another influence had not taken place in the development of Western thought. Under the compulsion of general development, the thinking of the European peoples is first directed toward the explication of the dogma of the Church, thus bringing forth a rational system of immense proportions. For the development of philosophy up to the 19th century (and in a certain sense up to the present day) it has been of importance that theology in the West is older than independent science. Although over the course of the centuries people have detached themselves more and more from theological opinions about the world, for philosophy not individual opinions and theories are decisive, but rather the direction in which the primary question moves. Despite tremendous efforts, European thinking did not achieve a completely independent formulation of problems up to the 19th century because from the very beginning it had been distracted by a formally superior theological speculation in certain directions.

The great epoch of Western philosophical thinking begins in the vigorous, promising century that directs the mathematical sciences and the investigation of the physical nature with bold momentum into unexpected paths. From the 17th century onward, philosophy, regardless of its connection with theology, is indissolubly linked with the independent research of modern science. The philosophical systematists of the Baroque era are at the same time the leading mathematicians and physicists of their time. However, they do not succeed in freeing themselves from the power of traditional formulations of questions in metaphysics and in their conception of man.

Theology and natural science stand unharmonized side by side and engage in magnificent battles in the minds of the great thinkers. A strong restlessness and an immense philosophical productivity result from the encounter between the old metaphysical basic ideas and the new basic concepts and methods of investigating nature. The entanglement of problems and complexity of hypotheses reaches its climax.

The systematizer who initiates this epoch is Descartes; it is Hegel who brings it to an end. The theological and scientific elements that struggle with each other in Descartes are synthetically combined with each other by Hegel, as previously by Leibniz; at the same time, the Greek tradition penetrates anew, enriching and complicating, by way of humanistic philology. Descartes is dismissively referred to by the theologians today as an Enlightener. From their point of view they are right to be angry with this bold and yet cautious spirit. If we celebrate him as the father of modern philosophy, we do so because in his person he was the first to present the conflict between theology and science on a grand scale. We are able today to do justice to Descartes because the intellectual situation out of which he created no longer exists; we have gained the distance necessary for a just judgment. There is but a single name that denotes this distance: Friedrich Nietzsche.

Nietzsche is the first European philosopher who no longer derives his problems and solutions from the conflict between theology and science, but advances to independent formulations of problems independently of the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition. His recourse to pre-Socratic philosophy is the precise historical expression of the new situation.

That philosophy should remain allied with natural research is beyond doubt for Nietzsche. But it is just as certain to him that philosophy can never become a merely 'epistemological' appendage of the exact sciences. No one can solve its problems except itself. This recovery of philosophy in its independence from theology and in its sovereign position vis-à-vis the individual sciences is the most important event in recent intellectual history.

It is necessary to understand this event today. As tends to happen in times of crisis when the new is already present but recognized by only a few, the powers that fought with one another in the past awaken once more. The theological metaphysics with its traditional problems reconstitutes itself anew; the exact sciences find advocates who call themselves philosophers and who are willing to renounce any philosophical problematic in favor of a formal language in which everything can be said with the utmost precision that interests no living human being. The tendencies of theological metaphysics and the exact sciences, whose union and conflict constitutes the history of modern philosophy up to Nietzsche, confront each other once more under the catchwords 'metaphysical' and 'anti-metaphysical' philosophy in a final formalization. However, the skirmish already bears the character of that unreality which characterizes events in which the soul of the age is not

present. It is more a ghost battle than a battle of spirits. Let us seek, beyond theological and scientific 'philosophy', the firm ground of a truly philosophical problem!

Genuine problems are posed by life, not by tradition; tradition can only provide guidance and standards for overcoming them. For more than a century, the peoples of the West have been struggling with an experience of which internationally recognized philosophy has not yet taken note. It is the experience of the peoples' own existence, which is referred to by the name nationalism. With this experience the urge for the peoples' historical self, understanding is inextricably linked. When we pose the question of man anew today, we are posing the question of historical reality. *German philosophy in its development from Leibniz to Hegel has approached this problem in bold advances; it was first formulated by Nietzsche, and it is only now being fully understood in our time.*

Descartes had consciously removed the problem of history from himself; a philosophy that makes itself the handmaid of the individual sciences is simply incapable of seeing historical existence at all. Both 'metaphysical' and 'anti-metaphysical' philosophy pass by historical life in this way. Neither lacks formulas, but human thought cannot be separated from human existence. It lives in problems; it turns rigid in formulas. Philosophy today is where the problem of shared historical existence is experienced and thought.

Iphigenia in Tauris.

When the verses strike our ear:

'Come forth into your shadows, stirring treetops...'

then before our mind's eye stands the sublime image of the daughter of Agamemnon, who, erect and proud, in noble simplicity and quiet grandeur, longingly gazes over at the distant native coast. The old legend of the house of Atreus, Greek measure, and modern humanity are, as is usually perceived, thought to have entered into a wonderfully intimate union in Goethe's mind, and Iphigenia stands there as priestess before the altar of the noble ideal of a classicism in which ancient substances are wedded with modern sensitivity. Iphigenia in Tauris is regarded as the drama of humanity, as the most perfect presentation of the idea of humanity that succeeded for Goethe at the beginning of his turn to classicism (Cavaliero, 2013; J. W. v. Goethe & Farrelly, 2000; J. W. v. Goethe, Pascal, & Swales, 2014).

If one investigates this idea of humanity in Iphigenia, it turns out first of all that there can be no talk of a doctrine of humanity. Nowhere does the drama deal with general human duties; it knows only duties of kinship, hospitality, and an obligation to the gods. Only a single passage at the end could stimulate a dogmatic interpretation in the sense of the idea of humanity. When Iphigenia entrusts her and her house's fate into Thoas' hands and says: 'Destroy us, if you may', the king answers (V. 1936ff.):

*'You think the rough Scythian, the barbarian hears
The voice of truth and humanity that Atreus,
The Greek, did not perceive?'*

And Iphigenia answers:

*'Everyone hears it,
Born under every sky, to whom
The spring of life flows purely
And unhindered through the breast'.*

Is it not said here: *We are all human, and each of us hears the voice of truth and humanity? Is not the doctrine of humanity thus proclaimed by Iphigenia herself and the old conception of the drama of humanity confirmed?*

But what does Iphigenia really reply? *Under every sky, she says, there can be human beings in whom 'the spring of life flows purely and unhindered through the breast'.* These are the ones who perceive the voice of truth and humanity. *It remains an open possibility that there are human beings in whom the spring of life does not flow purely and unhindered; Iphigenia does not speak of them.* What she rejects is the limitation of the feeling for truth and humanity to the Greek; what she states is not a general doctrine but an experience: there are human beings in whom the spring of life flows purely and unhindered. She counts herself among them; by addressing the king, she appeals to him to examine himself as to whether he too might belong to them. The process is concrete: eye to eye the Greek woman faces the barbarian; now and here it must prove to which group he belongs. There is nothing in this scene that conflicts with a racial conception. How could the primal phenomenon of a specific racial basic feeling be better described than by the metaphor of the spring, in whose free flow the feeling of existence of the nobly born manifests itself? What Thoas really is shown in the test. Iphigenia does not draw logical conclusions from a humanistic dogma but confronts Thoas with the necessity to decide and thereby reveal himself.

Iphigenia in Tauris, alongside Werther and the first Faust probably the most perfect work that flowed from Goethe's soul, allows us in its main character to experience the human being in whom the spring of life pours purely and unhindered. In the figure of Iphigenia we are not confronted with the noble jointed doll of a humanistic postulate, not with man as he should be, but with a living soul that shows in every moment how a nobly born being feels, thinks and acts. But the magic of classicism is overpowering. Perhaps nothing is more difficult than recognizing that Iphigenia is not an ethical postulate in Greek garb, but a real German human being.

According to traditional interpretation, humanistic content and classicistic form are most closely intertwined precisely in this drama. *Goethe,*

one believes, enters a new epoch of his existence with Iphigenia. This drama is the gate through which he enters the land of serenity, perfection and maturity. Storm and Stress now lie far behind him. Not the urgent heart and its abundance, but beauty, truth and measure are now everything to him.

This conception, it seems to me, does not do full justice to the drama. Iphigenia is the last work of the young Goethe: in terms of content it is neither humanitarian nor classicistic in form. Rather, it is the purest representation of the deepest experience of his youthful period, the experience of his own, unerring feeling, his 'subjectivity,' as it used to be called, his innermost certainty of existence, as it is more aptly termed.

Goethe's term for this innermost certainty of existence is heart. By heart Goethe understands the ultimately only immediately comprehensible final justification of everything we feel, think and do in ourselves, in the unfathomable depth of our soul. 'Heart' apparently does not say much, justification by the unfathomable, explanation by the inexplicable, naming by the unnameable, and yet it says everything, for the recourse to the heart is the recourse to the center of life, from which everything that happens to man receives its meaning. Without soul, without personal responsibility, without conscience, everything that happens in and around man is nothing but meaningless, empty bustle. Iphigenia in Tauris gives shape to the most important experience of the young Goethe: that it is the heart to which man owes everything, that there is only one betrayal for him, betrayal of what the heart tells him to do. Iphigenia in Tauris is the drama of the pure heart, not the conjuration of a marble-cold ideal by classicistic means, but the liveliest, albeit most refined, representation of fresh, immediate experience.

The figure of Iphigenia is anything but the representation of an invariable content. Iphigenia is a ceaselessly agitated soul, an intense subjectivity. At issue in the drama is not the victory of an objective truth, but the victory of truthfulness. The virgin and priestess does not confront us as the administrator of an eternal objective meaning, but as a living being that quivers with joy and pain.

'A wheel of joy and pain rolls through my soul', she says at one point (V. 1184), and even to the king she flares up so that he says (V. 1821): 'From holy lips comes forth a savage song'.

The wonderful composure with which she faces Arkas and Thoas is the pride of the king's daughter and the priestess, not the serene calm of a mind moved only by gentle waves. Iphigenia is the spiritual sister of Werther and Faust. The seemingly so antithetical figure of Tasso does not belong to another world but is only a particular abstraction of that subjectivity which stirs so vividly in all of Goethe's favorite characters.

When Iphigenia acknowledges herself as belonging to the race of Tantalus, that is no empty phrase. Genealogically she really belongs in the

line of those whose 'vigorous marrow' stems from the Titans, for whom every desire turns to fury and whose fury ranges boundlessly about (V. 328 ff). This fateful fury is the subjectivity of those around whose brow the god forged a brazen band, bearers of an immense blind selfishness which is nonetheless a distorted self-certainty. As a foreigner, an outsider, Iphigenia would not be able to absolve her house.

Only the granddaughter of the Titans can help; the deed demanded by necessity can only be accomplished from the power of a tempestuous heart.

Iphigenia stands between two worlds, one of which (Thoas, Arkas) she belongs to as priestess and guest, the other (Orestes, Pylades) she belongs to by blood. Compelled by the necessity of the moment, she is forced to commit an act that does not stem from her own soul. In passing on what the clever Pylades puts into her mouth, she becomes unfaithful to herself, slips into an external and mechanical action; she is now only a means, no longer a person; it is not she who acts; it acts through her. Thereby she violates the root of her being, loses her purity. This purity does not consist in being untouched by mood, feeling and passion, but in the power of self-assertion, in the unshakable faithfulness to the deepest part of her soul.

With horror she feels that she is about to lose herself, then in a mighty upswing of the soul through an 'unheard-of deed' she saves herself (v. 1892 ff). She casts aside the clever, forced word and speaks the truth, although she must believe that this will ruin her brother and her whole house. One should not underestimate this decision. Objectively, viewed from the actual interconnection of events, what she does is madness: she opposes the plan that would lead to salvation, she takes the side of the opponent, and with no other justification than that the purity of her soul demands it. Viewed from the level of actuality, it is illogical, but it corresponds to the logic of her heart. From the unconditional self-assertion speaks the granddaughter of the Titans: it is the same unconditional nature that once brought the curse and now shall bring blessing upon the whole race. Yet nothing changes in the mighty contrast between Atreus and Iphigenia, between blind rage and knowing goodness. One should not overlook the power of decision that lies in Iphigenia, how monstrous it is to stake everything on one's own inner self at this moment.

The unexpected has happened, Iphigenia has placed the self-assertion of her character above any calculation of possible success, the inner self has detached itself from the external rational coherence of things and thereby seems to bring everything into confusion. Iphigenia, who has listened to Pylades' advice, acts contrary to what he wishes based on his causal foresight. But his clever calculation is not confirmed by the course of events. He has underestimated the strength of the Taurians, the opponent is already driving the Greeks back. Orestes' external situation has changed fatefully while Iphigenia detaches herself from Pylades' plan and returns to her original attitude. What had to be considered folly now appears as wisdom. What situation would Orestes be in if his sister, burdened with the lie, now stood

beside him before the victorious king? Iphigenia's self-assertion comes entirely from within herself, without any regard for the interconnection of events, which is precisely why it can now be in harmony with events. That her friends are losing does not disturb the priestess anymore; with gathered strength and whole soul, she brings her confrontation with Thoas to an end. If her courage to be herself had been less, her conscience not so unconditional, she would have been drawn into defeat and perhaps into destruction. The madness of the pure heart reveals itself as the wisdom of things. Scarcely has Iphigenia spoken the words (2005ff):

*Forgive me, brother! but my childlike heart
Has placed our whole fate in its hands.
I have confessed your design
And saved my soul from betrayal.*

when the turn has already happened that takes the reproach from her.

What is brought into the center through the action of the drama, the self-certainty of pure feeling, must clearly reveal itself within the score as the part, the main voice. But it is not so simple to look into Iphigenia's heart. The steady stance of the drama, the loftiness of the overall tone, easily deceives one into thinking that the heroine indulges in humane reflections, rather than striding from one peak of feeling to another. It is nothing but an illusion if one takes the opening monologue for an elegiac piece and imagines hearing the tone of calm composure continuing in the subsequent conversations with Arkas and the king. Whoever has once experienced the incomparable Iphigenia played by Anne Kersten at the Munich State Theater, the classicist veils will already fall from their eyes after the very first verses, when the great artist, following the splendidly struck rhythm of the beginning, immediately allows the passionate soul of Agamemnon's daughter to become palpable at the word 'shuddering feeling'. Here speaks not an unchanging prudence, but a mind open to the mood of the moment, of deepest impressionability, a soul that preserves itself only by giving itself to the world. The opening monologue is not a noble-longing declamation, but a single mighty swelling outburst of the strongest feeling; in the increasingly impassioned address to the goddess, passion streams forth with impetus (v. 35 ff). Several more times (v. 538 ff, 982 ff, 1039 ff, 1094 ff, 1317 ff, 1712 ff) we hear the priestess directly address the gods. This is not temple habit: Iphigenia's prayers are breakthroughs of genuine emotion, improvisations of the heart at the highest points of the widest-spanning waves of feeling.

But the impulsive nature of the heroine also emerges everywhere else (v. 461 f, 844, 867ff, 967ff, 1156ff, 1190ff, 1677 ff, 1956). *Her falling silent* (v. 349, 918) *at the realization of the terrible fate of her house is the silence of a deeply agitated soul deprived of words.*

Pure is the heart that finds itself in harmony with itself. The mind at

one with itself is free. Iphigenia essentially wants nothing but to be free; through the lie she feels bound, estranged from herself. She does not fight for others, she fights for herself; but since what she seeks to attain is true freedom, she also frees the others, and it is revealed that the pure heart stands in a secret covenant with the world.

Characteristically different from these prayers is the formal blessing wish of the priestess to Thoas (v. 220 ff). To believe in this covenant, in a final unity, although the world knows nothing of the heart, the heart nothing of the world (as the action of Iphigenia shows), leads to religion.

One can never admire enough with what power Goethe has brought the belief in the gods of the Hellenes to life in Iphigenia. *The Parzen song could almost be called a highpoint of Hellenic piety. The gods are present everywhere. And yet the action itself and the character around which it revolves are not antique. Iphigenia's conscience is 'modern'.* But what is the meaning of the 'modernity' of this drama? Pylades, as the man of the external interconnection of things, is Iphigenia's true opponent. Not by chance does the decisive point come to clear expression in the conversation between the two (IV, 1). Pylades presents the necessity to Iphigenia. She replies:
Yet my own heart is not satisfied.

When her interlocutor here scents 'hidden pride' (subjectivity), she defends herself with the prime argument of the philosophy of the heart:

I do not inquire, I only feel.

And as the highpoint of this life-affirming philosophy she speaks the words (v. 1652):

The heart enjoys itself only when entirely unstained.

The heart does not receive its purity from the gods, its freedom it owes only to itself. The gods do indeed speak to humans through a 'hint of the finger' (v. 1464); but what one has to do, the human must know from within themselves. Not through miracles and external signs do the gods communicate with humans.

They speak to us only through our heart (v. 494).

Thereby the ultimate is touched upon: the relationship of humans to the gods. No statement of humanism reaches into this sphere. But the stance that Goethe's Iphigenia proclaims also transcends the boundaries of Hellenic religion. It is perhaps the most expressive passage of this drama, when Iphigenia at the depths of her confusion remembers the Olympians and pleads with them for her salvation with the words (v. 1717):

And save your image in my soul!

With what unheard-of boldness the maiden places herself opposite the gods here! *There is a kind of Promethean self-certainty in her demand that the gods should be concerned about their own image in the soul of this human. The gods are not indifferent to prayers and sacrifices, they need humans as these need them.* But from this general reciprocal relationship between gods and humans to the prayer cry: save your image in my soul, is a long way. *One*

could see in Iphigenia's prayer the expression of a new, of a religious humanism. This new humanism would have to be called Protestant in intellectual history, not going back beyond Cicero and Plato, but beyond the faith of Luther. In the concept of faith of the German Reformation lies that inwardness of the relationship between human and God that leads to Iphigenia's piety.

Schiller's Wallenstein.

Until the start of the Thirty Years' War, the German people lived in the peace of the Empire; after 1648, the Empire was no longer a reality. *To the biological and material damages that the terrible war inflicted on the German people must be counted as the last and heaviest the destruction of the idea of the Empire* (Mann, 1976; Mortimer, 2010).

We possess a poetry that still lets us sense the lost spiritual space of the Empire. It is Simplicius Simplicissimus. Its theme is the homeless German, the German without an Empire. Grimmelshausen's creation is irreplaceable for us because it at least still lets us feel the wound that the spiritual downfall of the Empire left in the German people during the Thirty Years' War. A generation later, and even this wound is no longer felt. A generation grows up that seeks its way without knowing anything of the Empire. Emperor and Empire were still present somewhere, but as spiritual powers they had vanished virtually without a trace.

It is the miracle of our history that we recovered at all from this spiritual collapse. A hundred years after the Peace of Westphalia, the ascent to the new classical period begins with Klopstock. To be sure, we sense from our classical poetry that it moves in a space without an empire. Its diversity and richness, but also its problems and the contingency of its creations, are the consequence of that loss. *Entirely left to itself, without being rooted in a political-spiritual community, without guidance by an idea, the solitary poet must seek his material in life and an imponderable past, glancing yearningly at times toward the unattainable Hellenes, whose native saga and history offered the poet everything he needed.*

Neither Goethe nor Kleist, neither Grillparzer nor Hebbel grasped the theme of the Empire. 'Götz' and 'Egmont' can only be called historical poetry in the cultural-historical sense: Kleist wrote the drama of Prussiandom; Hebbel saw only the state, and Grillparzer in his 'Ottokar' even avoided the Empire. His work is merely Habsburg, without relation to the substance of the real Empire.

It is different with the great epic poet of the southeastern space. Stifter's 'Witiko', which nobody knew recently, which few know today, and which will be read in schools tomorrow, is the purest work about the Empire that we possess. The whole contrariety and tension of the German soul lies in the fact that alongside this work of the Southeast stands the so entirely differently constituted work of a Swabian. 'Wallenstein' is Schiller's mightiest achievement. *Of all German poets, Schiller is the only one who succeeded in*

transferring a piece of the Empire's history into the truth of dramatic poetry (Schiller, Kimmich, & Paulin, 2017). And it is certainly one of the most shattering confirmations of the fateful course of our history that even this subject matter came into the hands of our greatest tragedian only by chance, in no way from a conscious connection to the idea of the Empire.

It goes without saying that we must not tear apart a poetic whole and then use the individual pieces as evidence for some opinion or system. Every poetic work is a structure with its own atmosphere, its own life, and its own lawfulness. However, it is aestheticism to understand the intrinsic existence of the poetic work as an absolute existence and to oppose the artistic structure to this world as a world unto itself. It is the material that connects even the consummate structure of the greatest artist with reality and history. The intrinsic lawfulness of the work of art, which finds expression in its form, does not negate the mysterious lawfulness that prevails in the materials. No poet can shut himself off from the pull of necessity that comes with his subject matter; every union with a new material means an undertaking into the unknown for him, because what is truly contained in his subject matter is only unveiled in the course of the work.

The Wallenstein material was the luckiest that Schiller ever seized upon; nevertheless, he did not sense what was actually happening when he 'dramatized' these events so familiar to him.

For many, a classification and consideration of poetic forms still appears more necessary than a classification and consideration of materials, which always seems to have something philistine clinging to it. But it is merely an inheritance of the 19th century when one sees the material only in the region of the 'factual.' There are characters, there are events, perhaps a main action of state, but hovering above this is the universal human, which is what the poet is 'actually' aiming at. It seems self-evident that Max Piccolomini 'embodies' the unconditional moral demand, and Wallenstein embodies power and politics with its realism. The historical material, in truth a piece of the living past of the community, thus dissolves into a mere exemplary occurrence, with 'ideas' hanging like rags on its framework. An undividable reality is replaced by an aggregate split into morality and factuality. What are individual characters, what are historical events? Reality is the Empire! For those who know nothing of the Empire, our history ultimately disintegrates into psychology and misfortunes. But if we look at Schiller's 'Wallenstein', then the Empire stands before our eyes in that fateful moment after Gustavus Adolphus' death. We do not experience examples of morality and immorality, but rather a concrete moment of real communal existence.

The Empire is not one material among others, it is the general material that is contained in some way in any authentic subject matter that a German poet is able to grasp. The unheard-of thing about 'Wallenstein' is that the poet, without knowing it, directly approaches the mighty material, and

does not fail! What did Schiller still know of the greatness of the Empire? Coolly and objectively, as a mere constitutional form, it is mentioned in the 'Prologue':

We see in these days disintegrating

The old firm form, which once a welcome peace

A hundred and fifty years ago

Gave to the realms of Europe.

But even if the historian no longer possessed any knowledge, the poet had to bear witness to the Empire from his soul, if as a German he wanted to do justice to the material seized upon out of interest in a remarkable character. For the poets are the deep memory of their people.

We have only one true historical tragedy, Wallenstein is its hero, its true theme is the Empire. Goethe's 'Faust' is also a poetic work of the Empire, because every great German creation stems from the Empire. But 'Faust' is not a historical drama, no more than 'Götz' or 'Egmont' are fundamentally historical dramas. 'Wallenstein' is a poetic work of the Empire that has the historical Empire as its subject. Schiller proved himself equal to the material he took from history as a creator, and thus produced our only dramatic work that has the depth of the Empire in both subject matter and soul.

The Empire is the unity of 'rule and freedom' (Prologue), over which today (1798 or 1941, it is the same) as in former times struggle takes place. All struggle is about ensuring that the idea of freedom is not powerless, and life is not devoid of ideas and slavish; it is about the right order of existence. It is the most beautiful idea of Schiller the dramatist to first present the Camp before our eyes. This camp means much more than a mere preparation for the figure of the military leader. It is a world unto itself, a world that is admittedly out of joint. The camp shows us the Empire in the condition into which it had fallen through the Thirty Years' War. It is the Empire in disorder. Everywhere signs of disintegration, violence and arbitrariness prevail, pillage and destruction mark the path of degenerated armies. The order of peace has vanished from memory, no one knows anymore for what purpose the war is being waged, existence is without law.

Out of the tumult the fundamental theme of Germanic warriorhood stands out clearly and sharply: honor. It flashes in the speeches of the huntsmen and flows broadly in the cavalry song at the end. The song of freedom and honor that first give meaning to the soldier's life and are therefore above life, does not mean the freedom of the Empire; but it does mean that freedom from which the Empire stems and from which it must constantly renew itself. Thus the camp presents disorder and the creative principle of order together before our eyes. What we see directly is the disintegrating Empire of 1634, but as long as honor does not die, the Empire too cannot die.

The honor of the soldier is inextricably linked to the honor of the leader. The camp before Pilsen is the following of a military leader whose

name is already played about by the legend of invincibility like the truly great leading figures. But where there is a leader, there the Empire is also possible. Warrior's honor and leadership are the center of the Empire, the decay of outward order need not yet mean downfall: from the order-creating deed of leadership, the Empire can be reborn. A sense of such possibilities flashes through Wallenstein's camp. Hie Emperor, hie Military Leader: it is not quite stated so clearly, but it lies in the air. The old authority in the splendor of tradition is confronted by the young authority of deed.

Here is no Emperor anymore. The Prince is Emperor!

With these words of Questenberg's (P. I, 3) the camp is characterized. Legally the Duke of Friedland is only one of the princes of the Empire, in reality he is the master of the situation. The army is on his side, but is it truly in his hand?

The appearance of the Capuchin friar means more than just a burlesque interlude. It is the party of the court that speaks here, and indeed, which is significant, in a popular way. The imperial war counselor Questenberg is not dangerous, the Capuchin is, even if one hardly listens to him now (in the Berlin production the stage empties during his sermon). Still: the Croats take his side:

Stay here, little priest, fear not,

Say your little verse and share it with us.

A deep-reaching contrast opens up, the warrior is confronted by the monk, the salvation of soldierly leadership by organized spiritual power. The Emperor too has his soldiers, even if they are not bound to him by their own strength and their own salvation. The military leader is equated by the Capuchin with Herod and Holofernes, which is nothing less than a curse. The scene is entirely serious, it brings the true opponent onto the stage, the spiritual originator of the disastrous war: the Counter-Reformation priesthood. The zealous Capuchin is only the foreground, in the background one sees Father Lamormain (P. II, 2; 7). Questenberg too knows how to strike the Counter-Reformation tones forcefully.

Without great ado, Schiller has thus placed an opponent alongside the empire founded on military prowess, and with a few strokes has drawn the historical situation in all its gravity. The Viennese court and the Counter-Reformation ('Spanish') system on one side, the bold soldierly leader on the other. The question is whether Albrecht von Wallenstein is also the man to dare the step from mere soldierly leadership of the camp to leadership of the Empire.

Max Piccolomini does not ask this question. In his words before the war council Questenberg (P. I, 4), the mood of the camp finds purified and consummate expression. To the fiery youth, Wallenstein is the ruling soul and the center that is a stay for thousands. The salvation of true leadership resounds in his words:

And what a pleasure it is, how he awakens

*And strengthens and renews all around him...
From each one he draws forth his own strength,
The distinctive one, and draws it forth greatly,
Let's each one remain entirely what he is;
He only watches over that he always be so
In the right place; thus he knows how to make
The ability of all people his own.*

The difference between Max and Wallenstein is not that of two abstract principles, or of morality and immorality, but rather of youth and age. Max Piccolomini does not see the possibilities in the midst of which the military leader stands. He too bears a guilt, the guilt of blindness. Germany is torn into factions; the Emperor, obstinate and himself a faction, sees himself as an advocate of the Church, not of the Empire. In this terrible situation, a prince of the Empire may well have the thought: should it not be possible to wrench the Empire out of these contrasts with one jerk, to make the imperial power independent of Father Lamormain and the alien Spanish system? And would it even be at the price of a temporary alliance with the Swedes! Wallenstein is inwardly neither Lutheran nor Papist. New possibilities for the future are based on this.

The spiritual representative of the party of the court is Octavio Piccolomini. He is a Metternich of the 17th century, a defender of the existing order out of aversion to upheaval. To the son who appeals to the 'living oracle' within the military leader, he objects to the disregard for the 'old, narrow orders', holds up before his eyes the 'measured boundaries of property' (P. I, 4). This Piccolomini cannot be dismissed as a mere intriguer. He is obedience personified toward the existing order, the man of his office (P. V, 1).

*I do not ponder; I do my duty;
The Emperor prescribes my conduct.*

That he works together with the monks is self-evident (P. V, 2). The decisive event is the defection of the regimental commanders from Wallenstein. This defection, aided and accelerated by Octavio Piccolomini's prudence, reveals the entire depth of the gulf that exists between Wallenstein's leadership salvation and the power of the Emperor. On the side of the prince stands a personality and her changeable influence, to which only Terzky and Illo ultimately succumb; on the side of the Emperor stands the entire superiority of legitimacy, the persuasive power of the existing, and the security of tradition. The odds would be uneven, even if the prince unswervingly pursued his path as one called. But against the indicated political background, Wallenstein's character tragedy now first unfolds. To all the objective contrasts is added the contrast within the prince himself. Only under the described preconditions can this character tragedy be meaningfully discussed. If one takes it as the essential and primary thing, regarding the contrasts between which Wallenstein is ground down only as an occasion for

the unfolding of a remarkable personality, then the action, with its historicity, also loses its gravity and weight. What then remains is a character study dressed in the costume of the 17th century. At the end of the great conversation with his father, Max Piccolomini seems to gain an inkling of the real situation. He sees the action and reaction between the individual and his historical world. They will make him guilty too, he senses (P. V, 3). Here the youth is grazed by a breath of the realization of the inevitability of events, of which we, after the masterful exposition of the first two pieces, become witnesses in the last part of the tragedy unfolding with the logic of fate.

In all dramatic literature there is no other monologue that is better justified inwardly and more necessary in its place than that of the hero at the beginning of 'Wallenstein's Death'. The event has slipped from his control. He still believed himself free when he was no longer so. The events take their course without asking him. For a moment he recognizes his situation: he wanted to shake the 'power, sitting securely, calmly enthroned', which has fortified itself on 'the childlike faith of the peoples' (W. T. I, 4). Only now does he see the opponent he has to deal with: habit, tradition, the 'common' (that which is common to all). He wants to shake 'time-hallowed, vested possession'. Too late he recognizes:

This will be no battle of force against force.

He could confront an opponent with whom he fights on equal terms, but against the Emperor he is powerless. Nevertheless, he begins to negotiate with the Swedish colonel, not shrinking from surrendering Eger, with a clear characterization of the situation in the Bohemian region created by the Counter-Reformation. At the same time, he leaves no doubt that he does not want to betray the Empire; he wants to know nothing of surrendering Prague. The veil of delusion has already enwrapped him again: he still believes he can negotiate, that he has the Swede as a partner before him, while in the Swede fate itself already stands opposite him, with which there can be no negotiation. Objectively seen, what now follows is only a playing out. The compelling nature of these scenes lies in the fact that we experience the doom from within, from the one it strikes, who still believes he stands freely opposed to it. Never has the web of freedom and necessity been more transparently portrayed. We experience freedom, but we suffer necessity.

Wallenstein's guilt (if one may speak of guilt) is that he tries to keep fate at a distance through reflection, while he should take it upon himself through action. To be sure, he senses that the threads have been taken from his hands, but he still tries to assert himself in an illusion of freedom. He refuses to recognize that it is no longer a matter of 'having an effect' (W.T. I, 7), but of resolution. When he finally makes it under the influence of Countess Terzky (the sister sees more clearly than he), it is too late. At the very moment when he wants to take up the struggle with utmost determination, the Emperor has already won. Like one doomed to death in the Germanic saga, Wallenstein attains the maturity of the fighter:

*He can no longer trust me, so I too
Can go no more back. Let come then what must.
Fate is always right, for the heart within us*

Is its imperious executor (W.T. I, 7). He identifies with his destiny. Ready to receive the fate that is his fate, he goes into the final struggle. Over Wallenstein's final actions lies the transparent shadow of sublime irony. Once more he has abandoned himself to fortune. He who was just now a victim of reflection is now calmed by the blessing of 'having no choice' (W.T. II, 2). In this mood he stands before Max Piccolomini. The youth does not comprehend that here there is 'no choice' anymore, that it is 'too late'. He speaks of betrayal; he is unable to perceive the serious tone that resounds in the words of the military leader:

*Submit to it. We act as we must;
So let us do what's necessary with dignity,
With steady step...*

Max Piccolomini is the belief in freedom, the belief of youth, which still knows nothing of the bondage of man. By bringing the youth together with the hero once more, the poet sets freedom and necessity in opposition to each other, not as principles, but as living humans. Honor stands against honor. Wallenstein's honor is to assert himself and his will in bondage, Max Piccolomini's honor is to keep faith with the Emperor without breaking faith with his freely chosen leader. The former succumbs to the necessity that he unleashed through his actions, the latter to freedom; the former to the events he set in motion, the latter to the heart that guides him. But in unfathomable depths, freedom and necessity are one. For Wallenstein is free, and Max Piccolomini succumbs to necessity.

The Empire could only become the subject of dramatic poetry by freedom becoming the subject. But the poet could not grasp freedom without also grasping necessity. Thus, the poetry about the Empire becomes poetry about the heart and fate. In his readiness for fate, Wallenstein regains himself: *Night must be where Friedland's stars are shining* (W.T. III, 10).

I feel that I am the man of fate (W.T. III, 15).

Over Wallenstein's farewell lies the mood of perfect detachment. From his words to Gordon and Seni speaks smiling mildness. Grateful towards the fortune that bore him up, in the conviction that now the envy of fate is 'sated', the military leader looks forward to the next day. Once more, unchanged but in a softer key, the theme of fate resounds. Looking at Max Piccolomini's sacrificial death, he says:

*Maybe I would then have paused, maybe.
Or not. Yet why now spare? Too earnestly
It has begun to end in nothing.
Have it then its course!*

Schiller's Wallenstein is not a criminal from ambition, but he is also not a great political leader who has a new idea of German unity. What is he?

A German man amid the contrasts of German history, grasped by possibilities he does not overlook, overwhelmed by the course of events that he does not master, victim of a historical entanglement that at this hour could be resolved by no one. What wonderful irony lies in the fact that Schiller places this man, who wants to act at the wrong time, right in the midst of the astral belief of the Renaissance, to let him seek the right hour in the signs of the heavens!

The character of the Wallenstein poetry as a true tragedy of fate clearly emerges precisely through the contrast to the playing at fate in astrology. In Wallenstein's final readiness for fate, the frivolous astral belief falls away from him. But the gripped spectator, who thanks to the poet is wiser than the tragic hero, recognizes in the downfall of a great man the full weight of the history of his people.

We expect readers to enjoy these texts.

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Chapter 4.

Alfred Baeumler: Bachofen and Nietzsche.

Introduction.

Johann Jakob Bachofen (born 22 December 1815) was an antiquarian, anthropologist, jurist, philologist, and professor of Roman law at the University of Basel from 1841 to 1845. Although he was born in Basel, his family was originally from Germany. His father was a prominent lawyer and politician in Basel. Bachofen studied at the universities of Basel, Berlin, and Göttingen, where he was a student of the famous historian Barthold Georg Niebuhr, who influenced his interest in antiquity. During his studies, he became fluent in several ancient languages, including Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit.




Figure 1a. Johann Jakob Bachofen.



Figure 1b. Bachofen's tomb

In 1841, Bachofen traveled to Italy and Sicily, where he studied archaeological sites and works of art from antiquity. These trips were decisive in his formation as a historian. He resigned his university professorship in 1845 to devote himself to his research independently, living off his personal fortune for the rest of his life. Bachofen specialized in the study of various ancient civilizations, such as Lycia, Crete, Greece, Egypt, India, and Spain, and sought to reconstruct their history from myths, traditions, and symbols. His research focused on the prehistory of humankind and the origin of social and political institutions.

His theories were rejected by his contemporaries as speculative and method-devoid, and certain scholars have argued that his theories lack solid empirical evidence and that his focus on matriarchy as the original form of social organization is simplistic. Specifically, anthropologists like Lewis Henry Morgan dismissed Bachofen's ideas due to lack of evidence. Morgan believed human society developed from primitive to civilized rather than from matriarchal to patriarchal as Bachofen theorized. Historians also took issue with Bachofen's reliance on myth and literature rather than physical artifacts and records. Classicists like Karl Otfried Müller argued that there was no trace of matriarchal society in their studies of ancient civilizations. Additional scholars who rejected Bachofen's theories include: Edward Tylor, anthropologist, believed matriarchy was an erroneous theory, James Frazer, anthropologist, found no solid evidence for Bachofen's matriarchal ideas, Emile Durkheim, sociologist, called Bachofen's work 'conjectural', Max Weber, sociologist, dismissed Bachofen as unscientific, Jane Ellen Harrison, classicist, critiqued Bachofen's 'romantic symbolism', and Jacob Burckhardt, historian, considered Bachofen's ideas unfounded.

Despite these criticisms, her work remains important in the development of gender theory, family history, the study of family structures, and in the discussion of the role of women in society. Only in the 1970s with the rise of feminist scholarship did Bachofen's theories find more positive reassessment.

Bachofen died on 20 November 1867 in Basel. Although he had little recognition during his lifetime, his ideas and theories have been valued and have inspired numerous thinkers and writers, such as Joseph Campbell, Friedrich Engels, Robert Graves, Thomas Mann, and Rainer Maria Rilke. His most famous work, 'The Matriarchy: An Inquiry into the Religious and Legal Character of Matriarchy in the Ancient World' continues to be an important reference in the study of society and culture (Bachofen, 1987; Bachofen & Manheim, 1967; Bachofen & Partenheimer, 2007).

We have made every effort to make a good translation without betraying the substance of the text.

Text of 'Bachofen and Nietzsche' (A. Baeumler, 1929)

Towards the end of 1876, just at the time of his stay in Sorrento, Nietzsche received a letter from his friend Overbeck from Basel, at the end of which we read: 'The Bachofen's, who paid us a visit yesterday, send you many greetings. Bachofen, as he himself often does, invites you to stay away from everything that is outdated.' This passage is one of the few truthful information we have about the personal relationship between Bachofen and Nietzsche. In the first place, we are struck by the unusual fact of a piece of advice addressed to Nietzsche. The considerable age difference between the two (about 29 years, or almost a generation) can be cited as a motivation, which would have been reflected in their relationship. The older one tries to guide and advise the younger one, even through a letter from a colleague. We hardly believe that such a caring and paternal attitude would have been to the

liking of the young Nietzsche, restless and conscious of his worth. Rather, we should assume the opposite: Nietzsche was not at all accustomed to being treated in this way. The hearts of the younger ones were open to him, while the older ones, like his teachers Ritschl and Burckhardt, had great respect for him.

We do not know what Burckhardt was really thinking about himself in the course of his relationship with Nietzsche. There is also a certain difference in age between Burckhardt and Nietzsche, although this difference is less than that between Bachofen and Nietzsche, amounting to 26 years; the age difference between Burckhardt and Nietzsche is, however, less relevant since Burckhardt was celibate. Their attitude towards each other is that of two celibate colleagues, united by common interests and ideas. On the other hand, in his relationship with Bachofen, Nietzsche does not have to deal with an eagle that nests alone and which he accompanies in flight, sometimes even managing to fly higher: on the contrary, in this case the bourgeois home of the Bachofen, spacious, comfortable, and respectable, with the imprints of the will of the householder who behaves like a patriarch, is opened to Nietzsche.

In the Bachofen dwelling, which overlooks Cathedral Square, any guest must submit to a strict law, and if he ever breaks it, he is subject to an equally severe reprimand. It is true that Nietzsche cares about good manners, but he also knows how to see the difference between the social tenor of the secret councilor of Naumburg and the life of the patriciate of Basel, that is, between the social conventions of the higher officials of Central Germany and the rigid tradition of the old bourgeoisie of Basel. Even in the good manners dictated by the best education, Nietzsche was wont to reveal his state of mind, and for this reason he can only perceive around him nothing but commiseration and even ill-concealed astonishment. And in particular, once in front of the grand piano, he no longer notices either conventions or good manners. His lyrical-orgiastic euphoria is unheard of in Bachofen's house, and we should not be surprised if his piano displays are abhorred here.

On the other hand, the discipline of the Bachofen house, however, all the joviality and cordiality of the householder, is absolutely alien to Nietzsche. The Bachofen house is so strange to him that it seems to him almost like a boulder thrown into the path of his life, a boulder that he surrounds in contemptuous silence.

Bachofen's name does not appear either in Nietzsche's edited works or in the published portions of his legacy. On June 18, 1871, Nietzsche borrowed from the University Library of Basel Bachofen's first work on myth, 'Study on the Funerary Symbolism of the Ancients'. Only those who do not know the customs of scholars will infer from this that Nietzsche has actually read Bachofen's volume. We know that, from Nietzsche, Bachofen appreciated 'The Birth of Tragedy'; while we have no Nietzsche judgment of Bachofen. Perhaps, this is evident in those phrases in which Nietzsche relates the sound of a warm contralto voice with the idea that there are women destined to

dominate men: here he recalls his colloquies with Bachofen. We should rather speak of a more general influence of Bachofen on Nietzsche, for in this respect, that is, in the field of the study of antiquity, we find no allusion of Nietzsche to Bachofen.

This silence is all the more singular if we consider that Nietzsche is always looking for those who do not share the 'madness of progress' of his time. Among these, in addition to Schopenhauer, Wagner and Burckhardt, there is also Bachofen. The pessimism of the latter – if it can be said so, since it is not a philosophical conviction, since Bachofen did not study Schopenhauer or the other philosophers of modernity – is born of a personal intuition and of the awareness of an irreparable loss, of an abyss of decadence, from which neither individuals nor people are able to detach themselves by their own strength.

For Bachofen world history is a struggle between two principles, and not an incessant 'progress in the consciousness of freedom', within which each evolutionary stage must be considered in the light of success and vice versa. But at one-point Bachofen is optimistic: his conviction is that Christianity has imposed itself on the world once and for all. On the whole, despite many setbacks, human evolution proceeds gradually from the lowest plane of matriarchy to the highest plane of patriarchy. That is why Bachofen considers the evolutionary present positively, since it is integrated into Christianity, that is, into a patriarchal religion. Under the protective mantle of this religion, Bachofen feels safe. Under the shelter of the Cathedral, he reads its Greek and Roman authors, and observes their votive vases and stelae. For Bachofen, Christianity and classical antiquity constitute two totally separate spheres and, at the same time, redirected to the same impersonal unity, to which both seem to converge in the course of human history.

Just as the Christian and the ancient epochs are distinctly separated on the historical plane, while at the same time partaking of the same historical unity, so Bachofen separates and unifies with great ease, within his work, the Christian, and the ancient elements. There can be no conflict between these two elements: Christianity is ultimately victorious, but antiquity departed with the highest honors and its religious symbols remain imperishable signs of the eternal tension of the human mind.

Nietzsche behaves in a radically opposite way! He, too, shows an exclusive interest in spiritual greatness which is precisely called Christianity and antiquity. But the epistolary passage quoted at the beginning of this essay clearly refers to the crux of this diversity. Bachofen advises the young Nietzsche, 'as he himself is wont to do', to stay away from everything that is outdated. Bachofen looks at Nietzsche very differently from how we see him today. In Nietzsche we distinguish a fighter of his time, while Bachofen shows an aversion to what is 'outdated'. And why? Bachofen, in keeping with his contemplative nature, lives in timelessness. He notices the relevance of Christianity and antiquity, despite having passed away, and he glimpses continuity from the perspective of the symbol. The gaze that lingers serenely

on the Mediterranean coasts transcends the mass of ideas of its time. Bachofen is completely indifferent to the present, to this time. He considers even a single minute spent on modern ideas wasted. Christianity is the only modern element that it takes into consideration. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, it is quite the opposite: he too sees modernity in Christianity and vice versa. *But Christianity is essentially what it does not accept, for it represents the veil of fog that covers the solar landscape of antiquity.* We are no longer allowed to see, look, and enjoy the view. Nietzsche turns incessantly from the present to the past, and from the past back to the present. And since he wants to decide, he continues to ask himself these questions: what attitude should we assume today towards antiquity and Christianity? Who are we? Are we Greeks or Christians? And what should we be? Nietzsche's spiritual development can only be understood in the light of these pressing questions. But we must also avoid the mistake of believing that in Nietzsche there was a 'conflict' between the pagan world and the Christian world.

In Christianity Nietzsche immediately saw the adversary: and not because he himself was a half-Christian or in a room, but because he perceived life in a pagan way, and from this life perceived in a pagan way he felt compelled to strike an attack on modern Christianity. Nietzsche appears to us in his indomitable attitude as a fighter against Christianity, as emerges from the background of 'The Birth of Tragedy' and 'Untimely Considerations. For Nietzsche, the question of antiquity is inseparable from the modern Christian world. In this regard, the unpublished Untimely Movement entitled 'We the Philologists' seems decisive. In this essay, Nietzsche sets out to consider antiquity from the highest perspective, seeking to examine the 'philosophical premises of classical philology'.

Nietzsche asks (and the genius consists precisely in the simplicity with which the question is posed here): how can antiquity be 'classical', that is, constitute a model for a type of culture that declares itself Christian? The answer goes like this: it may be because of the imperfection of modern man, and in particular because of the vileness and mendacity of the man of science. 'Classical culture! If only there were at least that little bit of paganism which Goethe recognized and praised in Winckelmann, and it would never be too much! But now there is all the mendacious modern Christianity in addition to or even mixed with classical culture; this is too much for me and I can barely contain myself from vomiting.' Classical philology 'mixed' with Christianity embitters Nietzsche.

He contrasts the real Greeks and the humanist philologists: 'The Greeks are for the symbolic element and possess a free virility and a pure view of the world; philologists have no attitude towards the symbol, they are servants to the manger of the State, clumsy Christians.'

And how Christian one must be to consider the Greeks among the first monotheists! Here is Nietzsche mocking Welcker, the highest authority in the philological field. 'A real propensity for antiquity makes anti-Christians.'

Nietzsche's contemporaries are blamed for having made classical studies take a harmless turn. It was this turn that transformed him into a mere 'scholar', which deep down he still is. In a neutral study you can put everything together, even paganism and Christianity. But we only want what we feel and think, we live precisely before the need to make a choice.

Nietzsche makes his decision: in 'The Birth of Tragedy' he has maintained a hostile silence on Christianity. The task of 'Untimely Considerations' is to bring an ancient spiritual attitude into dynamic expression. The struggle against the epoch itself, which they inaugurate, is the struggle against that Christianity which has determined this epoch.

To the ideal context of the essay entitled 'We Philologists' belong the same lectures on 'The Future of Our Schools', given by Nietzsche in Basel in the winter of 1872; conferences which, because of their historical significance, I have no qualms about equating Fichte's 'Discourses on the German Nation'. Nietzsche states in the second lecture that the feeling for Hellenism, once awakened, immediately makes itself felt with arrogance. 'Antiquity renders it out of date', we read in 'We Philologists'.

At this point we must complete the interpretation of the epistolary passage quoted at the beginning. Bachofen cannot help but see in the 'unactual' Nietzsche the Antichrist who is hostile to him, while Nietzsche glimpses in Bachofen's exhortation the ignorance of his innermost feeling. With the publication of 'Human, All Too Human', Nietzsche's frequentation of the Bachofen house was interrupted. The contrast that has always existed between the two thus leads to a definitive clarification. The moment Nietzsche explicitly proclaims himself an opponent of Christianity, Bachofen bids him farewell once and for all. No other solution would have been possible, considering its characteristics.

In the contrast between the two, which by chance brought them together in Basel, the problem of modern culture appears as clearly as ever before. Modern culture is founded on both antiquity and Christianity; the ancient and the Christian elements are everywhere intermingled in the modern mind, and in particular precisely in the modern sciences of antiquity. The modern soul can be examined from the classical philologists; referring to the same model, Nietzsche has investigated the irresolution and incompleteness, the ambiguity and 'dialectic' of modern man. It is not by chance that dialectics is spoken of here: in the 'culture' of his time Nietzsche actually combats Hegel's dialectic. The modern philologist as a servant of the state: in him the Hegelian system is realized.

Hegel had shown how antiquity and Christianity can be 'reconciled' in a big way. He was Hölderlin's friend and truly loved antiquity. But he also wanted to be the philosopher of Christianity, the final moment of the Reformation. Impelled by this necessity, Hegel configured his dialectic in this way: the thesis put forward by antiquity, which in Logic corresponds to pure being, to pure affirmation, is followed by the antithesis of Christianity, in Logic by pure

negativity. Thus Hegel sets out to erect the cathedral of his system out of affirmation and negation, of idealized antiquity and secularized Christianity. But what Hegel erects here is only the cathedral of cultural formation; therefore, not an authentic Gothic cathedral, but an example of neo-Gothic, of an artificial Gothic. It is only in the man of culture that antiquity and Christianity are reconciled effortlessly, that is, dialectically.

The whole process takes place, in fact, in the realm of speculation: absolute spirit is 'substance', which is what some of the ancients thought. But it is also a 'subject', in the sense of Christianity. Hegel was proud of his task of unifying the system of substance with that of the subject. The philologist moves within the same dialectic. If, on the one hand, one has been a Christian, on the other, one assumes antiquity by becoming a classic, but of course only as a matter of taste. Thus a weakened Christianity is connected with a benevolent aestheticism. One consoles oneself with the fact of historical fact that antiquity has been 'superseded' by Christianity. Once this is established, you can safely move on to the ancients. In this way, the sciences of antiquity become a historical discipline, while Christianity becomes a historical problem.

Modern historicism is all here: the Hegelian system symbolically foreshadows it. Historicism, 'culture', means this: neither paganism nor Christianity is taken seriously anymore. Historicism becomes the content of 'generalized state instruction' according to the Prussian model, that is, of that state culture which Nietzsche first combated in his Basel lectures.

If we define the historicism of the nineteenth century in the way it did a moment ago, that is, as a neutralization of Christianity through antiquity and vice versa, we see in Bachofen and Nietzsche, reunited in their time, the true bitter enemies of Hegelian cultural optimism. In contrast to the veiled connection between antiquity and Christianity, Bachofen and Nietzsche oppose the separation of the two spheres. Bachofen and Nietzsche, within their respective perspectives, dissolve the Hegelian synthesis: in this respect, they can be approximated to Kierkegaard, whose pseudonymous writings are all destined to the task of sharply redrawing the line of demarcation between paganism and Christianity. And if the friends of antiquity are to recognize how, within modern culture, Christianity has entirely corrupted antiquity, a true Christian, like Kierkegaard, cannot fail to see how, within that same culture, Christianity has in turn been radically distorted by antiquity.

For Bachofen, whose thought is all marked by the unity between the study of ancient symbolism and the Protestant faith, nothing seems more absurd than the division between paganism and Christianity! In Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, on the other hand, the distinction between the two worlds emerges. From his earliest works, Nietzsche considers such a separation an inescapable necessity, a principle dictated by intellectual honesty. For Kierkegaard, the radical elimination of any pagan element from the notion of Christianity constitutes the task assigned by Providence on the basis of the

need of its time. But is it possible to find in Bachofen's thought any element in favor of the split?

Yes, Bachofen does not shy away from such a problem. The distinction is implicit in its peculiar relation to antiquity. Bachofen approached antiquity on the basis of internal and external presuppositions radically opposed to those of Nietzsche. Bachofen envisioned his path not as a philologist, but as a legal historian and archaeologist. In Bachofen, the vision of antiquity developed independently of the idea that modern aesthetics has made of the ancients, nourished only by the deepest experiences of the scholar, by maternal love and by the link with the historical school of law and with the romanticism of Heidelberg.

Bachofen's is a true contemplation, not an ethical-aesthetic conception. He does not confront texts in which the aesthetic perspective culminates but deals with codes and legal documents that immediately introduce him into the life of the ancients. Subsequently, his gaze was fixed on the sepulchral chambers and funerary vessels, then always on real and visible elements. Well, Nietzsche also turned his gaze to the Greeks, but paying more attention to feeling than to reality. With gallant arrogance and without lingering too long on preliminaries, he sketched out a new and daring sentiment of antiquity: Nietzsche had nothing to do with empirical inquiry. The inner vision and the intoxicating aroma of ancient Greece are enough for him.

Bachofen, on the other hand, whose masters already predominate empirical inquiry, feels the need to see with his own eyes the relics of the ancient world. Basically, Nietzsche and Bachofen differ because while the former never felt the need to have before him the ruins of the Hellenic temples, the latter finds peace only after 'having become acquainted with the principal scenes of the ancient world'.

Considered from the perspective of philology, in Bachofen the absence of inhibitions, typical of the amateur, represents only an epiphenomenon. Alongside it intervenes a deeper and more substantial freedom, which I only define and in the opposite direction as the absence of 'humanitarianism'. The latter represents the ultimate and largely abstract effort to reunify paganism and Christianity. The young Nietzsche opposed with all his might the realization of this historical perspective. 'The *human* to which antiquity refers should not be confused with the *Human*' (3[12] in (Friedrich Nietzsche, 2008a)). Or again: 'How is it possible to consider the ancients only in the aspect of humanity!' Such a crisp exclamation is inconceivable in Bachofen, who never attempted to represent the ancients on the model of a classical humanity. He, on the other hand, always saw ancient humanity exclusively under the profile of the man of nature, without ever corrupting that image through the implication of ethical value judgments.

Bachofen thoroughly grasped the 'double aspect' of man, which is both animal and spiritual. Bachofen knows nothing of man 'in himself', an entity of only spirit and person, since he does not start from a false and idealized image of

man, nor does he dialectically surpass the animal; rather, it considers men and women for what they really are. Without being influenced by this moralism tending above all to 'moralize' the natural element, Bachofen's free gaze testifies to how nature penetrates man in depth. In its original meaning, 'nature' is identified with sex. Throughout his work on myth, Bachofen contests the bourgeois moralization of natural forces, the attempt of the benevolent to distort nature.



Figure 2. The Triumph of Bacchus (Nicolas Poussin, 1594-1665).



Figure 3. The Triumph of Apollo (Stefano Tofanelli, 1752-1812).

The nineteenth century knows no force more decidedly anti-bourgeois than the Bachofenian interpretation of the symbol; even the realism of the second half of the century does not succeed in uprooting bourgeois ethics as deeply as Bachofen did.

Let us now return to explain the disintegration of the bourgeois synthesis, which Bachofen's symbolism has effected on the basis of the sexual sphere.

According to the current opinion, in love, and still more in marriage, the natural instinct is raised to a higher degree: in this way the natural instinct becomes ethical, directing itself to the good of the other and contributing to the preservation of the State. The ethicization of natural instinct corresponds to its psychological translation into poetry: in poetry, sexual life is transmuted into a sphere of sublimated experiences. The ethicization of marriage and romantic literature go hand in hand.

Bachofen radically overcomes the ethical and psychological falsification of the sexual sphere thanks to the method by which, far from interpreting reality unilaterally or subjectively, in the light of personal ideas or desires, he puts himself in a position to grasp objective facts and to recognize the real potentialities of natural life in all their force and vigor.

In the sphere of sexual life and marriage, moral norms are not fulfilled, and values are not realized: instead, cosmic powers, divinities, are revealed. This realm certainly does not include individual experiences or 'sensations' that can be traced back to subjective pleasure, but rather profoundly significant universal phenomena that continually return. The sexual relationship possesses within itself an unlimited depth. The changes in world history in the customs of associated life, the law and the State are closely connected with the changes in the relations between men and women. In the light of his analysis of the symbolic meaning of sexual intercourse, Bachofen has narrated the history of humanity in a radically new way. And this was possible for him because he knew how to listen like no other to the secret language of mute symbols, which includes nothing of what men usually say or think. What man thinks is by no means the deepest. The deepest realities are discovered, on the other hand, in what men do not know how to express and in what, without the need for words or thoughts, is protected and celebrated through worship and customary customs. Only those who understand the language of symbols are in a position to interpret the life they live and are transfused into it.

Bachofen turned his gaze to the past with an incomparable force of symbolic introspection. Among the hundreds of symbols he discovered, I would like to refer here only to those that refer to the various possible forms of coexistence between man and woman. In this regard, we are presented with a whole series of symbolic figures. Here we find the moist force that generates uninhibited, carefree fertility of the father: the symbol of the swamp. From the masculine side, the unknown, anonymous, indifferent parent corresponds to him.

Here we find the hetaira that is given to the first one who arrives: the symbol of Aphrodite. To this corresponds the tyrant, the sovereign who takes power from the woman (of essentially oriental origin). Then we find the Maenad, the Dionysian bacchante, the maddened woman who excites the man. It corresponds to the man who makes the woman fall in love, but then corrupts her and leads her to ruin: the symbol of Dionysus. Successively we are faced with the woman who lives within the marriage bond: the symbol of the fertility of the fields, the symbol of Demeter. Its corresponding is the

Apollonian father who transmits his name to his children.

Bachofen shows a particular predilection for portraying the virgin hostile to man, the Amazon. The series closes with the Roman matron, who is subject by right to the male, but who nevertheless retains a high religious dignity. Its correspondent is the *pater familias*, the *dominus* of the woman, of the house, and of the State.

Through the study of ancient symbols and myths, Bachofen has illuminated all these figures and breathed fiery life into them from his own passionate interiority. Of particular suggestion in Bachofen is the vision of the world in which 'virile power' is represented as a 'leaf at the mercy of the wind': the matriarchal world. Bachofen teaches us to turn our gaze towards a dense network of feelings, thoughts, cults and customs, religious and legal systems that all revolve around the power of natural fertility and its corresponding symbol, the woman-mother.

Within the religion of Mother Earth are intertwined birth and death, living and perishing, drunkenness and despair, songs of joy and funeral laments, all intoned in the same mournful horror: a chord that Bachofen never tired of resounding. He defines 'gynecocracy' as this cultural stage that has now disappeared in which female divinities are venerated. Bachofen was the first to bring back to light, from the bosom of Mother Earth of the ancient tradition, this 'epoch of the independent world' together with its 'original rules of life'.

Bachofen also found an ancient symbology for the asexual and immaterial substance, that is, for the spirit. The highest degree of patriarchy is the Apollonian, which is untouched by death or perishing. For Bachofen, the whole history of the cosmos and of man consists of the conflict between the material and feminine force, blindly stretched out to embrace, to procreation, but also destined to the funeral lament, and the paternal principle, immaterial and pure. And in the victory of the Apollonian principle, Bachofen glimpses the deep meaning of history.

He pauses to lovingly portray a moment of the conflict between the maternal, material principle, and the paternal, immaterial one. It is that phase of Greek history in which the tide of Dionysian delirium floods Helena. Dionysus, the male divinity, first induces women to furious madness. 'Caught in her bed, the woman then wanders furiously through the silent mountain peaks, in pursuit of the God, where he makes himself known by the cries he loves to utter on the heights. The maiden finds delight in the still-throbbing flesh of the freshly slaughtered kid, involuntary cruelty has no mercy for a flourishing young life [...]'. This is how Bachofen portrays the woman possessed by Dionysus: in her orgiastic fury, a mixture of religion and sensuality, she at times rises above the man.

In honor of Dionysus there stands not the 'chaste pedestal which befits Phoebus Apollo, the pure solar divinity which knows no change', but the savage dithyrambs, who calls Dionysus *dithyrambogenes*, the author of

sudden changes of mood, ambiguity, and equivocations. Dionysus is the enigmatic divinity of the world in continual becoming, in whose honor fables and riddles are recited; Dionysus is never in relation to order and seriousness always equal to itself, but to mockery, deceit, rapture, fickleness, always inclined to illusion by changing colors, and closely united to dualism, destined to perish along with his own creation and buried at the feet of the Delphic god.

The description of the god Dionysus is the only passage in all of Bachofen's work that refers to Nietzsche: he too has depicted Dionysus as a labyrinthine and enigmatic divinity, playful and cruel, deceitful and a lover of becoming. As for Bachofen, so for Nietzsche Apollo functions as an antithesis to Dionysus. Nietzsche declares that the contrast between Apollonian and Dionysian represents in the Greek soul one of the enigmas to which he has been most attracted when confronted with the Hellenic essence.

He tried to understand why it was precisely Greek Apollinism that emerged from the Dionysian substratum, noting how Apollo imposed himself precisely where Dionysus previously dominated. And so logic makes its appearance, prevailing over the whims of the passions, beauty triumphs over demonic monstrosity, order overcomes chaos, and divine proportion prevails over excess. The Nietzschean antithesis between Apollonian and Dionysian, that is, between 'measure' and 'excess', has nothing to do with the opposition expressed in Bachofen between Dionysian and Apollonian symbols.

In Bachofen, Dionysus and Apollo are contrasted not in terms of 'excess' and 'measure', but as earth and sky, the entities linked to matter and immaterial being. The antithesis between Dionysian and Apollonian in Bachofen coincides with that between 'chthonic' and 'uranic'.

Bachofen's influence and fame lie in the vastness and depth of his vision of myth. The flaws of Bachofen's work manifest themselves wherever it transcends history. Bachofen does not accept a distinction between historical time and mythical time, between historical inquiry and mythological inquiry. With caution and deep reflection, he revokes the boundary between the time of history and the time of myth, already drawn at the time by Schelling, taking the side in favor of the 'continuity of human evolution'. For Bachofen, the beginning and the end, myth and history are one and the same.

Anyone who wants to understand and love Bachofen to the end, without silencing his conscience, must reintroduce the boundaries between myth and history into his work. Such a distinction (which with Schelling I offer to Bachofen's interpretation) allows us to glimpse Bachofen's original intuition in all its grandeur and purity. His work can be read as pure mythology; this circumstance makes it possible to love Bachofen's work without a sacrifice of the intellect, a sacrifice that not all interpreters of Bachofen have been able to avoid.

Bachofen accesses historical time insofar as he understands it on the basis of mythology. Historical man has nothing to offer to the Bachofenian empirical

method. Bachofen does not pretend to identify himself in the psyche of a member of the Hellenic city-state. There is always something impersonal in the symbols subjected to Bachofen's inquiry. In the men who create cults and myths there are universal powers at work. The historical school has defined this universal-impersonal element as the 'spirit of the people'.

The world of the unconscious creation of the people, the world of symbols, remains alien to Nietzsche, who feels at ease on Greek soil, where the individual acts at the impulse of the Genius. By virtue of his instinct, Nietzsche has immediate access not to the mythical Greece of Theseus and Heracles, nor even to the aesthetic-philosophical Greece of Aristotle, but to that Greece still enveloped in the aura of a primal action. He has indeed set foot on the historical terrain, but at that precise point where it is still impregnated with the mythical night, showing the actions of primitive men in all their numinous splendor, and still nourishing themselves with the fertile nectar of myth.

Homer, Aeschylus, Heraclitus, Empedocles: these are the favorites of Nietzsche, who considers that with Socrates the decadence begins. But the significance of this astonishing assessment is not always fully understood. It is the direct consequence of the fact that Nietzsche from the beginning dwelt in heroic and primeval Hellas. It is precisely this heroic Hellas that is already sensibly imbued with history, that Bachofen does not know how to see, while Nietzsche lacks the vision of the religious reality of the symbol. For Nietzsche, myth remains essentially a poetic-theoretical creation. The Nietzschean reference to the mythical 'guild that has given birth to all that is Hellenic', after the Homeric work, nevertheless suffers from indeterminacy. Theogonic narratives are the only mythical element to which he has referred.

And yet Nietzsche conducts the psychological analysis of the Greek 'tragic' with incomparable genius. Nothing similar had yet been said in relation to grecity, nor had it been said: the joy that springs from pain, the interweaving of joy and cruelty, the excess of pain as pleasure, the becoming one with the primal pain and joy of being. These are the images with which Nietzsche has tried to express his youthful experiences. Later he defined his first work in these terms: 'A network of personal experiences that are all precocious and even rough, located in the confines of the communicable'; adding that the scientific problem constitutes his first theoretical interest. Have we not regarded 'The Birth of Tragedy' as a first fruits, with fearful respect offered in sacrifice to a Greek god, a burnt offering in honor of Dionysus? No, it is not this, but it expresses a 'countermovement', that is, a movement contrary to science, morality, Christianity. 'In this problematic book of mine, my instinct, the instinct that affirms life, has turned against morality, discovering at bottom a counter-theory and a counter-valuation of life, in essentially artistic and anti-Christian terms. How to define it then? As a philologist and a man of letters, I baptized him, not without a certain freedom—for who could know the true name of the Antichrist?—, with the name of a Greek god: I called him a

Dionysian.

Dionysus, then, is but an experimental acronym, a name which belongs to indicate something absolutely universal and actual; Dionysus represents Nietzsche's task as Antichrist. Although in 'The Birth of Tragedy' the disciple always speaks of a well-known god, he is not a disciple of the Greek god Dionysus. It is Nietzsche himself who admits it: it is I who invented Dionysus. What a blasphemous statement in Bachofen's ears! For those who cannot create or invent a god: gods exist to be understood by us in a symbolic way.

In recent critical literature on Nietzsche, the Dionysian phenomenon has been placed at the center of Nietzschean intellectual biography. But are Nietzsche's assertions about Dionysian Greekness really contained in the true understanding of its actual meaning and the core of his contribution to the interpretation of antiquity? The psychological side of the solitary ecstasy and its correlation with the Dionysian myth, both contained in 'The Birth of Tragedy', remain one of the most fascinating undertakings ever attempted by a young man. But do the Greeks have anything to do with a phenomenon that, deep down, springs from a modern soul drunk on music? And therefore of a music totally alien to the Greeks? In any respect, Nietzsche reveals himself to be a listener of Tristan trying to sketch the 'Dionysian phenomenon'. The author of 'The Birth of the Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music' is an enthusiastic cultivator of dissonance. It follows that Nietzsche did not intend to make a specific contribution to the understanding of Greek art and religion in his book.

In Nietzsche's terms, the antithesis of Dionysian and Apollonian has a general, and not specifically Greek, stamp, so much so that today it is applied a little everywhere. Nietzsche's first work is a hastily grown book and matured precociously in the tropical sun of Wagnerian genius. One cannot fail to see in the later 'Prologue' the impelling result of necessity and friendship. Now Richard Wagner's friend is going to violate the 'great Greek question' by introducing into it 'elements of modernity', that is, music, and in particular dissonance. It was Nietzsche's youthful and unconditional love of music and its genius that focused Nietzsche's early work precisely on the 'Dionysian phenomenon'.

If we look at the complete material, fragments, and essays, of the Basel Nietzsche, we find a radically different picture of Greekness. Thus we are presented with another Nietzsche. Instead of an exalted Dionysian there appears an indomitable fighter, a virile warrior; instead of the music-intoxicated mystic, the undaunted young man of the *Untimely* appears before our eyes. Dionysus is not spoken of in the 'Untimely Considerations': in them we find no passage that refers to 'The Birth of Tragedy'. And yet, the third of the *Untimely*, 'Schopenhauer as an Educator', is the book of the young Nietzsche. He himself has claimed to have poured into it his own intimate adventures, his becoming, as well as his highest hopes. 'In him every word is

lived, it is deep, intimate [...]' ('Ecce homo'). Now, we wonder if it is possible that in a work which, for example, was entitled 'Nietzsche as an Educator', Dionysus is never mentioned in any respect. This would only be possible on the condition that the 'Dionysian' (in the musical sense) never constituted the most profound and significant thought of the young Nietzsche, and that it was the 'untimely' Nietzsche that had primacy over the 'Dionysian' Nietzsche.

What has truly fallen under Nietzsche's gaze, what has accompanied him all his life exhorting him to action, is not the Greek image of the 'Dionysian', but of the 'heroic'. That which in 'Schopenhauer as Educator' proves to be insurmountable, that is, the heroic existence of the individual, constitutes the most significant nucleus of Nietzsche's original vision of Greekness. 'To live means first and foremost to live dangerously.' This is Nietzsche!

This is not to say that the lyrical-musical Bacchus, the ecstatic enthusiast, is not Nietzsche. But such an ecstatic-lyrical aspect, provocatively propelled to the foreground, is only one element of the whole edifice: the aspect of sensibility, of the 'nervous and cerebral life grown too much' that Nietzsche recognizes even in his own Greeks. They show, no less than Nietzsche himself, also very well the other side: the vehemence and passion of the will. However, as 'The Gaya Science' teaches us, the will is 'the affection of command, the hallmark of self-control and force'. Such affection is no less 'anti-Christian' than Dionysian drunkenness.

This dynamic aspect of Nietzsche's work has proved particularly fruitful for a discovery of the first order, namely the discovery of the agon and its significance for Greek culture. To reveal the state of mind of the victor in the contest, the typical state of mind of a Greek: this is the crucial contribution that Nietzsche has offered us for the understanding of antiquity. Already as a student he had exercised with the theme 'The Homeric Strife'. It seems that his philosophical interest in the Greeks was inflamed precisely in this respect.

The excerpt from Nachlass on 'The Homeric Strife' is among the most instructive that Nietzsche has bequeathed to us. This short essay begins by contesting humanity celebrated as that which separates and distinguishes men from nature. Such a split, Nietzsche asserts, does not exist. 'Natural and human qualities have developed in close connection with each other.' Man is in everything and for all nature, carrying within himself a disturbing 'double' aspect: it is precisely the propensity to cruelty that is in fact the fertile ground from which all humanity develops. That is why the Greeks are distinguished by the cruel and joyful aspect of the annihilation of the adversary, just as the tiger does, a characteristic that can also be seen in Alexander the Great, and which dominates the whole of Greek history and mythology, while we, who confront the Greeks on the basis of the soft image of modern humanity, we are thrown into terror.

In the Greek city-states, there is an ethic radically different from ours. In them, the triumph and rejoicing of the victor are justified. Nothing separates

the Greek world from ours so much as the high regard in which it holds envy. In envy the Greek does not see a stain, but the reflection of a beneficent divinity. 'What an abyss separates the ethical judgment of the Greeks from ours!' The young Nietzsche projects his soul into the Heraclitean vision of a cosmos permeated by eternal conflict and subjected to eternal justice; That is why we can affirm that Nietzsche's inner nature is not expressed in 'The Birth of Tragedy', but in what he has said about Heraclitus. For it was Heraclitus who explained Hesiod's good Eris as the beginning of the world.

'It is the idea of the contest so pleasing to the Greeks and to the Greek state, that, from the gymnasiums and arenas, from the artistic contests, from the clash between the political parties and between the cities, it is transferred to the universe, so that the whole cosmic gear revolves around it.' This metaphysics of the agon is poetized in a powerful mythological image: what we perceive has no existence of its own, so there are no 'things', and the world consists only of victorious instants of one quality over another. Things are but 'the glaring gleam and sparkle of a drawn sword, and the luminous aura of victory in the struggle between opposite qualities.'

Nietzsche sees the warrior, victorious and conquering man come to the fore in Greek history. He has glimpsed in the depths of his own heroic feeling the will to victory and predominance that animates all Greeks: and this also allows him to transform the notion of agony into the hinge of Greek culture. The magic of the Nietzschean image of the agon rests on the fact that the struggle is entirely interpreted from the perspective of victory. No sacrifice is too costly, no pain too intense for victory!

It is here that the relationship between the Dionysian Nietzsche and the agonal Nietzsche comes into play. And perhaps it is precisely because of Wagner's music that today we understand the psychology of ecstasy, contained in *The Birth of Tragedy*, as split from the Greek agonal psychology. That joy in annihilation which is at the heart of the Dionysian phenomenon also plays a part in the state of mind aroused by victory. 'The cruelty of the victor represents the summit of the intoxication of life.' The 'Dionysian' linked to action and victory must be understood in a heroic and not a mythical sense. In Nietzschean terms, an authentic expression of the 'Dionysian' would not be an ephemeral intoxication to live in solitude or between two, nor a mystical fervor in and of itself, all turned to interiority, but the intense cry of joy of the victor still shaken by the spasm of the struggle.

As is well known, it was not Nietzsche, but Jakob Burckhardt, who discovered the profound meaning of the agonal instinct in the Greeks. Burckhardt's 'History of Greek Culture' contains an extensive chapter on the Greek agon. But the difference between the Burckhardtian and the Nietzschean notion of agon is, in this respect, decisive. Burckhardt describes the agonal instinct from the outside, considering it a singular fact, something related to moments of danger and to events of death. These words of his about athletes are extremely significant: 'The fact that the whole of life is

subordinated to a single moment of absolute tension cannot be regarded as a positive example of happiness; In the meantime you either lose any tension or fall prey to deep anxiety about the future.'

To devote one's whole life to a moment of tremendous tension, to tend one's whole existence to the victorious instant: this is precisely what Burckhardt on the one hand rejects with a poorly concealed shudder, while on the other hand Nietzsche accepts as the only thing capable of making life worth living. As far as the agonal instinct is concerned, Nietzsche has nothing to learn from Burckhardt, since he knows it well inwardly, and therefore represents it from within.

To represent the agony from the inside outwards, to justify envy, the good Eris of Hesiod: this is what it means to destroy the bourgeois world. In the realm of the latter, envy always plays a determinant role, though much less appreciated than it is in the non-bourgeois world since the bourgeois value system eradicates this primal instinct along with all other natural impulses. Without allowing himself to be involved by the illusory idea of 'humanity' typical of bourgeois morality, Nietzsche observes the real world, the world of man, with a disenchanted gaze: interwoven not so much of moral 'values', as of struggle and victory. On this point Bachofen and Nietzsche immediately stand side by side: if, thanks to his studies of myth, the former annihilates the system of bourgeois concealment in the sexual sphere, the latter destroys the same system in the sphere of the professions, striking Greek wisdom: 'The potter has sworn against the potter, and the carpenter against the carpenter, the beggar envies the beggar and the singer the singer' ('The Homeric Agony'). Considered in objective terms, in terms of content, Bachofen and Nietzsche always seem to us to be closer to each other, although not in terms of the notion of the Dionysian. What Bachofen has revealed in the context of symbol and myth, the deepest truth evoked by the abyss of the past, Nietzsche has shaped in the historical realm, sustaining the possibility of a truly heroic existence. And if both have been able to become true interpreters of antiquity, it is because they have overcome the smokescreen of modern ideas, re-drinking themselves at the source of the human.

Their contrast must be understood on the basis of this significant coincidence of visions. Diversity concerns first and foremost their conduct of life. In terms of attitude and lifestyle, Bachofen is a nineteenth-century bourgeois. No matter how deeply he has delved into the primeval world of myth, he remains an observer. Bachofen considers antiquity, while Nietzsche wants to revive it. The contrast between Bachofen and Nietzsche thus coincides with that between Burckhardt and Nietzsche. If Burckhardt's words about the agon are those of an expert, uttered nevertheless from the ivory tower of a scholar, what Nietzsche declares about the agon springs from the mouth of a young man determined to fight and win. Bachofen's Christianity can only be understood from the perspective of his meditative and admiring attitude toward antiquity. He was able to serenely scrutinize the glittering symbols of

antiquity, for he knew how to anchor his own interior and exterior existence to the Christian reality. Thanks to this anchor of security - to use an emblematic image of Burckhardt - that new synthesis was made possible, strictly Bachofenian, which reconciles Christianity and antiquity, insofar as it considers Christianity as the consummation of ancient Apollinism by the work of a superior revelation. Such a reconciliation of opposites is valid for the meditator and not for the one who acts: Bachofen is bourgeois insofar as he peacefully harmonizes the contradiction in his person and in his work, while Nietzsche represents the extreme opposition to this bourgeois type, precisely by virtue of the fact that he acts, even if his action is limited to contempt for the bourgeois world and to an irreproachable conduct of life in the clear air of self-imposed solitude.

This contrast, however, between the meditative and the dynamic, does not have the last word. The names of Bachofen and Nietzsche have a truly symbolic force and meaning because this antithesis is restated on a more recondite and decisive plane. For the moment we will limit ourselves to alluding to what this last plane entails. The ultimate contrast between Bachofen and Nietzsche, starting from their comparison, is made clear as far as the symbol is concerned (this is also the basis of the contrast between Bachofen and Burckhardt). As an inquirer, Bachofen is not a scholar or even an aesthete. But he is a particular spectator: in his observation we discover not thoughts or simple images, but symbols. To contemplate symbols, however, a special attitude is required, since even a scholar endowed with the highest aesthetic intuition does not know how to contemplate the symbol. The one who considers the symbol is not a spectator in the usual sense of the term, nor is he a scholar, but rather a 'sage'. Bachofen is therefore a sage, a seer, one who is turning away contemplating. Those who contemplate what is revealed to them no longer know how to act. A depth of vision takes possession of him that makes him inactive. As a specific characteristic of Bachofen, this depth of vision constitutes the most intimate layer of his bourgeois life, and at the same time silences any objection raised against it.

Who is antithetical to the seer, to the sage? The psychologist! The sage stands apart: his gaze flies over his own century and past centuries until he plunges into archaic time. The psychologist, on the other hand, has his eyes turned towards his own time or in proximity to it. Nietzsche was, without a doubt, the sharpest psychologist of the nineteenth century. And his fame derives partly, if not entirely, from his psychological inquiry. If, however, we ask ourselves what is constitutive of psychology, we must answer: stillness and external security, 'securitas'. But he who lives dangerously, who sets himself a great deed, who feels himself acting, forgets all psychology. The psychological audacity of which Nietzsche is so proud was possible only against the background of the bourgeois system, of which he is nevertheless a part as a dissident. Extreme psychologism is the mental attitude that ultimately derives from bourgeois securitas. The tragic aspect of Nietzsche's

life is marked by the fact that his own heroism does not succeed in definitively detaching itself from his century. Symbolic contemplation, wisdom, does not set itself a goal. Nietzsche's powerful restlessness, which impels him to action, is the exact antithesis of Bachofen's contemplative stillness. But from restlessness can only be born a subjective, psychological action, which in turn provokes subjective and psychological effects: in a word, the well-known youthful restlessness. Even today the youth is as little free from the bourgeois century as Nietzsche was. He who contemplates symbols ceases to be a bourgeois: the bourgeois spirit is in fact hostile to symbols.

Thus we have come to the end of the comparison: as a psychologist, Nietzsche reveals himself to be linked to the spirit of his century, to the same spirit which he despised as a man of action, while Bachofen, as a contemplator of symbols, has surpassed the spirit of the nineteenth century, of the same century to which he continued to belong as an empirical observer. Finally, Bachofen and Nietzsche appear to us in this way: on the one hand, the contemplative old man, the sage, and on the other, the ardent young man, thirsting for supreme action: the most beautiful, the most significant and fruitful antithesis that the century of our fathers has offered us.

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Chapter 5.

Alfred Baeumler: Nietzsche as an existential thinker.

Introduction.

The text presented here can only be described as 'magnificent', 'brilliant' and of an intellectual clarity that far surpasses all the post-1945 'interpretations' I have read (and I read many, many). **Perhaps that is the reason why there has been an attempt to keep it in the darkness of oblivion.** Baeumler edited an edition of Nietzsche's writings, which was published by Alfred Kröner from 1930 onwards and is still accessible today in new editions. After 1945, Baeumler's texts were successively replaced by texts written by somebody called Walter Gebhard. A shame. Ideas are confronted with ideas. I highlight this quote from the text: *'What I recount is the history of the next two centuries, describing what is about to happen and what cannot be otherwise: the arrival of nihilism. I can describe this history now because necessity is at work here'*. It is only today that we are approaching the end of these two centuries. Each reader will judge by himself. I also employed Nietzsche's editions in Spanish (Friedrich Nietzsche, 2005, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012b, 2014b, 2018a, 2018c, 2018e).

Text of 'Nietzsche as an existential thinker' (A. Baeumler, 1930).

'These are times of great danger when philosophers appear, just then the wheel always turns faster, philosophers and art replace the disappearing myth'. With foresight, the one who uttered these words added: 'But philosophers precede us with great anticipation, because the attention of contemporaries will only very slowly turn towards them', concluding his thought with this wise sentence: 'A people conscious of their dangers begets the Genius'. One would have had to look at history with extraordinary audacity to utter such words! The one who pronounced them is one of our precursors, a savior of the people abandoned by myth! In Berlin, a generation earlier, Hegel had declared: 'Philosophy is its own time translated into thought; it would be madness to suppose that an individual can transcend his own time and that a philosophy can surpass the world in which it appears'. The cultured German bourgeoisie joyfully welcomed Hegel's idea. For the ears of a bourgeois, what sounds better than the words that tell him that no one can transcend their own time? He is disturbed in his sleep and business if he hears people shouting in the streets: an era of the world is over, the Gods have abandoned their altars, their values no longer have any price, their children refuse obedience! As soon as they notice these voices, the preachers of morals come forward to deny the great event and calm the spirits. Everything is in order, they say, our institutions are good, our values eternal; it is men who make bad use of them. Those responsible turn out to be men, their mentality, and not the institutions. The preachers speak thus because they do not know that the wheel of history does not stop for moral

considerations: *in history only action counts*. When existence, in its entire structure, is shaken to the foundations and an era comes to an end, a correction of mentality is of no use. A bourgeois is one who does not notice such an earthquake and does not see the signs of sunset. Rightly, he fears that the end of 'his' time will bring about the end of internal and external peace. *It is no wonder, then, if the bourgeois proclaims as mad or sick, or at least unilateral for lacking measure, the philosopher who comes with great anticipation, who does not want to become an expression of his own time.*

It is natural, therefore, that two successive generations have understood Nietzsche as scandal or madness. The indomitable adversary of the culture of bourgeois Europe could not be welcomed without it denying itself. Only those who were marginal to society remained to acclaim him, or else they sought to homologate his image of Nietzsche to bourgeois humanist ideals. Today, however, it is no longer permitted to approach the reality of Nietzsche with hatred or indifference, nor even with fanatic enthusiasm. *The moment has arrived: Europe is illuminated by the meridian light of a historical-universal hour. The century has just begun, the 19th had begun three generations earlier with the death of Goethe, the century that must decide itself in relation to Zarathustra.* This decision, whatever it may be, is highly desirable and can no longer be postponed.

And this is the most significant thing we can say about Nietzsche; but certainly no more than what Nietzsche already knew about himself.

There has been talk of a judgment on Zarathustra. But who would dare to judge a fighter? *A hero triumphs or succumbs, he is never judged. It is his own action that judges him.* But then, can the era that he himself foretold judge Zarathustra? Was it not Zarathustra himself who predicted the arrival of the last man? That is, the man who has devised his own happiness under administrative guardianship, the solidary and moralistic citizen, the man of compassion *ex lege*, who is either sick or a nurse, *tertium non datur*, and therefore the employee who keeps this state of the sick and nurses alive in exchange for a fixed remuneration? Indeed, *if we speak of Zarathustra today, we do so not as judges but as accused!* We speak from the place assigned to us by destiny, the same destiny that sent the savior before his own collapse. We speak, then, not in psychological or literary terms, but in historical-existential terms.

Old Europe has burned itself in a war that enveloped the world in flames. The victors are still disputing the spoils, not knowing who the real defeated is: that is, whether it is that civilization in whose 'defense' they set out. If we Germans first perceived the general catastrophe of old Europe, perhaps it is because this feeling constitutes the metaphysical equivalent of our terrible defeat. At bottom: the defeated, the exhausted, sees decadence everywhere. But is the catastrophe of Europe not seen better from the outside, for example from Asia, than from the Christian soil? The peoples of the East see what many of us still today do not know how to see, but which

nonetheless was glimpsed by the one who begins his last work with these words: *'What I recount is the history of the next two centuries, describing what is about to happen and what cannot be otherwise: the arrival of nihilism. I can describe this history now because necessity is at work here'*. *Who still dares to deny that nihilism has arrived, and that Europe has lost confidence in itself?* The conferences and debates are a sign not of an ascending era, but of a declining era. The culture of Western Christian Europe is no longer dynamic. And with what knowledge of the cause is Europe conducting its own destruction! *How much more time will have to pass before the reckless work of liquidation has been completed?* Only then will the serious part of history begin.




Figure 1a. Friedrich Nietzsche.




Figure 1b. Arthur Schopenhauer.

Until now, whenever the subject of Nietzsche was discussed, he was associated with Schopenhauer and Wagner, sometimes even with Hegel and Marx. In any case, the discussion never went beyond the 19th century. From the Catholic side there has been a deeper look: Nietzschean thought has been considered, in effect, the pinnacle of nominalism, tracing a line that goes from Master Eckhart, through Luther and Kant, to Zarathustra. Josef Bernhardt believed he recognized in Nietzsche the 'expiatory sacrifice' of European atheism, the final act of the tragedy that begins with Master Eckhart and reaches its climax in Luther. From the Protestant perspective there is a radically different view; but one thing is true: *Nietzsche is an event of the*

Western world, not an event of the 19th century.

The fate of Christianity is closely linked to the name of Nietzsche, as, moreover, he himself admitted by taking on the name of Antichrist: not by an act of pride, but by the effect of his own shattering impressions. *'I know my fate. My name will be associated with the memory of something terrible, the memory of a crisis never seen before on earth [...]'*.



Figure 2a. Martin Luther.




Figure 2b. Immanuel Kant

Certainly, it is not our business to denigrate the tone of the words of the Antichrist. The time when Christ is farthest away cannot be called Christian. What then should one who, without joining Christ's entourage, refuses to mock God be called? He takes seriously everything that he distinguishes around him, without pretending not to hear the voice that tells him from within: 'You are not a Christian, declare it and break over such an announcement!'.

What is the terrible event of which Nietzsche feels himself the symbol? It is a historical event, for which reason Nietzsche can only be understood if he is related to this precise historical process, just as Luther can be understood on condition that he is related to the historical event of the Protestant Reformation. *The crisis that Nietzsche foretells, describing it in all its details and experiencing it beforehand in all its horror, is the complete*

fragmentation of the European spiritual unity. Nietzsche sees the rift opening up to the very foundations, sees the whole apparently solid structure of the European world tottering, when no one yet, except the Russian Dostoevsky, suspects anything. In Nietzsche nothing is better known than the appellation of good European. But what does Nietzsche mean by 'good European'? With this expression he wants to indicate the lords of the Europe of the future. *Such rulers will appear at the time of the decline of old Europe*. Nietzsche has described this decline with unmatched precision, this description is remarkable not only because it does not shine with due prominence within Nietzsche's complete work. Nietzsche wanted to put in the foreground the positive aspect of his vision, his specific end, taking for granted the fall of old Europe. *Nietzsche's goal is that the overman [Superman, Übermensch], the good European, are only possible on condition that the spiritual unity of old Europe dissolves completely*. Spengler rightly grasped in his reading of Nietzsche the thesis of decline. However, Spengler's interpretation of Nietzsche's work takes him very far from it since Nietzsche's interpretation of the 'decline of the West' is much more historically correct and philosophically profound than Spengler's.

Nietzsche does not 'poetize' history but investigates the historical process with absolute realism. Jakob Burckhardt first saw to what extent all Nietzschean thought gravitates around history. Upon receiving 'The Gay Science', Burckhardt writes: 'I cannot avoid coming back to the same question: what would come out if you taught history?! Basically, you keep imparting to us above all history lessons [...]'.

The Spenglerian thesis of decline is mistaken because it ignores the unity of a Christian Europe. By contrast, Nietzsche's foretelling of decline is based precisely on the profound intuition of the significance of Christianity for European unity. *Once Christianity disappears, Europe too ceases to exist*. Then there will only be two possibilities: either Europe returns, as in the past, to the bosom of the Church, giving rise to a new Middle Ages, or it will have to travel to the end the path of the Reformation. This journey, however, leads to Zarathustra.

He who seriously considers Nietzsche, speaks equally seriously of the past and future of Europe. From Charlemagne to Luther, Europe retains its unity. The Reformation was the last great European crisis. Crisis means division: from the 16th century on, the edifice of the Church, this last Roman building (as Nietzsche calls it), no longer encompasses Europe with its vault. In the North, a fragment of European life became autonomous, thus sanctioning the end of the Middle Ages. A century later, modern, and rationalist science comes on stage, which together with Protestantism is imposed in northern Europe until the First World War. The culture of old Europe is constituted by three fundamental elements: Christianity, Roman humanism, and rationalist science.



Figure 3a. Jakob Burckhardt.



Figure 3b. Oswald Spengler.

Nietzsche's extraordinary boldness is rightly understood on condition that one recognizes how he declares war on these three elements. Europe represents the synthesis between Christian inwardness, Roman culture, and the scientific spirit. Any one of these three elements would have chained even the boldest until the 19th century. The son of the Protestant pastor of Röcken, the student of Pforta, brings together in himself all the premises to become one of the most relevant exponents of the old European synthesis. But at this point an unexpected event intervenes: the young Nietzsche immediately feels alien to the European spiritual unity, although still far from fully realizing it. He moves in the surrounding world with unlimited and almost embarrassing confidence. *And only when everything withdraws from him and a loneliness of unheard-of vastness envelops him, does he realize what is happening to him. Little by little, Nietzsche understands that he is part of that group of the chosen who with their own lives must bear witness to a new state of affairs (to a new hazard).*

Before Nietzsche, only one in Europe had remained equally alone, also a German, an eternal boy figure: Hölderlin. Between Nietzsche and the poet of his childhood predilection we grasp a very significant analogy: both have shared the same strangeness in the face of the modern world: but if Hölderlin expresses it in his Hymns, Nietzsche pours it into his own philosophical work. 'The Will to Power' represents a commentary on Hölderlin's poems. Hölderlin and Nietzsche stand in the center of modern culture, strange and sublime, just as Pindar and Plato were: in both the plunging into the night of modernity symbolizes their estrangement fraught

with fate.

With astonishing confidence, the young Nietzsche approaches the Greeks as his true educators. He aims not so much at a restoration of 'antiquity', as at making the Hellenic world come alive again by evoking the most hidden instincts of the Germanic essence. If one is German, one does not feel generically close to the 'ancients', but one notices a particular kinship with the Greeks. *Hölderlin and Nietzsche are equally far from the late-Roman world imbued with Hellenism, the world to which Europe owes its cultural identity.* Nietzsche only paid homage to Roman authors as models of fine prose style. His spiritual homeland is not the Hellenistic-Roman world, but the anti-Roman and anti-humanistic Iliad of the golden centuries, that is, of those centuries in which all artistic and philosophical manifestations of the coming time are rooted. Before the eyes of Hölderlin and Nietzsche appears the Greek state built on the Gods, with its young men and strong bonds of friendship, with its contests and deeds, with its Pindar and its tragedy. Not even Goethe, Schiller and Winckelmann managed to penetrate the heart of Hellenicity, because otherwise, Nietzsche argues from his early writings, it would have necessarily derived from this a 'lasting amorous alliance' between German and Greek culture. For Germans it is not a matter of 'historically' appropriating ancient Greek culture along with other ancient cultures, but of hoping that from the original affinity a vital form similar to the Hellenic one will sprout for the Germanic essence. That is why the German spirit continually turns to question the Greeks: from them it expects to know once and for all the formula that can free it from the spell. In Nietzsche's enthusiasm for the Greeks there is no trace of historicism, however hidden it may be: for Nietzsche, the question concerns not so much culture as the reintegration of the true Germanic nature.



Figure 4a. Left. Friedrich Hölderlin.



Figure 4b. Richard Wagner's Bust in 'Festspielpark Bayreuth', sculpted by Arno Breker.

The rediscovery in the deepest instinct of pre-Periclean and pre-Socratic primitive Greece, in short Nietzsche's most significant historical discovery, will maintain its fundamental meaning until the end. Everything else necessarily follows from this: the rejection of Christianity along with the repudiation of the Roman-humanist tradition. This is the historical meaning of the notion of the Dionysian; from this perspective, Nietzsche reconsiders the entire question of Western history, as Hölderlin had approached it in his last Hymns. According to Nietzsche, the setback consisted in the fact that the Nordic peoples lagged behind Romanic culture, without discovering the path that leads to the Greeks. In an 1875 note, Nietzsche states that for some time there has been a struggle of the Germans against ancient culture; it has always been precisely the best and deepest part of the Germans that has opposed that culture. Such stubborn opposition is justified as long as it aims to resist Romanized culture, which in turn is the residue of a nobler and deeper culture. Thus, Roman culture turns out to be Greek culture become exterior. It was Christianity that imposed and violently spread Roman exterior and decorative culture among the Germans. Thus was consummated that masterpiece that keeps united the Greek element and the priestly element, that is, Romanized antiquity and Christianity.

Nietzsche's critique of Europe rests on his essential vision of Western unity, which appears everywhere in his early writings. Moving from this background perspective one must then understand the significant fragment 'We Philologists', within which neo-humanism is greeted with honor, since Nietzsche identifies in it a strong anti-theological element.

Nietzsche enters 19th century Europe in this way: he rejects Christianity as the antithesis of the true Germanic essence, while from neo-humanism he accepts the anti-theological tendency, and fights science because it is hostile to myth and denies instinct. Nietzsche stands in opposition to the all-encompassing cultural powers that dominate his time: for him, the Greeks must be everything. He also pays tribute to the contemporary powers that assist him in the struggle: Schopenhauer and Wagner. Nietzsche, who trembles with veneration for someone, chooses them both as untimely exponents of their era, in order to proclaim the supreme hope placed in the imminent rebirth of Hellenic culture on the foundation of the German essence. It was the early mistake, the mistake typical of a young man who sees allies in

the strongest spirits of his century, just when the German bourgeoisie turns to those spirits, glimpsing in them the most exalted expression of its metaphysical need for peace.

Things are different with Hegel's philosophy of history. In it, Nietzsche immediately discovers his adversary. Hegel had effected the Western synthesis, uniting Christianity with Hellenistic-Roman culture within a conceptual system. In the philosophies of Hegel and his followers, placed at the base of classical gymnasium education, Nietzsche sees condensed in formulas that Europe against which he is fighting. When he picks a fight against the Hegelian veteran Strauss and against higher education in the image and likeness of the Prussian cultural State, Nietzsche attacks not so much Hegel and his school as ancient and Christian Europe. Christianity, science, and Roman tradition have celebrated their last wedding in the neo-Gothic and neo-humanist culture cathedral. Modern philology is the fruit of that wedding. Not by chance has the highest reason for his own task turned Nietzsche into a philologist. Modern philology is a humanistic science, then a distinctly European science. Nietzsche directs his attack precisely against that 'humanity' along with its false vision of man and his cultural State. For Nietzsche, the greatest antithesis is constituted by the contrast between philologists and Greeks, between gymnasium education and Hellenic education. The Gymnasium corresponds exactly to the science that underpins it. In Nietzschean terms, the task of this school institution is to present antiquity in such a way that it does not conflict with the Christian religion of the State, and to understand Christianity in a sense that allows classical culture to endure alongside it. One wants to be Christian within certain limits, and at the same time classical, but in moderation. The ideal consists of a Hellenicity sweetened by the catechism, and of a Christianity extended as far as Homer and the philosophers. The idea of ancient Christian Europe finds here its scientific justification as well as its pedagogical systematization. At the moment when he attacks neo-humanist philology and its Gymnasium, Nietzsche conducts an action analogous to the one he will repeat, with more potent weapons, in 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' and 'The Will to Power'. Starting from the fundamental Germanic-Hellenic vision, Nietzsche fights Roman-Christian Europe at its focal point.

Nietzsche and Hölderlin thus dissolve the Western synthesis through the Greeks: the fact, endowed with a symbolic force of very high historical significance, that Kierkegaard (the Danish and Christian polemicist, who feels sent by God to effect a similar dissolution, starting however from the perspective of Christianity) comes between them. Kierkegaard fights the union between Christianity on the one hand, and pagan culture and philosophy on the other, with the same resolution with which Nietzsche wages war on Romanic-Christian Europe. The main adversary too is the same: Hegel and the historical-dialectical cultural philosophy of Kultur. Both see in Hegel's philosophy the absence of the real man. For Kierkegaard, man stands before

God with the consciousness of always having guilt, while for Nietzsche man tends to accomplish that for which he was born. Kierkegaard wants to subject man to the authority of Scripture, while Nietzsche wants to subjugate him to fate. However both converge on a negation: they are convinced, in effect, of the failure of European cultural unity, as well as that 'the human', the foundation of modern culture, is nothing more than a volatilized Christianity, a 'precipitate of Christianity', as Kierkegaard maintains.

Some have tried to understand Nietzsche in light of one of the most relevant phenomena of Nordic Christianity. No more fatal misunderstanding is imaginable. Nietzsche descends from a long chain of Protestant ancestors, has praised the healthy Protestant air of Basel (when a friend wanted to convert to Catholicism), placing the type of Christian above both the artist and the scholar, but nothing authorizes us to doubt that he took paganism, the Greeks and Dionysus very seriously. Keeping Nietzsche's deep-rooted conviction in view, to go on talking about a synthesis between Nordic Christianity and the Mediterranean Sehnsucht for beauty in one who is distinguished precisely by the unity of his will, which must be understood as a total lack of sensitivity both to Christianity and to Hellenicity. There is no atheistic Christianity. 'It was atheism that led me to Schopenhauer', Nietzsche admits to dispel misunderstandings. 'I do not by any means consider atheism a result, much less do I have it as an event: I understand it by instinct'. However absurd it may seem; what relationship does Nietzsche maintain with Christianity? He takes paganism as seriously as Kierkegaard takes Christianity seriously; it would therefore make as much sense to find a secret paganism in Kierkegaard as to glimpse an internalized Christianity in Nietzsche. We must therefore believe him when he affirms: 'From direct experience I know no true religious affliction', since his notes and works in fact demonstrate it to us.

For Nietzsche, the question arises on a different plane: not inwardly, but outwardly. *As a true man of antiquity, he sets himself the task of living what he thinks.* For Nietzsche, the question is to realize his own thoughts. Like the philosophers of antiquity, he is an educator and politician by instinct. Nietzsche went to meet shipwreck because of the impossibility of finding a solution to the problem that arises in this regard.

Whoever wants to get a true picture of Nietzsche must know how to correctly interpret the still faltering first expressions of his genius. *Dionysus is the first word uttered by Nietzsche, but also the last. Behind his hieroglyph one must look not for a Greek god, but for the secret of the one for whom the deep meaning of the world has opened up again.* If the inner experience underlying the name of Dionysus is difficult to access, well-guarded is the book dedicated to him. And what a title!: 'The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music'. And what a chaos of moods and ideas this early book contains! However, not a few consider it Nietzsche's best work. Here

Dionysus has not yet discovered his own language, and yet, despite speaking with a voice not his own but veiled by the words of Schopenhauer and Wagner, he speaks with impetus and precision. At bottom, nothing is more alien to him than aesthetics. But for a large number of reasons, the Wagnerian work of art must remain at the center of everything: thus Dionysus speaks as a metaphysician of tragedy.

Let us overlook for a moment the distinction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, which replicates in aesthetic terms the splitting of the world between 'will' and 'representation'; let us not consider the elaborate interpretation of tragedy, which supremely reveals a modern theatergoer; let us also disregard the notion of the tragic myth; let us likewise set aside the psychological disguise (dream and intoxication), there are many things to overlook in this early and 'more than unripe' book, and yet something unusual and disturbing remains, the long trained ear knows that it is the existential coherence with which the author faces Christianity that ultimately constitutes the charm of the book.

'In my youth', Nietzsche will say later, 'I invented a theory and valuation of life opposed to the Christian ones'. 'How to define it then? As a philologist and man of letters, I baptized it, not without some freedom, for who could know the true name of the Antichrist?, with the name of a Greek god: I called it the Dionysian valuation'. What then is Dionysus? A pseudonym for the Antichrist. Only if one knows how to assess the meaning of this name does one understand Nietzsche.

Dionysus is the original formula of the 'will to power', the 'uncreated will to life that is itself creative'. Dionysus becomes the symbol of the maximum and supreme ascent of life, the moment when above all the squandering of oneself intervenes, not the preservation of oneself. The name Dionysus indicates that synthesis of pleasure and pain that the living being perceives while sacrificing itself by becoming victorious creator and annihilator in the supreme instant of its being-there. Within this vision, Nietzsche later highlighted the heroic element: glimpsing it in the good and rigorous ancient Hellenic will open to everything terrible, evil, enigmatic, annihilating, fatal in being-there, but still inclined to say yes to life even in its supreme and most pressing sorrows.

The youthful Nietzschean work accepts a trait of pain that is alien to its author. In this one notices above all the influence of Schopenhauer. What is original and authentically Nietzschean is not the pessimism of suffering and redemption, but the pessimism of will and action. The latter corresponds to the fundamentally tragic-heroic aspect of the Dionysian vision of man.

The deification of the supreme instants of life through the symbol of Dionysus already sounds pagan and yet is not enough to prevent the anti-Christian tendency of the young Nietzsche from being completely exhausted in itself. And one still says very little when we hear the thesis according to which the author, in his early work, observes a 'cautious and hostile silence

with respect to Christianity'. Nietzsche himself later gave his own version: in the 'perfidious dwarfs' cited at the end of paragraph 24, one must see the priests. A little earlier, in paragraph 23, the Christian myth is bluntly rejected: *'It seems that it is almost impossible to successfully transplant a foreign myth for any length of time without irreparably damaging the tree: it may perhaps be strong and healthy enough still to expel the foreign element through tremendous struggle, but it is generally destined to consume itself sick unto death, weakened in morbid growth'*. In these words outlines the prevailing fundamental historical vision in Nietzsche from the beginning to the end, a vision which will later reappear with the same meaning in 'On the Genealogy of Morals'.

Already from his early work, Nietzsche sees in the priest and in the priestly myth his adversary. In decisive paragraph 9, faced with the 'Semitic myth of original sin', which locates the origin of evil in curiosity, in lying seduction, in lust, in short in a series of eminently feminine affects, the Aryan idea of virile crime represented by the figure of Prometheus is forcefully contrasted. Since he takes guilt and pain upon himself, the Promethean hero does not need the priest, who can only dominate where 'original sin' persists. But if sin can only be annulled through atonement, this, unlike sacrilegious crime, cannot heroically take upon itself all the consequences. Over the worldview of the acting individual looms the idea of Moira, of Fate, of Justice in the Greek sense, which can be summed up as: 'Everything that exists is just and unjust, and equally justified in both cases'.

In 'The Birth of Tragedy' the anti-Socratic tendency comes to the fore. The Dionysian is equivalent to the pessimistic and tragic, to the joy of destruction; the Socratic, on the other hand, corresponds to the theoretical and serene, to the anti-heroic and optimistic. The appearance of Socrates is one of the most significant events in world history. With Socrates, the anti-heroic man and the anti-Dionysian worldview take the lead. Intellect dethrones instinct and primary impulse, while consciousness destroys the certainty of unconscious life. For humanity in the Socratic sense, there are no more heroes, therefore no more tragedy: knowledge and happiness take on maximum value. *Socrates is the gravedigger of ancient heroic Greece: with him, Alexandrian 'serenity' is contrasted with the humanity of Aeschylean tragedy*. The intellectualist ideal is absolutely anti-Dionysian, the development of reflection reveals the conflict experienced by the Dionysian philosopher who becomes a philologist.

The theoretical man and the priestly man are hostile to life: Socratism and Christianity coincide in this mortal enmity. Dionysian philosophy strikes both in the heart. From this perspective, the Roman imperium appears as a phenomenon of 'extreme secularization'; the 'elimination of the Romanic element' is understood as a necessary consequence of the return of the German spirit to itself and to its original Dionysian homeland.

The anti-Socratism of the young Nietzsche emerges from the depths

of the positivity of his nature: he is anti-Socratic by instinct, opposing everything that is mere 'theory'. Nietzsche rejects the contrast between contemplative life and active life, a contrast that seems 'Asiatic' to him: the Greeks of the heroic era are beyond that. For Nietzsche, nothing more intolerable than the idea of eternal rest, of eternal bliss, however noble it may be; nothing is more hateful to him than the idea of a 'sabbath of sabbaths'. The sincerest praise Nietzsche ever gave Luther refers to the fact that he fought contemplative life. Here the heroic-dynamic element of Nietzsche's nature is revealed; this later returns in the notion of the overman, of the philosopher of the future, who is a creator of values and not a mere contemplator: and ultimately it underlies the global vision of 'The Will to Power'.

Nietzsche never saw embodied in a more perfect way the idea he has of the philosopher except in the proud breed of the pre-Socratics: Thales, Anaximander, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles. *Besides being contemplative and theoretical, they are true men of action, solitary and daring, chosen by destiny to replace the dying myth with a new vision of the world.* Philosopher is he who creates the new image of the world that takes the place of that of mythical and popular origin. He takes on the task of guide on the stage of world history, and never comes after events, but always 'projected forward'. His teaching is an educational and political program addressed to reality at once. The earliest Greek philosophy is a philosophy of pure statesmen: therefore, Nietzsche takes the term 'statesman' in its highest sense, that is, in the Greek sense.

Against the mechanized 'cultural State' of his own time, Nietzsche feels the greatest contempt; we, on the other hand, do not even know how to recognize the fracture that occurred with the Persian wars and the disappearance of Greek political philosophers.

Nietzsche was able to imagine the Greek state of the golden age with unequalled illuminating force: the polis founded on myth, wholly imbued, and set in motion by the agonal instinct, by the strongest instinct of the Hellenes: the will to power and victory. It is typical of petty bourgeois philistinism, Nietzsche repeats in 'Twilight of the Idols', to refer to the Socratic schools in order to explain what fundamentally Hellenic is: the philosophers already represent a backlash with respect to the aristocratic taste of the golden age, 'in contrast to the agonal instinct, the polis, the value of the race, the authority of tradition'. If one wants to grasp an aspect of that golden greatness, one must read Pindar and Heraclitus as Nietzsche read them. Within the fragments of the Nachlass on the Greek state, on Homeric agony, on philosophy in the tragic age of the Greeks, that temple in ruins but still gathered in its recognizable majesty, which Nietzsche wanted to erect on the fundamental structure of pre-Socratic Hellenicity, rises up before our eyes. If we roll one after the other the drum columns of the fragments, we reconstruct an image of the building, although it is not the same one. What in 'The Birth of Tragedy' remains unsaid or hidden appears in all its splendor in the image of the heroic

man, the man endowed with a single instinct, the instinct for struggle, triumph, and sacrifice for victory.

In this world the 'good Eris' predominates, not a false 'humanity'. The instinctive life of man, an idea deeply rooted in Nietzsche, cannot be repressed. From the deepest instincts of nature, that is, from the instinct for unsociability and wickedness, springs also what is best and noblest in man. The greatness of the Greeks derives from the fact that they discovered the way to master the strongest instincts of their warrior race, opening the way for them to agony. Nietzsche sees 'the noblest Hellenic principle' in the idea of agony, of contention, which is not limited to celebratory games, but dominates the life of both the Greek city-states and individuals.

The world is a sublime game of mutually combating forces, a 'becoming, a flowing of things, a building and destroying, without any moral implication, in an eternally equal innocence to itself'. Today, upon hearing the word 'game', we immediately go with our minds to the chaotic dance of the atoms. The Greeks, on the other hand, see in it the game of Zeus. Eternal justice reveals itself in conflict. 'Strife is the father of all things', says Heraclitus, Nietzsche's favorite. Within mutual conflict the essence of all things is revealed: the world is a mixture that must be continually stirred.

Without fear of exaggerating, one can affirm that Nietzsche's most recurrent images before public opinion are distorted precisely at the focal point. Nietzsche is always presented, even distorting him, as a fragile and delicate man, an aesthete or sensitive artist, if not even a nervous tyrant with a poet's soul. From the details of his way of life and from not a few of his statements wrong conclusions are drawn; therefore, what is intimate in this strong man, already difficult enough to recognize in itself (in this regard, it should be emphasized how the biography written by his sister contains in many points more accurate references), remains totally unknown. How is it that in Nietzsche's writings one does not grasp the tone of the ruler, of the dictator who speaks with the fullness of power conferred on him by a destiny's predestination? And who, having ears, would not know how to hear the metallic hardness of many expressions, and who, having eyes, would not see a terrible vigor shining through, glimpsing at times, as for example in 'Ecce Homo', a solitary diamond brilliance? Nietzsche is precisely the opposite of an exhausted man of sensibility. *His Renaissance image is always insisted upon, and one does not know how to grasp the more significant and powerful image of primordial Greece.* In the latter lives Nietzsche's soul. Never would an aesthete have been able to imagine a similar image of the polis. Not even a scholar of world history of Jakob Burckhardt's rank would have known, despite all his erudition, how to grasp the meaning of the agonal principle. The disciple of Heraclitus drew from the depths of his heart the image of the young man who resembles him.

According to factual data, Nietzsche is a robust, healthy, gifted, and hardworking young man. He enlists in the army as an artilleryman, wanting to

look more like a soldier than a scholar for the rest of his life. He falls ill in Basel, feeling oppressed by his teaching duties and by his increasingly difficult relationship with Wagner. The illness itself is an enigma and has more to do with his strong will than with any possible constitutional weakness (which, moreover, has not been verified) of his psychosomatic system. Nietzsche's tireless activity during the Basel years is amazing. Deussen, meeting him one night in 1871 in Basel on his return from a meeting, describes him as a 'fiery, elastic young lion, naturally self-conscious'. This snapshot corresponds exactly to the image Nietzsche drew of himself by fitting in with the Greeks.

Before bringing the discourse on the later Nietzsche, one must understand the young Dionysian-agonal one, who struggles against the most exalted figures in history, breaks off his friendship with Wagner and courageously pushes forward his powerful pedagogical-political will. Rohde found in his friend an 'irresistible and impetuous instinct to action'. From the same instinct spring not only Nietzsche's political ties to the 19th century, but also the 'painfully unpacified pathos' of which Rohde speaks. The terrible tension between the man of will and the world around him has made Nietzsche's life tragically solitary. In the end what Wagner was finally able to achieve remains inaccessible to Nietzsche: compromise and fulfillment of himself. And even if he had lived longer, Nietzsche would have hardly been able to achieve a similar balance. Christian Germany and pre-Socratic Greece were too far apart. However, not only the pathos deriving from resistance to the world makes Nietzsche's existence tragic.

Nietzsche carries within himself a splitting that will be fatal to him: a conflict of metaphysical dimensions splits his being in two; and making them agree was the arduous task of man Nietzsche. *To the end, the philosopher and the musician dispute preeminence within him; consequently, the periods of his life are characterized by the degree and manner in which they allow themselves to be determined by music.* The philosopher wants to be the master, imposing himself on the musician, yet he cannot live without music. Nietzsche comes into contact with the world not through sight but through hearing: things speak to him through 'relationships of a musical type'. From a very young age, Nietzsche cannot live without composing and playing the piano, and even in 'Ecce Homo' he confesses how much one has to suffer because of the fate of music, 'like an open wound'.

To understand Nietzsche's inwardness and destiny, one must grasp how the philosopher and musician coexisting within him are irreconcilable contrasts. Nietzsche neglected the law that gave shape to his life only once when he attempted in his youth to reconcile these two contrasting parts during his friendship with Wagner. The result was 'The Birth of Tragedy', in which the philosopher is relegated to the background while the musician dominates the formulation of ideas. This reckless act, for which the friendship was sacrificed, was later atoned for by Nietzsche with the illness that would lead

him to his death. From the nervous collapse that followed this transgression of limits, philosophy and music separate within Nietzsche. Ever after, the opposition between philosopher and musician constitutes the cardinal law of Nietzsche's life.

The antithesis between philosophy and music in Nietzsche does not coincide with the distinction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The notion of the 'Dionysian', as sketched by the early Nietzschean oeuvre in close connection with Wagnerian music, is rather the emblematic formula for that fateful attempt at reconciliation. The Dionysian, as genuinely understood by Nietzsche, is intrinsically tied to the agonistic. What unites them is the joy of triumph, which includes the Dionysian joy of annihilation. The philosophical Nietzsche is the Dionysian-agonistic thinker; the political-pedagogical instinct that in turn proclaims him relates to this with coherent profundity. In 'The Birth of Tragedy', Nietzsche commits a sacrilege by denying the interference of political parties in the affairs of State and by establishing an intimate connection between philosophy and music, between Dionysus and Wagner. As he later confesses, this 'corrupts' the 'magnificent Greek question' by introducing elements of modernity. This intrusion of music into original philosophical reflection is expressed in the improbable notion of the tragic-musical myth: a melodramatic Dionysianism that has dissonance as its stylistic vehicle and Wagnerian musical drama as its *mise-en-scène*. But Dionysus is not the God of dissonance enjoyed in a deliberate, exclusive fashion by the modern listener of Tristan. He is instead a severe God, the supreme emblem of what is terrible and magnificent in lived life. Dionysus is a philosopher, not a musician: he is the philosopher of the will to power.

The late Romantic music that Nietzsche interprets as 'Dionysian music' is characterized by a totalitarian harmonic theory. Harmony is everything for it: it lacks any principle superior to harmony, whether plastic or dynamic. 'Tristan and Isolde', the emblematic work in this sense, is the masterpiece of an all-encompassing harmony of delays and dissolutions, a work that for the first time reveals to Nietzsche the enchanted realm of music, for which Schumann had predisposed him. Nietzsche's musical conception in 'The Birth of Tragedy' feeds on the Tristan experience; the later Nietzsche still speaks of the 'perilous fascination' exerted by Tristan's music, of its 'sweetly suffered infinitude', in a way that reveals a fragment of his soul as remaining attached to it.

The crucial event of his existence coincides with the definitive distancing from this music: it happened in the summer of 1876 in Bayreuth, during the first festival in which Nietzsche participates as a celebrated guest and at the same time as the worthy friend of Wagner. As if thunderstruck, he intuits what has been preparing itself for him for years, finally revealing to him what he sees as morbid within himself. *The pact made with Romantic music becomes for Nietzsche a terrible misunderstanding: not a simple*

deviation of taste, but a fateful event of metaphysical dimensions. But how could an event of this kind happen? For Nietzsche, his friendship with Wagner was certainly decisive, along with his veneration for this 'lawgiver' figure and his 'hegemonic nature'. Yet it was not only friendship with Wagner and veneration of him that led Nietzsche astray: it was also the music he bore within himself. And precisely because the error was deeply rooted in Nietzsche's innermost being, he needed so much time to overcome the crisis. But the spiritual overcoming of the crisis would be accomplished as soon as he discovered a new conception of music, for Nietzsche's life was unthinkable without music.

Nietzsche's definitive break from Bayreuth in the summer of 1876 was the most significant politico-cultural event of the 19th century. It is precisely at this juncture that the Dionysian philosopher discovers himself. In the 'Prologue' that follows 'Human, All Too Human', which contains the most remarkable things Nietzsche said about his spiritual evolution, the most fruitful event of his life is described in terms that clearly express its Dionysian nature. In this regard, Nietzsche alludes to an 'enigmatic, questionable, problematic victory, and yet still a victory'. It was an outsized victory: the triumph over a triumphant figure. 'Bayreuth was the most glorious triumph any artist had ever achieved before'. What a tangle of contradictions! At the very moment he perceives a 'total deformation' of his instinct and stakes his life anew by tearing his heart from the people dearest to him, he grasps the supreme triumph.

Nietzsche then experiences the 'first explosion of strength and will strained toward self-determination and self-affirmation': for the first time he can truly be himself. The instant he distances himself from the music erroneously understood as 'Dionysian', Nietzsche truly becomes Dionysos philosophos.

Well then, the fact that the literary expression of this definitive farewell is the book titled 'Human, All Too Human' is the most paradoxical aspect of an equally paradoxical life. 'Human, All Too Human' is a modest, sober work, even cold. Understanding Nietzsche comes from understanding and interpreting this book, which expresses not a way of being, but Nietzsche's will to be something, and for that very reason is Nietzsche's most energetic expression. 'Human, All Too Human' is not an immediate exposition but the first conspicuous example of an indirect presentation that will distinguish Nietzsche from now until 'Beyond Good and Evil'.

Nietzsche's early books reveal a colorful, changing, seductive and intoxicating tone. Musicality not only penetrates the metaphysics but reveals itself precisely in the form; by virtue of the exposition conducted preferably with shifting, lively images, the language becomes hermetic and metaphorical, allowing the author to glory in mocking logic. The first work that shows us philosopher Nietzsche liberating himself from music deliberately turns toward the opposite extreme: the musical, enthusiastic thinker becomes an intellectual

given to analysis, a cold 'free spirit' who gives his opinion looking down on things from on high, within the strictest logical limits. The intellect, winking at scientism, chooses the most concise, least showy form, the aphorism, to express its truths in the simplest, most rigorous way possible. What leads Nietzsche to the aphorism is a choice, a decision, not a diminution of his forces (although the new form has the additional advantage of suiting someone only active during the respites his suffering affords him). The aphoristic form is consequently not the expression of any sudden love for Romanic culture.

The French school to which Nietzsche deliberately turns reveals an anti-German will: however, this will has ends quite distinct from the mere abandonment of German culturalism for the sake of subtler, more honest distinctions. The appeal to Romanic psychology and stylistic tradition functions only as an instrument toward a higher, forward-looking goal. 'Human, All Too Human' everywhere shows itself to be the result of rigorous inner discipline. One perceives in it a deliberate modulation of tones, a certain modesty toward feelings and images, a beloved monochrome background. The attenuation of any bright polychromy of life is the expression not so much of the years of harshest depression as rather of Nietzsche's sovereign will (Jakob Burckhardt would have described 'Human, All Too Human' as a 'sovereign' book). Will, not feeling, can dominate the intellect.

Consequently, in this work feeling goes silent; will speaks precisely through the intellect, thus manifesting its utmost power. If life makes a mistake in joining itself with life-hostile music, will must then intervene in defense of life itself. Will thus becomes the exponent of the Dionysian principle; thus, Nietzsche's most intellectual book turns out to be the first of his existential-Dionysian works. Nietzsche effectively considers psychology as a weapon to employ against decadence. It is not a psychologist speaking here, but someone wanting to conquer decadence by availing himself of psychology.

'Human, All Too Human', which comes immediately after Nietzsche's most bloody and significant victory, is formally, from the viewpoint of form, a text very distant from music, precisely because *it is the first book of the autonomously philosophical Nietzsche*. It appears as the most sober and concise of Nietzsche's aphoristic books: the tone yet to come, however, remains asleep in the guarded rhythm and word that abstains from taking flight. And yet this book contains the first formulation of Nietzsche's deepest vision concerning the essence of music. Nietzsche's link to music is, so to speak, subterranean, negative. The polemic developed there against the redundancy of late Romantic music implies a new basic understanding of the essence of music. 'Music as a Late Fruit of Culture' is the title of aphorism 171, the decisive aphorism of the first volume, which says that music, among all the arts, is the last to appear in the autumn where the culture that engendered it shrivels. Someone more sensitive to nuanced metaphors, with

that reticence with which the enthusiast of yesterday is defended today, would say that music, in the highest sense of the term, is a swan song.

This thought, expressed so delicately, stands at the same height as the passage that leads us from the world of the young Nietzsche into the Zarathustrian landscape. Autumn and swan song, thus intervenes that link with death which music bears within itself. Caducity, dissolution, the death contained in beauty all belong to the most authentic meaning of music. One must look to the musical-Dionysian Nietzsche in order to understand the meaning of this original intuition. In 'The Birth of Tragedy', life in its supreme manifestation is joined with the dramatic-musical work of art. Only on the basis of this identity was it possible to establish the connection between music and philosophy, between the German present and the Greek past, between Wagner and Nietzsche. But just when the alliance between these men and ideas is about to reach its pinnacle, the musical-philosophical dream dissolves. Nietzsche has the clear, terrible sensation that a decisive event has been fulfilled, without however displaying full awareness of the catastrophe's amplitude. In aphorism 171 on music, it is perhaps clearer to us than to Nietzsche himself, it is precisely in those years that he is guided by an instinctive, almost clairvoyant certainty.

Great music is a swan song, death-music, because a culture breathes its last sigh within it. How horrendous Nietzsche must have found the sensation of erring so profoundly concerning a decisive question where error is impossible, for life and death are decided here! He had believed he was hearing Dionysian life, the harbinger of a heroic culture, when in truth it was the past that spoke. Thus is dispelled the enigma of Bayreuth: it could never have been the 'dawn heralding the battle-day' of a future German culture, for in reality those were the shadows of death. Far from emerging from the primordial eternal past of nature and people, these are rather the projection of the last shadows of an epoch fated to perish. An artistic myth, a musical theater of legends had thus been substituted for the authentic myth, the disciple of Heraclitus and Aeschylus, bedazzled by his own will and enthralled by his veneration of Wagner, had failed to realize it.

In the years following the Bayreuth catastrophe, later a memory accompanied by a certain horror, Nietzsche gains a better understanding of his own nature. This is shown to us by that clear separation between the musical line and philosophical line, so easily recognizable from then on. From these two lines, whose antithesis subordinates all other contradictions within Nietzsche, the fabric of this soul's destiny unfolds. The line of death surfaces wherever the modern man speaks, the musician, the poet, whereas the line of life appears wherever the friend of the Greeks expresses himself, the Dionysian philosopher, the educator and politician. The 'Birth of Tragedy' is the book of this soul's destiny: the lines intertwine almost to the point of terrible yet fascinating entanglement; then they unravel starting from the break with Bayreuth, determining from that point on, thanks to their sage

masterful co-presence, Nietzsche's entire spiritual process.

Wanting to understand Zarathustra, one must know the author's entire inward and outward biography. *Nietzsche defines Zarathustra as a 'Dionysian demon'*, asserting that in this work the notion of the Dionysian becomes 'supreme action'. Just a moment ago, we made use of the analogous expression 'existential-Dionysian'. This expression anticipates the essence of Zarathustra and enters by full rights beginning from 'Human, All Too Human'. However paradoxical it might sound, 'Human, All Too Human' is the first step toward Zarathustra.

The friendship that binds him to Wagner is felt and regarded by Nietzsche as an ancient honor. Given the great difference in age between them, the relationship between Nietzsche and Wagner can only be configured as the bond linking disciple to master. In his capacity as Wagner's worthy friend, Nietzsche fights alongside the Master of Bayreuth for a renewal of German culture. The break first and foremost signifies that he must continue fighting alone for a goal that is by no means glimpsed in Bayreuth. The solitary gradually realizes the meaning of the break with Wagner. To continue in total solitude is an exceedingly arduous thing: this is attested by the still faltering step of the first book of aphorisms. In 'The Wanderer and His Shadow' morale starts to recover; the air grows warmer in Dawn. The rays of sun filter through the dissolving clouds, the entire fourth book of 'The Gay Science' is already immersed in a new light: it concludes with an allusion to the thought of the eternal return and the incipit of Zarathustra.

This development, spanning the years between 1876 and 1882, reflects the increasing fortification following the definitive break from Bayreuth. In 1883 the liberating work is at last completed. *Zarathustra appears and Dionysus speaks through his mouth*. The mature man conducts what the youth did not manage to fulfill: Dionysian thought now speaks its own language. Zarathustra is the reverse side of 'The Birth of Tragedy'. In the latter, Wagner is Dionysus; musical dissonance corresponds to the primordial Dionysian phenomenon; the philosopher is subordinate to musical theater. By contrast, in Zarathustra the philosopher appears as lawgiver before the crowd. The Heraclitean ideal is thus effectuated: 'Heraclitus was proud; and when a philosopher is proud, his pride is truly great'. Nietzsche had to rise to the figure of Zarathustra in order to overcome Wagner. He needed the most sublime mask to achieve victory in the supreme agony beloved of the Muses. First and foremost, in Zarathustra Nietzsche celebrates his own triumph over Wagner, who is not coincidentally represented in the 'Prologue' under the guise of the clown in the tower. The relationship between disciple and master has been completely inverted: he who was once venerated now appears as the lowest rung on the ladder leading to supreme glory.

'Between envy and friendship, as between self-contempt and pride, there lies an enormous tension and separation: the Greek lives in envy, the Christian in friendship' (Aurora, 69). Nietzsche's soul is extremely torn

between self-contempt and pride, since he knows well the tension that exists between envy and friendship. 'Envy' must of course be understood in its ancient sense, that is, as 'good Eris'. Envy is an ardent tension yearning for the highest prize, which can be won on condition of prevailing over a worthy adversary. For the young Nietzsche, Richard Wagner had been the 'sublime forerunner'. But as soon as Nietzsche noticed that his own goal was loftier than what was envisioned for Bayreuth, he had to triumph over Wagner in order to attain his own end. Wagner had thus succeeded in awakening what still lay latent in Nietzsche's nature: the supreme will to triumph. It was the powerful example embodied by Wagner that shattered philology in one blow. From Wagner, Nietzsche learned the way to conquer men for himself and dominate the world. Nietzsche dons the mask of Zarathustra, going forth to conquer the world and thus solitary conducting a far more momentous feat than what he had failed to take on in the company of his friend. Thus is fulfilled the destiny of one who lives out his life in the tension between envy and friendship.

Keeping this firmly in mind, we can then understand why in 'Ecce Homo' Nietzsche wrote concerning the first part of Zarathustra: 'The concluding part was completed precisely in that sacred hour when Richard Wagner dies in Venice', and why he adds: 'My notion of the Dionysian here becomes supreme action.'

And it is music that constitutes the greatest threat to Nietzsche's philosophy. However, the herald of death must harmonize with the philosophy of life, for without music life is an 'error': the line of death can never vanish from this soul. That is why the years preceding Zarathustra are so somber: although philosophical development is in the foreground, at bottom it is marginal, since the main issue continues to be music. The question is: how can the line of death be subordinated to the line of life, and how can music be made the handmaiden of philosophy? Zarathustra constitutes the solution to the dilemma: the doctrine of the god Dionysus is announced in the new tone of sententious song. The line of life and the line of death are tightly braided: the hymn of life resonates in the tonality of death. Dionysian thought celebrates supreme triumph; Dionysus philosophos is reintegrated in his honor; and the initial error is grandly redressed. After the musician (Wagner) was transformed into Dionysus, the latter had to become musician in turn. The form of 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' gushes forth from this necessity. In it bursts out Nietzsche's innate music: he himself numbers this book among the symphonies.

In Zarathustra, the Dionysian content and the musical form are clearly and precisely separated. In Zarathustra, the lawgiver of the future is foreshadowed, the heroic man who annihilates the figure of the 'last man', the vehicle of democratic and anti-heroic culture. The Dionysian motif resonates with the purest accents within 'Of Old and New Tablets':

'Oh my will! You who ward off from me all, it is not necessary, you

are my necessity! Save me from all petty victories!'

Agonal thought reaches its essential formula: Dionysus appears there as triumphant and annihilating. The creator of new values must be at the same time victor and annihilator: 'ready to annihilate in triumph.'

Zarathustra has always been considered a sui generis book: not only with regard to the content, but also in relation to the form. The latter is nourished by the lyrical dimension, without ever achieving it: the narrative does not want to lead to song, although brushing the hymn in some moments. There is therefore a tension towards poetry, but no fulfilled poetry in itself. Everything that belongs to the sphere of reflection is expressed in a hard, rough tone, in terms of command and empire; however, moments of an almost lyrical purity emerge here and there, where all the music of the book flows. It is difficult to separate some independent parts from the flow of the whole, because we do not see in it an end or an epilogue that does not seem casual, however lyrical beauty spills out precisely in isolated fragments, fragments often of just a few verses:

'Around autumn, clear sky and autumnal joy.

*Look what fullness is around us! It is beautiful to lean out
from overabundance towards distant seas'.*

In Zarathustra we perceive a tone that denotes a magic and exaltation not very far from Tristan. And yet in Zarathustra the accent of pain is completely lacking: its distinctive feature is perfect joy; its rhythm is of dance. 'Light steps' are Zarathustra's pride. The verses of the lyrics do express, yes, perfect joy, but also a joy presaging fate, a joy that transcends itself. Nietzsche calls this risky element 'alcyonean'. The symphony of Zarathustra has an alcyonean tonality, a tonality characteristic of a melancholic soul, attracted by death and saved by dance. For that soul, music and tears are the same. 'I cannot establish any difference between music and tears'. From melancholy is born perfection, the blissful overabundance that rests in itself in Nietzsche's favorite autumnal days. 'Indeed, this is what I ask of music: that it be serene and deep as an October afternoon'.

And in contrasting his music with Wagner's, Nietzsche declares: 'My melancholy wants to rest in the nooks and abysses of perfection: that's why I need music'. Does not the word 'perfection' have the same meaning as 'music'? And does 'music' not correspond, perhaps, to 'swan song'? The maturity for death is what hovers over the radiant autumn day of the alcyonean soul: the soft accents that put wings on dancing feet spring from the predisposition to death. 'The light and divine, everything that is divine runs on light feet'.

This last quote is taken from 'The Case of Wagner', that is from the first of those writings to which the last alcyonean, autumnal and fruitful year of Nietzsche's conscious life is devoted. What is it that lends Nietzsche's opusculum its magical force? A poetry, and precisely an alcyonean poetry: only by mistake has this opusculum been considered a pamphlet. This incredible imprint appears as a song of praise intoned to Bizet's Carmen, a very refined

device to irritate the Wagnerians. However, the music of *Carmen* is not devoid of an intrinsic connection with what Nietzsche defines as 'alcyonean'. This word is explained there in two passages:

'This music is serene; however, not with a French or German serenity. Its serenity is African: over it hangs fate, its happiness is brief, sudden, pitiless. I envy Bizet for having had the courage of this sensibility which until now did not have its own language in European cultured music, the courage of this more tanned, more burnt southern sensibility... How good for us are the golden sunsets of his happiness! Do we perhaps heal ourselves in the distance? Have we ever seen a calmer sea?'

From this passage taken from 'The Case of Wagner' we go on to consider aphorism 255 from 'Beyond Good and Evil', where the merit of music is discussed: here too it is a matter of a music that is over-German and supra-European which knows how to impose itself even over the tanned sunsets in the desert and feels at home among the superb and fierce beasts of prey... The tension towards transcendence manifests itself here starting from a different point of view: all customs disappear, including the favorite southern Europe, the soul that burns with passion only rests in the perfection of death in the desert.

Music is all this, also an elevation of music in Zarathustra. But if we want to hear the word 'alcyonean' directly from Nietzsche's mouth, we must take the other passage from 'The Case of Wagner' where everything becomes clear:

'These young Germans of today are right: how could they miss what we alcyoneans miss in Wagner, the gay science, the light foot, the mockery, the fire, the grace, the great logic, the dance of the stars, the proud spirit, the flashes of the South, the placid sea, perfection? ...'

To this mysterious lyricism of death is linked in Zarathustra the lasting impression of absolute solitude. For the author, music and tears are identical: the mystery of the book is a solitude that induces weeping. This solitude, however, contrasts with the Dionysian motif, to which it is impossible to link it in any way; likewise, the line of life does not converge at all with that of death. And yet both are brought together here: their union expresses the ultimate hidden mystery in Nietzsche's soul in the most intimate and profound way.

Four years after the composition of the third Zarathustra, Nietzsche arrives in Turin: he feels strangely attracted from the first moment by the still unknown city: the first gift of Nietzsche's new stay is 'The Case of Wagner', a musical fragment. Shortly before, already in Nice, Nietzsche had felt a particular closeness to music: 'music offers me sensations as I have never perceived before', he writes to Gast. The last year of his conscious life passes entirely under the sign of music. It is the year of the 'Dithyrambs of Dionysus', of which Nietzsche makes a copy during the summer; shortly before the final collapse he carefully prepares a second slightly modified version. The poems

date back, in effect, to the time of Zarathustra; the novelty, however, consists in the sincere ardor with which Nietzsche sets out on his sudden inspirations. Among the Dithyrambs there is one that reveals the author's intimacy, an image of perfect alcyonean joy that touches the horrendous abyss: 'The Sun Sets', which begins:

*You will not burn for much longer still
My insatiable heart.*

A mysterious feeling of transcendence dominates the couplet:

Oh day of my life!

The sun sets.

These verses introduce the definition of alcyonean perfection in the two stanzas that begin:

Come now, golden serenity!

You, first fruit of death,

Sweetest mystery.

What is the meaning of this lyrical element that has become autonomous? Among the Dithyrambs there are fragments of authentic poetry; however only a luminous reflection of poetry, not fulfilled poetry in itself. And yet the Dithyrambs are a swan song, pure music, but what does Nietzsche mean by 'pure music'?

It is a turn in Nietzsche's life, no less decisive than that of 1876. Back then Nietzsche had found himself again: the most heroic of his books from that period is absolutely anti-musical ('Human, All Too Human'). Then music prevails: in 'The Gay Science' it appears in sayings and songs, while in Zarathustra the heroic element is completely transfused into the musical one. Once balance is achieved, thought rests in the stillness of noon. The Engadine is the landscape that provides the backdrop for this moment that Nietzsche perceives as a 'heroic idyll', the essence of Zarathustra could not be more precisely defined. The hero speaks in an alcyonean tone, Dionysus turns into an idyll...

No path would have led beyond the idyll; no road would have led to action. The 'Dionysian action' of Zarathustra consists precisely in the form. That is why the fourth Zarathustra was doomed to fail, since it had turned out to be an allegorical sketch. Nietzsche then abandoned the project of continuing Zarathustra: in the following years of waiting, he dedicated himself to the main philosophical work, 'The Will to Power'. In musical terms, 'Beyond Good and Evil' is a reply. The question of what should come after Zarathustra is implicit in everything Nietzsche undertakes from then on. Zarathustra can no longer appear since there is no passage from the heroic idyll to action. A second mask on the model of Zarathustra is now impossible.

But then something surprising happens: Nietzsche himself takes the field. Thus begins a new phase of his creative activity: the phase of direct action. Zarathustra had announced without ever having fought. There would no longer be a continuation in which he intervened as the protagonist. And

here comes Nietzsche-Dionysus: 'The Will to Power' is interrupted, because Nietzsche, the subverter of all values, like the Great Corsican, intends to make his lightning appearance before all of Europe. What does the passage from 'The Will to Power', a passionate but ultimately contemplative work, to the eruptions of the last year, 'The Twilight of the Idols'; 'The Antichrist'; 'Ecce Homo', mean?

The Nietzsche of these pages has been understood as someone who wants but achieves nothing. He who wants is by no means someone who wields vain pretensions or aspires to be ethical; Nietzsche is by no means an impotent of the will, he is rather the man of a single instinct: the instinct of the legislator, the ruler, the Victor. For Nietzsche, having a will and being a philosopher are the same thing, since by philosophy he means wisdom, not science. Viewing Nietzsche's life in this light, his so-called changes appear very different from how they have been seen so far. They have generally been viewed in the light of manifestations of a hypersensitive subjectivity on the artistic plane, conditioned by passion and arbitrariness, by the thirst for adventure or the excesses of an unusual sensibility. However, Nietzsche is the very opposite of an adventurer of the intellect.

He has become what he had to be and had to become what he wanted to be. 'Become what you are' is equivalent to: 'Want what you are'. A fate constitutes Nietzsche's intimate nature. But this fate possesses rigorous logic and sovereign will.

The young Nietzsche unconsciously opens himself to the modern world as a metaphysical dreamer, guided by instinct and veneration for Richard Wagner. He still does not know himself or the world either, and yet in him there already exists that wariness that foreshadows total solitude and a sense of destiny. His first book already hides the most significant thing behind a pseudonym: Dionysus. ('My writings know very well how to defend themselves', he will write later.) In the third of the 'Untimely Meditations', Nietzsche will use Schopenhauer's pseudonym, while in the fourth he will adopt that of Richard Wagner (as anti-Alexander). 'Free spirit' is the pseudonym worthy of a great diplomat.

This figure, as well as that of the god Dionysus, is invented by Nietzsche to say something very specific. It expresses an exceptional condition in biographical-spiritual terms. All the pseudonyms (except the first) correspond to a stage in the journey of a will conscious of the still distant supreme goal and determined to act only at the right moment. Each pseudonym represents the mask of a sovereign will. 'One should only speak when one cannot be silent, and only speak of what one has overcome: everything else is charlatanry, 'literature', lack of discipline'.



Figure 5a. Drunken Dionysus with panther, satyr and grapes on a vine. Roman copy from the 2nd century CE after a Hellenistic original.



Figure 5b. Second-century Roman statue of Dionysus.

Nietzsche maintains the mask of the free spirit until the moment of liberation, which is followed by Zarathustra, 'the guest of guests'. Well, Zarathustra is Nietzsche himself, not a sage from the East; however he is a particular manifestation of Nietzsche, a pseudonym, an autonomous figure: Dionysian thought as a musical-alcyonean phenomenon. *With the appearance of Zarathustra the free spirit is fulfilled.* And it is a sign of unease that in 'Beyond Good and Evil' Nietzsche once again resorts to an abandoned pseudonym. And unease reaches its peak when a programmatic writing of the mature Nietzsche, 'On the Genealogy of Morals', where there is no longer any trace of the resource of the free spirit, sees the light as a corollary to 'Beyond Good and Evil'. At this point, the whole difficulty of Nietzsche's condition after Zarathustra manifests itself: from then on he will no longer use any fiction, descending into the field without a mask.

Nietzsche's life is marked by foresight, utmost caution, tenacity, resolution, not by emotional instability and a taste for change as an end in itself. The vivid inner fullness is thus welded to an iron resolution of the will. For Nietzsche, not the changing contingency of what is experienced is decisive, but the task that remains identical.

'It still seems to prevail in us our old determination: for a long time we have known nothing but riddles. The selection of events, tension and burning longing, rejection of what we love and adore most: all this frightens us as if from us here and there emanated an arbitrariness, a whim, sick and volcanic. And all this is nothing else, however, but higher reason and foresight of our task for the future'.

What remains (because it is identical to the will) is the heroic element. In the early works, the hero is immediately celebrated: in 'Human, All too Human', the hero speaks through formal rigor, while in Zarathustra the heroic-Dionysian thought constitutes the doctrinal content. Nietzsche does not change in relation to the decisive thing: the young Nietzsche instinctively affirms the values of the fighting Nietzsche; Zarathustra announces them; the mature Nietzsche theoretically justifies them in philosophical terms; the last Nietzsche translates them into action by delivering the decisive blow. The true image of Nietzsche accompanies the understanding of the radical nature of his heroic vision.

The image changes diametrically if we start from the line of death, insofar as it connects with the musical element and therefore with the form. It is at this point that the change becomes clear: the young Nietzsche sinks into that pseudo-Dionysian joy that is precisely the opposite of the joy of the last Nietzsche ('brief, sudden, merciless'). The passive enjoyment of the Tristan listener is dissolved by the dynamic joy of the admirer of Carmen, for whom after a musical evening dawn breaks 'filled with synthetic visions and illuminations'. What emerges in contrast in the realm of feeling and taste is seen in the realm of will as a counterpoint: here too we find an increase in activity, an acceleration and accentuation of rhythm. At this point we have not a contrast with the original will, but a final elevation and fullness. Corresponding to Nietzsche's passage from an initial pseudo-Dionysian feeling of unity and liberation to the moments of alcyonean joy of maturity and the concluding phase of his conscious life, is a mutation of form: starting from the rhetorical-Dionysian style of the early work, With an abrupt turn, Nietzsche moves on to the alcyonean music implicit in the books of aphorisms and the idyllic-heroic rhythm of Zarathustra.

The transition represented by the last volume of aphorisms, which appears under a double mask, is also expressed in formal terms. 'Beyond Good and Evil' is characterized by a maturity that is revealed even in musical similarities: here it is no longer necessary to contain feeling, so that the reader is never abandoned by the impression of consummate perfection, of a melancholic farewell, in this sense the aphorism on the prelude to Wagner's 'Die Meistersinger' must also be understood, which describes in such an incomparable way the condition of autumnal maturity, which is of the essence of the book.

The tone of 'On the Genealogy of Morals' is diametrically opposed: here for the first time rings the accent of challenge, the disdainful tone of the

last Nietzsche, who abandons all masks to face the verdict of death in hand-to-hand combat. We can understand this new style as long as we do not forget the innate tension in Nietzsche: at the moment when the lyrical-alcyonean element is dismissed, only the heroic-speculative element remains, stemming from that hard and disdainful style that distinguishes the fighter bent on triumph, and no longer the seer waiting for a final decision.

The mistake made by Nietzsche's interpreters is perhaps due to the fact that his character has been sought to be grasped exclusively from the perspective of music, rather than from the perspective of the heroic will: the mutation concerns the musical and formal sphere, never however the sphere of existence and thought.

What distinguishes the last period of Nietzsche is the dissolution of the synthesis represented by Zarathustra. He always felt a sense of happiness that came from having managed to compose that work where the contradictory aspects of his nature converge into a unity. But the supreme task still required one last sacrifice: to bid farewell to the landscape of Zarathustra. Only by entering as conquering-annihilator into his own time would Dionysus have been able to celebrate the supreme triumph.

The first blow strikes at triumphant Wagnerism ('The Case of Wagner'). The next blow must be struck at the main adversary: Christianity ('The Twilight of the Idols'; 'The Antichrist'; 'Ecce Homo'), embodied in Germany, in the Reich of the Junker Christian. At the origin of the very harsh invectives launched by the last Nietzsche against the Germans lies, yes, the increasingly intolerable consciousness of his own solitude, but above all a much deeper reason. Having appeared on the European stage for the final battle for effective power, Dionysus needed a real adversary.

The matter no longer concerns mere thought because what is at stake is hegemony. Radical cultural critique and the devastating philosophy of history are no longer enough; a figure must appear, provided there is enough explosive to blow it sky high. This figure is ultimately the Reich that has outlawed Nietzsche: by striking at the Reich, he annihilates everything he has always fought against, Wagnerism, Christianity, bourgeois morality. Quoting passages about Germans extracted from Nietzsche's last works without considering the existential condition in which they were written is laconic. Already from the works in which Nietzsche uses 'pseudonyms' we can infer everything concerning Wagner, Luther and Germany, based on Nietzsche's own pedagogical tension with respect to his homeland.

Such tension culminates in his last creative year: Nietzsche no longer feels German but thinks of himself as French. All this is not a matter of fact but represents an extreme instrument of struggle. And the most critical terms themselves, bent on the annihilation of the Reich, derive not only from insights or objective knowledge, but also from 'ironic antitheses' which, expressed in the highest style, constitute instruments of aggression in the struggle for effective power in real Germany. Nietzsche was never a mere

theoretical philosopher: he remains an 'existential thinker', and he is so to the highest degree in the last period, the one in which he actually comes into his own.

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Alfred Baeumler: The Solitude of Nietzsche.

Introduction (JSGJ).

The starting point is this: Friedrich Nietzsche is not among us, so he cannot 'certify' whether one or more interpretations of his writings are 'canonical'. Many people, with very different political backgrounds, can and have interpreted his writings in different ways. Each of these interpretations, especially the post-1945 ones, has an ideological background that can be overt or remain hidden. Interpretations that have no value are those that use altered or censored texts. Fortunately, the reality is very stubborn. Moreover, the mere fact of confusing the 'dominant' interpretation with the true one is nothing more than a sign of intellectual weakness or opportunism, especially when no one knows or will know which interpretation(s) are the 'true' ones. There are no incorrect, invalid, or perverse interpretations. Let us finish 'sinking the nail' by mentioning that the most complex and interesting interpretations are those presented by philosophers such as Heidegger, Baeumler, Jung and perhaps a couple more. Those presented by 'writers on philosophy' are of little value.

An inspection of many books published in recent years has shown in several of them the existence of a slight odor indicating the presence of recycled materials and clichés for the umpteenth time. **However, the topics for writing about anything that serves to include the word 'Nietzsche' seem not to be ending. It is expected, at some point, the appearance of some works of the type: 'Nietzsche and Mickey mouse', 'SpongeBob was Nietzschean', 'The Wolf and the three Little Pigs in the light of Nietzsche's Will to Power', etc. I suspect that if Friedrich could read some recent texts he would surely shoot himself (this text included perhaps).** My theory explaining this monumental amount of texts is that, as the world is already clearly overpopulated, this overpopulation seems to have also been extended to the academic environment. It is possible that this overpopulation has allowed the entry of specimens prone to academic-intellectual vacuity.

We will call 'Nietzschean Nazis' all those involved in the adoption, interpretation, reinterpretation, new understandings, and use of certain philosophical concepts of Nietzsche in National Socialist ideology and philosophy. An excellent source of reference on this subject is found in chapter VIII (*Nietzsche in the Third Reich*) of Steven Aschheim's book *'The Nietzsche legacy in Germany: 1890-1990'* (Aschheim, 1992). I must mention that Steven was, when he published that book, Associate Professor of History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which makes him an interested party in this subject (which is not the subject of any particular criticism, but which should be mentioned for the sake of transparency). Personally, I have the personal impression that Chapter VIII reveals a slight anxiety and a certain

precipitation to present Nietzsche as one of the pillars of National Socialism. This is a legitimate position, but in the book there are no convincing elements or arguments, only a large list of references written by Nietzschean Nazis.

It must be stated that it seems clear that some of Nietzsche's ideas exerted a great influence on National Socialist ideology. But why did I say, '**it seems to be clear**'? The answer is that we need an approach to this question that is so conclusively clear that no one can object or deny the conclusions obtained by employing it. Apparently, the only way to answer definitively is to make a list of those ideas of Nietzsche that are **unique** to him (i.e., that no one held them before) and see whether or not they are within National Socialist thought or philosophy. Apparently this has not been done. As long as this great task is not conducted, we will have to content ourselves with articles that contain more disqualifying adjectives regarding National Socialism and its followers than contributions of high intellectual level.

Baeumler was the first philosopher to introduce Nietzsche as another philosopher. In a previous article we presented a text, written by Baeumler, presenting one of the foundations that, according to the author, links Nietzsche with National Socialism (Juan Sebastián Gómez-Jeria, 2023). We consider it necessary to present other different facets of his thought reflected through his writings. That is why we present here the English translation of another text by Baeumler entitled 'The Solitude of Nietzsche' (F. Nietzsche & Baeumler, 1932). We believe we have done the best job possible to maintain the spirit of that work. We must mention the existence of an Italian version of this text (A. Baeumler & Terzuolo, 2003). It contains some additions by Baeumler himself but dated post-1945. For that reason we have not included them here.



Figure 1a. Alfred Baeumler and Martin Heidegger.



Figure 1b. Speech by Baeumler at one of the NSDAP congress.

Text of The Solitude of Nietzsche.

‘All this, ultimately, belongs to a generation that the two of us will probably not come to know: a generation for which the great troubles for which I have suffered, and by virtue of which, and for the love of which I certainly still live, are destined to become vital and to be transformed into will and action’ (From a letter from Nietzsche to Overbeck in 1887) [letters are available in (Friedrich Nietzsche, 2005, 2007a, 2009a, 2009b, 2011, 2012a), some letters in (F. W. Nietzsche, Levy, & Ludovici, 1921), (F. W. Nietzsche & Leidecker, 1959), (Friedrich Nietzsche, 1996)].

The mysterious trail of the one who in 1885 was to write: ‘Today there is no one in Germany who knows what I want or that I want anything [...]’, extends to the heart of the Germany of the first pre-war, increasingly opulent and satisfied. And this, two years later, after having felt multiply the sense of the very deep loneliness that surrounds him, will say, in truth, more for himself than for a professor from Basel named Overbeck: ‘This winter I have made a vast reconnaissance around European literature [...]; Today's Europe does not have the slightest suspicion of what are the terrible decisions around which my work revolves, and of what is the pivot of the questions to which I refer, it does not even know that a catastrophe is being prepared with me whose name only I who know it will pronounce’.

He will say it to himself, for there are no ears capable of understanding it. It was implausible that he was right, it was plausible instead that he gave voice to a great but unknown psychic predisposition. And precisely the listening was directed to this last eventuality: so did Overbeck and Rohde, whose correspondence on ‘Beyond Good and Evil’ represents one of the most sensational documents of the nineteenth century. And who could agree that this Europe resplendent with unparalleled prosperity was nearing the end? To warn, to announce the catastrophe, to describe its symptoms and, going further, to invent a ‘countermovement’: all this was Nietzsche's task, all this was what he lived for, since he was able to sustain it. It is almost a scandal that even today someone speaks of Nietzsche as a ‘sufferer’, without referring to his fate, subjective or objective. What is subjective tends in fact to assume precisely in him, as never in a mortal, a sense of destiny. He does not

invent a destiny: he 'lives' his own destiny, his destiny. It embodies the turn of times. Nietzsche has no choice, not being able to defect either forward or backward (from the letter to Overbeck of February 3, 1888): a gigantic 'It' has taken his seat. There is only one thing left: to say yes, to assume his own destiny: 'Here I am', *amor fati*.

The needle that indicates magnetic storms oscillates incessantly from one side to the other, always in the direction of the poles. Similarly, the Nietzschean sensibility continually oscillates in this or that direction, but its own sense and consciousness of destiny always remain unchanged. The astonishing consequences of Nietzsche's existence are more easily traced in letters than in works. This existence has shaped a 'tenacious will', a will that is misunderstood if thought of as the will to greatness. Nietzsche has 'wanted' only one thing: his own destiny. Everything came to him without the need to evoke it, because it was up to him alone to decide. He 'wanted', that is, he did not escape what was imposed on him. 'I am the antithesis of a heroic nature,' he said of himself in *Ecce Homo*. 'No sign of struggle is detectable in my life'. Nietzsche lives 'heroically' and 'wants' something, but in him there is no connection between these two concepts, a 'heroic will'. The marble bust of Klinger is substantially false. The 'tenacious will' is not shown grinding its teeth. Nietzsche redefined the notion of 'heroic'. Nietzschean heroism is not that of saints who raise praises to God during martyrdom, nor that of a will that strives for something, nor the heroism of suffering, nor even a heroism of action. For Nietzsche there is only one action that is repeated continuously: his action consists in sustaining his own task and destiny: to be what he is. Its purity is this: to resist to the bitter end.

I

'If only I could give you an idea of my sense of loneliness! I have never felt anyone, among the living or the dead, close to me. All this horribly unspeakable: only the daily exercise of this feeling of loneliness and a gradual evolution of it, from the earliest childhood, has made it not yet perish. For the rest, I see before me the task for which I live: a factum of indescribable sadness, but clarified by the awareness that this is greatness, if greatness is suited to the tasks of a mortal'. (Letter of August 5, 1886).

In 1886 Nietzsche wrote these words to his friend who two and a half years later went to look for him in Turin. For five years now he has lived in the lucidity of which these words of resignation and at the same time of pride are testimony. Based on his statements it is easy to glimpse Nietzsche's 'megalomania'; we wanted to leave aside everything that infuses meaning and clarity. But what are Nietzsche's conditions in 1881? He has already left behind *Aurora*, the first systematic attack on morality produced by Christianity. Nietzsche makes a pilgrimage through the heights around Genoa with his gaze back to the future, as no one has yet dared to do. He feels within

himself 'the summits of reflection and moral action in Europe and of many other things'. (Letter of November 29, 1881). Before the eyes of the solitary appears a distance of historical-universal character, while the present is illuminated with an ineffable light. An era lasting centuries is now at an end. The philosophical thought of the last centuries reveals its authentic late-Gothic face. A man at the height of Columbus lives internally and entirely the end of the Middle Ages! And this man who feels repelled by his own century, projected into the second half of the century that comes after him, such a man, then should not have written: 'My hour has come'? And this man, looking away from such a distance, should not have written about one of his contemporaries, Richard Wagner: 'Until that moment I was looking for someone who was superior to me, and knew how to really value me [...]'. Now, however, I can no longer even compare myself to him: I fall within a completely different range'? (Letter of February 3, 1882).

True, these words sound haughty; but that does not make them fake at all. But if Nietzsche really belonged to another 'rank', objectively understood, on the plane of universal history, and if Wagner was already part of a world empire in decline, was not then Nietzsche the nuncio and the representative of a new Kingdom? Reflecting on this latter eventuality can be helpful even for those who are still deaf. Nietzsche saw himself as the antagonist, on the plane of world history, of Wagner, of Schopenhauer, of Bismarck, of the 'Reich', of modern Europe. Should not the solution of the tormenting dilemmas of his life and work then consist in the fact that he was indeed such an antagonist?

The contrast with the epoch itself is not based on the fact that Nietzsche, like Wagner, Bismarck, or Goethe, asserted a well-disposed work against the will of contemporaries, against the 'clumsy world', so that, in the end, the winner is grateful for this same world. Nietzsche's contrast with his own time has much deeper roots. Nietzsche preceded his people not by one, but by two, if not three generations. Even if he had lived longer, he would never have received the homage of contemporaries. All expressions of his self-consciousness refer to the distance that separates him from his century: Nietzsche does not have a 'predecessor'. Human greatness always remains the same, regardless of the century in which it manifests itself. However, there is a historical greatness. Nietzsche is one who has a universal vision, persevering with full consciousness in a certain historical position.

The task assumed by Nietzsche demanded of him the sacrifice of all his human sympathies. The ultimate sacrifice demanded was Wagner's detachment. Nietzsche knew well how to separate the human plane from that of history and destiny. He was never obvious: he wrote 'The Antichrist', without ever propagating atheism, he composed 'The Wagner Case', without ever denying Tribschen's journey. To the harsh criticisms required by the content of the pamphlet are linked the phrases about Wagner present in 'Ecce

Homo'. Nietzsche never ignored the greatness of Wagner; but he would have always remained small, if he had not understood to sacrifice the same friendship with Wagner to his recognized opposition of historical-universal dimension.

In January 1887 Nietzsche heard for the first time the orchestral performance of the music of Parsifal, well known to him since the piano reduction ('Prelude'). In this regard he writes to his sister: 'I cannot think of it except with deep impression, so much I feel conquered and taken by this music. It is as if, after many years, someone finally spoke to me of the problems that have tormented me for a long time but making me uncomfortable: his is not the answer to which I had been predisposed in some way, but a Christian response, which, in the end, has been the response of the strongest souls that the last two centuries have produced among us' (Letter of February 22, 1887).

In our view, this is one of the salient passages of the Nietzschean correspondence. Nietzsche, a year before 'The Wagner Affair', speaks with such freedom of Parsifal, for which he breaks with Wagner! Never has anyone seen so deeply the fissure between human 'reality' and historical 'reality'. Nietzsche understands the old Wagner as well as the young Wagner, he certainly loves him no less: it is the powerful force of his own task that distances him from Wagner. What obedience ad purity in the face of his own destiny! And now, however, that singular strabismus: shock and astonishment overwhelm the lone combatant in the sight of the adversary. 'It is as if, after many years, someone, at last, spoke to me [...]' For an instant the loner is no longer alone. Listening to the last and most consequential formulation of that to which he does not belong (although he does not deny a dangerous affinity), looking the adversary directly in the eye, he feels himself a real man, while, before the eyes of the friend, he feels the shadow of a shadow...

Rohde and Overbeck were not only opposing natures: they were also distant from each other politically. Rohde was an admirer of Bismarck. Overbeck, on the other hand, had a very lukewarm attitude towards the Reich. However, both relate to Nietzsche without understanding him. And all the more so Overbeck, but only because, unlike Rohde, he was never linked to Nietzsche by a deep bond of friendship knotted in youth.

On June 16, 1878, Rohde, writing to Nietzsche about 'Human, All Too Human', without understanding the human and philosophical position assumed by the friend, stigmatizes with provocative frankness his weak scientific scaffolding. And how does Nietzsche respond to him? Praising him: 'All is well, dear friend: our friendship does not have such a fragile foundation that it can suddenly be overturned by a book'.

Six years later, on April 10, 1884, Nietzsche sent Overbeck the third

part of the Zarathustra with these words: 'Long live! my old friend Overbeck, here is the first copy of my last Zarathustra: it belongs to you by right! There is an idea, a really great idea, which will certainly keep me alive for a while yet. But this is up to me! The main thing now is that you say it for yourself!' We do not have the answer from Basel. But Nietzsche's epistolary reply begins: 'My dear friend Overbeck, deep down it is really beautiful that during these last years we have not moved away, and even, as it seems, neither for the Zarathustra' (May 2, 1884).

'Our friendship has not been destroyed even by the Zarathustra': is a nobler, more delicate, and more respectful reply possible? What should be Nietzsche's state of mind, if in the meantime his memory of having written almost the same thing to Rohde six years earlier had been clouded?

Friends do not understand it: that is why you have to tell them. And this is why Nietzsche continues: 'In the meantime I intend to assert myself and take advantage of the condition I have conquered for myself: for now, in all probability, I am the most independent man in Europe. My goals and my tasks are vaster than those of any other, and what I call 'great politics' at least gives me a good position from which to look at things present from above'.

Among the letters of the last year of activity, the one addressed by Nietzsche to Overbeck on February 3, 1888, assumes particular prominence. In it Nietzsche, with disturbing precision, indicates the starting point of the path of pain that stands before him. He says he spends days and nights in which he no longer knows how to continue living, seized by a gloomy despair never before experienced. His condition has become unbearable and painful, akin to torture. His last writing ('The Genealogy of Morals') gives an account of this in part: '(I am) in a state similar to that of a bow tense to the point of breaking, any affection does good, given that it is powerful'. Extreme affection as a remedy! Who could say it more clearly? But the question remains: 'What remedy is being talked about here?'

Numerous Nietzschean statements of the last conscious year have, in fact, an echo of megalomania. Here is an example: Nietzsche recommends Gast's musical to Hans von Bülow, who had some time before directed the Hamburg Theatre. But without receiving any response. He therefore sends Bülow a letter, in which he lets him know that the 'most exalted mind of the age has expressed a wish to him'; adding in his own account to Gast: 'I am permitted to call myself such' (From a letter from Nietzsche to Gast of October 14, 1888). Undoubtedly: Nietzsche considers himself a prince regent, whose wishes are orders. He, with the same 'arrogance,' as the Philistines would say, delineates in 'Ecce Homo' the external circumstances in which he disposes himself to 'transvaluation'. In Nietzsche contact with reality thus begins to loosen. The most afflicted year of his life is filled with writings that carry within them the tonality of that 'African' serenity, which refers to the

‘noon of music’. And just as he reaches extreme solitude, Nietzsche’s ship moves away from shore. The decisive question sounds like this: ‘Is Nietzsche’s loneliness a subjective and pathological phenomenon, or a historical reality? Is the Nietzsche of 1888 destined to enter a psychiatric sanatorium or in the history of Europe?’

II

He who speaks of nothing but himself, is either a monomaniac or a genius of destiny; or truly a great or a megalomaniac: this is the only way worthy of Nietzsche to pose the question.

Wherever the solitary is caught closely linked to his destiny, the symbol emerges in personal terms. Nietzsche’s life is full of ‘cases’ he interpreted as symbols. For the understanding of his letters, this moment, so to speak, astrological has a high significance.

In ‘Ecce Homo’ Nietzsche alludes to his own life where he speaks of Stendhal’s discovery: ‘Everything that makes an epoch in him came to him by chance and never by order’. We call ‘casual’ a phenomenon that has no necessary, verifiable, demonstrable relationship with our person (i.e., that is fortuitous). Such an event has, however, for us significance, for the case appears there as destiny. Nietzsche’s worldview is fatalistic, not causalist: In ‘The Will to Power’ he combats causalism. When, in the letter addressed to Brandes of November 20, 1888, he speaks of the ‘sense of the case’, Nietzsche thereby defines destiny, and at the same time the true tendency of his own philosophy, which is none other than the discovery of the ‘sense of the case’, or the expression of *amor fati*.

In 1882 Nietzsche’s ‘fatalistic surrender to the gods’ rises to the powerful pathos of waiting that directs each step in a single direction. Their faith remains intact, even after all signs have been revealed to be illusory. ‘In the end, everything comes in due time’ (Letter to Gast, March 5, 1884). Sometimes Nietzsche intentionally plays with symbolic images. And so when he proposes to travel to Corte, in Corsica, to prepare for ‘The Will to Power’, he affirms that, according to his calculations, Corte is the small town in which Napoleon was conceived (Letter to Gast of August 16, 1886). But among the many cases, the most significant is this: the omen constituted by Leipzig, and linked to Goethe, coincides in a singular way with the fact that Nietzsche’s remains were buried on August 28, the day of Goethe’s birth. As for Wagner, the most fatal presence in Nietzsche’s life, the coincidences are densified: at Nietzsche’s first arrival at Tribschen, a significant chord resounds; ‘Human, All Too Human’ and Parsifal’s poem ‘intersect’; Nietzsche finishes the first part of the Zarathustra just at the ‘sacred hour’ of Wagner’s death in Venice.

Amor fati: with this formula, his favorite to indicate his own life, Nietzsche says yes to himself as a symbol. And only those who have

understood themselves as a symbol can do so. Nietzsche's life can only become a formidable itinerary of self-knowledge. To grasp himself as a decisive symbol of modern history: this was Nietzsche's task. The most 'subjectivist' of all men lives under the most categorical of imperatives. Whoever is willing to 'transvalue all values' is a servant of destiny, not a 'titanic' aesthete hungry for experiences. Nietzsche became fully aware of this in 1881: 'I often imagine myself as a scribble that an unknown force has traced on paper to evaluate a new pen' (Letter to Peter Gast, late August 1881).

In Nietzsche, self-love is more easily glimpsed than the fact that this self-love represents the reverse of his sense of destiny. And we must not forget that in Nietzsche the most horrible declarations of self-love appear when he tries to incite those (and in the first-place friends) who do not suspect in the least with whom they are dealing. Ecce homo must be read as a whole as a single broadside launched by Nietzsche against his own friends. Let us pause to reflect on what Nietzsche means when, bearing in mind Rohde or Overbeck, he writes: 'Except for my dealings with some artists, and in particular with Richard Wagner, I have never spent a decent hour with Germans'. In the 'benevolence' of the friends he glimpses the worst cynicism, blaming them for never having read his books attentively: 'And as for my Zarathustra, who of my friends has seen in him anything but an unjustified arrogance and fortunately completely negligible [...]'.

Analogous is the tone of the letter to Overbeck of November 12, 1887, in which Nietzsche, with very provocative accents, speaks of his poetic composition, of the 'Hymn to Life', which should be sung in his memory: 'Let us say a hundred years from now, in case someone realizes what I represent'. Overbeck seems to have accepted these words without flinching, perhaps because in the same letter Nietzsche introduces the discourse on the appreciation and gratitude he feels for the immutable loyalty of the friend. Whoever knows how to correctly read a letter like this (there are others of the same tenor), perceives in it two voices that contradict each other. Here we can notice a duplicity of meaning that is not at all accidental but constitutes the nature of Nietzsche when writing his own letters. The problem of loneliness, of hiding, of 'acting out a comedy', ultimately results in the problem of the communicability of one's own personality. Speaking of a 'predisposition' to loneliness and 'acting out a comedy,' it is easy to boil down to psychologism. But if you ask yourself what the point of solitude is, you get rid of the problem that has arisen at first sight. Is Nietzsche a lonely stranger, or one who has been lucky enough not to be able to 'communicate' about himself on the historical plane? **Is his loneliness the consequence of a natural predisposition, or the expression of how he has come to situate himself between two centuries?**

We can pose the question also in this way: does the adversary against whom Nietzsche fights, the nameless chaos that surrounds those who want to become God as man, have a historical name or not? Did Nietzsche truly want to be Dionysus, dying of religious madness (in which case we should take him seriously and venerate him as a God), or is he a historical figure driven into the night of madness by a coincidence of circumstances and events? In no case, however, is the explanation that Nietzsche went mad sufficient. He was crazy, and therefore no longer the 'Nietzsche', as happened in January 1889. Only understood as a man is a historical figure, only as a man can he bears a name that is at the same time an idea, but not as insane! As 'Nietzsche' he lived as a historical figure until the moment of nervous breakdown. The other considerations do not take any position: they speak of 'Nietzsche' and at the same time of a madman, so that the problem arises, also insoluble, of when madness 'began'. But this is an apparent problem. Is the man we are talking about a madman from the beginning, or the 'Nietzsche' who dies spiritually at the beginning of January 1889? If he is a madman, then it makes no sense to speak of 'Nietzsche'; and let it be done at most out of respect for those whom he has seduced. But if he is 'Nietzsche', then it is necessary to confront his work. And yet, it does not serve in this case to 'partially' discredit the work by alluding to the megalomania of the Author.

In conclusion: Nietzsche's 'loneliness' is a pathological phenomenon or should be considered as a reality of modern history to which attention should at least be paid. The present volume contains the main testimonies of this loneliness, so to speak its procedural records. The process between Nietzsche and the twentieth century, in which such acts play a role, is celebrated among historical greatness, but cannot be decided in the medical field. **The medical verdict can never become a historical judgment: it can only take the place of the latter.** Conversely, a psychiatrist may, yes, challenge the historian's judgment regarding the person of Nietzsche regarded as a historical figure, but he may neither 'object' nor 'adduce' evidence.

There can be no moral judgment about Nietzsche's loneliness, let alone a psychological 'explanation'. You can only choose between a psychiatric assessment and a historical consideration. But if today it is possible to consider Nietzsche's loneliness in historical terms, this is also a historical fact. Without a precise historical point of view, one cannot grasp Nietzsche's historical solitude.

III

Nietzsche could always have had around him a small circle of people willing to listen and understand him. What he lacked were like-minded people, who therefore had an idea of the Nietzschean task. 'It is not that I lack people around me,' he writes in the letter to Overbeck of October 12, 1886, 'but what I lack are people who share my same concerns!' For Nietzsche, the

desire for friends is not a whim or even a pretension but is objectively founded. The thinker with his gaze turned to the nihilism of European morality wants people to grasp this event. If, out of benevolence, he is considered half-mad, it is obvious that he expresses this intention.

In the summer of 1885 Nietzsche wrote to Overbeck: 'Sometimes I feel the lack of a confidential conversation with you and with Jakob Burckhardt, but more to ask you how you manage in this predicament and how you tell each other the news [...]'. After all, he has long known that his desire is an absurdity.

The year 1885 is the year in which Nietzsche becomes fully aware of his irreversible loneliness. He feels at the height of his intellectual strength, having devised a philosophical system, partly conducted: who could therefore dispute his right to speak with full self-awareness? And he behaves in an eminently Nietzschean way: as an angry and excessive man, he allows himself to be carried away by the first impetus of anger, and yet he never says the false. 'I am very proud if I think anyone can love me. This should obviously presuppose that he knows who I am'. To indicate the rank that corresponds to him, he quotes Wagner, Schopenhauer, and the founder of Christianity. The juxtaposition is meaningless in itself and can only be understood by considering the recipients, raised in veneration for Wagner and Schopenhauer. But we are not hard to believe that Nietzsche would have named himself along with Wagner, Schopenhauer, and Christ even outside the situation just described...

Interspersed with the most violent vents, we read the phrase that sums it all up: 'I have never had a friend or a confidant with whom to share my interests, my worries, my indignations: it is a pity that there is no God, for at least One would have come to know them' (beginning of March 1885). This declares the point of view from which to understand Nietzsche's loneliness: he is as alone as a believer can be with his God, but Nietzsche has no God at all. Therefore, it is a thousand times more alone.

His pride consists in never having erred in his own loneliness, and in this pride lies his own legitimacy to consider himself, and only himself, the turning point of Western history. From this derives, by the way, the grotesque error made by those who claim to be Nietzsche, without ever having known the 'anguish of isolation'.

Neither God nor friends: the last formula of Nietzschean solitude. Not having a God was necessary for him, not having friends seemed to him at first a fortuitous fact. That he would live without God, Nietzsche knew from youth; and that he had to remain friendless, was for him a bitter experience that for a long time he refused to accept. But the latter cannot be separated from the former: absolute incommunicability does not concern only the

extreme conditions of Nietzsche's task; it is an integral part of the task itself.

The passages of Nietzsche's correspondence that make us think of his 'megomania' all bear the same imprint: they claim individuals who are not willing to communicate what they do not know how to capture. They are therefore moments of weakness, of discouragement, during which Nietzsche tries to force the interlocutor to recognize what only he can know.

Nietzsche's loneliness could only grow on Protestant soil. The doctrine of justification by faith constitutes the dogma of the solitude of the soul which presupposes a personal God. And yet, absolute solitude in the face of a personal God is not possible. Man is absolutely alone in sight of his own destiny. The devout man is alone with God, Nietzsche is alone before his fate.

There are two significant passages in which the name of Dante emerges on Nietzsche's lips. In the letter to Overbeck of July 2, 1885, Dante and Spinoza are mentioned as those who best understood their fate of solitude. 'But their way of thinking, compared to mine, was such as to enable them to endure loneliness; after all, for all those who have had any confidence with a 'God' there has not yet been a loneliness comparable to what I know is mine'.

This epistolary passage sheds light on the certainty with which Nietzsche views his own historical condition: he sees himself as both an end and a beginning. Nietzsche does not present himself as the founder of religions, but, assuming a certain position in Protestant Europe, announces his own word dictated by solitude and destiny. Along with this icy word, which corresponds to Durer's engraving so beloved by Nietzsche ('The Knight, Death and the Devil'), another melody now also vibrates. It resonates loudest where Nietzsche speaks of the joy, height, and beauty of his Zarathustra. And when he encounters this tonality, it is as if he wanted to say that neither a Goethe nor a Shakespeare would know how to breathe a moment within the passion and at the height of his Zarathustra; and that Dante, compared to Zarathustra, is only a believer, not one who even believes the truth. Let us isolate for a moment the profound idea that animates this antithesis. Consider the difference of Nietzsche's two references to Dante: the first time he mentions Dante to indicate his own position; the second time he quotes him only to extol Zarathustra. In the first case, this great historical figure sheds light on the difficult and serious struggle waged by Nietzsche as a philosopher against the nihilism of European morality; in the second, Dante's name, along with that of others, becomes a simple means of transforming Zarathustra into a god-like being. When Nietzsche makes Zarathustra say: 'I draw circles around me and sacred limits, and always less ascend with me to the highest mountains; with ever more sacred mountains I build a mountain', speaks of loneliness: no one can prevent a poet from ascending ever higher in his feelings and in his consciousness: feelings and conscience do not put up any resistance: one ascends effortlessly in the ether of imagination. Zarathustra

moves within this ether to where he presents himself as an Alcyonean poet. Nietzsche's true loneliness is of a completely different nature: it is not poetized but described in its concrete reality; not only experienced in intoxicating moments (and therefore captured in poetic terms), but intensely lived. End of Baeumler's text.

Comment.

Nietzsche's loneliness is an extremely complex question, and one that does not seem to have an easy answer or be the subject of a brief analysis. It is necessary to be an authentic 'archaeologist' and look for the traces of that loneliness in all the writings of all kinds that Nietzsche left to see if it is possible to add something else that is novel and not a simple made-up reiteration of things already written or said. Nietzsche's letters and fragments are a good starting point.

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Chapter 7.

Alfred Baeumler: Hellas and Germania.

Introduction (JSGJ).

Johann Joachim Winckelmann was born on December 9, 1717, in Stendal, Germany. The son of a shoemaker, Winckelmann showed a keen interest in study and the humanities from a young age. In 1738 he entered the University of Halle to study theology and medicine, although he soon turned his attention to classical philology and art history. In 1748 he moved to Dresden, where he worked as librarian for Count Heinrich von Büнау. There he had access to a magnificent collection of art that further sparked his interest in classical antiquity. In 1754 he published his work 'Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst' ('Reflections on the Imitation of Greek Art in Painting and Sculpture'), which laid the foundations of neoclassicism. In 1755 he traveled to Rome thanks to the support of Cardinal Albani. There he immersed himself completely in the study of Greco-Latin culture and art, closely examining the papal collections and the excavations that were taking place. The result of these investigations was his influential 'History of the Art of Antiquity' ('Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums'), published in 1764 (Winckelmann, 2011, 2013).

Winckelmann distinguished between the 'high style' of classical Greek art embodied in works such as the pediments of the Parthenon and the 'beautiful style' of the Hellenistic period. He argued that beauty resides in noble simplicity and serene grandeur and idealized the Greek art of the fifth century BCE. He considered it the pinnacle of beauty for its noble simplicity and serene grandeur. This periodization was accepted by historians such as Lessing and had a great influence on neoclassicism. He rejected the Baroque as excessive. This inspired the neoclassical rejection of the Rococo. His meticulous descriptions of classical statues and remains laid the foundation for the modern archaeological method. Winckelmann's ideas had a profound impact on the German writers Goethe and Schiller, enthusiasts of neoclassicism. Goethe traveled to Italy following in his footsteps. The composer Richard Wagner defended the beauty of Hellenistic art in the face of Winckelmann's classicist canon. For his part, the English painter Joshua Reynolds rejected Winckelmann's ideas, defending an idealism based on Raphael and Michelangelo as opposed to the imitation of Greek art. In 1768, as he was about to return to Germany, Winckelmann was assassinated in Trieste by a thief who was trying to steal his medals and old coins. He is considered the father of art history and one of the main architects of neoclassicism (Harloe, 2013; Hatfield, 1964; North, 2013; Potts, 2000; Valdez, 2014).



Figure 1a. Johann Joachim Winckelmann.



Figure 1b. The Torso of Belvedere.



Figure 1c. Apollo of Belvedere.

Goethe discovered Winckelmann's work during his studies in Leipzig and was greatly impressed by his ideas about the Greek ideal of beauty and nobility. In 1786, Goethe made a formative trip to Italy, following in

Winckelmann's footsteps. He visited Rome and Naples to see first-hand the vestiges of classical antiquity. Winckelmann's descriptions of statues such as the Apollo of Belvedere or the Torso of Belvedere deeply inspired Goethe. In his work 'Journey to Italy', Goethe pays tribute to Winckelmann's work in rescuing Greek art from oblivion and laying the foundations of neoclassicism. He shares with Winckelmann the admiration for the serenity and simplicity of Greek art as opposed to the 'exaggerated' art of the Baroque. However, Goethe has his own more idealistic view of antiquity. He is not a blind follower of Winckelmann but incorporates Winckelmann's ideas into his conception of Weimar classicism, along with Schiller. He defends an ideal of balance and control of the passions. In poems such as 'Limits of the Human Being' the influence of Winckelmann's exaltation of classical Greece can be appreciated. Goethe also departed from Winckelmann in his revaluation of nature, compared to the former's artistic-historical emphasis (J. v. Goethe, 2013; Hatfield, 1964; Valdez, 2014; Wellbery, Atkins, & von Goethe, 2014).

Hölderlin discovered Winckelmann's work during his studies and was greatly impressed by his idealized view of Classical Greece. It incorporated many of his ideas. He shares with Winckelmann a deep love for Greek culture and a view of that period as the pinnacle of humanity. In his novels 'Hyperion' and 'The Death of Empedocles' we can see Hölderlin's admiration for the Greece of Pericles that Winckelmann extolled so much. However, Hölderlin has a more nostalgic and melancholic view of that lost ideal of the Greeks. It is not a celebration but a longing. In his later odes he laments the remoteness of the Greek gods and the loss of that harmony with nature. Hölderlin criticizes Winckelmann's neoclassical imitation and advocates a more spiritual return to the Greek. Aesthetically, Hölderlin departs from Winckelmann's classicism and elaborates a freer poetic language, with a changing rhythm. In short, Winckelmann was a key inspiration for Hölderlin, but he ended up developing a very personal voice on Greece, with more emphasis on longing than mimesis (Holderlin, 2008; Hölderlin, 1980, 2016; Murrey, 2014; Weineck, 2012).



Figure 2a. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.




Figure 2b. Christian Friedrich Hölderlin.




Figure 2c. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche.

Winckelmann and Friedrich Nietzsche lived in distinct times, but some connections and influences can be found between his ideas and works. Nietzsche was highly critical of Winckelmann's neoclassicism and idealism, which he saw as a sterile imitation of antiquity. In works such as 'The Birth of Tragedy', Nietzsche rails against Winckelmann's vision of a serene and Apollonian Greek art. Nietzsche vindicates the Dionysian. He points out that Winckelmann and the neoclassicists saw only a friendly side of the Greek spirit, ignoring its tragic and abject side. Nietzsche also firmly rejected Winckelmann's academic and archaeological emphasis, advocating a vital appropriation of the Greek legacy. In contrast to Winckelmann's nostalgia, Nietzsche adopts a critical and unnostalgic stance towards classical Greece. In aesthetic terms, Nietzsche proposes a substantially different artistic ideal, far removed from classicism. However, Nietzsche agrees with Winckelmann in pointing to classical Greece as a point of reference and cultural landmark. Both thinkers also share a deep interest and knowledge of Hellenic culture in its many facets (Böckmann, 1941; Guthenke, 2008; Hatfield, 1964; Liebert, 1937; McGill, 1940; North, 2013; Valdez, 2014; Weineck, 2012).

Text of 'Hellas and Germania' (A. Baeumler, 1937).

Not Iphigenia's sweet complaint:

'And I spend long days on this shore
seeking in the soul the land of the Greeks';

but the impetuous expression of will of Faust addressed to the wise Chiron:

*'And should not I bring you back to life,
With the strength of my ardent longing,
the unique picture of it all?'*

it adequately expresses the relation of the Germanic spirit to Hellas. For Western culture, the recovery of the Hellenic is the result of the immense efforts made by the soul of the Germanic race to return to itself. German Hellenism is a conquest, undertaken with a courage whose dimensions are truly universal-historical, of forgotten coasts and summits of the past, a true expedition of Alexander in the dominion of soul and spirit.

The reason why this event has not always been seen and understood correctly is to be found in the fact that we have not yet finished the action of reconquering the Hellenic world. But if one closes one's eyes to the reality of Germanic Hellenism, one inevitably runs the risk of misunderstanding and distorting such shocking phenomena as Hölderlin and Nietzsche. Therefore, the decisive battle begins with them.

The century will have to tell what values the West will use to shape a future. We are sure that only a system of values deeply akin to the Hellenic one will be able to save Europe from the anarchy of values. The discovery of the Hellenic world signifies nothing less than the harbinger of a new epoch, of an epoch beyond the Gothic and the Enlightenment. For us, the Hellenic is not one value among others, nor even a historical greatness next to the Roman, the Iranian or the Indian world. Rather, our consciousness confirms the intuitive certainty of Winckelmann, Hölderlin, and Nietzsche, according to which our fate is decided in relation to Helena.

For the West, the Germanic reconquest of Hellas is a process that is fertile in development and therefore difficult to grasp at a glance. To avoid any misunderstanding, we must firmly maintain that, despite its alleged great scientific merits, the 'neohumanism' of the nineteenth century, understood as a whole as a posthumous effect of the imposing Hellenic movement, represents a regression that risks reducing Greek antiquity to a mere occasion, albeit apparently privileged, of historical knowledge. Among the neo-humanists only one was able to think and act according to an immediate relation to the Hellenic essence: Friedrich Thiersch. It should therefore be called philhellenic rather than neo-humanist. His basic assumption is life, not history: and so,

even among philologists, he was the only one to recognize the grecity in Jahn's significant theory of physical exercise.

Nietzsche's merit is that he recognized and averted the danger of historicism. In his tragic struggle against neohumanism, Nietzsche safeguarded the vital importance of Hellenism to Western culture. Since Nietzsche, Germanism and Hellenism are directly related to each other. In their covenant of alliance lies the guarantee of the spiritual unity of Europe. But this unity does not spring from mere scientific cooperation, but rests on essential determinations of commonly shared values. **The peoples who make up spiritual Europe cannot be taken for an indistinct whole, and yet the fact that they can be brought together under the banners of a life-bearing system of values, which represented by Hellas, should not be underestimated.**

Crippled by its own excess of historical critique, 'neohumanism' has defined as a prejudice of classicism the fact that in the Hellenic world there dwells a power that for us constitutes an essential binding model. And, precisely at this decisive point, classicism has shown itself superior to the 'neohumanism' that emerged from it. Historicism has been scandalized that classicism has established an absolute norm. But the mistake lies rather in having understood this norm, valid for praxis, only in aesthetic terms. The idea of race, then, leads us to understand the meaning of that absolute norm starting from the physical element in its deepest roots, and therefore Hellenic.

Let us, then, leave aside 'neo-humanism', this unhappy birth of philological and historical criticism, and return to that single complex of creative acts which, as the spiritual reconquest of true Hellenism, certainly has greater significance for the history of western Germany than the much-decanted Renaissance.

It is clear that this reconquest must have begun with the humanism of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In fact, in order to reconquer Hellenism, humanism had to give itself certain presuppositions. But the humanism of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries represents a prelude to what begins only with Winckelmann. Born with Winckelmann, classicism is more than a taste and a literary or artistic current: it is a real movement that cannot be encompassed in humanism. Winckelmann did not limit himself to projecting onto ancient art the humanistic image of the exemplarity and paradigmatic value of ancient authors but instituted a new relationship with antiquity thanks to the fact that he had placed Hellas as such at the center of his reflections, elevating the Greeks, as a historically existing people, a living model.

Until Winckelmann, Rome was the undisputed historical, religious, and spiritual fulcrum of the West. The city on the banks of the Tiber was the 'eternal' city par excellence, the heir of the ancient world, the mediator

between declining antiquity and the new Christian one. Until Winckelmann, all studies devoted to Hellenism were closely linked to an overall vision whose center was Rome. Hellenistic studies had never modified the essentially Romanesque character of humanism. Humanism had always remained true to its Latin origins. The spiritual unity of the West seemed to derive perennially from the confrontation and integration of the two 'Romanesque' traditions (the ancient and the Christian). The Rome of Augustus together with that of St. Peter: was this not Europe? Homer, Plato, and Euclid were later annexed to the Romanesque vision of Europe. No one had ever thought that Hellenism could constitute a world in itself, an autonomous cosmos to be perceived and understood unconditionally. The Hellenic was only one of the elements of the ancient tradition. The latter would have perceived its scent and perfume without in any way modifying the primacy of Rome.

Winckelmann erased the vague idea of 'antiquity', recognizing the centrality of Athens and retreating Rome to second place. For this reason, he effected a transvaluation whose meaning neither Winckelmann himself nor his contemporaries could have misunderstood.

'The most silent words are those that stir up the storm. The ideas that surprise us guide the world with a feline step'.

If ideas have never come with a feline step, certainly are the Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture, published in Dresden in 1755. Without flinching, no one can take in their hands the book that gave life to the Hellenic movement. The concrete premise is Dresden's collection of ancient statues. After noting that Dresden contains in its collection works of indisputable attribution to Greek masters, Winckelmann begins as follows: *'The purest sources of art have been opened: blessed is he who discovers and tastes them. Finding these sources means setting out for Athens; and Dresden will henceforth be the Athens of artists'*.

In other words, go to Athens, not to Rome, and not to Paris. Winckelmann founded the new kingdom, disassociating himself from the Romanesque-humanistic legacy. His visual sensibility has opened up to him the domain of beauty, to which the West had had no access before him. Leaping space and time, guided only by his genius, Winckelmann managed to grasp what he felt was close to the depths of his being. In it, Romanism and Latinism are thus immediately transcended.

'As much as we may be able, the only way we can be inimitable is by imitation of the ancients, and what has been said about Homer, namely, that he learns to admire him who knows how to understand him, applies equally to all the works of art of antiquity, particularly those of Greece'. Good taste, so say the 'Thoughts on Imitation', is first formed under the Greek sky, and the

taste which Greece bestowed on her works of art has been indelibly impressed upon her. In the 'History of Ancient Art' of 1763, the ripe fruit of Winckelmann's Hellenism, we read this lapidary passage: 'The Roman artists must be regarded as imitators of the Greeks, so that they cannot have given life to any school or any style'. With this idea, the West begins to detach itself from the undisputed authority of Rome. If, in the course of a century, Goethe, Hölderlin, and Nietzsche respectively discovered the Homeric epic, the Pindaric lyric, the Attic tragedy, and the pre-Socratic philosophy, they owe it to Winckelmann.

A no less significant shift in thinking is closely linked to the transvaluation that for the first time, and in a specific context, puts Athens in the place of Rome. Winckelmann is not so much a new humanist, who, instead of the literary beauty of the ancient authors, admires the plastic beauties of the Greek artists, as rather a revolutionary who, with an ardent spirit, dares to confront the present with Hellenic reality captured with rare insight. In this way, German classicism separates itself from any humanistic aspect, since it does not assume a posteriori or imitate a form, but rather discovers an entire world. As we read Winckelmann, the Hellenic world appears to us as if by enchantment, enigmatically projected and made visible in the evocations of the Rococo. That Winckelmann is the discoverer of a cosmos can be understood, as always, by the style of his language. He is not really talking about art and literature, but about the man who creates art and literature. Hellenism, according to Winckelmann, is a way of being of man: relating to the world, interpreted free from the shadows of the Middle Ages, of an illusory afterlife, and celebrating it in all its splendor.

Winckelmann's plotinizing metaphysics of the Beautiful reveals itself to be insignificant and lacking in originality; while his descriptions of works of art reveal an entire world to us. In them he appears to us as one of the most brilliant realists in historical terms of all time. On the basis of the classicist formula of 'noble simplicity and quiet grandeur', one cannot help but understand what Winckelmann manages to say about nature, living forms and the Greek gods. He unveiled the Hellenic physis and understood the meaning of the care devoted to this physis by a people who have aimed exclusively at 'begetting beautiful children'. 'For the Greeks, nature was everything we imagined in idealistic terms'. The physical education of children was considered a crucial task. 'Thanks to physical exercise, the bodies were able to retain a gallant and manly aspect, that aspect which the Greek masters conferred on their statues, without superfluous ornaments and additions'. Along with the gymnastic competitions we must mention the great festivals and games that give luster to Hellenic life. The naked Greek reveals himself in all his bodily perfection; Art in this respect is by no means an outward adornment, but the natural reflection of a perfect existence. There is no such good order of life within the rigid 'Egyptian' laws. The essential political

condition of the Greeks is freedom. Political freedom is rooted in the freedom of art.

With reason and acuity, Winckelmann reiterates as a fundamental characteristic of the Greeks the 'serenity of the soul'. By this he also understands a strong and glorious vital resonance, typical of a people who are at the same time warriors and artists. Neither the Egyptians, nor the Etruscans, nor the Romans knew the joyful and triumphant tone of Hellenic virtue. Winckelmann is completely alien to the formalist interpretation (derived from a misunderstood harmony) of the 'Greek serenity' that 'neohumanism' would later pass off as the quintessence of the Hellenic worldview, which Nietzsche later firmly refuted in 'The Birth of Tragedy'. When he weaves the praise of the 'serenity of the soul', Winckelmann does not invent it out of thin air, but glimpses it as the salient national trait of the Hellenes, which he deduces from their works and their lifestyle. With the same representative force he fixed the specific characteristic of the Hellenic essence, that is, the high esteem enjoyed by children and young people. The purest representation of beauty, which Winckelmann conducts in harmony with the Hellenes and in opposition to the Gothic taste, is given by the developmental phase from puberty to adulthood. Guided by his own artistic sensibility, he identifies the heroic lifestyle with the Ephebic Apollonian principle in which extreme tension is combined with supreme grace. By relying on this principle, Winckelmann captures the heart of the real life of the Greeks.

Youth and virility, both delineating the true 'serenity of the soul', find their perfect representation in Apollo. With Winckelmann, Apollo becomes for the West the divinity symbolizing the Hellenic world. Belvedere's description of the Apollo goes so deep that it corresponds much more to the preclassic Apollo of the temple of Zeus at Olympia than to the later-period statue that Winckelmann actually had before his eyes at the time of describing it.

'His stature surpasses all human form, and his bearing reflects the divine greatness which imprints him . . . From the heights of his purity, he sublimely directs his gaze to the infinite, beyond his victory: on his lips one reads contempt, and the anger he encloses within himself dilates his nostrils and rises to his haughty forehead.

Humanism interpreted the gods in an allegorical sense, that is, not as a reality of worship, but as abstractions, personifications, imaginations, poetic fictions. On the contrary, Winckelmann's renewed relationship with Hellenism is shown by the fact that in his descriptions he breaks with allegorical rationalism and, as an ancient interpreter would have done, bases them on the distinction between men and gods. For Winckelmann, God is not so much an idealized and spiritualized man as a true divinity, that is, an autonomous entity, separate in relation to the being of man's world. The Greeks call the

gods 'the Blessed'. And Winckelmann places as the main characteristic of the image of the gods the blissful tranquility. Winckelmann therefore continues his description of the Apollo of Belvedere as follows: 'But the peace and tranquility of the soul that floats above it remains unchanged [...]'.

In the landmark commemorative letter of 1805 dedicated by Goethe to Winckelmann, Winckelmann is celebrated as an 'ancient nature'. The appellation shows how profoundly Winckelmann's influence has acted. It shows how Goethe understood Winckelmann to the core. One can be a humanist or an archaeologist, without possessing an 'ancient nature'; but only the latter would have been able to comprehend the Hellenic world.

Goethe knew that he was not only an epigone of Winckelmann's efforts in the field of art, but also an ancient nature that continues the struggle for life waged by his famous predecessor. Thanks to him, classicism has become an essential constituent of German culture, but not without losing in strength and resolution what it had achieved with Winckelmann.

A single overview is by no means sufficient to do justice to Goethe's enormous contribution to the reconquest of the Hellenic world. However, we wish to fix here its consequences in the field of the history of the German spirit. Unlike the tragic natures of Hölderlin and Nietzsche, Goethe's epic spirit did not set out to make the fateful decision first made by Winckelmann. Goethe's classicism finds its ultimate expression in the second part of Faust, that is, in the superb vision of the union between the Germanic spirit and the Greek spirit. The historical event that begins with Winckelmann and is defined by Goethe has its allegorical representation in the nuptials between Faust and Helen.

The Spell of Helena-Galatea is undoubtedly among the poet's most fascinating creations and is on the same level as his youthful lyrics. But here the Winckelmannian vision and theory of the Apollonian and virile nature of the Hellenic world are missing. Apollo's spell would have been more historiographically correct and more historically significant than Helen's. If he had wanted to make a decisive contribution to Winckelmann's description of Heracles' Torso, Goethe would have had to portray a Siegfried (albeit an outsized one for his imagination!).

The second part of Faust does not represent the document of a new opening, but the testimony of the personal life of the Author in the twilight of his second period. The Gothic spirit from which Goethe has just detached himself is shown to be on a par with the Hellenic one, precisely because Goethe clearly sees before him the historical task of proceeding with the recovery of the Germanic spirit to which the Gothic also tends. But this would only have been possible by passing through Apollo and not Helen. Initiated by Winckelmann, the break with the Gothic vein recedes, although only in part,

through Goethe's individual resolution of the conflict.

But we must never lose sight of development in its entirety: without Goethe, the opening up of Greek antiquity would never have been a decisive event in the history of the German mind. His sincere 'feeling of antiquity' bursts forth continuously and with great energy from his superb verses. As far as his conscience has been able to go, poems such as 'The Bride of Corinth' and 'Great is Diana Ephesians!' show it. But Goethe also looks into the depths of Hellenic religion with the 'Song of the Fates' and 'The Limits of the Human'. But what prevented Goethe from making up his mind? Goethe's classicism lacks that moment which Winckelmann was so resolute about and then reappeared with Hölderlin and Nietzsche: it lacks the awareness that classicism belongs to the sphere of religion and that in this sphere no 'this and that' is allowed, but only an 'or this or that'. Winckelmann raised the question of religion, which Goethe assumed and understood, but left it unresolved. This constitutes the historical-spiritual presupposition of the tragic life of Hölderlin and Nietzsche.

The indecision in which the Faustian poem runs aground is expressed by the aesthetic position of the late Goethe, who avoids drawing the extreme consequences of classicism: that is why he does not succeed, as a poet, in grasping the great ancient style. The path that leads to the hymn, pursued, and found by Hölderlin with the sacrifice of a lifetime, is therefore closed to him. And it is true that in Goethe's poetry the gods appear from time to time, but always and only evoked, never directly questioned, and celebrated. The admirable lyrics of the *Divan* create an original and partly religious atmosphere – a mystical-pantheistic atmosphere, never ancient. Thus, the second part of *Faust* is an expression of a commitment: not only in terms of worldview, but also in an aesthetic sense.

And as the classicist Goethe's masterpiece *Pandora* demonstrated, the mixture of classical and romantic elements could not necessarily lead to a formal hodgepodge and thus ultimately to the most hybrid form of the Baroque, that is, opera. The classicist Goethe thus leads to a form of art that is not absolutely Greek, but romantic, no different from the other Germans who, only a generation before the conclusion of the Faustian poem, had recovered, thanks to Hölderlin's work, the Pindaric hymn.

Goethe merely collects and transmits, while Hölderlin decides and looks ahead. Hölderlin's last 'Hymns' are presented with unparalleled purity and in absolute independence from the formal Baroque universe of the eighteenth century. And we certainly do not belittle the all-encompassing, conservative, and conciliatory spirit of the great Goethe, if we declare that German classicism is fulfilled not by Goethe but by Hölderlin! For us, Goethe remains the same. But Hölderlin is the man of destiny who, revered by us as a seer, had previously been long unknown.

To give expression to his universal vision, Goethe turns to the Persians and the Indians; Hölderlin, on the other hand, knows only Hellas and Germania. Hölderlin's path is identified with the course of destiny of the German spirit: it returns to Germany via Hellas. And we could not distort it more brutally than by relating it to the romantic school! It is precisely the purity of classicism that separates him from the romantic Goethe. In his poetry, the landscape and the altars of Hellas stand with an immediacy that is somewhat disturbing to us moderns. The poet who never set foot on Greek soil contemplates the panorama of the Greek archipelago:

'Of your islands, still flourishing, none has disappeared. Crete and Salamis green with the imperishable laurel; Delos, surrounded by fertile reefs, raises its haughty head at dawn; Tenedos and Chios abound with purple fruits; From fertile hills flows the fountain of Cyprus; of the Calaurius, as of old, silvery streams pour into the ancient waters of Father Oceanus. All of them are still alive, the mothers of heroes, the islands, blooming year after year'.

When, one morning, looking down from the ship, I looked for Delos and a flat, elongated island presented itself, I knew then that this could not be the old Delos, and that therefore Hölderlin had been mistaken in portraying it with a 'haughty head'. But it soon became clear to me that what had appeared to me was the great Delos; while not even the Ionic Homer could have described more accurately than the Swabian Hölderlin the island of Apollo and Leto, the little Delos I saw shortly afterwards, with the rough height of the Cinto.

What Winckelmann had intuited would later appear in all its vivid reality to the contemplative soul. It would contemplate, however, not an absolute 'beauty' or a fictitious and idealized Greece, but that real context that is Hellas with its gods, heroes, and men. This world has not collapsed, but still maintains a mysterious relationship with the object of our search and discovery. Hölderlin, in the last analysis, glimpses what binds us so closely to Hellas not in the sphere of art and poetry, nor even in the domain of noble sentiments and ideals. With the courage that comes from purity, he glimpses in the bond that unites us to Hellas the same relationship that mediates between us and the Hellenic gods. We love Greece because its gods are also ours. The poet who for more than a century has been understood and misunderstood as the singer of a romantic nostalgia for Greece, reveals himself in the end to be the only sober person in an age of abstract, romantic, and idealistic intoxications. Hölderlin speaks of a healthy sobriety, announcing a healthy realism: without gods there is no community, and without community no heroic life is possible. Uprooted equals ungodly.

'To die is to live alone and without gods!'

Where there are heroes, there gods are worshipped. Hölderlin's hope

for Germany thus coincides with the hope of the return of the gods.

'I can already hear the choruses of the party in the distance
in the green heights and the echo of the forests;
where the child's spirit is awakened, where the changing soul of the people
joins in the song of praise to the gods'.

The peculiarity of Hölderlin's lyric consists in the fact that it excludes with the utmost energy any accidental, sentimental, or personal accent. It is 'anti-modern' in the highest degree, for it reveals nothing subjective or romantic. Hölderlin wonders about man, but he can only answer if he announces divinity. Without the touchstone of the divine, men fall into disorder. It is only if they remain devoted to the sacred powers that peoples reach their summit.

'Only before the Celestial Ones the peoples
They obey the sacred hierarchical order
erecting temples and cities [...]

Hölderlin announces a new communion between gods and men: not the unity of an absolute God and man, but the union of a popular community with its own gods. The Poet cannot live without a community. He is not so much a spokesman for the subjective feelings and thoughts of isolated individuals, which only taken together form an audience capable of understanding, as an original and spontaneous singer of hymns and praises to the divine powers, their interpreter, who only by placing himself at the service of the divinity recognizes himself as an integral part of the community. But in an age without gods, the relationship with the community is altered. The Poet is that loner who does not see the hour 'when my solitary song / joins you in songs of joy [...]'.

Thus, the gods are not 'given' to us like the weather, plants, and stones: their reality has a mysterious relationship with the life of the community that worships them. 'As heroes crown them, so the sacred elements need the devoted heart of man to honor them'. That is why the gods are no longer seen like the stars in the sky. A community without gods cannot, therefore, reintroduce the cult of the Celestials by a majority vote. Peoples only return to their gods in the sudden resonance of historical events. Consciousness moves along with what happens in the course of time. Knowledge of the decline of the gods is given only to those who have not yet boldly lost faith in the people and in the return of the gods. And the courage of one's vocation grows along with the deepening of one's consciousness. It is here that we must look for the meaning of the famous passage in the Hyperion about the Germans.

And where Hölderlin finally arrived in complete solitude, Nietzsche has gone through his entire brief life, but bathed in the brilliance emanating from a crucial turnaround. The consciousness of the disappearance of the gods in his century does not leave him for a moment. It is precisely this awareness that gives life to the most stupefying and enigmatic book, 'The Birth of the Tragedy of the Spirit of Music'.

Nietzsche had to re-establish the relationship between the German and Hellenic spirits on the basis of a markedly worsened situation, from which the nineteenth-century sciences of antiquity expanded in all directions and were determined in a 'neo-humanistic' sense. Apollo was conjured by Winckelmann, while Helen was conjured by Goethe. Hölderlin's appeal, on the other hand, went unheeded. The Germans, however, must make Hölderlin's fate their own; and with the youthful work of Nietzsche the Hellenic movement enters a new phase. From now on, the religious question posed by classicism falls under the enlightening light of conscience and is decisive for German spirituality. Associated with Nietzsche's name is the idea, ever more pressing, of that far-reaching decision before us.

Starting from the universe of Winckelmann and Goethe, the young Nietzsche raises the question of why, since the time of our two predecessors, the tension that leads us back to the Greeks has been progressively relaxed; Moreover, he draws the conclusion that at some crucial points even the two precursors did not succeed in 'penetrating the core of the Hellenic essence and establishing a union of love between Greek and German culture'. Nietzsche's ensuing struggle to define precisely the Hellenic spirit reaches its own fulfillment in the face of the heroes of classicism. Nietzsche turns to Winckelmann and Goethe from the heights of a strengthened relationship with Hellenism and with a mixture of superiority and recognized respect: 'Perhaps the Germans have incurred an unfavorable climate. But there is something Hellenic about them – and this is awakened in contact with the South: Winckelmann, Goethe, and Mozart'.

The essential character of Nietzsche's youthful work, a work composed on an impulse of necessity, in any respect, certainly does not make it easy for the Author to delineate his overall understanding of the Hellenic spirit. The young Nietzsche speaks of a Greek god and his return under the mask of a learned philologist. The Hellenic spirit and the Germanic spirit are united by a mysterious affinity. And so, after the former powers of life and art have lost their cathartic power, the time has come to revive the tragedy of the German spirit. Dionysus and Apollo are thus assumed: by antithesis and by identity at the same time, this is the new formula for designating both the Hellenic world and its most perfect creation: Attic tragedy.

And how powerful is the formula 'Dionysus and Apollo'! The allegorical game of Faust and Helen comes to an end. Before us stands the

ephebus god: victorious, sternly Doric, in all his resplendent splendor renewed. And next to him is Dionysus, 'mysterious and inscrutable', even though he is a Hellenic divinity made up of non-Greek elements. Today we tend to overestimate what Nietzsche says in psychological terms about sleep and drunkenness, forgetting the aesthetics of musical drama; And yet we marvel at discovering the grandiose project of restoring a Hellenic existence from the distinction between two opposing cults.

And it is precisely as an initiate of the god Dionysus (albeit with the aspect of one who gives shape to a theoretical treatise) that Nietzsche speaks to his own Alexandrian epoch of that reality whose language is music and dance. He calls 'Dionysian' that supreme pleasure to which the passage through twilight and negation leads, evaluating men and cultures in relation to a tragic-Dionysian criterion. The German soul, from the depths of which the Reformation was born at the time, seems to Nietzsche to be of a Dionysian nature. With unheard-of audacity, but with profound truthfulness, he quotes the Lutheran chorale as the 'first sign of the Dionysian call' and announces the rebirth of the German myth.

The decisive contribution to Nietzsche's life is the project of a new philosophy, starting from the unaltered forces of that profundity which is common to Hellenic and Germanic culture. The philosophy of the will to power, so difficult to interpret, so distorted, is born of a congeniality of soul and spirit with the auroral philosophy of pre-Socratic Hella. The Nietzschean project, *Dionysos philosophos*, signifies the definitive detachment of German philosophy from the theological-philosophical ballast in whose shadow German idealism developed. And so the name of Nietzsche is associated with the decisive crisis of Western philosophical thought.

In 'The Will to Power' we read an aphorism that tends to encompass the whole of German philosophy (and therefore Nietzsche himself) as a particular form of the Sehnsucht [desire for some intangible thing, note from translator] for the Greek world. This philosophy, Nietzsche argues, aims to continue in the discovery of antiquity, in the unearthing of ancient philosophy, especially of the pre-Socratic, of 'what among all the Greek temples is best concealed'. From this follows an interpretation of the German efforts aimed at a universal philosophical understanding, which at the same time corresponds to a self-definition and a justification of German classicism in its ultimate meaning:

'Therefore, it seems, we can judge from later centuries that the whole of German philosophy has a specific dignity precisely because it is a progressive recovery of antiquity, and any claim to 'originality' sounds petty and ridiculous in the face of the superior claim of the Germans: to have resumed that bond which seemed forever broken, that bond with the Greeks. that is, with the 'human type' so far best achieved. Today we approach all those

fundamental forms of interpretation of the world revealed by the Greek spirit with Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, and Anaxagoras. It is obvious that as far as our ideas and determinations of value are concerned, we are becoming more and more Greek, in the manner of ghostly Hellenizing presences; And I hope that in the near future this will also be true for our bodies! There I place henceforth (or rather always) all my hopes for the German essence!"

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Chapter 8.

Alfred Baeumler: Alfred Rosenberg and the Myth of the 20th Century.

Introduction (JSGJ).

One of Alfred Baeumler's several excellent texts is dedicated to political philosopher Alfred Rosenberg's masterpiece, entitled 'The Myth of the 20th Century' (Rosenberg, 2004; Rosenberg & Scholle, 1999). Here we present what we believe to be the first English translation of this text. In our opinion, and given the complexity of Rosenberg's text, we suggest that those interested read the text presented here first because it will provide them with an excellent basic approach. We have used the 1943 edition (A. Baeumler, 1943). This text, like others before it, is a translation that I hope will be improved and commented on by future researchers who are not afraid to do so. The quotations contained in this text are from the original edition and, in the future, they would have to be modified to the extent that there is a complete standard text of the Myth in English to cite. For suggestions and comments, please contact the translator.

Text of Alfred Rosenberg and the Myth of the 20th Century.

On the eastern border of Estonia stand two fortresses, facing each other. On the west bank of the Narva River rises Hermannsburg, built by the Teutonic Order: imposing and clearly structured, firmly rooted and at the same time projecting aloft, with sharp contours, the image of a force that, resting on itself, turns towards the world to dominate it spiritually.

On the eastern bank lies the Slavic fortress of Ivangorod. Endlessly piling up new masses, the barely articulated construction spills into space. Their proportions and measurements are almost unhuman. While the tower here in the West reminds us of the posture of a warrior who sits calm and secure in the chair, there in the East the idea of a humane and chivalrous attitude cannot be presented. These misshapen walls must hide terrible secrets. Before our spiritual eyes there appears an inhuman despotism and an equally inhuman servitude. Every medieval fortress has its dungeons, but this castle looks like a single, gloomy dungeon. We miss in this construction any resonance of a joyful and free creation. The hopelessness of a soul opposed to the German seems to have created in him its symbol.



Figure 1. Left. Hermann Castle (also Hermannsburg, Herman Castle, Narva Castle, Narva fortress, and *Hermanni linnus*) in Narva, eastern Estonia. Right. Ivangorod fortress (Ivangorod, Russia).

German form and Asian infinity: in the narrow space of the eastern border of the Baltic lands meet. From the silent absolutism of the architectural appearance, emerge with unprecedented force the characters that are the destiny of peoples.

As an East German, in an outpost of the ethnic group, Alfred Rosenberg was born. In the destiny-laden space where the form-rich center of Europe meets the immensely monotonous East, in the field of tension of two races and cultures, he received his first impressions. The Balts have united against the strangeness that surrounds them and have developed a closed, familiar tribal feeling. As if they represented a single European noble family, they opposed Russian breadth. In their stately estates and in their cities they cultivated the strict forms of humane chivalrous treatment, consciously erecting a protective wall of human measure against the foreign Tartar excess.



Figure 2. A map of the Baltic Tribes, around year 1200. The Eastern Balts are shown in brown hues while the Western Balts are shown in green. The boundaries are approximate (Wikipedia).

Hermannsburg is a true symbol of the Balt essence: something German, which could just as well be in Franconia, but here adopts a special stance: looking down with distant restraint on a world that does not and will never know the European form.

It is characteristic of the Balt to act through being. It is not proper for the Balts to attack this or that directly and change it by force. The Balts does not gladly deny it. He never rushes into details to destroy them; he waits until he can oppose the New as a Whole to the Old. When he has fully conformed to the New, no one can be more implacable than he, and nothing will prevent him from preferring the Right and Noble to the False and Ignoble.

There is something about the Balt that could be called a sense of humanity, a special sense of the relationship between human beings. This sense is something different from mere social touch, it is a certain way of seeing the world. A Balt always sees the world through the medium of the human being. It cannot and will never abstract from the human. Everywhere he looks through, from the work to the creator, from the achievement to the one who does it.

In a very profound sense, he is the man of the anecdote. Who could rejoice more cordially over an anecdote than he? But what is an anecdote? The revelation, reduced to its bare minimum, of a human character or situation. The interest in characters and situations is a Baltic tribal peculiarity and it must be added that, in spite of all aesthetic talent, this interest is essentially ethical. What matters is how the whole human being behaves, how he answers a question in life, how he relates to the world and to other human beings.

In the unique and special thing that Rosenberg's work has brought to the German spirit, we recognize a historical gift from the East at the center of German collective life. What the Fatherland gave him, he gives back to the spiritual Fatherland to which the Baltic people have always been united. Goethe and Schopenhauer educated Rosenberg, and he never denied his inner affinity with the spirit of Kant. In the face of his work, schematisms that seek to bring the East back to the 'Prussian style' or to Herder's empathic capacity fail. The Baltic essence cannot be defined by the 'Prussian style' or by the romantic richness of the soul. The proximity of Russia's immense space and its configurations of power have generated in the Baltic an internal breadth that has become alien to the German interior, which in the course of the tragic history of the Reich became too narrow within small political territories. Nowhere else in the total German space has anything been formed that could be compared to the attitude of the Baltic: hardness in the innermost core, which joins an unusual breadth of horizons in a unique character. It is only on the border, in constant coexistence with a foreign ethnic group, that sensibility for human beings and wills can be developed, which, together with the breadth of the soul, constitutes the particularity of the Baltic.

Baltic Germanism is in the early nineteenth century in a similar relationship to the core territory as Southeastern Germanism is to Bismarck's Empire. Neither the Protestant Northeast nor the Catholic Southeast fit into the educational atmosphere of Bismarck's Empire. Neither is touched by the state's conception of the nuclear territory, which combines the realism of a

new age with the philosophical idealism of Fichte and Hegel in a mixture. The dangers that lay in the idealistic statism of Bismarck's Empire did not exist for the eastern frontier regions of the old empire. Here there was maintained a disposition to see the political and the spiritual in new ways, a disposition that in inner Germany had disappeared under the pressure of statist narrowing. *It is impossible to consider it a coincidence that the two books that revolutionized the political and spiritual attitude of the nuclear territory, Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf and Rosenberg's The Myth of the Twentieth Century, were written by Germans from the northeastern and southeastern periphery of the former Reich.*

The boy who was born on January 12, 1893 in a bourgeois house in the town of Reval on the Estonian coast, fate had not put an easy life in the cradle. The Balto does not carry the heart on his tongue; but even from the sinnest indications the vital feeling of a soul can be guessed. Even the imprisoned Kant has been recognized as melancholy. Rosenberg's literary oeuvre remains completely free of all painting, mood, and conceptual lyricism; From this man for whom only action and form count, a direct manifestation of feeling is not to be expected. And yet in his work a continuous trait of feeling is clearly perceptible. It is the human appeal of this work that its triumphant content is sustained by the slow movement of a melancholy soul. Rosenberg's heart is not casually attached to the vast and severe landscape of his homeland; where you should feel at home in the middle of forests, fields and meadows, it has to be 'like in Estonia'. Something of the pastoral mode of the third act of 'Tristan und Isolde', of a longing for infinity that goes beyond all forms, is found in this melancholy, before which the world sometimes seems to recede like a shadow. For such a soul, life is sometimes perceived as a melancholy affair. This state of mind has been compressed by Schopenhauer (in the poem on Kant's death) in the wonderful verse:

'The world is barren, and life is long'.

Spiritual creation can never be deduced from temperament. But surely the secret of creative impulses is closely connected with the type and color of temperament.



Figure 3. Alfred Rosenberg.

At the end of the first book of 'The Myth', Rosenberg draws a picture of Germanic man. He is the man of 'ecstasy', with this word Chamberlain had already given the concept of idealism, the man of discoveries and audacity, of scientific knowledge and personal artistic creation. Rosenberg characterizes ecstasy more closely as 'maximum mental disposition for action'. But in the deepest depths of this disposition for action he discovers what has just given this image its true Nordic depth: the feeling of the oneness and singularity of the soul, which is the presupposition of all freedom and greatness, and the consciousness of solitude that arises from it. 'Everything stands colored and configured in a peculiar way, intuited and strange at the same time, and in the middle and next to it I find myself, the Nordic man, the consciousness that has become the mystery of existence, solitary' (The Myth, p. 271).

Description and confession merge in this sentence, and it is precisely on this that the objective truth of the work that contains it is based. Solitude and action condition each other in the Germanic personality. For the action here is not a senseless and violent activity or an inner restlessness that moves on pre-written tracks, but the creative movement of a self-surrendered self. The action of the Nordic man is born of the dream of the soul, the great doers of the north are at the same time the eternal dreamers. There is nothing indeterminate and 'dreamy' about this concept of dreaming; as Rosenberg uses this expression, it is a clear term of genuine psychological depth. Dreamers in this sense are people who splurge generously on the world. Whoever knows how to speak of dreams in this way knows the presuppositions of world-historical action. Before all decisive action there is the audacious project, that inner action which is initially only the most secret possession of an individual and is revealed by decision. With this he enters the conditions of time and falls under the power of fate. But even the work, dismembered by the necessities of existence, is haloed by the brilliance of the soul that once dreamed of it.

Even the most rationally lucid creative man is never a purely rational being. From a center which always remains in darkness arises all that suddenly rises before us, as if sprung up 'out of nothing', the free projects of

the soul, for which there is no previous trace in the given connection of things. *Anyone who builds something out of his own strength somehow makes his way from darkness to light.* In some, one project follows another until finally the last one becomes a work. Others carry out only a single thought apprehended with foreboding and clarity in youth. So it was with Schopenhauer, and similarly with Rosenberg.

The dispositions which are united in it are maintained in their diversity with the greatest severity by the unity of character. On the basic disposition for the configuring vision and the configuring creation, he initially embraces the profession of architect. The internal dynamics of his nature push him beyond the realm of artistic creation, without changing the configuring impulse. The only thing that transforms is the form of expression you choose. Under the constraint of an internal necessity, the innate configuring force shifts from the artistic to the real human; the action of men in their characterological conditioning attracts interest upon themselves. He recognizes it as his life's task to see, distinguish and make forms in this area. It moves away from stone, metal and wood to turn to the noblest and most difficult material that exists: the human being.

From the artist emerges the politician and philosopher of culture. Perhaps here it may be recalled that Westphalia, the homeland of the Balt tribe, is the land that in two apparently opposite spheres has produced forms of maximum simplicity and strength: within the art of the Romanesque style, a proud succession of magnificent constructions and in the sphere of human coexistence, an exemplary juridical thought. Understanding the relationships between people in their structure as buildings, understanding the juridical-political systems almost architecturally and conceiving them as an expression of human characters, has always remained the strength of Balt Rosenberg.

As if driven by an inner force, at the age of 24 he begins to write thoughts, not knowing where that will take him. The innate gift for configuration means that, from the first attempt, he achieves closed texts, and his formulations have an astonishing certainty and maturity. But the most remarkable thing is that this young writer makes decisions that he will not need to retract in his entire life. We are faced with the rare case of a perfectly straightforward inner development, which is nevertheless not rigid at all, which can only be explained by an extraordinary firmness of character. Rosenberg's reflexive and political talents are not two different dispositions that somehow interact, but only two forms of expression of the same unitary fundamental force. The closed personality unfolds its activity in two opposite directions, which we usually find distributed in different personalities. So sure is this personality of itself, so firmly rested in confidence in its star, that it can afford the freest movement. The thinker communicates his firmness to the politician, the politician to the thinker his unconditionality.

Rosenberg's thought is political not only because it chooses political objects such as Judaism or the diversity of nations, but in a much deeper

sense. *We must call a thought truly political when it is not satisfied with the description of human phenomena, but advances to the motive forces that determine the life of the individual and of the community.* Guided by his unusual ability to grasp the essentially human, Rosenberg has developed his own style of political knowledge. It has taught us to recognize essential features and forms even where before everything seemed to dissolve into an amorphous subjectivism and an accidental moralism. In all that is human-historical, he knows how to discover with the sense of smell of a hunter the determining and configuring impulses. He knows no realm of pure forms that rests in itself and is enjoyed by a contemplative spirit. All that is spiritual autotelic is alien to him. Form is action. Every artistic or political form is born from a fluid igneous nucleus, it is the revelation of a soul. In the end, there is no form at all that is nothing but form: form is conformation. And all conformation is the action of a personality. Wherever we look in the human sphere, everywhere we find form, both in the daily life of a people and in its legal system or in its art. For this thought there is nothing fortuitous or isolated. Whether he is a statesman, an artist, a writer, or a Jewish merchant, Rosenberg relentlessly examines his work in terms of the internal form from which it proceeds. There is no room for evasion or excuse here; There is no retreat to an absolute spirit or good intentions: everything that happens is an expression of a mentality. Everyone must resign themselves to being held responsible for what they do. Form and consciousness are not on different planes that are separated as 'ethics' and 'aesthetics', but are one, and that is why Rosenberg must always understand conformation when he says form. *The produced is unthinkable without the producer, and the producer is always the personality.*

Without reflection, only guided by his instinct, Rosenberg has introduced configurative thinking into political and historical knowledge. Each form corresponds to a certain attitude of mind, the forms struggle with each other for their self-affirmation and validity, their struggle is the content of universal history; Germanic dynamism cannot imagine life in any other way than as a struggle of forces with each other. *Not to have understood this struggle as a mere animal struggle for existence, but as a struggle of form against form, that is, of value against value, is the decisive achievement in Rosenberg's thought.* 'Force against force, in God is compensation'. In this formula, to which Hebbel reduced Germanic dynamism, Rosenberg's basic assumption is also expressed. The subtitle of his major work, which reads: *'An Assessment of the Soul-Spiritual Shaping Struggles of Our Time'*, *should not have been overlooked.* To see in the daily struggle the battle of the spirits, not to idly contemplate the struggle of the spirits, to awaken and maintain in the midst of tumult the consciousness of the greatness and historical scope of the political event, this is the art in which Rosenberg is a master and in which no one surpasses him.

The book of his life, the foundations of which were already laid by his

first essays, was born of struggle and yet is at the same time the work of profound justice. Nothing can be called more Germanic and at the same time more German than this union of combative attitude and justice, which remains eternally incomprehensible to the pure man of violence. Pure violence lacks that with which the noble soul instinctively begins: the recognition of form.

At the same time, Rosenberg's work repels all those who want to be satisfied with the mere contemplation of forms. The 'Myth' has revealed the spiritual-historical wanderers on the battlefields for what they are: undecided spectators of a drama in which they would be obliged to participate. What is a character that only dreams of itself and renounces to fight in the hostile world for its existence and its honor? Whoever sees the shaping struggles of his time must also struggle with them. Not to see is not to want to see. *Contemplative knowledge obliges*. There is in this a debasement of man by refraining from taking a practical position and abandoning values in the space of the spirit to their destiny. For a value is really value only when it is affirmed by living men with all the devotion of their person and, if necessary, defended in the concrete clash. The coincidence of the philosophical and political orientation of the forces in Rosenberg's personality is based on the fact that the spiritual form is seen as compelling action.

The first notes in which Rosenberg attempts to give an account of his time and his position in it appeared in 1917 in Moscow. The Higher Technical School in Riga, where he had studied, was transferred to Moscow in 1915. In the same year that the Russian state collapsed, the student Rosenberg prepared his drawings for the state examination in architecture and in early 1918 passed the examination. On November 30, 1918, Rosenberg rented the great hall of the Black-headed House in Reval and gave a lecture on the subject 'The Jewish Question'. On the same night of this talk, he left Reval and traveled to Berlin. With instinctive certainty he had grasped one of the central themes and tasks of his life. A short time later he became a contributor in Munich to a political magazine entitled 'In Good German, Weekly for Order and Law'. Its founder and publisher is Dietrich Eckart. In the eighth issue of this magazine appears Rosenberg's first article against Bolshevism: 'The Russo-Jewish Revolution'.

It was a lucky star who guided Rosenberg to Munich. In the Munich State Library his spirit of learning found rich nourishment. Through tireless reading he unconsciously created the necessary prerequisites so that the thoughts conceived in Moscow and Reval could mature into a book. But also politically, Munich was the right ground for the young writer who saw the problems of the time from the Jewish question. The Baltic linguistic variety did not prevent the comrade from the far north, who did not even possess German citizenship, from being well received by the Bavarians fighting Judaism. The firm stand on the Jewish question was a credential of character that meant more than any paper and even more than the vernacular. At Dietrich Eckart's house, Rosenberg meets Adolf Hitler for the first time.

The young National Socialist movement immediately found in him one of its most active collaborators. His instinct for what was happening in the depths of time had led him single-handedly to speak to excited people surrounding Maria's column on Marienplatz and to hand out pamphlets together with Dietrich Eckart from a car. When, from January 1, 1921, the movement's fighting newspaper, the 'Völkischer Beobachter', began to be published in the possession of the party, he stood out with his first article in it (On Zionism), which was immediately followed by others on Freemasonry. In August 1921 he and Dietrich Eckart took over the management of the 'Völkischer Beobachter'. After (in February 1923) the 'Völkischer Beobachter' had become a daily newspaper, on March 10, 1923, he published on the front page the note: 'From today I have assumed the main editorship. Alfred Rosenberg'.



Figure 4a. Völkischer Beobachter. It started life in 1887 as the Münchener Beobachter. In 1918 Rudolf von Sebottendorff, a member of the Thule Society, a right-wing, völkisch and partially secret and esoteric group, acquired the newspaper. Early in 1920, the name was changed to Völkischer Beobachter.



Figure 4b. Völkischer Beobachter.

In the historical 'consultation hours', in which under the fiery breath of the time and the spiritual guidance of Adolf Hitler the ideas and tactical principles of the movement were shaped, Rosenberg always participates. On 14 October 1922 he was with the Leader on the decisive day in Coburg. On the night of November 8, 1923, he accompanied the Leader with his pistol in his hand to the hall of the Bürgerbräukeller, with pistol in hand, and on the morning of November 9 he marched at the head of the column that took the road to the Feldherrnhalle. The development of the man of action runs as straight as the spiritual unfolding.



Figure 5a. Alfred Rosenberg with Adolf Hitler during the Beer Hall Putsch in Munich, November 1923.



Figure 5b. Hitler in Munich addressing a meeting of the NSDAP in 1925. Third to the left of Hitler is Alfred Rosenberg, on the right are Gregor Strasser and Heinrich Himmler (Photo Heinrich Hoffmann).

Today one can scarcely imagine how much strength of character was then required to wage the seemingly hopeless struggle against the Jewish power. Anyone who rebelled against Judaism was branded a 'popular instigator'; It seemed unthinkable that a spiritual man could be anti-Jewish [changed from 'anti-Semitic', translator's note]. But it was precisely in the formation of a new spiritual attitude that the revolutionary nature of the National Socialist movement consisted. *The fatal mistake of its (non-Jewish) opponents was to suppose that this movement had adopted the program of the old 'anti-Judaism'. They did not see that this was not an 'anti', i.e., a struggle*

against the Jew as an opponent placed on the same plane, but something completely new. In the struggle of the National Socialist movement against Jewish rule, nothing of the narrow-mindedness which accompanied the previous 'anti-Semitism' [anti-Judaism] is perceptible, in spite of all its firmness of character. Rosenberg's early combat writings are not a continuation of the illustrated literature on Jews and Freemasons represented by the names of Fritsch and Wichtl.

The young National Socialist movement owes much to these men, but all its literature is something other than a continuation of what they started. While these men certainly already show an awareness of the connections in which modern Judaism and Freemasonry are to be viewed, it is only through the NSDAP that the struggle against the supranational powers has been conducted as truly political. The confrontation could only become truly penetrating if not only material was gathered, but also if the present representatives of these powers in Germany were concretely attacked, with the aim of eliminating them. But this, in turn, was only possible if there was a clear idea of what should take the place of the corrupt system that handed over the political and spiritual life of the people to international powers. Only from the positive side could the struggle be conducted effectively and in a new style.

For the men who fought with Adolf Hitler, an attitude that was probably unique in history was characteristic. The fanaticism of this entourage is well known; less well known is that inner unconditionality was accompanied by a cheerful superiority, which often turned into joviality. The Leader's Shakespearean humor very often resonated in liberating laughter with the temperaments of his closest associates. *It must not be forgotten that National Socialism not only had to fight against Jews, Communists and Freemasons, but at the same time had to distance itself from numerous nationalist and solitary groups that sought to wage the same struggle, when in fact they were still deeply attached to the ideas of the past.* To have prevented all mixing with folkloric-archaic circles belongs to the Leader's greatest achievements; and it was precisely in this struggle that he found in Rosenberg the strongest support. Very late in life, many opponents realized that National Socialism, in the midst of daily struggle, also represented a spiritual attitude that had previously been unknown.

Political decision and smiling security, fanaticism and détente were united in a unity in this attitude. The superiority that Adolf Hitler's fighters felt in themselves was nothing more than a psychological oddity: it had a historical basis, for it was an expression of the distance that separated the Leader and his entourage from their time.

During the period of the party's ban, when the Völkischer Beobachter also did not appear, Rosenberg founded the magazine 'Der Welt Kampf' [The World Struggle], in which he continued the struggle against the supranational powers from 1924 to 1930 (the year of the founding of the

National Socialist Monthly, 'Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte'). For years, 'The World Struggle' was the spiritual compilation of material for those who led the movement to victory in all German districts. The most pressing task was to show the German people that the pitiful state in which they found themselves was not due to the failure of their own forces, but that certain individuals, whose names were on everyone's lips, were to blame, because they practiced a policy of subjugation instead of a policy of resistance and reconstruction. At the same time, it had to be shown that these so-called German politicians did not really have command in hand but were led by those who were not always based in Germany.

The journalistic attack on the Invisibles was anything but easy. Information from the enemy camp was completely missing. *The National Socialist combat journalist depended on what Freemasons and Jews intentionally or unintentionally revealed in their newspapers, magazines, and books. As he immediately recognized, it was not at all a question of having information about the people and companies of the opposing side, but rather of making visible the adversary's way of feeling and valuing.* Only when the opponent had become a figure could the real fight against him begin. The facts that could be known had been known for some time; but knowledge remained dead as long as the adversary was not a figure. To condense it into a figure and thereby give the defensive forces goal, momentum, and direction, which was Rosenberg's feat.

His ability to grasp what is humanly essential and characteristic was fully developed. With the conscience of a passionate, tenacious and fierce fighter, endowed with an infallible sense of smell and backed by his excellent memory, he devoted himself to the pursuit of his adversary. From the self-incriminations of cynical and shameless impostors, he extracts all that there is to extract. Woe to him whom I have ever caught! He forgets no one, he lets go of none. He knows how to grab the opponent at the decisive point and knock him down or, when knocking him down is not possible, hit him in a way that hurts. *An irritated patriot or an offended moralist does not speak here, but the world-historical adversary of Jewish-democratic internationalism speaks here.* The journalist Rosenberg does not fight against Mr. Schmidt or Mr. Cohn, but he fights against the demon made visible, which is the mortal enemy of Germanness. It awakens in the reader the feeling: here it is a matter of life or death, it can only be You or Us!

In Rosenberg's articles and pamphlets from the early years of the movement's struggle, German nationalism takes on a new depth. It is neither literature nor historical knowledge prolonged to the present, when Rosenberg treats international capital as 'Moloch' and its servants as servants of Moloch. *Gold has been called an 'idol' a thousand times, but no one had had the courage to recognize that Jewish capitalism is true idolatry.* Such recognition could only come from one who clearly felt that the worshippers of Moloch were only triumphing because the servants of the national gods had become

weary, indolent, and skeptical. For Rosenberg, nationalism is something different from a matter of economics, but also something different from a matter of morality. The nation demands the whole man and thus aligns itself with the series of religious powers. But once the German has recognized what the nation demands of him, then he is certainly the God of Abraham, that very real Hebrew God who is worshipped even more in the stock markets than in the synagogues.



Figure 6a. Left. Modern Moloch (Quentin Massys or Metsys, 1466–1530).



Figure 6b. The Modern Golden Calf (Henri Meyer, 1841-1899).

It is a simple but coercive logic that underlies Rosenberg's position: you have to take your adversary seriously, you have to recognize that these people have to act this way because they are like that, and therefore they will never change. They have their gods, but we have ours!

If, in the struggle against Jews and Freemasons, Rosenberg moved in a field where much of what he had already achieved helped him, in taking a stand against Bolshevism he found himself completely reverted to himself, to his instinct and his experiences. The Bolshevik revolution was still in its infancy, everything seemed to be still open and any evaluation possible. According to the usual economic, psychological, and political consideration, it would have been necessary to postpone the final judgment even further, or the idea of a pact with the new state of things in the East would have been incurred. That there was a rejection of Bolshevism no less unconditional than

the rejection of Judaism is to the credit of the NSDAP, which, however ridiculous it might have seemed to the learned and knowledgeable at the time, assumed responsibility for the existence of Europe. Rosenberg had as a basis for his judgment only his assessment of the Bolshevik leadership, in which there were also many Jews, and his knowledge of the Russian people. As Balt, he knew what could and could not be expected from a Russian. While all around him he dreamed and fantasized, while Oswald Spengler and then many others, seduced by Dostoevsky, raved about the 'soul of the East', Rosenberg remained sober and realistic. His unerring instinct for the human didn't fail him here either. He recognized that the new state order of the East at its innermost core was not constructive, but chaotic.

Rosenberg always left open what might become of the peoples who inhabit the vast Russia. *But he defended with the greatest determination the thought that the Bolshevik system was a calamity to that country and a menace to Europe.* Nothing dazzled or diverted him. His position was not determined by isolated impressions or feelings, but was based, like that of his compatriot Victor Hehn (*'De moribus Ruthenorum'*), on objective knowledge. Along with this, of course, in something else: in the deep knowledge about what makes peoples small or great, what is alive or dead, what is fertile or parasitic. The enormous effect of his stance was due to the fact that it was perceived: this assessment truly points to the whole. Here it is not decided according to momentary impressions or immediate advantage, but according to determining motives. A new notion of politics struggles to come to light. That the Bolshevik leadership was especially prominent in Jews might be objectively unimportant; as a symptom it was decisive. The two adversaries presented by Rosenberg to the German people went together. Their political unity could only be made visible to those who recognized the values that both annihilated or at least threatened. It is not arbitrariness, but arises from an internal necessity, that alongside the series of writings directed against Judaism ('The Trail of the Jew Through the Changes of the Ages', 'Immorality in the Talmud', 'Zionism Enemy of the State', 'The Protocols of the Elders of Zion', 'Jewish World Politics') there is the writing 'Plague in Russia'.

And alongside these combat writings stands the first official writing of the movement in which its positive aspect is exposed: the 'Principles and Objectives of the NSDAP'.

A word must be said about the manner in which this struggle for the German nation was waged by Rosenberg. The clever could twist the gesture at the use of something like the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion'. *They were sitting in the living room of good taste and scientific 'objectivity', and it was simply impossible for them that one day a Bolshevik would ever appear to smash their bourgeois porcelain and burn the contents of their libraries.* How could they have any idea that Judaism, which they regarded as harmless, collaborated with Bolshevism, and what danger it threatened Western civilization? But those who got into the tumult of the struggle to defend

European culture from Germany in the turbulent times after the World War had to look for weapons and could not make too long considerations. *The origin of the 'Protocols' remained obscure, something Rosenberg did not hide. With remarkable prudence, in the midst of the fighting, he pointed out that there was no definitive proof of its origin.* But it would be a grave mistake to infer from this that he had taken a possibility for reality and thrown the documents into the fray without objective examination. The content of the 'Protocols' was clear and unambiguous. It did not contradict in any way what could be deduced from other Jewish manifestations and from the actions of international Jewry. Rosenberg approached the product from the physiognomic side. The Jewish will to power, which in economics and politics was blatantly exposed everywhere, but in literature was only occasionally apprehended, expressed itself openly (perhaps too openly) in the product. To make this will to power existing in reality also visible in literature could seem permissible to the fighter. Anyone who demands of a fighter that he wait until there are more tests like that has no idea what a world-historic confrontation is.

With the youthful strength of an early self-reliance that measures the world by clearly recognized ideals, Rosenberg has thrown himself into the fray. A fortunate star led him to the small group of unknown men in Munich who had taken up a seemingly hopeless struggle for Germany's freedom. *In Munich he was soon united by a virile friendship with the somewhat older Dietrich Eckart, who was a staunch admirer of Schopenhauer.* It was an alliance such as is only possible between people of different temperaments who are united in a common commitment to a great cause. He later wrote to both Chamberlain and Eckart.

The event that decided Rosenberg's later life was the encounter with Adolf Hitler. In the young soldier at the front, in whom an immense shaping force struggled for the form of activity that suited him and which had an almost magical effect on all the people with whom he came in contact, he immediately recognized the emotional and political center of a new Germany. He saw in him the born leader of all those who trusted more in the faith of their hearts and in the strength of their will than in the calculations of prudence. Adolf Hitler was for him the soul-awakening of the nation and at the same time the only one whom he believed capable of assuming and bearing responsibility for the whole. He always saw him as man, taken in the world-historical sense. 'Whether on the battlefields of France, before thousands of his friends and enemies, before a court, he is always the same: the leader, the man who embodied the longing for the best, who gave expression to their urgency to action, beyond action'. So Rosenberg wrote during Hitler's trial in February 1924, in the darkest of times, when he was working on the reconstruction of the shattered party, in the 'Great German Newspaper' which was then trying to replace the 'Völkischer Beobachter'. The bravery and faith of the fighters who had once been touched by the Leader's

mysteriously cool force remained unshaken. For these men, who did politics not only with their heads but also with their hearts, it could not be otherwise that Adolf Hitler would one day determine the fate of Germany. 'If the German essence is not a dream of a sunken past, but still lies as a dormant psychic force in the people, then this people will certainly one day raise its alarm clock as leader to the place where it belongs. Whatever may be the outcome of the process, love and veneration will invariably accompany in loyal fidelity the man whose heart knows only one thing: the German fatherland, the German people, German freedom'.

With these words Rosenberg spoke to the hearts of an ever-increasing number of Germans. Even in the formulation, words like these are characteristic of his way of being. In it, you always perceive that you are not saying something that is only valid for the moment. He never appears merely as a transmitter of thoughts or as a mere propagandist of an idea. He is always with his whole personality behind what he says, and the formulation reveals that thought is his psychic property and his most personal experience. But every thought, every experience, and this is only what is proper to it, is immediately related to the center of the worldview of the thinking and living: Rosenberg never moves on the periphery of his world; In everything he thinks and writes, he goes from the center of the soul outwards. When he has nothing to say that relates to the core of his being, then he doesn't speak up. *Language is not intended for him for games, but only for the utmost seriousness.*

From the constant reference of all manifestations to the center of the personality comes the dignity proper to all that Rosenberg says, and which finds its proper expression in the attitude of his style. This style lacks all rhetoric, all superfluous ornamentation. Thought always rushes to the essential, which is pointed out as briefly and forcefully as possible. The peculiarity of his style derives from the fact that Rosenberg never writes or speaks without having before his soul an intuitive image of his object. He never surrenders to the word as such, he never lets himself be carried away by the expressive medium. From the greatness and seriousness of the object which he has in mind, the seriousness of the style follows of itself.

If, from the earliest days of the movement's struggle, Rosenberg's demonstrations always seemed to many party comrades the purest proclamations of a new worldview, this is not least due to the ethical evidence of his writings and speeches. They are self-evident because they arise from the immediate relationship with their objects and problems, ethically evident because their objects and problems are the highest and most serious that exist, and because their presentification is carried out with the utmost responsibility. This man has never been moved and occupied by anything other than the fate of his people. It is always the same question that moves his heart and his brain: What will become of the German essence?

Others have also lived in concern about the future of the nation and have striven for the stance of their idiosyncrasies. In the spiritual struggle for

the idea of the nation, the Leader's comrade in struggle has given a new tone. He sees and experiences that Adolf Hitler not only knows how to reawaken faith in the indestructible strength of the German people everywhere, but that the Leader and his movement are themselves this reborn force. The immediate experience of this imperishable force contrasts sharply with what the post-war present shows everywhere with its decomposition and discouragement. The group of men gathered around the Leader are animated by a single thought: Where the Leader is, there is Germany. What claims to represent Germany officially today is not Germany at all. In the movement it is not a question of the 'pretense of power' of any new party, but only of making manifest the truth: Germany can only be where freedom and honor are fought, and not where politicians of compliance haggle over the facilitations of a state that they themselves have brought about by their lack of decisiveness. From this National Socialist attitude is drawn all that Rosenberg has written and said. His task was to develop, on the basis of the faith in the eternal Germany which he had awakened by the effectiveness of the Leader, a new and truer picture of the German essence and of German history.

No one was better prepared for this task than the frontier German, for whom the fundamental experience of his youth, the self-assertion of Baltic Germanness, had opened up history to him from its decisive side. It was obvious to him that in life and in history it is always the character of people that decides. Character is not something that changes because of the collapse of institutions, it is the Permanent in the change of things, on which it can be built when everything seems to collapse. What does 'State' matter, what does 'Culture' matter? Away with abstractions! As long as there are Germans willing to fight for the honor of the nation, the state and culture can re-emerge at any time. Only one thing can never lead to a political and spiritual revival: the inactive contemplation of one's own past. It is only through action, not contemplation, that the present is raised to the height of the past.

In such recognitions lay the overcoming of historicism, the hereditary disease of German culture from the nineteenth century. *Historicism sees the present as something to become, not as something to be configured.* Whoever has ever fallen into the historical consideration of things, sees only developments and conditionings, only states and not actions. The idea of race, which contains the enormous knowledge of the constancy of living forces and of the eternal presence of innate character in the flow of events, is incomprehensible to him. The imposition of National Socialism found precisely in the well-disposed a mode of consideration which took only the state and culture as states, whose law was slow 'development'. One was not able to assume these states from within, dynamically, as the creations of men of a particular type and race. *The revolutionary effect exerted by Rosenberg's image of history was based on the fact that it not only dissolved historicism, a corrosive critique would have let it pass at most, but spiritually replaced it with a completely unusual totally new worldview.* By taking seriously the idea

that all historical life is determined by men of a particular type and race, by penetrating the stratum of states and advancing everywhere with implacable consequence to the configuring center, Rosenberg had not only to pronounce new assessments in numerous particular cases, but also to destroy the central political dogma of historicism. For historicism it was obvious that all historically converted states were 'legitimate' and that the meaning of history could only be sought in a balance of opposing states. No one believed it possible to unite historical consciousness with something other than the conservation, cultivation and balance of what exists.

The new historical consciousness which arose from the struggle of the National Socialist movement against the Weimar Republic turned its back on the optimism of the historically educated bourgeoisie and opposed to it its own, deeper and more correct vision of historical life, with an implacability such as only the seriousness of responsibility for the future can bestow. *'Contrasts must not be balanced but must be resolved in struggle'*. With this phrase Rosenberg reduced the new dynamism to the shortest formula in a retrospective of ten years of lived history ('Ten Years of Revolt', 1928).

On the unconscious assumption that the meaning of world history can only be sought in something common to all peoples, time and again attempts have been made to reduce human history to a single formula. The flexible complaint about the discord of nations and about the struggle of spirits is the inevitable reverse of such attempts. A historian like Heinrich von Treitschke spoke virile words about the necessity of war, starting from an understanding of the great powers and the living conditions of peoples. Rosenberg's recognition is broader and goes deeper. It is one thing to justify war, and another to recognize that struggle is the fundamental category of history as such. The life of peoples is not only a struggle for power, but also a struggle for ideas. Religious clashes do not go back to the whim of some theologians; in them, racial souls fight against each other. The contention of figures and characters with each other is given by their existence; war, then, is only a form of manifestation of the original tensions that are placed with the historical existence of man.

Where it was previously believed to perceive spiritual movements and developments of unreal units, the configuring eye recognizes processes of an entirely different nature. Rosenberg drew attention to one of these processes with the concept he coined of 'character protest'. The German Reformation, which arose from Luther's action, is not to be understood as a piece of 'ecclesiastical history' but can only be understood as a character protest of the German-German soul against a foreign coercive religious system. Such a protest of character is a unique historical event; It is at the same time a revelation of enduring racial substance. The peculiarity and value of the new concept consists in the fact that here character is recognized as a historical power. It is not an anonymous 'spirit', it is not abstract ideas that give rise to historical crises. One character, i.e., one attitude of mind, rebels against

another, and only where at the same time a character acts in an ethical sense is there the prospect of beginning and implementing such a protest of character against the overwhelming supremacy of one tradition.

The shaping of the new conception of history meant much more than an outstanding spiritual achievement that had practical value for the struggle of the movement and especially for ideological formation. Before National Socialism could demonstrate in the political and social fields its capacity to shape real life, its picture of history was the only convincing proof that it arose not only from a transitory discontent, but that it proceeded from the real and lasting foundations of German life, and that therefore its opposition was of a positive and not a negative character.

The struggle against the Communists and the Jews, which had to be waged relentlessly, was, in spite of all its harshness and all the sacrifices, that only a struggle in the previous camp demanded; it was necessary because the coalition between political Catholicism and international Social Democracy, on which the existence of the Republic rested, paralyzed all constructive forces and gave free rein to the underworld. The real historical adversary was the black-red coalition in conjunction with all the bourgeois parties that believed they could justify a pact with those who had submitted to the will of the enemy. Within the black-red coalition, tactical as well as ideological leadership resided in political Catholicism. It was not worth wasting a word about the more or less honest insignificance of the Social-Democratic functionaries and their rickety Enlightenment ideology, whereas the Centre was a religious and political power whose roots went deep into the past. If the struggle was to be waged from the essential foundations, then the movement had to win first of all on the terrain on which its strength seemed to lie against this adversary. The struggle had to move from the social and political 'previous field' to the ideological center. It had to be shown that the ignominious alliance of German political Catholicism with international Marxism was more than a tactical error of some parliamentarians, that *the Catholic Church was of internal necessity opposed to the racial-popular awakening*. In the midst of the hubbub of political confrontation, false theories of universal-historical scope had to be destroyed, an edifice of thought had to be convincingly built in their place, and a concrete interpretation of Europe's past and present had to be given. *Thus, from the situation of struggle, the plan of 'The Myth of the Twentieth Century' emerged.*

At the end of the World War, a man, completely self-devoted, begins to reflect on himself, on the fate of Germany and on the peoples of Europe. Disposition and inclination lead his thoughts, he is an architect, to be organized around the problem of art. H. St. Chamberlain's *'Fundamentals of the Nineteenth Century'* gives him the idea of race. The special situation in which he finds himself as Balt at the beginning of the Bolshevik revolution poses to him the problem of the Jew and the future of Russia. *A deep inclination to spiritual clarity and self-account led him to a personal*

appropriation of the thoughts of certain German thinkers: Goethe, Schopenhauer, Schiller, Kant. The history of Deussen's philosophy gave him his first connection with the spiritual world of India. From these elements, the first notes were made in 1917. In the thick oilcloth notebooks, acquired in Moscow, which contain in tight but readable writing excerpts, aphorisms, notes and elaborate essays, some in double versions, lies before us the germ of 'The Myth'. The thoughts formulated here for the first time unfold in a book that in 1922 was announced under the title 'Philosophy of Germanic Art', completed as a draft in 1925. The title now is: 'Race and Honor'. *A further reworking and expansion led to the definitive version whose title, from January 1928, was 'The Myth of the Twentieth Century' and which appeared in the autumn of 1930.*

Rosenberg's inner development from architecture to politics is carried out on the basis of his configurative thinking, without any tension or difficulty. At the core of his being is the courage to recognize and carry out and defend in life what is recognized. The displacement of total activity from the artistic to the political sphere is the natural consequence of their fighting spirit.

'The Myth' was born out of political struggle; with the same right, it could be said that Rosenberg's political struggle was born out of 'The Myth'. For the philosophical and political position represented in 'The Myth' is already developed in its essential features in its fundamental features in the first drafts, so much so that Rosenberg, when he wrote his first articles in Munich and then when he devoted himself to the writing of his major work, was often able to take literally passages from the sketches of his youth in later works.

At first glance, many are tempted to understand 'The Myth' only as a polemical writing. The combative nature of its author is expressed so strongly, the allusions to the present are so many, that the idea of an occasional writing may well be presented. But a glance at the history of the work's genesis shows that first impressions can be deceiving. It is precisely the decisive feature in the development of Rosenberg and his work that the fundamental thoughts and the inner procedure remain unchanged from the outset. Because of its genesis, 'The Myth' cannot be anything other than an occasional written polemic. His references to the present spring from the same philosophical-historical thought as from the situation of struggle. A thinker who sees that the character of individuals and peoples never changes in its decisive features, must necessarily see past and present as one.

The Jew of antiquity is the same Jew who will later corrupt the princely electors. The germinal core of the book does not lie in the polemical intentions, but rather in the positive, in the vision of a new image of man and humanity. Denials and attacks spring from the affirmation of a great figure whose contours embrace the phenomena of the present in the presentation of the whole but determined nevertheless in each singular feature. The immense

abundance of the material is contained in the unity of conception. Decadence emerges from something nebulous-indeterminate to a concrete figure, it goes from the 'what' to the 'how'. But this concrete seeing does not bear fruit only in a method that is then to be applied; a verse or a thought suffices to bring before him a man, a style of existence, an epoch in its peculiarity. What makes it fruitful is the leap, the gift that cannot be further derived from external phenomena, but of immediately extracting the essential features.

The method is physiognomic, it does not aim at connections, but at those essences that we call characters. Taken in itself, this method could lead to a collection of historical portraits, to a historical album of figures. In a peculiar way, however, in Rosenberg the physiognomic procedure is combined with a diametrically opposed one. The same spirit that refers everything that happens to human characters also knows how to abstract and recognize great connections. The characterization does not become biographical, intimate, but historical, philosophical. Each character reveals itself in its 'principles', in what it recognizes as its highest values. The struggle of characters against each other must therefore be conceived at the same time as the struggle of historical systems of values. The physiognomic procedure thus leads to the confrontation of historical systems of values and worldviews.

A worldview is not a collection of eternal truths in itself resting, whose point of reference is unknown; it always remains inseparable from the subject who produces it and represents it in all its actions and creations. This subject cannot be an isolated individual, but only a historical individuality, within which singular individuals have life and subsistence. Only the original subjects of the historical movement, the peoples, have a worldview of their own. The worldview is always the place of origin and at the same time the concrete compendium of the supreme values of a natural-historical community.

The procedure of an ethical-historical physiognomics of peoples, men and institutions has been developed by Rosenberg with instinctive consequentiality, not derived from logical principles. He, who has recognized the unity of his procedure is in a position to determine the relationship between 'The Myth' and 'Foundations of the Nineteenth Century'. Many seem to imagine that 'The Myth' has somehow developed from Chamberlain's work. But what Chamberlain did in Rosenberg was a general thing; The impulse and scope of the whole and the coining force of the writer's language were a model for him, not the doctrine. In adopting expressions such as 'chaos of peoples' and 'coercive dogma of faith', Rosenberg demonstrated a happy literary nose. What worked upon him in terms of content was Chamberlain's philosophy of religion, in which there is much general German spiritual material. With the indeterminacy of the 'Foundations', however, he could not do much. In this exposition, which was too closely linked to the latest scientific literature of the time, I must have missed a unitary procedure. The author of the 'Fundamentals' indulges in his witticisms; Often your intuition is

lucky, sometimes not.

Despite some brilliant characterological achievements (such as the confrontation of Luther and Ignatius of Loyola), the unity of a physiognomic system is lacking. Chamberlain's devaluation of the political-historical must also contradict Rosenberg's sense of realism. From the very beginning, a more accurate picture of human destinies lies before Rosenberg's eyes. Chamberlain dwells on the general notion of an Aryan creative capacity; Rosenberg sets himself the task of concretely showing this force in its historical particularities and in its struggle with the powers that oppose it. It does not want to develop assumptions, 'foundations', but to describe a unique course of struggles. His gaze is attached to events and their connection, he remains close to historical powers, while Chamberlain has art first and foremost in mind. His last word is culture, Rosenberg's last word is worldview.

While Chamberlain, in accordance with his concept of race, broadens the concept of culture as much as possible, the philosophical-cultural approach acts in a limiting way on its total conception (the acting man regresses), while the concepts of character, worldview, and value that Rosenberg uses are in immediate relation to the world of the acting man.

The most important effect Chamberlain had on Rosenberg was to draw the young architecture student's attention to Goethe and Kant. The two beautiful books that Chamberlain dedicated to Goethe and Kant were more significant for the author of 'The Myth' than the 'Foundations of the Nineteenth Century'. The philosophical flow of these works came to meet a still misunderstood impulse that he felt in his own soul. In the contemplation of the great personality, his conviction of the dignity of the Self was strengthened. What ultimately drew Rosenberg to Chamberlain was to find vividly expressed in him the fundamental feeling of his soul. The thought that had been born with him attained complete confirmation. Personality was inflamed with personality. It was the thought of the personality itself in which the coincidence resided. In an even more emphatic and effective way, because more realistic and historical, the younger one was to bring the archaic German-German thought to the consciousness of the time.

It is an often confirmed experience that 'The Myth of the Twentieth Century' is a difficult book. The cause cannot be sought either in the disposition or in the expression. It is certainly not obvious at first glance, but it is understandable and comprehensible; This is often idiosyncratic and unusual, but plastic and clear. On the contrary, it must be said: despite the author's unusual stylistic means, the whole remains difficult to capture. In the abundance of elaborated material the cause of this cannot be sought, this abundance is also found in books of fluid reading such as the 'Fundamentals of the Nineteenth Century' and 'The Decline of the West', the physiognomic procedure should make 'The Myth' an attractive book, if not even exciting. However, this work remains today a spiritual massif that is difficult to access in the midst of German culture. Rosenberg's abbreviating and concentrating

style, which is a consequence of his intuitive thinking, may well have contributed to the difficulty of comprehension. All these prolixities, sometimes linked to a logically strict mode of expression, which clarifies relationships, are odious to the author of 'The Myth'. He always takes what he senses to the most compressed formula and does not shrink from the boldest abbreviations either. Once one has penetrated into this abbreviated style, not only is its individually founded necessity perceived, but it is no longer possible to escape the attraction of this mode of expression. However, the real cause of the difficulty of understanding his work must be sought in a deeper layer.

The author of the 'Foundations of the Nineteenth Century' caused an immense commotion by introducing the idea of race into the presentation of historical links. The attempt first undertaken by Gobineau of a racial consideration of history was continued by him under new assumptions on the basis of studies of the natural sciences. Richard Wagner's world of thought, with which he always remained united, in all its audacity, did not correspond at all in all its features to the revolutionary spirit which the idea of race was to breathe into German thought. The strictly self-contained system of Bayreuthian conceptions contained not only the theory of the total work of art but was itself a kind of total work of art, a synthesis between the classical spirit of Weimar, the philosophy of Schopenhauer, and Wagnerian music: a combination into which the idea of race entered as one moment, among others. However, the whole has not been determined. The resulting contradictions were certainly saved personally, but not ideologically, by the veneration of the Wagnerian genius who had been able to weave it all together. The task of drawing the necessary revolutionary consequences from the concept of race remained invisible and unresolved. It was believed that a bridge could be built between the concept of race and idealist humanism, between Gobineau and Herder and Schiller, between Goethe and Mendel.

However great Wagner's synthesis was, as soon as he turned to the political and the problem of the worldview and an attitude in accordance with it arose, the internal incompatibility of the various moments of that total spiritual work of art had to become apparent.

Rosenberg did not grow up in the air of classicist humanism. When he devoured all Goethe, he was self-absorbed and assimilated only what was in accordance with his nature.

*That which does not concern you,
they must not suffer it...*

It was always his favorite quote. The brief sketch of Goethe contained in 'The Myth' allows us to recognize in which direction his appropriation went. It was the advantage of his youth spent in Reval to be able to develop with complete independence in order to achieve the same autonomy that distinguishes his compatriots Karl Ernst von Baer and Viktor Hehn. It was not by chance that Hehn became the author of the most anti-classicist book in all Goethe

literature. His example shows with what realistic energy even classicism could be transformed into something of its own in the border region. To energetic natures who participate in German spiritual development outside the borders of the State, the distance from the mother country affords them other possibilities of choice and of undisturbed harmonization of the assimilated formative elements than to those who, living in a closed formative atmosphere, have never felt the sharpening breath of the contours of a strange world. With utter nonchalance, the young Rosenberg was able to let the elements of his spiritual development, Goethe and Schopenhauer, Kant and India, grow together into a whole. It was a highly personal and individual whole that thus came about, and he had only the purity and strength of his instincts to thank that something very eccentric and capricious did not spring up in this way.

The act that arose from this assumption was the overcoming of the historicism of classical formation. Convincing and just, scientifically irreproachable and valid for all time, seemed to be the nineteenth-century image of history. Classicism and Romanticism had worked on it, but Classicism had proved stronger. At the center of world history was what was called 'the West', that is, the European synthesis of antiquity, Germanity and Christianity. It was the image that Hegel had brought into an easily comprehensible formula in his brilliant construction of world history, and which still underlay Ranke's more realistic historiography. Athens, Rome, and Jerusalem were the stations through which the universal spirit moved. Germanness had been recognized as a universal-historical force, but it remained essentially subordinate to the history of the Christian churches. The intuition gained by philology of the affinity of the Indo-Germanic peoples had not been incorporated into the overall picture. Hellenicity, Romanity and Germanness seemed to be connected to each other only by historical effects (receptions), while the essential unity between ancient India, Iran, Hellenic culture, the Roman Empire and the Germanic world was severed by the classicist concept of the development of a single West.

The nineteenth century failed to resume the once-cut threads. The science of the Indo-Germanic could only develop in a secondary line, culminating in Leopold von Schröder (also a compatriot of Rosenberg); German philology and historical science followed a different path. The immediate cause of their abstention lay in the lack of reliable research results. Although such a foundation cannot be denied recognition, the omission to follow the path taken by Bopp can only be explained by a concrete-historical-philosophical, and therefore ideological, unconscious assumption. Humanist representations, coupled with Christian ties, kept the classicist tradition alive even when the science of the shovel, year after year, brought stone after stone to light that belonged to a construction very different from the one that classicism had dreamed of.

With all its great merits for a deeper understanding of Hellenic and

Roman culture, classical archaeology in particular suffered from an unprejudiced appreciation of the results of prehistoric research. The unity of the Indo-Germanic remained merely a content of consciousness, nowhere did it become a lived, sap-filled reality that could have fertilized research and led it down new paths. It was shameful to see how stubbornly Germanic civilization in its breadth and nobility was ignored and interpreted from the Roman-Christian perspective.

Despite the high level of his achievements, when the idea of race burst like lightning into this situation, which was not very glorious for German historical science, a revolution of the humanities could theoretically have taken place. The heroes of German romantic historiography at the beginning of the previous century could have risen from their graves and enthused their belated successors to take up the grandiose projects that they themselves could not carry out because the scientific requirements were still lacking. His revived example might have put an end to the time of discouragement from excessive scientific caution; the idea of race would have been greeted with jubilation as confirmation of the intuition of a primordial Indo-Germanic people and made a methodological guide to a new science of Indian, Iranian, Hellenic, Roman and Germanic 'Antiquity'.

None of that happened. A figure as powerful in spirit as Chamberlain was not received with benevolent high esteem as a necessary correction of a science petrified in its disciplinary limits, but with silence, ridicule or petty specialized criticism, the concept of race was outlawed, classicism and Hegelianism, in the face of real investigation, for the pure philosophical-historical reaction celebrated their last triumph without glory.

The fear of using results that are not completely undoubted should not have gone so far! It was precisely German research, under the guidance of the concept of race, which should have recognized the Indo-Germanic as a closed cosmos.

This is the situation in which the young Rosenberg, an admirer of Schopenhauer and Indian philosophy, thinks and plans, without having any notion of it. In the Indian example it had been revealed to him what the unity of the Indo-Germanic means. This unity had become an experience that determined his further thinking. There is nothing simpler than the path to greatness. One only has to have experiences that relate to the order of things as it really is, and to have the courage to hold on to one's own experiences, even when the actual existence of that relationship is not yet demonstrable. Fidelity to oneself is the prerequisite of every feat that subdues souls. German research had become unfaithful to its great beginnings in the nineteenth century; Today, therefore, we must allow ourselves to be told truths by those who have been able to remain faithful to an authentic conception, rooted in the reality of things themselves.

In fundamental conceptions it is not so much important that they contain many details, but rather that they lead in the course of investigation to

the correct details. Indeterminacy is not in itself a deficiency. *Indeterminacy becomes dangerous only when it wants to take the place of determination.* Then private research can be stopped, errors are dogmatized, and the well-known phenomenon arises of the pseudo-scientific exposition of connections that we do not yet know in their realities. A distinction must be made between the form-pregnant indeterminacy of a genuine idea and the confusion resulting from an appropriation of isolated facts not guided by any instinct or method. It is a fundamental mistake of German specialized science to equate fecund indeterminacy with infecund indeterminacy, and to give nothing for an idea until it has yet fulfilled realities.

The Indian has always retained for Rosenberg, from the point of view of philosophy, a particular brilliance. He never allowed himself to be seduced into undervaluing and setting aside this magnificent appearance of the Indo-Germanic because it did not fit into the scheme of 'universal history'. Something similar happened to him with Iranian. Unobfuscated by the construction of 'Western' development, always guided by a lively sense of popular character and by the unmistakable physiognomy of a spiritual creation, he followed in his own way the trail of historical links. He did not seek to establish temporal relationships and dependencies, but to recognize affinity, that is, the internal relationship of characters and creations to each other. In this way he arrived at a concrete notion of the course of world history that departed completely from the traditional one. He saw the ebb and flow of the Nordic spirit from the East through the perspective of India and Iran, and wondered if a development very different from the real one might not have been possible. The actual course of history, passing through Jerusalem and Rome, condemned a large part of the Germanic world to destruction, and only belatedly and fragmentarily led to the emergence of a Germanic Europe, seemed to him to be devoid of internal necessity and inevitability. Far from him was the idea of wanting to correct the course of world history, his sense for what Chamberlain so beautifully called the 'majesty of facts' remained ever alert, but he could never convince himself that everything must happen as it did. This did not come from a craving for playful assumptions or an inclination to self-sufficiency, but from a keen feeling for the possibilities that lie dormant in all living forces. Before his eyes was the image of a powerful shaping soul who, unaware of itself in its passage through time, had been harassed and often hindered in its unfolding by other forces. Who can say that world history had to run through Rome and Augustine, Bishop of Hippo? Is it not conceivable an entirely different course of things, a universal history without Jerusalem and Rome, the main content of which would have been a fertilization of the Germanic spirit by the spirit of India and Iran?

No one who has ever recognized what a race is can deny the legitimacy of such considerations. In the constancy of the racial character of the great peoples there are contained real possibilities which the traditional

conception does not know. The difference between possibilities and realities remains unquestionable, but the word possibility acquires a new meaning in the racial consideration of history. Although the possibilities are not yet realities, the idea of a possible course, when founded on the racial dispositions of peoples, is capable of displaying an extraordinary fruitfulness. It gives judgments an evaluative scale that is more than just an arbitrary assumption or subjective imagination.

In the idea of a universal history without Rome lies the key to Rosenberg's philosophy of concrete history. What seems critical and destructive in 'The Myth' is superficial, conditioned by a representation of very high positive content and revolutionary force that acts in the depths. The adversary is not arbitrarily placed or attacked from a subjective point of view. The strength of the work's conviction is based precisely on the fact that every negation springs from a position and that everything underlies a single scale of affirmation. *Whoever wants to engage in a confrontation with this book must not cling to this or that singular detail but must confront himself with the scale that is applied here.* But this scale is not so much a personal taste as a scientifically well-founded conviction.

Factual research in recent decades has elevated to the rank of incontrovertible certainty the fact that what we call world history is a single gigantic confrontation between peoples of Indo-Germanic and non-Indo-Germanic descent. The East-West antithesis, which dominated the old historical conception, has dissolved and given way to the antithesis of two 'linguistic' groups of races and cultures. Deep in the 'West' extends the non-Indo-Germanic, and likewise in the depths of the 'East' the Indo-Germanic spreads. The traditional scheme placed a unity where essential antagonisms had concluded a temporally limited truce and overlooked deeply founded affinities that by the 'chance of universal history' had been excluded from historical realization. What form would the European spirit have today if the metaphysics of India and Iran, united with the philosophy of the Hellenic world, had acted directly on Germanness? If Hellas had not had to be recovered by Winckelmann, Goethe, and Hölderlin, if India had not only had to be recovered by Germanic science but had not had to pass through the gorge of Rome and Jerusalem, they had merged in the lap of the spiritual forces of Germania into a universal Indo-Germanic worldview. World history would have taken a different course. But the depth of the historical being is diminished not only by thinking of it as composed of pure chance in the empirical sense, but also by representing it as simply necessary. Happening cannot be constructed. There are only developments, but not a 'development' whose linear course could claim necessity for itself. The reality of the course that led to the present state must be recognized; its necessity is never demonstrable. In the representation of another course, when it is not merely assumed arbitrarily, there resides a regulative force which the representation of the necessary development is entirely lacking. The latter will always lead to

a justification of the factual in every form of manifestation. Hidden in the traditional concept of the linear development of a single West is a dogma: the dogma of the necessity of all temporal events. It is one of the greatest achievements of the thinker Rosenberg to have quietly overcome this dogma already in the assumptions of his work.

When, in 'The Myth', states of affairs and ways of thinking of the post-war era are treated with the sharpest polemics, this does not spring from a limited 'party politics' or from conjunctural considerations of any passing utility. Rather, this polemic is the reverse of what constitutes the object of the exhibition: the shaping struggles of the past. It is not the author's intention to 'attack' current powers; Rather, it wants to make visible a system of values from which follows the refutation of the powers that are unleashed in the decomposition of German and European life. That is an entirely different and more effective method of refutation than direct attack.

Every immediate polemic suffers from the weakness that one confronts one's adversary on the same plane and thereby relativizes one's own position, which is only the 'other'. The author of 'The Myth' does not even think of attacking, for example, from the position of the German spirit the Roman Church, as his course is almost always misunderstood. *The force of his polemic comes rather precisely from the fact that he does not take the adversary as equally existent, but only assigns to him the historical place that corresponds to him.* 'You really shouldn't exist at all,' he rebukes his opponents. "It is high time that you cede the field to the powers and values that have so far been prevented from their free deployment by a long and hard history." It is a question of liberating these values, and the controversy follows from that by itself. The adversary is not sought in his place and fought with effort but is swept away like a storm. This storm arises from the pressure difference that arises of its own accord as soon as the original Indo-Germanic value system is confronted with the system that is revealed in post-war Europe.

Rosenberg has created a new procedure of political confrontation. By showing the supposed aims of the movement's struggle in the gigantic struggle of the times, it employs history for the first time on a large scale politically. This has nothing to do with 'political history' in the sense of the nineteenth century. The past, understood as an incessant struggle of some worldviews corresponding to the decisive racial groups: this is the seminal idea of 'The Myth'. 'Fight' against 'evolution'! 'Contrasts must not be balanced but must be resolved in struggle'. Out of the current chaos has arisen the mindless hodgepodge of values, which ends in bastardization, which means lack of character. The reception of the Jew into the European community of peoples is the symptom of the general decomposition. The attitude toward Judaism makes it possible to guess where whole forces are still stirring. It is only from men in whom there lives an instinct which rejects the Jew that anything can be expected for the reconstruction of Germany and Europe. It is

foolish to speak here of 'anti-Semitism' (anti-Semitism). It is not a question of denial and criticism, and still less of a critique of the incapability of any great Jewish people scattered throughout the world. *It is about restoring the forces that have created all that is inwardly powerful and noble that fills our existence. Only one way of salvation and liberation is open: the way back to the value system that corresponds to our innate character.*

His physiognomic method has put Rosenberg in a position to transform this understanding into concrete knowledge. During long years of tireless work, he immersed himself in the literature offered to him and chose the features by which he could most effectively present the picture of history that emerges from its few fundamental assumptions. It is utterly insufficient and erroneous to reproach him with dependence on the literature of his time or the use of dubious sources. That is a criticism intended for immature ears. 'The Myth' does not compile cultural oddities that could be examined one by one in terms of their authenticity but develops a total conception of history from the point of view that it is always character that manifests itself in all events. The task of a scientific critique would be to deal with this total conception. That there has so far been no criticism worthy of being taken seriously can surprise no one. The historical image of tradition does not have the power to confront the revolutionary vision that is in accord with reality.

With astonishing certainty, Rosenberg's first sketches of 1917 (first published in the 'Writings and Discourses') delineate the fertile germ from which all that was to come was to spring. A sketch with the title 'Nirvana and Personality' allows us to recognize at what point the incipient reflective work begins.

The starting point is the 'configuring principle' turned towards the Eternal, which, essentially like the mysterious primordial background of the world, prevails in all the great Indo-Germanic creations. From the confrontation between Goethe and Indian philosophy, the following thoughts develop: the purification of the human personality is the common goal to which the extreme modes of thought of the Indo-Germans tend. The Hindu believes that he attains this goal by withdrawing from the world; the German, dedicating himself to the finite, which he conceives as a symbol of the infinite. Both build from the inside out, but in different ways. The Hindu sees only the barrier as an obstacle; Goethe sees it as a condition for greatness. What they have in common is an enormous shaping force. Strength in one case tends to purification, seeking to divest oneself of personality; in the other case, by elevating it.

From the very beginning of the thought, the opponent is also considered. The Jew is measured according to the Indo-Germanic notion of personality; It becomes clear that for him it is not a question of stripping himself or of elevating the personality, but of destroying it. *In the Jewish idea of the messiah lies the claim to world domination.* Because it lacks shaping forces, the Jewish people always remains as it is; We certainly find in him the

'marked character', but not raised to the 'dignity of personality'. 'That is why these people hate everything that is not like them, that is why there should be no tolerance towards them' (Rosenberg: 'Writings and Discourses', Vol. I, p. 16).

It is a thought of Goethe's that stimulates Rosenberg to go on. 'Meaning widens, but paralyzes; action gives life, but it limits'. By a very independent and audacious extension, this important thought acquires the character of a philosophical principle. The alternation between sense and action is, comparable to inspiration and expiration, the rhythm of life as such. Inspiration is sense, exhalation is action. By inspiring, we surrender to meaning, we open ourselves to the depths of the world and aspire to encompass everything; By exhaling we limit ourselves, we act in the finite, we work. The Hindus offer us the example of extreme feeling; the Germans, that of extreme action. In the idea of personality the two are united. The German makes unity a historical reality and elevates it to philosophical consciousness. That is why the German must become the universal-historical adversary of the Jew, who not only has no idea of the systole and diastole of the personality, but in his blind thirst for power even strives to destroy everything that this cosmic rhythm carries within it.

No one can deny his admiration for this sketch, written only in key words, which so fortunately unites the philosophical with the political. It follows that Rosenberg did not have to wait for Spengler's characterization of the 'Faustian' man. From his confrontation of Goethe and Tolstoy, as well as from numerous other characterizations, it is evident that at the time the puzzling book with the title 'The Decline of the West' appeared, he already carried within him all those clear and fruitful thoughts that would later be shaped in 'The Myth'. Spengler's 'Faustian man' agrees in essential features with Chamberlain and Rosenberg's 'Germanic man', which should not be surprising given that these characterizations contemplate the same reality. Man characterized by the thirst for discovery and audacity, science and art, technology and work, is the one who has created the world in which we live. But within this 'Faustian' culture, abysses have opened, problems have arisen that can no longer be solved by simple cultural considerations. A philosophy of culture that in this desperate conjuncture does not seek to increase chaos but to dissipate and build it, must be determined by a central thought in accordance with the powers that created Europe and clearly delimit itself from everything that has brought 'the West' to the brink of perdition. The mystical concept of an elusive 'cultural soul' is incapable of this, and 'morphological' comparisons between all the cultures of the Earth may perhaps satisfy curiosity but not provide the European with clarity about himself (Compare Rosenberg's 1925 essay on Spengler).

It is only in the face of attempts such as Spengler's, along with which one could also name the failed efforts of Ernst Troeltsch (not to mention other insignificant ones), that the constructive force that lies in Rosenberg's sketch

becomes very evident. Otherwise, one might be tempted, for simplicity's sake, to take his fundamental thoughts for granted. What could be simpler and more obvious than such a thought of personality as the center of the Indo-Germanic world? However, it is decisive, first, that here personality is seen together with race. Already in the first proposition, both the abstract concept of personality of theoretical idealism and the concept of culture without race in modern times are overcome. Then there is the breadth and depth with which the personality is apprehended. How seductively close it is to overestimate the antithesis between Indian passivity and European activity to the point of turning it into the opposition of two 'cultures' separated by worlds! Rosenberg recognizes even in the idea of the negation of one's own self the tendency towards the purification of the personality. On the other hand, he does not allow himself to be dragged by the idea of personality into individualistic discourses. It is only in action against and on behalf of other forces that man experiences the increase that is possible for him. Two tendencies fill his life: the one towards personality and the one towards dedication to the community. Neither should weaken the other. 'That is why it is necessary to cultivate solitude and introspection temporarily, and it is only in this pulsation of two tendencies, guided by conscience, that man is born' ('Writings and Discourses', Volume I, p. 18).

Under 'man' is not meant an abstract homo sapiens, but the man who makes up the great story, the Aryan personality. From this man who knows 'ecstasy' separates himself that selfish human being whose only relation to the world is an impulse of power that nothing can delimit: the Jew. Rosenberg tackles the problem of the Jew at the decisive point, at the root of personality. He distinguishes (in a 1919 essay) between person and personality. *It designates as a person the selfish and natural impulse of man's affirmation, so strongly developed in the Jew. Not only the individual, but the whole Jewish people is entirely a 'person', so that its only guiding notion is that of dominion over other men.* The fullness and breadth of the world, the freedom of the spirit, remain completely forbidden to the person. Personality, on the other hand, is possessed only by a being capable of self-denial and who thus becomes aware of his freedom. The principle of freedom has not been developed among the Jews; it has ventured only into a few individuals. The pernicious action of Judaism is based on the fact that it did not leave free rein to the ideal power of the personality, in so far as it developed it, but even put that power at the service of the person. 'While other peoples were internally divided and contained by their religion and morality in order to impose themselves without consideration, here morality and religion were placed entirely at the service of unlimited selfishness' ('Writings and Discourses', Vol. I, p. 122).

As the attempt at this distinction between person and personality shows, Rosenberg strives to arrive at a new philosophical concept of man. At the heart of it is the configuring principle; But man is something other than,

for example, only the individuation of a general shaping force. Such a representation would lead to an abstract-metaphysical or aesthetic-vitalistic theory of man. Both erroneous paths are avoided with fine skill. Rather, Rosenberg tries to clarify a notion according to which man is neither quite nature nor entirely freedom. It is nature because it is a natural being and belongs to a certain race; It is freedom because it is only by rising above nature that it is truly man (personality) and only by intensifying itself does it reach its height. This is the fundamental definition already present in 1917: 'Personality is a conscious recognition of a unity of nature and freedom' ('Writings and Discourses', Volume I, p. 10).

In a lengthy confrontation with Schopenhauer's doctrine of the will, Rosenberg attempted to clarify his concept of man in 1918. To the unconscious and instinctive impulse to which Schopenhauer refers everything, he contrasts the properly human, the 'configuring' will. He assumes, then, back to man what in Schopenhauer was separated from man as the realm of ideas. In art, religion, and philosophy, we see at work a 'formal impulse' (Schiller) that is equally human, in an even deeper sense, than the natural impulse. We can't say more about it. 'We only know conformation when it manifests itself, in art, in science, and in philosophy; Its essence is completely enigmatic to us. We can only say that it is the most profound creative human activity, opposed to nature, based on the idea of freedom' ('Writings and Discourses', Volume I, p. 63).

In 'The Myth' an entire chapter is devoted to Schopenhauer ('Will and Impulse', pp. 323 ff). There is the sentence: 'One of the most important recognitions about the essence of man is that of the existence of the fact that he is a configuring creature' (Myth, p. 343). In a further development, five directions of the configuring will are distinguished: religion, morality, art, science, philosophy. In all these directions the unity of the personality is manifested.

The recognition of man as a configuring being proved fertile for Rosenberg, first in the field in which he had reached this conception, the artistic. The oldest part of 'The Myth' is the second book, in which is elaborated the material that was once to serve for a 'Philosophy of Germanic Art'. It is a symbol of Rosenberg's personality that the fundamental thought of his political-revolutionary book is developed in an aesthetic treatise. The essay 'On Form and Conformation in the Work of Art' of May 1918 presents the first sketch of that interlocking of thoughts that in the finished work has not without reason received the title 'The Essence of Germanic Art'.

Man as a personality is a configuring will; this will is racially conditioned (Myth, p. 279). When Rosenberg titles the last chapter of the second book of 'The Myth': 'The Aesthetic Will', he consciously contradicts all the theories that claim to be able to apprehend the work of art from the formal side. The work of art certainly has its own formal law, but it is equally a product of the shaping forces of the soul like all the other creations of man.

It is, therefore, a mistake when many aesthetes believe that they can dispense with the content of the work of art. The content itself is a formal problem (Myth, p. 304). When the work of art is understood as an act of racially conditioned personality, aesthetics must become a new meaning in the aesthetics of content. 'The choice or exclusion of certain elements of the content is for us already a configuring process, entirely artistic' (Myth, p. 304). *The artist's choice and conformation of the material are mutually connected internally.* It was not only his own artistic inclination that led Rosenberg to develop his thought of personality as an act in an aesthetic problem. In the aesthetics of the nineteenth century, he was confronted with a conceptual edifice that gave consistent expression to a false conception of man. Through the formalism of this aesthetic, the work of art had been detached from the creative interiority of the artist and erected in a certain way on itself; By emphasizing the content, the personality was restored to its rights. By means of the theory of contemplation, a moment of artistic apprehension and comprehension had been isolated and exaggerated. The refutation of this doctrine was singularly adequate to assert the correct conception of man as an active configuring being. Aesthetics necessarily goes astray when it stops at the consideration of the work. Its task is to trace the path from the work of art to the artistic conformation, that is, 'to understand representation as a necessary effluence of the internal process' ('Writings and Discourses', Volume I, p. 39). Only the activation of the concept of form puts us in a position to do justice to the reality of the work of art in all its depth.

By form Rosenberg means the external artistic process, by conformation the inner artistic process. Artistic creation is a characteristic example of human activity in general. Personality is synthetic activity. 'This inner creative process, this inner synthesis of the world pouring in from without, this living uniting of apparently divergent tendencies, which is what I want to designate as conformation. It is the inner reaction to the world and at the same time a human force that spontaneously tests itself in the world and strives to unite the singular into an organic unity' (ibid., p. 36).

To properly understand the term conformation, which is fundamental to all of Rosenberg's thought, one must free oneself from all 'aesthetic' prejudices. The word designates the human personality in its relation to the world at large. Its meaning is epistemological rather than 'aesthetic'. It is hardly supposed that Rosenberg, when he coined this thought, already knew anything of Kant's 'synthetic unity of apperception'; However, his concept of conformation comes very close to this central concept of pure reason. It is only for man as a shaping being that the world is constituted. As an artist, he creates from the material of his experience a world under a specific formal law, an artistic world. 'Conformation is the profoundly internal activity that occurs in the artist when matter and content, coming from outside and inside, want to merge into a whole; it is the quiet middle center where the true work of art has its beginning, the axis around which the analysis of the outer and

inner world is rotated until a synthesis as an artistic world' (ibid., p. 37).

The point to which all these considerations are directed, and from which they at the same time start, is the active interiority of man, that is, the personality. By means of a philosophy of interiority, the contradictions and problems in which a thought that does not know the essence of the act necessarily becomes entangled must be resolved. Rosenberg carefully avoids the dangers that lie in wait for a philosophy of interiority. One of these dangers is psychologism, that is, that form of consideration which takes man as a psychological subject isolated from the world and from things. The personality in Rosenberg never becomes a merely 'experiencing' individual. The essence of all Western art is for him: 'that the Nordic soul is not contemplative, that it does not lose itself in individual psychology, but that it experiences cosmic-psychic laws volitionally and configures them spiritually-architecturally' (Myth, p. 433). The other danger is spiritualism, that is, the tendency to conceive of man as detached from the senses and the body, from nature and matter, and to apprehend him as an absolute self, as pure interiority. Once this step has been taken, there is no possible return to the world, to the community, to the destiny and to the tasks of history.

Man is, in Dürer's words, 'inwardly full of figure'. Interiority should not be understood as a passive experience or an amorphous surrender, but rather a configuring creation from that igneous-fluid nucleus that we try to circumscribe with words such as personality or will. From this philosophy of conformation any notion of 'subjectivism' must be kept completely away. The inner is always referred to the outer, soul and world need each other. Only with a false notion of interiority, where everything dissolves into spiritual smoke, can nature and the artist's work be volatilized in a non-objectual way. Already in the essay on form and conformation, Rosenberg therefore directs the strongest attention to the matter and technique of the work of art. In Futurism's lack of nature and purpose, he recognizes a clear sign of dissolution. Great art is for him realistic precisely because it is the art of personality. He declares that he has put matter first with a certain one-sidedness because it is important to him 'to highlight the dignity of the object in the face of an unbridled subjectivism' ('Writings and Discourses', Volume I, p. 35).

From the opposition between interior and exterior follow two distinct possibilities of artistic style. The configuration may be conditioned more by the subjective moment or more by the objective. If the objective moment predominates entirely, we are faced with pure construction, the engineering style; If the subject predominates entirely, a fantastic art of unbridled imagination arises. In great art, both moments are recognized; however, they do not have to be in balance. Through the predominance of one or the other moment, two opposing styles emerge. This is the subject of an essay entitled 'Objective and Individual Style', which is immediately linked temporally and thematically to the essay on form and conformation (compare Myth, pp. 345

ff.: 'Personality Style and Objectual Style'). As early as 1918 Rosenberg compared this contrast to that of the Doric temple and the Gothic cathedral. The Greeks follow the law that resides in matter, 'they closely adapt their creation to their material and try to represent the various functions of the material in clearer and clearer forms. They go back, so to speak, to the necessary alphabet and construct from the objective, with the greatest restraint, a fine feeling of measure and harmony, their individual' ('Writings and Discourses', Volume I, p. 49). In a similar way they built the Romanesque and the Renaissance. 'The Romanesque style rests on the primordial forms of stone construction, the cube and the semicircular arch. To these fundamental elements all the principal forms may easily be referred, they also give us, like many forms of the Greeks, the coined alphabet of architecture' (ibid.). Conversely, in the Gothic period, human individuality boldly imprinted its own forms on matter. From this emerges an individual and inimitable style, closed in on itself, limited to a certain period. The forms of the individual style in architecture are almost unusable. 'While Greek formal beauty had universal objective validity and could be built up over millennia, Gothic had a markedly shaped character for a few generations' ('Writings and Discourses', Volume I, pp. 49 ff).

In the essay on objective and individual style this distinction is expressly kept free from any value judgment. The exposition of thought in the Myth, on the other hand, is partly burdened by the value judgment that is linked to the Spenglerian opposition between Apollonian and Faustian culture. The neutral distinction between objective and individual style is put in relation to the metaphysical antithesis between space and time, and the conception arises that the Hellenic style would correspond to an ideal of bodily-static beauty, while the Nordic-Germanic style would correspond to a dynamic ideal of will. Since Rosenberg now equates this difference with that of form and conformation, it is an assessment that apparently degrades the classical style of the Hellenes. It now seems as if the ideal of harmonic beauty and Hellenic art are a counterexample to Nordic volitional art. Rosenberg goes so far as to assign Greek beauty to the body and Germanic beauty to the soul. Since man as a person, according to their terminology and in contrast to man as personality, belongs to the objectual world (Myth, p. 349), individuality is the union of person and personality (Myth, p. 369; compare p. 389 ff), the appearance arises that the classical art of the Greeks would no longer belong to the great Indo-Germanic art of personality. There can be no doubt, however, that the art produced by the Doric temple and the sculptures of the Parthenon is also an art of the deepest interiority and shows that surplus of soul power which distinguishes all the great Indo-Germanic creations.

The distinction between form and formation is of exceptional systematic importance. On the one hand, it points to the relationship that exists between the world and the self, matter, technology and spirit, by linking training to form, and on the other hand it offers the possibility of

distinguishing levels of formation. However, there is always the danger of exaggeration when a systematic distinction is applied to historical reality. What matters to Rosenberg is clear: he wants to free the art of northern Germany from the disfiguring painting that has been inflicted on it by an aesthetic that is under the spell of a false ideal of harmony. To this end, the concept of conformation as opposed to that of 'harmony' is excellent. But the art of the Hellenes cannot be treated on the same level as formalist aesthetics, which is only based on a misunderstanding of classical harmony. In Greek and Nordic-Germanic art, we encounter two different kinds of conformation. A closer examination of classical art would show that even in the serene calm of his most finished works dwells that mysterious surplus of soul which has led Rosenberg to the concept of conformation. In the end, the confrontation of Germanic and Greek art was for him only a means of presenting his notion of character as the substratum of the artistic creation of both in the most plastic way possible. It was never his intention to point out essential oppositions that did not exist within the Indo-Germanic sphere. Only a philosopher of culture like Spengler, who overlooks the majesty of racial realities, can erect absolute antitheses such as 'Apollonian' and 'Faustian', of whom Rosenberg says: 'He does not see soul-racial powers shaping worlds, but invents abstract schemes' (Myth, p. 404).

What Rosenberg misses in Greek art, he has clearly expressed in the confrontation of the Iliad and the Song of the Nibelungs, already carried out in the sketches of 1918. It is far from wanting to belittle Homer as a creator (Myth, p. 307). Rather, for him, it is a question of delimiting the completely different world of the north from the world of Homer. His reasoning is as follows: the Homeric poem is not built on the actions of men as effluvia of their inner being. The course of events is, so to speak, random. The poet of the Song of the Nibelungen, on the other hand, derives the events themselves from within his characters. It is simply an injustice to link an aesthetic critique to the sometimes clumsy technique of the Song of the Nibelungen, for the creation of characters such as Siegfried, Crimilda, Rüdiger, Hagen, and the concatenation of a course of action arising from their attitude towards fate with inner necessity, constitute an artistic achievement. A narrow concept of form has so far prevented critics from seeing this. 'Their actions flow from the will of internal forces and conflicts; they act according to an internal consequence and according to a certain disposition of the soul. It is the interweaving of action born from within oneself that has just woven the tragic antithesis that leads to catastrophe' (Myth, p. 307).

The concept of conformation proves to be immediately productive here. It is foolish to quarrel over details when the wall of an old prejudice is collapsing, kicking up dust with a roar. Rosenberg has put an end to an aesthetic discussion that brought nothing new and has opened the door to new insights. 'For to recognize a work of art that presents strong personalities means to recognize an equivalent creative shaping force that has created them'

(Myth, p. 307). By means of the new procedure the work of art is not simply brought back to the artist, as has often happened before, but to a racially determined and lawful force of mind. From the inner temper of the soul follows the style. By referring to a characterological disposition, the artistic work is not dissolved in the psychology and biography of the artist but understood as an organism from the racially shaped personality. The artistic form of the Song of the Nibelungs must be sought in a deeper layer than where it was hitherto thought to be found. The concept of racial character explodes the categorical system of formal aesthetics. The art of North Germanic art has the form according to its content. From a poem whose art lies in the knotting of the dramatic knot, one cannot expect, by invoking the laws of the 'epic', Homer's mode of representation.

Every great content creates for itself the form that belongs to it alone, and it is only from the configuring forces that the definitive form can be understood. The application of patterns of absolute aesthetics leads to the gravest injustice. The point is to eliminate this injustice, not that Homer's critique is correct in every detail. He who only criticizes criticism only shows that he has not grasped the decisive point.

'Every figure is an act, every act is essentially a discharged will' (Myth, pp. 316 ff). 'The Greek, too, was in the depths of his will at the time of the birth of his art' (Myth, p. 318). The development towards form that is later produced in him takes place in a different way in the Nordic artist. The lack of 'form' in it is not an aesthetic deficiency, but a consequence of its artistic conception. For the German, 'personality' always means an antithesis to matter, an 'active, attacking and tireless effort to transfigure matter into an allegory of the innermost will and of the forces shaping art' (Myth, p. 302). The Hellenic, on the other hand, seeks the balance between the internal impulse and the external form, between conformation and form. That is the meaning of Greek beauty and 'harmony'. The will to style and the work come to coincide here, while the feeling of infinity and the consciousness of gravity of the Nordic soul oppose a harmonization of the internal and the external and lead to the predominance of the will to form in artistic representation.

Every book of profound effect has its secret. The secret of 'The Myth' is that its author has taken the thought of personality seriously. Philosophical-artistic treatises will only be read correctly when they are conceived as a way to a deeper knowledge of the Nordic soul of itself. Behind the aesthetic value stands an extra-aesthetic value (Myth, p. 449). Nordic art is the way it is only because the 'idea of the imperishable personality' is a 'declaration of war' on the world of appearances (Myth, p. 389). *The more man becomes aware of his personal existence, of his uniqueness and imperishability, the more distant the world becomes to him as a mere interlock of appearances.* 'In the idea of personality the metaphysical problem is condensed into one point' (Myth, p. 392). Rosenberg has described the temper of the solitary self, according to his personal temperament, in the Myth, pp. 388 ff. But he utters the decisive word

where he points out the connection between the idea of personality and the concept of destiny. The relation of the Germanic soul to fate has nothing to do with fatalism or magic. Self and fate confront each other with no causal connection. It is not without good reason that Rosenberg recalls in this important statement the conceptions of Luther and Kant and at the same time refers to Hölderlin (Myth, pp. 397 ff). *By its own act, the self summons the destiny that it assumes as inescapable and yet self-willed. Freedom is not an enigmatic faculty of doing as one pleases, but the disposition of mind that has dared to 'declare war' on the world of appearances, in the face of almighty destiny.* The Nordic man knows that he is free because he has the certainty that he can inwardly endure everything that comes his way, even if it is at the price of his own life. Freedom is where their honor lies. 'The idea of honor is inseparable from the idea of freedom' (Myth, p. 532).

In the northern sense, honor is not a social phenomenon, it is not honor to others, but honor to oneself. In the Germanic world, personal honor is everywhere encountered as the 'center of all existence' (Myth, p. 598); Life is worth nothing in the face of honor. It is no coincidence that the great Germanic poet chooses conflict as his subject, for in conflict honor shines brightly. *Honor and destiny are correlative concepts: only those who have honor can also have a destiny.* In the ancient Song of Hildebrand this appears with marvelous clarity: 'In the fulfilment of the self-engendered law of honor, old Hildebrand sees at once the prevailing destiny...' (Myth, p. 399).

In 'The Myth', for the first time honor has been placed at the center of extensive philosophical and historical exhibitions. Chamberlain had understood loyalty as a fundamental feature of the Germanic world. However profound and correct this may have been, a decisive point had not yet been touched; moreover, Chamberlain had stopped at the mere ascertainment of the facts. Rosenberg discovers honor as the unitary point of the Germanic world and not only gives a description of this fact but recognizes honor as 'the supreme value of Germanic man'. It allows us to see the civilization of the north, so to speak, from the inside as a whole, and not only as a past, but ever-present whole. Times come and go, times change, but the supreme 'characterological value' always remains the same. Much can change, freedom and honor must remain at the center if there is to be a European civilization with a Germanic imprint.

For the idea of liberty of conscience and honor 'was fought on every battlefield, in every scholarly study, and if this idea does not triumph in the next great contest, the West and its blood will perish, as India and Hellas disappeared one day forever in chaos' (Myth, p. 115).

These two sentences, which close the imposing characterization of the gigantic spiritual event of the West, contain the program of Rosenberg's life's work:

"With this recognition that Europe in all its creations has been creatively shaped by character alone, the theme of both European religion and

Germanic science, but also of the new Germanic politics, is revealed. To become aware of this fact, to live it with all the ardor of a heroic heart, is the prerequisite for every future rebirth. This knowledge is the basis of a new worldview, of a new-old idea of the State that generates a new vital feeling that will only give us the strength for the liquidation of the usurped dominion of the non-European and for the creation of a civilization of our own that permeates all spheres of life' (Myth, p. 115).

The idea of freedom is not empirically collected in 'The Myth' as an isolated moment and placed at the beginning of the work but is developed from the central thought of the work with consequent logical necessity. *If the book were not built on the consistently realized concept of man as an active and configuring being, if action did not occupy the center of his anthropology, then the idea of honor would be completely groundless.* It would lose none of its significance, but the force of conviction of 'The Myth' would be less. The peculiarity of this work in relation to the 'Fundamentals of the Nineteenth Century' finally consists in an internal systematicity, which is not recognized by every reader, but felt by the majority.

The philosophy of modern history has taught us to regard the emergence of the complex and tangled whole we call culture as the work of configuring, so to speak, natural forces acting in silence. Culture was an 'objective' spirit; The individual did not enter into consideration, the violence of the form seemed to direct everything by itself. Frobenius concluded that culture is not created by men, but 'lives' in men. In the morphological method, this form of consideration of culture, which starts from the external configuration and its formal metamorphosis, reached its zenith. With this attitude, the present remains a white spot on the map; We have to wait and see what the mysterious forces of culture have in mind, and a cultural policy cannot be derived from this philosophy. Like all spiritual beatitude, it only leads to all powers, even corrupting ones, having a free hand.

Rosenberg's approach of understanding culture from within, that is, from its supreme value, opens up entirely new possibilities. *We can now understand culture as an organism without, however, falling into the passivity of an organic-morphological consideration; at the center of all cultural creation is man, not as an accidental individual, but as a personality, who is unique and yet in all his decisive manifestations appears as the representative of something universal.* For the supreme value of a race is at once personal and universal. It is 'universal' not in the sense of a universal human culture, but in the sense of a civilization shaped by a certain character which, notwithstanding all change of form, remains the same in its essence.

Another advantage of the concept of 'supreme value' is that it has an immediate bearing on all areas of human creation and action. This precludes any reduction of the concept of culture to a mere doctrine of forms. The idea of supreme value is all-encompassing; It does not place man's action from a unilaterally aesthetic, technical or ethical point of view. If we wanted to use

these categories at all, we would have to find a predominance of the ethical point of view. But what is decisive is that these categories no longer fit together, because man is understood here as a configuring being as such, as a creative personality, before whose unity the autonomy of those 'singular' spheres recedes.

The most important advantage of the doctrine of supreme value, however, is that it forces us to conceive of culture not only as something past, but at the same time as something extremely present. In the clear light of the thought that each race has only one supreme ideal (Myth, p. 116) and cannot renounce its supreme value without sinking the culture formed by it into chaos, neither a sweet abyss in expectant contemplation nor a literary prophesying of sunsets or sunrises are possible. The supreme value rules unconditionally and at all times. It is not necessary to wait first for the results of the philosophy of culture to know what to do. It is in one's own heart that each one must discover what matters and on which all civilization rests. Through fundamental characterological value, everything else is organized. 'For a supreme value requires a definite grouping of the other precepts of life conditioned by it, that is, it determines the style of existence of a race, of a people...' (Myth, pp. 116 ff). *The present must not only be understood from the past, but also the past from the present.* Those characterological values that once clashed, are still clashing today. The shaping struggle that was taking place in the Reichstag of post-war Germany is the same one that led to the Concordat of Worms in 1122. Every historical figure is referred to certain characteristics and cannot be detached from them; Happening is always a struggle of man against man, of character against character, whether it be works of art or ideas, legal principles or educational forms. From one human character to another there is no 'development', there is only self-affirmation or self-immolation. Western culture is not a melting pot in which the spiritual contents of all areas and peoples, by virtue of a mysterious law, are 'developed' into a 'cultural synthesis', but a characterological unity that must be affirmed if chaos is not to ensue. It is precisely from the current references to Judaism and democracy, to Marxism and liberalism that the seriousness of historical consciousness speaks. *He who does not see the dissolution and its exponent, Judaism, does not recognize what is positive and healthy either. The struggle against Judaism and the corrupting phenomena of the present is the guarantee that the past has been correctly understood.*

The recognition of historical figures, Rosenberg shows us, does not have to lead to a passive attitude. Rather it is the other way around: nothing can strengthen the will to struggle of an inwardly whole man more than the insight that history is not self-producing 'development', but a struggle from man to man. *Before Rosenberg, the philosophy of culture knew struggle only in the form of a completely ahistorical critique as the Enlightenment practiced it with everything traditional.* It is only recently that 'The Myth' has shown how the recognition of historical figures can be combined with the struggle for

a certain supreme value that in itself is of a historical nature. *The form of this work is not a historical exposition peppered with anti-Semitic excurses, the typical misunderstanding of those who measure Rosenberg against the standards he has left behind, but a new procedure based on intuition and reflection that is followed with the need for the thought of a characterological value that encompasses past and present.*

While around that small number of men at whose center the Leader stood, anxious but confused minds demanded and sketched out a new art out of art, a new education out of education, Rosenberg wrote the simple and clear recognition that was so thoroughly tested in the struggle of the movement: the new race of Germany is looking for a new art, 'but with the knowledge of what it will not be born of before a new noble value, dominating all life, takes possession of us' (Myth, p. 449). How little can be meant by the wealth of 'cultural goods' that accumulates in a 'sympathetic' soul when the living presence of a supreme ordering value is lacking! What man does and creates dissipates like chaff to the wind when it is not determined and sustained from a center.

The nineteenth century immeasurably expanded our knowledge of the cultures of the earth; this century developed at the same time enormous economic and political activity. In all areas, the men of the twentieth century are faced with a vast heritage. And yet, there was once nothing heavier and more oppressive than taking on this inheritance. For the century of the greatest effort of all forces and of the most visible successes was at the same time the epoch of a gigantic weakness of the will. It might be called the century of Schopenhauer, whose theory of the will was at the same time the most seductive doctrine of the absence of will. Will is not just impulse. Nor is it just a mindless restlessness directed by the intellect. *A great will presupposes a great faith.* When a strong disposition to volitional activity does not find its proper goals, then arises that restless attitude which has so often been praised as a sense of Western culture, and which nevertheless was only the reverse of an inner perplexity and a despair of the soul. The nineteenth century lacked faith in itself and so, despite its entrepreneurial zeal and its capacity for performance, it was a time of unhappiness and weakness of will. *In the present there was no longer any greatness believed, everything great receded into the distance and became 'culture'.* When the men of this admirable but unfortunate age turned to the past, it was not with a feeling of veneration and at the same time self-victory, but from the dark impulse to assuage a hidden discontent and rest in the contemplation of the past greatness of the feverish aimless toil of the present.

The greatest diagnostician of this epoch, Nietzsche, recognized with real insight in historicism the expression of the incredulity and weakness of the will of his century. From the past contemplated without will, no goals can ever be derived. An age that does not muster courage in itself cannot become greater and richer through the vaster and more abundant past. It was the

misfortune of 'historical formation' to forget that action does not spring from knowledge of what happened, but from faith in the presence of forces shaping history.

Rosenberg's first answer to the nineteenth-century problem was a clear and sure instinctive rejection of historicism. *Already the first notes allow us to recognize that from the beginning only one question moved him: What will become of us? Where are we going? What task has been imposed on us? From an upright interior and a hopeful soul, he outlines the thought of conformation, to which he has always remained faithful.* Against Schopenhauer he formulates his fundamental conception of the creative will: 'Not the suppression of suffering, nor the satisfaction of a desire, and therefore of a tendency of the will, but the spontaneous creator, the legislator, the inspiration, the command, however one describes the inner activities whose essentiality is embraced and exhausted by the concept of conformation. that is what brings happiness, bliss' ('Writings and Discourses', Volume I, p. 64). Starting from the intuition of a new epoch to come, he summons the courage to write: 'The classical period of Europe, especially of Germany, is yet to come (ibid.)'.

The experience of the great personality of the leader and the overwhelming force of the National Socialist movement reinforces his certainty. The formative power of the great will, which he feels within himself, erupts as a bold action. From a passionately felt present, the image of Indo-Germanic prehistory is shaped. The weakness of historicism is not only recognized but overcome from within. The new era is here. Against the 'dreamless destroyers', against the black magic of anti-Germanic dreamers such as Jews and Jesuits, a new creative dream vision arises (Myth, pp. 455, 459 and ff). It has not been incubated in isolated brains; with a soul-subjugating power, it is born in moved hearts that immediately recognize in it with veneration the legacy of a powerful remote past.

Everything that is great in the past and belongs to us, everything that is a present force carrying the future within itself, Rosenberg condenses into the concept of myth. Myth is the creative dream of reality of a soul; not a subjective dreaming, but an objectively powerful image of what will be. Nothing in the world arises without faith; all the men who transformed the face of the Earth have lived proceeding from a myth. The will to shape a new world is never born from the contemplation of existing forms, it can only be born from the strength for shaping. A creative force that knows itself to be powerfully capable of shaping feels itself as mythical. In this sense, all great cultures have arisen from myths, and even the work of an Ignatius of Loyola was rooted in a 'myth' (Myth, p. 456). Without the dream force of a race, nothing arises that gains any powerful existence in history.

The myth is presaged and outlined by creative individuals but can never be psychologically understood from isolated individuals. Its content is universal, it is the substance of a race, of a people. The inscrutable

integration of all the directions of the self, of the people, in general of a community, constitutes its myth' (Myth, p. 459). The myth is not a unique figure, but an enduring shaping principle, it is the primordial foundation of all forms, the creative center of the life of a natural-historical community.

If a people, in the course of its history, is displaced from its myth, it suffers a disturbance in its self-consciousness. Between the soul of the people of that people and reality, the image of the world designed by the soul of another race confusedly interposes itself. Feeling and acting become hesitant, darkness and division take the place of original naivety and unity. Certainly, life gains tensions and colors that it probably would never have gained without that disturbance, but that richness is paid for dearly. Through a divided self-consciousness, a gifted and enterprising people can be brought to the brink of destruction. Even if it finally manages to prevail in countless political and spiritual struggles, its history will not lose its tragic character, and only after enormous efforts and repeated spiritual revolutions will it find the way back to its origin. Until Rosenberg, it had been considered obvious that only the richness of a people's experiences and creations was decisive in judging its evolution. Through the 'myth', the crucial thought has been introduced into historical contemplation that the evolution of a people must be judged according to the unity and cohesion of its attitude.

The health and strength of both individuals and peoples manifest themselves in their ability to distinguish the myths that belong to them from those that are harmful to them. The 19th century lacked this capacity for discernment, allowing itself to be seduced by doubt and criticism to equalize all myths. But neutrality equals dissolution, for neutrality is but another word for lack of faith. The paralysis of the 19th century's will is rooted in its lack of faith, which ultimately led to the myth of a people of foreign race, the soulless myth of money and world domination, becoming the idol of the West. Under the triumphal din of an apparent victory, this idol had been erected over all peoples in Versailles in 1919. The Führer's struggle against Versailles was the struggle against the Jewish-democratic myth. Rosenberg's task was to bring this struggle to its conclusion on the fundamental plane. The Führer's comrade-in-arms resolved the task by demonstrating that world history cannot be understood as an imaginary 'development' toward an imaginary goal, but rather is the self-affirmation and struggle of myth-shaping forms of being against one another.

With bold apprehension, Rosenberg has thus resolved the decisive problem of the philosophy of history, over which people have been racking their brains for centuries. Every authentic myth is a myth of blood. Blood is the ultimate historical reality we know. Whatever form a myth takes, it is always a self-affirmation of whoever shapes it. The difficulty of historical understanding lies in the fact that the myth-generating communities do not glimpse the correlation of what they produce with themselves. The fertile mantle that forms around them, they consider a gift from the gods. The myth

in which the shaping principle carried within the community first expresses itself becomes mere doctrine, that is, a teaching detached from its subject; life denies itself and turns against life. By discovering that every formulated myth, every historical religion is born of blood, life returns to itself. The myth of blood is not a 'mythology' among others, it does not establish a 'new' religion alongside the old religions, but rather has as its content the mysterious primordial origin of all mythological shaping. All mythologies proceed from a shaping principle; the knowledge of this principle is not in turn a mythology, but the very 'myth' contemplated with veneration as life.

The antithetical concept to myth is dogma. A dogma too can originally be a true myth born of blood. A myth becomes a dogma when it is detached from man and elevated to unconditional truth. In the name of this unconditionality, it can be imposed on men of another blood as the truth par excellence. Myth is not as transferable as blood; it is not universal and can never become universal. Dogma, on the other hand, is already universal by virtue of its absoluteness and hence eminently useful as a means of universal propaganda. The antithesis of myth-dogma reflects the antithesis of organic-historical popular unity and universal church.

The decisive question posed by Rosenberg's concept of myth is: How is it possible to speak of a new myth when it is a matter of the myth of blood? In what sense is this myth a myth of the 20th century? The answer is simple. The myth of blood is not only the myth of the 20th century because it will determine this century and those to come, but also the myth of our time because only our time could recognize it. As a recognized myth it is new, its discovery a revolutionary event. In its content it is ancestral, as old as the history of peoples. No one had known of this myth until now, and yet everyone has lived according to it. The discovery of its hidden reality is the change of era.

The myth is always the myth of a community. It refers to those who believe it and make it reality; implicit in its concept is the relation to a human belief and action, with an author and center. For this reason, the concept of myth cannot simply be replaced by the concept of idea. The idea exists by itself, detached, absolute. Its validity consists precisely in its not relating to anything else. Like revelation, the 'idealistically' understood idea comes 'vertically from above'. Only through a reinterpretation can the idea become an 'idea for me' ('idea for us'). The myth does not need a humanizing reinterpretation; as the myth of blood, it is human from the beginning.

Through the concept of myth, all absolutist misunderstandings are discarded from the outset. Ideas do not exist without racial-popular bearers. 'Ideas are racially conditioned, just like volitional values' (Myth, p. 20). Only a racial soul can be the bearer of a reality-shaping idea. Rosenberg calls myth the 'idea' of a history-bearing racial soul. His work presents world history as the 'dramatic struggle of enemy racial souls' (Myth, p. 8).

Based on myth, the word idea acquires a new concrete meaning. The

idea is the myth that has passed through the spirit and will of an individual and arrived at consciousness. It is great individuals who time and again set before the eyes of a community the values it lives by.

The value that surpasses the others and to which all values somehow refer, Rosenberg calls the supreme value of a race or people. With this, the term idea is happily translated into German: supreme value is the duty that a historical community imposes upon itself.

The myth is the creative force and life itself; it is the source of all values and valuations, the origin of all historical meaning and the creative unity of all actions. It is not because he proclaimed ideas that contradict the value patterns of the confessions, or because he made some *'amusing annotations on the European church'*, that Rosenberg has been taken up by the representatives of the church and blacklisted, but because he has carried honesty and consequence to their ultimate consequences, to the point where the decision has to be made. The struggle around the 'myth' does not deal with this or that value, this or that historical fact, but with value itself and the meaning of human-historical existence in general. All the historical-critical manifestations about the 'myth', whether from the theological or non-theological side, whether in the guise of scientific innocuousness or intellectual arrogance, can only provoke yawns in an attentive and honest reader of the book. It must be recognized that in the Protestant field, voices have been raised more than once that found this kind of 'criticism' consisting of juxtaposing critical objections to historical details instead of addressing the work as a whole, shameful. From the clergy of the church, confused by the continued study of scholasticism, no more than hypocritical 'objectivity' could be expected. Some Protestant preachers were weak enough to lean on this pseudo-historical criticism. But many nevertheless recognized that the 'myth' posed a question to their church that could only be answered from the very center of the church. The reaction to the 'myth' only deserves to be taken seriously where it is theological, for only the theological response does justice to the fact that Rosenberg questions the church itself, not by means of denials in the liberal style, but by expounding the creative unity from which man truly lives. The theological response at least recognizes the plane on which Rosenberg's work moves.

For that pastor from Schleswig-Holstein who contrasts with refreshing naivety the myth of the blood of man to the message of faith in the blood of Jesus Christ, Rosenberg is a lost soul, but he has correctly determined the rank of his work. 'He knows', he says of Rosenberg, 'that there exists a truth superior to all other realities, a supreme value by which all other values are measured, that there exists a force which is the primordial source of all force and all life, an ultimate meaning and a definitive interpretation of all being, which has unconditional validity'.

To speak theologically means to encompass the whole. The theological response does justice to Rosenberg at least insofar as it recognizes

that his work encompasses the whole. It makes no sense to respond theologically to an enlightened thinker, because he does not attack from a plane corresponding to the theological. Between Voltaire and Rosenberg there is not a difference of degree, but of nature. The witty mocker Voltaire stands beyond all confessions and nations; Rosenberg speaks from a concrete historical position. He does not feign a timeless superiority of reason, which does not exist, does not speak in the abstract but with responsibility as a German from a certain point in German history. Like Nietzsche, Rosenberg proceeds historically from German Protestantism; the incomprehensible phenomenon for the theologian consists in the fact that neither the Thuringian nor the Baltic shows the slightest personal contact with the Christian spirit.

The personal detachment from Christianity is often presented as the result of hard struggles of the soul. A convincing description of such struggles has not yet been given; in most cases the idea of these struggles seems to simply arise from the vague feeling of obligation that they should actually exist. However, it is only a legend invented by theologians that a position outside the church must be linked to some struggle or agony. A large number of intellectually and socially active Germans live quite naturally outside the church. 'Properly religious problems I do not know from experience...'. This phrase from Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo' expresses a possibility, too unfamiliar in the theologized Germany, which it is high time to take note of.

It has sometimes been assumed that the author of the 'Myth' is somehow influenced by Nietzsche. *In reality, Nietzsche has contributed nothing to the formation of the 'Myth', just as German Romanticism has not influenced it either; Rosenberg's spiritual liberators have been exclusively Goethe and Schopenhauer.* Since Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, there have been great Germans time and again who, without knowing of each other, led an existence free from all ecclesiastical ties. There has been talk of an *anima naturaliter christiana* [phrase by Tertullian of Carthage, translator's note], the independent spirits were qualified as exceptions, as 'heretics'. It is time to speak of an *anima naturaliter germanica* and to cease considering the history of the German spirit from the history of the church. Only in the eyes of theologians who believe in an eternal duration of the Christian era can the independent spirits appear as 'heretics'. The Christian era was a world-historical episode. Christianity is only tradition; it no longer has any power that stirs the soul. The inner life of the era stirs today in those who in other times would have ended up at the stake for their convictions.

The enormous commotion aroused by Rosenberg's work should not be judged by the arguments that were opposed to it. No impartial person would deny today that the apologetic movement that attempted to rise up against the 'Myth' has been stifled by its own spiritual sterility. The book against which the apologists of the churches directed their sermons was full of vivid experiences, it was ardent, sustained by a suprapersonal conviction and therefore captivating and overwhelming. What was opposed to it lacked

everywhere the tone that moves the soul. In front of the lived idea stood the unlivd dogma, in front of the myth stood the 'word', in front of the certainty of faith stood the certainty of the institution. And yet, the unique excitement surrounding the 'Myth' is a symptom of great importance. In this agitation manifests what was literally taken seriously by the defenders of the churches: the awareness that a new era of struggle around Christianity has begun. Before, the church claimed to measure everything that happened by its own standards; now a new measure has been erected: the reality of the German people and their history.

We are not the ones who have to justify ourselves before the Church, but rather the Church that has to justify itself before us: this is the decisive understanding to which every reader of the 'Myth' must arrive, if they do not allow themselves to be captivated by a mysterious 'word' that demands the sacrifice of their reason. The Germanic substance, the racial soul of the German people existed before there was a Christianity in the north; it has determined the history of the German faith and has produced Christian art; it will continue to determine our history even when Christianity is no longer the religion of our people. There is no choice: either one recognizes what the world and life prove everywhere, that everything great is produced by man thanks to the grace of his blood, that the history of each people is a great unity and that the individual must find the place that corresponds to him in that unity; or one claims to derive the Supreme from a revealed 'word', not bound to race, and with that one immediately falls into insoluble difficulties, especially when it comes to delimiting that Supreme from the less elevated, that is, that produced by man. The hopeless confusion into which theological thought falls as soon as it is confronted with the realities of life and history (theology is not a discipline of faith but of subtlety, it needs it!) has become completely visible for the first time thanks to Rosenberg's decisive thinking. By having placed the myth at the center as the supreme value, he has forced theology into a very unfavorable battlefield for it. Supreme value is at the same time a religious, ethical and historical concept. Whoever allows themselves to be guided by this concept is capable of comprehending the world and life in a unified way. Under the theological assumption, on the other hand, this concept loses its applicability. Precisely the supreme value cannot be 'revealed' but must come from man himself; the other values join it organically. If, on the contrary, a revelation is assumed, then the historical world fragments. The sacrifice of reason before the claim of revelation means at the same time the renunciation of the understanding of history.

The theological literature on the 'Myth' reveals that the apologists of the confessions find themselves in a quandary for the first time. It is a matter of concealing through much talking the fatal circumstance that the point from which they can respond has not yet been found. But such a point will never be found, because it does not exist. The traditional categories of apologetics break down before a thought that is neither enlightened-denying nor romantic-

constructive but moves in realities. *Theology only exercises its power as long as life has not yet come to find itself. It can dominate theories. Realities and history escape it.* Over the myth of blood, it has no power at all, because it is not an abstract philosopheme, but life itself that has become conscious of itself. The sacrifice made by the German people in the First and Second World Wars can no longer be dissolved into a series of individual acts of devotion, as required by theological thought removed from reality. In the necessity of the times of war, an 'impersonal collective' has been born; the community of the sacrifices made by it unites the millions 'together with their children and more distant descendants' (Myth, p. 449). 'Patriotism' no longer exists; in its place, a 'mythical, real experience' has come about. A new sense of reality gathers individuals into an indestructible unity, into a community of suprapersonal consecration. In the thunder of battles, the people have experienced 'that the old will of blood still lives' (Myth, p. 700). The community of blood has helped itself: before this experience, the old legends of the East pale. A new legend does not replace the old one; the object dissolves into nothingness before the eyes of the diligent apologists. Before the reality of the dawning day, the phantoms vanish.

It has never been properly understood what it means that Rosenberg rejects not only the dogmas of the Christian churches, but any formation of dogmas. Through the 'Myth', not only is the epoch of all Enlightenment and liberal argumentation against Christianity and the church ended, but through it any attempt at a 'romantic' restoration of the Middle Ages becomes impossible; rather, the entire situation in which Christianity can even be discussed in the future fundamentally changes. How childish the enterprise of continuing to speak of a new 'rational religion' seems in the face of such a revolution in the mode of thought, and of continuing to oppose 'revelation' to 'individual reason'. The historical thought that Rosenberg applies with the utmost consistency is not the thought of the historical biblical criticism of the 19th century. The author of the 'Myth' is not a descendant of Ludwig Feuerbach and David Friedrich Strauss, but the founder of a new understanding of human-historical existence. *He does not proclaim any new dogma or institution but speaks from the certainty of a new faith in the eternal, reality-creating powers.* It borders on the comical when a theological reader believes he can determine that Rosenberg presents us with a liberal content in mythical garb. It has always been attempted, on the part of the historical powers whose time had passed, to press the New into the thought forms of the Decrepit, in order to make it appear at least for a brief period harmless. But such artifices no longer have any effect in the face of an honesty that only expresses what is. Rosenberg only expresses what he has experienced, his instinct for the real enables him to distinguish the essential from the inessential and preserves him from getting lost in dialectical justifications of what is merely transmitted and still existing. For him, faith is not any kind of assent, but the relation of the soul to what effectively acts in

the creative depths and moves in a formative way. Faith is a feeling for the real. A new epoch is born from a new sense of reality: that is the meaning of the 'Myth of the 20th Century'. Precisely the distancing from all false 'myths', dogmas and fictions is what is subversive about this work that has arisen from honesty, which does not proclaim more than the author knows and can take responsibility for, but which also does not shy away from drawing the ultimate consequences from the experience of the change of eras. Rosenberg's importance for our time is based on the fact that he has succeeded in making visible, by spiritual means, the event and experience of the renaissance of the German-Germanic popular soul.

About a process surrounded by the mystery of creative life, one can only speak in allusions. As energetic as the language of the 'Myth' may become when it comes to describing historical characters and institutions, it is nevertheless always restrained when referring to the new faith. In this, the difference between a mere literato and a writer who speaks and acts by historical mandate becomes manifest: whoever wants to give expression to what moves their epoch without contact with hidden realities will not only go astray but will also betray themselves by the strident tone with which they speak precisely of what they consider germinal life; whereas he who really sees what wants to come into being involuntarily becomes quiet (as by the cradle of a newborn).

The theological critics of the 'Myth' have lacked any disposition to notice the reserve with which Rosenberg speaks of the essential. Instead of treating his phrases as expressions of a faith, they considered them finished and smooth formulas; instead of as allusions to an inexhaustible content, they took them as dogmatic statements. Even this had to be the final result of the habit of speaking dogmatically about faith: to no longer perceive real faith when one encounters it. None of the Christian churches today has the openness to welcome living faith into its fold and appropriate it, an openness that once made the church a historical power.

The sense of reality of a powerful movement has shattered the barriers that in Western Christendom the churches imposed on the spiritual outbursts of the European nations. Once the Franciscan movement of Italy flowed into the Roman church, once the Pietistic current renewed Protestantism in Germany. Today, Christianity no longer manages to transform living faith into dogma, experience into institution. Powerless, the churches have to watch as the political and intellectual life of the era shapes itself outside their traditional forms. In the shadow of Versailles, facing the Jewish-Bolshevik danger, the Christianity of the churches has demonstrated its incapacity for a formative and creative intervention; it is indifferent how many adherents the Christian churches count today: whoever understands the language spoken by the history of peoples knows what is coming now. The churches have abandoned the peoples; spiritual powers do not overcome such defeats.

In this context, the struggle surrounding the 'Myth' reveals itself as an event of symbolic significance. The apologists of the Protestant church believed they could consider Rosenberg as an individualist and thus combat him, and 'refuted' the myth of blood from the basis of old dogmas and institutions as a new popular religion. *This whole intellectual game is nothing more than a superficial process; in the depths of reality, something quite different has been fulfilled.* Only in appearance did theology attack an individual; in truth, it was felt with precision that here an individual was not simply speaking with subjective authority and expounding a 'rational religion' invented by him, but that a new era had taken the floor. For the first time, the Christian church truly finds itself, not just in form, on the defensive. And that is the event of reforming significance that is linked with the 'Myth of the 20th Century': the greatest event of Western history, the separation of the European spirit from Christianity predicted by Nietzsche, is recognized in this book as a real historical process in the present German context and affirmed with a truthfulness that admits no compromises. *The total collapse of 1918 had to mean the end of the existence of the German people, if an advance toward a new form of existence did not take place.* Only a miracle could still save the German spirit. This miracle has been accomplished by the faith that the World War kindled in Adolf Hitler and some other brave men. The German people will always be grateful to the man who wrote these words in a politically desperate situation:

'We proclaim, after this experience, as the religion of the future German, that we, politically defeated today, humiliated and persecuted, have found the root of our strength, in reality we have discovered it for the first time and have revived it with a force like no previous generation. The mythical apprehension and the conscious recognition face each other today for the first time, in the sense of German renewal thought, not as enemies but mutually stimulating each other: the most ardent nationalism no longer directed at tribes, dynasties, confessions, but at the primordial substance, at the essence bound to race, is the message that will one day fuse all dross to bring forth the noble and extirpate the ignoble' (Myth, p. 85).

It was to be expected that the theologians, the only ones who have seriously dealt with the 'Myth', would transfer the confrontation with Rosenberg to their terrain; however, this does not change the fact that their apologetic efforts do not do justice to the book to which they are dedicated. The theologian always starts from the assumption that Rosenberg arrives at his own position from a critique of Christianity. In reality, this critique is secondary; the position itself is primary. Rosenberg is not a biblical critic who approaches Christianity from a standpoint devised at the desk, but a man in the storm of the times, who passionately experiences the rebirth of the German people and who, in his endeavor to make comprehensible to others the position attained in combative existence and intellectual work, takes a stance towards the historical phenomenon of Christianity. *The 'Myth' is*

completely misunderstood if one asks what it has to say for or against Christianity and then judges it accordingly. The author of the 'Myth' does not confront Christianity as a theologian confronts another theology; as a political man, he seeks to correctly understand the history of the German people. Since this purpose was not taken seriously, the theological literature of refutation has been papier-mâché from the outset; but where it was not 'refuted' in the abstract but asked concretely, it was also felt that the questioner was shaken by Rosenberg's vision and felt the ground shifting under his feet. *The myth of race and the discourse of revelation cannot be connected in any way.* The Roman church had no doubt about this. *It put the work on the Index of Forbidden Books and prohibited its servants from following its line of argument in any way. Its so-called scientific refutation was only a diversionary maneuver for the credulous and ignorant, with which it was to be concealed that no confrontation over the content was entered into.* The Vatican gave the instruction: this event has not taken place; race is not spoken of; we do not know an autonomous history of peoples! The German Protestantism does not have it so easy. Since it has distanced itself from Karl Barth, it is not willing to separate itself from German history. In general, it takes the problems of historical existence very seriously and recognizes that history must also be viewed under the aspect of race and blood. The question facing German Protestantism today as its question of destiny is: how is faith in a racially unbound revelation still possible once the idea of race has been generally recognized? The same thing happens with this thought as with gravitation. Like it, it cannot be suspended for a moment (in the interest of 'revelation') without everything bursting apart. One can only view the history of man in the light of an alleged revelation or in the light of racial thought. There is no third option. The attempt at a synthesis always has to be something transitory and will ultimately necessarily lead to the racial-historical consideration of man. Without sacrificing his reason, today no one can renounce the historical interpretation of his own existence; the key to deciphering, however, lies in the recognition of man as a racially shaped character, not in a revelation that evades historical knowledge.

The aspect of the content of Rosenberg's confrontation with Christianity, put in the foreground by the theological critics, is not at all decisive for the total understanding of the 'Myth'. Rosenberg did not initiate this confrontation; it has a venerable prehistory whose context and significance to characterize was certainly not in the interest of the apologists. Since the great doctrinal disputes of the Middle Ages, since Count Gottschalk and Master Eckhart (to whom the 'Myth' not without reason accords a decisive place), the German spirit has grappled with the paradoxes of Christianity. It sought the inner center that a foreign religion could not give it. It has accomplished tremendous things in the endeavor to inwardly appropriate the paradox of the cross, the mystery of the incarnation and the doctrine of the trinity, until at least in part it succeeded in giving even the most strange and

contradictory a Germanic face. These efforts never reached an end, and the history of German philosophy represents the monumental proof that there was always something that did not let the German man rest and again and again sent him on a pilgrimage in search of the truth. Since Kant, the search for the inner center of the German soul has entered a 'critical' stage. Only those who do not want to see could fail to recognize that an inner necessity reigns in the confrontation of German thought with Christianity. From Kant and Fichte there leads a straight line to Lagarde, Chamberlain and Rosenberg. In making this observation, one must bear in mind that here we are not speaking of the National Socialist Rosenberg and the core of his work, but solely of the spiritual context in which his confrontation with Christianity is inscribed. *Neither Fichte nor Chamberlain, neither Lagarde nor Nietzsche can be identified with National Socialism, for National Socialism does not exist before Adolf Hitler.* But those men were already on the front on which, through the great spiritual movement of our time, the decisive victory has been won.

On the path of the Germanic spirit towards itself, critical philosophy is the decisive achievement. With veneration Rosenberg names Kant, he refers to the critique of knowledge. Through his critique of knowledge, Kant laid the philosophical foundations for the definitive liberation of the spirit from the fantasy of ecclesiastical dogmas; through his ethics of duty he restored honor to man. Although the revolution provoked by Kant remained limited to the sciences and philosophy, the critique of knowledge ultimately became, in its effects, the precursor of a Europe after the Middle Ages. And yet, alongside the harshest judgments on ecclesiastical institutions, in Kant there is not a word against Christian doctrine. Kant, on the contrary, strives to bring the content of his ethics into harmony with the teachings of Christ, and defines religion as the 'fulfillment of our duties as divine commands'. This turn can be considered a classic formula of the era of reconciliation between independent Germanic philosophy and the Christian tradition. Duty, that is, action, comes first for the German thinker; although the moral law is grounded in man independently of God, he nevertheless considers the fulfillment of this as religion and endeavors to demonstrate the conformity of its demands with the teachings of Christ.

The priority of action stemming from inner freedom, the veneration of the person of Jesus, the rejection of the Old Testament and the apostle Paul, the struggle against dogma and the sacraments, against the ecclesiastical notion of office and hierarchy, are fundamental invariable traits in the confrontation of the German spirit with Christianity for the past 150 years. It was quite crude on the part of the church apologists to pretend that Rosenberg had raised new assertions in this regard. The author of the 'Myth' never thought of presenting himself as a theologian. As a German man, he arrived at the same free conception of Christianity that has been in the possession of the revolutionary minds of his people since Leibniz and Lessing.

The idea of a non-ecclesiastical Christianity is the ultimate and most delicate result of a secular labor of the European spirit on the medieval tradition. On German soil, this labor has found its crowning, and here too it has been ended. That the Germans clung to a Christianity that had passed through the Nordic spirit, liberated from all magic and purified of Judaism, that they sometimes finally identified Germanity and Christianity, cannot surprise a historical observer.

The little understanding that Rosenberg's adversaries showed towards his inner attitude and the lack of justice they evidenced is illustrated by the fact that they did not have a word for the spiritual development that issues in the 'Myth'. Precisely Rosenberg's relationship with Christianity reveals that he was never an iconoclast. He contemplated with veneration the image of Christianity coined in German history. For the German it is so easy to rediscover himself in the Germanized Christianity. Only gradually did he recognize that the transfer of Christianity to the Germanic world of the north was a fateful destiny, and only slowly did he come to the conviction that no religious power resides even in the person of the founder of Christianity. Finally, the person of Jesus became for him a mere venerable memory, a figure who by virtue of his historical-universal effect is better kept out of any confrontation with historical Christianity. Towards the Germanized Christianity, Rosenberg has refrained from any hurtful attack; he has always followed the principle that he formulated in a speech in Aachen (1939): 'that all the great movements that were once shapers of history are already ennobled by the mere fact that Germans believed in them'.

His internal confrontation with Christianity was essentially determined, as in many others, by the experiences that the national fighter had to undergo in Republican Germany with the political efficacy of the Christian confessions. The core religious and political problems clashed in the Jewish question. The decision had to fall in the face of the Jewish problem.

Rosenberg finds himself in agreement with the best of his people when in the most substantial of his early struggle writings, 'The Crime of Freemasonry', he defends the philosophical-Christian attitude of Lagarde and Chamberlain against modern disintegration and sees in the attacks of the Freemasons and Jews on the religion of these men an undermining of the foundations of our existence, Christianity ('The Crime of Freemasonry', p. 67). A weakening of Christianity, which is of course never equated with ecclesiastical Christianity, must be seen here as a weakening of Germanity, the defense of Christianity becomes a national duty. And when in his early writings Rosenberg emphatically points to Jesus, he does so because he believes he can rediscover the most ancient Aryan knowledge of the oneness and dignity of the personality in some phrases of the New Testament ('The Crime of Freemasonry', p. 177). It is the same motive that also guided Kant. The new thing is that Rosenberg has recognized the abysmal difference that separates Germanic-Christian metaphysics from the legalistic religion and

lack of personality of Judaism.

This inclusion of Judaism means more than a mere enrichment of knowledge. Since emancipation, the Jewish race has been attacking the vital fabric of old Europe. It seeks allies among the possessive instincts of noble but tired and unproductive peoples and among all the disintegrating elements of modern society in order to finally realize in the age of the stock exchange the ancient dream of Jewish world domination. In such a situation, the religious decision becomes political and politics at the same time religious. The question of whether a Jew enters or does not enter the German popular community through baptism, for example, carries political and religious consequences by which the general state of our civilization is affected.

In this situation, Rosenberg has posed the existential question to the Church. With intuitive certainty, he reduced the bewildering multiplicity of particular issues to the single and essential question that contains them all. His reasoning is of a persuasive simplicity: if there exists a value that is above national honor, then a struggle that must lead to the liberation and recovery of the people is impossible. Only a supreme value understood and affirmed by all is capable of engendering that decision which is necessary to break all resistance. Whoever truly wants the salvation of the German people from the Jewish embrace, will not be diverted from the pursuit of their goal by anything. A community of struggle will form that will take possession of the law of action; the attitude of each individual towards this community of struggle will reveal their real position. Whoever is bound to values other than the honor and freedom of the nation will be left behind. The renaissance will be accompanied by a division of spirits. The Christian confessions cannot remain outside the struggle. If this were granted, a second supreme value would have been recognized, which contradicts the concept of supreme value and is therefore absurd. National honor, if taken seriously, cannot be a value among others; it can only be the supreme value or nothing. For this reason, the Christian confessions are faced with the demand to separate themselves not only from Rome but also from Jerusalem ('The Crime of Freemasonry', p. 159).

What Rosenberg did was not to attack the confessions and put a new confession alongside the old ones, but to place the confessions, and not only the confessions, before the decision. It is a mistake to assume that National Socialism was active from the beginning on the confessional question. Rather, in the early years of the political struggle, the Christian confessions were treated with all the consideration and respect corresponding to the German tradition. The question was whether the confessions would recognize what it was about. They would have had to let themselves be transformed by the New that was breaking into existence with such overwhelming force, if they still carried the future within them. *Only the Roman church, which had already been unable to absorb the movement unleashed by Luther into its bosom in the 16th century, immediately closed itself off to the utmost hostility.* The

Protestant church had just been diverted from the path traced for it by Schleiermacher by the Calvinist Karl Barth. Absorbed in this internal crisis, it was unable to hear the call that was addressed to it. There were more than enough brave Lutherans, willing to give the nation the honor it was due. But the church was not open enough to find the way to life from Judaic theology.

For a moment, one believes one can feel how universal history contains the breath. The moment passes, in the churches no one has noticed anything. In Alfred Rosenberg's soul, all dreams and thoughts converge on the conception of the 'Myth'. When the book appears, it arrives just in time to make visible the situation that had formed in the first ten years of struggle. The Roman church is in open attack, Protestantism has refused the movement. It already carries within itself the tendency of the 'Confessing Church'. A universal-historical confrontation has begun. The clarity and decisiveness with which Rosenberg expounds the supra-political meaning of the present convulsion, proclaiming a 'myth rich in content, full of blood, a life-feeling that possesses a center around which everything forms and configures itself' (Myth, p. 613), causes the representatives of the confessions to go on the attack. The serious question posed by Rosenberg's work is not heard, the 'response to the myth' becomes a task of church politics, the theological dispute begins. But intangible like a spirit, the book in which for the first time national honor is planted at the center of human existence passes through the combatants. The response to the 'Myth' does not occur from the pulpits; the question is directed at the 20th century; the century will respond.

Only that 'profound inner confidence in one's own kind' (Myth, p. 611) that integral peoples have and that we have unfortunately lost can be at the center of our civilization. The 'creation of a feeling of supreme value' (Myth, p. 611) is the prerequisite of all culture. Since the Christian confessions have been unable to prevent our political and intellectual life from falling into corruption, it would be a punishable illusionism to suppose that the restoration of the German people could arise from anything other than a new spiritual center.

'The prerequisite for all German education is the recognition of the fact that it was not Christianity that brought us civilization, but rather Christianity owes its enduring values to the Germanic character (which is the reason why it does not present these values in some states). Therefore, the values of the Germanic character are the eternal to which everything else must adapt. Whoever does not want this renounces a German renaissance and dictates to themselves the sentence of spiritual death. But a man or a movement that wants to help these values to total victory has the moral right not to be indulgent with the opposite. He has the duty to overcome it spiritually, let it wither organizationally, and keep it politically impotent. For if a cultural will is not made into a drive for power, it would be better if the struggle had not even begun' (Myth, p. 636). Let it be called intolerance if you will... without this intolerance nothing great has yet been created in the world.

A racial soul can only have one supreme value above it. When this value, from a certain point on, is not only felt unconsciously but also recognized and affirmed consciously, when the myth of blood has once entered into the historical consciousness of the people, then it becomes the most important internal task of the nation to create a type that corresponds to the myth. '...type is the plastic form, bound to an era, of an eternal racial-psychic content...' (Myth, p. 531). The myth of blood is in itself untouched by the conditions of time; blood is the source of all historical configuration, but in itself it is not a form bound to an era.

From the mythical maternal womb great creative personalities arise directly; the type, on the other hand, is not an immediate birth from the mythical basis, but the temporal-personal creation of great individualities acting with the full power of a historical mandate. Personality and the idea proclaimed and lived by it are the shapers of types. The primordial mythical basis constitutes the prerequisite for a genuine and enduring type to be able to emerge. Names like Frederick the Great and Moltke designate at the same time German personalities and an idea. Elusive, mythical and yet real, the Germanic hereditary union stands behind them.

Each era is always posed anew with the task of producing a certain type. The task of our era is, after overcoming the dissolution of the 19th century, to first recover the myth, 'to create a new human type from a new life-myth' (Myth, p. 2). The myth itself cannot be created; its rediscovery is not action but experience, birth (comp. Myth, p. 481). This experience has been gifted to the German people by the fateful event of the World War. In August 1914, the supreme value of the Moltkean army became the supreme value of the entire people (Myth, p. 520). What was then a passing event must now, after the myth of blood has been reborn from the events of the Great War, become, from the unconscious depths of the racial substance and yet completely consciously, the goal of the education of the entire nation.

The fundamental concept of type for education can only be correctly understood if it is taken from the context in which it is introduced by Rosenberg. What a genuine type means, that is, one referred to a myth, can only be understood after clarifying the concepts of authority and freedom. As long as there was no notion of the racially formed personality, only abstract 'authority' could be contrasted with abstract freedom. However, 'authority without race' is just as chaotic and incapable of founding politics and education as freedom without race. Authority is only genuine and enduring where it is linked to life; a freedom not linked to life, on the other hand, is merely another word for anarchy. True freedom can always only be the freedom of life toward itself. Rosenberg calls this freedom 'organic freedom' (Myth, p. 529). Only a dominion that asserts the same vital values to which everyone feels inwardly obligated possesses true authority, and only a system of increasing freedom can be safe from both anarchism and despotism. The life-bound personality moves in full independence within the margin set for it

by natural forces and dispositions.

It is their own living forces that demand guidance and direction, without which they are unable to have activity and elevation within the historical community. The stronger the personality, the stronger the demand for 'discipline and inner edification' (Myth, p. 530). The era that allowed individual forces to grow unchecked has passed. A new era of strict breeding of types has begun. 'Today the strongest personality no longer demands personality but type' (Myth, p. 531).

The type cannot be more distorted than by confusing it, as a great historical form which is naturally something completely different from a social 'type', with a schema. The type arises through the shaping power of great historical goals referred to living forces and corresponding to these forces. Within it, the greatest diversity is possible. For the individual grasps, those goals from within themselves through their own imagination, understanding and will. The type is fiery and animating, the abstract schema is arid. It does not arise from the living forces themselves but is stamped upon them without consideration for their own character and stubbornness. The type is the vital form of freedom; schematization has been in all times a means of servitude.

The sociology of the past has counterposed the social principle to the individual principle and has ultimately believed it could trace all ideological antitheses back to the difference between individualism and universalism. It was a spiritual decision of high rank when Rosenberg opposed the abstract doctrine of totality and showed that an idealism of totality that does not recognize 'the racially bound soul of the people as the measure of all our thoughts, will-desires and actions, as the ultimate measure of our values' (Myth, p. 697), is not ideologically distinguished from the combated individualism. Universalism is only a twin brother of individualism (Myth, p. 695), both lack race and nature.

It is deceptive and dangerous to construct an 'organic' system in the realm of pure spirit, alien to blood and without a people, if the true organic center, the natural-historically unique racial soul of the people, does not constitute the starting point and end of the entire construction. Neither an abstract individualism nor an abstract universalism or socialism molds peoples 'descending as it were from the clouds'; racially healthy peoples know neither the one nor the other measure (Myth, p. 539). A state system is socialist when its measures serve the whole (Myth, p. 541). This political goal is not achieved through universalist doctrines, but through National Socialist leadership and the education of everyone in an organic worldview at whose center stands the idea of the honor of the nation as a biological-spiritual unity. Socialism cannot be defined as the subordination of the individual to the will of any collective (Myth, p. 534 f). The subordination of the individual only makes sense when the collective has a true content and a fiery center. Subordination to a life-hostile power has nothing to do with socialism.

Abstract principles, whether individualistic or universalistic, always lead to anarchy and decadence. 'Only their consequence can show whether a measure is socialist...' (Myth, p. 535). National Socialism does not want to realize nationalism and socialism, but to lead the German people to the supreme form contained within it. 'The German people does not exist to defend any abstract schema with its blood, but rather, all schemas, systems of thought and values are in our eyes only means to strengthen the vital struggle of the nation outwardly and elevate the internal strength through a just and appropriate organization' (Myth, p. 644).

Myth and type are the fundamental concepts of Rosenberg's work of thought. There are few books that include within the circle of their observation and judgment so many problems of a religious, political, philosophical and practical nature as the 'Myth of the 20th Century'. Almost unfathomable is the diversity of life unfolded here, the abundance of mastered material. That this book nevertheless represents a victorious unity is due to the fact that it has arisen from a single spiritual decision that penetrates everything with its clarity and consequence and assigns each detail its place within the whole. The book that deals with personality is at the same time the imprint of a closed personality in the midst of thought. The reduction carried out here of everything that has happened and is still happening in the vast realm of historical being and life to the character of man is therefore convincing because the author confirms it by demonstrating it. His philosophy of action subjugates the reader because it itself is action.

Everything is developed from a single premise, what man creates and produces, communal orders and religions, buildings and symphonies, philosophical systems and technical solutions, is an expression of his character. It arises from an animistic center that is inserted into the organism of the natural-historical unity from which it originates. Every spiritual measure is false and in its ultimate consequences pernicious if it does not grow from the relation of the individual to the center of the racial-popular whole. From the lack of center of gravity and center of the past epoch stem all those phenomena of decomposition whose terrifying revelation in the time after the First World War caused the will for renewal to arise from the healthy core of the German popular being. While others were still trying to find positive aspects in decadence, the Führer saw salvation only in the renaissance of the nation. Through the force of his heart and will, National Socialism became the center of a new life. In place of unthinking customs and bloodless concepts came fiery communal forms and great ideas. The nation once again felt itself in the service of a historical task.

From the experience of the renaissance of the German people through National Socialism, Rosenberg took the strength to trace the chaotic situation into which modern Europe had fallen back to a few simple lines and lay the foundation for an ideational mastery of problems that seemed to have become insoluble. The principle that guided him in this has been expounded by us. It

can be formulated in the following general formula: the value patterns of life and all its creations cannot be conceived as ideas or spiritual essences existing in themselves, without doing violence to life and putting it in mortal danger. For all the values that shape and elevate existence come from life and are bound to life. A thought that posits values and forms in absolute terms springs from a worldview that is hostile to life in its deepest foundation. Therefore, it must not be treated as an inaccessible guild matter immune to criticism but must be examined from the center of life. This examination was initiated by Rosenberg with a critique of the hypostasis of the aesthetic form. The result was that absolute aesthetics is based on a misunderstanding of the aesthetic will. It constructs a beauty in empty space without consideration for living man, for whom alone beauty can exist. Every artistic creation refers to the man who produces it and thereby to the racial soul that determines his creation.

Art does not exist, nor religion, nor the State, nor the law; there exist only human characters and orientations of will, from which everything that presents itself to us in historical experience arises. Religious, legal, political and spiritual antitheses and struggles are ultimately struggles of psychic attitudes against each other. Universal history will never be comprehensible to us if we contemplate it as a development of 'humanity' towards some fabulous goal. Experience everywhere shows us only living centers of communities that seek to realize and carry forward their supreme value. All confusion and decomposition in the existence of peoples has its cause in the fact that men have hitherto not known the law that reigns in all living events and that knows nothing of arbitrary changes of innate orientations of the will. The constancy of character given with the continuity of blood is the primary phenomenon of the human-historical world. The religion and law, art and poetry, ethics and politics of a popular community are most closely intertwined with each other because they are only diverse manifestations of the same fundamental will. The concordance of these manifestations with each other constitutes the essence of the culture of a community. In the past, the unity of culture had to be wrested from opposed universalist tendencies, by which mixture and alienation were fostered. For centuries, the psychic-racial-popular characters managed to establish a unity of culture despite all universalist counter-effects. Finally, the strength was exhausted. The international Jew, taking advantage of monetary thought, rose to become the master of the world and threatened to destroy all fiery creative power; Bolshevism set out to physically annihilate the nations. Then the need of the time engendered in the most threatened people the will and knowledge that led to a renaissance. National Socialism put in place of the confused mixture of general representations and ideals that was designated as the spirit of humanity or the idea of Western culture, an organically founded worldview. It was not content with symptomatically curing decadence but attacked the evil at its root.

When Rosenberg recognized the idea of honor as the spiritual center

of the Germanic world and determined national honor as the supreme value of all our creation and action, not only was the lost connection of our system of values with the mode of valuation of our ancestors restored. More happened than a mere correction of our measures of value: the reinstatement of the supreme value of honor brings with it a new hierarchical order of all values and at the same time a style of feeling and thinking values that makes a relapse into the universalist error of the past impossible.

The past Christian era elevated the idea of love (*caritas*), which is in inner connection with the virtues of mercy and humility, to the supreme value of Western culture. Although European history was always very far from corresponding in any way to this supreme value, it was a fictitious, not real supreme value; the hierarchy of values once established (by the Church) remained in force, although it was demonstrated time and again that this order of values had no constructive power, put the sick and weak before the healthy and strong, and moreover did nothing but favor hypocrisy. Modern humanitarian democracy has emerged from this ideology, whose morality was characterized by Nietzsche as the morality of 'descending life'. The overcoming of democratic decadence by National Socialism restored the aristocratism of nature. A social order that is not diverted from its essential tasks by the idea of love will also take care of the sick and weak, without having to construct its educational and value system on the care of the needy. After all, the institutions that serve the sick and weak are also created and sustained by those who do not belong to the sick and weak. Through the re-establishment of the aristocratic order of values, at the center of which stands honor, to which belong the virtues of valor and truthfulness, society is not only liberated from the unfruitful principle of compassion, but also redeemed from the spirit of untruthfulness that the idea of 'love' has brought upon all public life. For complete self-denial may well become a reality at some point in individuals of special constitution and lead to phenomena such as those we know from the history of some religions. But the healthy strength of a community can never be put into the service of breeding such individuals. They remain exceptions and may well serve a religious institution for recruitment, but never as models for a political community.

A fatal devaluation of all the values on which strong life stands, and an irremediable corruption of truthfulness and education, must result when love is introduced as the universal value of a social order and as a shaping power of types. Love may well be universalized (one can speak of love), but it can never shape a type, because it does not develop from natural forces, but can only be taught to them, which in the face of the persistence of human dispositions leads only to contradiction and insincerity.

It is one of the deepest insights we owe to Rosenberg that love and honor are the central values of two opposed systems of values, and that unlike the system of honor, the system of love has no inherent power to shape types (Myth, p. 158). The chaotic state that Western culture had reached by the end

of the 19th century revealed the contradiction into which Germanic Europe had fallen because of the ideology of 'love'. Under the dominion of the idea of love, nowhere could a worldview and life order corresponding to real forces take shape. All power spoke the language of love, and the more unnatural and violent its dominion was, the more loving its ideology was.

From the doctrine of the supreme value it follows that a people can only live happily if it shapes its existence in accordance with itself, that is, if all its thinking and acting springs from a single root. If religion and politics come from different roots, the contradiction, in other words fundamental untruthfulness, has to become a permanent state. Only after overcoming this contradiction is an authentic shaping of types possible, for the prerequisite of all real education is the unity of life and doctrine.

Considered as a shaper of history, and not in itself or in isolated individuals, the idea of love reveals itself under the aspect of education as the true misfortune of Western culture. The institution that introduced this idea into the formation of the European peoples has become the great school of disloyalty. 'The Church itself, as a form of discipline, could not and should not know any love in order to maintain itself and continue to impose itself as a type-shaping power. But it could conduct power politics with the help of love' (Myth, p. 159). Power politics with the help of love means debasing the idea to a mere means, thereby abolishing the unity of life and doctrine, politics and spirit, indispensable for the education of the Germanic-German man. Only a revolution that stripped the idea of love of its dominant position could create the prerequisites for a German education of Germanic character. By putting the idea of honor in place of the idea of *caritas*, Rosenberg restored to German education and at the same time to European culture the essence it should never have lost. The personality shaped by the supreme value of honor is the human type whose dominion will put an end to the split between politics and spirit. The era of the contradiction between the expansionist politics without ideas of great and small nations on the one hand and a 'democratic' humanitarian-charitable ideology on the other (its most hypocritical formula was Commonwealth) is over.

The revolution of National Socialism does not consist in replacing one ideology with another, but in redirecting the thinking and acting of the German man to the living center from which all human creations flow. That center is what the word worldview points to. By worldview, National Socialism understands that unity conditioned by the racial disposition of the psychic attitude on which is founded the possibility of mastering all problems of life and thought.

Under the supreme value of honor, life and doctrine, politics and spirit, can only unfold unitarily. 'The idea of honor, national honor, will be for us the principle and end of all our thinking and acting. It tolerates no center of equal force beside itself, neither Christian love, nor Masonic humanity, nor Roman philosophy' (Myth, p. 514).

In the world of the German soldier, honor has always been the supreme value. Rosenberg's work consists as little as Kant's ethics in having found a completely new principle, which certainly counts as a dubious merit in the realm of ethics. However, new and audacious is the knowledge that honor is the center of being and life not only of an estate but of the entire nation, and the clear vision of the central position of the idea of honor in its relation to other values.

The supreme value of honor impels the personality to achieve the utmost in performance. That is the reason why this supreme value radiates over the entire life of the individual as well as the community. The fundamental values closest to honor are those of loyalty and duty.

Honor is first and foremost always the honor of a concrete personality; it is inseparable from the will to self-affirmation and the real existence of the one who possesses it. Honor can never become universal: honor can always only be the honor of this or that particular man; honor does not exist. In this is founded that under the dominion of the supreme value of honor that decadence of morals which was inevitable under the dominion of the universalist idea of love cannot arise. The idea of love can be abused as a means, the idea of honor can only ever be realized in concrete personal representation. An existence under the supreme value of honor has to be a life in truthfulness.

Extending from the center of personality ('personal honor, honor of lineage, honor of the tribe, popular honor', Myth, p. 162), honor remains always linked to personality and opposes an insuperable resistance to any universalization and absolutization. Within the Germanic-German vital order, no other value can occupy the place of the supreme value. The idea of honor is inseparable from the idea of freedom (Myth, p. 532). The personality conscious of honor cannot exist except in freedom; the Germanic-German forms of dominion are always at the same time forms of freedom. The deepest reason that the Nordic soul cannot but behave in protest against the Roman Church lies in the fact that the Church aspires to dominion over souls. 'The Church wanted to reign through love, the Nordic Europeans wanted to live free through honor or die free with honor' (Myth, p. 146).

Will, honor, freedom, which is the heroic triptych in which the unitary personality unfolds. In considerations on the concept of personality, the central concept of the cosmovision's awakening, we have found the germ of the 'Myth of the 20th Century'. Volition has revealed itself, on closer examination, as the fundamental character of the human being; in honor we find the supreme value of the will and in freedom the fundamental value of all the political and spiritual creations of man existing under the idea of honor. The common opposing point of reference of will, honor and freedom is destiny. According to the Germanic-German conception, I and destiny face each other without the I being able to subjugate destiny or destiny oppress the I. 'In the fulfillment of the self-generated law of honor, old Hildebrando sees

at the same time the prevailing destiny' (Myth, p. 399). Destiny and personality are always referred to each other, destiny cannot be understood without personality, personality not without destiny. With this observation, Rosenberg reaches the highest point of the latent philosophical system that is perceptible everywhere in his work of thought.

The 'Myth of the 20th Century', which was elaborated in its current form towards the middle of 1928, was published in October 1930. Until then, through his speeches and struggle pamphlets, through the 'Völkischer Beobachter' and 'World Struggle', Rosenberg had tirelessly promoted the spiritual revolution of the German people and the formation of the party's will. In the 'Völkischer Beobachter' and 'World Struggle' the National Socialist speakers found an essential part of the material they needed to channel the formation of political opinion in the German people, led astray by a thousand false doctrines, onto new paths. What a writing like 'The Evolution of the Party Program' ('Essence, Principles and Objectives of the NSDAP', 1922) meant for the internal union of the party can hardly be overestimated. For the isolated fighter in the countryside as in the midst of the human masses of the big cities, who daily faced a torrent of questions and problems, Rosenberg's speeches, articles and writings were like a constellation that invariably pointed to the Führer's will as the North Star. In 1932 the writing 'Essence, Principles and Objectives of the NSDAP' was completed with the closed expositions of the work 'The Essential Structure of National Socialism'.

With the publication of the 'Myth' a new era began in Rosenberg's activity. After the immediate success of this book, surprising given the difficulty of the work, the book slowly gained, inside and outside the party, the position alongside the Führer's work. In 1930 Rosenberg founded the 'National Socialist Monthly Notebooks'. Their task was and remains today the positive continuation of the cultural work of National Socialism and the treatment of all questions of the movement that require discussion and exposition.

In the midst of an extraordinarily broad and intense literary activity, Rosenberg has always been present as an active political fighter as well. He has never fallen into the old German error of forgetting, absorbed in intellectual work and the treatment of domestic political issues, the fact that the German people has to assert itself in the struggle with other nations and in friendly relations with kindred national aspirations in the world. The fighter for ideology and borders Rosenberg, for whom the intellectual and political action of man springs from the same attitude, always keeps foreign policy with its problems at the center of his attention. In 1927 he published the bold book titled 'The Future Path of a German Foreign Policy'. As the NSDAP's representative on the Foreign Policy Commission of the German Reichstag, he delivered two speeches on the Polish question. In November 1931 and May 1933 he was in London to awaken understanding for the German revolution in circles of the English people, an attempt which, faced with the opposing

Jewish-reactionary forces, had to be denied success. A culminating point of his political activity is the speech he delivered in November 1932 at the Volta Congress of the Italian Academy. In this speech ('Crisis and New Birth of Europe') he characterized with impressive force the peculiar character and position of the four great nations in Europe and called for the conclusion of the four-power pact, that is, the only policy capable of avoiding war among the European peoples. With the founding of the Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP under the command of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, this activity was put on a broader organizational footing. In the new office, problems of the East received special attention, without the office's activity being limited to the East. The founding of the Nordic Society based in Lübeck bears witness to this. For obvious reasons, however, nothing more precise can be said today about the initiatives of the Foreign Policy Office in the different realms.

In January 1934, Rosenberg was charged by the Führer with overseeing all the ideological and spiritual formation and education of the NSDAP. At the 1937 party congress, Rosenberg was decorated by the Führer, as the first among the living, with the newly instituted National Prize for Art and Science. It is not our task here to take even a cursory look at the subsequent development of Rosenberg's manifold activity. For the defense against the pseudo-scientific attacks by the Roman church, Rosenberg published in 1934 the writing 'To the Pope and the Roman Church', which once again set forth the position of National Socialism towards obscurantism and hostility to culture. In 1937 the writing titled 'The Protestant Forgers' followed this. In the lively discussion that accompanied the internal confrontation of the National Socialist worldview with the spiritual forces of the German tradition, Rosenberg intervened decisively time and again in the years from 1933 until the outbreak of the Second World War. With constant readiness to turn towards all sides, he watched that not only every open attack but also every falsification or trivialization of the spiritual will of the party that approached 'in rubber slippers' was immediately rejected. In doing so, he never contented himself with merely defending or denying. Each of his rectifications was at the same time an interpretation of the essential. His critique was never impressionistic and in no case limited itself to symptoms, it always aimed at the center of the issue. Even in the period after the seizure of power, his awareness of the problems of the era and the demands of the day remained highly alive. The current occasion was always for him merely an opportunity to develop and deepen the worldview of National Socialism in certain directions. What took the form of critique was always at the same time a 'shaping of the idea' in the thick of the present. To the impulses ever anew emanating from Rosenberg, the party formation owes its determined attitude and its clear ideological orientation.

The image of history outlined in the 'Myth' was developed by Rosenberg in some of its features and fundamentally shaped. Here, above all, the speeches 'The First German Reich' (1935), 'The Expansion of the German

Image of History' (1935) and 'The Struggle for the German Past' (1939) must be mentioned. In a speech at the Sports Palace on German law (1934), Rosenberg coined that formula which illuminates the course of German history, and which can help some apolitical contemporaries understand the meaning of the NSDAP's ideological struggle: 'One can never wage a great struggle in world history with a prospect of lasting success if one still remains within the ideology and worldview of one's adversaries'. In this phrase, fraught with meaning, we can see summarized at once the political strategy and the ethics of its author. Later, a subsequent era will venerate Rosenberg as one of the greatest German educators. Some believe, because they do not know what history is, or because they even confuse history with a train schedule, that the future can be 'made'. The fighter Rosenberg triumphed because he understood German history, because he understood what the German spirit is. It was always a heartfelt certainty for him that the truth of a conviction is proven solely in struggle.




Figure 6a. Alfred Rosenberg.



Figure 6b. Alfred Rosenberg.



Figure 6c. Alfred Rosenberg.

Plastically, Rosenberg has delimited from the historical thought the spirit of the popular community versus the charitable spirit of bourgeois society in a speech at the Sports Palace on law and equity. 'Today we do not give out of clemency but give out of duty. We no longer hand over our donations with condescension, but conscious of the equal value of the recipient. We no longer sacrifice by grace, but by obligation towards the people to which we belong. We want to build a new world community'.

Special importance corresponds to the speeches that Rosenberg has delivered at the cultural gatherings of the Reich Culture Chamber directed by him. From the very first moment after the seizure of power, he took a stance against the degeneration of German culture. On different occasions he set forth the principles that have determined the movement's struggle against the Jewish and intellectualist disintegration of German culture. With the finest understanding he has always conceived of technology and its future task.

Of the commemorative speeches that Rosenberg has dedicated to great Germans in order to keep them in the memory of the Germans, those on Fichte, Kepler, Kant, Ulrich von Hutten, Gutenberg and Lagarde should be mentioned. That the grandest of these commemorative speeches was dedicated to Arthur Schopenhauer, the man and fighter (delivered on February 22, 1937), corresponds to the spiritual essence of its author.

On repeated occasions Rosenberg has given strong personal expression to his love for philosophy. In a speech on science and research (1936) he voiced the conviction that one day there will exist a National Socialist philosophy. Before Humboldt University he said: "National Socialism does not demand the renunciation of the object and subject of scientific attention and endeavor; the scientific spirit is an essential moment of the National Socialist worldview itself." To the cognitive audacity of the Nordic man, Europe owes having been liberated from the oppression of medieval superstition. But even in the world already illuminated by science, obscurantist forces attempt to infiltrate by manifold detours. Against all these enemies of reason, Rosenberg opposed himself with biting clarity, with the awakened consciousness that there is scarcely anything more important for our civilization than the freedom of research. It belongs to the most brilliant aspects of his work that he makes its historical place in the struggle of Germanic knowledge for the conquest of our worldview. Of the speeches that Rosenberg has delivered on the theme of worldview and science, two must be especially highlighted. On November 7, 1934 he spoke (at the University of Munich) on the freedom of science. On February 16, 1938 he professed in a major speech (at the University of Halle) on 'The Struggle for the Freedom of Research' his adherence to the spirit that sees the essence of science in the exploration of the inner lawfulness of things. Formative knowledge, he says in this speech, differs from mere empirical and magical contemplation of this

world. It is fantasy to bid farewell to causal investigation conquered by great minds under any pretext. If we were to attack causality and wanted to transfer concepts from the inner moral realm to the universe, he continued expounding in the speech on Copernicus and Kant, 'then the enthusiasts of our time would consequently, from their vision, also have to declare that in the end our Earth revolves around the Sun out of duty and the Moon accompanies the Earth out of love'.

The political revolution cannot be separated from the spiritual revolution; but the political separation from the past occurs abruptly, while the spiritual overcoming of the past can only take place through internal confrontations. Therefore, the time scale of the two revolutions is different. In the Halle speech he says: 'The replacement of one world conception by another is subject to very different lapses of time than a political revolution...'. The measure imposed by this understanding on the ideological confrontations of our days has never been exceeded by Rosenberg. If nevertheless he belongs to the admiration of all National Socialist fighters, this is based on the fact that within the limits imposed by the era and the nature of man he has inflexibly advocated for what he has recognized as correct. When he underscores the special time scale of spiritual revolutions, no one fears that this is happening in order to beat retreat. He simply expresses the recognition of the law of the matter.

In two lectures (1936 and 1938), Rosenberg has addressed the error that confuses the popular community with the mass. The comradeship that unites all members of a living people does not exclude the individual having a right to solitude. No creator can exist without hours of recollection, and solitude relates to comradeship as exhalation to inhalation. The life of the community too, like all life, is bound to polarities. The overcoming of individualism does not mean the abolition of personality. Only through the implacable extirpation of all false adoration of individuality can personality enter into its rights. Not only can a new art arise solely from the cultivation of the 'silent forces'; the new way of life that we hope for can also only come from within, from an 'impalpable state of mind which is nevertheless more solid than granite in a firm person'. Through external doing and the accumulation of masses, no culture arises. Culture can only ever be the enveloping form that the pressing force of an inner form constructs around itself.

If Rosenberg has been able to say so much essential and convincing precisely on the problems of cultural formation, this is due to his incredible sense of what he himself has called the 'law of the inner form'. His independent thinking began with the understanding of the importance of personality; in the ever-renewed demonstration by new paths that in all realms of life only the pure personality, obedient to its inner law, can be creative, it finds its culmination. In the powerful spiritual convulsion that we experience today, Rosenberg stands as one of the most vigorous defenders of all that to

which Indo-Germanism has owed its greatness and world-historical influence in all times. The Western world has fallen into formlessness through the cult of empty forms; Bolshevism has annihilated the form-shaping principle wherever it could. The new world can only be born from the re-establishment of the form-shaping soul. National Socialism did not arise from the analysis of the world and man, but from a new contemplation of the world and man. The spiritual development of Alfred Rosenberg that we have outlined offers a great example of this observation. *Rosenberg has fulfilled in an exemplarily German way Goethe's demand that distinguishing and uniting must always go together.* The union of tradition and revolution that characterizes the Führer's work is also the decisive feature of his spiritual labor.

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Chapter 9.

Alfred Baeumler: Aesthetics.

Introduction.

Alfred Baeumler's Aesthetics was published in 1934 (Baeumler, 1934), and was employed for this translation. This is an excellent text that needs to be put into the hands of researchers because it shows us a pre-1945 Baeumler. This is because after the end of the war Baeumler was interned for three years in concentration camps in Hammelburg (Baviera, Germany) and Ludwigsburg (Baden-Württemberg, Germany). Since it has been claimed that around one million German prisoners of war died in American and French occupation areas, mainly due to inhumane living conditions and neglect to provide adequate food, water, and medical care (*Hoc in disputatio est in aeternum*), we do not know what effects these facts may have had on him. And we want to be sure to have the original deep, innovative, insightful, visionary, influential, rigorous, humanist, controversial, multifaceted and revered Alfred Baeumler.

It would be a good idea, in a future edition of this text in English or Spanish languages, to translate the Greek, Latin and Italian words and expressions into those languages.

The text is ordered as follows:

First Section: The Idea of Beauty.

- I. Plato. a) Symposium. b) The Republic. c) Nomoi.
- II. Plotinus. a) Spirit and form. b) Art and Nature. c) The beautiful soul.
- III. Augustinus. a) Beauty. b) Number. c) The Highest Good. Theodicy.
- IV. Middle Ages and Renaissance. a) Bonaventura and Ulrich von Strassburg. b) Thomas Aquinas. c) Dante. d) Ficino. Lomazzo. e) Bruno.

Second Section: The Concept Of Art.

- I. Aristotle. a) Ποίησις - Τέχνη (Poiesis - Techne). b) Μίμησις (Mimesis). c) Τὸ καλόν (The Beautiful).
- II. Rhetoric. a) Generā dicendī. b) Περὶ ὕψους (On the Sublime). c) Quintilian.
- III. Theory of Art. a) Polycletus. Aristoxenus. b) Judgment. Ἐκφρᾶσις. c) Vitruvius
- IV. Middle Ages and Renaissance. a) Middle Ages. b) Dante. c) Alberti. d) Dürer. Leonardo. e) Vasari. f) Zuccaro. g) J.C. Scaliger.

Epilogue.

Text of Alfred Baeumler's Aesthetics.

First Section: The Idea of Beauty.

I. Plato.

Aesthetic reflection was not sparked by the phenomenon of art, but by the phenomenon of the beautiful; this is the first and most consequential event

in the history of aesthetics. In Plato's writings lies the founding document of this science, hidden, if not concealed. Behind it, however, looms the mountain range of Pythagorean thought, barely accessible to interpretation anymore.

Plato has become the teacher of beauty for millennia through the Symposium and Phaedrus. He did not become so through observation of beautiful forms in nature or through critical consideration of existing art forms, he became so through his enthusiasm for beauty, which was one with his pedagogical Eros. In Plato's aforementioned 'most beautiful' dialogues, the concept of Eros enters into a marriage with the concept of the beautiful, whose philosophical magic corresponds to the enchantment of the author by the living beauty of Athenian youths. The indefinite but intense light with which the concepts of beauty and love are surrounded here has had an enormous impact. It was not possible to think the problem further, because there was no 'problem'; but it remained to evoke the mood and the words again and again, it has happened countless times. In the Republic, Plato became the unwilling discoverer of art. He 'discovers' it by radically questioning it (as 'imitation'). Thus the philosophy of art has the strangest beginning: it begins by disputing its object. The book that contains its founding document has the state-military education of the youth as its main theme; at the same time, it represents the sharpest polemic ever written by a philosopher against art.

One must recognize this fact in all its bluntness, but not try to save art for Plato's system by appealing to his own poetic talent or in any other way. The attempt to construct an aesthetic system out of scattered remarks by Plato on the beautiful and art is completely hopeless. Rather, it must be stated: the Greek Plato lays the foundation for aesthetics without intending to, just as the Greeks became the great people of art without wanting 'art'. After all, nothing would have been more incomprehensible to them than the *kalokagathia* of the classical ideal.

In the Sophist, the tone is struck that comes to fruition in the Laws: no longer 'the beautiful' is the theme, no longer 'imitation', but art; however, art as holy art, the foundation of a state that is removed from development and based on the ancient standards of measure.

a) Symposium.

Agathon celebrates Eros as the most beautiful of the gods: he is first the most beautiful because he is the youngest of the gods, delicate and supple in form (ὕγρὸς τὸ εἶδος). There is always war between Eros and formlessness (ὁσχημοσύνη γὰρ καὶ Ἔρωτι ἡρὸς ἀλλήλων ἀεὶ πόλεμος. Symp. 196a). Socrates refutes Agathon: if Eros were beautiful, as the latter says, he would not run after the beautiful; he is longing for the beautiful, or rather for procreation in the beautiful. For there is no longing for the ugly. Agathon was

right in saying that for the gods existence is ordered through Eros towards the beautiful; for there is no Eros towards the ugly (Symp. 201a).

Platonic aesthetics begins with the distinction between beautiful (καλόν) and ugly (αἰσχρόν). This distinction must not be interpreted 'artistically', in the modern sense. *For the Greek, beautiful and good are the same.* Health is beautiful, life that fulfills itself is beautiful, measure and everything perfected in itself is beautiful. Thus the Greek uses the word 'beautiful' in precisely that broad sense in which we still use it today. Apparently, for him this concept stood in a primordial relation to the idea of the living. 'The living is beautiful', this is the first principle of Hellenic aesthetics. Its most powerful formulation is found in Hippias Major (288e), where it is stated that even the most beautifully crafted vessel could not make any claim to being judged beautiful next to a mare, a girl, and all other beautiful things. When Goethe, admiring sea snails and hermit crabs on the beach at Venice, exclaims: '*What a precious, magnificent thing a living being is! How well-proportioned to its condition, how true, how existing!*', he describes the concept of καλόν.

This panhellenic view is a premise for Plato's doctrine of Eros (the following according to Symp. 206c to 212a). The irresistible drive of the living being towards procreation seizes animals and humans with equal power, when it drives them to procreate in community with the other. *There are two kinds of immortality: some animals and humans procreate in the beautiful according to the body; others procreate in the beautiful according to the soul.* For the body strives for immortality as well as the soul. By bringing forth an offspring and leaving it behind in place of the old, the mortal preserves itself, and thereby itself partakes in immortality. The reverence for immortality causes every being by nature to honor that which has sprung from it. While here preservation happens through and by means of change, the divine preserves itself by remaining entirely the same in relation to everything for all eternity. To this beautiful corresponds a different community than that of the bodies. Lover and beloved live there much more intimately together than even parents with their bodily children; they are bound to each other by a firmer friendship, since more beautiful and immortal children stand between them.

At this point (Symp. 209c ff), where Plato paints pedagogical Eros, already outlining the program of the Republic, the idea of the supreme agon breaks through in the doctrine of love. Friendship is the birthplace of immortal fame. Only as a work of friends can the Greek imagine the state, and solely emerging from competition about the supreme form of the state can Plato envisage his own fame. This is proven by the words that build the bridge from the Symposium to the Republic: 'And everyone would rather see such children born to him than human ones, if he looks at Homer and Hesiod and

the other great poets, envying them for leaving behind such children who procure them immortal fame and memory, since they themselves are so; and if you wish, like Lycurgus left behind children in Sparta, saviors of Sparta and, to put it so, of Greece' (Symp. 209c f).




Figure 1a. Plato.



Figure 1b. Eros.




Figure 1c. Lycurgus.

Now only comes the turn towards the exuberant that is peculiar to the feast (210a ff). Abruptly, next to Plato the politician and educator stands Plato the lover, in a deeply mysteriously enthusiastic sense. The true thought process of the lover is that he cannot love a beautiful body without recognizing that the beauty in any one body is sister to that in other bodies, and that it would be nonsensical not to regard the beauty in all bodies as one and the same. *With that, the 'high sea' of the beautiful has been reached: from beautiful bodies the path leads to beautiful conduct, from there to beautiful insights, and only lastly does he who obtained the highest vision, the supreme*

initiation, attain to the vision of Beauty. Only for him who can behold Beauty itself (αὐτο το χαλάς) does life truly become worth living. In intoxicated words the enraptured one proclaims this Beauty as a '*Being eternally uniform with itself, by itself, and for itself*' (αὐτο και αυτό μεθ' αυτου μονοειδές αἰ ὄν, Symp. 211b).

Being finally reveals itself as the Beautiful, from which everything individually beautiful is descended, and just as Being is one, and not becoming, so this Beautiful is 'first, eternally being and neither becoming nor perishing, neither growing nor diminishing, further neither beautiful here ugly there, nor soon so soon otherwise, also not beautiful in this respect ugly in that, also not beautiful here ugly there, as for some it is beautiful for others ugly'.

b) The Republic.

Plato's work on the state, brought forth from pedagogical eros, expression and symbol of the height of manhood of life, is not only a 'system' but a moment in the existence and life of Athens itself. The first coherent discussion of art, which begins in the second book of the Republic and ends in the third, reaches in its concluding section the word 'Kalokagathia' (Rep. 401e ff), which had been cautiously saved up to that point. The final thought is that only a youth who has admitted beauty into his soul from the earliest youth onward and always nourishes himself with it will become a Kalos kagathos. *This is the purpose of musical education (μουσική τροφή): together with gymnastic training it should so develop the warrior (courageous) and philosophical disposition of the young man until both are in due correspondence* (Rep. 411e).

What does it mean, then, to take beauty into one's soul? (Rep. 401e). Surely not: to behave aesthetically, although Plato (typical case!) already grazes upon the concept of 'taste' in the passage cited above (Rep. 402a): the youth will correctly love and hate without initially being able to state the reason, taste is a judging power of the soul that precedes consideration or investigation, as 18th century aesthetics put it. But if Plato demands the influence of music for his guardians, he does so not because he considers 'art' to be an educational asset, but because he considers music a necessary means of upbringing in the same sense as an appropriate diet. Just as the properly educated man will abstain from Syracusan feasts, Attic bakeware and Corinthian girls, so will he reject music that indulges in all harmonies and rhythms, no matter how soul-elevating or soul-enlarging it may otherwise be; indeed, precisely the soul-elevating and enlarging effect of music and poetry is what prompts Plato to undertake his critical examination. Expression and participation for their own sake are completely denied by him. Much may be expressed; but there is only one correct attitude (ευσχημοσύνη, Rep. 401a; 404d f). Just as the simplicity of gymnastics brings health to the body, so the

simplicity of music engenders temperance in the soul (Rep. 404e). Neither the independence of the form nor the abundance of the content is at issue, but solely the adequacy of the effect for a certain political-educational purpose. There is only one correct music for the statesman just as there is only one correct diet for him. Insofar as music and poetry have meaning at all, they are related to one thing: the attitude of the warrior. According to Plato, the guardians are to be defined as ‘fighters in the supreme contest’ (ἄθληται οἱ ἄνδρες τὸν μεγίστου ἀγώνος, Rep. 403e). From this the strict exclusion of all arousing, sweet, voluptuous and plaintive musical modes follows of itself. For these harmonies and rhythms necessarily correspond in life to lack of composure (ἄσχημοσύνη, Rep. 401a). The musical modes are inseparable from the political order of life. ‘Nowhere are the musical modes changed without the most important laws of the state suffering damage’ (Οὐάμως γὰρ κινούνται μουσικῆς τρόποι ἀνεν πολιτικῶν νόμων τῶν μεγίστων, Rep. 424c). *Only two musical modes must exist: a warlike one, corresponding to the spirit of the courageous battle array, the bold deed and the brave endurance, and a lighter, peaceful one, arising from the free agility of the soul, and suited to support prayer, persuasion or instruction* (Rep. 399a ff).

According to modern views, art reflects life in its boundless manifoldness, purified. For Plato there is no manifoldness, no changing expression, no individuality, but also no aesthetically self-contained form. And yet he was the first to talk about art with unprecedented expertise. He mocks the madness, of the poet, and thereby gives at the same time the highest description of the poetic imagination (Ion 533 ff, compare Phaedrus 245a), where *μανία* is solemnly acknowledged. However much has been written about this contradiction, one thing seems to have been overlooked so far: that Plato does not have a theoretical relationship with art as Aristotle does, but a practical one; that he approached the problem of art, in other words, as politician and educator. For him, art is in the positive as well as negative sense a political phenomenon. It is banished from his political community not only by the ‘intellectualism’ of the dialectician, but just as much by the passion of the founder of the state and educator. We are not raising here the question of what comes first, Plato the thinker or the politician. It suffices to acknowledge that the problem must also be seen from the perspective of the actor.

It is handed down that Plato destroyed his own poems when he turned to Socrates. The historical phenomenon of his philosophy first became possible at all through Attic tragedy. Nothing would have been more obvious than for Plato to become the greatest eulogist art has ever had. Why did he not become so at his height of manhood, he who was so destined for this task that he became it even against his own will? After all, he could also (as his later interpreters did) have incorporated art into his system, as a pure theoretician, with some kind of safeguards. Why did he fight it? For a purely ‘theoretical’

interpretation of the Republic, it will always remain something striking that Socrates, after everything has already been said, returns once more to poetry, seemingly long since disposed of. To be sure, a logical progression can be stated to the extent that the conceptual determination and evaluation of imitative activity can only occur with the necessary precision after the theory of ideas has been developed. But why did Plato devote two extensive sections below and above the summit of the theory of ideas to poetry? The composition of the whole is determined by this. The reference to Plato's interest in art does not seem sufficient to me to account for this arrangement. In the Republic we have before us the depiction of an agon: the contest between the philosopher and the poet, between Plato and Homer. The work thus fulfills the demand that it poses to the man through its own definition of the guardian. The continual reference to the poet, and in particular the peculiarity of composition in Book 10, is explained by this; neither a repetition nor an amplification is present there, but a fulfillment: the contestation of the most magnificent musical agon of antiquity. In the presence of the best youths of Athens Plato wrestles with the greatest of poets.

Homer, the poet who together with Hesiod had given the Hellenes their gods, to whom all of Greece owed its education, whose works were taken in hand in order to learn how one ought to arrange one's life (Rep. 606e), this poet had to be the mortal enemy of anyone who wanted to proclaim a new law of life to the Greeks. There cannot be two lords of education; if Plato rules, Homer cannot rule. After all, poetry does have an influence on life, it is an educational-political power. What does this look like in Homer's case? In public, Plato says, he did not appear as an educator; if one can say of him that during his lifetime he was authoritative for the education of certain individuals who revered him on the basis of associating with him and handed on to later generations a way of life that one could call Homeric, in the way that Pythagoras was revered in a special manner as educator, and as his students still stand out from all other men in expressly calling their conduct of life Pythagorean (Rep. 600a ff). Is Homer also an educator, a founder of the state? What state has he founded! Diversity, disorder, unleashing of all passions is the consequence of his indiscriminately imitative art. A state that is in proper order would contradict itself if it tolerated the imitative poet within its borders, for he allows a bad constitution of state (*κακή πολιτεία*, Rep. 605b) to prevail in souls. Plato's 'good' *Politeia* thus stands against Homer's 'bad' *Politeia*. But good is the one that is not based on imitations but on the truth in educating the youths. Between truth and untruth there can be no reconciliation, no compromise. Only one power can rule the city. Who would not hear the overtone of highest triumph in the words with which Socrates proclaims the unconditional victory of dialectic over poetry? (Rep. 398a f).




Figure 2a. Homer.




Figure 2b. Hesiod.



Figure 2c. Pythagoras.

Between philosophy and poetry, says Socrates openly confessing at the pinnacle of victory at the end of the conversation, there is an ‘old enmity’ (παλαιὰ διαφορὰ, Rep. 607b). Now, according to Plato's will, the dispute is settled. The first half of the tenth book is filled with the splendor of the most perfect triumph: not only does the poet stand in second place as an imitative artist in relation to the reality and truth of his structures, but he also has to be satisfied with third place. A train of thought of unrelenting logic assigns him the place in the dark. First place is due to the ideas, second place to the objects made according to them, only third place belongs to the works of art and poetry that imitate the world of objects. Compared to the doubly non-self-sufficient existence of the work of art, even the structure delivered to becoming and time of nature or craft gains an appearance of solidity. Only that which transcends time, remaining equal to itself, is truly real; what arises

and perishes in time has only a derived existence. Far from all truth, however, are the products of an imitative art which can only make everything because it does not create full, complete objects, but merely takes individual features from things, whereby even this little has the character of a shadow image (Rep. 598b).



Figure 3a. Homer.



Figure 3b. Hesiod.




Figure 3c. Plato.




Figure 3d. Socrates.

Just as Greek art begins with the geometric style, which does not imitate but divides and measures, so Greek aesthetics, after almost all the great possibilities of art have been fulfilled, begins with Plato's war of annihilation against the mimetic arts. Before the crucial question is asked as to what imitation (μίμησις) actually is, Plato has his Socrates once again confirm what feelings of love and reverence he had nourished since his youth for Homer, the great teacher of tragic poets. 'But truth must count for more than men' (Rep. 595c). Thus shielded by the invocation of truth, the dialectician opens the investigation against the poets. It is an artifice that this investigation begins with painting. Plato's interest in the visual arts cannot be compared with his passionate interest in poetry. The painter is only introduced in the *Politeia* so that the attack can be carried out all the more surely and annihilatingly over the terminus of 'making' (producing) (ποιεῖν, Rep. 596c). The craftsman (δημιουργός) who wants to make a bed or a table directs his gaze towards the one originally existing idea of the bed or table (Rep. 596b). How far removed he is from the one who brings forth the ideas as their creator (φύτουργός, Rep. 597d), from God! But even if the craftsman can never succeed in bringing forth an idea, he is still an honest man, and clearly to be distinguished from those miracle men and jacks-of-all-trades, each of whom claims to be able to make everything that a craftsman can produce by virtue of his knowledge and skill in his respective field. In this respect the imitative jack-of-all-trades resembles the sophist, who also understands everything that goes on between heaven and earth (cf. Gorg. 456). By using the word 'sophist' (Rep. 596c) Plato relates his battle with the poet to the agon with his philosophical opponents. In both cases it is about the same error: sophists and imitative artists remain attached to appearances without penetrating to being and truth. They are content to conjure up everything once more by the cheap means of a mirror, but what they make is untrue, it is apparition-like, not archetypal (φαινόμενα, οὐ μέντοι ὄντα γε ποῦ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, Rep. 596e). This gives rise to that climax: painter-craftsman-god, in which the lowest place in the series of demiurges falls to the artist (Rep. 597b ff). On this level stands the tragic poet along with all other imitators, 'in third place down from the ruler and the truth' (τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, Rep. 597e). Can a more miserable profession be conceived than this production of shadow images? (εἰδῶν δημιουργία, Rep. 599a). Would not the one who can express himself in works prefer to devote himself to this rather than mere imitation? 'Would he not rather want to be the one praised (ὁ ἐγκωμιάζομενος) than the one praising (ὁ ἐγκωμιάζων)?' (Rep. 490b). With that, the climax is reached: the poet receives the deadly blow.

If Homer dares to speak imitatively about the greatest and noblest things, about battle and the art of war, about founding states and education, one must thus speak to him: 'Dear Homer, if you are there, where truth and

excellence are concerned, not the third downward, an image maker, as we have recognized the imitative artist to be, but rather the second and therefore able to recognize what institutions make people better or worse at home and in the state, then tell us: which state has been better constituted through you, as Lacedaemon has through Lycurgus and as through many others so many great and small states? But you, which city calls you the originator of good laws and its benefactor?' It would be worthy of more precise examination which passages of the Homeric poems are 'crossed out' by Plato. *Above all, they seem to be those passages that point to the 'Pelasgian' background of the Homeric world.* Particularly clear in this respect is the beginning of the third book of the *Politeia*, where the popular notions of Hades and the cult of the dead are rejected. In any case, Plato's struggle against Homer is a multi-layered phenomenon. At the top, the founder of the state struggles against the founder of the state, then the man of the geometric style against the man of imitation, at the same time the representative of the Aryan conquering race against the remnants of the pre-Indo-Germanic folk belief in the Ionian epic, all summed up in the struggle of the dialectician against the poet (incidentally, in an overall presentation Plato's struggle against the tragic poets, to whom he himself once belonged, would appear no less important than his struggle against Homer. But Homer is also the 'leader' of the tragedians).

The 'many', to whom Homer's verses and those of the other poets sound pleasant in the ear, stand in contrast to the boys and men who are supposed to mean freedom and fear slavery more than death (Rep. 387b). This difference between the many and the freedom-lovers corresponds to the difference between those who admire beautiful colors, shapes and sounds, who run everywhere where something is 'made', and those who love the truth. The former resemble dreamers who admire shadows; the latter alone lead a life without deception. The juxtaposition of the poet and the dialectician is grounded in the difference between the many and the one, between that which appears and true being. Just as true knowledge relates to that which is, not to the individual things surrounding us, so true love of the beautiful does not relate to sounds, forms and colors, but to 'the beautiful itself'. In this juxtaposition of 'beautiful things' and 'beauty itself' (καλὰ πράγματα and αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος) the Platonic train of thought reaches its climax (Rep. 476a ff). Only the philosophers are able to grasp the ever constant; the others wander about in the universe of things like musicians in the universe of harmonies and imitative artists in the universe of forms and passions (cf. Rep. 484b).

c) Nomoi.

Nothing is more difficult for modern man than to shake off aesthetic formalism. One can hardly put oneself into a mode of thinking that is completely foreign to any opposition between form and content. And yet this

mode of thinking is not at all 'primitive', but rather that of the oldest culture. When we speak of measure and symmetry, we have in mind the idea of formal relationships between 'things', abstract numbers or lines. The concept of symmetry has even been narrowed down to the meaning of 'opposite equality'. However, the concepts of measure and symmetry, the oldest and most venerable that philosophy has, are not produced by a formal mode of thinking, but stem from a pure substantial thinking, which we can also call a thinking in symbols. It is peculiar to this thinking that it subordinates the universe and man to a 'third factor' which is not something external and foreign to them, but their common and essential aspect. This third factor is measure, not as form but as content; not as abstract law but as concrete determination of being. The concept of the norm of measure contains an aesthetics that is neither a 'doctrine of beauty' nor a 'doctrine of art', these spheres have not yet diverged either, but quite simply an aesthetics of order.

The arts that man invents and practices, whatever their kind may be, can never have any other content and form than the measure inherent in the whole into which he is born. *There are two 'arts' in particular that testify to the cosmic order: music (to which dance always belongs) and architecture.* They are the oldest, the cosmic arts. The history of art begins with them. It does not begin with the cave paintings of hunting peoples, for these are not intended productions in which a state of life represents itself, it starts where the rhythmic order of life translates itself into the rhythm of an intended work. *Life has been rhythmic from the very beginning; only man, however, is able to represent the rhythm of the universe in self-created orders. The earliest of these representations is the sacred dance according to sacred music. Music and dance, the firstborn of the eternal norm of measure, are followed by architecture, which is 'frozen music' in a deeper sense than the witty phrase means.*

The earliest art is followed by the earliest aesthetics. Since art is not a product of 'development', not a creation of need, but the human representation of the divine order of the universe, it does not seem surprising that from the very beginning insight ($\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\iota\alpha$) is connected with it. From Pythagoras to Vitruvius, from there through the Middle Ages to the Renaissance and up to the present, the arc of an aesthetics of the norm of measure spans. It would be difficult for us to reconstruct this arc if an important piece had not been preserved right in the middle. We find this piece in Plato's late writings.

Where Plato expresses himself about his favorite subject, education, for the last time, in the seventh book of the *Nomoi*, the speaker from Athens, summing up everything preceding, says: 'No one should allow himself any deviation in song and dance from the sacred songs and the whole dance style of our youth as established by the state, any more than any violation of any

other law' (Laws 800a). We know the idea, it already underlies the Politeia, but there it is pushed back by the polemic against the imitative artist. Now the cheerful noise of competition has died away, in the stillness the eternal lines of being emerge commandingly. Thus the original meaning of the word Nomos also becomes visible. Let it then, it is said in the same speech of the Athenian shortly before, 'be accepted as a settled matter this curious institution that songs have been elevated to the status of laws, and let the example of the ancients guide us herein, who gave this name to song accompanied by the cithara; so that they too, perhaps, were not very far from the conception we have just characterized, even though, as it were in their sleep or rather like one only half awake, they had only a dreamlike notion of it' ('Λέγομεν μὲν δὴ, φαμέν, τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, νόμους τὰς ᾠδὰς ἡμῖν γεγονέναι, καὶ καθάπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ ἴστε περὶ κιθαριῶδιαν ὄντως πως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὠνόμασαν, ὥστε τάχ' ἂν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι παντάπασι γε ἀφεστῶτες εἶεν τοῦ νῦν λεγομένου' etc. (Laws 799e). A question in the 'Problems' of the Aristotelian school refers to the same tradition: 'Why are the songs called nomoi which they sing', Probl. XIX 28).

Plato, the politician and aesthete of the eternal norm of measure, probably dips back into the same tradition from which Pythagoras also came. That in the Nomoi the circle of Greek history is transcended, that Egypt is repeatedly mentioned as the preserver of the old norms, is no coincidence. The same idea of Nomos underlies the ancient culture of the Chinese. It is represented by E. M. von Hornbostl as follows: 'Since earliest times the pan pipes in China were sacred norms of measure (Lü=norm). The music office is part of the ministry of Li, the laws that 'are rooted in the great universe', 'through which the ancient rulers could receive the Tao of Heaven', obedience to which is the highest duty and the only means to remain in accord with the course of the world. At the time of the equinoxes, when Yang and Yin hold the scales even, all measures are re-examined. Every new dynasty seeks to restore the correct measures of primeval times, convinced that only the loss or disregard of the norms could have caused the downfall of their predecessors. The basis of the system is the pipe of 1 foot in length, which gives the fundamental tone. Starting from it, the following pipes are alternately given $\frac{2}{3}$ and $\frac{4}{3}$ of the length of the preceding pipe. The system is thus a metric chain of fifths and fourths... The tones, engendering each other in alternation of feminine and masculine, follow the cosmic law. It is this, not musical intention, which is realized in the absolute pitches: the Lü are in harmony with the phases of the cosmic cycles of time, the melody of the cult music is transposed to the pitch of the month' (The norm of measure as a means of cultural-historical research. *Festschrift for P. W. Schmidt*. 1928, p. 304 f). All the peculiarities of the system described here are also found in Plato.

1. There is no separation between form and content: form is content, content is form.

2. The system is unchangeable. Any change means a violation of the law of life. From this follows an enormous strictness; standardization is precise and must be adhered to most exactly.
3. The system is metric. The basic measure appears both as 'quality' and 'quantity', as tone, as well as distance or number.
4. World and man: The basic idea is that of a metric world harmony, into proper relation with which man must set himself.
5. Male and female: The division of the sexes extends into the essence of being and finds expression in two different genders of tone.

From the ancient songs and dances, says the Athenian of the *Nomoi*, the most suitable ones must be selected for the state. In doing so, it will prove necessary to distinguish the songs suitable for the female and male sex according to a certain norm, and to assign them the appropriate harmonies and rhythms, for harmony and rhythm must correspond to the matter itself. But the difference is to be designated as follows: the sublime and what calls for courage is to be recognized as the male kind, while the inclination to the orderly and the temperate, on the other hand, as more appropriate to the female sex (μεγαλοπρεπές - κόσμιον καὶ σῶφρον, *Laws* 802e). Here is the origin of the concepts of grace and dignity. Cicero refers to this passage when he speaks of *venustas* and *dignitas*. From this distinction Vitruvius draws the principle for classifying the orders of columns of the Greek temple.

The *Politeia* had not allowed the aesthetic problem to unfold. The image-making arts had been pushed to the fore, music on the other hand, by far the most important art for antiquity (*Laws* 669b), had indeed been made the basis of the educational work, but had not been considered in the theory. Fully consistent with this, the 'Pythagorean concepts', as we can call them, harmony and measure, had been presupposed, but remained concealed. It is as if the sun of the day of battle had dazzled the starlight. Now, as the sun sinks, they emerge. At the end of the *Philebos* Socrates states: 'Now then the essence of the good has found refuge with us in the nature of the beautiful. For due measure and fitting proportion (symmetry) evidently everywhere come to be beauty and virtue' (Νῦν δὴ καταρέφευγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. Μετρίότης γὰρ καὶ συμμετρία κάλλος δῆπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι. Now, certainly, the power of the good in the nature of the beautiful has taken refuge in us. For moderation and harmony, beauty and virtue without a doubt, happen everywhere. *Phil.* 64e). Beauty, symmetry and truth now stand side by side. This 'beauty' is obviously no longer that of the *Symposium*, this 'truth' obviously no longer that of the *Politeia*. They find their reconciliation in symmetry, one step more and they will find themselves in number (*Timaeus*!).

In the *Philebos* the relationship of subjective pleasure to the order of things is examined and the result is 'that pleasure is neither the first nor the

second possession, but that the first lies in the realm of measure and moderation and fitness and everything that must be assumed to partake of the nature of the eternal' (Phil. 66a). It is therefore only a provisional determination when it was said earlier: to the beauty of those regular bodies which are not occasionally beautiful but always and in themselves beautiful there correspond also peculiar feelings of pleasure which have no resemblance to sensual titillation (Phil. 51c). Plato is not concerned with determining these feelings, but rather with declaring that in the face of eternal harmony the subjective feelings are without significance and even in the best case are to be placed last in the table of values. It belongs to the formalistic thinking inappropriate to these matters when one sees in such a passage of the *Philebos* only a reference to mathematics, not a reference to the essence of being. While it is certainly permissible to think also of mathematics here, one must not conceive its constructs formalistically but must grasp them ontologically.

The immediate continuation of the problem that could not be solved in the *Politeia* is contained in the dialogue *Sophistes*. Here, in the course of the conversation, the image-producing art (εἰδωλοποιικὴ τέχνη, idol image making technique) is subdivided. Two kinds of imitative art must be distinguished: the first is the depictive (εἰκαστική), the second the semblance-producing art (φανταστική). The essence of the former (art of likeness-making) consists in preserving the symmetries of the model (παράδειγμα) in length, breadth and depth, and also in applying the appropriate natural colors to each part (Soph. 235d f). Don't all imitators do that? Theaitetos asks. No, is the answer; in an artwork of great height, in that case the upper parts would appear too small, the lower too large, because we see the latter from close up, the former from a greater distance. The images are therefore not given the actual symmetries, but those that appear beautiful) [**Footnote in the original edition.** In Kantian language this means that the image follows not the constitutive but the regulative principles of pure reason]. However incidentally this distinction may be made, it becomes clear that the aesthetic problem has been taken under consideration anew.

The rays of Plato's philosophy of old age gather in the *Timaeus* and are reflected from there into the millennia. In the *Timaeus* the beauty of regular bodies is praised, which is to be understood as an eternal one, not as one that only appears to the subject (Tim. 53b). The sentence sounds like the magic formula of Pythagoreanism: 'All good is beautiful, and what is beautiful is not without the right measure' (Πάν δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν οὐκ ἄμετρον, all that is good is beautiful, and that which is beautiful is not unconscionable, Tim. 87c). Ugly (αἰσχρος), on the other hand, is what lacks measure (cf. Soph. 228a).

The conceptual implementation of Pythagoreanism in the field of the aesthetic as well as the pedagogical problem is contained in the 'Nomoi'. The

basic concept of the part of this work that belongs here is the concept of order (τάξις). The investigation begins with the reminder of the festivals of the gods, which the Muses' leader Apollo and Dionysus attend. There was no young creature that was able to keep its body or voice still even for a moment. The choral dance that accompanies the festivals suits this agility; at the same time it accomplishes the first work of education. One who understands the choral dance is well educated, one who does not understand it is uneducated (Laws 654a). This simple thought stands before an infinite background.

Only man has a sense for order and disorder in movements, for which we use the words rhythm and harmony. For only man is given the gods as fellow choristers (Laws 653e). One could call this thought the fundamental thought of an aesthetics of primordial times. The crucial thing is that here man is opposed to all other beings with all determination: not because he is a natural being, but because he is friends with the gods does he have a sense for harmony and rhythm of movement. Measure and order are of divine origin, which is the first proposition of Platonic-Pythagorean aesthetics. That form and content cannot fundamentally be separated is the second. When we say, 'he sings beautifully' (καλῶς) and 'he dances beautifully', we also want to say at the same time that he sings beautiful things (καλὰ) and dances beautiful things (Laws 654b f). One cannot sing beautifully and dance beautifully unless the content of what is sung and danced were beautiful. The posture or song of the brave is beautiful, of the coward ugly. Therefore, the proposition generally applies: Posture and song are beautiful when they are an expression of the excellence (ἀρετή) of the soul or body, whether directly or through images; the opposite applies to baseness (Laws 655 b).

In summary: the chorus is a work of art based on τάξις, which is able to educate the unruly youth to τάξις. (Formulation by Jolles, *Vitruv's Aesthetics*, p. 53). The centering of the investigation on the concept of τάξις includes the downfall of the theory of ideas. Assuming the concept of measure, there can no longer be any metaphysical difference between model and image; the image likeness has been replaced by a (symbolic) 'representation'. The difference in being between model and image is suspended, because the system of norms of measure excludes such a hierarchy. Also in the work of art the eternal order can be 'imitated', i.e. represented. All this is implied in the words: 'whether directly or through imagery' (εἴτε αὐτῆς εἴτε τινὸς εἰκόνοϋς, either from herself or from some image, 655b).

In the Politeia there is at some point the phrase: the poets would have to imprint the image of the good constitution (ἀγαθὸν ἄκουσμα ἡδονῆς, Symp. 401b) on their poems. The Nomoi have the same idea, but they go far beyond the Politeia by completely releasing the image (as a representation of order) from the curse of the theory of ideas. The things do not 'partake' in

measure at a greater or lesser distance, but they either represent it (symbolically) or they do not. The degree of being of the 'imitating' work of art in this sense is not inferior to that of everything else that exists.

Not slowly and investigatively, but quickly and dictatorially the main question is answered in Laws 655d ff. Plato stands before the multiplicity of talents, habits, characters, fates. Is a corresponding multiplicity of rhythms and harmonies to be permitted on the basis of this human element? We already know the answer from the Politeia, now it just comes even more insistently, decisively: the right lawgiver will bring the poets by persuasion or, if he does not succeed in this way, by force to represent in rhythms and harmonies with beautiful and praiseworthy words only the movements and manners of prudent, brave and also otherwise efficient men (Laws 660a). That is the purpose of the Nomoi: through the decree and power of the law to maintain order among men. If necessary, men must be forced to be orderly. With the prerequisite of the measure standard, this idea lacks any violent character. Multiplicity is aberration, order and truth is only one. The right lawgiver does not rape but builds on the foundation of unwritten laws (cf. Laws. 793a ff). This is the ground on which the Egyptians erected their state system. And only the Spartans besides them understood what matters: Not in innovations, in the overthrow of the ways of song and life lies salvation, but in the preservation of what corresponds to the eternal orders and can never change. Therefore, among the Egyptians, no painter or other artist is permitted to direct his inventiveness towards anything other than what corresponds to native custom. There, the paintings and statues made ten thousand years ago are neither in any way more beautiful nor uglier than those made today (Laws 656d f).

In this context, the problem of feeling, which we know from the Philebus, also returns. For the judgment of musical art, the feeling of pleasure that it arouses is essential (Laws 658e f). But not the pleasure of this or that should be decisive, but only that of the most educated and virtuous. Prudence and courage are the supreme judges of art: that is Plato's last word on practical aesthetics. His aesthetics has been content aesthetics from the beginning, now it receives the final formulation. Not feeling is decisive, but right feeling; but this is determined by the right content. The right feeling is that which is in harmony with order. The aesthete and the educator Plato fight one and the same fight against feelings that contradict order.

Insofar, negatively formulated, the climax of the whole train of thought lies in Kleinias' phrase that all innovations can be traced back to 'disorderly feelings' (ἄτακται ἡδοναί, 660b). This is not to be understood, as Apelt translates, as 'undisciplined lust for pleasure', but as any feeling that opposes τάξις. Thus the investigation concerning feeling culminates in the demonstration that not mere pleasure feeling, and mere opinion can be

decisive for judging musical art. This demonstration is combined with resuming the concept of imitative arts (τέχνην εἰκαστικὰ καὶ μιμητικὰ. 667d ff). The feeling is dependent, we can say. Not the joy makes the like like and the symmetrical symmetrical, but that is so in reality (cf. Laws 667e f). Thus for the judgment what ultimately counts is not feeling, but the thing. One must call true art that one which achieves likeness in the imitation of the beautiful, (...ἐκείνην τὴν ἔχουσαν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μιμήματι, Laws 668b). For the aesthetic problem, this formulation signifies culmination and conclusion. As an imitation of the beautiful, mimesis has been made a participant in the highest dignity. The aesthetics of the norm of measure has fully prevailed over the theory of ideas.

In the seventh book, the aesthetic and pedagogical line of thought is continued without leading to new results. But in another respect the last word is spoken here. Once more Plato immerses himself in the mood and tone of the agonal 'Politeia'. The tragic poets appear and ask: 'Dear strangers, may we enter your city and territory? And may we introduce and present our poetry there, or what do you think about that?' (Laws 817a f). 'You highly esteemed strangers', is the answer, 'we ourselves are poets of a tragedy and possibly even of the most beautiful and best one. Our whole political system is in its structure nothing other than an imitation of the most beautiful and best life and this is in our opinion the only true tragedy. So you are poets, but we no less, namely for the same field, thus rivals and competitors for the prize of the most beautiful drama, and such an achievement can, if our hope does not deceive us, succeed only for legislation corresponding to the demands of truth'. Plato has remained the same, and yet now the aspect is reversed. In the Politeia he used the concept of imitation to bring his concept of education and the state to victory over Homer's 'bad Politeia'. But in the wisdom of his old age he takes up the concept of imitation in order to characterize his state with it: this state is the highest work of art, but 'work of art' only in the sense that the world ordered by the gods is a work of art.

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II. Plotinus.

At the end of their most vigorous time, in the fifth century, the Greeks had epics and tragedies, temples and statues, pictures and poems in

abundance, but amidst the richest artistic life they did not feel the need for aesthetic reflection. Despite the luxuriantly continued artistic activity, this reflection does not occur in the following centuries either. Philosophy rises up, mathematics and natural sciences unfold, there is historiography and rhetoric, a poetics and a theory of music, but the science of aesthetics remains in the form in which Plato left it behind. Only in Plotinus does it appear as an integral part of a closed system. Plotinus is the first systematizer to write treatises on the beautiful: *περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ κάλλους*, and in that respect he is the first ‘aesthetician’. Aesthetics (as it has been understood so far) is a daughter of Hellenism; it is the evening star of philosophical systematics. Plotinus occupies the same position at the end of ancient philosophy as Hegel does at the end of the epoch of Christian philosophy.



Figure 4a. Pythagoras.



Figure 4b. Plotinus.




Figure 4c. Aristoteles.



Figure 4d. Porphyry.

Plato stands at the threshold of Hellenism, Plotinus at its end. In between lie 500 years. Plotinus is related to Platonic Athens roughly as Leibniz is to the time of the Hohenstaufens. It has long been recognized how little Plotinus has to do with the real Plato, how often in later times Plotinus was meant when one referred to Plato. *How deep in truth the contrast becomes clear in no field more than in the aesthetic one.* The whole philosophy and pedagogy of τάξις, which is present in the *Politeia* in an undeveloped form, developed in the *Nomoi*, remains alien to ‘Neoplatonism’. Not by chance does the treatise *περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ* begin by rejecting the concept of symmetry (see below p. 20 f). Beauty does not consist in symmetry, but rather in what ‘shines forth’ in symmetry, and that is precisely what is lovely (ὥς καὶ ἐνταῦθα φατέον μᾶλλον τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ συμμετρῖᾳ ἐπιλαμπύμενον ἢ τὴν συμμετρίαν εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτ’ εἶναι τὸ ἐράσμιον, *Enn.* VI. 7, 22). With this proposition Plotinus is not arguing against an outside opinion but delimiting his world against another world. Nothing makes the ‘subjectivism’ of Neoplatonic philosophy so strikingly clear as this turning away from the objective norm of measure. If we ask where the vague expressiveness, the shimmering quality of a proposition like the one just quoted stems from, we will be referred back to Plato’s *Symposium*. Plotinus’ philosophy means: some concepts of Plato, combined with the main concepts of Aristotle, fused by a foreign, ardently glowing breath of life in a spirit unknown to Greekdom.

Plotinus stands uncomprehendingly opposed to the scientific tendency of Aristotelian art theory: cognition of the existent insofar as it exists under the form of the made. But since the idea of shaping is immanent in Aristotle’s fundamental distinction between form (μορφή) and matter, Plotinus, as it were without intending it, falls within the aesthetic province. ‘Spirit’ as a shaping principle, the shaped as the beautiful, with that the conquest has taken place.

The combination of Platonic and Aristotelian concepts into a new unity has not been undertaken for the first time in aesthetics by Plotinus. Already Cicero combined the Platonic idea with the Aristotelian notion of purposive activity and thus was able to draw a picture of the artist that has not been without significance for the history of aesthetics. In the *Orator* (2, 7 ff), Cicero depicts the speaker as he should be, perfect eloquence: the original is always ‘still more beautiful’ (*pulchrus*) than the image. Even beyond

Pheidias' sculptures we can imagine still more beautiful ones; and when this artist created Zeus and Athene, he did not merely copy; 'rather, in his mind was a certain outstanding image of beauty which he kept firmly before his gaze as he guided head and hand to make likenesses ...' (sēd ipsius in mente insidēbat spēcīēs pulchritūdinis eximiā quaedam, quam intuēns in eāque dēfixus ad illius similitūdinem artem et manum dirigēbat).

Here Plato appears for the first time in literature with the full force of his authority as a witness for an aesthetic theory. It is the Plato of the theory of ideas; the Plato of the Nomoi is forgotten. Under the influence of Aristotle the problem of shaping comes into the foreground; under Plato's influence this problem is interpreted 'metaphysically' (or theologically). Plotinus sets the example for the following centuries of how one can flee on the path across form into the formless, of how nihilism and aesthetics are to be connected. 'So let us flee to the beloved homeland', it says towards the end of the treatise On the Beautiful. 'And what does this flight consist in and how does it take place? We want to rush out onto the sea as Odysseus from the sorceress Circe or from Calypso, as Homer puts it, and indicates it, I think: he was not content to stay, although he had the pleasure that one sees with the eyes and enjoyed the fullness of perceptible beauty. For there is our fatherland, from whence we have come, and there is our father' (Enn. I. 6, 8).

a) Spirit and form.

In Plato, a tremendous shaping force had thrown reality onto the state. In Aristotle, a differently oriented shaping force had completed the begun conquest of the scientific cosmos. *Now, at the end of the philosophy of antiquity, at the entrance to Hellenistic scholasticism, it is no longer a matter of conquest: philosophy has become a means for guiding souls home. Only through Plotinus is Plato finally turned into a theologian.* Even at the height of the theory of ideas, in the Politeia, Plato's gaze reaches down from the eternal and immutable to the laws of education and the state. Plotinus' treasure, on the other hand, is directed solely to the 'One'. The polis with its laws, its youths and men has sunk, the individual gives himself alone to the contemplation of eternal shaping and re-shaping. The forms of human coexistence have become invisible, meaningless, in the darkness of the world the light of the Good alone shines and responding to it shining up here and there is that which is related to it.

In contrast to Plato, Plotinus does not have a personal relationship to art. His inwardly turned spirit feels the body as an impediment. When his student Amelios asks him to sit for a painter, he refuses: one should not leave behind to later times a shadow image of the shadow image as something worth seeing (Porphyry., 'Vita Plotini', beginning). In doing so, every pathetic stance against the 'body' is absent. His attitude is not one of struggle, but of flight. (important for his position on sensuality is his argument with the

Gnostics. Enn. II. 9). Sensuous appearance is not declared evil, but only inadequate. *The Plotinian cosmos is devoid of tension or conflict; within this cosmos, all occurrences transpire effortlessly, quietly, and without violence.* Shape does indeed ‘take possession’ of matter, but this taking possession is not an impressing, but a happening. The demand can never arise that possession ‘should’ take place, since there is no should in this world. The power to shape is in the soul, which is therefore called the shaping soul (ψυχὴ μορφοῦσα, Enn. I. 6, 6). When the divine soul ‘touches’ something, it overpowers it and makes it beautiful. The overpowering is thus to be imagined like being touched by a gentle breeze.

There is no imperative to shape matter; everything is as it is. For the soul, on the other hand, there is the sacred command of purification, i.e. the return to the highest form. The inner eye, which begins to see when the outer one closes, cannot immediately behold the full radiance of beauty. ‘So the soul must become accustomed, it must first see the beautiful activities, then the beautiful works, not those created by the arts, but by the men whom one calls noble; and then look at the soul of those who do these beautiful works’. The approach to this supreme beauty, the beauty of the soul, takes place in the manner of stripping off all matter. Here Plotinus chooses a simile from the activity of the sculptor. However, this does not mean that his mysticism has an aesthetic sense, but rather that his aesthetics is to be understood mystically. ‘*Turn inward to yourself and look at yourself; and when you see that you are not yet beautiful, do as the sculptor, ... chisel away what is useless, and straighten what is crooked, cleanse the dark and make it bright and do not cease to work on your image with your hands until the divine radiance of virtue shines forth from you ...*’. If at last, Plotinus continues, you are only you and alone together with yourself and nothing impedes you any longer from becoming one, but you are ‘wholly and entirely pure, true light, not measured by magnitude, not encircled by shape within narrow limits, also not distended into a magnitude by infinity, but entirely immeasurable, greater than all measure and exalted above all quantity’, then you yourself are the seeing power, then ascend, you need no more guidance, gaze steadily, for only such an eye beholds the great beauty. If the eye is unpurified or weak, it does not see the entirely bright. That which sees must be made akin and similar to that which is seen: ‘No eye can see the sun that has not become sunlike; so no soul sees the Beautiful that has not become beautiful’ (Enn. I. 6. 9, on the concept of ‘removing’, cf. Borinski I, p. 169 f).

The treatise ‘*On the Beautiful*’ begins in the tone of the calmest investigation with the question of what beauty, which is found in the realm of sight, hearing, actions, sciences and virtues, really is. It is said almost universally that a harmonious proportion of the parts to one another and to the whole (συμμετρία τῶν μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον) and additionally a beautiful coloring constitute visible beauty; to be beautiful

means for visible things and indeed for everything else to be symmetrical, to have measure in oneself. Accordingly, there could only be a composite beauty, not a simple beauty. Furthermore, the whole could be beautiful while its individual parts would not need to be but would only be insofar as they contribute to the beauty of the whole. But if the whole is beautiful, the parts must also be beautiful, for a beautiful thing cannot be composed of ugly constituents. According to the doctrine of symmetry, the light of the sun and colors, since they are simple, would be excluded from being beautiful; and likewise gold and the sparkle of the night. But one and the same face can appear beautiful at one time, not beautiful at another, without the symmetry of its parts changing. Thus beauty must be viewed as something that is added to the symmetrical; the symmetrical must obtain its beauty through something else. Concordance does not make it: even false doctrines can be in concordance. Virtue in turn is a beauty of the soul, but in what sense could it be symmetrical? Even if the soul has several parts, they cannot be symmetrical as magnitudes or as numbers, for in accordance with what proportion should the composition take place? And in what should the beauty of spirit consist when it exists alone? (Enn. I, 6, 1). These are the fundamental considerations with which Plotinus undertakes his attack on the Pythagorean-Platonic doctrine of symmetry and number. The crux of the argument clearly lies in proving that beauty can only be simple. The example of light is highly characteristic: while Pythagorean thought proceeded from the structure of the world and from music, Plotinus connects to the exciting phenomenon of light. Moreover, for him as the thinker of the 'One', the emphasis on the simplicity of the beautiful was a self-evident demand. Otherwise, the highest One would have had to be denied the predicate of beauty. From the spiritualizing tendency of his philosophy there necessarily follows the attack on the archaic metaphysics of symmetry, which had already resisted Plato's theory of ideas.

The way in which this attack is conducted is of exemplary significance for the future. In order to dethrone symmetry as a law of the world, one must first formalize it. Once form and content are separated, the game is won, because then only a formal concept of order has to be fought. By splitting off the formal concept of the 'symmetrical' from the undivided phenomenon, Plotinus retains an unquantifiable, purely qualitative, simple 'content' which is now considered to be truly beautiful. This content must be present everywhere something is to be called beautiful, just as a body can only be called golden if it is golden throughout. From now on there is a new kind of 'content aesthetics': the 'spiritual' content, independent of form, has been discovered (on the relationship of this theory of beauty to the theodicy problem, see below p. 30 ff).

The beautiful content is perceived and judged directly by the soul. 'For there is a beauty that is grasped at first glance, which the soul somehow perceives and pronounces; in recognizing it, it approves it and somehow

conforms to it; when its gaze falls on the ugly, however, it turns away, refuses it and rejects it, for it does not harmonize with the soul and is alien to it' (Enn. I. 6. 2). Beauty is thus a simple quality that the soul perceives directly by virtue of its affinity. This raises the question of the cognition of beauty. Plotinus says that beauty is recognized by a corresponding faculty in the soul, which judges in union with the rest of the soul. But perhaps, he adds, the soul alone also decides, measuring beauty according to the idea that dwells within it (Enn. I. 6. 3). The soul rejoices and is moved when it becomes aware of the trace of what is kindred to it. Beauty appears where the originally formless participates in form (μετοχή εἶδους). What does not have a share in Logos and form-tendency is utterly ugly. But also ugly is what was not completely mastered by shape and concept (μὴ κρατηθὲν ὑπὸ μορφῆς καὶ λόγου), because matter did not allow a shaping completely corresponding to the form-tendency.

Whatever form is present in the perceptible world stems from the soul and thus from the spirit. For that which is unnatural, there is no idea in the spiritual, just as there is also no form in the arts of that which is contrary to art. A congenital paralysis of the foot is based on the fact that the formative power could not master matter; a paralysis due to accident, on the other hand, is based on damage to the exemplary form (Enn. V. 9. 10). The opposite of beauty is ugliness. It is defined as a foreign admixture in the soul, as a turning toward the corporeal and the material (Enn. I. 6. 5). True being belongs only to that which has form; the truly existent is also the beautiful, the not truly existent is the ugly. At the same time, the former is the good, the latter the evil (Enn. I. 6. 6). 'Where beauty decreases, being also acquires a lack. Therefore being is also desirable, because it is the same as beauty, and beauty is lovable because it is being' (Enn. V. 8. 9).

b) Art and Nature.

In the treatise on spiritual beauty, although Plotinus does not actually turn to the artist's creative work, he begins setting forth his thoughts with an example that makes his 'idealist' doctrine of the artist and art completely clear. Let us imagine, he says, two blocks of marble, one devoid of all articulation and unworked, the other mastered by art and fashioned into the image of a god. The one created by art appears beautiful not because it is a stone, otherwise the other would be equally beautiful, but by virtue of the beautiful form which art has imprinted on it (παρὰ τοῦ εἶδους ὃ ἐνῆκεν ἡ τέχνῃ, V. 8.1). 'This form was not inherent in the material, but existed, even before entering the stone, in the mind of the sculptor, and in it, not insofar as he had eyes and hands, but insofar as he shared in art. So in art this beauty was much higher. For it did not enter into the block of marble, but remaining itself, sent forth from itself a lesser [beauty]; and the latter did not remain pure in it either, and obeyed the will of the sculptor only to the extent that the stone

yielded to art'. Art is thus beautiful in a higher and truer sense, because it (and not the work) possesses beauty (μειζόνως καὶ ἀληθεστέως καλή ἐστι τὸ κάλλος ἀχοῦσα τὸ τέχνης, V. 8. 1). For everything that spreads itself forth gives up something of its essence, power from power, and so also beauty from beauty; every creative principle is in itself stronger than that which it creates: καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν πᾶν καθ' αὐτὸ κρεῖττον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ ποιουμένου (ib.). Plotinus is aware that in this doctrine he has overcome Plato's mimesis theory with its denigration of artistic activity. 'Since the arts possess beauty, they add something to everything deficient, just as Pheidias did not form his Zeus after any perceivable model, but as Zeus would look if he ever appeared before us' (V. 8. 1).

The value of individual arts now no longer depends on their relation to the appearing model, but on their greater or lesser distance from the non-appearing idea (form). And Plotinus assumes that the imitative arts in the narrower sense (painting, sculpture, dance and pantomime), which take something sensory as their model, can only be traced back to the realm of supersensible forms through the 'logos' of man. Music, on the other hand, which directs all its thoughts to harmony and rhythm, corresponds to the music in the sphere of pure spirit.

One would completely distort Plotinus' doctrine if one ascribed to it any privileging of the 'artist' in the modern sense. What we call artistic activity is here integrated into a much more comprehensive activity which, according to its rank, is not comparable with the generative power of nature. In order to determine the relationship between nature and art, we must refer to Plotinus' concept of the creative power. *The creative is one, the created many.* The resting wisdom (φρόνησις) of the world must not be confused with human striving for wisdom, which springs from a lack. He who still has to reflect resembles a cithara player practicing; once he has mastered his instrument, he no longer needs to reflect. So it is with the highest creative power: it does not seek wisdom but possesses it, and therefore it rests (its creation is therefore a beholding. Enn. IV. 4. 12). Nature, however, is an image (ἄλμα) of wisdom. It creates without knowing. Without choice and purpose it passes on what it has to matter (Enn. IV. 4. 13). Nature, because of its immediate relation to the creative power, is 'more beautiful' than art. Life takes precedence over symmetry. 'An uglier living thing is still more beautiful than a beautiful statue'. Why? Because it is more desirable; but this is because it has soul; the soul in turn receives light and beauty from the Good (VI. 7. 22). There is a climax of formedness, whereby the living takes precedence over the dead, even if the latter partakes of symmetry. This climax can be imagined according to the analogy of Plotinus' 'light metaphysics', according to which spirit, life, love, beauty take the place of the highest, inaccessible light, from where formedness (soul-likeness) diminishes more and more towards the darkness of formlessness.

The intellectual principle of construction always remains the same. The beauty of color arises from the fact that the darkness in matter is overcome by the presence of the incorporeal light. Therefore fire as such is also more beautiful than the other bodies. It shines and glistens, as befits form. 'With sounds it is insensible harmonies that produce the sensible ones; they let the soul become aware of the beautiful by showing it in something else what is akin to it' (I. 6. 3).

c) The beautiful soul.

Plotinus' aesthetics can be summed up in the formula: the source of beauty is the beautiful soul. The philosopher of the soul also adopted the concept of the beautiful soul (the combination of words itself does not yet exist in this form) from Plato. We turn to inner beauty, the beauty of the soul, when we turn to outer beauty. The object of the soul's love is always only the soul itself. 'Not form, not color, not any size, but the soul itself, colorless, bearing within itself colorless self-control and the radiance of the other virtues: to perceive within yourselves or to behold in another, magnanimity, just sense, pure self-discipline, courage with its serious countenance, dignity and chastity, which unfold in a calm, undisturbed soul condition, stirred by no excitement and no passion, and shining above all this the spirit, the godlike' (I. 6. 5).

Plotinus' system is based on the principle of the doubling of being. The produced being is understood and derived from a producing one. Everything external is grounded in an internal, every external form presupposes a creative 'inner form'. In this respect, the concept of the inner form (τὸ ἔνδον εἶδος) is the highest concept in Plotinian aesthetics. The inner form is the principle of inner beauty that remains after abstraction of the external. The house that the builder has erected is beautiful because it coincides with the inner form, with the idea of the house in his mind. It is 'a visualization of the indivisible in plurality' (I. 6. 3).

In the hovering character of the aesthetic basic concept εἶδος, the hovering character of Plotinian philosophy finds its expression. Εἶδος is everywhere present, being equivalent to ἰδέα, where the distance between the form-producing principle and matter is meant to be emphasized. In other passages, on the other hand, εἶδος is identical with μορφή: the shaped. This ambiguity and elusiveness of the key concept corresponds to the elusiveness of the Neoplatonic concept of beauty. There is no form resting here in its own dimension. All form is only a 'reflection' of the highest form. We have tried to express this fact in some places by translating εἶδος as 'form-tendency'.

Abolition of being-form resting in its own symmetry and thus in the symmetry of the universe, this is, viewed historically, Plotinus' most consequential act. For understanding his aesthetics, the statement is above all

important that the producer is stronger than the produced (see above p. 23). Form emanates from spirit as the ray of light emanates from the sun; it comes over matter; one cannot think here of any actual creating and moving. What happens here is not a dynamization of the realm of forms, but merely the withdrawal of the forming principle from the world of appearances. The soul makes beautiful, says Plotinus. But the principle of the soul, so must be answered from the standpoint of dimension aesthetics, deprives of soul. This principle takes from things the inherent measure; it makes their 'symmetry' something borrowed. The view of the world of Plotinus is characterized by the notion that form suffers a loss of power when it passes into matter. For it follows that true power exists only in the non-material. This is the 'ideal' formula for the devaluation of any appearing form.

The beauty of the soul, the inner form, is the generative principle of appearing beauty, the external form. Beauty thus 'is' twice: first in the soul, then in matter. In the *voûç* is the *ἀρχέτυπον* for all that is formed (Enn. V. 9. 9). 'What now exists like forms in the perceptible, stems from there; but what is not (shaped), does not' (ib. 9, 10 and 11). In these sentences from the treatise on spiritual beauty, the principle of the doubling of being emerges with unsurpassable clarity. At the same time it becomes clear that philosophy and science gain nothing by tracing back appearing beauty to the beauty of the soul. The systematic finding of an idle 'doubling of being' corresponds exactly to the position Plotinus occupies in the history of philosophical concepts: he himself did not increase the stock of concepts but merely used the existing one to represent a new state of soul; he did not conquer a new piece of world but showed the existing world in a new psychic illumination. In Plotinus the idea has become the highest good, and the most important expression of this transformation is the emergence of the notion of beauty. 'Beauty' is the expression that being is lovable. The world-historical significance of Plotinus lies in the fact that he was the first, even if with borrowed means, to formulate an erotic relationship of man to being.

Lovely is not the appearing form, but rather that from which the form is produced; lovely is not the appearing Being, but the true Being, which sustains in life all that appears. Lovely is the power which preserves as Being all that exists. Truth, Beauty, Goodness, and Being are the same. There is nothing else that would be desirable beyond this highest Good. How carefully Plato took care to isolate the feeling of pleasure in its domain and keep it away from where it is a matter of cognizing being! But if he allowed it, then he took care that the 'symmetrical' structure of being became all the more clearly visible (see above, p. 14 f). In this distinction the passionate man proves himself a Greek. This distinction is abolished by Plotinus, and 'beauty' is the expression for it. Beauty and passionate love belong together: not in the naive sense meant by the Greek myth of Aphrodite, but in a sublime-rapturous sense. One must relate to the highest, to the world of ideas, with not only the

head but also the heart. The realm of ideas is not a realm of coldly admired essences, but a spiritual world grasped with the heart. To raise oneself up to it is bliss. 'Elevation' from the dust of earthly life, the 'everyday', that is the effect of all genuine contemplation of ideas. Beauty is the expression for this 'elevating' character of the spiritual world.

Modern philosophy of beauty, with all its sentimentality and unfruitfulness, is rooted in Plotinus' philosophy. Plotinus' aesthetics is an aesthetics of the highest good. From this it follows of itself that it is a 'content aesthetics'. This new content aesthetics is separated from the aesthetics of symmetry by the rapturous negation of the world of appearances, expressed methodically by the doubling of being and form. In addition to the appearing symmetry we are to conceive another one from which the former only 'shines forth' (see above p. 18). One possible consequence of this doctrine is that now all appearances are sought out and examined with regard to the shining-forth beauty, that from every form the conclusion about the highest formative is drawn. Plotinus created the mental type of theodicy, and as the originator of this mental type he has incidentally also become the originator of aesthetics as a universal doctrine of beauty. The appearing beauty bears witness to the presence of the highest good in the world. In what follows we see everywhere, where the idea of the highest good and theodicy emerge, at the same time the aesthetic worldview emerge. With it is connected each time the standpoint of content aesthetics and the unconditional privileging of natural beauty above everything that human beings have produced artificially. If the highest beauty is in the spirit, but the spirit shines forth directly from the creations of nature, above all from the living soul, then what is made by man necessarily recedes. Thus we see in Plotinus natural beauty exalted at the expense of that beauty which art is capable of; we find natural light named as the first example of the beautiful, and in all thinkers of theodicy (with the exception of Hegel) we will find the hymn to nature again.

The philosophy of the beautiful seems to point us the way to the principle of formation. If one reads Plotinus' words about the inner form and about the creative work of the sculptor, one could be strengthened in this opinion. But Plotinus has become an aesthetician of artistic creation only through a misunderstanding of later thinkers. Already the real natural form is indifferent to him, even more indifferent is the artistic form. His theory of art arises solely through an intensification of the concepts of 'bringing forth' and 'creating'. Intensification into the supersensible is indeed the principle of rapture in general, but no cognition is gained through intensification; blurring of boundaries can have an 'elevating' effect, but certainly not an enlightening one. Plotinus' path from form to the principle of all formation, from external appearance to inner form, this path 'inward', to the soul, this path of spiritualization of an alleged 'external', it is nothing other than a subtle means of denigration, invented by a spirit fleeing the world of appearances. The

beautiful appearance becomes delimited so that the spirit can be boundlessly beautiful. For the ascetic human being, the path of de-delimitation is a holy path. In science and philosophy, on the other hand, this path is easy to take, with edifying effect, but it proves itself scientifically and philosophically as an unfruitful aberration. This becomes most evident in view of the ambiguity that is necessarily connected with a doctrine of beauty in the sense of Neoplatonism. Plotinus' system allows the sensuous appearance to 'participate' in the beautiful. It is indeed only a reflection of spiritual beauty, but still a reflection. This thought underlies that two-facedness of the philosophy of the beautiful which has remained with it to this day. With this thought one can justify everything and condemn everything. The appearance is acknowledged, but it is also not acknowledged again, for it is only an image of something that is there, and not 'now' and 'here'.

Literature. Enneades Plotini. Rec. H. F. Müller I, 1878; II, 1880. περὶ τοῦ κύκλου (1,6) und V, 9 in der Übersetzung von R. Harder; das übrige nach H. F. Müller. H. F. Müller, Zur Geschichte des Begriffs 'schöne Seele'. German.-roman. Monatsschrift. 7. Bd. 1915. Plotini Über de pulcritudine. Ed. F. Creuzer. 1814. (Mit ausführlichem, wertvollen Anmerkungsteil). Franz Koch, Goethe und Plotin, 1925.

III. Augustinus.

In his examination of early Christian literature, Overbeck came to the insight that viable Christian literature could only come about in the forms of what already existed (F. Overbeck to F. Nietzsche, Jan 31, 1882) (Nietzsche, Overbeck, Oehler, & Bernoulli, 1916). *The new content by no means developed new forms for itself, it merely appropriated those already existing.* 'Christianity sublimates all things', Overbeck had written earlier to Nietzsche, 'but basically it remains the same' (April 7, 1879). This 'basically' is paradoxical, for 'basically' everything has changed, only the form has not. For one who thinks historically, forms are by no means insignificant, and early Christianity's dependence, indeed that of the entire Middle Ages, on the antique stock of forms and ideas is a phenomenon worth reflecting upon.

What applies to literary forms applies equally to philosophical concepts. The Platonic theory of ideas had already been made serviceable by Plotinus to a spirit foreign to it. The relation of man to the spiritual world had been defined as an affective one, as a relation of longing and love; the watchword 'back', the parole for flight, had attached itself to it. Both could be interpreted Christianly. Likewise, the most important change that Plotinus had made to the concept of the idea offered itself for Christian interpretation. The archetypes of things now no longer appeared as independent entities or powers, but rather as thoughts of the νοῦς. The Platonist among the Fathers of the Church, Augustine, thus had, as the historical observer might say, 'only'

to 'replace' the $\nu\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\varsigma$ of the Neoplatonists with the personal God of the Christians, and a Christian doctrine of ideas was there. From now on, the ideas dwell in the intellect of God; they are thoughts of the almighty Creator, the prototypes of His creation, which, while everything formed after them arises and perishes, themselves remain eternally unchanging. This 'only' is just as paradoxical as Overbeck's 'basically'. For in reality, not of the logical context, which is also a 'reality', but with regard to individual human beings who adopted this new conception of the idea, nothing has remained the same. What can appear as a small change in logical terms signifies for human beings the collapse of a world. This can be recognized with all desirable clarity in our field. Augustine went through the school of Roman rhetoric; as a rhetorician, as he himself relates, he composed (a now lost) treatise '*On the Beautiful and Fitting*' ('*De pulchro et apto*'). If we look at his remarks on the beautiful in later writings, we find them in complete accordance with ancient tradition. Undoubtedly, Augustine himself was of the highest sensitivity towards beauty as a human being. Nevertheless, every statement he makes testifies to a new relationship to nature and art.



Figure 5a. Augustinus.



Figure 5b. Pseudo-Dionysius.



Figure 5c. Pseudo-Dionysius and the celestial hierarchy.

a) Beauty.

In the Book 4 (approx. Chapter 13) of the ‘*Confessions*’, Augustine asks: ‘What is beautiful, and what is beauty? What is it that attracts us and makes us friends of the things we love? They would not attract us to themselves if they did not have charm (*dēcus*) and form. And I observed and saw that with bodies there is something that somehow makes up a whole and is therefore beautiful, but something else that makes them charming (*dēcēre*) because it conforms to something else, just as a body part conforms to the unity to which it belongs, or as a shoe conforms to the foot, and similar things’. The distinction between *pulchrum* and *aptum* in this sense is traditional in Greek aesthetics and Roman rhetoric. In Book 10 (approx. Chapter 34), when Augustine speaks of the beautiful things that humans produce, the beautiful things, the manifold beauty (*pulchra*) of the one beauty (*pulchritūdō*) that is their origin, are contrasted in a wholly Platonic way. In the midst of this Platonizing sentence, this is the compositional principle of the *Confessions*, falls a word that blows up the entire ancient metaphysics of beauty. ‘For the manifold beautiful things, which are conveyed through souls into skillful hands, come from that beauty which is above souls, and to which my soul sighs day and night’ (Quōniam pulchra trāiēcta per animās in manūs artificiōsās ab illā pulchritūdine vēniunt quae super animās est, cui suspīrat anima mea diē ac nocte). The sudden turn to the soul’s own troubled self and its relation to God is what is surprising. The soul that sighs day and night cannot linger with beauty. The terrible seriousness of the relationship to God precludes any relationship to apparent beauty: all other relationships founder on this most real of relationships. Augustine relates to art as a whole just as much as a ‘realist’ as Plato related to the mimetic arts. His realism is radical, removing and devaluing everything that could distract the troubled soul from its exclusive relationship with God. When humans turn to works of art, they turn outward, to what they create, and abandon within themselves the one who created them. And just as much when they abandon themselves to the beauties of nature. ‘The eyes love beautiful shapes in varied alternation’, says

Augustine, 'they love bright and graceful colors. But my soul must not let itself be bound by them; it must remain bound to the one who created all this.... Seductively the light, the queen of colors, which pours itself out over everything visible, approaches us even when we, busy with other things, do not notice it; and when it suddenly disappears, a longing for it remains behind, and when it is gone for a long time, our mind becomes gloomy'. Thus Augustine describes the natural beauty of light, to which Plotinus also gave special mention. But now the sudden insertion: 'O light that Tobias saw when he guided his son on the path of life with closed eyes', etc. 'That is the true light, which is one, and all are one who see it and love it. That physical light, on the other hand, seasons the blind lovers of the world with alluring but dangerous sweetness'. The whole thinking of the early Christian era is based on the contrast between 'outside' and 'inside', and art collapses together with nature into the abyss of carnality. Paulinus of Nola refuses to have an image made of himself and his wife, because one cannot portray the *homō cōelestis*, and one should not portray the *homō terrēnus* (Panofsky, *Idea*, p. 71; cf. above p. 19).

b) Number.

The eminent position that Augustine occupies as a mediator between antiquity and the Middle Ages, even in the history of the aesthetic problem, would not be explicable from the remarks quoted alone. *The inward turn, the turn against the 'flesh', is characteristic of all early Christian writers. It necessarily had a destructive effect. Augustine, on the other hand, did not only have a destructive but also a preserving and constructive effect.* Everywhere else, the founder of the Latin Church anticipated the harshest, cruelest questions for the thinking of posterity, in the aesthetic realm he behaved conservatively and preserved one of the greatest and most important ideas of antiquity. The idea that Neoplatonism had expelled and believed it had destroyed, the idea of symmetry or the measure inherent in things, is taken up by Augustine and united with Christian-Neoplatonic metaphysics. Thereby, alongside Plato, Augustine joins the ranks of mediators of the Pythagorean system of thought, whose main concept is number, measure, rhythm (*nūmerus*). His structure of thought is the last of antiquity: the, admittedly contradictory, synthesis of Pythagoras (Plato) and Plotinus.

In the Neoplatonic system, the Platonic duplication of being had been eliminated in terms of the content of the doctrine by the fact that matter, as the dark and formless, appeared as a non-being (μὴ ὄν) in contrast to the forming light. This monism of theory was contradicted by the practice of escape, through which the reality of that which one fled was practically confirmed. Matter, which was theoretically a μὴ ὄν, constituted practically the not quite negligible world of the 'external', to devote oneself to which was a falling away from the 'spirit', in Christian Neoplatonism from God. Apparently,

Augustine's adherence to the Pythagorean tradition makes this situation even more complicated, since in addition to the existing, but theoretically denied, duplication of being, there is now the idea of universal order, which contradicts Neoplatonic thought. Precisely the idea of order, however, offered Augustine the possibility of expressing his strict monism, the monism of the Creator God.

God has ordered everything according to number, measure and weight, the world as God's creation is beautiful, nature is one great hymn of praise to the Creator. This could be extracted from Romans 1:20, while a justification of art as a human work was not possible in view of Acts 17:29. When the idea of the unity and omnipotence of the Creator was held with such unconditionality, as was done by Augustine, it was possible to incorporate the Pythagorean world as the world of God into the new Christian system. *The duplication of being in Platonism was now replaced by the contrast between God and the world*: in the face of this dualism, however, a twofold accounting was possible. As the 'external', the world was a $\mu\eta\ \delta\acute{o}\nu$; as 'creation' it was an immaculate work of eternal wisdom.

In Plotinian terms, the beauty of nature would have had to be described in a completely indeterminate way as a 'shining through' of spiritual beauty. But if we find the Plotinian motif of flashing forth in Augustine again, it has a new meaning. When the human spirit transcends itself, the eternal primal number, divine wisdom itself, flashes towards it from its inner abode (K. Eschweiler, *'Die ästhetischen Elemente in der Religionsphilosophie des hl. Augustin'*, 1909, p. 47). The concept of symmetry, excluded by Neoplatonism, re-enters the doctrine of beauty and is made serviceable to the new, Christian theodicy. An entire program of aesthetics lies in the words of Augustine's treatise *'De ordine'*: 'Contemplating earth and heaven, he perceived with pleasure nothing but beauty, and in beauty the figures, in the figures the dimensions, and in the dimensions the proportions' ('... terrām coelumque collustrāns sēnsit nihil aliud quam pulchritūdinem sibi placēre. et in pulchritūdine figūrās, in figūris dimēnsiōnēs, in dimēnsiōnibus numerōs', Eschweiler, p. 12). Plotinus had risen from visible beauty to the One as the source of beauty. Augustine goes from the idea of supreme beauty further to the concept of beauty, from there to the concept of form, from there to the concept of measuredness, from there to the concept of proportion (rhythm). Led by the concept of order, he travels the path back to appearance. Alone because of this act, Augustine must be counted among the most influential shapers in the history of aesthetic science **[Footnote in the original edition:** Of course, there are also passages in Augustine's works that allow the Neoplatonic doctrine of beauty with its duplication of beauty to shine through. Thus Conf. X, 6, where the light and sound and fragrance of nature is contrasted with a kind of light and sound and fragrance that belongs to God and the inner human. Or when carnal numbers

and spiritual numbers are distinguished (Eschweiler, p. 13 note 2)].

A much-noted definition of Augustine's (after Cic. Tusc. 4, 31) reads: *Omnis enim corporis pulchritūdō est partium congruentiā cum quādam colōris suāvitātē* (*De Civ. Dei* 22, 19). Further characteristics of beauty enumerated by him are: *ūnitās*, *aequālītās*, *similitūdō*, *convenientia* (*prōportiō*), *ordō*. He repeatedly uses the sentence that composite beauty as a whole is more beautiful than in the part (Eschweiler, p. 11). Certainly this was the common property of Greek aesthetics, but it had been destroyed by Neoplatonism. We owe the preservation of the idea of measure to Augustine's unusual aesthetic talent and his education through Roman rhetoric.

c) The Highest Good. Theodicy.

That Augustine finds the 'measure' of the world primarily in the form of rhythm (*nūmerus*) corresponds to the dynamism of his being and thinking, which is foreign to the idea of a resting substance. Being is moving and moved life. God is indeed the unchangeable truth (*veritās incommūtābilis*), but not a resting truth and not a resting being but living truth and true vitality. Since every enhancement of being (life) is at the same time an enhancement of perfection and bliss, for life is perfection and bliss, in God being and truth, perfection and bliss coincide in the highest enhancement. From this point of view, God is called the highest good (*summum bōnum*). To strive for truth, to turn to God, means at the same time to long for life and bliss. The relation of the soul to God as the *summum bonum* is that of enjoyment, whereby 'to enjoy' means as much as to love for its own sake and is to be distinguished from 'to use' (cf. J. Bernhart, '*Augustinus. Ein Lesebuch*', 1922, p. 144).

If form-weakness is being-weakness, and lack of form is lack of being, while enhancement of form, on the other hand, is enhancement of being, then beauty is a necessary expression of the strength of being, then God, the *ēns reālissimum*, as it was later called, is also the highest beauty. 'You my Father, You my highest good, You beauty above all beauties', Augustine says in the Confessions (*Mī Pater summē bonē, pulchritūdō pulchrōrum omnium*, Conf. III, 6). And in another passage: 'Late have I loved You, You old and new Beauty, late have I loved You' (Conf. X, 27). From this point of view, 'beauty' is a word for the union of truth, perfection and supreme pleasure in the highest being. Could it be just a coincidence that in Augustine's description of the rapture of the soul to God, that phrase seems to appear for the first time which later in Dante and in the Renaissance denotes the irrationality of the experience of beauty? Beauty is portrayed there as an 'I know not what'. *But Augustine describes as an experience that he is sometimes transported into a strange state and feels in it an ineffable sweetness* ('...You send me into a strange state and into I know not what sweetness...', *ad nescio quam dulcēdinem*, Conf. X, 40). Augustine knows beauty as form, as rhythm, and as the *summum bonum*. However, his

aesthetics, which encompasses everything that antiquity thought about the beautiful, is not yet exhausted. The idea of the *summum bonum* as the beauty above all beauties, the emotional conception of the concept of truth, the emergence of the concepts of love, bliss, light, all this indicates that the ultimate impulses of Augustine's thinking again and again coincide with Neoplatonism. This becomes particularly clear in view of the idea of theodicy. In the Plotinian system this idea was possible without contradiction; Augustine, however, had adopted the concept of *numerus*, he could not at the same time assert and deny a general order of being, as he had to do if he admitted relatively disproportionate, relatively arrhythmic (*innūmerōsē*) parts of creation. What is meant by a relative-rhythmic? The idea of theodicy and the concept of *numerus* exclude each other: either being is ordered in itself, or certain parts need a 'justification'.

The whole in the sense of Plotinus is not an order expressed in numerical relationships, but a symphony of different intensities of being. Each intensity level corresponds to a certain degree of beauty, since being has only what has form. The 'whole' here is thus a harmony of stronger and weaker beauties. The individual beautiful is both beautiful and ugly: the former insofar as the form tendency has prevailed, the latter insofar as matter reigns. Unrestrictedly beautiful is only the spirit. Neoplatonic theodicy is concerned with the defense of the less beautiful, with the justification of the weaker role of being. Here the idea of theodicy is inseparable from the idea of form. Nothing that exists at all is bad in itself, but only by comparison with the more perfect. Considering the whole, in its place it is (relatively) good (Enn. III. 2, 17). The 'whole' in the Plotinian sense is not an ordered whole like the Pythagorean cosmos, but a whole of relative participation. According to the symmetrical view, on the other hand, there are no ugly places in music or in the structure of the world, not even relatively ugly ones. Everything is beautiful only through its own commensurability and commensurability with the whole, but everything is equally beautiful. This 'whole' is not a picturesque whole composed of light and shadow, in which the shadow is just as necessary as the light, but a substantial whole in which everything has the same necessary relation to the 'whole'.

In Augustine, the idea of theodicy has a different meaning: we do not know God's plans, we cannot survey his work. What sounds to us like the harshest dissonance may, seen from his perspective, bear within itself the meaning of infinite beauty. With the idea of sin and evil, an antithetic enters into thinking that is completely unknown to Plotinus. 'The contest is no longer pleasing to him who is defeated, yet it would not be beautiful if he had not fared ugly' (Nūllī autem vērō lūdī āgōnisticī placent, sed tamen cum eius dedecōre decōrī sunt, Eschweiler, p. 53 n. 3). The aesthetic dialectic that emerges here takes on the cruelest form as soon as the idea of predestination comes into play. Seen from this perspective, God's permission of evil

becomes an aesthetic problem to be solved: even the creation of the evil ones (angels or men) makes sense in the 'poem' of the whole. (... atque ita ordinem saeculōrum tamquam pulcherrimum carmen ex quibusdam quasi antithētis honestāret, Eschweiler, p. 51 n. 1). The comparison with the painting with its black spots also recurs (ib. n. 2), indeed death is compared with the muses in a declamation (Eschweiler, p. 52 n. 3 and 4). With all this, the ancient idea of cosmos and the Pythagorean concept of symmetry are incompatible.

IV. Middle Ages and Renaissance.

The unknown man of the 5th century AD, who under the effective name of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite brought the Neoplatonic system down to a few simple formulas and thus handed it down to the Middle Ages, has had a lasting influence on the history of aesthetics. Through him primarily the Neoplatonic concept of the beautiful is transmitted to the following centuries. Medieval aesthetics has two main sources: alongside Aristotle, who defines art theory, Augustine and Dionysius for the theory of beauty. Art theory and theory of beauty proceed completely separately alongside each other (cf. below p. 65 f). A 'beauty of art' does not exist for the whole Middle Ages. The predicate of beauty accrues solely to God and his creation. One thinks as Chrysostom had already thought: 'Who does not despise all the creations of art when in the stillness of heart he admires early in the morning the rising sun...' (A. von Humboldt, *'Kosmos' II*, p. 30). When in the 9th century one enumerates the seven most beautiful things in the world, one names the heavenly vault, sun and moon, a greening fruit garden, the sea, the chorus of believers and the righteous, and the *rex pacificus* (F. von Bezold, *'Das Fortleben der antiken Götter im mittelalterlichen Humanismus'*, 1922, p. 35).

Between early Christianity in Asia Minor, Africa, and Rome and the High Middle Ages lie 900 years of history. At the height of Scholasticism, in the works of Thomas Aquinas, something of Hellenic sensibility for beauty shines forth again, reflected from a pure mirror: so tremendous is the turn of events. 'The Lord himself, according to Clement of Alexandria, was devoid of all beauty in his outward appearance'. Thomas, on the other hand, writes: 'Everything that is good and noble in the created must necessarily be in God in the best and noblest way' (cf. M. Dvorak, *'Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte'*, 1924, pp. 70 f). There is the old contrast between 'inside' and 'outside', soul and flesh; here the most finely elaborated idea of an order of all values founded in God.

It does not seem impossible to present the entire theological-philosophical system of Thomas Aquinas from the point of view of beauty. For everything is good, i.e. ordered toward God. From this universal order emanates a splendor which can be interpreted as God's joy: God simply delights in all things because each, with its essence, is in actual accord (cited

op. cit., p. 95). No longer does alien splendor frighteningly shine into the decayed world (sāeculum), rather, the world lies as ordered creation in the light of grace.



Figure 6a. Thomas Aquinas, Clement of Alexandria, Bonaventura.




Figure 6b. Thomas Aquinas, Clement of Alexandria, Bonaventura.



Figure 6c. Bonaventura.

a) Bonaventura and Ulrich von Strassburg.

Bonaventura links Neoplatonic light metaphysics with the contrast between sin and grace. Things are ordered according to their likeness to God. In man, to whom the light of reason is given, likeness is greatest; through grace this light is enhanced even further. The divine light is the fundamental and primordial form of all things. ‘Nothing is without light, because it is form, and form gives being’ (E. Lutz, *‘Die Ästhetik Bonaventuras. Festgabe für Clemens Baeumker’*, 1913, p. 209). Grace is opposed by sin as the created light is opposed by matter. The ground of beauty is thus form or light; these two are beauty itself. The true, the good and the beautiful are identical, yet the good as such is object of the appetitive faculty; it is beautiful in relation to the

Like Bonaventura, Albertus Magnus, his pupil Ulrich von Strassburg, and finally Thomas Aquinas draw from the treatise of Pseudo-Dionysius on the divine names. The commentary on this text that is fundamental for medieval aesthetics stems from Albertus Magnus (*ōpūsculum dē bonō et pulchrō*). Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of *concinnitās* and *nitor* (*Ἐναρμονία καὶ ἀγλαΐα*), which both resemble light because they spring from the highest source of light. As all good springs from God's goodness, so all wisdom springs from His wisdom and all beauty from His beauty. By sharing in His essence, through love of His own beauty God holds everything together (According to M. Grabmann, *Sitz.-Ber. der Bayer. Akad. d. Wies.* 1926, p. 60). Following this, beauty is defined by Ulrich von Strassburg as *consonantia cum claritate*. 'As the physical light is the cause of the beauty of all colors, so is the *lūx formālis*, the light shining in the forms, the beauty of all forms' (ibid. pp. 58 f). I see in this an attempt to resolve the contradiction, evident in Augustine, between the universal idea of order (*cōnsōnāntīa*) and light metaphysics (*clārītās*). Symmetry (*cōnsōnāntīa*) is brought into a necessary connection with *clārītās*. The light of form radiates only over what is so formed that it stands in proportion to it (ibid. p. 35). The light of form hovers only over things that are in due proportion.

b) Thomas Aquinas.

Through Thomas, the reconciliation between the idea of symmetry and light metaphysics carried out in Albert's commentary is fused with Aristotelianism. The concept of the beautiful includes *claritas* and *debita proportio*. Proportionateness of parts is the characteristic of corporeal beauty. (*Pulchrum autem respicit virrt cognoscitivam: pulchra enim dicuntur, quae visa placent. Unde pulchrum in debita proportionem consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus..* According to Baumgartner in '*Überwegs Grundriß*'. II. 1915, p. 503). Although the beauty of appearances is dealt with here, the modern notion of merely phenomenal beauty should be rejected. In accordance with the ancient concept of measure, it is entirely a matter of objective beauty. 'The faculty of sensory perception is here inserted merely as an intermediary between the well-proportioned object and the human being who recognizes the beauty of the object' (H. Brinkmann, '*Zu Wesen und Form mittelalterlicher Dichtung*', 1928, p. 5).

The good and the beautiful are one. What is good is striven for its own sake; what is beautiful must first, according to the form it possesses corresponding to the archetype in God's intellect, be recognized, which recognition takes place through the eye and ear. Only the actual senses of cognition (*quī maximē cōgnōscitīvī sunt*), sight and hearing, come into consideration here: only what is seen and heard can be called beautiful, but not what we taste and smell. Beautiful is what pleases in and of itself in

cognitive apprehension (. . . Pulchrum autem id, cūius ipsā apprehēnsiō placet.. After Baumgartner p. 502 f).

In what manner finally in the *Summā Theologiae* the concepts of *intēgritās sive perfectiō* are added and connected with the doctrine of the Son and of the Father, no longer belongs to our theme.



Figure 7a. Albertus Magnus.



Figure 7b. Dante Alighieri.

Max Dvorak attempted to construct a connection between the aesthetics of the high Scholastics and the new art of the Gothic (*'Art History as History of Ideas'*, p. 102 and passim). I consider neither a subjective nor an objective (unconscious) agreement to be possible. The prerequisites are missing for this: an independent aesthetic reaction and an independent aesthetic reflection. What does not succeed even within antiquity, to harmonize aesthetic reflection and transformation of styles, since the most important motive-ideas remain unchanged, also does not succeed in the Middle Ages. Certainly the tremendous upheaval that takes place in the 13th century also expresses itself in the forms of thought, just as in the style of the simultaneously arising art. But one must not observe the aesthetic concepts if one wishes to recognize this parallelism. One must turn to the metaphysical central concepts. In aesthetic reflection the ancient tradition remains predominant. A correspondence between aesthetic theory and the style of art can only be determined beginning with Alberti.

c) Dante.

According to the content of his work Dante belongs to the Middle Ages; according to the style in which he expresses this content, he is the first person of a new time (see below p. 67 f). The metaphysics of light and the

highest love, the aesthetics of the *summum bōnum* (if this expression may be permitted) is presupposed everywhere in the Divine Comedy.

La divina bontà, che da se sperne
Ogni livore, ardendo in se scintilla
Si, che dispiega le bellezze eterne.
(Parad. VII, 64 ff)

Luce intellettual piena d'ardre,
Amor di vero ben pien di letizia,
Letizia che trascende ogni dolzore.
(Parad. XXX, 40 ff)

When Dante touches upon the aesthetic problem in the theoretical writings, he expresses himself in agreement with Scholasticism. But he does not do so without making a personal addition. Speaking of the soul, he says that it acts through bodily organs, and then acts correctly when the body is built rightly and fittingly in all its parts. 'And when it is rightly and fittingly built, then it is beautiful in the whole and in the parts; the proper order of our limbs excites a pleasure from I know not what kind of wondrous harmony...' (E quand'egli è ben ordinato e disposto, allora è bello per tutto e per le parti; che l'ordine debito delle nostre membra rende un piacere di non so che armonia mirabile... Convivio, c. 25).



Marsilio Ficino. — Tithe de British Museum.

Figure 8a. Marsilio Ficino.



Figure 8b. Gian Paolo Lomazzo.




Figure 8c. Giordano Bruno.

d) **Ficino. Lomazzo.**

Nothing can make the continuity between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance clearer with regard to the doctrine of the beautiful than the fact that Marsiglio Ficino still composed a commentary on the writing of Dionysius about the divine names. It fits the conventional conception of the Renaissance so little that Ficino thinks more ‘medievally’ here than the High Middle Ages, that his concept of beauty is more spiritualistic, more hostile to the body than that of the high Scholastics. The reason for this is simple: Ficino is an extreme Neoplatonist, while the high Scholasticism on the other hand stands under the influence of Aristotle. But Aristotelianism educates one to respect the world of the senses.

The high Scholasticism only arrived at an aesthetics insofar as it took up Neoplatonic strands of thought. From Aristotle, an aesthetics was not attainable for it, because art (in the narrower sense) did not exist as an independent domain of being for the theoretical human of the Middle Ages. In addition, the only Aristotelian passage (Met. XII, 3; see below p. 51) that could have provided stimulus was obscured by Albert's commentary, which rendered $\chi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\nu$ as *bōnum*. (According to Grabmann op. cit. p. 31 f). Grabmann's observation that the later Aristotelian commentators of nominalist orientation expressed little or nothing at all about the beauty of spiritual and bodily kinds (op. cit. p. 21) is of historiographic significance. It confirms our thesis that the countermovement to the metaphysics of beauty issues from Aristotle. But ‘nominalism’ as well, which at the end of the Middle Ages also could not produce an aesthetics because art was still not an ‘object’, only brought forth the aesthetics of the concept of style in the 19th century. The founding of the *Academia Platonica* in Florence (1470) by Cosimo de Medici is of no small importance for the history of aesthetics. Without this founding and the works that emerged from it, the old metaphysics of beauty would perhaps have been buried under the new onslaught of Aristotelianism in the 16th century, and art theory would have held the field alone.

Gemistos Plethon and Marsiglio Ficino, the leading minds of the

‘Academy’, speak of Plato but mean Plotinus, through whom in their opinion the wisdom of Pythagoras and Plato was first unveiled to us. Ficino translates Plotinus into Latin (Florence 1492): with this deed begins that posthumous existence of Neoplatonism which reaches its late climax in the aesthetics of German classicism and in Hegel’s philosophical system. The significance of Ficino’s commentaries on the Symposium, Phaedrus and the Enneads for the history of the theory of beauty has been elucidated by Panofsky (Regarding the following: ‘*Idea*’ p. 28ff). A priestly rather than a philosophical spirit blows through the Florentine ‘Academy’, in accordance with the character of Neoplatonism. The ideas as the ‘true substances’ are immanent in the mind of God; earthly things are only their images. Knowledge has only become possible for humans because their souls, from their pre-earthly existence, have preserved impressions of the ideas, like sparks of the divine primal light, which have almost gone out but can be brought to shine again through teaching. The aesthetic trait of the Neoplatonic system asserts itself when Ficino above all refers to the cognition of the beautiful for this theory of cognition. The idea of the beautiful impressed upon the mind enables us to recognize and judge visible beauty. What we enjoy in this cognition, the triumph of *eidos* over matter, is ultimately a victory of divine reason. That beauty in turn is referred to as a ‘ray’ from the countenance of God goes without saying. Ficino not only closely follows Plotinus with regard to the general mood but also in details. The rule of form over matter is formulated by him as *imperium formae super subiectum* (Panofsky, *Idea*, p. 94). Since *subiectum* (ὑποκειμενον) means as much as material (matter), this is the first formulation within modern times of the later classical theory of beauty and art.

In his commentary on the Symposium, following Plotinus closely, Ficino refutes the view that beauty consists in the proper order of all parts. The notion of beauty’s simple, qualitative essence, which alone fully accords with the metaphysics of light, seems here to want once more to eliminate the transmitted elements of classical proportion aesthetics. But the Renaissance Neoplatonist is not inclined to surrender proportion aesthetics. To save it he devises a kind of ‘schematism’: between the incorporeal beauty of the idea and the beauty of bodies intermediate members are inserted (*preparazioni incorporee*), whose characteristic is well enough accounted for by proportion aesthetics. The aim of the investigation is to prove that beauty is a gift from above. The quantitative determinations peculiar to beauty are indeed recognized, but only in order to figure as proof of the incorporeal character of beauty. Comparing this new subordination of the proportion-aesthetic element with the coordinate integration of the same element in the period of high Scholasticism, a fanatic trait cannot be mistaken in the former.

Here already the theology of a church preludes, a church which is no longer the ‘catholic’, Germanic-Romanesque church of the Middle Ages. The

theology of the Counter-Reformation announces itself. *One is hardly surprised to rediscover Ficino as the most important source for the art theorist of the Counter-Reformation, Mannerism* (the proof of Lomazzo's dependence on Ficino was furnished by Panofsky. 'Idea', p. 52 ff). The tendency of this new, quasi non-naïve metaphysics of the beautiful aims at deriving symmetry from a supreme principle, i.e. from God.

Characteristically the new spirit expresses itself not so much positively in a new determination of beauty as negatively in a new accentuation of the Neoplatonic concept of ugliness. For Zuccaro, oriented in an Aristotelian-Scholastic manner (cf. below p. 78 f), matter is a 'thoroughly suitable and compliant substrate of the idea', whether of the human idea of the artist or the divine one. In contrast, for the Neoplatonic theorists of Mannerism matter appears as a resistant principle of evil and ugliness. 'It is now the *prava disposizione della materia* that causes the faults or errors of natural phenomenon, and the task of the artist as a 'minister of divine grace', as one of these authors puts it verbatim, consists in leading natural things back to their original state intended by their eternal creator' (Panofsky, *Idea*, p. 53).

The theologization of the concept of beauty expresses itself at the same time in the form of a theologization of the artist's vocation. The activity of the artist is interpreted as a struggle against 'matter', the artist becomes a colleague of the priest. In a manner of speaking he has to conjure matter and magic out of it again the archetype it had received and which it only reluctantly gives up again.

Formally the same synthesis lies before us between the concept of art and the concept of beauty that is achieved on another level by Zuccaro and Bellori (cf. below p. 83). *The Idea of Beauty, which for centuries had remained essentially independent of the theory of art, now becomes the main content of the theory of art.* G. P. Lomazzo accomplishes the synthesis ('*Trattato dell' arte della pittura, scoltura et architettura*', 1585. '*Idea del Tempio della pittura*', 1590). Cautiously and with wise reservation in the early renaissance Alberti had set the concept of beauty in relation to art. Now by means of Lomazzo in the final consequence of Neoplatonism art is swallowed up by the idea of beauty. 'While Ficino' says Panofsky, 'in his writings had concerned himself with beauty yet not with art, and art theory had until now not concerned itself with Ficino, now we stand before the memorably significant historical fact that the mystical-pneumatological theory of beauty of Florentine Neoplatonism, after passing the interval of a whole century, is resurrected as mannerist metaphysics of art' (*Idea*, p. 55). This fact is less striking than Panofsky seems to assume. Rather, the rapprochement and repulsion between metaphysics of beauty and theory of art is the covert law underlying aesthetics as history of ideas in the past.

e) Bruno.

The spirit not of the Renaissance as such but rather of its Neoplatonic branch condenses itself in the person and effect of Giordano Bruno. This man's position between the Middle Ages and modern times, between the Florentine Academy, its Plotinism and Kabbalism on the one hand, the modern view of nature and the revived Aristotelianism on the other is of eminent importance. Bruno influences German idealism far beyond his century, exercising the strongest influence as an aesthetic thinker.

The problem of 'beautiful' art that did not exist in the Middle Ages is at least seen in the 14th century. The aesthetes of the Renaissance certainly do not yet think of conceiving art as a mere realization of beauty. They linger by the notion of a certain relationship between art and beauty, and therein lies their wisdom. In the epoch following the Renaissance this measured relation between the two is dissolved, beauty casts itself into the role of master over art. In the aesthetes of Mannerism it first becomes the humble maidservant of beauty; in Giordano Bruno by contrast artistic activity, conceived universally, moves into the center but receives all its meaning and content through the concept of beauty. Bruno carries through the possibility implicit in Neoplatonism of interpreting the metaphysics of the One and the Beautiful on the basis of Aristotle's concept of ποιησις.

Bruno is the philosopher of 'life' in the sense of Plotinus, i.e. the philosopher of the soul and spirit. But he lets the 'One' stream forth into the world and swell up into the world soul. (From the historical point of view, a revival of the Stoic notion of immanence was overcome by Plotinus). How much he remains a Neoplatonist here is evident from his position regarding the concept of symmetry. The ancient doctrine of measure is cited by him as being ascribed to Orpheus, who calls the universal reason (L'intelletto universale) the 'eye of the world', 'because it sees all the things of nature within and without so that everything generates and maintains itself not only inwardly but also outwardly in its peculiar symmetry' (*De la causa*, 2. Dial. Op. it. I, p. 174). Plotinus, it says further, calls her the father or first progenitor. By Bruno himself however she is called the 'inner artist' (artefice interno). So we should presumably also imagine to ourselves the inner artist as outer artist. But the development of the thought does not correspond to this demand. Quite like in Plotinus the inner formative force emerges dominantly. In order to have firmness and constancy, it says in the preface of the *Eroici furori*, all things of the universe must have weight, number, order and measure, so that they can be administered and ruled with justice and reason (Op. it. II, p. 290). The universe is subject to the law of Adrastea (a Plotinian phrase), and only those can approach the 'spiritual sun' who harmonize themselves with the divine inward harmony and the symmetry of the laws inherent in all things (ib. p. 334). That this means merely a rhetorical insertion

of the concept of symmetry in that system which has robbed it of its actual value becomes clear through the continuation. All heroes and not merely animalistically loving ones have God as the object (of their love), strive toward divine beauty which first communicates itself to the souls and shines back (risplende) in them; from them, better through them, it first communicates itself to the bodies. Therefore it comes that the correctly formed feeling (*l'affetto ben formato*) loves corporeal beauty only so far as it is indication (indīce) of spiritual beauty. 'It is always a certain spirituality that attracts us to the body; yet its name is beauty. This consists not in greater or lesser dimensions, not in definite colors or forms but in a certain harmony and consonance of limbs and colors' (Anzi quello che n'innamora del corpo, è una certa spiritualità, che veggiamo in esso, la qual si chiama bellezza; la qual non consiste nelle dimensioni maggiori o minori, non nelli determinati colori o forme, ma in certa armonia e consonanza de membri e colori, ib. p. 336). This is proved by the affinity of the mind with the more acutely and penetratingly perceiving sensory organs.

We see here the same attempt undertaken as we found in Ficino. *The concern is to do justice to a certain extent to outer form while retaining the Plotinian concept of 'inner form'*. This attempt is bound again and again to founder on the inexorable dialectic of the once assumed opposition of 'outside' and 'inside'. Its terminological expression finds this failure in the replacement of the clear concept of symmetry by the altogether indefinitely remaining concepts of armonia and consonanza.

The blend of Platonic and Aristotelian concepts so characteristic for Neoplatonism has perhaps never found a more succinct expression than in Bruno's words: matter unites itself with the form of the universe 'so that the nature of the body, which is not beautiful in itself, so far as it can participates in beauty, since indeed there is no beauty that does not consist in a certain appearance (specie) or form, and no form that is not produced by the soul'. And indeed all forms of all things bear the form of the soul in themselves, so all things are thus ensouled (animato). (De la causa, 2. Dial. I, p. 179). From this follows, although it is not expressed, that all things also are beautiful in some degree. Aristotle's principle of form is combined with Plato's principle of idea and from this there emerges aesthetic idealism. Spirit (spirito) is the true reality (atto) and the true form of all things; soul (anima) is placed above matter and reigns (signoreggia) in the compound, effecting the union and constancy of parts (ib. p. 183). So in summary, says Bruno, we have an inward formal principle (principio intrinseco formale), that exists eternally and for itself. Only sophists hold substance to be perishable, because they wrongly call substance what emerges from the compound. But this is only an accident that dissolves into nothing. They say what emerges from the compound is truly the man, which is truly the soul, which is either the perfection or the energy (entelechia) of the living body, or even merely a thing

that arises from a certain symmetry (certa simmetria) of bodily constitution (complessione) and the limbs (ib. p.184).

Everything is reduced to the opposition of an unfathomable soul and an ensouled structure. The fundamental thought of all boundless thinking, that the soul has no measure, experiences at the end of the dialogue an ingenious formulation. World, soul and Godhead are fully present in the whole and in each part. One should not imagine this corporeally and spatially (corporalmente e dimensionalmente) but rather in the manner in which a voice is present as a whole in a whole room and in each part of it, for it is understood wholly everywhere. So the words which I now speak are understood wholly by all present, the wordplay with *tutto* and *tutti* that follows is untranslatable, even if thousands were here; and if my voice could reach the whole world, it would be there as a whole for the whole (ib. p. 189). Even if the mysterious presence of sound had already been employed by Plotinus to prove that the soul is a whole in itself but at the same time appears in many (Enn. VI, 4, 12), the manner in which Bruno employs the thought shows a heightening here. The forefeeling, in this heightening, of the dissolution through Mannerism and High Baroque of any even just phenomenally symmetrical visible form, the anticipation of the grand centuries of music that are approaching seems to be contained in it. Nothing can more contradict the clear bodily awareness of presence and the feel for proportion of the Renaissance than this conclusion of the dialogue with its intense making-present of the mysterious omnipresence of the disembodied tone.

The universe is one, infinite, immobile; it moves not locally, because there is nothing outside it, it could move itself into, since it is all things. It can become neither smaller nor larger, for it is infinite; nothing can be added to the infinite nor taken away from it, for it has no parts which could be proportioned to one another (perché l'infinito non ha parti proporzionabili. 5. Dial. I., p. 239). In these sentences the thought that bursts asunder form reaches its culmination. They are the epitome of the 'philosophy' of a man oriented more literary than philosophically. Here for the first time we find the modern type of priest without a church in pure form. Philosophy, inspired by theology, the concept of 'infinite' life and 'absolute' spirit: this is the prelude of German idealism and modern philosophy of life. What the inspired man of letters Bruno propounds is genuine philosophy of life: never can the infinite be captured and contained by form, it is absolute unity, it has no comparable parts. By the Renaissance beauty had been posited in 'comparability' (Dürer). At the threshold of the Baroque Bruno sees the essence of beauty in incomparability.

A writer who had understood the concept of the One, the Infinite, the soul, inner form, had to become of necessity in the 16th century a herald of

genius. The proximate cause is the new Aristotelianism: the 'Poetics' is translated and commented upon, Scaliger's *Poetics* appeared in 1561. 'So there are 'regolato' of poetry', it says in the first dialogue of the *Eroici furori*, 'who with toil and trouble barely let pass Homer as poet but among whom Virgil, Ovid, Martial, Hesiod, Lucretius and still many others are set among the number of rhymers (versificatori), because they measure them all according to the rules of Aristotelian poetics'. These 'beasts' completely miss the uniqueness and incomparability of the 'heroic' poet. Homer was not in his (innate) kind (nel suo genio) a poet who would have depended on rules, he is rather the cause of rules (è causa delle regole); rules may be good for those who feel more inclined to imitate than to invent. They have also only been collected by someone who was not himself a poet of any sort (sorte) but only understood how to collect the rules of this one sort (namely the Homeric one) for the use of one who did not want to become another kind of poet but one like Homer, who did not follow his own Muse but appeared as ape of the Muse of another (scimmia della musa altrui) (II, p. 310).

The curse word of the Middle Ages for the artist was that he was the ape of nature (cf. below p. 61). The late Renaissance, which saw the artist in his pride, coins the new curse word of the 'ape of the muse of another'. The relationship of genius to the rules has not been described more clearly and decidedly even later (of course Bruno says hardly anything that the author of *Τὸφοι βύθιος* would not already have known). Scaliger, who calls the poet 'another God' (alter deus), has arrived at a similar definition of the artist from completely different assumptions.

It is no coincidence that unrestricted thinking reaches a climax in grasping the peculiarity of genius: 'You conclude quite correctly that poetry is not born of rules, except in terms of incidental externalities. Rather, the rules are derived from poetry: and therefore there are just as many kinds and species (geni e specie) of true rules as there are kinds and species of true poets'. 'But then how are the true poets recognized?' asks the interlocutor. 'By the song of the verses; besides, by the fact that this song delights or instructs us or instructs and delights at the same time' (II, p. 310 f).

In the contrast between poet and versifier, the contrast between the 'inner form' and the 'proportions' appears before us once more. The level of fundamental decisions, however, has now been abandoned. The new insight is empirical-psychological in character; it merely amounts to a justification of the diversity of human dispositions and talents. The final formula is that there are and can be just as many kinds of poets 'as there can be and are human ways of feeling and inventing' (II, p. 311).

Literature. Zur 'Lichtmetaphysik' im Mittelalter: Cl. Baeumker, Witel. 1908. S. 357- 514. M. Grabmann, Des Ulrich Engelberti von Straßburg O. Pr. (f 1277) Abhandlung *De pulchro*. Sitz.-Ber. München, Phil.-hist. Kl.

1926. 5. Abhdl. H. Janitschek, Die Kunstlehre Dantes und Giottos Kunst. 1892. E. Panofsky, 'Idea', 1924. K. Borinski, s. oben S. 17. Julius Schlosser, Die Kunsttheorie. 1924. Über Lomazzos Trattato dell' arte della pittura, scultura et architettura (1585) vgl. K. Birch - Hirschfeld, Die Lehre von der Malerei. G. Bruno, Opere italiane. Her. v. Gentile. 1907 f.



Figure 9a. Denis Diderot.



Figure 9b. Johann Joachim Winckelmann.



Figure 9c. Plutarch.

Second Section: The Concept Of Art.

I. Aristotle.

Aristotle did not found a doctrine of beauty, but a doctrine of art. This theory of art did not have the brilliant fate of Plato's metaphysics of beauty.

It lies in the nature of Aristotle's questioning that it is less easily accessible, that above all it cannot be understood by the enthusiasts who have so willingly attached themselves to Plato, who is innocent of this. The theory of art lacks the enthusiastic *ἰθιασος*. Not because it would be 'sober': properly handled, it leads like any philosophical science to the knowledge of being.

Aristotle developed not only a general doctrine of being and a doctrine of action, but also a doctrine of art, taking the word in the broadest sense. Above the external division into physics, metaphysics, ethics and logic, which follows the content of the treatises, the division of the sciences into practical, productive and theoretical (*ἐπιστήμη πρακτική, ποιητική, θεωρητική*), which Aristotle himself mentions and substantiates convincingly at important points, has been wrongly relegated to the background (Met. V, 2; 1026; in a different order Top. V III, 1, 156). Aristotle only drew the basic lines for the productive science. The intention is recognizable, the execution is missing. The gaps in the tradition are also painfully felt here. Nevertheless, the influence of the philosophy of *πρῆσις* has been tremendous. Throughout the centuries, the trace of this philosophy extends, which in its unity is less easily recognizable than the metaphysics of the beautiful, but which surpasses the latter in terms of its significance for scientific cognition.

One must be warned against the repeatedly futile attempt to derive Aristotle's theory of art in the narrower sense from the remnants of the Poetics. Only when what art means in general for Aristotle is understood can an attempt be made to interpret the existing elaborations on the poetic art. Fundamental for Aristotle's philosophy of art are the Physics, the Metaphysics, the Politics, and the Rhetoric. Here the Politics is of particular importance, especially in its first, third and eighth books. Furthermore,

attention must be expressly drawn to the fallacy of the undertaking to smuggle in the delimitation between art in general and what later ages called 'fine art', i.e. between art in the broader and narrower sense, by simply passing off the later doctrine as Aristotelian. For such a substitution there is not the slightest support in Aristotelian terminology. (This proof was provided by A. Döring's book *The Art Doctrine of Aristotle*, 1876). The invention of an Aristotelian 'fine art' betrays the notion, completely inadequate to the history of the aesthetic problem, that aesthetics has been handed down to us from antiquity solely as a 'philosophy of the beautiful', while it is none other than Aristotle who is the inaugurator of a powerful counter current.

It is highly unlikely that among Aristotle's lost writings there was also an investigation on the beautiful. For Aristotle investigated nature, the soul, the state, human action, the forms of speech and thought, of poetry and of being in general, but he never made 'the logical' or 'the psychic' or 'the political' the object of an investigation. Just as little could this have happened with 'the beautiful', whose concept is so characteristic for Platonic philosophy. The place in the system where one would believe one has to look for a doctrine of the beautiful is already occupied by the concept of art. Just as it is not possible to think the concept of 'the beautiful' with Aristotle's method, so it is not possible to give the concept of art a place in Plato's system such as is done in the division cited above by Aristotle. The 'metaphysical' distinction between ὄντα, ὅτως ὄν swallows up all other possible distinctions. In the realm of ὅτως ὄν there are no differences of being, in the realm of ὄντα it does not make sense to make any. Neither from Plato's nor from Plotinus' school has a poetics or theory of art emerged. From the perspective of the philosophy of beauty, such a theory would refer only to an 'externality'. But the external appears here as unimportant and accidental. Only when one does not see it tainted with the flaw of contingency can one consider it worthy and capable of a theory.

So the course of events cannot be imagined like this: Plato discovered the idea of beauty, Aristotle, less artistically gifted and in accordance with his 'empirical' orientation, was not interested in the metaphysics of beauty, or else a treatise by him on it has been lost. Only through Plotinus, then, was the philosophy of beauty firmly established, and ever since, aesthetics has been secured against falling into positivistic and naturalistic doctrines. Through Neo-Platonic philosophy, the creative spirit of the artist, the animating soul, was put in its right place. Just as the tree does not bear blossoms and fruit at the same time, so little, F. Koch thinks in line with the previous view, should one demand from Plotinus the determination of the 'technical' of the inner form (F. Koch, *Goethe and Plotinus*, 1925, p. 139).

This schema: Neo-Platonic inwardness on one side, outwardness of a formal theory of art on the other, is based on nothing other than Neo-Platonic

philosophy itself. However, it is not fruitful to define with value distinctions like 'inward' and 'outward'. Plotinus is no more 'inward' a philosopher of art than Aristotle, but Aristotle is a scientific philosopher, while Plotinus is a teacher of salvation. It is not different psychological attitudes that are at issue here, but philosophical methods. The contrast between an unrestricted and a formal-analytic thinking, as it confronts us in Plotinus and Aristotle in peerless vividness, has lost none of its topicality over two millennia. Neither in antiquity nor in modern times has Neo-Platonic thinking ever turned to the theory of art.

Theory of art is simply something other than determining the technique belonging to the inner form. The separation of 'technique' and 'inner form' already contains a theory, namely that theory of art which corresponds to the metaphysics of 'the beautiful'. It is precisely this theory that conceals the greatest danger of all for a cognition of art: it is this that necessarily leads to the real work of art being torn apart into soul-like form and technical phenomenon on the path of 'spiritualization' and 'internalization'. The unfruitfulness of all Neo-Platonic concepts with regard to the cognition of art is based on this. A Platonist has never addressed the forms of the work of art and the problem of art history; and when Goethe and Schiller turned from their Neo-Platonic world of thought to the real work of art, they forgot their metaphysical formulas and turned to Aristotle.

There is an antagonism between the metaphysics of beauty and the theory of art that reaches down into the depths of the philosophical problem as such. It is quite correct when a recent aesthetician says: someone could construct a complete system of aesthetics without knowing of the existence of a poetic art, a music, a painting (M. Dessoir, *Aesthetics and General Theory of Art*, 2nd ed. 1923, p. 591, [Footnote in the original edition. One could raise the question of what right we still have to place the word 'Aesthetics' over the present contribution. However, this concept has both a narrower and a broader meaning, just as the concept of metaphysics does. Just as metaphysics can mean *prima philosophia*, but also 'metaphysics', so too can aesthetics mean the 'doctrine of the beautiful', but also the *prima philosophia* with respect to the appearance of art.]). *Neo-Platonism has made the aesthetic independent and has thus introduced the art-scientific positivism into philosophy in the first place.* While the inner form takes shape at one pole, at the other the pure 'technique' takes shape. It is inadmissible to impute this idea of the 'outer form' to those who are unable to recognize in the metaphysics of 'the beautiful' the solution to the aesthetic problem.

The traditional view of the exclusive significance of Plato for the history of the aesthetic problem is all the more unreasonable since precisely the 'Platonizing' philosophy of Plotinus took over the important concept of form (εἶδος) from Aristotle. Plotinus exposes the concepts of εἶδος (μορφή)

and ὕλη to the fiery climate of the theory of ideas and thus, from Aristotelian germs of thought, gains a system contradicting the Greek genius, which through the mysticism with which it surrounded the concepts of form and formation was able to influence the imagination of the Christian millennia. Plotinus was able to derive elements of mood from the Platonic writings, but he took the constructive concepts from Aristotle. And only because they originally belonged to an understanding of being as shape was he able to use them as he did. The fact that Aristotle is the first great thinker of the organism may not be unrelated to the fact that his basic concepts are called εἶδος and ὕλη. It is conceivable to develop his system as a philosophy of the formation and transformation of all that is. If there has ever been an 'aesthetic' explanation of the world, then it is this one, whereby of course the word 'aesthetic' has to be understood in a sense other than the customary one, neither 'metaphysical' nor formalistic, but ontological.

The world that Aristotle's concepts reveal unfolds in the light, it is a world of day and definiteness of form. The same thinker who criticizes the concept of the idea, from whom the notion of a beauty in itself remains completely remote, coins the word εἶδος into a term that philosophy has not been able to dispense with ever since, above all not the theory of the beautiful when it ventures into the field of art that is alien to it in terms of its origin. For Aristotle, εἶδος is constitutive of being in the realm of nature as well as in that of art. Everywhere where an indeterminate becomes 'something' in relation to an ordering and shaping principle, there is ὕλη, and εἶδος is that in relation to which there is ὕλη. What distinguishes artificial things from all others is that their εἶδος does not lie in them themselves. The work of art is separated from all natural formations by the fact that its existence is preceded by an image (design) in the soul of a producer (ἀποτέχνης γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, Met. VI, 7, 1032a). This definition of art refers to everything that is produced, to cookery and medicine as well as to architecture and the other arts. The principle of production in the producer is either reason, or skill, or some power (Met. V, 1). That which produces and that which is produced are similar (ὁμοειδές Met. VI, 7, 1032a. [Footnote in the original edition: 'ἡ τέχνη ἀρχὴ καὶ εἶδος τοῦ γιγνομένου, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ'. De an. gen. II, 1, 734a; vgl. ib. II, 4, 740b. Ferner Met. XI, 3, 1070a.]). In this respect there is no difference between the productions of nature and those of art. The only difference is that in art, both the εἶδος and the material cause of the movement lie in something other. The word ποιεῖν refers to the material moving cause [Met. VI, 7, 1032b]. So it relates to the work, the craftsmanship and skill. What happens by nature or by necessity has its principle in itself; but what happens by art can be or cannot be, since its principle lies in something other [Eth. Nic. VI, 4].

a) Ποίησις – Τέχνη (Poiesis – Techne).

In the domain of action (πράττειν) we do not find a contrast like that between the producer (ποιεῖν) and that which is produced (τὸ ὄν ποιούμενον, Eth. Nic. VI, 4a). Action (πράττειν) turns back upon itself, production (ποιεῖν) leaves behind an independently existing thing. In action, the goal lies in the activity of the agent itself; in production it lies in that which is produced (Eth. Nic. VI, 5, 1140). Therefore, in judging action the nature of the agent is decisive; while in production, the judgment depends solely on the quality of that which is produced (Eth. Nic. II, 3, 1105). A distinction must be made between what happens κατὰ φύσιν [according to nature] and what happens κατὰ τέχνην (according to art). Τέχνη means not only artistic practice but also that on which cultivated artistic practice is based, namely theory. The corresponding Latin word ars likewise means teaching, science. As ‘art’ in the comprehensive sense of the word, thus including achievement, τέχνη is defined by Aristotle as ‘a state involving reason and understanding for effecting something’ (ἥ τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική. Eth. Nic. VI, 4 1140a; cf. Döring op. cit., pp. 49f).

It seems that Aristotle also recognized productions that do not meet the requirement of μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς, i.e. productions that owe their existence to custom or mere instinct. Döring sees this well-founded in the fact that in art it is the quality of the work that matters, and that deliberation and understanding are important only insofar as the objective result depends on them (Döring op. cit., pp. 72 f). However, poetic thinking necessarily raises itself to theory, just as practical thinking in ethics, economics and politics unfolds into a theory of itself.

Once the physician has determined that this or that remedy has helped in a particular disease, he proceeds to the proposition that it helps everyone. From such inductively obtained general propositions a system of rules develops, and with that the theory is complete (Döring op. cit., p. 77). All these rules are strictly related to a single point of view, that of the purpose of the art in question. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle has left us an example of a methodical theory of art. In rhetoric, Döring rightly says, ‘we have at least one example of a theory of art in the Aristotelian sense, which thus worthily stands side by side with the theories of ethical action in ethics and politics for the field of art’ (ibid., p. 78). And not unjustly Döring points out at the same place what merit Aristotle deserves for developing the concept of ‘theory of art’. All those numerous words ending in *-ik* that have passed into modern languages remind us of this merit.

The significance of τέχνη as theory of art is related to the fact that ‘for almost all arts’ a distinction can be made between the craftsman (δημιουργός) and the artist (ἀρχιτεκτονική). In addition, there are those who have achieved perfect theoretical training with regard to theories of art (πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην, Pol. III, 11, 1282a). The highest degree of skill in art, as attained

by Pheidias and Polycletus, is called wisdom (σοφία, ἀρετὴ τέχνης. Eth. Nic. VI, 7, 1141a). There are arts that are necessary for man (τέχνηαι πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα οὔσαι) and others that, while not necessary, serve for entertainment (πρὸς διαγωγὴν ὄντα, Met. I, 1. 981b). The former are for use (utility), the latter for pleasure; the former have a purpose, the latter have no purpose. The inventors of the latter, because their inventions do not serve utility, are considered 'wiser' (ibid.), thus occupying a higher rank. This valuation corresponds to the later division of the arts into lower ('mechanical') and higher ('liberal').

Man derives pleasure from skillful imitations. It is therefore obvious to seek the criterion for distinguishing art in the narrower sense from art in general in the principle of imitation, and to divide the arts into useful and entertaining, i.e. imitative. However, this would be nothing but a misunderstanding, as the investigation of the concept of imitation proves.

b) Μίμησις (Mimesis).

Art either accomplishes what nature is unable to achieve, or else it imitates nature (ὡς ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται, Phys. II, 8, 199a).

Döring gives this foundational proposition the interpretation: 'It is about the completely similar result of the operation of nature and art because of the purpose prevailing in both. If the house arose by nature, it would become just as it now does through art. And conversely, the products of nature, if they could also be produced by art, would turn out exactly as they now do by nature. ' So with the word μιμεῖσθαι the immanent purposiveness of nature is to be pointed out (Döring op. cit., p. 82).

The common mistake is to interpret the concept of imitation mainly from the Poetics, whereas it has a general meaning, and the Poetics can only be interpreted on the basis of the general concept of imitation. To imitate means 'to make like' (Döring, p. 146). In German we express this meaning by connecting the verb *nachahmen* with the dative: to imitate nature. If, on the other hand, we say *nachahmen* and put the accusative, the meaning of mere copying is close at hand. In view of Aristotle's concept of living nature, we have no reason to give the concept of imitation, wherever it appears in him, a positivistic interpretation. For 'nature' for Aristotle is not a totality of existing things, to use a later word *natura naturata*, but φύσις, creating nature, *nātūra natūrāns* (cf. Döring, p. 149, note).

What then do we have to understand by imitation in the aesthetic sense in Aristotle? I believe with Döring that in answering this question one has to start from the important passage in the 5th chapter of the 8th book of the Politics. Here the senses are classified according to whether they are capable of perceiving an image of the characteristic (ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ψυχαῖς).

‘It turns out, then, that in one part of the perceptible things the characteristic does not exhibit an image, as for example in the impressions of touch and taste; but it does in the visual impressions’ (Pol. VIII, 1340a). Sculptors and painters are not mere copiers of reality, Aristotle also does not ascribe to the tragedian the imitation of existing characters, but rather the imitation of actions, but rather imitators of human nature as it manifests itself in emotional movements (affects). The principle of imitation sets the artist the goal of achieving the arousal of affects through the imitation of sounds, forms and colors. Of course this too is an ‘imitation’, but art must have an object after all. What matters is how this object is defined. If it is understood as a dead, ‘positive’ phenomenon, then the principle of imitation is deadly; if on the other hand it has the breadth and depth of human life, then it will be difficult to find a more correct principle of art.

Man differs from other living beings in that the instinct for imitation is innate in him from childhood and he is particularly skilled at imitation. The pleasure in imitations is also innate in humans. Things that we see in reality with discomfort, we look upon with pleasure when they confront us in an exceptionally successful image (εἰκῶν). This pleasure goes back to the pleasure in learning. If one does not know the imitated object, the pleasure in execution, coloring or something similar remains (Poetics c. 6). Certainly, this is spoken soberly, but perhaps not as soberly as it sounds in our over-rationalized language. And it already contains in itself the observation which a few hundred years later is stated by Plutarch as follows: ‘For that which is ugly in essence can never become beautiful; but imitation finds applause when it represents a thing, be it beautiful or ugly, in the most similar manner’ (Plutarch ‘Dē audiendīs poētīs’ c. 3). The word μιμησις here is unmistakably tending toward the concept of representation. Translated as ‘imitative representation’, it is not unjustly used in the famous Aristotelian definition of tragedy: ‘Tragedy is the imitative representation of a serious and self-contained action of magnitude, in embellished speech ... performed by characters in action and not narrated, which through pity and fear accomplishes the purification of such emotions’ (Poetics c. 6).

Aristotle does not speak of an imitation of the beautiful. On the other hand, he mentions the procedure of painters of unifying here and there scattered existing things into one (Pol. III, 11, 1281b). The doctrine of the choice of parts seems to have belonged to Hellenic popular aesthetics, to the ἑξωτερικοὶ λόγοι (Eth. Nic. VI, 4, 1140a). It already appears in the conversation conducted by Socrates with the painter Parrhasios in Xenophon (Mem. III, 10), taken entirely from the mouth of the people. Not infrequently one encounters the view that with this idea of a procedure of selection and producing something new through combination, the horizon of the concept of imitation is surpassed in the direction of the ‘ideal’. However, that story, circulating in antiquity and repeated a thousand times, of the painter Zeuxis

who gathered together the five most beautiful maidens of his home city Croton in order to form his Helen from their individual beauties (Cic. de inv. II, 1), is not an expression of an idealistic view of art, but precisely of naturalism. For the point is: only in nature can the most beautiful details be found. This naturalistic doctrine is so disconsolate because it ties the artist to a specific empirical phenomenon, to obvious nature, to what is there, to which he remains bound even as a selector. To the picked-up thought of the selection of parts, Aristotle opposes in the same Politics the deeper and more correct thought of an intrinsic lawfulness of technical contexts: 'No painter', he says, 'would allow the animal in his picture to have a foot exceeding proportion (συμμετρία), however beautiful it might be, and no shipbuilder would tolerate this in the stern or any other part of the ship, and just as little would a conductor let a voice which surpassed the whole chorus in strength and beauty sing in the chorus' (Pol. III, 13b, 1284, trans. by Rolfes). In such insights the power of Aristotle's fundamental idea of the independence of artistic production proves itself. For what seems to be said here is nothing other than that the unity of the produced whole is decisive, not the beauty of the parts.

c) Τὸ καλόν (The Beautiful).

The concept of 'beautiful' as an aesthetic guiding concept is unknown to Aristotle. He uses this concept as it was customary in Greek everyday life. Beautiful above all is the natural and vital which is appropriate to its condition. A comparison of the structures of art with the structures of nature from the point of view of beauty is not considered, just as in general the chasm between nature and art and the relation of the two across this chasm is foreign to antiquity. When Aristotle recommends including drawing among the childish occupations because it helps one to better judge works of art (Pol. VIII, 2, 1338a), he is not thinking of pictures and statues but of technical structures. So he recommends technical, not artistic, drawing. And when immediately afterwards he has to commend drawing for sharpening one's eye for 'beautiful bodies', what is meant is: one who can draw will not be subject to any deception about the order and proportion of bodies in which their perfection manifests itself. When music is spoken of, which Aristotle treats with particular attention and love, it says: one should pursue it in youth so that in later years, when one no longer practices it, one has the ability to distinguish the good from the bad (τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν. Pol. VIII, 6, 1340b). This already sounds quite like 'formation of taste', but it cannot be meant so because the assumption, namely the notion of an 'art-beautiful' existing in and for itself and making demands on taste, is completely missing. Beautiful, as defined in the Rhetoric, is what, because it can be chosen for its own sake, is praiseworthy, or what, because it is good, is therefore pleasant precisely because it is good (Rhet. I, 9, 1366).

Certainly we no longer find in Aristotle the strict, exclusive relation of

music to the attitude of life that we find in Plato. Rhythms and harmonies resemble the true nature of anger, mildness, courage and what is opposed to them: in listening, our mood changes (μεταβάλλομεν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων, Pol. VIII, 5, 1340a). For education Aristotle draws the same conclusions as Plato. The Doric mode, measured and firm, which is in accordance with the manly character, has the advantage (Pol. VIII, 7, 1342b). But Aristotle already makes the distinction between an ethical-pedagogical and an aesthetic relationship to music. For education, the dignified modes are suitable; for mere listening (πρὸς ἀκρόασιν) to what others play, the exciting and intoxicating tonalities come into consideration (Pol. VIII, 7, 1342a).

Nowhere here is the beautiful spoken of in reference to art in the modern sense. Also in the Poetics there is not a single passage in which 'the representation of the beautiful' would be declared as the purpose of the poetic art. (On this see Döring op. cit., pp. 93 ff). The only passage, in the seventh chapter of the Poetics, which employs the concept of the beautiful positively, gives the common Greek conception of the beautiful known to us - it states that whether it is found in a living being or otherwise in a thing consisting of parts, beauty consists in magnitude and order (Τὸ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἔστιν; cf. Rhet. I, 5, 1361). Beautiful, so we can say in general, is that which is in its order. Beautiful is the good, the seemly, the honorable. In a living being we describe the opposite of life as ugly (αἰσχρὸν); in an artistic construct, e.g. in a house, we call it bad (μοχθηρὸν, Top. I, 15, 106 a). How widely the concept of the beautiful is conceived by Aristotle is shown by a passage from the Metaphysics, which states: the beautiful and the good differ in that the former appears only in actions, the latter also in unmoved things. The main characteristics of beauty are: order, commensurateness, and delimitation (τάξις, συμμετρία, τὸ ὀρισμένον), and they are found to an eminent degree in mathematical science (Met. XII, 3, 1078 b). For mathematics has to do (according to Met. V, 1, 1026 a) with that which is unmoved in material things.

Only fragments remain of Aristotle's philosophy of art. (For a complete presentation, above all the 'Problemata' stemming from his school, especially their 19th section, would have to be drawn upon). The significance of his intervention is almost better gathered from tradition than from the extant pronouncements. The later doctrine of rhetorical art and the theory of music have been determined directly or indirectly by Aristotle. It lay in the spirit of his thought, oriented towards the work, to stimulate and influence the cognition of all working and creating. To him the work is a being; to cognize beings is the task of philosophy. It was left to later times to understand what exists as a mere existent. Aristotle sees in that which exists through art a kind of being, not a kind of existent. His philosophy does not attempt to behold the fiery center of life; it knows the shaping force only in relation to that which is shaped by it.

The benefit that Aristotle means in the history of philosophy as a whole is not insignificant precisely in the realm of the aesthetic problem. Never could the phrase about 'Raphael without hands' have been coined, not even in the remotest tradition, by a mind schooled in Aristotle. For his theory of art is based on the great idea of the unity of the creative process. Here there is no 'inner' and no 'outer', but matter, work, and form. The form is not present as something higher which is then 'materialized', but rather the undivided process is envisaged. Without the work in which it is consummated, it would be meaningless. For the construction (of a house), to finally allow Aristotle's favorite example to take effect, 'is in the constructed and happens and is at the same time with the house' (Ὡ γὰρ οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, καὶ ἅμα γίγνεται καὶ ἔστι τῇ οἰκίᾳ. Met. VIII, 8, 1050a; trans. by Rolfes).

II. Rhetoric

The significance that rhetorical tradition has for the history of the aesthetic problem is far too little known and investigated for anything adequate to be presented here. It immediately becomes apparent that Aristotle here, as in the theory of music, takes the lead. By classifying in his *Rhetoric* the kinds of linguistic expression as means of rhetorical influence and dealing with them in context under general points of view, he lays the foundation for an understanding of linguistic utterances from perspectives other than purely grammatical or logical ones. Much more than his *Poetics*, his *Rhetoric* gave his successors the first thoroughgoing example of an analysis of form.

a) *Generā dicendi*

Of particular importance for aesthetics are those distinctions which were handed down in the schools of rhetoric under the names of the different λέξεις, i.e. the ways of linguistic expression. The starting point here are the chapters 2-7 of the third book of Aristotle's '*Rhetoric*'. Aristotle's pupil Theophrast wrote a treatise on the four good ways of expression (ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως) which unfortunately we can no longer reconstruct. We do not know whether Theophrast wanted to understand the styles as norms, or whether, which seems more probable to me, he derived them from the peculiarities of the three greatest Greek prose writers. **[Footnote in the original edition.** Kroll on Cicero's *Orator* (1913) p. 78. In this context, Kroll uses the phrase: 'just as aesthetic criticism always lags behind literary production...'. It is the business neither of poetics nor of rhetoric to set up norms a priori. However, neither of them lags behind anyone, insofar as it makes no sense to say that the one who cognizes lags behind that which is to be cognized]. In any case, the first attempt is made here to theoretically classify the formed according to characteristics. It is the first approach to a doctrine of style rather than a doctrine of the style itself. The praxis of recognizing style is conquered without having the concept of style itself. Without doubt this earliest

cognition of types of formation was only possible on Aristotelian scholarly ground.

For the reconstruction of the *generā dicendī*, Cicero's *Orator* (c. 23 ff, 75-99) is primarily available. Cicero distinguishes three genera: the *tenue* (the plain style), the *medium* (the middle style) and the *grave* or *ornātum* (the high style) (Cf. below p. 57). The perfect orator should master all three kinds. To the objection that there has not yet been such an orator, he replies by referring to Plato that we can have a thing in spirit (*animō*) even if we do not see it (*Or.* c. 29, 101). This phrase shows that Cicero was indeed able to appropriate Platonic pathos, but that he had no idea of what was called cognition in Aristotle's school. It is all the more regrettable that Theophrast's treatise has been lost.

Just as philology, literary criticism in antiquity reached a high level. Hans von Arnim gives us a picture of the enterprise from which rhetorical style criticism emerged (*'Life and Works of Dio of Prusa'*, 1898, pp. 134 ff; pp. 153 ff). In Hellenistic Greece, which was closed off from politics, the glorious past is the only subject of intellectual life. Since there is a lack of content, nothing new can be created. Thus the talent for form directs itself toward the goal of understanding what the ancestors achieved. A special genre consists of speeches praising or criticizing people, animals, objects of nature or art. *Syncrisis* (σὺγκρισις) belongs among the favorite forms of sophistic rhetoric. The point is to find all the praiseworthy qualities of an object and to highlight them in the best light, and then to weigh the advantages of two objects against each other. Plutarch wrote a *Syncrisis* on Aristophanes and Menander, Dion a *Syncrisis* of the three Philoktets. The particular experts on aesthetic criticism are simply called *κριτικοί*.



Figure 10a. Marcus Fabius Quintilian.



Figure 10b. Leon Battista Alberti.



Figure 10c. Albrecht Dürer.

b) Περὶ Ὑψους (On the Sublime).

The ancient masterpiece of style-critical observation, neither more nor less, is the treatise *On the Sublime* (Περὶ Ὑψους), which originated, according to Kaibel's conjecture, at the end of the 1st century AD and has been preserved for the most part. The author of the highly personal work asks what artistic means the effect of the 'high' in poetry and rhetoric is based on. He does not give the best recipes which anyone can follow; his intention is much rather 'to show the gifted pupil the way by which, under certain conditions and through penetrating study, he may attain to the height of ancient models: he is to learn and reflect, immerse and try himself, he is to feel and experience the sublime, he is to understand that only what gushes forth out of his own excited soul has a sublime effect, that only a style identical with the inner man is a justified style' (G. Kaibel, *Hermes*, 1899, p. 117).

Of course, it would be wrong to conclude from the priority given to 'greatness of soul' (μεγαλοψυχία) that the aesthetics of the author consist in simply tracing the grand style back to the great man. Nature is presupposed by him; it goes without saying that a petty, slavish soul cannot express itself greatly. The grand style is an echo of a great soul (ὕψος μεγαλοφροσύνης ἀπήχημα, Section 9). But the subject of the treatise is not soul and nature, but art. Forms are compared and analyzed, not the psychology of the subjective 'nature'. The danger of all subjective-psychological consideration in aesthetic

questions lies in the fact that the problem is suffocated in embryo by the answer 'genius!' - it appears solved before it is even properly posed. The danger of the objective-formal treatment on the other hand lies in the aesthetic problem shifting into the question of a recipe for the production of works of art. However, these two dangers are not of equal rank. The first is deadly; in the second case, on the other hand, a problem still emerges: the question of the limits of the teachability of art. There can be no doubt about the methodological advantage of the objective-formal method. The significance of rhetorical theory for the development of the aesthetic problem is based on this.

The question of the teachability of art belongs to the iron stock of rhetorical theory. It was raised right at the beginning by the author of the treatise '*On the Sublime*'. Is there really any doctrine (τέχνη) of the grand style at all, since many believe that these things can never be traced back to rules? What a great nature has, they say, must be born, not taught (γεννᾶται τὰ μεγαλοφυῆ, καὶ οὐ διδασκὰ παραγίνεται). The works of nature 'degenerate' under the influence of rules. But nature, the author objects with determination, by no means proceeds unmethodically; to be sure, it is always the original principle of coming into being, yet the decision in the individual case is the affair of method, without which even genius is uncertain (Section 2). Such words have double weight when spoken by a man who everywhere demonstrates the liveliest understanding of the nature of genius.**[Footnote in the original edition.** Individual analyses of the author of περὶ ὕψους are still unsurpassed today; such as section 10 (Sappho), section 16 (Demosthenes) and others]. In a brilliant excursus on the relationship between genius and rule, for example, the author says that it is precisely because of their greatness that great minds sometimes stumble, while small ones are always safe from falling (Section 33). Precisely because he knows genius, he considers a doctrine of art, a tradition necessary. He knows that even the greatest genius is not alone in the world. Before the eyes of the living there must always stand the writers and poets of the past as present models, and no one should shy away from asking in each individual case what those would have done here (Section 13). In the spirit of a Greek this process necessarily takes on the form of an agon. Noble Eris directs this struggle: 'Beautiful and worthy of highest fame is this struggle of the world and wreath, in which even falling short of one's predecessors is not without honor' ('*On the Sublime*', Section 13).

For the Greek the great predecessor is present as an individual, to enter into competition with whom is honorable, a conception extraordinarily well suited to keeping the relationship to the past alive. For the Roman, who lacks the conception of competition as a principle of masculine existence, the danger of traditionalism associated with any imitation of formed models becomes acute. When Quintilian speaks of imitatio, it has a different meaning than in the author of the treatise on grand style: the former always has in view

the difference between emulous zeal (ζῆλος) and imitation (μίμησις), while the Latin thinker thinks not so much of human beings (as nature) as of the once minted form, the style. Imitation made Roman literature great; tradition is what it owes the memorability and transmissibility of its great models to. Through the principle of schooling that underlay it from the beginning, Latin literature has become the school of style for peoples. Not by chance does Quintilian's book on the orator contain, alongside the first formulation of the concept of style in art, also the first definition of the relationship between teacher and pupil, the first theory of school pedagogy. If we look for the practical pedagogy of the Greeks, we find it in a work that narrates nothing but the lives of great individuals, in Plutarch's *Parallels*. The agonistic Greek sees the man, the Roman sees the work, and with it at the same time what can be taught and appropriated. To be sure, this Roman esteem for the once minted form can degenerate into pettiness, it can lead to over-schooling; yet a great principle lies in it nevertheless. In any case this esteem provides an extraordinarily favorable ground for the cognition of artistic things. In Greece too, after all, a firm style of life and art could only take shape through doctrine and tradition, only through immanent confrontation within an interconnection of deeds and works.

Under these perspectives, Latin rhetoric gains a special significance: what in the history of the arts takes place as it were subterraneously and silently, the confrontation with the tradition of forms, has for the first time been brought into the light of consciousness by the orators. The great theorist of tradition and style is Quintilian, whose significance for the history of aesthetics as well as for the history of pedagogy can hardly be overestimated.

c) Quintilian

In every respect Quintilian venerates Cicero as his master; in theory, however, he goes far beyond him. In the principle, to be sure: art is a more reliable guide than nature (*ars est dux certiōr quam natūra*; Cicero, '*De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*' IV, 4, 10), he agrees with him. But the concept of artes is redefined by him. Cicero separates the orator's art from science: there is science only of things that are known, the orator's activity is based on mere opinions (Cicero, *De Oratore* II, 7). This echoes Aristotle's separation of a logic of truth from rhetorical logic of probability. Quintilian objects, however, that while the orator only states what is probable, he knows that it is only probable. And besides, the orator also follows a definite method. Like all arts, the art of oratory consists in insight and exercise (*inspectio et exercitatio*). 'An art consists in the fact that he who has learned does it better than he who has not learned' (Quintilian II, 17, 39 and 42). Following this, Quintilian raises the question of which art rhetoric belongs to. In the answer he distinguishes arts that are entirely founded on insight (*inspectio*) without any exercise (*actiō*), like astrology, then those that fulfill themselves in

exercise (πρακτική), like the art of dance, and finally those that attain their goal through the perfection of a work presented before the eyes (ποιητική), like painting. Rhetoric belongs to the second kind, that is, it has its form in agendō (Quintilian II, 18, 1 f).

In this classification, science and art are brought together under one perspective. The distinction between arts of action and arts of work completion seems to go back to Aristoxenus, who is said to have distinguished between musical and apotelestatic arts (music, poetry, dancing - architecture, painting, sculpture) (according to R. Westphal, *‘Die Musik des griechischen Altertums’*, 1883, pp. 12 f). Poetry is to be thought of in conjunction with music and dancing. The principle of the division into arts of movement and arts of rest could be called the opposition of time and space. In the ‘musical’ arts the acting human being himself is the work. Insofar Nietzsche’s distinction between Dionysian and Apollonian art may be recalled here (The Birth of Tragedy 1: ‘Man is no longer an artist; he has become a work of art...’).

Artist, artwork and work are theoretically carefully distinguished by Quintilian (II, 14, 5; X, 1, 1). The work of oratory and the orator is speech (orātiō). However, there is a distinction that applies to all three, and that is style (genus dicendī orātiōnis). Not only in appearance (species) do artes, artifices and opera differ, but also in style, just as Etruscan statues differ from Greek ones, Asian orators from Attic ones (X, 1).

The 10th chapter in the 12th book of the *‘Institutio Oratoria’* is epoch-making in the history of aesthetics because it contains a much-read concrete doctrine of style (something similar was given by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Demetrius Phalereus). The extraordinary sentence with which Quintilian introduces his exposition looks forward to Montesquieu and Winckelmann: ‘All these styles of which I speak have their own lovers as well as their own originators, and therefore there is still no perfect orator and perhaps no perfect art either, not only because one thing is more prominent here and another there, but also because one and the same form has not pleased everyone, partly because of differences in temporal and local conditions, partly because everyone has his own taste and bent’ (Suōs autem haec operum generā, quae dīcō, ut auctōrēs sīc etiam amatōrēs habent; atque ideō nondum est perfectus orātor ac nesciō an ars ulla, non solum quia aliud in aliō magis ēminent, sed quod non ūna omnibus formā placuit, partim condiōne vel temporum vel locōrum, partim iūdicīō cūiusque atque propositō. XII, 10, 2 f).

The concept of taste is fully developed within the framework of rhetorical schooling already in Cicero’s time. ‘Things of art and science are judged correctly or incorrectly by all through a hidden sense without any artistic or scientific method’ (Omnēs enim tacitō quōdam sensū sine ullā arte

aut ratiōne, quae sint in artibus ac ratiōnibus rectā ac pravā diiūdicant, Cicero, *De Oratore* III, 50). Quintilian speaks of the feeling of a certain faculty of judgment (about the witty) that is akin to the palate (...quod sentitur latentī iūdicīō, velut palātō... VI, 3, 19). In antiquity, however, one does not proceed to a doctrine of feeling or aesthetic judgment but remains within the sphere of the formed. Not a theory of taste, but a doctrine of style is the theoretical expression of the discovery of ‘taste’.

In Chapter 10 of Book 12 Quintilian first speaks of paintings, then of statues. The overview he gives of the traditional artistic judgments of antiquity is of the greatest historical importance (XII, 10, 7 ff). After Quintilian has judged the species, that is, the individual modes of expression of a number of orators, and has spoken of the Attic, Asianic and Rhodian styles, he repeats the doctrine of the three kinds of poetry and rhetoric (XII, 10, 58 ff). The grand style (ᾀδρὸν, grande atque robustum) is meant to move and shake, the simple style (λεπτὸν, subtile) to report and instruct, while the third, intermediate style (medium, σφριγῶν, floridum) is to appease and delight the audience. Gravitas corresponds to the grand style, acumen to the simple style, lēnitas to the intermediate style.

What the rhetorical doctrine of style lacks is precisely that by which it could first become a historical-critical means of cognition: consideration of time. Quintilian recognizes the importance of innate nature but has no idea of the importance of time. In this respect he remains stuck at the rough distinction between earlier and later in the sense of crude and refined. The sense is there for individual differences of style, not for styles of time. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the art of distinction evidenced here. The genera dīcendī are styles, which is: not metaphysical entities, but human-historical modes of comportment. The general technique of linguistic expression is particularized by the distinction of style; but thereby an approximation to the phenomena of history becomes possible.

Literature: W. Kroll, *M. Tullii Ciceronis Orator*. 1913. H. Rabe, *De Theophrasti libris περὶ λέξεως*. 1890. J. Stroux, *De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi*. 1912. *Περὶ vxpovc*: Übersetzung von H. F. Müller (*Die Schrift über das Erhabene* 1911).




Figure 11a. Leonardo da Vinci.



Figure 11b. Giorgio Vasari.



Figure 11c. Federico Zuccaro.

III. Theory of Art.

a) Polycletus. Aristoxenus.

If art in the narrower sense belongs to art in general (τέχνη), then it follows of itself that theory is not foreign to it. The kind of ‘insight’ corresponding to art in the narrower sense was not further determined in antiquity or later. A theory of art in the modern sense, i.e. a theory that takes art as its object, was unknown to the ancients. But quite early they attempted to grasp the measured content of a work of art in theoretical form. Music and architecture seem to have been the first arts for which there was a ‘doctrine’. The height of musical theory in Aristoxenus suggests a long preceding tradition. Among the temple builders it seems to have been a very early custom for each to theoretically, and that means probably mainly according to measurements, describe his temple (H. Brunn, *Gesch. d. Griech. Künstler II.*, pp. 342ff; cf. Otto Stein, ‘*Die Architekturtheoretiker der it. Renaiss.*’, 1914, pp. 4f). For poetry the situation was quite different: the prevailing notion of the aid of the Muses and the influence of the god (μῆνις) did not permit theory and norm. We who are accustomed to speaking of ‘the’ art and ‘the’ artist can now hardly imagine any more that for the ancients there was no uniform ‘art’ encompassing poetry, architecture, painting and music. The ancients did not

think subjectively from the experience of 'the' artist, but objectively from the work and its origin. For them, the poetic art had no connection with the other arts, for what would the painter have had to do with Apollo and the Muses? Yes, the unaesthetic realism went so far that bronze sculpture was strictly separated from working marble. There is no 'sculpture', there are only men who can work both bronze and marble. This objective, work-related mode of contemplation runs through all of antiquity.

The first theoretical treatise on art of which at least the name is still preserved derives from a bronze founder. Polyclitus' 'Canon' was a treatise on the proportions of the human figure. In the third book of Vitruvius' work on architecture, a part of it is probably preserved for us. Amazing, almost incomprehensible, with what triumph this meager fragment of ancient aesthetic of measure shines through the centuries. For the Renaissance artists, the few sentences of Vitruvius appeared as the embodiment of the τέχνη of antiquity.

The greatest music theorist of antiquity, Aristoxenus of Tarentum, emerged from the school of Aristotle. Two moments are to be distinguished in his doctrine: the general musical theory and the doctrine of the three styles of melody-making (τρόποι μελοποιίας). Traces of the doctrine of the three styles are already found in Plato, and a member of the Academy, Heraclides Ponticus, also wrote on music. But it was only on the basis laid by Aristotle of a division of modes (ἁρμονίαι ἠθικαί, πρακτικαί and ἐνθουσιαστικαί; Politics VIII, 7, 1341 b) that stylistic characterization could be systematically carried through. The three styles are: the diastaltic trope, which corresponds to tragedy (heroic); the systaltic trope, characterized by love feelings and lament; and between them stands the hesychastic trope as the symbol of equilibrium of soul. Choral lyric and epic correspond to it (H. Abert, *Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griech.* Musik, 1899, pp. 66 ff).

b) Judgment. "Ἐκφρᾶσις.

Since anything but an aesthetic attitude in the modern sense can be attributed to the Greek, nothing is more astonishing than the fact that so many works of art were created among them. This presupposes a high esteem for art, without, however, finding anything in the transmitted views on art corresponding to this practice. A history of the esteem of art in antiquity would be highly desirable. The first task would have to be to investigate, on a broad basis of monuments, the relationship of art to myth. Then the aesthetics of the artists would have to be elucidated; and finally Greek popular aesthetics would also have to be ascertained. Without recourse to 'that great fundamental force of all Greek life, agon', which appears here as the rivalry between cities, in order to obtain an equally perfect structure as is already present elsewhere (Jacob Burckhardt in his lecture on the Greeks and Their Artists; Lectures, 4th ed., 1919, p. 166), the phenomenon of Greek art will

never be explained.

The first thing that strikes us today is the different valuation of the individual arts. According to Aristotle, the technically most perfect works (τεχνικώτατα) are those in whose production chance has had the least influence; the most banal those whose production entails detriment to the body (Politics I, 4, 1259). Already the juxtaposition of these two viewpoints is striking. The contempt for bodily labor has its deeper reason, it is not in turn to be 'aesthetically' explained. Above all the sculptors are affected by this contempt, while the painters seem to have been ranked higher from the beginning (this valuation survived into the Renaissance and still stands in the background of the *paragone literature*, i.e. that debate carried to exhaustion over whether painting or sculpture deserves precedence). To me, the contempt for the sculptor, above all the sculptor in metal, in comparison with the painter seems sufficiently justified by the 'keeping away from the fiery furnace', by the latter's more aristocratic technique. One should not think only of the deformation of the body associated with the hard work but must understand this itself again symbolically. Sculpture in bronze belongs to the Nibelung craft of the pre-Indo-Germanic Mediterranean peoples. The conquering race breaking into the Aegean region from the north found a high technical civilization, which it appropriated to be sure, but to which it did not subordinate itself spiritually. The martial values brought along remained intact to the end: contempt for physical labor and acquisition. The higher esteem of the painter is understandable if one assumes that his art was regarded as native and imported. In fact, painting could be viewed as a daughter of drawing. *According to Burckhardt's happy remark, anecdotes about painters, but not about sculptors were recounted.* Presumably because painters were counted as belonging to good society, whereas it was assumed about a sculptor that he stemmed from the pre-Indo-Germanic population which, though not annihilated by the conquerors, was nevertheless despised by them. Artistic skill thus coincided with 'ugliness', i.e. inferiority in relation to race. Bronze sculpture is here only an example for the civilized artistic skills in general. *This finds expression in the mythical figure Hephaistos: the master of all arts is ugly and serves the gods for laughter, but he is yet included among the gods with genuine Hellenic sense of justice.*

The agonistic style of the Greeks' lives seems to have had an influence on their artistic judgment. The question of 'who was the 'best' in an art form' was self-evident to them. In the conversation that Socrates has with Aristodemos in Xenophon, the following artists are ranked highest because of their 'wisdom' (σοφία): for his epic poetry, says Aristodemos, I admire Homer the most; for his dithyrambs, Melanippides; for his tragedies, Sophocles; for sculpture, Polyclitus; and for painting, Zeuxis (Mem. I, 4, 3).

However, one should be careful not to read our modern judgments

about art into such statements. With true Hellenic nonchalance, Plutarch brings out the enduring Greek view of artistry even in late antiquity. No well-endowed youth, he says at the beginning of the *Life of Pericles*, has ever, upon seeing the Zeus of Pheidias or the Hera of Polyclitus, therefore wanted to become a Pheidias or Polyclitus. Indeed, in this context Plutarch also names the poets Philetas, Anacreon and Archilochus, but (according to Burckhardt's remark) no tragedian. If a work gives us joy through its beauty, the creator does not necessarily deserve respect; often enough it happens that we admire a work and despise its master (*Pericles* c. I, 2). Almost the same phrase about Pheidias and Polyclitus is found in Lucian's little piece 'The Dream', which allows us to look more deeply into the judgmental attitudes of ancient people than any other testimony.

In addition to the art-theoretical writings of the kind of Polyclitus's 'Canon' and Aristoxenus's teachings on music or the literature of grammarians, rhetoricians and critics, there are also writings of a different kind about art from the Hellenistic period. These include Plutarch's essay on the question of how young men should read the poets. It says that very different things can be gleaned from the works of poets, just as bees, goats, pigs and other animals variously pursue the flowers, stalks, roots, seeds or fruits in the meadows. Some leave out nothing regarding the myth, others pay particular attention to what is new, yet others focus solely on the beauty of expression. And finally, there are those who read in order to strengthen their own rectitude (*de aud. poet.* c. 11). The latter ethical-pedagogical view can probably be regarded as the one held in highest esteem. It corresponds to the Greek's naive, content-focused perception. In the same work by Plutarch there is the characteristic anecdote: when Timotheus brings an Artemis on stage who rages like a maenad, someone shouts to him: That's the kind of daughter you should have!

Focused entirely on content is the literature of those art connoisseurs and lovers who have left us descriptions (ἐκφράσεις) of works of visual art. We have from the two Philostrati descriptions of (real) paintings that still enchanted Goethe. Kallistratos applied the procedure to statues as well. Here it is a matter neither of art criticism in general, nor of stylistic criticism. Rather, in *ekphrasis* the interest in the formal does not refer to the object, but to the rhetorical form of the description itself. So this is about transferring from one art form to another. A good example of this kind is found in Lucian's writing 'Zeuxis'.

c) Vitruvius

Alongside Quintilian's system for teaching the art of rhetoric stands, as the only completely (at least decently) preserved work from antiquity on art, the book by Vitruvius. The Roman undoubtedly had an extensive Greek technical literature, now lost, in front of him. The universal character of his

theory, which is expressed in six fundamental concepts, is based on the fact that the overarching concept is not art as a human-historical phenomenon, but beauty. The concepts of rhetoric relate to a world of historical forms, and lead to the classification of such forms. Vitruvius's concepts, on the other hand, originate from a sphere in which man appears not as a personally willing and shaping entity, but merely as a natural being, bound to the harmony of the universe. Hence the strictness of Vitruvian measurements: they are originally of a sacred nature. The temple is not a product of individual humans or peoples, but an image of eternal order. Just as the concepts of rhetoric have an original affinity with the historical world so Vitruvius's concepts of measurement are originally and essentially hostile to history.

Art theory proceeds from the given nature, beauty theory from the inventive human. We recognize what methodological consequences this has from Vitruvius's approach to the problem of style. In the phenomenon of the three temple orders he had before him a historical material that could well have invited the discovery of the concept of style. Within rhetoric the concept of style had found a fixed place; in architectural theory it found no place. Vitruvius's division is twofold, not three- (or five-) fold, as Walter rightly noted (*Gesch. d. Asth. i. Alt.*, p. 807). Vitruvius contrasts the strict form of the Doric temple with the more delicate, slender and ornate forms of the Ionic and Corinthian orders. In contrast to this bipartition, the expected tripartition does not emerge. But if, despite the historical diversity, Vitruvius holds fast to the division into two, this has its profound meaning. Bound up with the doctrine of the world order is the distinction between a masculine and a feminine potency. By starting from the cosmic potencies of the masculine and the feminine, Vitruvius does not characterize a historically present style as masculine or feminine, otherwise nothing could have prevented him from also finding a designation for the third of the existing styles but constructs the essence of the three orders according to the measure of the world order. There is a way of building that corresponds to the man, and a way of building that corresponds to the woman, an architecture of dignity and an architecture of grace. Already Plato distinguishes two kinds of beauty corresponding to the male and female character (above p. 13). Cicero once cites this distinction as a generally known and familiar one: 'There are, however, two kinds of beauty, in one we find charm, in the other dignity; we must regard charm as feminine and dignity as masculine' (*Cum autem pulchritudinis duō generā sint, quōrum in alterō venustās sit, in alterō dignitās: venustātem muliebrēm dūcere dēbēmus, dignitātem vīrilem, de off. I, c. 36*).

In the third book of *De Oratore*, Cicero admires the combination of utility on the one hand and grace and dignity on the other in the works of nature. The constitution of the world, he says, is so arranged for the security and salvation of all, that the sky is round, the earth lies in the middle, the sun keeps its course, approaches the winter sign in order then to rise again on the

other side, etc. Not the slightest change in this order is possible without everything falling apart. Every living being, every tree, but also every artistic creation such as a ship shows the same combination of purpose and beauty. We recognize it best in the temple. 'The columns support the structure of the temple and the hall, and yet their usefulness is no greater than their dignity. The familiar gable of the Capitol and the other temples was brought forth not by grace, but by necessity. For in considering how rainwater could drain off on both sides, the purpose of the house was combined with the dignity of the gable. And if the temple stood in the sky where there is no rain, it would lack the dignity peculiar to it without the gable' (De Oratore III; 46, 180).

This is not rhetorical exaggeration, but genuine Pythagorean Platonism. There is no difference between functionality and beauty, in the essence of things both are one. The dimensions of the temple are grounded in the heavens; the temple is beautiful because its dimensions are an image of the absolute dimensions. Hence the strictness of the norm. Natural growths and artificial structures are equated with this order and beauty. They exist only insofar as they participate in this beauty or imitate it.

Walter aptly points out that Vitruvius does not think of historically deriving the Greek architectural styles from the relationship between support and load, but rather has only the 'law of forms' in mind, and his conception is intuitively mathematical, not dynamically practical (Gesch. d. Ästh., p. 801; 803). However, this is neither arbitrariness nor narrow-mindedness of an individual, but the consequence of the basic ancient conception of architecture.

Six categories are listed by Vitruvius: *ordinatio* (τάξις), *dispositiō*, *eurhythmia*, *symmetria*, *decor*, *distributio*. *Prōportiō* (belonging to the definition of *ordinatio*) is the correct measurement of the individual parts of a building based on a unit of measurement chosen from one of the building's own members. In the case of the temple, the unit of measurement is taken from the ground plan (the front width). The correct measurement of each part and the overall form of a work based on the chosen unit of measurement (*modulus*, *rata pars*) is called *prōportiō* (ἀναλογία) (According to Jolles, Vitruvs Ästh. 1906. Pp. 9 ff).

The concepts of *symmetria* and *eurhythmia* are the aesthetically decisive ones: *Symmetria* is the content-determined *prōportiō*, i.e. a dimensional ratio of a specific character. *Symmetria* arises from *proportio*; not every *prōportiō*, however, leads to *symmetria*, but rather, as Jolles puts it, the *prōportiō* must be 'worked out' into *symmetria*. The definition of *symmetria* is: 'Symmetria is the harmony arising from the building's own members, i.e. on the basis of the *modulus* (*rata pars*) there should be a resposion between the individual parts and the overall appearance' (Item *symmetrīa* est ex ipsius operis membrīs conveniēns consensus ex partibusque separātis ad ūniversae

figūrae speciēm ratae partis responsus) (Vitruvius, de arch. ed. Rose, p. 12).

Decisive about this definition is that it determines the relationship between the individual parts and the overall appearance as consensus (harmony). The question still remains to be answered as to which dimensional ratios make correctly calculated proportions beautiful, or which dimensional ratios allow the 'harmony' to emerge from itself. Such ratios can be expressed in numbers. The beauty of a building thus depends on suitable numbers. These numbers are taken from the proportions of the human limbs. Nature has constructed the human body according to certain proportions; temples for the gods must be erected accordingly. 'If nature has thus composed the human body so that its limbs correspond in their dimensional ratios to the overall form, the ancients seem to have been right in also observing an exact proportional relationship between the individual members and the appearance of the whole (universa figurae species) in the execution of buildings' (ibid. p. 66). One measures by finger width and hand breadth, by foot and ell. But these dimensions are distributed across a 'perfect number' (τέλειος, nūmerus perfēctus). The name Plato does not appear by chance at this point: Vitruvius is in the midst of Pythagorean-Platonic number speculation.

Earlier research either ignored such passages or misinterpreted them, dismissing them simply as 'mysticism'. Thus Jolles speaks of Vitruvius's 'number aesthetics', giving the impression that these are formal games, while what emerges here is a metaphysics in which a specific view of the universe and of man and of their relationship to each other is formulated in numbers (Plato, Tim. 31 f). Vitruvius's teaching must not be detached from its mythical background; the mythical was as self-evident to his time as the aesthetic is to us today. **[Footnote in the original edition.** The myth appears everywhere in Vitruvius with complete ingenuousness. Characteristic is the charming story of the origin of the Doric temple order, which is said to have existed first. The oldest temple in the city of Argos, which Dōrus built for Hērā, happened to have this form. After colonies had been founded in Asia Minor on the command of the Delphian Apóllōn and the Carians and Leleges had been driven out, temples were built there, first indeed for the paniōnian Apóllōn. When they wanted to set up the columns but had no symmetriae for them, they measured the imprint of a male foot and applied this to the height of the man. They found that the foot amounts to one sixth of the male height. 'Thus the Doric column has since then represented the proportions, strength and beauty of the male body in a building' (Ītā Dōricā columna vīrilis corpōris proportiōnem et firmitātem et venustātem in aedificiīs praestāre coepit). For the Ionic column, the proportion of a woman's foot to the height of the female figure was taken. It was found that this proportion was 1:8 (De arch. p. 84 ff)].

Not a formal aesthetics, but a content aesthetics is hidden in

Vitruvius's categories. The beautiful proportions are not devised by an artist and are therefore not subject to changing tastes. They are the sacred, eternal lawfulness of nature, of the very 'structure' of the world, and forth a treason they are beautiful. Vitruvius's theory of beauty is by no means limited to architecture or even to art in general. Everything well-ordered is beautiful, whether it be the universe, the state, the human body, the household, a tragedy or a statue (cf. Jolles, p. 99). The work of art has a special status only insofar as it is designed for the human eye or ear. Here a new lawfulness comes into play which, in contrast to the cosmic one, could be called the optical and auditory. The concept of *eurhythmia* refers to this. 'Eurhythmia is the beautiful appearance, i.e. in their composition the limbs should present a view that is correct in its dimensions' (*Eurhythmia est venustā speciēs commodusque in compositiōnibus membrōrum aspectus. De arch. p. 12*).

Symmetria refers to beauty itself, *eurhythmia* to beauty for our eye. That *symmetria* is perceived is in itself irrelevant; since it is based on numbers, it can also be heard or recognized in some other way. For the artist, of course, it is not a matter of indifference that the works of architecture present themselves to the eye. The question arises for him whether and to what extent he should accommodate the needs of the eye. Here two directions are possible. One rejects working *eurhythmically*. This is how the Egyptians and the earlier Greek artists worked strictly symmetrically (Jolles, p. 100). Diodorus relates (I, 98) of a statue whose one half was worked on Samos and whose other half was worked in Ephesus; when the parts were joined together they matched so well that it was as if the whole statue had been fashioned by a single person (Jolles, p. 91). The canonical style, which disregards any consideration for the subjective view, could not be better characterized than by this story. The other direction is not canonical but *mimetic*, i.e. here the beautiful proportions are not represented as they are in themselves, but attempts are made to 'imitate' those proportions that are beautiful to our eye. For example, if the height of the columns were calculated symmetrically correct, the view would still fall into the realm of the ugly, because the human eye does not always perceive the correctly calculated and intrinsically beautiful as such. In places where the eye deceives, the symmetry must be softened ('tempered') until the impression of symmetry also arises (Jolles, p. 28). That in which the eye deceives itself must be compensated for by calculation, says Vitruvius (*Ergō quod oculus fallit, ratiōcinātiōne est exaequandum. De arch. p. 74*). 'For the eye demands beauty, and if its pleasure is not flattered by proportion and additions to the units of measurement, so that what is lacking is intensified by tempering, the beholder will be presented with an empty and unbeautiful sight' (*Venustātem enim persequitur vīsus, cūius sī nōn blandīmur voluptātī prōportiōne et modulōrum adiēctiōnibus, utī quod fallit temperātiōne adaugeātur, vastus et invenustus conspicientibus remittētur aspectus. ib. p. 75*).

This consideration for the laws of the eye seems self-evident to us today, but it was not to antiquity. For the ancients there is an enormous difference between *symmetria* and *eurhythmia*. In our language we would have to say: *symmetria* (συμμετρία) expresses eternal lawfulness, *eurhythmia* (εὐρυθμία) merely imitates what is desired in a particular place in the work of art by virtue of the subjective lawfulness of our visual organ. The modifications of *symmetria* conditioned by this, too, of course seek nothing other than to assert *symmetria* itself. But for ancient thinking in its strictness, this is already too much. Only what is constructed according to the laws of *symmetria* is true; everything else is an illusion similar to the truth. Greek art ultimately took the path of *eurhythmia*; Plato decidedly took the side of the older ‘symmetrical’ art.

Literature. J. Overbeck, *Die antiken Schriftquellen zur Geschichte der bildenden Künste bei den Griechen*. 1868. C. Robert, *Die Kunsturteile des Plinius*. In: *Philologische Märchen*. 1886. S. 28- 82. A. Kalkmann, *Die Quellen der Kunstgeschichte des Plinius*. 1898. Th. Birt, *Laienurteil über bildende Kunst bei den Alten* 1902. J. A. Jolles, *Vitruvs Ästhetik*. 1906. Die übrige Literatur siehe oben S. 17.



Figure 12a. Julius Caesar Scaliger.




Figure 12b. Vitruvius.



Figure 12c. Polycletus' Doryphoros.



Figure 12d. Aristoxenus.

IV. Middle Ages and Renaissance.

a) Middle Ages.

The notion of art as it had developed in Hellenism is completely alien to the Middle Ages. An independent reflection on art in the narrower sense, even in the simplest form, does not occur among the Scholastics. While the notion of artistic creation has not been unknown since Plotinus, it does not have the power in itself to make the aesthetic problem visible. If occasionally God's creation is compared to that of an artist, it is done not to pay art an honor, but rather 'in order thereby to facilitate the understanding of the nature and working of the divine spirit, or, in rarer cases, to make possible the solution of other theological questions' (Panofsky, *Idea*, p. 20). Thomas Aquinas occasionally speaks of the architect who conceives in his mind beforehand the form of the house, which is as if it were the idea of the house to be realized in matter (cf. Panofsky, p. 85). But this is always just a passing on of Aristotelian goods. The problem of art in the narrower sense, which had already received scant attention in Aristotle, did not exist for a time which moreover still lacked access to the master's *Poetics*.

In the Middle Ages, the artifex is the originator of every 'artificial'

work, who conceives the form of the work beforehand in his mind. *The artist is not creator but realizer of an idea, craftsman.* Artistic life and artistic practice fully correspond to this view: the artist does not appear as an individual but as a member of a corporation that possesses both the art theory and the right to practice art. It would be wrong to regard this form of artistic life as 'primitive'; it is as fully valid as any other, as proven by the works. Coming from the Mediterranean context, what first strikes one is the absence of written-down theory. A canon like that of Polyclitus or a literature like that which Vitruvius drew from is unthinkable here. This is not a deficiency but the natural consequence of the corporate principle of the Germanic peoples: in place of theory stands the tradition of lodges and masters; the closed workshop, the master-journeyman relationship (which of course also exists in the South) achieves everything here without exception. This artisanal mode is possible only with an art that is wholly in the service of others, which is wholly dependent on the client. But still even in Dürer's day the artist concludes a contract with the commissioner just like an artisan.

The lack of any art theory becomes quite clear when one considers the artes. Following ancient tradition, one distinguishes the *artes liberales* from the *artes mechanicae*. The former include grammar (literature), rhetoric, dialectic (philosophy), arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music theory; the latter include weaving, armor making, navigation, agriculture, hunting, medicine, theater arts. The liberal arts are purely theoretical in nature, only they are worthy of the free man after whom they are named. The mechanical arts are purely practical without a theoretical basis. In the place of theory there is the artisanal tradition. An exception is medicine: its basis lies in physics, hence the name *physicus* for the doctor (Schlosser, '*Kunsttheorie*' S. 66). The seven liberal arts were compared to the seven planets, the mechanical arts were held in little esteem. They are referred to as 'illegitimately born' by theology. Their name is derived, in a truly medieval etymology, from *moecha* (adulteress) (Borinski I, p. 89). The dominant idea here is that of the unconditional superiority of nature as God's first creation over all the artificial arrangements of man. 'Only nature really creates. Man is dependent on artificially (*mechanicē*) imitating nature in his work. His work is therefore spurious, 'unreal': *adulterinum*'. Borinski sees in this a peculiar combination of Aristotle's dictum that art imitates nature as far as possible for it with the notion of Adam's curse.

What we today call the arts finds a place neither among the *artes liberales* nor among the *artes mechanicae*. In the 'stone encyclopedia' on the Campanile in Florence they appear once in the entourage of the *mechanicae* (Schlosser p. 66). But philosophically, their position remains entirely undetermined. It is the achievement of the following centuries, in accordance with the change in style, to give them a position in the intellectual world of man. Viewed purely intellectually, 'nothing would have been more obvious'

than to assign the arts a place among the *artes liberales* where the art of rhetoric maintained itself undisputed. But the power of tradition and the profoundly justified view of the artisanal nature of the artist prove stronger. By virtue of the theoretical character of his 'art', the humanist, the poet-philologist and elegant speaker enjoys high honors in the later Middle Ages. After all, already in antiquity poetry was considered nobler than all the other arts. Only after the visual artist in the Renaissance had entered into a relationship with theory did an equation between poet and painter, sculptor and architect become possible. It is not the idea of the artist's creative power that sets the process in motion, but rather the idea that the artist's activity has something to do with the *artes liberales*.

b) Dante.

As the enigmatic figure of Plato guards the threshold of ancient aesthetics, so Dante's closed spirit guards the threshold of modern aesthetics. In one place in the '*Divine Comedy*' a metal counterfeiter is referred to as a 'good ape of nature' (Inf. XXIX, 139). This echoes the medieval view of the artist as a mere imitator of nature, as a maker of 'spurious' works. Nature, we read in Canto XI of the *Inferno* (99 ff), has its origin in the divine intellect and in divine art (dall'divino intellètto e da sua àrte), while art by contrast is only as it were a grandchild of God (a Dìo quàsi e nipòte). That nature is far above all art, that she is firstborn, goes without saying for the theologian Dante. In Purgatory, Polyclitus's marble is given as an example of art overcome by nature (X, 32 f).

It sounds quite different when Dante compares the sometimes distracted path of the creature to the highest light with the artistic will to form (*intenzion del' arte*): just as the soul reaches it, so does this will of the 'deaf' matter not always achieve the goal of form (Parad. I, 127 ff). The philosophical content of the simile points to Dante's Aristotelian-Thomist concept of the world and the heavens; the way in which the artist emerges here, however, makes us prick up our ears. The real Dante shines through at such moments, the self-confident artist, the shaping spirit. What Dante teaches is the Middle Ages; he himself is no longer the Middle Ages. He is the first person who speaks our language. The Ghibelline, the passionate patriot, the great loner amidst the communal world of the Middle Ages, he, and not Petrarch, the melancholy poet, is the first 'modern man'. The lyricist and orator Petrarch is very proud of what he writes, but for him this means that he has succeeded in recalling the Muses from exile. It is highly characteristic of the self-confident yet at the same time so temporally bound manner of this man, how he explains the non-occurrence of poetry among the *artes liberales*: it is above all of them and encompasses them all (Borinski I, p. 119). Dante does not have these worries; he feels himself to be an artistic creator. His new human form of existence is expressed completely in his relationship to the

work. He is the embodied concept of a new style; his artistic consciousness manifests itself as a consciousness of style. No ancient, no medieval artist is equal to him in this regard. This is no longer the humble craftsman of the Middle Ages without a name, who recedes behind his work. With the pride of a man who has glimpsed the unseen and articulated it in words, Dante steps before his people and posterity. What an un-medieval sound strikes our ears when we hear the poet say to Virgil in the Inferno (I, 86 f):

Tu se' solo colui, da cui io tolsi
Lo bello stile, che m'ha fatto onore.

To gain fame through art, through style, which is not thought of in Christian terms. A new attitude to life finds expression here: 'to attain the eternal in a worldly way' (Borinski I, p. 103). We may deduce this from the words that Dante addresses in the depths of hell (XV, 84 f) to his former teacher, the rhetor Brunetto Latini.

M'insegnavate come l'uom s'eterna

The poet who creates for posterity, who produces an eternal work, makes himself an eternal figure. The power of even the mightiest earthly imagination fails to depict the light of the highest love (Parad. XXXIII, 142), so speaks the Dante who immortalizes the content of Christian Middle Ages in his poem. This content would correspond to a work without a name. But in producing this work, as an active human being, as the creator of a new style that will be an object of admiration for all posterity, he emerges as an individual. Invisible above his work stands: I dared it! Petrarch, the educated man, is proud of his 'style of writing'; Dante, the artist, creates his work by imperiously impressing his style on the subject matter of the present.

c) Alberti.

Two events determine the fate of aesthetics in the era of the Renaissance and the Baroque. One is the rediscovery of Vitruvius in the second decade of the 15th century, the other is the text reconstruction of Aristotle's Poetics (Pazzi's Latin translation, 1536). Alberti draws his work on architecture (also in 10 books, first printed in 1485) from Vitruvius' work; Aristotle, on the other hand, becomes the legislator of poetic theory through J. C. Scaliger (1561). Lessing's struggle against French tragedy is at the same time a struggle against Scaliger's Aristotelianism.

The difference between Vitruvius' and Alberti's theory corresponds to the difference between ancient art and the art of the Renaissance. The background of Vitruvius' book is formed by myth and Pythagorean-Platonic metaphysics. Thus ancient art also frees itself with its magnificent definiteness of form from the background of myth. Alberti's book is without background.

It is as simple, present and clear as the Italian architecture of the period, which has taught us to see the building as a cube with a facade. Although it has a specific style, the temple is at the same time an organism with the unfathomability of the living. Alberti's building is no longer all-round and unfathomable, it is a showpiece turned towards the viewer, as a whole it is 'facade'.

It will be no coincidence that in the very country that witnessed Dante's imperious artistry, the foundation for modern art theory is laid. What strikes every viewer coming from the Hellenistic and medieval theories of beauty as if by a stroke is the self-confidently bold realism with which Alberti places the activity of the artist at the center of the theory. One sometimes hears the opinion expressed that the modern concept of the artist originates from the Renaissance. This is an error: the Renaissance did indeed place the artifex as a type alongside the poet, the scholar, the statesman; but this artifex is much more an engineer than an artist in our sense. According to Alberti, the art of the painter and architect is based on science, namely mathematics. This constitutes the break with the Middle Ages: the artist is no longer a craftsman who draws from the workshop tradition and the practical experience of a master, but an independent entrepreneur guided by his own intellect and scientific theory. 'The hand of the workman serves the architect only as a tool' (Alberti's preface to his work on architecture).

Through this (humanistic) foundation in science comes that sharply rational trait in Alberti's theory which makes it historically something absolutely new.

In his treatise on painting (1435) Alberti develops the doctrine of the visual pyramid. The definition of painting reads: 'Painting will therefore be nothing other than the artificial representation on a surface by means of lines and colors of a cross-section of the visual pyramid according to a certain distance, a certain viewpoint and a certain lighting' (L.B. Alberti's shorter art-theoretical writings, translated by H. Janitschek, 1877, p. 68 ff). What is overwhelmingly new about this explanation is the methodical attitude from which it arises. No longer the object, no longer beauty, no longer the general concept of artificial production as such is the starting point, but the specific process of painting itself. Soberly and factually Alberti describes the technique of painting, not its craft elements, but its essence. This is about something quite different from a canon in the sense of ancient aesthetics. The 'rule' does not refer to given proportions, but to an action guided and controlled by consciousness.

The work of visual artists is generally defined by Alberti as follows: they bring out images from bodies created by nature into the work they produce (*Artēs eōrum, quī ex corpōribus ā nātūrā procreātīs effīgiēs et simulācra suā in opus promere aggrediuntur...*). This is done by removing or

adding something to any given material. When working in wax or clay, the work is accomplished both by adding and taking away; others only take away, like stone sculptors. Painters, on the other hand, have their own technique (*propriō artificiō ēnituntur*, ib. p. 171). In this context, Alberti gives the description of the marble sculptor's procedure that has become classic: by cutting away the superfluous, he brings out the human figure, present and hidden inside the block, into the light (*Alī solum detrahentēs velutī quī superflua discutiendō quaesitam hominīs figūrā intra marmoris glebam inditam atque absconditam prōdūcunt in lūcem*).

The definition of the architect as a planner moving loads and joining bodies (On Architecture, preface) has the same sober precision. Up to Alberti, art theory and theory of beauty go hand in hand. Attempts are certainly made to incorporate the artist who beholds beauty into the system of the metaphysics of the beautiful (Plotinus). In doing so, however, he loses his independence, since here art as such is not granted any independence. Alberti is the first who, since for him the independence of artistic activity is a prerequisite, is able to combine the concept of beauty with that of art without a destructive effect. His historical significance is based on this. Alberti finds himself somehow opposite Plotinus, with the telling difference that the latter stands at the end, the former at the beginning of a long period of development.

The process must not be imagined in such a way that Alberti simply adopted the old concept of beauty. Between the Middle Ages and the Quattrocento lies the conquest of 'reality' by art. When Alberti speaks of beauty, he no longer has the highest beauty in mind, which is one with the lovable and the good, but he thinks of the beauty of appearances. He is a naturalist; just as Quattrocento art is naturalistic compared to medieval art. The painter he describes is a keen observer of nature (Janitschek, p. 149 f). Those who rely on their inventive spirit (*ingégno*) without having a model in nature which they follow closely with their eyes or intellect (*Sènza avèr essèmpio alcūno dālla natūra, quale con òcchi o mēnte sèguano*) never learn to paint correctly, but only get used to their errors. 'That idea of beauties, which scarcely even the most experienced are able to recognize, flees from unexperienced minds' (*Fuggiè gl'ingégni non periti quell'idèa delle bellèzze, quale i ben esercitatissimi appèna discèrnono*. Janitschek, p. 151).

In two passages of his work on architecture, Alberti defines beauty. In the second chapter of Book Six it says: Beauty is a certain harmoniousness with calculation of all parts in the whole to which they belong, such that nothing can be added, removed or altered without it becoming less commendable. (*. . . ut sit pulchritūdō quidem certa cum ratiōne concīnnitāsūniversārum partium in eō cūjus sint: ita ut addī aut dēminuī aut immūtārī possit nihil, quin imprōbābilius reddātur*) [**Footnote in the original edition:** I have rendered *concīnnitās* as 'symmetry'. Alberti does not use the

Greek word: apparently out of aversion to the Greeks. He prefers the word *concīnnitās*, which is closer to him through the Roman-rhetorical tradition (Cicero)]. Of the principles (*praecēpta*) of beauty and ornament it is said that they are borrowed from philosophy and adapted to the particular nature of the art in question (Book Six, Chapter Three, end).

Alberti gives the detailed exposition of his theory of beauty in Chapter Five of Book Nine of architecture. Symmetry (*concīnnitās*) arises through the combination of *numerus*, *fīnitiō* and *collōcātiō*. Alberti now strikes up a veritable hymn to symmetry. It encompasses the whole life and thought of man, it runs through all nature. Everything nature produces has its measure set according to the law of symmetry. Nature knows no higher aspiration than that everything it produces be absolutely perfect. Without symmetry it would never reach this goal. 'Beauty is a certain harmony and consonance of the parts of a whole to which they belong, according to a definite measurement (*numerus*, *fīnitiō*, *collōcātiō*), carried out as symmetry, i.e. the most perfect and primary law of nature, demands' (. . . *ita utī concīnnitās, hoc est absolūta pīmāriaque rātiō nātūrae postulārit*).

These sentences stand in direct opposition to Alberti's art theory. Here an absolute, pre-existing beauty of nature is presupposed; art falls completely into dependence on this beauty and thus on nature. The previously so active artist now appears as an imitator: our ancestors had not unjustly declared that they imitated nature as the best artist of forms (*nātūram optimam formārū artificem sibi fore imitandam indixēre*). As soon as nature appears as artist, the artist must lose significance. The tension between Alberti's concept of beauty and his concept of art is evident.

For the relationship to Vitruvius, the comparison of the temple with the organism is characteristic: 'Just as in a living being the head, foot and every other limb stands in relation to the other limbs and to the whole rest of the body: so too in a building and especially in a temple all parts of the body are to be shaped so that they all correspond to one another, so that with any arbitrary individual part all the others can be measured exactly' (VII, 5). Seen from the outside, Alberti's agreement with Vitruvius is complete. But precisely the most important distinction, that between symmetry and eurhythmy, is missing. In this lies the whole contrast between the Renaissance and antiquity. The theory of beauty is there, the mythical background from which it no longer emerges. The speculative part of Alberti's work is a humanistic backdrop.

The connection of the aesthetic problem with a cosmological-anthropological number speculation is not something accidental but follows by necessity from the nature of ancient metaphysics of the beautiful. But just as little as the humanists write like Cicero and Virgil, just as little have ancient cosmological ideas really come to life in the Renaissance. Under the

rule of the Christian concept of God, ancient cosmological ideas can only lead a sham existence. The sense of reality that lives in the cosmological speculation of the ancients also gives the works of art of antiquity their peculiar force of being. If one sees a Renaissance building after an ancient one, one suddenly finds oneself confronted by a detached, abstract existence. The degree of reality is not the same, the work is not embedded in cosmic symmetry, but appears in relation to the viewer and his eye. Of course, ancient builders also took the eye into account; however, there is a difference whether the work of art is constituted by consideration of the eye, or by the eye's circumspection, or whether the changes conditioned by the eye are only understood as 'temperatures' of cosmic symmetry.

With subjective art begins also subjective aesthetics. The discovery of the visual pyramid and the definition of painting made possible by it as the representation of nature in relation to a subject is a symbolic event. The world no longer appears as a being of its own vital power, the formulas for this are merely repeated from the ancients, but it exists only in relation to a subject. This subject is by no means yet the lone creative 'genius', it is a technically constructing subject. But it is the point of relation to which the world exists.

The fundamental term 'nature', which now arises, denotes the world in its relation to human senses. Between the theory of beauty of antiquity and the theory of beauty of the Renaissance, the concept of the world surrounding us and related to our senses pushes itself. Thereby the world becomes a sensible world, i.e. 'nature'. In antiquity this relation is secondary; with the discovery of 'man' in the Renaissance it becomes primary. The 'subjectivism' of the Renaissance is a sober, objective subjectivism, which is connected with the strongest sense of the work. In artistic terms it is characterized by the discovery of the eye as mediator between the world and the ego.

For Alberti, it goes without saying that the work of art is there for the eye or the ear, and that its existence is exhausted in this. The passion for the eye characteristic of the Renaissance is already experienced and articulated by him. The eyes above all, he says, naturally desire beauty and harmony, and prove very obstinate and sensitive in this regard (*Et sunt praesertim oculi nātūrā praecupidi pulchritūdinis atque concinnitātis: et in eā rē sēsē praestant mōrōsōs et admodum difficīlēs. IX, 8*). Often they cannot say at all what it is that offends them (*quidnam sit quod offendat nequeunt explicāre*), unless their unconditional greed for beholding the beautiful is not fulfilled by (the object). In the forms and shapes of buildings there lies a natural sublimity and perfection that excites our inner being and makes itself felt at once (*quod animum excitat e vestīgiōque sentiātur. IX, 8*). Alberti indicates that he has experienced and observed in himself the process of aesthetic contemplation. He does not want to examine what it is that produces the pleasure. In any case, the judgment of beauty is effected not by mere conjecture but by an

innate inner insight. (Ut vērō dē pulchritūdine iūdicēs, nōn opiniō, verum animīs innāta quaedam ratiō efficiet. IX, 5). What beauty and ornament are in themselves we can perhaps understand more clearly inwardly than express in words. (Sed pulchritūdō atque ōrnāmentum per sē quid sit quidve inter sē differant, fortassis animō apertius intellegemus quam verbīs explicārī ā mē possit. VI, 2).

The same artist who writes the half mathematical treatise on painting at the same time gives expression to the knowledge of the irrational character of the aesthetic object. Strange union of rationality and mystery! We know it well, it is modern. In Alberti it occurs for the first time; in the art and philosophy of the Baroque it finds its monumental expression (Leibniz!). The first rational artist discovers the mystery of aesthetic effect. *Only now does the subjectivism of the Renaissance reach its depth.* At the same time, however, the problematic nature of the new art and beauty theory also comes to light. The mysteriously become 'beauty' is pursued by the artist. The artist no longer wants merely to liberate the norm of measure hidden in things, or he only wants it in theory, but not in practice, he wants to produce beauty through his activity. Thus, despite its seemingly so coherent artistic form, the Renaissance involves a double movement: towards beauty man can only comport himself receptively, passively, as described paradigmatically by Plotinus. For the Renaissance, however, the artist is one who produces. He is no longer the humble craftsman of the Middle Ages, but the companion of the proud humanist. Through this, a profound division comes into the essence of the new artistic type.

Between the metaphysics of beauty, which corresponds to a different worldview, and the new concept of artistic activity, there is a contradiction. Activity is the newly won precious good; but the doctrine of the beautiful, which as an inheritance of the ancients already has the highest consecration, is not to be sacrificed. As a solution to this contradiction, Renaissance art stands before us with its humanization (relativization) of Beauty. Systematically formulated: the Renaissance invents the Style of Beauty. This expression unites opposites: the word style points to artistic activity, the word beauty to the passive attitude of man in relation to the normative measure contained in the world. Through the synthesis undertaken in the Renaissance, the norm is transformed into a result of artistic willing and doing, cosmic normative beauty becomes 'art beauty'. As style and as theory, art beauty is a discovery of the Renaissance. The peculiar intermediate position of this age, which can no longer be attributed to the Middle Ages and not yet to the modern age, is imprinted here. Until the 19th century, the newly created concept of art beauty has occupied Western culture.

d) Dürer. Leonardo.

With the highest precision, Dürer expresses this tension in the

dedication of his theory of proportion to Willibald Pirckheimer. 'However, if it has its right measure, it cannot be blamed even if it is made very poorly' (Lange und Fuhse, *'Dürers schriftl. Nachlaß'*, p. 208). The sentence is so meaningful because otherwise Dürer emphasizes the activity of the artist with no less emphasis than Alberti does. But the 'measures' stand even higher than everything the artist is able to do on his own. Dürer's concept of measure is that of Vitruvius and Alberti: the most beautiful things are the 'comparable' ones (Vergleichung, compārātiō = concinnitās). Measurement makes sense only within a whole; symmetry (concinnitās) refers to the relation of the parts to the whole.

To be sure, Dürer knows the 'wondrous gift' that enables one 'to show his great power and art' in something he dashes off with his pen in half a day on half a sheet of paper or carves with his little iron into a little piece of wood, while another works in vain with the utmost diligence for a whole year (Lange and Fuhse p. 221). But he does not want to know anything about any 'spontaneity' of the artist. **[Footnote in the original edition:** An 'experienced skilled artist' combines power and art, i.e. ποιησις and τέχνη. For this, cf. Beenken, Wolfflin-Festschrift. 1924, p. 184ff. Beenken rightly rejects Panofsky's idealistic interpretation of this passage. However, I cannot find proof of Dürer's 'insecurity' in his art theory: rather, the juxtaposition of the 'measure' perspective and the 'power' perspective is the core of Renaissance theory]. 'The more accurately and similarly' an image is made like a human being, the better the work turns out (Lange and Fuhse p. 351). As honey is gathered together from many flowers, so the good is collected from many beautiful things (Lange and Fuhse p. 300). For 'master' is nature and human delusion is a maze (Lange and Fuhse p. 351). 'For your ability is powerless against God's creation' (Lange and Fuhse p. 227). 'Do not stray from nature into your own imagination, imagining you can find something better out of yourself; for you will be led astray. For truly art lies hidden in nature, he who can draw it out has it' **[Footnote in the original edition:** 'Reißen' in Dürer's language: to work with lines. So: whoever is able to draw out beauty from nature, has it] (Lange and Fuhse p. 226). This does not mean that a 'well-practiced artist' must for each new work 'copy lifelike images'. Rather, he represents what he has 'long gathered inwardly from without'. In this way, 'the secretly gathered treasure of the heart becomes manifest through the work and the new creature that one conceives in his heart in the form of a thing' (Lange and Fuhse p. 227). When Dürer says in his drafts in his painters' book that a good painter is 'inwardly full of figures', he does not think of the artist as the originator of this beauty, that would be for him 'a newly invented measure' (Lange and Fuhse p. 351), but of the treasure of conceptions that the true painter has taken from nature and harbors within himself.

Like Alberti, Dürer also points to the inexplicability of beauty. '*What beauty is, that I know not, although it adheres to many things*' (Lange and

Fuhse p. 303). 'Nobody knows that except God, to judge beauty' (Lange and Fuhse p. 290). There are various kinds of beauty and various causes of the beautiful. Everyone should beware of believing too much in himself. 'For everyone likes to make what pleases him like himself' (Lange and Fuhse p. 229). In this form Dürer warns once more against arbitrariness and the contingencies of subjectivity. His concept of beauty is soberly material natural. 'Utility is a part of beauty. Therefore what is useless in man is not beautiful' (Lange and Fuhse p. 304). Finally, it should be pointed out that Vitruvius' name ('Fitruvius') is mentioned by Dürer especially often and with special affection and reverence.

For the contemporary observer, there seems to be a contradiction between the art of Albrecht Dürer, which individualizes down to the smallest detail ('not omitting the tiniest wrinkles and veins', Lange and Fuhse p. 224), and the design of the painter's book, which was to deal with the measure of man, of the horse, of buildings, of perspective, of light and shadow and finally of colors (Lange and Fuhse p. 280 f). We believe that the scientific striving for the universal would have had to enter into a painful conflict with the artistic striving for the individual. However, not the slightest trace of a feeling of such conflict is to be found in Dürer. What he consciously aims at as a representational artist is to draw out the right thing from nature. For the rest, the represented may retain its particularity. One could say that in the concept of measure, the universal and the particular meet.

The joy that Dürer has in everything that contains a theory of the real, in Vitruvius, Euclid, perspective, is original and genuine. *As a representational artist he feels himself most profoundly akin to the scientific cognizer in his relationship to nature.* This seamless transition from art to science and from science to art is the hallmark of the Renaissance from Alberti on. The wondrous synthesis does not follow from the alleged ideal of the 'Renaissance man' but is a necessary consequence of the universal concept of nature held by the epoch following the Middle Ages.

The most perfect representation of the Renaissance synthesis is Leonardo da Vinci, the natural scientist and painter, theorist and engineer. In him the anti-Platonic element of the early Renaissance seems driven to an extreme: 'If even the things we experience through the senses are doubted, how much more deceptive must those things be that are against sensory experience, like the essence of God and the soul, about which nevertheless endless disputes and controversies go on, and about which it really applies that whenever reasons fail, shouting takes their place, which surely cannot happen with secure things' (Ludwig, Vol. 1, p. 68). Solely turned towards reality and tracking the secret law of the formation and transformation of its shapes, the eye of this powerful spirit rests inquiringly on the world of appearances. For him, painting is a natural science: just as science

reconstructs nature in a way, so painting appears to him as nothing other than a 'second nature' (Ludwig, Vol. 1, p. 57). In an entirely un-humanistic way, the art of poetry is placed far below painting, which one has unjustly expelled from the number of the liberal arts (ib.). Painting is mute poetry (*poesia muta*), poetry blind painting (*pittura cieca*); but the blind man is more crippled than the mute! (Ludwig, Vol. 1, p. 31, cf. p. 37). The beauty of the world consists of 'light, darkness, color, body, figure, place and position, distance, proximity, motion and rest' (Ludwig, Vol. 1, p. 37). 'O wondrous thing, to make the intangible appear tangible, the flat relief, the near distant' (Ludwig, p. 101). Painting is philosophy of nature, since like it, it deals with the movement of bodies. Its fundamental law states: 'The object that moves away from the eye diminishes in size and color in proportion as it gains in distance' (Ludwig, Vol. 1, p. 15).

For Leonardo, neither the object nor the goal of painting is 'beauty' (in this respect, J. Wolff erroneously in L. da Vinci as Aesthete, 1901, p. 61 f). The object and goal of painting is nature, and beauty has a place in Leonardo's thoughts only insofar as it is a beauty of the works of nature. When he speaks of 'divine beauty', 'divine proportions', 'harmonious proportionality of the parts that make up the whole' (Ludwig, Vol. 1, p. 60, 42, 40), he is nevertheless not speaking of 'the' beauty, but of appearing beauties. For him, God is to be found only in creation. The artist who represents nature is God's grandson, and thus related to God (Ludwig, Vol. 1, p. 35, 19).

The harmony of proportionate limbs, which nature with all her powers is unable to maintain, is preserved and kept alive through painting (Ludwig, Vol. 1, p. 60). In this consists the superiority of painting over music, that it can lend duration to the 'perishable charms of mortals' (Ludwig, Vol. 1, p. 59). This seems to us a slight achievement. We judge the artist by the extent and depth of his 'personality'. In the 16th century, however, one was not yet enervated by the subjective genius concept of modern times. Leonardo is content to think through the idea of pictorial creation. Like all strong natures and epochs, he does not dream of new contents (the content is self-evident) but reflects on form. The wonder is that man can conserve the essence of "Nature" through recreative means. What constitutes the essence of the painter is not the invention of unheard-of objects, but that he is master of calling into existence beauties that move him to love them (È il signore di generarle). Everything that exists, be it for frightening, for laughing or pitying, valley floor or summit, desert or inhabited region, he is the master of it (egli non è Signore). What there is in the universe, he has first in spirit and then in his hands, 'and these are of such excellence that in equal times they produce a well-proportioned harmony, compressed into a single glance, as real things do' (Ludwig, Vol. 1, p. 18).

The power and the secret of the artist lies thus in making. Behind Leonardo's aesthetics stands a philosophy of productivity. The real humanities are for him those who perfect themselves in a work. They are first in the mind of the one who foresees them; however, they cannot reach their 'perfection without manual operation (which is first in the mind of its contemplator and cannot arrive at its perfection without manual operation. Ludwig, I. p. 70 ff). Here there is no contrast between inside and outside, between head and hand, theory and practice, τέχνη and ποιησις belong together: what light and darkness, motion and rest is conceived with the mind alone without manual operation (is understood with the mind alone without manual work); from this 'science of painting' the activity is born (the operation then arises) which is much nobler than mere contemplation and speculation.

In regard to art theory, the scientific researcher Leonardo stands directly opposite the Neoplatonist Michelangelo. The activity of the sculptor is seen by Michelangelo in purely Plotinian terms (the mysticism of 'taking away', cf. above p. 20). Leonardo is free from all enthusiasm like Durer. The activity of the painter is the highest because it resembles the highest activity. He could never have said like Michelangelo: 'One paints with the spirit and not with the hand...' (Cf. above p. 69).

e) Vasari.

The Renaissance is naturally inclined and not idealistically inclined. Is not even Michelangelo as an artist a naturalist despite his Platonism? When Vasari wants to put forward a general dictum about art at the apex of the Renaissance, he says with the tone of convincing self-evidence: 'I know that our art is entirely and in the first place imitation of nature' (W. von Obernitz, 'Vasari's General Art Views'. 1897, p. 7). It is thoroughly the art and the artist that the first successful historian of the visual arts has to deal with, not beauty and not the idea. Nevertheless, something new is already emerging in Vasari. Unselfconsciously, he once calls nature the mother of art, while on another occasion invention (*invenzione*) receives this honorary title. Design (*disegno*) stands opposite it as 'father' (von Obernitz, p. 9). However, one should not relate this invention in a modern way to what is properly artistic, but rather the invention of the subject of the representation is meant (Schlosser, pp. 285 ff). Panofsky has shown in what form the 'idea' reappears in Vasari, now as an expression of what the Platonist denies through it: experience. From the knowledge of reality the idea now springs (Panofsky, pp. 33 f). In this conception naturalism of the Renaissance reaches its peak: the idea becomes the (attainable) 'ideal'. But Vasari is not significant as a theoretician, but as the creator of more recent art historiography. The deep contrast in which the new era stood to the Middle Ages is nowhere more evident than in his undertaking of the '*Vite de' più eccellenti architetti, pittori et scultori italiani*' (1550), this 'lineage and gallery of fame' (Heidrich, Contributions to the

History and Theory of Art History 1917, p. 10) of the new art. It is not an unheard of conception of the essence of art or the artist that guides Vasari's pen, it is merely the self-confidence of a profession that has supplanted that of the celebrated humanists in public esteem. The concept of an artist's fame in connection with a down-to-earth pragmatism has produced the successful work that was first overcome as a type by Winckelmann's achievement. Vasari writes the history of artists, not of art. He aims to sketch as vivid a picture as possible of individual personalities, not shunning even the most unsubstantiated anecdote. At bottom, however, all his figures are only 'modifications of the ideal artist type as it appears to him and his time' (Heidrich, Contrib. pp. 17 f).

With this, however, the historical significance of Vasari's achievement is by no means exhausted. This significance goes far beyond what the originator intended. His principle is fruitful: by depicting not only the artist but also acting as a critical connoisseur who always keeps the work in view, he is led of his own accord to the realization of contexts between works. The workshop word *maniera*, which we would probably do better to translate as 'make' rather than 'style', emphatically points to the realm of ποιησις; Schlosser conjectures that the famous characteristically stylistic expression of the *terribile*, which was applied above all to Michelangelo, was derived from the old rhetorical δεινὴ (Schlosser, p. 286). Probably the historico-philosophical schema which Vasari applies, albeit only externally, to his material is also borrowed from the realm of literary style criticism, which had long since distinguished between a golden, silver and brazen Latinity (Schlosser, pp. 277 f). *The transfer of the schema to the visual arts, however, is probably Vasari's personal property* (A. Philippi, 'The Concept of the Renaissance', 1912, pp. 51 ff).

Vasari does not know the application of the word *rinascita* to the stylistic character of the art reborn in the 13th century. But he already has a clear notion of the succession of the *maniere*. In the first edition of his work there is the remarkable statement that he wants to pay more attention to the order of the manners than to the chronology of the facts (*osservare l'ordine delle materie più che del tempo*, Philippi, p. 60).

f) Zuccaro.

Relatively quickly the security of the High Renaissance is replaced by the restlessness of the High Baroque. In between lies an era of Counter-Reformation tensions which appears in art history under the not very fortunate name of Mannerism (cf. above p. 38). The art theorist of Mannerism is F. Zuccaro, whose work '*L'idea de' pittori, scultori et architetti*' was published in 1607. Mannerism, Greco is its most characteristic manifestation, turns away from what the Renaissance had understood by 'nature'; it despises the demands made on the 'correctness' of representation by the naturalistic theory

of beauty. The light shines within, and what the artist creates springs from within the artist: the *disegno*, the drawing. The pre-drawing of the interior precedes the real drawing. *Disegno interno* is Zuccaro's main concept. 'Inside' and 'outside' diverge completely.

The problem that arises with this: how it is possible for the mind to form such an 'inner representation' is designated by Panofsky (see also Guhl-Rosenberg, 'Künstlerbriefe'. 1880. Vol. II. Pp. 4 ff) as the problem of artistic creation, and he believes that it is posed here for the first time (Idea, pp. 45 f). He overlooks or underestimates the non-Platonic tradition. The problem of artistic creation in general has already been posed by Aristotle. It is known to the Middle Ages, and it now only passes over to the field of art theory in the narrower sense with an admittedly peculiar accentuation. When Zuccaro approaches the problem of artistic creation with the conceptual apparatus of high scholasticism, he moves entirely within the lines of Aristotelian tradition, which was always more vigorous than the Platonic and made itself less noticeable only because the problem of art was never able to attract attention to itself as strongly as the problem of the beautiful. In another sense it was indeed 'the times' that set the old Aristotelian body of thought in motion again. It is the time when the Middle Ages was revived by the zealous activity of the leaders of the Counter-Reformation, the time of a new scholasticism and an important, universal founding of an order. The Jesuit order takes over the leadership. Structures of the highest artificiality, fantastically and calculatingly combining the wondrous arise. The analogy to the art of Mannerism, in which likewise a mystical spiritualism appears combined with a virtuoso and refined mastery of all effects, is obvious. Passion (imagination) and cold, intelligent will are united at work. Decisive is the devaluation of sensuality: with the aid of imagination the senses are brought under the rule of will.

*Aristotle had taught and Thomas Aquinas had repeated that what appears in the artist's work is preformed in the artist's mind. This simple theory is elaborated by Zuccaro into a fantastic system of concepts. Basically this system arises through an immoderate exaggeration of the traditional concept of artistic activity, through a theologizing of Νόησις. This theologizing finds its expression in the reinterpretation of the term *disegno interno*, which is interpreted by Zuccaro as *segno di dio in noi*. There is agreement between the procedure of the human being who produces a work of art and the procedure of nature, which creates reality. Nature can be imitated by the artist because it also follows an intellectual principle in its productions (Panofsky, 'Idea', pp. 48 ff). The essential goal of artistic representation indeed remains the imitation of reality, but nature within the artist, the senses, are completely disempowered. The senses are only called upon from above, the idea, by means of the imagination, first sets sensory perception in motion (Panofsky, Idea, p. 50).*

The lasting result of this theological variation on the healthy Aristotelian idea of the pre-existent idea in the artist's mind was that separation between an 'inner' and an 'outer' of art which to this day does not cease to exert its disastrous influence. Characteristically, Zuccaro is also noteworthy and important as 'the oldest official representative of academism in the field of visual arts' (Schlosser, p. 346). The emergence of artist academies in the era of Mannerism (Italy is the country of origin) may be no coincidence: if 'inner' and 'outer' diverge, then the 'outer' can become a matter of organization.

g) J.C. Scaliger.

Poetics had lain fallow for centuries. Horace's epistle to the Pisos with its elegant coinages and practical hints seems to have satisfied all needs. The verse work of Hieronymus Vida (1520), the Virgil-enthusiastic bishop, hardly gives more than an independent reworking of Horace's *Ars poetica*. 'Then in 1561 appeared the treatise *'Poetices libri septem'* by Julius Caesar Scaliger. *This book forms a deep incision in the history of aesthetics. It brought Pseudo-Aristotelianism to sole rule for centuries.* Like an immense concave mirror it seeks to capture within itself all rays of light of aesthetic science, in general everything that is connected in any way with it, as far as Latin antiquarian poetry is concerned' (E. Brinkschulte, '*J.C. Scaligers Art-Theoretical View's*', 1914, p. 101). Scaliger, like Vida a glowing admirer of Virgil, is the ancestor of the Romanesque baroque poetics. Aristotle, whom he, a gifted linguist, reads in the original language, is elevated by him to the eternal dictator of art and art theory.

As an Aristotelian, Scaliger is not concerned with the 'beautiful', but with art, here with poetry. He does not know an idea or a beautiful in itself, idea means material to him. Selection is his most important principle. The *docēre cum iūcunditāte* borrowed from Horace (Scaliger's *Poet.* Ed. sec. 1581. p. 902) is also emphatically presented. For Scaliger the poet is an extremely active human being. In nature the perfect only occurs locally and temporally inhibited, artists have the task of uniting it (*E multīs in ūnum opus suum trānsferunt.* *Poet.* p. 285). This does not mean, we add, making the artist a mere tool. The Platonist places all activity in the idea, thereby making the artist a mere tool. On the basis of Aristotelianism, on the other hand, the artist receives the task of making it better than nature, of bringing its lawfulness present but obscured in things clearly and undistortedly to light. Scaliger is the first conscious theoretician of the classicism intended by the early Renaissance.

The poets should know nature better than it knows itself, they should master the norms that nature follows so well that they appear more as its legislators than as its imitators (*Ita ut nōn ā nātūrā didicisse, sed cum eā certāsse, aut potius illī dare lēgēs vidēantur.* *Poetics*; ib). They represent things

not as they appear accidentally, but as they are according to their principles of being (*ipsīs nātūrae nōrmīs*). The classicist poetics and art doctrine of France is an elaboration and further development of Scaliger's thoughts. Boileau says: *rien n'est beau que le vrai*, that is Scaliger. And when Bouhours demands that the poet should preserve the essence of things, that he should never destroy the essence des choses, not even in order to elevate or beautify his material (cf. Baeumler, '*Kant's Critique of Judgment*', p. 35, note 5), he professes himself a follower of the same spirit. The final formula of this spirit will be that the artist should imitate 'beautiful nature' (Batteux), that is precisely what Scaliger means when he defines: poetry renders things in words not as they are but rather as they would be and could and should be. *Imitatio* is not only the principle of poetry but also of sculpture and painting. Objectivity is Scaliger's highest point of view. His criticism is never formal but directed at the object (material) [**Footnote in the original edition:** He criticizes that Homer makes the west wind blow in the wrong direction. Of the harbors described by Homer and Virgil, he prefers the latter's, because it is more practical for ships, Brinkschulte p. 19]. This certainly also has to do with Scaliger's professional attitude (he was a physician).

Through imitation the poet makes himself into another God, 'for of what the master craftsman of all things has created, the other sciences are so to speak portrayers; but since poetic science portrays the image of all that is and is not with greater accuracy, it seems not, like other sciences, merely to reproduce as an actor, but to create like another god, therefore the name shared with him seems to have been given it not by human agreement but by the providence of nature (... *vidētur sānē rēs ipsās, nōn ut aliā [scientiā], quasi histriō, nārrāre. sed velut alter deus condere...* Poet. p. 6). The poet is not a mere copyist of reality, but creator of 'another nature'. Scaliger thus understands the word in the original and proper sense. He rejects the derivation from *fingere*: the poet has not gotten his name from inventing, as is commonly thought, but from making: *Poētae īgītūr nōmen nōn ā fingendō, ut putārent, quīā fictīs ūtērētur: sed initiō ā faciendō versum ductum est* (Poet. ib.).

In the 16th century it becomes important to equate Aristotle with reason (Borinski I, p. 222). Scaliger equates Virgil with nature ('Virgil our second nature'). This equation is then possible and meaningful if the notion underlies it, as is the case here: the lawfulness contained in nature has been portrayed by Virgil with such fidelity that no contradiction can exist between the two principles 'imitation of nature' and 'imitation of Virgil'. *Like Quintilian, Scaliger divides the arts into two groups: the works of one are only insofar as they are made, those of the other, after they have been made.* A temple, e.g., is still not 'there' as long as it is under construction. On the other hand, a song, a dance, a wrestling match exist only in the performance (Poet. p. 206; cf. above pp. 55 f). The main concept of ancient

commensurability aesthetics (συμμετοχή, *cōnvēnientia*) is mentioned by Scaliger and related to verbal art. The *cōnvēnientia* is the 'cause' of beauty (Poet. p. 446). However, this is mere echo of Cicero and Vitruvius, the *cōnvēnientia* does not belong to Scaliger's basic aesthetic concepts.

The art theory of the Renaissance and Baroque reaches its peak in the 16th century in Scaliger's poetics, in the 17th in the doctrine of G. P. Bellori. However great the time difference, the difference in tone and education between the two men may be, with regard to influence they have the same significance. Out of the giant shadow they still cast on the 18th century emerges German literary criticism and German art historiography. As Lessing stands in relation to Scaliger, so Winckelmann stands in relation to Bellori.

Librarian to Queen Christina of Sweden, friend of Poussin, most intimate enemy of his contemporary Bernini, *Antiquario di Roma* by virtue of his office, Bellori certainly occupies externally a more splendid, but almost exactly the same European position that later, in his Rome, was to accrue for a few years to the shoemaker's son from the Altmark, Winckelmann. *Through Bellori Raphael becomes the criterion of classicism.* Winckelmann adorns his first work, which revolutionized the 18th century, with a description of the Madonna Sistina just acquired for Dresden. In 1664 Bellori delivers that fundamental lecture on art before the Accademia di S. Luca in Rome which he later prefixed under the title 'L'idea della pittura, scultura ed architettura' to his work '*Le vite de' pittori scultori et architetti moderni*' (1672). It is a 'programmatic writing' (Schlosser, p. 417). *It arises from the feeling that the times are torn and in need of a guide.* The voice of the classicist admonisher sounds not from the summit of achievement, but from the depth of the trough. Classicism arises from a feeling of stylistic decline. As the word 'Gothic' was used in the Renaissance to declare the preceding epoch infamous, so now, admittedly no longer in that victorious mood, the term 'Baroque' becomes the abusive epithet characterizing the preceding epoch. Classicism presupposes the explanation of a decline of art in one's own time.

By being the first to raise the issue about the corruption of our age, Bellori becomes the ancestor of all classicist endeavors down to our own time. The awareness of confronting a wrong direction, a wrong *maniera*, awakens the desire to establish the right style. Classicism means reflection on the right model. In reality there were two directions to which Bellori opposed himself: one he saw ossified in mannerism, the other abandoned to crass naturalism. Against Borromini and Bernini on the one hand, against Caravaggio on the other: that is the tactical situation. The practical solution is sought by elevating the art of the Greeks as the standard, now for the first time (Schlosser, p. 457), and relating the art of modern times (Raphael) to it by virtue of that schema already developed by Vasari. This creates a tradition which forms a prerequisite, not to be overlooked, for Winckelmann's recovery

of the Greek original from the overestimation of the Roman tradition (cf. Schlosser, p. 458). The theoretical solution is already prefigured in this situation. The point was to prove, says Panofsky, that neither the Mannerists nor those who gloried in the name of Naturalists were right, that rather 'the true salvation of art had to be sought in a just mean between these two equally reprehensible extremes, in that just mean which one had of course learned to revere as the infallible standard the antique, as an art not 'naturalistic' but precisely in its limitation to a 'purified' or 'ennobled' reality quite properly 'natural' (Panofsky, *Idea*, p. 59).

The task of the artist is to harbor an idea of beauty itself in his mind by imitating the highest artist, and to improve nature according to this idea. But the artistic idea is derived from sensuous experience. Through selection from the natural beauties of nature the idea is superior to nature, it is reality in pure form. 'Originating from nature it overcomes its origin and makes itself the model of art' (*originata dalla natura supera l'origine e fassi originale dell'arte*. Panofsky, *Idea*, p. 60). This sentence is the epigrammatic formulation of classicism. The word manner now receives the meaning: to work from an arbitrarily assumed habit without a model from nature. At the same time, however, working solely from the natural model receives the stamp of the contemptible. It has become possible to distinguish the nature to be imitated from 'common nature' (Panofsky, *Idea*, p. 62). In every respect, Bellori signifies the completion and conclusion of the aesthetic endeavors of the Renaissance. Not least (which Panofsky did not emphasize) because only now the idea and concept of the beautiful has been systematically incorporated into art theory. What Alberti began has now been carried through; the two lines running separately through the centuries, still avoided touching each other in Scaliger's poetics (since Scaliger does not speak of beauty), are united by Bellori. The extraordinary effect of his treatise stems from this: a simpler solution, a more perfect synthesis was inconceivable. There was no more problem, no more dispute between beauty and art, between Plato and Aristotle: the imitation of rightly understood beauty of nature had to produce with inner necessity the highest beauty of art. That is the secret of classicism. By transferring the concept of beauty to art, which had become possible through the matured concept of 'imitation', Bellori could become the lawgiver of art. He spoke to the practicing artist, but he did not speak of art but of beauty. It is no accident that his treatise first appeared as an academic oration: he would be worthy to be called the spiritual father of all art academies.

For the validity of art and the artist, Bellori's synthesis is of decisive importance. Only now is art grounded in the stars and superior to nature in every way. Bellori quotes passages from poets in which the highest beauty of a living being is expressed through comparison with a painting or statue, and finally disputes that Helena, as a natural woman, could have been beautiful

enough to be the object of a ten year war. The Trojan War had in truth not been waged and sustained because of the imperfect beauty of a real woman, but because of the perfect beauty of a statue that Paris had abducted to Troy. Surveying the long debate winding through the centuries around the problem of nature and art, one will surely always feel the story of the academic orator Bellori to be the most charming formulation of a well-thought-out solution.

The process completed in Bellori is formulated by Panofsky from his Platonic point of view in the happy phrase 'Elaboration of the idea into the ideal' (Idea, p. 62). By the word 'ideal' is to be understood what classicist artists and aestheticians have understood it to mean down to the present day: the beauty itself present in nature but to be regained by the artist from his own inner being, surpassing every individual phenomenon of nature. Through classicism, says Panofsky, the theory of ideas is transformed into a legislative aesthetics; classical art has not so much a normative philosophy about art running parallel to it as a constructive theory for art; Mannerism, on the other hand, neither, but a speculative metaphysics of art. The peculiar character of classicist practice and theory, at once invective and normative, is explained by its historical position between metaphysics (Mannerism) and empiricism (Naturalism) (Panofsky, Idea, pp. 62 f).

The historical significance of Bellori is certainly not yet adequately characterized by the catchword 'classicism'. The matter also wants to be seen from the other side. That academic oration forms only the introduction to a work dealing with actual Italian artists. Not a philosopher but a connoisseur, critic and antiquarian speaks in Bellori. Properly considered, his theory of the art of beauty is really only a high-flown façade. Behind it, however, we find a quite solid structure of art-historical cognition erected, a cognition certainly not derived from the 'idea' of art but built on thorough studies of the local Italian schools of painting. *Bellori not only completed the speculative line, but also the art critical and art historical one.* According to Schlosser's judgment (p. 455) it is he who has really fully established the division into 'schools' in art history. With this achievement Bellori comes very near the threshold of style criticism, historically connected with the 'Roman' Winckelmann.

Literature. Vitruvii de architectura libri decem. Ed. Y. Rose et H. Müller-Strübing. 1867. (Übersetzungen daraus nach Jolles). W. Sackur, Vitruv und die Poliorketiker. 1925. A. Dyroff, Zur allgemeinen Kunstlehre des hl. Thomas. In: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Suppl.-Band II, 1923, S. 197-219. E. Panofsky, 'Idea'. 1924. Julius Schlosser, Die Kunsttheorie. 1924. K. Borinski, s. oben S. 17. A. Dresdner, Die Kunstkritik. Ihre Entstehung und Theorie. I. Die Entstehung der Kunstkritik. 1915. Guhl-Rosenberg, Künstlerbriefe. 1880. Otto Stein, Die Architekturtheoretiker der ital. Renaissance. 1914. Dürers schriftlicher Nachlaß. Her. v. Lange u. Fuhse. 1893. Leonardo da Vinci, Das Buch von der Malerei. Her., übers, u. erl. von

Epilogue.

While working on the continuation the author has been faced with tasks that made it impossible for him to complete the work for the time being. For now he has no choice but to indicate the basic lines of the planned continuation by defining some points.

In the first part it has been shown in the history of the basic aesthetic concepts up to the 17th century that from Plato's foundation metaphysics of beauty and art theory run parallel to each other, repelling or uniting, and that herein is to be sought the 'secret law' of the entire development (cf. above p. 35). In the 'aesthetic' 18th century both tendencies reach their climax. Shaftesbury's Neoplatonism stands at its threshold. What Ficino was for the Renaissance, Bruno for the Baroque, Shaftesbury is for the 18th century. 'The beautiful making, not the beautifully made is the really beautiful' (Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*. Transl. by Robertson. 1900. II. p. 50). Consistent Platonism is always recognized by the independent being of the beautiful or artistic structure being denied. If there is a 'first beauty' of which everything else is only a 'shadow', then only an appearance of reality remains for the proportioned phenomenon. The difference between nature and art becomes insignificant, nature however retains priority over everything made. Through the artist the highest beauty takes effect, and the producer, like the observer, is related to it only through the 'sense of inward measures' (the sense of inward numbers, *Characteristics*. I, p. 217). *Nature in its unity is the archetype of all artistic beauty; the unity of the work of art is thus to be determined by analogy with the unity of the cosmos.* Shaftesbury translates the ancient idea of the standard of measure, of 'symmetry' into the subjective language of the 18th century. Genuine taste is related to the eternal norms. There is an education of taste, a formation of the 'beautiful soul'. The phrase about the 'beautiful soul', which does not occur in Shaftesbury but summarizes his whole philosophy, appears in a contribution by Wieland to Sulzer's *Theory of the Fine Arts*, article 'Naïveté' (*Allgemeine Theorie*. New expanded edition. III. 1793, p. 503). Herder translates the nature hymn from Shaftesbury's main work (the 'Moralists') and carries forward in his aesthetics the idea of the unconditional priority of natural beauty. *With Shaftesbury Leibniz exerts an influence on the century in the same direction. The concepts of perfection, harmony and beauty thus become central concepts of the 18th century, the aesthetics of nature moves into the center of speculation at the expense of the philosophy of art.*

At the same time Leibniz and Shaftesbury together promote the transition to the subjective-psychological treatment of the aesthetic problem. In Leibniz's school the transition to the subject is made via the concept of the monad as a representing force (Cf. Robert Sommer, 'Grundzüge einer

Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie und Ästhetik, 1892). 18th century aesthetics in Germany therefore leads by inner necessity not to a theory of art but to a theory of the producing aesthetic faculty, i.e. to the doctrine of genius. Kant's Critique of Judgment exerts its deepest influence through the proposition about genius: 'Genius is the talent (natural gift) that gives the rule to art' (Critique of J. §46). With his century Kant gives natural beauty precedence over artistic beauty (Critique of J. §42). Whether it makes sense to subsume the beauty of nature and art under one concept is not asked. It was no coincidence that the nature lover Goethe felt addressed by the treatment of art in the Critique of Judgment.

The concept of genius and the concept of nature thus belong together. The theory of genius is not connected with the theory of art. Voltaire, who has the rhetorical concept of style, is dismissive of the concept of genius, and gives his Philosophical Dictionary only a brief article against the concept of beauty. He is the antagonist to Shaftesbury; he remains a pupil of the great 17th century down to the last consequences. In the article 'Nature' of his dictionary he puts the words in nature's mouth: 'I am called nature, but I am wholly art'. Even more sharply in the 26th Dialogue of the Philosophical Dialogues and Conversations: there is no nature, everything is art. Sentimental Platonism abolishes nature in order to celebrate nature as the object of vague enthusiasm. The classicist still regards even nature as the deliberate achievement of a sovereign, and thus as an appropriate model for his own well-considered activity.

The struggle against the poetic rule, which is led by the 'art critics' in Switzerland and in Germany, is not the struggle of a better informed reason against 'rationalistic' narrow-mindedness, but it is the struggle of the English concept of nature against the French concept of art. Two styles are wrestling with each other, Shakespeare against Corneille; in theory, however, 'nature' stands against 'the rule', genius against the mere imitator, i.e. against the style tradition. In Storm and Stress the English taste comes to victory. However, it was not the breakthrough of a real new style: Schiller returns to the French model, Goethe and Romanticism finally mix together the most diverse style forms.

Lessing's 'Laocoön' lies on the line of dissecting the work of art, on which also the works of the poeticists and rhetoricians lie. Lessing does not share the psychologism of the century, it is a dissection of the technique, not a dissection of the feelings. But behind his work there is no peculiar and self-contained view of art. This is the difference between the genius Winckelmann and him that Lessing himself felt. The 'Laocoön' is the work of a scholarly critic; it does not express a new relationship to art, but only represents a peculiar special performance within the traditional form of poetics. In occasional remarks in the Hamburg Dramaturgy (79th piece) and in the

painter scene at the beginning of Emilia Galotti the old Neoplatonic view of art shimmers through. The artist's work is considered as merely a technical one: '... or do you think, Prince, that Raphael would not have been the greatest painter genius if he had been born unfortunately without hands' (Cf. above p. 51 and pp. 76f). In the same passage from Emilia Galotti the formula of Schiller's classical art theory is hinted at, which sets the activity of the artist in the annihilation of the 'material': 'Art must paint as plastic nature, if there is one, imagined the image: without the waste which the resisting material inevitably causes...'.

When at the height of German classicism the aesthetic problem becomes the main problem, when here the aesthetic attitude towards the world appears as the center of a humanistic religiosity, so from the point of view of the history of ideas we are not facing an intellectual new creation, but a rebirth and fulfillment of English Neoplatonism.

The aesthetics of German classicism is an aesthetics of the 'inner form' in the sense of Shaftesbury, for whom aesthetic enjoyment represents a kind of pious and virtuous behavior. 'For in its ultimate ground the immersion in the beauty of the world is for him an admiring devotion to the inward, spiritual power that produces form and order out of itself, an elevation to the primordial form, the primordial law, an even if only illusorily accomplished unification with the Absolute' (Chr. Fr. Weiser, '*Shaftesbury und das deutsche Geistesleben*'. 1916. p. 200).

The theological-erotic character of Neoplatonism (cf. above p. 25), translated in a way through Leibniz's philosophy of the representing force, finds its purest expression in Schiller's early work, the 'Philosophical Letters'. Alien perfection, sympathetically felt, becomes my own and elicits the consciousness of my own ennoblement, my own enrichment; I desire it because I exalt myself. 'Harmony, truth, order, beauty, excellence give me joy because they transport me into the active state of their inventor, their possessor... I converse with the Infinite through the instrument of nature, through world history, I read the soul of the artist in his Apollo'. The difference between nature and art is that the universe is not a pure imprint of an ideal, as can be the completed work of a human artist.

The art theory of classicism consistently works with a double concept of nature. Its whole pathos is directed against 'common' nature, against the mere imitation of reality. 'Art consists in the annihilation of nature as reality, and its restoration as a product of the imagination'. This is how W. v. Humboldt expresses himself, whose art theory agrees with Schiller's in all essential points (Humboldt's '*Collected Works*', Vol. VII, 2, p. 584).

Behind the anti-naturalism, however, hides a higher naturalism, which one could call the naturalism of the ideal. The artist seeks to represent the

ideal, i.e. true nature. ‘..for all reality is more or less a limitation of that general truth of nature. Every individual human being is just less human the more individual he is; every mode of feeling is just less necessary and purely human the more it is peculiar to a specific subject. Only in discarding the accidental and in the pure expression of the necessary lies the grand style’ (Schiller on Matthisson's Poems). The artist's work consists in stripping away, in sublating matter. From this follows the connection between the theory of art and the idea of aesthetic education.

The path to the true human being, to humanity in us, traverses the same stages of negation in the subject that the artist traverses in the representation of the object: only by annihilating the empirical ego do we rise to the pure ego. When in his main aesthetic work Schiller quotes Fichte, one Neoplatonist refers to the other. The universal human is at the same time the highest form and the highest content; in the ideal, content and form coincide, there is no contradiction between truth and beauty (Cf. Schiller's letter to Goethe of July 7, 1797).

The more form, the more truth; the more power and freedom, the less matter. In the Kallias Letters to Körner (January 25, 1793; February 23, 1793; also October 25, 1794), Schiller develops the idea that beauty is nothing other than freedom in appearance. We perceive beauty everywhere where form dominates mass, whether it is a plant, an animal or an artistic construct. Beauty is self-determination appearing. Coercion, unfreedom, brutality appear as ugliness. As Shaftesbury already says: ‘*Slavery is nothing but dissonance and disproportionateness*’ (Characteristics, Vol. I, p. 136). It is the mind alone that gives form; everything that lacks mind is ugly, and formless matter is deformity itself (ibid. Vol II, p. 132).

Plotinus' world-fleeing philosophy of freedom is transformed by Schiller into a world-powerful philosophy of freedom: true art, he says in the preface to ‘*The Bride of Messina*’, really and actually makes man free, by ‘awakening, exercising and developing in him a power to push the sensuous world, which otherwise weighs on us only as a crude matter, presses on us as a blind force, into an objective distance, to transform it into a free work of our mind and to master the material through ideas’.

In the ‘*Aesthetic Letters*’, this philosophy is developed into a theory of the shape that reconciles the opposition of nature and reason within itself. The construction moves most artfully beyond the distinction between artist, viewer, work of art and natural work; the concept of shape is defined so that it can take on both objective and subjective meaning. ‘The whole shape rests and dwells within itself, a completely self-contained creation, and as if beyond space, without yielding, without resistance; there is no force that struggled with forces, no gap where temporality could break in’ (15th letter). This is not only a description of the ‘whole’ which the work of art is, but at

the same time also a description of the state of mind in which the viewer and the producing artist are supposed to find themselves. Shapedness is the hallmark of the 'middle attunement' in which sensuality and reason are simultaneously active (20th letter). The aesthetic human being, and only he, is 'a whole within himself' (22nd letter). This is precisely what the famous formula aims at, that man is only wholly man where he plays.

The shape, removed from time, resting in itself, is a simile of the world. Shapedness means worldliness. The genuine work of art is a world unto itself, a microcosm, and the viewer of it, as soon as he comports himself appropriately, himself turns into a whole without lack. The transition into the aesthetic mood or into contemplation is characterized by the expansion of the subject into the wholeness of the world. The term for this is totality .

The philosophy of totality is a descendant of the old concepts of cosmos and symmetry. By incorporating Neoplatonic metaphysics of the matter-form relationship into itself, classical aesthetics emerges. In this, the 'subjective' Neoplatonic element emerges more strongly in Schiller ('thus the real artistic secret of the master consists in his annihilating matter through form...', 22nd letter), while Goethe moves closer to the old concept of symmetry and its objectivism. An intellectual form, he remarks explicitly against Plotinus' admired treatise on beauty, is 'by no means diminished when it emerges in appearance, provided that its emergence is a true generation, a true propagation. The generated is no less than the generating; indeed, it is the advantage of living generation that the generated can be more excellent than the generating' (Goethe, '*Maxims and Reflections*', ed. by Max Hecker, 1907, p. 141. On Goethe's relationship to Plotinus, cf. the above mentioned work by Franz Koch, esp. pp. 28 ff).

The self-contained whole is the core concept of German classicism. In Schiller it bears the name shape, in Humboldt the name totality, in Goethe the name nature, and in Kant's philosophy the name system. The most perfect representation and the most perfect simile of that unity in multiplicity which we call world is the organism. The highest work of nature and the highest work of art are thus placed side by side under the same superior concept: both are representations of 'systematic' unity.

In the small treatise by K. Ph. Moritz '*On the Formative Imitation of Beauty*' (1788) we have before us a development of thoughts corresponding in significance and content to Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, stemming from the soul of Goethe. *The 'great connection of things' is declared here to be the Only, the True, the Whole, that which supports itself on its center point from all sides and rests on its own existence.* Every beautiful whole from the hand of the formative artist is in miniature an imprint of the highest beauty in the great whole of nature (Reprint. '*Monuments of German Literature*', Vol. 31, p. 14). In the artistic 'power to act' lies the sense for the highest beauty in the

harmonious structure of the whole; similar to nature itself, this power to act forms whatever it grasps into an independently existing whole (ibid. pp. 15f). There can be no difference between nature and art: 'As soon as it exists, the beauty of the formative arts stands with it (i.e. nature) on its great scale and does not want to be compared with it in its individual parts but thought and felt along with it in its total scope, as belonging to it' (ibid. p. 26, On the concepts of 'world' and 'whole' cf. A. Baeumler, Kant's '*Critique of Judgment*', Vol. I, pp. 249 ff).

Against a naturalist like Diderot, for example, Goethe seeks to bring out the difference between nature and art. '*Nature organizes a living, indifferent being; the artist, a dead but significant one; nature, a real one; the artist, an apparent one*' (Diderot's '*Essay on Painting*', Ch. 1). 'Nature is separated from art by an enormous chasm, which genius itself cannot cross without external aids'. This is what we read in the introduction to 'Propylaea'. However, this does not cancel out Goethe's basic idea that the work of art is an analogue of the work of nature. Nature is not able to give permanence to the beauty she produces. Man, placed on the pinnacle of nature, regards himself once more as an entire nature 'which has yet again to produce a pinnacle within itself' (Goethe on Winckelmann, section 'Beauty'). This second peak is the work of art, which thus owes its existence to an ideal continuation of nature's productivity.

Thus already the work of Erwin von Steinbach appeared to Goethe, 'the great harmonious masses, enlivened into countless tiny parts: as in works of eternal nature, down to the tiniest fiber, everything shape, and everything purposive toward the whole' (On German Architecture). The greater the artist, the more his soul rises 'to the feeling of proportions, which alone are eternally beautiful' (ibid.). Goethe articulates the aesthetics of symmetry with majestic simplicity in the short essay '*Simple Imitation of Nature, Manner, Style*'. In order to fully understand what style is, we must first distinguish the faithful and diligent copying of nature letter by letter from another mode in which the artist is inventive and 'makes a language for himself' in order to express, in his own way, what he has seized with his soul.

Simple imitation is based on calm existence and a loving presence; manner seizes a phenomenon with a light, capable spirit, but style 'rests on the deepest foundations of cognition, on the essence of things, insofar as we are permitted to recognize it in visible and tangible forms'. The word style is thus meant to denote the highest degree that art is capable of achieving (Schiller uses the word in the same sense. Cf. above p. 88, 26). *A work of art then has style when the eternal order of things, the great symmetry, expresses itself purely in it.*

Goethe's and Schiller's concept of style is a timeless value concept and as such is distinct from Winckelmann's historical concept of style. For

Winckelmann, style is a temporal phenomenon, it has an initial phase, a climax and a final phase. With this one observation, Winckelmann becomes the founder of realistic art history. For classical aesthetics, styles are nothing more than 'kinds of the beautiful' (K. Ph. Moritz, *'On the Formative Imitation'*, reprint, p. 6). Winckelmann saw that beauty has a history. The beautiful does not spread out (in time) into kinds, so to speak, but it is a human creation and as such has a temporal development.

By virtue of a unique ability to experience, Winckelmann has replaced the Beautiful with Art: this is the basis of his immense significance. Just as Plato founded the aesthetics of the Beautiful, so Winckelmann establishes realistic art history. We find in him a similar paradox as in Plato, for the latter becomes the philosophical discoverer and theoretician of art through the polemic of the Politeia; Winckelmann, on the other hand, becomes the discoverer of the concept of style, although at the same time he is the greatest admirer of Plato and timeless beauty. 'An incomprehensible attraction to you, awakened not by shape and growth alone, let me, from the very first moment I saw you, feel a trace of that harmony which transcends human concepts and is attuned by the eternal connection of things' (Letter to von Berg, June 9, 1762). Winckelmann's theory of beauty is rooted like Plato's in his enthusiasm for friendship. It is the mistake of previous interpretations that the great historian has been placed very close to classical aesthetics of the ideal and totality on the basis of his Platonism, whose special root has been overlooked. *His most important discovery, the discovery of art as a historical phenomenon, was noticed neither by Goethe nor Schiller nor Humboldt.* And yet the author of the *'History of Art in Antiquity'* knew what the 'investigation of style in art' he had undertaken meant. 'For perhaps a century will pass before it succeeds a German to follow me on the path I have taken, and who has the heart where mine sits' (To Volkmann, July 16, 1764). The highest beauty is without definite content and expression. There is only one single concept of beauty, 'which is the highest and always the same' (*'History of Art'* VIII c 2, §10). This highest concept of beauty must remain indefinite because our knowledge consists of 'concepts of comparison', while beauty cannot be compared with anything higher (IV c 2, §21). 'The ancients sought to make their works perfectly beautiful, which is why they could not have varied very much. For beauty is an extremum and in the extrema there is no more variety' (*'Unknown Letters of Winckelmann'*, ed. Uhde-Bernays, 1922, p. 45).

Winckelmann deals with beauty in that section of his work where he depicts art among the Greeks, namely under the heading: *On the Essence of Art*. Beauty is designated by him as the highest end and focal point of art. Among the Greeks art reached its peak because beauty was valued higher by them than by any other people (IV c 1, §2 ff). To present the art of the Greeks Winckelmann calls the foremost intention of his history. His work has a

double meaning: on the one hand, through the supreme beauty of the Greeks, it refers to the supreme beauty of nature, for 'much of what we might imagine as ideal was nature itself to them' (ib. §6). But this naturalism of the ideal is necessarily hostile to historical consideration.

In the '*Trattato preliminare*' (c 4, §13) Winckelmann says that one can still see in reality today figures like the Niobe and the Vatican Apollo. Of certain heads of deities which seem to have been made without observing reality, he suspects that they may be nothing but portraits of people who lived in ancient times (ibid.). If beauty had already been produced by nature in this way, nothing would remain for the artist but to become a collector and imitator. Such imitative art would have no history. But in the preface to the History of Ancient Art we read: 'the history of art should teach the origin, growth, change and decline of art, along with the different styles of peoples, times and artists, and demonstrate this as far as possible from the surviving works of antiquity'. Art as a historical being is the subject of the work, not a timeless beauty. Winckelmann says of the older Greek style, for example: 'Art was severe and harsh, like the justice of those times, which imposed death for the slightest crime' (VIII c 1, §17). He is also thinking purely historically when he says, 'with such strict concepts of beauty art began, as well-ordered states with strict laws, to become great, and the images were similar to the simple morals and men of their time' (ib. §12). One must assume, the '*Trattato preliminare*' repeats (c 4, §45), that art began, like states, by becoming great through strict laws. 'Art, which always keeps pace with poetry and eloquence, conformed like them to the spirit of the century' (ib. §124). So Winckelmann makes the unprecedented attempt (Montesquieu is his model) to relate the art of peoples and periods to the respective temperament, religion and form of government. Already in the description of Baron Stosch's engraved gems of 1759 he says: 'the knowledge of art consists mainly in the difference of manner and style both of nations and of centuries, and in the feeling for the beautiful; and I have particularly sought to emphasize and point out precisely this in the Egyptian, Etruscan and Greek pieces in this collection' (Donaueschingen ed. Vol. 9, p. 279). The unrelated addition 'and in the feeling for the beautiful' clearly shows the two-sidedness of the overall conception.

For his division of Greek art into four 'main periods', Winckelmann refers to Scaliger's Poetics and to the opinion of the ancients. Phidias brings about the grand and lofty style. The time from Praxiteles to Lysippus and Apelles constitutes the period of the beautiful style, followed by the imitators' style (VIII c 1, §4). The four 'degrees of style' are also characterized as: the straight and harsh, the great and angular, the beautiful and fluent, and the imitative style (VIII c 3, §17). But not only the 'different artistic epochs' that succeed one another in one people are characterized. Next to the temporal criterion steps the spatial one, next to the idea of the style of periods stands

the idea of the style of peoples. There is an Egyptian, an Etruscan and a Greek 'taste' (II c 1, §1). This taste is grounded in physique and temperament, i.e. in bodily constitution and disposition. Of the people of Egypt Winckelmann says that they did not seem created for pleasure and joy; he speaks of the 'melancholy of this nation', which produced the first hermits (ib. §7). For him, Greek art is inseparable from the freedom of the Greeks in religious and political respects. Monarchical constitution, superstition, inclination to the mysterious (II c 5, §22), as we find among Egyptians, Phoenicians and Persians, do not provide the ground for art in the Greek sense. To bring forth this growth required the favor of a mild sky and a free constitution. The Greek people were cheerful, they invented festivals and games; the serenity of their temper stands in contrast to the cruelty of the Romans with their bloody gladiatorial festivities (IV c 1, §9 f).

In Hegel's synthesis of Schiller and Winckelmann, the historical basic concept of style falls by the wayside. Hegel's aesthetics is, in accordance with the Platonic-Neoplatonic basic tendency, a pure aesthetics of content. The Platonic basic character of Hegel's system clearly emerges in the Lectures on Aesthetics. *The construction of the 'idea' of the Beautiful is at the center, not the concept of style.* Nevertheless, this aesthetics of content represents a new stage in the history of philosophical thinking about art. It is no coincidence that the epoch of Hegel is followed by the epoch of historical research into style. For although Hegel constructs the Beautiful as an 'idea', he does so with regard to art. Natural beauty, as recent research has shown, occupies only a very subordinate place in his system. For Hegel, beauty is artistic beauty, 'as it unfolds into a world of realized beauty in the arts and their works' (Aesthetics, 'Complete Works' Vol. X, p. 107). Hegel thus disempowers natural beauty without, however, turning to the history of the art of real peoples. As I characterized it earlier in my selection from Hegel's Aesthetics, he provides a phenomenology of the (artistic) ideal. In this way, a historical philosophy of art arises in the medium of the absolute idea, a history of art that is a history of contents which have found artistic expression, and which at the same time demands and prevents a history of styles. For every new content corresponds its own mode of expression, which has its own lawfulness and its own history. But this lawfulness and this history cannot be considered in the aesthetics of content. Thus the concepts of style and of art history as style history had to be newly conquered in the struggle against Hegelianism. In the art historian Carl Schnaase the Hegelian tradition comes to an end; with the style phenomenologist Jakob Burckhardt and the realistic historiography of art of the 19th century begins an epoch that carries out Winckelmann's original conception to the end.

It lies in the consequence of the Platonic aesthetics of content that it becomes a philosophy of the beautiful cosmos, i.e. a philosophy of nature. Hegel's historical genius conceived an aesthetics of content within the

medium of history and spirit. The contradiction we found in Winckelmann thus comes strikingly enlarged and systematically formulated to light in Hegel. His aesthetics is a philosophy of the beautiful as a philosophy of historical art; it constructs the one idea of beauty as a historical phenomenon. The struggle of the 19th century was about the final elimination of the concept of the beautiful; it ended with the replacement of the concept of beauty by the concept of art. By constructing an independent 'world of art', Platonism in Hegel elevated itself to its ultimate contradiction. Without the construction of the one art, the discovery of historical art would have been impossible. Now that this discovery has been completed, a return to Hegelian constructions is no longer possible. The explication of the historical concept of style is one of the most important stages in the overcoming of Platonism altogether.

The hopelessness of the 19th-century philosophy of the beautiful is shown by Friedrich Theodor Vischer's aesthetics. Not guided by Hegel's historical genius, Vischer elaborated the aesthetics of natural beauty and thus drew the consequence of any genuine aesthetics of content. The original index of his aesthetics is an intellectual-historical document of the first rank: it shows what any aesthetics of content must ultimately lead to, namely a general symbolism, a *characteristica universalis*. The eye of the beholder traces shapedness wherever it is found, and the shapes of art are only one kind of manifestation of the universal principle of form (see above p. 90, 22 K. Ph. Moritz!).

In his later critique of his aesthetics, Vischer wanted to dismiss the section on natural beauty from his work. But, and this is decisive, he did not arrive at a new approach, but only made an insignificant change in view of the fundamental problem. Natural beauty should only not be assigned a 'main section'. The appearance should only be avoided that there is a beauty independent of a 'percipient subject' ('*Critique of My Aesthetics*', Critical Walks, Vol. IV, 2nd ed., pp. 224 ff). This presupposes that the percipient subject 'is the active factor in contact with the object'; natural beauty remains an 'independent world'. And with that remains the coordination of 'natural beauty' and 'artistic beauty' under the superior concept of beauty, there remains the Platonism of the philosophy of beauty, which prevents recognition of the real, never deducible style worlds of history. What remains is the relation to the percipient subject, which blocks access to the real world of art. The beholding human is related to the cosmos; the world of art is created by active man and can only be understood by assuming a specific activity. Fr. Th. Vischer finally wanted to help himself (as did M. Deutinger, by the way, following Schelling) by assuming a specific artistic 'imagination'. But this concept is only useful if, unlike in Vischer and Deutinger, it is not meant to veil the contrast between contemplative and active behavior, but to designate stylistically creative productivity.

Turning away from the metaphysics of 'beauty' means: considering art as a historical phenomenon alongside other phenomena of culture. The place of the philosophy of absolute spirit is taken by a realistic philosophy of culture. It is no coincidence that Jacob Burckhardt became a leading figure, for it is he who establishes the historical concept of culture as the overarching concept of modern art history (On the contrast between Schnaase and Burckhardt cf. the collected essays by Ernst Heidrich: '*Contributions to the History and Theory of Art History*', 1917).

It is characteristic of the modern, realistic tendency of recent historiography of art that Franz Kugler opens his '*Handbook of Art History*' (1841) with a section on 'Art in its earlier stages of development'. Art of the 'crude', 'imperfect', 'primitive' kind belonging to the 'Northern European antiquity', the islands of the Great Ocean and the Mexicans is grasped and acknowledged as art in the historical sense. The work of art is now conceived not as a concretion of the idea of beauty, but as a historical individual brought forth by race, people, times, materials and technical conditions. With this anti-Platonic, realistic view of art, which finds its positivistic extreme in Gottfried Semper's book *On Style*, the relativization of art is necessarily linked. Historiography becomes involved in the problems of modern philosophy of history, and toward the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century it almost takes first place among those sciences in whose domain the struggle for the historical worldview is fought out. This struggle is still not over today. Only the positivistic and psychological extreme has come to an end. The great task that became visible in the 19th century now really stands before us for the first time.

In the epoch of Platonism, the question was: How is historical beauty (the historical work of art) possible? Now, on the other hand, the problem is: How is the independent existence of the work of art qua work of art within the historical context to be saved? Platonism dissolves the unique historical work of art into a 'case' of beauty. For it, unity is no problem: in the temporal the one timeless idea 'realizes itself'. All Platonic philosophy begins with a separation of the temporal and the non-temporal, and at all decisive points this original separation reappears. Here one can do nothing but rediscover the separation of the temporal and the non-temporal everywhere in the phenomena. Conversely, historical consideration is always in danger of losing sight of the unity of the work of art, of what makes the work of art a work of art. It regards the work of art as a product among others, it considers it merely as an 'expression' of the race, people and time that created it. The peculiarity of the artistic expression, the conditions of the stylistic context are neglected. Art history is in danger of dissolving into general intellectual history or into history in general.

Dehio's great work on the '*History of German Art*' contains in its

preface the sentences that have become famous: 'My true hero is the German people. I give German history in the mirror of art...'. Who would not happily agree with these words? Who would not like to consider German art as 'something inseparably connected with the wholeness of the life process of our people'? The historical reality of art, says Dehio in another passage (beginning of Book 3), does not arise 'simply from the self-movement of art problems to be thought of in isolation, it is created and borne by the whole human being'. Wherever we encounter more than a superficial change in art, a 'transformation in the general condition' must have taken place (ibid.). But it should be history in the mirror of art that is to be written here. This history has its own lawfulness, its own historical logic, its own 'development'. Only when the danger is averted that an essential problem disappears through the word 'expression' can we surrender ourselves to the historical consideration of art with a clear conscience.

That the work of art is an expression, that it is part of a whole of life, is self-evident to us today; the task is to free it from its isolation as a form of expression and to understand it within the context of the history of style to which it belongs. It is impossible to completely understand every individual work of art as 'expression', be it of an individual or a people. There is an independent history of forms of representation, for the elucidation of which modern art history owes much especially to Heinrich Wölfflin. To be sure, the great styles ultimately lead back to the category of expression; they are all expressions of the existence and creative power of peoples and races. Peoples and races have their own specific ideal of beauty, and no historical art form, as long as it is genuine, can exist independently of this art-immanent ideal. Insofar, every style has an 'idea' as its basis; however, this does not signify a return to Platonism. For we are not dealing here with a timeless ideal of beauty, but with the sublime historical image of real human beings. This sublime image is not fixed prior to historical development in its historical form but must first be inferred from the latter. The permanent must be recognized in change, change must be recognized on the basis of the permanent. In historical reality, the contents conditioned by racial disposition are overlaid by the received contents of foreign or related cultures ('influences'), and the form of the work of art is modified according to the immanent, 'internal' laws of the development of form. Not everything is historically 'possible' at all times with an unchanged will to expression (Wölfflin). Therefore, the art of a people and a period cannot be derived from the enduring will to expression of a presupposed subject. In purely biological consideration of art, the 'transmission belt' between the general and the particular is missing just as it was missing in the cultural-historical view of art history previously in vogue, which gave the art historian Dvorak occasion for the witty comparison. From the most detailed and apt description of the culture of the Renaissance the art of the Renaissance in its historical concreteness cannot be derived. What is missing is that 'transmission belt'

which will be found wanting wherever a general 'essence' is assumed, and a concrete historical form is to be derived from it. The concept of style eliminates this dualism between the general and the particular, between essence and appearance.

Art history as style history states: Art is indeed not an independent, but still an original phenomenon. This phenomenon has its own development, although during all phases of this development it remains connected to the ground of life from which it originates. Style is an objective phenomenon. It is impossible to derive it from typical experiences of a subject (the 'genius'). The view of art and the world originating from Dilthey's concept of experience leads only to a compilation of typical ways of seeing. But ways of seeing are not styles. Ways of seeing are inherent in races, peoples and individuals, and insofar they are the first, not further to be fathomed, as it were the primordial precondition of all artistic creation. Styles, on the other hand, are temporally historical structures.

The phenomenon of art cannot be derived from experiences and from efforts at expression. *Art can only arise from the desire to immortalize a content, and the expression of this desire is style. The monumental style stands at the beginning of all art.* The need for private confessions would never have produced great historical art. It is only because there is monumental art that there is also intimate and idyllic art.

'In the building the pride, the victory over gravity, the will to power should become visible; architecture is a kind of power-eloquence in forms, sometimes persuasive, even flattering, sometimes merely commanding. The highest feeling of power and security finds expression in that which has a grand style. The power which needs no further proof; that disdains to please; that responds with difficulty; that feels no witnesses around itself; that lives without consciousness that there is opposition to it; that rests in itself, fatalistically, a law among laws: that speaks of itself as grand style' (Nietzsche, 'Twilight of the Idols', Wanderings of an Untimely One, 11).

End of the text.

For the Greek words we employed the polytonic or accented Greek: it includes acute, grave, and circumflex accents on vowels, as well as smooth and rough breathing marks on initial vowels of words. It also includes other diacritical marks such as cornua, subscripts, etc. For Latin words we used Latin with accents and diacritical marks: it includes accents on stressed vowels, such as the acute accent or the macron. It may also include other diacritical marks such as the apex to mark long vowels, the underscore for short vowels, etc. We would appreciate it if you could inform us of any errors so that we can correct them.

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