STALIN’S WILLING EXECUTIONER   JEWS AS A HOSTILE  ELITE IN THE USSR
The Jewish Century 
Yuri Slezkine 
Reviewed by Kevin MacDonald
A 
persistent theme among critics of Jews—particularly those on the 
pre-World War II right—has been that the Bolshevik revolution was a 
Jewish revolution and that the Soviet Union was dominated by Jews. 
This theme appears in a wide range of writings, from Henry Ford’s 
International 
Jew
, to published statements by a long list of British, French, and American 
political figures in the 1920s (Winston Churchill, Woodrow Wilson, and David 
Lloyd George), and, in its most extreme form, by Adolf Hitler, who wrote:
Now begins the last great revolution. By wresting political power 
for himself, the Jew casts off the few remaining shreds of disguise 
he still wears. The democratic plebeian Jew turns into the blood Jew 
and the tyrant of peoples. In a few years he will try to exterminate the 
national pillars of intelligence and, by robbing the peoples of their 
natural spiritual leadership, will make them ripe for the slavish lot of a 
permanent subju
gation. The most terrible example of this is Russia.
1
This long tradition stands in sharp contradiction to the official view, 
promulgated by Jewish organizations and almost all contemporary historians, 
that Jews played no special role in Bolshevism and indeed were specifically 
victimized by it. Yuri Slezkine’s book provides a much needed resolution 
to these opposing perspectives. It is an intellectual tour de force, alternately 
muddled and brilliant, courageous and apologetic.
APOLLONIANS AND MERCURIANS
One of the muddled elements, apparent at the beginning and present 
throughout 
The Jewish Century,
 is Slezkine’s claim that the peoples of the world 
can be classified into two groups. The successful peoples of the modern world, 
66 Vol. 5, No. 3
The Occidental Quarterly
termed Mercurians, are urban, mobile, literate, articulate, and intellectually 
sophisticated. Distinguished by their ability to manipulate symbols, they pursue 
“wealth for the sake of learning, learning for the sake of wealth, and both 
wealth and learning for their own sake” (p. 1). Since Slezkine sees Jews as the 
quintessential Mercurians, he regards modernization as essentially a process 
of everyone becoming Jewish. His second group, which he calls Apollonians, 
is rooted in the land and in traditional agrarian cultures, and prizes physical 
strength and warrior values.
Slezkine conceptualizes Mercurianism as a worldview, and therefore a 
matter of psychological choice, rather than as a set of psychological mecha
-nisms, the most important of which is general intelligence.
2
 As a result of this 
false premise, he exaggerates the similarity among Mercurians, underestimates 
the power of ethnocentrism as a unifying factor in Jewish history, and fails to 
understand the roots of Western social and economic institutions. 
Slezkine views Judaism as one of many Mercurian cultures—peoples that 
dwell alone in Diasporas, living among strangers and often acting as economic 
middlemen: the Overseas Chinese, Indians, and Lebanese, and the Gypsies and 
Irish Travelers. Their common denominator, in Slezkine’s view (and mine
3
), is 
their status as strangers to the people they live among—sojourners who, above 
all else, do not intermarry or socialize with the locals. Their interactions with the 
local Apollonians involve “mutual hostility, suspicion and contempt” (p. 20) and 
a sense of superiority. Moreover, a “common host stereotype of the Mercurians is 
that they are devious, acquisitive, greedy, crafty, pushy, and crude” (p. 23). The 
Mercurians possess greater kin solidarity and internal cohesion than the people 
they live among; they are characterized by extended families and patriarchal 
social organization. 
So far, so good, although I would stress that the family organization of such 
groups derives more from the long-term adaptation to the culture areas they 
originate from than from an adaptation to the nomadic, middleman niche.
4
 But 
Slezkine maintains that Mercurians are above all smarter than the people they 
live among: They are said to possess “cunning intelligence,” but it is surely a 
mistake to consider such disparate groups as Jews (or the Overseas Chinese) 
and Gypsies (or the Irish Travelers) as having in common a particular set of 
intellectual traits. After all, the Jews, as Slezkine shows, have repeatedly become 
an academic, intellectual, cultural, and economic elite in Western societies, 
while Gypsies have tended toward illiteracy and are at best an economically 
marginal group. 
Slezkine imagines that the Gypsies and literate middleman groups like the 
Jews or Overseas Chinese differ not in intelligence but only in whether they 
express their intelligence through literacy or an oral culture: “Businessmen, 
diplomats,  doctors,  and  psychotherapists  are  literate  peddlers,  heralds, 
healers, and fortune-tellers” (p. 29)—a formulation that will not stand the test 
of current psychometric data. In fact, the general patterns of Gypsies are the 
Fall 2005 / MacDonald
67
opposite of Jews: a low-investment, low-IQ reproductive style characterized 
by higher fertility, earlier onset of sexual behavior and reproduction, more 
unstable pair bonds, higher rate of single parenting, shorter interval of birth 
spacing, higher infant mortality rate, and higher rate of survival of low birth 
weight infants.
5
 Intelligence, for Slezkine, is a lifestyle choice, rather than a set 
of brain processes underlying information processing and strongly influenced 
by genetic variation. As we shall see, this formulation is very useful to Slezkine 
as he constructs his argument later in the book.
In his attempt to paint with a very broad brush, Slezkine also ignores 
other real differences among the Mercurians, most notably, I would argue, 
the aggressiveness of the Jews compared to the relative passivity of the 
Overseas Chinese. Both the Jews and the Overseas Chinese are highly intel
-
ligent and entrepreneurial, but the Overseas Chinese have not formed a hostile 
cultural elite in Southeast Asian countries, where they have chiefly settled, 
and have not been concentrated in media ownership or in the construction 
of culture. We do not read of Chinese cultural movements disseminated in 
the major universities and media outlets that subject the traditional culture of 
Southeast Asians and anti-Chinese sentiment to radical critique, or of Chinese 
organizations campaigning for the removal of native cultural and religious 
symbols from public places.
6
 Slezkine paints Jews as deeply involved in the 
construction of culture and in the politics of the host societies, but the role of 
the Chinese was quite different. The following passage describing the political 
attitudes of the Overseas Chinese in Thailand could never have applied to 
Jews in Western societies since the Enlightenment:
But few seem to know or indeed to care about the restrictions on 
citizenship, nationality rights, and political activities in general, nor 
are these restrictions given much publicity in the Chinese press. This 
merely points up the fact, recognized by all observers, that the overseas 
Chinese are primarily concerned with making a living, or amassing a 
fortune, and thus take only a passive interest in the formal political life 
of the country
in which they live.
7
Moreover, Slezkine pictures the middlemen as specializing in “certain 
dangerous, marvelous, and distasteful” (p. 9), but nevertheless indispensable, 
pursuits (p. 36)—a formulation that carries a grain of truth, as in places where 
natives were prohibited from loaning money at interest. However, he ignores, 
or at least fails to spell out, the extent to which Jews have been willing agents 
of exploitative elites, not only in Western societies, but in the Muslim world as 
well.
8
 This is the overarching generalization which one can make about Jewish 
economic behavior over the ages. Their role went far beyond performing tasks 
deemed inappropriate for the natives for religious reasons; rather they were 
often tasks at which natives would be relatively less ruthless in exploiting 
their fellows. This was especially the case in Eastern Europe, where economic 
68 Vol. 5, No. 3
The Occidental Quarterly
arrangements such as tax farming, estate management, and monopolies on 
retail liquor distribution lasted far longer than in the West:
In this way, the Jewish arendator became the master of life and death 
over the population of entire districts, and having nothing but a short-
term and purely financial interest in the relationship, was faced with 
the irresistible temptation to pare his temporary subjects to the bone. 
On the noble estates he tended to put his relatives and co-religionists 
in charge of the flour-mill, the brewery, and in particular of the lord’s 
taverns where by custom the peasants were obliged to drink. On the 
church estates, he became the collector of all ecclesiastical dues, standing 
by the church door for his payment from tithe-payers, baptized infants, 
newly-weds, and mourners. On the [royal] estates..., he became in effect 
the Crown Agent, farming out the tolls, taxes, and courts, and adorning 
his oppressions
 with all the dignity of royal authority.
9
Jewish involvement in the Communist elite of the USSR can be seen as a 
variation on an ancient theme in Jewish culture rather than a new one sprung 
from the special circumstances of the Bolshevik Revolution. Rather than being 
the willing agents of exploitative non-Jewish elites who were clearly separated 
from both the Jews and the people they ruled, Jews became an entrenched 
part of an exploitative and oppressive elite in which group boundaries were 
blurred. This blurring of boundaries was aided by four processes, all covered by 
Slezkine: shedding overt Jewish identities in favor of a veneer of international 
socialism in which Jewish identity and ethnic networking were relatively invisible; 
seeking lower-profile positions in order to de-emphasize Jewish preeminence 
(e.g., Trotsky); adopting Slavic names; and engaging in a limited amount of 
intermarriage with non-Jewish elites.
10
 Indeed, the “plethora of Jewish wives” 
among non-Jewish leaders
11
 doubtless heightened the Jewish atmosphere of 
the top levels of the Soviet government, given that everyone, especially Stalin, 
appears to have been quite conscious of ethnicity.
12
 For their part, anti-Semites 
have accused Jews of having “
implanted those of their own category as wives and 
husbands for influential figures and officials.
”
13
By emphasizing the necessity and distastefulness of traditional Jewish 
occupations, Slezkine also ignores the extent to which Jewish competition 
suppressed the formation of a native middle class in Eastern Europe. (This 
has also occurred throughout Southeast Asia, because of competition from 
the Overseas Chinese.) Instead, Slezkine sees Eastern Europeans, through 
stereotypic lenses, as quintessential Apollonians, some of whom became 
Mercurian modernists when forced to by circumstances, rather than as 
containing elements that would have naturally aspired to and competently 
performed the economic and cultural functions that instead came to be 
performed by Jews because of their ability to create ethnic monopolies 
in goods and services. When Jews won the economic competition in early 
modern Poland, the result was that the great majority of Poles were reduced 
to the status of agricultural laborers supervised by Jewish estate managers in 
Fall 2005 / MacDonald
69
an economy in which trade, manufacturing, and artisanry were in large part 
controlled by Jews.
14
 On the other hand, in most of Western Europe Jews had 
been expelled in the Middle Ages. As a result, when modernization occurred, 
it was accomplished with an indigenous middle class. If, as in Eastern Europe, 
Jews had won the economic competition in most of these professions, there 
would not have been a non-Jewish middle class in England. Whatever one 
imagines might have been the fortunes and character of England with predomi
-
nantly Jewish artisans, merchants, and manufacturers, it seems reasonable 
to suppose that the Christian taxpayers of England made a good investment 
in their own future when they agreed to pay King Edward I a massive tax of 
£116,346 in return for expelling two thousand Jews in 1290.
15
While  Slezkine’s  treatment  overemphasizes  middlemen  as  a  societal 
necessity rather than as ethnic outsiders competing for scarce resources, he 
does note that the rise of the Jews in the USSR came at the expense of the 
Germans as a Mercurian minority in Russia prior to the Revolution. (Jews 
were excluded from traditional Russia apart from the Pale of Settlement, which 
included Ukraine, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Crimea, and part of Poland.) Germans 
manned the imperial bureaucracy, formed a large percentage of professionals, 
entrepreneurs, and artisans, were more literate than the Russians, and had a 
sense of cultural superiority and ethnic solidarity: 
And so they were, mutatis mutandis, head to the Russian heart, mind 
to the Russian soul, consciousness to Russian spontaneity. They stood 
for calculation, efficiency, and discipline; cleanliness, fastidiousness, 
and sobriety; pushiness, tactlessness, and energy; sentimentality, love of 
family, and unmanliness (or absurdly exaggerated manliness).... Perhaps 
paradoxically, in light of what would happen in the twentieth century, 
Germans were, occupationally and conceptually, the Jews of ethnic Russia 
(as well as much of Eastern Europe). Or rather, the Russian Germans were 
to Russia what the German Jews were to Germany—only much more so. 
So fundamental were the German Mercurians to Russia’s view of itself 
that both their existence and their complete and abrupt disappearance 
have been routinely taken for granted (pp. 113–114).
Although the replacement of Germans by Jews was well under way by 
the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, a key consequence of the Revolution 
was the substitution of one Mercurian group, the Germans, by another, the 
Jews. The difference between the Jews and the Germans was that the Jews 
had a longstanding visceral antipathy, out of past historical grievances, both 
real and imagined, toward the people and culture they came to administer. 
Indeed, Russians on the nationalist right admired the Germans, at least up to 
World War I. For example, a statute of one nationalist organization, Michael 
the Archangel Russian People’s Union, expressed “particular trust in the 
German population of the Empire,”
16
 while its leader, Vladimir Purishkevich, 
accused the Jews of “irreconcilable hatred of Russia and everything Russian.”
17
Jews disliked the Christian religion of the vast majority of Russians because 
70 Vol. 5, No. 3
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of the antagonistic relationship between Judaism and Christianity over the 
ages; Jews distrusted the peasants, who “fell from grace” (p. 140) with the 
intelligentsia after the numerous anti-Jewish pogroms, especially after 1880; 
and Jews blamed the tsar for not doing enough to keep the peasants in check 
and for imposing the various quotas on Jewish advancement that went into 
place, also beginning in the 1880s—quotas that slowed down but by no means 
halted Jewish overrepresentation in the universities and the professions. In 
this respect, the Germans were far more like the Overseas Chinese, in that 
they became an elite without having an aggressively hostile attitude toward 
the people and culture they administered and dominated economically. Thus 
when Jews achieved power in Russia, it was as a hostile elite with a deep 
sense of historic grievance. As a result, they became willing executioners of 
both the people and cultures they came to rule, including the Germans. 
After the Revolution, not only were the Germans replaced, but there was 
active suppression of any remnants of the older order and their descendants. 
Jews have always shown a tendency to rise because their natural proclivities 
(e.g., high intelligence) and powerful ethnic networking, but here they also 
benefited from “antibourgeois” quotas in educational institutions and other 
forms of discrimination against the middle class and aristocratic elements of 
the old regime that would have provided more competition with Jews. In a 
letter intercepted by the secret police, the father of a student wrote that his 
son and their friends were about to be purged from the university because 
of their class origins. “It is clear that only the Jerusalem academics and the 
Communist Party members generally are going to stay” (p. 243). The bourgeois 
elements from the previous regime, including the ethnic Germans, would have 
no future. Thus the mass murder of peasants and nationalists was combined 
with the systematic exclusion of the previously existing non-Jewish middle 
class. The wife of a Leningrad University professor noted, “in all the institu
-
tions, only workers and Israelites are admitted; the life of the intelligentsia is 
very hard” (p. 243). Even at the end of the 1930s, prior to the Russification that 
accompanied World War II, “the Russian Federation...was still doing penance 
for its imperial past while also serving as an example of an ethnicity-free 
society” (p. 276). While all other nationalities, including Jews, were allowed 
and encouraged to keep their ethnic identities, the revolution remained an 
anti-majoritarian movement. 
Slezkine is aware of the biological reality of kinship and ethnicity, but he 
steadfastly pursues a cultural determinist model. He argues that biological 
models of ethnic nepotism are inappropriate because some nomadic groups 
are not kin groups but rather “quasi-families” like the Sicilian mafia (p. 35). 
But this is a distinction without a difference: Why are “natural” kinship groups 
significantly different from groups composed of families that band together? 
Each is characterized by internal cohesion and external strangeness, the traits 
Slezkine deems essential, but there are also kinship connections and a genetic 
Fall 2005 / MacDonald
71
divide between themselves and surrounding peoples. Cultural badges of group 
membership and a culturally generated ideology of kin-group membership are 
age-old ways of cementing kinship groups and setting up barriers that mark real 
biological differences—the evolved psychology described by modern research 
in social identity theory.
18
 And in any case, the demonstrable genetic differences 
between Slezkine’s prototypical Mercurians—the Jews, Gypsies, and Overseas 
Chinese—and the surrounding peoples cry out for a biological analysis. 
Moreover, Slezkine underestimates the power of ethnocentrism as a unifying 
factor in Jewish history. This is most apparent in his discussion of Israel, which 
he describes as a radical departure from the Jewish tradition, because Israel is a 
quintessentially Apollonian society. Long after Western societies had rejected 
ethnic nationalism:
Israel continued to live in the European 1930s: only Israel still belonged 
to the eternally young, worshiped athleticism and inarticulateness, cele
-
brated combat and secret police, promoted hiking and scouting, despised 
doubt and introspection, embodied the seamless unity of the chosen, 
and rejected most traits traditionally associated with Jewishness.... After 
two thousand years of living as Mercurians among Apollonians, Jews 
turned into the only Apollonians in a world of Mercurians (or rather, the 
only civilized Apollonians in a world of Mercurians and barbarians)” 
(pp. 327, 328). 
But Israelis certainly did not reject traditional Jewish ethnocentrism and 
sense of peoplehood. Slezkine portrays Israelis as simply choosing to be 
ethnocentric nationalists, but ethnocentrism (like intelligence) is a biological 
system, not a lifestyle choice, and traditional Diaspora Jews were certainly 
deeply and intensely ethnocentric above all else.
19
 There can be little question 
that Israel and Zionism have been and are promoted and spearheaded by the 
most ethnocentric elements of the Jewish community.
20
For Slezkine, as for so many Jews, the moral debt owed to Jews by Western 
societies justifies the most extreme expressions of Jewish racialism: “The 
rhetoric of ethnic homogeneity and ethnic deportations, tabooed elsewhere in 
the West, is a routine element of Israeli political life.... It is true that no other 
European nation is in a condition of permanent war; it is also true that no other 
European state can have as strong a claim on the West’s moral imagination” 
(pp. 364–365). Slezkine sees the moral taboo on European ethnocentrism, 
the creation of Nazism as the epitome of absolute evil, and the consecration 
of Jews as “the Chosen people of the postwar Western world” (p. 366) as 
simply the inevitable results of the events of World War II (pp. 365–366). In 
fact, however, the creation and maintenance of the culture of the Holocaust 
and the special moral claims of Jews and Israel are the result of Jewish ethnic 
activism. These claims have a specific historical trajectory, they are fueled by 
specific key events, and they are sustained by specific forces.
21
 For example, 
the Holocaust was not emphasized as a cultural icon until the late 1960s and 
72 Vol. 5, No. 3
The Occidental Quarterly
early 1970s, when images of the Holocaust were deployed on a large scale in 
popular culture by Jewish activists specifically to rally support for Israel in 
the context of its wars of 1967 and 1973.
Similarly, Slezkine sees the United States as a Jewish promised land precisely 
because it is not defined tribally and “has no state-bearing natives” (p. 369). But 
the recasting of the United States as a “proposition nation” was importantly 
influenced by the triumph of several Jewish intellectual and political movements 
more than it was a natural and inevitable culmination of American history.
22
These movements collectively delegitimized cultural currents of the early 
twentieth century whereby many Americans thought of themselves as members 
of a very successful ethnic group. For example, the immigration restrictionists 
of the 1920s unabashedly asserted the right of European-derived peoples to 
the land they had conquered and settled. Americans of northern European 
descent in the United States thought of themselves as part of a cultural and 
ethnic heritage extending backward in time to the founding of the country, 
and writers like Madison Grant (
The Passing of the Great Race
)
and Lothrop 
Stoddard (
The Rising Tide of Color against White World Supremacy
)
had a large 
public following. At that time both academia and mainstream culture believed 
in the reality of race; that there were important differences between the races, 
including in intelligence and moral character; and that races naturally competed 
for land and other resources.
23
J
EWISH
 S
UPERIORITY
The assertion that Israel is the only civilized Apollonian society, despite its 
acknowledged racialism and open discussion of ethnic deportations, reveals 
Slezkine’s belief in Jewish moral and intellectual superiority. Indeed, Slezkine 
regards both European individualism and the European nation-state as imita
-
tions of preexisting Jewish accomplishments: “Europeans imitated Jews not 
only in being modern [by becoming individualists interacting with strangers], 
but also in being ancient” [i.e., by developing ethnically based nation-states] (p. 
44). So we read condescending passages such as “among the most successful 
[of the European Mercurians] were Max Weber’s Protestants, who discovered a 
humorless, dignified way to be Jewish” (p. 41). This act of intellectual gymnastics 
depends on the following analogy: Jews act as an ethnically based tribe within 
societies, seeing non-Jews as strangers; Europeans establish tribal nation-states 
while behaving as individualists within their societies (seeing other Europeans 
as strangers). The sweeping conclusion: Jews are the progenitors therefore of 
both aspects of modernity: economic individualism and the ethnically based 
nation-state. The Holocaust then occurred because the European nation-state, 
although an imitation of Judaism, failed somehow to be sufficiently Jewish: 
“In the hands of heavily armed, thoroughly bureaucratized, and imperfectly 
Judaized Apollonians, Mercurian exclusivity and fastidiousness became 
relentlessly expansive. In the hands of messianically inclined Apollonians, 
Fall 2005 / MacDonald
73
it turned lethal—especially to the Mercurians. The Holocaust had as much to 
do with tradition as it did with modernity” (p. 46). 
But it is a huge stretch to argue from an analogy—and a loose one at that—to 
actual imitation and influence. (And one just doesn’t know what to say about 
his claim that Europeans perpetrated the Holocaust because they had become 
imperfect Jews.) Slezkine fails to provide any evidence that there is anything 
but a hazy and forced logical connection between European individualism 
and the Jewish role as a Diaspora people living among strangers. The reality 
is that by becoming individualists, Western Europeans returned to distinctive 
roots buried in their primeval past,
24
 whereas Judaism, because of its deep-
seated tribalism, was widely regarded by Enlightenment intellectuals as an 
outmoded relic. Indeed, several Jewish commentators have noted that the post-
Enlightenment forms of Judaism have essentially been responses to the corrosive 
effects of European civilization, with its emphasis on individualism and ethnic 
assimilation, on Judaism as an ethnically based collectivist group—what early 
Zionist Arthur Ruppin described as “the destructive influence of European 
civilization” on Judaism because of its tendency to break down group barriers 
and lead eventually to assimilation and intermarriage.
25
 Moreover, as Slezkine 
notes, Jews are not really individualists at all. Even in the modern world, the 
tribal approach of the Jews in economic enterprises employs ethnic kinship as 
a central component, whereas the individualistic approach of the Europeans 
sees this as illegitimate (p. 43). The bottom line is that it is ridiculous to claim 
that Jews are individualists because they treat outsiders as individuals while 
acknowledging that they retain a powerful ingroup consciousness and are 
masters of ethnic networking.
 It is no stretch at all, however, to show that Jews have achieved a preeminent 
position in Europe and America, and Slezkine provides us with statistics of Jewish 
domination only dimly hinted at in the following examples from Europe in the 
late nineteenth century to the rise of National Socialism. Austria: All but one bank 
in fin de siècle Vienna was administered by Jews, and Jews constituted 70% of the 
stock exchange council; Hungary: between 50 and 90 percent of all industry was 
controlled by Jewish banking families, and 71% of the most wealthy taxpayers 
were Jews; Germany: Jews were overrepresented among the economic elite by a 
factor of 33. Similar massive overrepresentation was also to be found in educational 
attainment and among professionals (e.g., Jews constituted 62% of the lawyers 
in Vienna in 1900, 25% in Prussia in 1925, 34% in Poland, and 51% in Hungary). 
Indeed, “the universities, ‘free’ professions, salons, coffeehouses, concert halls, 
and art galleries in Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest became so heavily Jewish that 
liberalism and Jewishness became almost indistinguishable” (p. 63).
Slezkine documents the well-known fact that, as Moritz Goldstein famously 
noted in 1912, “We Jews administer the spiritual possessions of Germany.” 
However, he regards Jewish cultural dominance, not only in Germany but 
throughout Eastern Europe and Austria, as completely benign: “The secular 
74 Vol. 5, No. 3
The Occidental Quarterly
Jews’ love of Goethe, Schiller, and the other Pushkins—as well as the various 
northern forests they represented—was sincere and tender” (p. 68). Their 
only sin was that their love of cultural icons transcended national and ethnic 
boundaries in an age of popular nationalism—for example, their promotion 
of German culture among the Czechs, Latvians, and Romanians. But this is far 
from the whole story. Jews were not simply lovers of Pushkin and Goethe. A 
major theme of anti-Jewish attitudes was that Jews were deeply involved in 
creating a “culture of critique”—that Jewish cultural influence was entirely 
negative and shattered the social bonds of the peoples they lived among. 
Slezkine cites Heinrich Heine as a prime example of a Jewish intellectual with 
sincere and tender love for German culture, but the Germans, from Wagner to 
von Treitschke to Chamberlain and Hitler, didn’t see it that way. For example, 
Heinrich von Treitschke, a prominent nineteenth-century German intellectual, 
complained of Heine’s “mocking German humiliation and disgrace following 
the Napoleonic wars” and Heine’s having “no sense of shame, loyalty, truth
-
fulness, or reverence.”
26
 Nor does he mention von Treitschke’s comment 
that “what Jewish journalists write in mockery and satirical remarks against 
Christianity is downright revolting”; “about the shortcomings of the Germans 
[or] French, everybody could freely say the worst things; but if somebody dared 
to speak in just and moderate terms about some undeniable weakness of the 
Jewish character, he was immediately branded as a barbarian and religious 
persecutor by nearly all of the newspapers.”
27
 Such attitudes were prominent 
among anti-Jewish writers and activists, reaching a crescendo with the National 
Socialists in Germany. 
Yet for Slezkine, if Jews did battle against various national cultures—and in 
the end, he acknowledges that they did—it was only because they realized that 
their Mercurian worldview was superior: “Did they really want to transform 
themselves into thick-skulled peasants now that the actual peasants had, for 
all practical purposes, admitted the error of their ways?” (p. 74). Jews were 
not recognized as legitimate curators of the national culture, but their lack of 
acceptance means only that they are truly modern: “Deprived of the comforts 
of their tribe and not allowed into the new ones created by their Apollonian 
neighbors, they became the only true moderns” (p. 75)—a statement that accepts 
at face value the idea that the secular Jews who had become the custodians 
and main producers of culture had ceased to have a Jewish identification. 
Slezkine fails to provide any evidence at all for this claim, and in fact there is 
overwhelming evidence that it is false.
28
The main weapons Jews used against national cultures were two quint
-
essentially modern ideologies, Marxism and Freudianism, “both [of which] 
countered nationalism’s quaint tribalism with a modern (scientific) path to 
wholeness” (p. 80). Slezkine correctly views both of these as Jewish ideologies 
functioning as organized religions, with sacred texts promising deliverance 
from earthly travail.