FOUNDATIONS OF GEOPOLITICS

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BOOKS

FOUNDATIONS OF GEOPOLITICS

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The history and fate of geopolitics as a science is paradoxical. On the one hand, the concept itself seems to have become familiar and is actively used in modern politics. Geopolitical magazines and institutions are multiplying. The texts of the founders of this discipline are published and republished, conferences, symposia are organized, geopolitical committees and commissions are created.

But, nevertheless, until now geopolitics has not been able to get into the category of conventional generally recognized sciences. The first geopolitical works of the German Ratzel, the Swede Kjellen and especially the Englishman Mackinder were met with hostility by the scientific community. Classical science, which fully inherits the hypercritical spirit of early positivism, believed that geopolitics pretended to be over-generalized and, therefore, was only a kind of "charlatanism."

In a sense, the sad fate of geopolitics as a science was also associated with the political side of the problem. The opinion was established that the war crimes of the Third Reich were expansion, war, deportation, etc. were to a large extent theoretically trained by German geopoliticians who allegedly provided Hitler's regime with a pseudoscientific base. (I meant, first of all, Karl Haushofer, a German geopolitician who at one time was quite close to the Fuehrer.)

However, at the theoretical level, German geopolitics was essentially no different from Anglo-Saxon geopolitics (Mackinder, Mahan, Speakman), French (Vidal de la Blache), Russian "military geography" (Milyutin, Snesarev), etc. The difference lay not in Haushofer's specific views, which were completely logical and adequate to the discipline itself, but in the methods by which a number of his geopolitical positions were implemented. Moreover, the specificity of Germany's international politics in the 1930s and 1940s in its most repulsive manifestations sharply contradicted the ideas of Haushofer himself. Instead of a "continental bloc" along the Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis, an attack on the USSR, instead of an organicist (in the spirit of Schmitt's theory of "peoples' rights") understanding of the Lebensraum doctrine, "living space" vulgar nationalism and imperialism, etc. It should also be noted that the Haushofer school and his magazine "Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik" were never elements of the official Nazi system. Like many intellectual groups of the so-called. "Conservative revolutionaries" in the Third Reich, they led an ambiguous existence, they simply tolerated, and this tolerance varied depending on the current political situation.

However, the main reason for the historical oppression of geopolitics is the fact that it too openly reveals the fundamental mechanisms of international politics, which various regimes often prefer to hide behind vague rhetoric or abstract ideological schemes. In this sense, we can draw a parallel with Marxism (at least in its purely scientific, analytical part). Just as Marx more than convincingly reveals the mechanics of production relations and their connections with historical formations, so geopolitics exposes the historical demagogy of foreign policy discourse, showing real deep levers influencing international ones.

interstate and interethnic relations. But if Marxism is a global revision of classical economic history, then geopolitics is a revision of the history of international relations. This last consideration explains the ambivalence of society towards geopolitical scientists. The scientific community stubbornly refuses

them into their midst, harshly criticizing, and most often not noticing, while the authorities, on the contrary, are actively using geopolitical calculations to develop an international strategy. This, for example, was the case with one of the first geopoliticians, the true founding father of this discipline, Sir Halford Mackinder. His ideas were not accepted in academic circles, but he himself directly participated in the formation of English politics in the first half of the 20th century, laying the theoretical basis for England's international strategy, intercepted by the United States by the middle of the century and developed by the American (more broadly, Atlanticist) followers of Mackinder.

The parallel with Marxism, in our opinion, is apt. The method can be borrowed and mastered by different poles. The Marxist analysis is equally important for the representatives of Capital and for the fighters for the emancipation of Labor. Likewise, geopolitics: it instructs representatives of large states (empires) on how best to maintain territorial domination and expand, and their opponents find in it the conceptual principles of the revolutionary theory of "national liberation". For example, the Treaty of Versailles was the work of the Mackinder geopolitical school, which expressed the interests of the West and aimed at weakening the states of Central Europe and suppressing Germany. Mackinder's German student Karl Haushofer, proceeding from the same premises, developed the opposite theory of "European liberation",

The latter considerations show that even without being accepted in the commonwealth of classical sciences, geopolitics is extremely effective in practice, and its importance in some aspects surpasses many conventional disciplines.

Be that as it may, geopolitics exists today and little by little it is gaining official recognition and the corresponding status. However, not everything is smooth in this process. Quite often we are faced with the substitution of the very concept of "geopolitics", which is more and more widespread as the use of this term becomes commonplace among laymen. The emphasis shifts from the full-fledged and global picture developed by the founding fathers to particular regional issues or geoeconomic schemes. At the same time, the initial postulates are geopolitical dualism, competition of strategies, civilizational differentiation, etc. they are either ignored, or hushed up, or even denied altogether. It is difficult to imagine something similar in any other science. What would become of classical physics if, in terms of "mass", "

The purpose of this book is to present the main geopolitics objectively and impartially, beyond preconceptions, ideological sympathies and antipathies. No matter how we relate to this science, we can make a definite opinion on its account only after getting acquainted with its principles, history and methodology.

INTRODUCTION

The definition of "geopolitics"

The works of numerous representatives of geopolitical schools, despite all their differences and often contradictions, add up to one general picture, which allows us to speak of the subject itself as something complete and definite. These or those authors and dictionaries differ in the definition of the main subject of study of this science and the main methodological principles. This discrepancy stems from historical circumstances, as well as from the closest connection of geopolitics with world politics, power problems and dominant ideologies. The synthetic nature of this discipline presupposes the inclusion in it of many additional subjects of geography, history, demography, strategy, ethnography, religious studies, ecology, military affairs, history of ideology, sociology, political science, etc. Since all these military men, Since natural and human sciences themselves have many schools and directions, it is not necessary to speak of any rigor and unambiguity in geopolitics. But what is the definition of this discipline, so vague and at the same time expressive and impressive?

Geopolitics is a worldview, and in this capacity it is better to compare it not with sciences, but with systems of sciences. It is on the same level as Marxism, liberalism, etc., i.e. systems of interpretations of society and history, highlighting as a basic principle a single most important criterion and reducing all the other countless aspects of man and nature to it.

Marxism[one] and liberalism are equally based on the economic side of human existence, the principle of "economy as fate." It does not matter that these two ideologies draw opposite conclusions Marx comes to the inevitability
anti-capitalist revolution, and the followers of Adam Smith consider capitalism the most perfect model of society. In both the first and second cases, a detailed method of interpreting the historical process is proposed, a special sociology, anthropology and political science. And, despite the constant criticism of these forms of "economic reductionism" from alternative (and marginal) scientific circles, they remain the dominant social models, on the basis of which people not only comprehend the past, but also create the future, i.e. plan, design, conceive and carry out large-scale activities that directly affect all of humanity.

The same is the case with geopolitics. But unlike "economic ideologies", it is based on the thesis: "geographic relief is like destiny." Geography and space act in geopolitics in the same function as money and production relations in Marxism and liberalism, all fundamental aspects of human existence are reduced to them, they serve as the basic method of interpreting the past, they act as the main factors of human existence, organizing all the rest around themselves. sides of existence. As with economic ideologies,

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[one] A clear analogy between geopolitics and Marxism was pointed out in 1943 by Karl Korsch in his book Historical Views of Geopoliticians: “(...) the new materialism of geopolitics has the same critical, activist and idealistic (in the traditional sense of the word) character as in the early periods of the so-called historical materialism of Marx ... Just as Marxism today strives for conscious control over the economic life of society, so today's "Haushoferism" can be defined as an attempt to political control over space. " Cit. from New Essays, 6 vol., 1943, p. 817.

geopolitics is based on approximation, on reductionism, reducing the diverse manifestations of life to several parameters, but despite the deliberate error that is always inherent in such theories, it impressively proves its harmony in explaining the past and extreme efficiency in organizing the present and designing the future.

If we continue the parallel with Marxism and classical bourgeois political economy, we can say that, like economic ideologies that assert a special category of "economic man" (homo economicus), geopolitics speaks of a "spatial man," predetermined by space, formed and
the relief, landscape due to its specific quality. But this conditionality is especially clearly manifested in large-scale social manifestations of a person in states, ethnic groups, cultures, civilizations, etc. The dependence of each individual on the economy is evident in both small and large proportions. Therefore, economic determinism is understandable both for ordinary people and for the authorities operating with large social categories. For this reason, perhaps, economic ideologies became so popular and performed a mobilizing function up to revolutions based on personal engagement in the ideology of many individuals. Human dependence on space, the main thesis of geopolitics is seen only with some distance from the individual. And therefore, despite the preconditions, geopolitics did not become an ideology itself or, more precisely, "mass ideologues to her." Its conclusions and methods, subjects of study and main theses are intelligible only to those social authorities that are engaged in
large-scale problems of strategic planning, reflection
global social and historical patterns, etc. Space manifests itself in large quantities, and therefore geopolitics is intended for social groups dealing with the generalized realities of countries, peoples, etc.

Geopolitics is the worldview of power, the science of power and for power. Only as a person approaches the social top, geopolitics begins to reveal its meaning, its meaning and its benefits for him, whereas before that it was perceived as an abstraction. Geopolitics is a discipline of political elites (both actual and alternative), and its entire history convincingly proves that it was engaged exclusively by people actively participating in the process of governing countries and nations, or preparing for this role (if it was about alternative, oppositional ideological camps removed from power due to historical conditions).

Without pretending to scientific rigor, geopolitics at its level itself determines what is of value to it and what is not. The humanities and natural sciences are involved only when they do not contradict the basic principles of the geopolitical method. Geopolitics, in a way, itself selects those sciences and those directions in science that seem useful to it, leaving everything else without attention. In the modern world, it is a "short guide to the overlord", a textbook of power, which gives a summary of what should be considered when making global (fateful) decisions such as the conclusion of alliances, the outbreak of wars, the implementation of reforms, the restructuring of society, the introduction of large-scale economic and political sanctions, etc.

Geopolitics is the science to edit.

Tellurocracy and Thalassocracy

The main law of geopolitics is the assertion of a fundamental dualism, reflected in the geographic structure of the planet and in the historical typology of civilizations. This dualism is expressed in the opposition of "tellurocracy" (land power) and "thalassocracy" (sea power). The nature of this confrontation is reduced to the opposition of a commercial civilization (Carthage, Athens) and a military-authoritarian civilization (Rome, Sparta). In other terms, the dualism between "democracy" and "ideocracy".

Already initially, this dualism has the quality of hostility, the alternative of its two constituent poles, although the degree may vary from case to case. The entire history of human societies, thus, is considered as consisting of two elements "water" ("liquid", "fluid") and "land" ("solid", "constant").

"Tellurocracy", "land power" is associated with the fixity of space and the stability of its qualitative orientations and characteristics. At the civilizational level, this is embodied in settled life, in conservatism, in strict legal norms, which are subject to large associations of people of the clan, tribes, peoples, states, empires. The hardness of Sushi is culturally embodied in the hardness of ethics and the sustainability of social traditions. Land (especially sedentary) peoples are alien to individualism, the spirit of entrepreneurship. They are characterized by collectivism and hierarchy.

"Thalassocracy", "sea power" is a type of civilization based on opposite attitudes. This type is dynamic, mobile, prone to technical development. His priorities are nomadism (especially navigation), trade, and the spirit of individual entrepreneurship. The individual, as the most mobile part of the team, is elevated to the highest value, while ethical and legal norms are eroded, becoming relative and mobile. This type of civilization develops rapidly, actively evolves, easily changes external cultural characteristics, keeping unchanged only the internal identity of the general attitude.

Much of human history unfolds in a situation of limited scope for both orientations, with the global domination of "tellurocracy." The element of the Earth (Land) dominates the entire ensemble of civilizations, and the element "Water" (sea, ocean) appears only fragmentarily and sporadically. Up to a certain point, dualism remains geographically localized on the sea shores, estuaries and river basins, etc. The opposition develops in different zones of the planet with different intensity and in different forms.

The political history of the peoples of the earth demonstrates a gradual growth of political forms, becoming more and more ambitious. This is how states and empires arise. This process at the geopolitical level means the strengthening of the factor of space in human history. The nature of large political formations of states and empires expresses the duality of the elements more impressively, reaching the level of more and more universal civilizational types.

At a certain moment (the ancient world), a fairly stable picture is formed, reflected in the "Mackinder's map". The tellurocracy zone is steadily identified with the inland expanses of northeastern Eurasia (in general terms, coinciding with the territories of tsarist Russia or the USSR). Thalassocracy is getting clearer

is designated as the coastal zones of the Eurasian continent, the Mediterranean area, the Atlantic Ocean and the seas washing Eurasia from the South and West.

This is how the world map acquires geopolitical specifics:

one) Intracontinental spaces become a "fixed platform", a heartland ("the land of the core"), a "geographical axis of history" that steadily preserves the tellurocratic civilizational specifics.

2) "Inland or continental crescent", "coastal zone", rimland represent a space of intensive cultural development. The features of "thalassocracy" are evident here. Although they are balanced by many "tellurocratic" tendencies.

3) The "outer or island crescent" represents "uncharted lands" with which only sea communications are possible. For the first time it makes itself felt in Carthage and the commercial Phoenician civilization, influencing the "inner crescent" of Europe from the outside.

This geopolitical picture of the relationship between thalassocracy and tellurocracy comes to light potentially at the beginning of the Christian era, after the era of the Punic wars. But it finally acquires meaning during the period of England's becoming a great naval power in the 17th and 19th centuries. The era of great geographical discoveries, which began at the end of the 15th century, entailed the final formation of the thalassocracy as an independent planetary entity, torn away from Eurasia and its shores and fully concentrated in the Anglo-Saxon world (England, America) and the colonies. The "New Carthage" of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and industrialism took shape into something unified and integral, and from that time on, geopolitical dualism acquired clearly distinguishable ideological and political forms.

The positional struggle of England with the continental powers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany and Russia was the geopolitical content of the 18th-19th centuries (+ the second half of the 20th century), and since the middle of this century, the United States has become the main stronghold of the thalassocracy.

In the Cold War of 1946 - 1991, the age-old geopolitical dualism reached its maximum proportions, thalassocracy was identified with the United States, and tellurocracy with the USSR.

Two global types of civilization, culture, meta-ideology have resulted in complete geopolitical outlines, summarizing the whole geopolitical history opposition of the elements. it is striking that these forms of the complete With geopolitical dualism on ideological level corresponded to two equally synthetic realities the ideology of Marxism (socialism) and the ideology of liberal capitalism.

In this case, we can talk about the implementation in practice of two types of "reductionism": economic reductionism was reduced to opposing the ideas of Smith and the ideas of Marx, and geopolitical to the division of all sectors of the planet into zones controlled by the thalassocracy (New Carthage, USA) and tellurocracy (New Rome , THE USSR).

The geopolitical vision of history is a model for the development of planetary dualism to maximum proportions. Land and Sea extend their original opposition to the entire world.

Human history is nothing more than an expression of this struggle and a path to its absolutization.

This is the most general expression of the main law of geopolitics of the law of dualism of the elements (Land versus Sea).

Geopolitical teleology

Until the final victory of the United States in the Cold War, geopolitical dualism developed within the originally specified framework, it was about the acquisition of maximum spatial, strategic and power volume by thalassocracy and tellurocracy. In view of the build-up of nuclear potential by both sides, some geopolitical pessimists seemed to have a catastrophic outcome of this entire process, since, having fully mastered the planet, the two powers either had to endure the confrontation out of the earth (Star Wars theory), or mutually destroy each other (nuclear Apocalypse).

If the character the main geopolitical process of history, the maximum the spatial expansion of thalassocracy and tellurocracy is obvious for this discipline, its outcome remains in question. There is no determinism in this respect.

Consequently, geopolitical teleology, i.e. comprehension of the goal of history in geopolitical terms only reaches the moment of globalization of dualism and stops here.

But, nevertheless, at a purely theoretical level, it is possible to isolate several hypothetical versions of the development of events after it will be possible to ascertain the victory of one of the two systems of thalassocracy.

1st option. The victory of the thalassocracy completely abolishes the civilization of the tellurocracy. A homogeneous liberal democratic order is being established on the planet. Thalassocracy absolutizes its archetype and becomes the only system of organization of human life. This option has two advantages: First, it is logically consistent, since in it one can see the natural completion of the unidirectional (as a whole) course of geopolitical history from the complete domination of Land (the traditional world) to the complete domination of the Sea (the modern world); and secondly, this is exactly what happens in reality.

2nd option. The victory of the thalassocracy ends the cycle of confrontation between the two civilizations, but does not extend its model to the whole world, but simply completes the geopolitical history, canceling its problematics. Just as the theories of postindustrial society prove that the main contradictions of classical political economy (and Marxism) have been removed in this society, so some mondialist theories argue that in the future world the confrontation between Land and Sea will be completely removed. This is also "the end of history", but only the further development of events does not lend itself to such a rigorous analysis as in the first version.

Both of these analyzes view the defeat of the tellurocracy as an irreversible and fait accompli. The other two options treat this differently.

3rd option. The defeat of the tellurocracy is temporary. Eurasia will return to its continental mission in a new form. This will take into account the geopolitical factors that led to the catastrophe of the continentalist forces (the new continental block will have maritime boundaries in the South and in the West, that is, the "Monroe Doctrine for Eurasia" will be implemented). In this case, the world will return to bipolarity again. But already of a different quality and a different level.

4th option (which is a development of the previous one). Tellurocracy wins in this new confrontation. It seeks to transfer its own civilizational model to the entire planet and "close history" on its own chord. The whole world will typologically turn into Land, and "ideocracy" will reign everywhere. The anticipation of such an outcome was the idea of a "World Revolution" and the planetary domination of the Third Reich.

Since in our time the role of the subjective and rational factor in the development of historical processes is greater than ever, these four options should be considered not just as an abstract statement of the likely development of the geopolitical process, but also as active geopolitical positions that can become a guide to actions on a global scale.

But in this case, geopolitics cannot offer any deterministic version. Everything here comes down to only a set of possibilities, the implementation of which will depend on many factors that no longer fit into the framework of a purely geopolitical analysis.

Rimland and "border zones"

The entire methodology of geopolitical research is based on the application of the principles of the global geopolitical dualism of Land and Sea to more local categories. When analyzing any situation, it is the planetary model that remains the main and fundamental one. Those relationships that are characteristic of the general picture are repeated at a more particular level.

After identifying the two basic principles of thalassocracy and tellurocracy, the next most important principle is rimland, "coastal zone". This is a key category underlying geopolitical research.

Rimland is a composite space that has the potential to be a fragment of either thalassocracy or tellurocracy. This is the most complex and culturally rich region. The influence of the sea element, Water, provokes active and dynamic development in the "coastal zone". The continental mass presses, forcing to structuralize energy. On the one hand, the rimland passes into the Island and the Ship. On the other hand to the Empire and Home.

Rimland is not reduced, however, only to an intermediate and transitional medium, in which the reaction of two impulses takes place. This is a very complex reality that has an independent logic and greatly influences both thalassocracy and tellurocracy. It is not an object of history, but its active subject. Fight for rimland

thalassocracy and tellurocracy are not a competition for a simple strategic position. Rimland has its own destiny and its own historical will, which, however, cannot be resolved outside the basic geopolitical dualism. Rimland is largely free in choice, but not free in the structure of choice, since apart from thalassocratic or

tellurocratic way of the third is not given to him.

In connection with this quality, the "inner crescent" is often generally identified with the area of distribution of human civilization. In the depths of the continent conservatism reigns, outside of its limits the challenge of mobile chaos.

By their very position, "coastal zones" are faced with the need to give an answer to the problem proposed by geography.

Rimland is a border zone, belt, strip. At the same time, it is a border. This combination leads to a geopolitical definition of the border.

Unlike borders between states, geopolitics understands this term differently, starting from the original model, in which the concrete historical, geographic and cultural concept of rimland is the primary border or archetype of all borders.

The spatial volume of coastal zones is a consequence of looking at the mainland from the outside, "from the perspective of sea aliens." It is for the "forces of the sea" that the coast is a strip extending inland. For the mainland itself, the coast opposite is the limit, the line.

The border as a line (and this is how it is understood in international law) is a rudiment of "land jurisprudence" inherited by modern law from ancient traditions. This is a purely land view.

But the gaze of the sea, external to the mainland, sees coastal territories as potential colonies, like strips of land that can be torn off from the rest of the continental mass, turned into a base, into a strategic space. At the same time, the coastal zone never becomes "own" to the end; if necessary, you can board a ship and sail home, to the "island". The coastline becomes a strip precisely due to the fact that it is unsafe for aliens from the sea to go deep into the continent only for a certain distance.

Since geopolitics combines both views of sea and land space, rimland is understood in it as a special reality, as a border-strip, and its qualitative volume depends on which momentum dominates in this sector, land or sea. The gigantic and quite navigable oceanic coasts of India and China are lines, strips of minimal volume. The respective crops have a land orientation, and the volume of the coastal strips tends to zero, to become just the end of the mainland. In Europe, and especially in the Mediterranean, coastal zones are broad strips extending far inland. Their volume is maximum. But in both cases, we are talking about a geopolitical border. Consequently, it is a variable category that varies, depending on the circumstances, from line to band.

Geopolitics projects this approach to the analysis of more specific problems associated with borders. She views the borders between states as "zones of variable volume". This volume of its contraction or expansion depends on the general continental dynamics. Depending on it, these zones change their shape and trajectory in the given

limits. The concept of a "geopolitical border" can include entire states. For example, the British idea of a "cordon sanitaire" between Russia and Germany assumed the creation of a "no-man's" (semi-colonial and British-oriented) zone, consisting of the Baltic and Eastern European states.
The continentalist policy of Russia and Germany, on the contrary, tended to turn this zone into a line (Brest-Litovsk, Rappalo, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact). The Atlantist Thalassocrates sought to expand it as much as possible, creating artificial "cushion states" (etats-tampons).

At the same time, a complete and perfect thalassocracy (England, USA) applies in this case a double standard: the borders of their own Islands, the thalassocrates strive to reduce to a line, and the coastal zones of Eurasia to expand as much as possible. For continental geopolitics, it is logical to use exactly the same principle in the opposite direction: the borders of Eurasia are lines, the borders of America are stripes.

The analogy with the historical rimland as the "cradle of civilization" shows the critical importance of "border zones" in more particular cases. Free from the need to bear the burden of the geographic charge of history, "border zones" often direct their energy to cultural and intellectual spheres. And the skillful use of this "light" geopolitical potential is the art of the geopolitical strategy of the opposing sides.

At the same time, it was the "naval forces" that mastered this to perfection, since they were always based on the principle of maximum and speedy extraction of benefits from the colonized territories. This distinguished them from the land conquerors, who, after seizing the territory, immediately began to consider it their own, and, therefore, were not in a hurry to squeeze everything out of it.

Geopolitics as destiny

The laws of geopolitics are extremely useful for analyzing political history, history of diplomacy, and strategic planning. This science has many intersections with sociology, political science, ethnology, military strategy, diplomacy, the history of religions, etc. Indirectly, but sometimes very clearly, it is also connected with economics, to the extent that some geopolitics suggested founding a new science, geoeconomics. In any case, in some aspects of the geopolitical method, an appeal to economic realities is necessary.

At the moment, with the gravitation of all types of sciences towards synthesis, towards fusion, towards the creation of new inter-scientific macrodisciplines and multidimensional models, geopolitics reveals its significance both for purely theoretical research and for practical steps in managing complex civilizational processes on a planetary scale or on the scale of individual states or blocs of states. This is the science of the future, the foundations of which in the very near future will be taught not only in special higher educational institutions and academies, but also in simple schools. With the help of geopolitical analysis, one can easily comprehend entire epochs of the historical development of countries and peoples. With the expansion of information zones characteristic of our time, the emergence of such simple and visual reductionist methodologies is inevitable,

Geopolitics is an invaluable aid in matters of education. Its structure is such that it could become the pivotal discipline at a new stage in the development of the school.

At the same time, the role of geopolitics in the broad social sphere is becoming more and more obvious. The level of information development, the active involvement of an ordinary person in events unfolding on the entire continent, the "monadialization" of the mass media, all this brings to the fore the spatial thinking in geopolitical terms, which helps to "sort" peoples, states, regimes and religions into a single a simplified scale so that the meaning of even the most elementary television or radio news is at least approximately clear. If we apply the simplest geopolitical grid of heartland, rimland, World Island to any message on international events, we immediately build a kind of clear interpretation model that does not require additional highly specialized knowledge. "NATO's Eastward expansion" in this approach means "

And finally, about the impact of geopolitical methodology on domestic and foreign policy. If the geopolitical meaning of certain steps of political parties and movements, as well as power structures is obvious, it is easy to correlate them with the system of global interests, and, consequently, to decipher their far-reaching goals. For example, the integration of Russia with European countries (especially with Germany) is a step of the tellurocratic forces (Eurasians), from which one can automatically predict the strengthening of "ideocratic" ("socialist") tendencies within the country. On the contrary, the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington means submission to the thalassocratic line and inevitably entails a positional strengthening of the "market people", and so on. In the same way, in the light of the laws of internal geopolitics, one can easily interpret the internal political processes of separatism of peoples within Russia, bilateral or multilateral agreements of various administrative entities and regions among themselves. Each event in the light of geopolitics acquires a clear meaning. This geopolitical meaning cannot be regarded as the ultimo ratio of the event, but in any case it always turns out to be highly expressive and useful for analysis and forecasting.

The absence of any textbook on this topic today prompted us to write and compile this book, which is an introduction to geopolitics as a science.

PART I THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF GEOPOLITICS

Chapter 1. Friedrich Ratzel States as spatial organisms

1.1 Education: German "organic school"

Friedrich Ratzel (1844 1904) can be considered the "father" of geopolitics, although he himself did not use this term in his writings. He wrote about "political geography". His main work, published in 1897, is called Politische Geographie.

Ratzel graduated from the Karlsruhe Polytechnic University, where he attended courses in geology, paleontology and zoology. He completed his education in Heidelberg, where he became a student of Professor Ernst Haeckel (who was the first to use the term "ecology"). Ratzel's worldview was based on evolutionism and Darwinism and was colored by a pronounced interest in biology.

Ratzel takes part in the war of 1870, where he goes as a volunteer and receives the Iron Cross for bravery. In politics, he gradually became a staunch nationalist, and in 1890 joined Karl Peters' Pan-Germanist League. He travels extensively in Europe and America and adds ethnological research to his scientific interests. He became a teacher of geography at the Technical Institute of Munich, and in 1886 transferred to a similar department in Leipzig.

In 1876 Ratzel defended his thesis on "Emigration in China", and in 1882 his fundamental work "Anthropogeography" was published in Stuttgart. ("Antropogeographie"), in which he formulates his main ideas: the connection between the evolution of peoples and demography with geographic data, the influence of the terrain on the cultural and political formation of peoples, etc.

But his most basic book was Political Geography.

1.2 States as living organisms

In this work, Ratzel shows that the soil is a fundamental, unchanging given, around which the interests of peoples revolve. The movement of history is predetermined by soil and territory. What follows is the evolutionary conclusion that "the state is a living organism," but an organism "rooted in the soil." The state is formed from the territorial relief and scale and from their understanding by the people. Thus, the State reflects an objective geographic reality and a subjective nationwide understanding of this reality, expressed in politics. Ratzel considers a "normal" state to be one that most organically combines the geographic, demographic and ethnocultural parameters of the nation.

He's writing:

"States at all stages of their development are considered as organisms that necessarily maintain a connection with their soil and therefore should be studied from

geographic point of view. As ethnography and history show, states develop on a spatial basis, more and more mating and merging with it, extracting more and more energy from it. Thus, states turn out to be spatial phenomena, governed and animated by this space; and geography should describe, compare, measure them. States fit into a series of phenomena of the expansion of Life, being the highest point of these phenomena "(" Political Geography "[2].

It is clear from this "organicist" approach that the spatial expansion of the state is understood by Ratzel as a natural living process, similar to the growth of living organisms.

Ratzel's "organic" approach is also reflected in his attitude to space itself (Raum). This "space" passes from a quantitative material category into a new quality, becoming a "life sphere", "living space" (Lebensraum), a kind of "geobiological environment". This is where Ratzel's other important terms "spatial meaning" (Raumsinn) and "vital energy" (Lebensenergie) follow. These terms are close to each other and denote a certain special quality inherent in geographical systems and predetermining their political design in the history of peoples and states.

All these theses are the fundamental principles of geopolitics, in the form in which it will develop somewhat later among the followers of Ratzel. Moreover, the attitude to the state as a "living spatial organism rooted in the soil" is the main idea and axis of the geopolitical methodology. This approach is focused on the synthetic study of the entire complex of phenomena, regardless of whether they belong to the human or non-human sphere. Space as a concrete expression of nature, the environment, is considered as a continuous vital body of an ethnos, this is the space of the inhabitant. The structure of the material itself dictates the proportions of the final work of art.

In this sense, Ratzel is the direct heir to the entire school of German "organic" sociology, the most prominent representative of which was Ferdinand Tennis.

1.3. Raum the political organization of the soil

How Ratzel saw the relationship between ethnicity and space can be seen from the following fragment of Political Geography:

"The state develops as an organism tied to a certain part of the earth's surface, and its characteristics develop from the characteristics of the people and the soil. The most important characteristics are size, location and boundaries. Soil types, along with vegetation, irrigation and, finally, relations with the rest follow. conglomerates of the earth's surface, and first of all, with adjacent seas and uninhabited lands, which, at first glance, are not of particular political interest. The totality of all these characteristics make up a country (das Land). But when they talk about "our country", this everything that man has created is added,

[2] See Friedrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie, 1887, Einleitung.

and all earth-related memories. This is how the initially purely geographical concept turns into a spiritual and emotional connection between the inhabitants of the country and their history.

The state is an organism not only because it articulates the life of the people on motionless soil, but because this connection is mutually reinforced, becoming something unified, inconceivable without one of the two components. Uninhabited spaces, incapable of feeding the State, this historical field is fallow. Inhabited space, on the contrary, contributes to the development of the state, especially if this space is surrounded by natural boundaries. If the people feel naturally on their territory, they will constantly reproduce the same characteristics, which, originating from the soil, will be inscribed in it. "[3]

1.4 Law of expansion

The attitude to the state as to a living organism presupposed the rejection of the concept of "inviolability of borders". The state is born, grows, dies, like a living being. Consequently, its spatial expansion and contraction are natural processes associated with its internal life cycle. Ratzel in his book "On the Laws of Spatial Growth of States" (1901) identified seven laws of expansion:

1) The length of the States increases with the development of their culture;

2) The spatial growth of the State is accompanied by other manifestations of its development: in the spheres of ideology, production, commercial activity, powerful "attractive radiation", proselytism.

3) The state expands, absorbing and absorbing political units of lesser importance.

4) The border is an organ located on the periphery of the State (understood as an organism).

5) Carrying out its spatial expansion, the State seeks to cover the most important regions for its development: coasts, river basins, valleys and, in general, all rich territories.

6) The initial impulse for expansion comes from outside, since the State is provoked to expand by a state (or territory) with a clearly inferior civilization.

7) The general tendency towards the assimilation or absorption of weaker nations pushes for an even greater increase in territories in a movement that feeds itself[four].

It is not surprising that many critics reproached Ratzel for writing a Catechism for the Imperialists. At the same time, Ratzel himself did not at all seek to justify German imperialism by any means, although he did not hide the fact that he adhered to nationalist convictions. It was important for him to create a conceptual

[3] See Ibidem

[four] See Friedrich Ratzel "Ueber die Gesetze des raeumlicher Wachstum der Staaten", 1901.

a tool for an adequate understanding of the history of states and peoples in their relation to space. In practice, he strove to awaken the "Raumsinn" ("sense of space") among the leaders of Germany, for whom most often the geographical data of dry academic science seemed to be a pure abstraction.

1.5 Weltmacht and the sea

Ratzel was greatly influenced by his acquaintance with North America, which he studied well and to which he devoted two books: Maps of North American Cities and Civilization (1874) and The United States of North America (1878 1880). He noted that the Americans' "sense of space" is highly developed, since they were faced with the task of developing "empty" spaces, having behind them a significant "political and geographical" experience of European history. Consequently, the Americans consciously carried out what the Old World came to intuitively and gradually. So in Ratzel we are faced with the first formulations of another important geopolitical concept of the concept of "world power" (Weltmacht). Ratzel noticed

Consequently, sooner or later, geographic development must approach its continental phase.

Applying this principle, derived from the American experience of the political and strategic unification of continental spaces, to Germany, Ratzel foretold her the fate of a continental power.

He also anticipated another major topic of geopolitics, the importance of the sea for the development of civilization. In his book "The Sea, the Source of the Power of Nations" (1900)[five] he pointed out the need for each powerful power to especially develop its naval forces, since this is required by the planetary scale of full-fledged expansion. What some peoples and states (England, Spain, Holland, etc.) carried out spontaneously, the land powers (Ratzel, naturally, had Germany in mind) should do meaningfully: the development of the fleet is a necessary condition for approaching the status of a "world powers "(Weltmacht).

The sea and the "world power" in Ratzel are already connected, although only in the later geopolitics (Mahan, Mackinder, Haushofer, especially Schmitt) this theme will acquire completeness and centrality.

Ratzel's works are a necessary basis for all geopolitical research. In a minimized form, his works contain almost all the main theses that will form the basis of this science. The Swedes Kjellen and the German Haushofer based their concepts on Ratzel's books. His ideas were taken into account by the Frenchman Vidal de la Blache, the Englishman Mackinder, the American Mahan and Russian Eurasians (P. Savitsky, L. Gumilev, etc.).

It should be noted that Ratzel's political sympathies are not accidental. Almost all geopolitics were marked by a pronounced national feeling, regardless of whether it was clothed in democratic (Anglo-Saxon geopolitics Mackinder, Mahan) or "ideocratic" (Haushofer, Schmitt, Eurasianists) forms.

[five] See Friedrich Ratzel "Das Meer als Quelle der Voelkergroesse", 1900.

Chapter 2. Rudolf Kjellen and Friedrich Naumann "Central Europe"

2.1 The definition of a new science

The Swede Rudolf Kjellen (1864 1922) was the first to use the concept of "geopolitics".

Kjellen was professor of history and political science at the Universities of Uppsala and Gothenburg. In addition, he actively participated in politics, was a member of parliament, distinguished by an emphasized Germanophilic orientation. Kjellen was not professional geographer and considered geopolitics, the foundations of which he developed, starting from the works of Ratzel (he considered him his teacher), as part of political science.

Kjellen defined geopolitics as follows:

"This is the science of the State as a geographical organism, embodied in space"[6].

In addition to "geopolitics" Kjellen proposed 4 more neologisms, which, in his opinion, should have constituted the main sections of political science:
ecopolitics ("study of the State as an economic force");

demopolitics ("the study of dynamic impulses transmitted by the people to the State"; analogue of Ratzel's "Anthropogeography");

sociopolitics ("study of the social aspect of the State");

kratopolitics ("the study of forms of government and power in relation to the problems of law and socio-economic factors")[7].
But all these disciplines, which Kjellen developed in parallel to geopolitics, have not received widespread acceptance, while the term "geopolitics" has firmly established itself in a wide variety of circles.

2.2 The state as a form of life and the interests of Germany

In his main work "The State as a Form of Life" (1916)[eight] Kjellen developed the postulates laid down in Ratzel's work. Källen, like Ratzel, considered himself a follower of German "organicism," which rejected the mechanistic approach to the state and society. The refusal to strictly divide the subjects of study into "inanimate objects" (background) and "human subjects" (actors) is a distinctive feature of most geopoliticians. In this sense, the very title of Kjellen's main work is indicative.

Kjellen developed Ratzel's geopolitical principles in relation to the specific historical situation in contemporary Europe.

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[6] See Rudolf Kjellen "Die Staat als Lebensform", 1916.
[7] See Ibidem
[eight] See Ibidem

He brought to a logical conclusion Ratzel's idea of a "continental state" as applied to Germany. And he showed that in the context of Europe, Germany is the space that possesses axial dynamism and which is called upon to structure the rest of the European powers around itself. Kjellen interpreted the First World War as a natural geopolitical conflict that arose between the dynamic expansion of Germany (the "Axis countries") and the opposing peripheral European (and non-European) states (the Entente). The difference in the geopolitical dynamics of growth, descending for France and England and ascending for Germany, predetermined the main alignment of forces. At the same time, from his point of view, the geopolitical identification of Germany with Europe is inevitable and inevitable, despite the temporary defeat in the First World War.

Kjellen reinforced the geopolitical maxim outlined by Ratzel that the interests of Germany (= the interests of Europe) are opposite to the interests of the Western European powers (especially France and England). But Germany is a "young" state, and Germans are a "young people". (This idea of "young peoples", which the Russians and Germans were considered to be, goes back to Fyodor Dostoevsky, often quoted by Kjellen.) "Young" Germans, inspired by the "Central European space", should move towards a continental state of a planetary scale at the expense of territories controlled " the old peoples "the French and the English. At the same time, the ideological aspect of the geopolitical confrontation was considered secondary by Kjellen.

2.3 Towards the concept of Central Europe

Although Kjellen himself was a Swede and insisted on a rapprochement between Swedish and German politics, his geopolitical ideas about the independent integrating significance of the German space exactly coincide with the theory of "Central Europe" (Mitteleuropa) developed by Friedrich Naumann.

In his book "Mitteleuropa" (1915)[nine] Naumann gave a geopolitical diagnosis identical to that of Rudolf Kjellen. From his point of view, in order to compete with such organized geopolitical formations as England (and its colonies), the USA and Russia, the peoples inhabiting Central Europe should unite and organize a new integrated political and economic space. The axis of such a space will naturally be the Germans.

Mitteleuropa, in contrast to pure "pan-Germanist" projects, was no longer a national, but a purely geopolitical concept, in which the main importance was not given to ethnic unity, but to a common geographic destiny. Naumann's project implied the integration of Germany, Austria, the Danube states and, in the long term, France.

The geopolitical project was also confirmed by cultural parallels. Germany itself as an organic formation was identified with the spiritual concept of "Mittellage", "middle position". Arndt formulated this back in 1818: "God has placed us in the center of Europe; we (Germans) are the heart of our part of the world."

[nine] See Friedrich Naumann "Mitteleuropa", 1915.

Through Kjellen and Naumann, Ratzel's "continental" ideas gradually acquired tangible features.

Chapter 3. Halford Mackinder "The Geographical Pivot of History"

3.1 Scientist and politician

Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861 1947) is the most prominent figure among geopoliticians.

Trained in geography, he taught at Oxford from 1887 until he was appointed director of the London School of Economics. From 1910 to 1922 he was a member of the House of Commons, and in between (1919-1920) the British envoy to southern Russia.

Mackinder is known for his high position in the world of British politics, on whose international orientations he was very significantly influenced, as well as for the fact that he owns the most daring and revolutionary scheme for interpreting the political history of the world.

Mackinder's example illustrates the typical paradox inherent in geopolitics as a discipline. Mackinder's ideas were not accepted by the scientific community, despite his high position not only in politics, but also in the scientific community itself. Even the fact that for almost half a century he actively and successfully participated in the creation of British strategy on international issues based on his interpretation of the political and geographical history of the world, could not compel skeptics to recognize the value and effectiveness of geopolitics as a discipline.

3.2 Geographical axis of history

Mackinder's first and most striking speech was his report "The Geographical Pivot of History"[10], published in 1904 in the Geographic Journal. In it, he outlined the basis of his vision of history and geography, developed in subsequent works. This text by Mackinder can be considered the main geopolitical text in the history of this discipline, since it not only summarizes all the previous lines of development of "political geography", but formulates the basic law of this science.

Mackinder argues that the most advantageous geographic location for the State would be the middle, central location. Centrality is relative and can vary in any given geographic context. But from a planetary point of view, in the center of the world lies the Eurasian continent, and in its center is the "heart of the world" or "heartland". Heartland is the concentration of the continental masses of Eurasia. This is the most favorable geographical base for control over the whole world.

[10] Halford Mackinder "Geographical Pivot of History" in "Geograghical Journal", 1904. Russian translation in j-le "Elements. Eurasian Review", 1996, No. 7, pp. 26 –31.

Heartland is a key area in a more general context within the World Island. In the World, Mackinder Island includes three continents Asia, Africa and Europe.

Thus, Mackinder hierarchizes planetary space through a system of concentric circles. In the very center is the "geographical axis of history" or "pivot area". This geopolitical concept is geographically identical to Russia. The same "axial" reality is called heartland, "the land of the heart."

Next comes the "inner or marginal crescent". This is a belt that coincides with the coastal spaces of the Eurasian continent. According to Mackinder, the "inner crescent" is the zone of the most intensive development of civilization. This is consistent with the historical hypothesis that civilization originated initially on the banks of rivers or seas, the so-called. "potamic theory". It should be noted that the latter theory is an essential point of all geopolitical structures. The intersection of water and land spaces is a key factor in the history of peoples and states. In the future, this topic will be specially developed by Schmitt and Speakman, however, it was Mackinder who was the first to deduce this geopolitical formula.

Next comes the more outer circle: the outer or insular crescent. It is an area entirely external (geographically and culturally) to the mainland mass of the World Island.

Mackinder believes that the entire course of history is determined by the following processes. From the center of the heartland to its periphery, there is a constant pressure of the so-called. "sushi robbers". This was especially vividly and vividly reflected in the Mongol conquests. But they were preceded by the Scythians, Huns, Alans, etc. Civilizations that flow from the "geographical axis of history" from the innermost spaces of the heartland have, according to Mackinder, "authoritarian", "hierarchical", "undemocratic" and "non-commercial character". In the ancient world, he was embodied in a society similar to Dorian Sparta or Ancient Rome.

Outside, from the regions of the "island crescent", the so-called pressure is exerted on the World Island. "robbers of the sea" or "island dwellers". These are colonial expeditions emanating from a non-Eurasian center, seeking to balance the overland impulses emanating from the continent's inner reaches. For civilizations "external crescent " are characteristic "trade" character and "democratic forms" of politics. To the antiquity was distinguished by such a character Athenian state or Carthage.

Between these two polar civilizational and geographic impulses is the "inner crescent" zone, which, being dual and constantly experiencing opposite cultural influences, was the most mobile and, thanks to this, became a place of priority development of civilization.

History, according to Mackinder, geographically revolves around the continental axis. This story is most clearly felt in the space of the "inner crescent", while "frozen" archaism reigns in the heartland, and in the "outer crescent" there is a kind of civilizational chaos.

3.3 Russia's key position

Mackinder himself identified his interests with the interests of the Anglo-Saxon island world, i.e. with the position of the "outer crescent". In such a situation, he saw the basis of the geopolitical orientation of the "island world" in the maximum weakening of the heartland and in the maximum possible expansion of the influence of the "outer crescent" on the "inner crescent." Mackinder emphasized the strategic priority of the "geographical axis of history" in all world politics and formulated the most important geopolitical law in this way:

"The one who controls Eastern Europe dominates the heartland; the one who dominates the heartland dominates the World Isle; the one who dominates the World Isle dominates the world." ("Democratic Ideals and Reality")[eleven]

At the political level, this meant recognizing the leading role of Russia in a strategic sense. Mackinder wrote:

"Russia is in the whole world in the same central strategic position as Germany in relation to Europe. It can carry out attacks in all directions and be subject to them from all directions except the north. The full development of its railway capabilities is a matter of time." ("Geographical axis of history")[12]

Proceeding from this, Mackinder believed that the main task of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics is to prevent the formation of a strategic continental alliance around the "geographical axis of history" (Russia). Consequently, the strategy of the forces of the "outer crescent" is to tear off the maximum amount of coastal spaces from the heartland and put them under the influence of the "island civilization".

"The shift in the balance of power towards the" pivot state "(Russia A.D.), accompanied by its expansion into the peripheral spaces of Eurasia, will make it possible to use huge continental resources to create a powerful navy: this is not far from a world empire. The threat of such a development will force France to enter into an alliance with the overseas powers, and France, Italy, Egypt, India and Korea will become coastal bases where flotillas of external powers will moor in order to spray the forces of the "axial range" in all directions and prevent them from concentrating to spend all their efforts on building a powerful military fleet. " ("Geographical axis of history")[13]

The most interesting thing is that Mackinder not only built theoretical hypotheses, but actively participated in organizing international support of the Entente for the "white movement", which he considered an Atlanticist tendency aimed at weakening the power of pro-German-minded Eurasian Bolsheviks. He personally consulted the leaders of the White Cause, trying to obtain the maximum support from the British government. It seemed that he prophetically foresaw not only the Brest Peace, but also the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact ...

In 1919, in his book Democratic Ideals and Reality, he wrote:

[eleven] H. Mackinder, "Democratic ideals and reality", New York, 1919.

[12] See p. 31 in Elements, no. 7, op. cit.

[13] See page 31 in "Elements", no. 7, op.cit.

"What will become of the forces of the sea if one day a great continent unites politically to become the backbone of an invincible armada?"[fourteen]

It is easy to understand what it was Mackinder who laid in the Anglo-Saxon geopolitics, which became the geopolitics of the United States and the North Atlantic Union half a century later: to obstruct by any means the very possibility of creating a Eurasian bloc, the creation of a strategic alliance between Russia and Germany, geopolitical strengthening of heartland and its expansion. The persistent Russophobia of the West in the 20th century has not so much ideological as geopolitical character. Although, given the connection highlighted by Mackinder between the civilizational type and the geopolitical nature of certain forces, it is possible to obtain a formula according to which geopolitical terms are easily translated into ideological terms.

Outer Crescent Liberal Democracy; "geographical axis of history" undemocratic authoritarianism; the "inner crescent" is an intermediate model, a combination of both ideological systems.

Mackinder participated in the preparation of the Versailles Treaty, the main geopolitical idea of which reflects the essence of Mackinder's views. This treaty was drafted in such a way as to secure for Western Europe the character of a coastal base for naval forces (the Anglo-Saxon world). At the same time, it envisaged the creation of limitrophic states that would separate the Germans and the Slavs, in every possible way preventing the conclusion of a continental strategic alliance between them, so dangerous for the "island powers" and, accordingly, "democracy."

It is very important to trace the evolution of the geographical limits of heartland in the writings of Mackinder. If in 1904 and 1919 (respectively, in the article "The Geographical Axis of History" and in the book "Democratic Ideals and Reality") the outlines of the heartland coincided in general outline with the borders of the Russian Empire, and later the USSR, then in 1943 in the text " Round planet and conquest of the world "[fifteen] he reconsidered his previous views and removed from the heartland the Soviet territories of Eastern Siberia, located beyond the Yenisei. He named this sparsely populated Soviet territory "Russia Lenaland" after the Lena River.

"Lenaland's Russia has 9 million inhabitants, 5 of whom live along the transcontinental railway from Irkutsk to Vladivostok. The rest of the territories are home to less than one person per 8 square kilometers. The natural resources of this land, timber, minerals, etc., are practically untouched. " ("The Round Planet and the Conquest of the World")[sixteen]

Removal of the so-called. Lenaland from the geographical boundaries of heartland meant the possibility of considering this territory as a zone of the "inner crescent", ie. as a coastal space that could be used by the "island" powers to fight against the "geographical axis of history." Mackinder, who took an active part in organizing the Entente's intervention and the "white movement", apparently considered the historical precedent of Kolchak, who resisted the Eurasian center, sufficient grounds for considering the territories under his control as a potential "coastal zone."

[fourteen] See HM "Democratic ideals and reality", op. cit.

[fifteen] See Halford Mackinder, "The Round Planet and the winning of the Peace", 1943.

[sixteen] See Ibidem

3.4 Three geopolitical periods

Mackinder divides the entire geopolitical history of the world into three stages[17]:

1) Pre-Columbian era. In it, the peoples belonging to the periphery of the World Island, for example, the Romans, live under the constant threat of conquest from the forces of the "heartland". For the Romans, these were the Germans, Huns, Alans, Parthians, etc. For the medieval ecumene, the golden horde.

2) Columbian era. During this period, representatives of the "inner crescent" (coastal zones) set out to conquer unknown territories of the planet, meeting no serious resistance anywhere.

3) Post-Columbian era. Unconquered lands more not exists. The dynamic pulsations of civilizations are doomed to collide, drawing the peoples of the earth into a universal civil war.

This periodization of Mackinder, with the corresponding geopolitical transformations, brings us close to the latest trends in geopolitics, which we will consider in another part of the book.

[17] See HM "Democratic ideals and reality", op. cit.

Chapter 4. Alfred Mahan "The Might of the Sea"

4.1 Sea Power

The American Alfred Mahan (1840 1914), unlike Ratzel, Kjellen and Mackinder, was not a scientist, but a military man. He did not use the term "geopolitics", but the methodology of his analysis and the main conclusions exactly correspond to a purely geopolitical approach.

An officer in the American Union Navy, he taught Navy History since 1885 at Naval War College in New Port (Road Island). In 1890, he published his first book, which almost immediately became a classic text on military strategy. "Naval Forces in History (1660 1783)"[eighteen.] Other works follow with a small interval: "The Influence of the Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire (1793 1812) "[nineteen,] "America's Interest in Sea Power, Present and Future "[twenty,] "The problem of Asia and its impact on international politics"[21] and "Sea Power and Its Relationship to War"[22.]

Almost all of the books were devoted to one topic, the theme of "Sea Power", "Sea Power". Mahan's name has become synonymous with this term.

Mahan was not only a military strategy theorist, but also actively involved in politics. In particular, he had a strong influence on politicians such as Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. Moreover, if we look back at the American military strategy throughout the 20th century, we will see that it is being built in direct accordance with Mahan's ideas. Moreover, if in the First World War this strategy did not bring tangible success to the United States, then in the Second World War the effect was significant, and the victory in the Cold War with the USSR finally consolidated the success of the Naval Force strategy.

4.2 Marine civilization = commercial civilization

For Mahan, trade is the main policy tool. Military action should only provide the most favorable conditions for the creation of a planetary commercial civilization. Mahan looks at the economic cycle in three ways:

1) production (exchange of goods and services through waterways)

2) navigation (which implements this exchange)

3) colonies (which circulate commodity exchange at the world level)[23.]

[eighteen] See Alfred Mahan "The influence of Sea Power in histo ry" (1660 - 1783) ", 1890; in Russian A. Mahan" The influence of sea power on history (1660-1783) ", M.-L., 1941.

[nineteen] See Alfred Mahan, "The influence of sea power upon the French revolution and empire (1793 - 1812)", Boston, 1892; A. Mahan "The influence of sea power on the French Revolution and Empire (1793 - 1812)", M. - L., 1940.

[twenty] See Alfred Mahan, "The Interest of America in Sea Power," 1897.

[21] Alfred Mahan "Problem of Asia and its effects upon international politics", 1900.

[22] See Alfred Mahan, "The Sea Power in its relations to the war," Boston, 1905.

[23] See Alfred Mahan, "The influence of Sea Power in history (1660 - 1783)", op. cit.

Mahan believes that analyzing the position and geopolitical status of a state should be based on 6 criteria:

1) The geographical position of the State, its openness to the seas, the possibility of sea communications with other countries. The length of land borders, the ability to control strategically important regions. The ability to threaten enemy territory with your fleet.

2) "Physical configuration" of the State, i.e. configuration of sea coasts and the number of ports located on them. The prosperity of trade and strategic security depend on it.

3) The length of the territory. It is equal to the length of the coastline.

4) The statistical number of the population. It is important for assessing the State's ability to build and maintain ships.

5) National character. The ability of the people to engage in trade, since sea power is based on peaceful and extensive trade.

6) The political nature of the government. The reorientation of the best natural and human resources to create a powerful sea power depends on this. "[24]

Already from this listing it is clear that Mahan builds his geopolitical theory based solely on the "Sea Force" and its interests. For Mahan, the model of Sea Power was ancient Carthage, and closer to us historically England of the 17th and 19th centuries.

The concept of "Sea Power" is based for him on the freedom of "sea trade", and the navy serves only as a guarantor of ensuring this trade. Mahan goes even further, considering "Sea Power" a special type of civilization (anticipating the ideas of Karl Schmitt) the best and most effective, and therefore destined for world domination.

4.3 Conquest of the world USA manifest destiny

Mahan's ideas were accepted around the world and influenced many European strategists. Even land and mainland Germany, represented by Admiral Tirpitz, took Mahan's theses into account and began to actively develop its fleet. In 1940 and 1941, two books by Mahan were published in the USSR.

But they were intended primarily for America and the Americans. Mahan was an ardent supporter of the doctrine of President Monroe (1758-1831), who in 1823 declared the principle of mutual non-interference between the countries of America and Europe, and also made the growth of US power dependent on territorial expansion into nearby territories. Mahan believed that America had a "sea destiny" and that this "Manifest Destiny"[25] consists at the first stage in the strategic integration of the entire American continent, and then in the establishment of world domination.

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[24] Ibidem

[25] See Albert K. Weinberg "Manifest Destiny", Baltimore, 1935.

We must give credit to Mahan's almost prophetic vision. In his time, the United States had not yet become one of the leading world powers, and moreover, even their "marine civilizational type" was not obvious. Back in 1905, Mackinder, in his article "The Geographical Pivot of History," referred the United States to the "land powers" that were part of the "Outer Crescent" only as a semicolonial strategic continuation of naval England. Mackinder wrote:

"The United States has just become an Eastern power. They influence the balance of power in Europe not directly, but through Russia."[26].

But already 10 years before the appearance of Mackinder's text, Admiral Mahan predicted exactly America's planetary destiny, becoming a leading maritime power, directly influencing the fate of the world.

In America's Interest in Sea Power, Mahan argued that in order for America to become a world power, it must fulfill the following points:

1) actively cooperate with the British maritime power;

2) discourage German maritime claims;

3) vigilantly monitor the expansion of Japan in the Pacific Ocean and oppose it;

4) coordinate joint actions with the Europeans against the peoples of Asia[27].

Mahan saw the fate of the United States in not passively participating in the general context of the peripheral states of the "outer crescent", but in taking a leading position in economic, strategic and even ideological terms.

Independently of Mackinder, Mahan came to the same conclusions regarding the main danger to the "sea civilization". This danger is the continental states of Eurasia, first of all, Russia and China, and secondly Germany. The fight against Russia, with this "uninterrupted continental mass of the Russian Empire, stretching from western Asia Minor to the Japanese meridian in the East", was the main long-term strategic task for the Naval Force.

Mahan transferred to the planetary level the "anaconda" principle applied by the American General McClellan in the 1861 1865 North American Civil War. This principle consists in blocking enemy territories from the sea and along coastlines, which gradually leads to the strategic exhaustion of the enemy. Since Mahan believed that the power of a state is determined by its potential for becoming a Sea Force, in the event of opposition, the number one strategic task is to prevent this formation in the enemy's camp. Consequently, the task of America's historical confrontation is to strengthen its positions on 6 main points (listed above) and weaken the enemy on the same points. Its coastal expanses must be under control, and the enemy's corresponding zones must be torn away from the continental mass by any means. And further: since the Monroe Doctrine (in its part of territorial integration) enhances the power of the state, the creation of similar integration formations should not be allowed.

[26] See Halford Mackinder "Geographical Pivot of History", op. cit.
[27] See Alfred Mahan, "The Interest of America in Sea Power", op. cit.

the enemy. On the contrary, the enemy or rival in Mahan's case, the Eurasian powers (Russia, China, Germany) should strangle the continental mass in the rings of the "anaconda", squeezing it due to the coastal zones taken out of its control and blocking, if possible, the exits to the sea spaces.

In World War I, this strategy was implemented in the support of the Entente to the white movement along the periphery of Eurasia (as a response to the conclusion of peace with Germany by the Bolsheviks), in World War II it was also turned against Central Europe, and in particular, through naval operations against the Axis countries and Japan. But it is especially clearly visible in the era of the Cold War, when the confrontation between the United States and the USSR reached those global, planetary proportions with which geopolitics have been operating at the theoretical level since the end of the 19th century.

In fact, the main lines of the strategy of NATO, as well as other blocs aimed at containing the USSR (the concept of "containment" is identical to the strategic and geopolitical concept of "anaconda") ASEAN, ANZUS, CENTO are a direct development of the main theses of Admiral Mahan, who on this basis can be called the intellectual father of all modern Atlanticism.

Chapter 5. Vidal de la Blache "France against Germany"

5.1 The picture of the geography of France

Vidal de la Blache (1845 1918) is considered the founder of the French school of geography. A professional geographer, he was fascinated by Ratzel's "political geography" and based his theories on this source, although he severely criticized many aspects of the German geopolitical school.

In his book A Picture of the Geography of France (1903), he turns to soil theory so important to German geopoliticians:

"The relationship between soil and man in France is marked by the original character of antiquity, continuity (...). In our country, you can often observe that people have lived in the same places since time immemorial. Sources, calcium rocks initially attracted people as convenient places for living and protection. We have a faithful student of the soil. Studying the soil will help to find out the character, customs and preferences of the population.[28]

But, despite such a completely German attitude to the geographical factor and its influence on culture, Vidal de la Blache believed that Ratzel and his followers clearly overestimate the purely natural factor, considering it decisive.

Man, according to de la Blache, is also "the most important geographical factor", but at the same time he is also "endowed with initiative." He is not only a piece of the scenery, but also the main actor of the play.

5.2 Possibilism

This criticism of the excessive exaltation of the spatial factor in Ratzel led Vidal d la Blache to develop a special geopolitical concept of "possibilism" (from the word "possible" "possible"). According to this concept, political history has two aspects: spatial (geographic) and temporal (historical).
The geographical factor is reflected in the environment, historical in the person himself ("the bearer of the initiative")[29]. Vidal de la Blache believed that the mistake of the German "political geographers" is that they consider the relief to be the determining factor in the political history of states. Thus, according to de la Blache, the factor of human freedom and historicity is belittled. He himself proposes to consider the geographic spatial position as "potentiality", "opportunity", which may become actualized and become a real political factor, or may not be actualized. This largely depends on the subjective factor of the person who inhabits the given space.

This approach was also taken into account by the German geopoliticians of the Haushofer school, who considered de la Blache's criticism to be quite reasonable and important. In this case, the role of ethnic or racial factor obviously increased when considering political

[28] Vidal de la Blache "Tableau de la Geographie de la France", Paris, 1903.
[29] See Vidal de la Blache "Principes de geographie humaine", Paris, 1921.

history of states, and this resonated with the general surge of racial issues in Germany in the 20s.

De la Blache's "Possibilism" was perceived by most geopolitical schools as a correction of the rigid geographic determinism of previous geopolitical authors.

5.3 France for "Sea Force"

Vidal de la Blache paid particular attention to Germany, which was France's main political opponent at the time. He believed that Germany is the only powerful European state, the geopolitical expansion of which is deliberately blocked by other European developed powers. If England and France have their vast colonies in Africa and around the world, if the United States can move almost freely to the south and north, if Russia has Asia, then Germany is squeezed from all sides and has no outlet for its energies. De la Blache saw this as the main threat to peace in Europe and considered it necessary in every possible way to weaken the development of this dangerous neighbor.

This attitude towards Germany logically entailed the geopolitical definition of France as part of the common front of the Sea Force, oriented against the continental powers. De la Blache's position was not the only one among French geopoliticians, since in parallel there also existed the opposite Germanophilic direction, represented by Admiral Lavalle and General De Gaulle.

In 1917, Vidal de la Blache publishes the book "Eastern France", in which he proves that the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine were originally French and that German claims to these areas were invalid. At the same time, he appeals to the French Revolution, considering its Jacobin dimension to be an expression of the geopolitical tendencies of the French people, striving for the unification and centralization of their State through geographic integration. He also explains political liberalism through people's attachment to soil and the natural desire to get it into private property. Thus, Vidal de la Blache, in his own way, connects geopolitical realities with ideological realities: the spatial policy of Western Europe (France) is inextricably linked with "democracy" and "liberalism."

De la Blachem's choice of "nautical orientation" fits perfectly into this scheme.

Chapter 6. Nicholas Speakman "Mackinder's Revision, Centrality of the Rimland"

6.1 Serving America

Dutch American Nicholas Speakman (1893 1943) is a direct successor of Admiral Mahan's line. Speakman was professor of international relations and later director of the Institute of International Relations at Yale University. For him, unlike the first geopoliticians, geography itself was not of great interest, and he was even less worried about the problems of connecting the people with

soil, the influence of relief on national character, etc. Spykman viewed geopolitics as the most important instrument of concrete international politics, as an analytical method and a system of formulas that make it possible to develop the most effective strategy. In this sense, he harshly criticized the German geopolitical school (especially in the book "Geography of the World"[thirty], considering the concept of "fair or unjust boundaries to be metaphysical nonsense."

Like Mahan, Speakman is characterized by a utilitarian approach, a clear desire to come up with the most effective geopolitical formula with which the United States can quickly achieve "world domination." This pragmatism determines the structure of all his research.

6.2 Mackinder Correction

Speakman, who carefully studied Mackinder's works, proposed his own version of the basic geopolitical scheme, somewhat different from Mackinder's model. Speakman's main idea was that Mackinder allegedly overestimated the geopolitical significance of heartland. This reassessment affected not only the current position of forces on the world map, in particular, the might of the USSR, but also the original historical scheme. Speakman believed that the geographical history of the "inner crescent", rimland, "coastal zones", was realized by itself, and not under the pressure of "Land nomads", as Mackinder believed. From his point of view, heartland is only a potential space that receives all cultural impulses from coastal zones and does not carry any independent geopolitical mission or historical impulse in itself. Rimland,

Mackinder's geopolitical formula "The one who controls Eastern Europe dominates the heartland; the one who dominates the heartland dominates the World Island; the one who dominates the World Island dominates the world." who dominates rimland dominates Eurasia; whoever dominates Eurasia holds the fate of the world in his hands. "[31]

In principle, Speakman did not say anything new with this. And for Mackinder himself, the "coastal zone", "outer crescent" or rimland was a key strategic position in control of the continent. But Mackinder understood this zone not as an independent and self-sufficient geopolitical entity, but as a space of confrontation between the two impulses "sea" and "land". At the same time, he never understood control over heartland in the sense of power over Russia and the adjacent continental masses. Eastern Europe is an intermediate space between the "geographical axis of history" and rimland, therefore, it is precisely in the balance of forces on the periphery of the heartland that the key to the problem of world domination lies. But Speakman presented the shift in emphasis in his geopolitical doctrine regarding Mackinder's views as radically new. In fact, it was only about a certain nuance of concepts.

[thirty] Nicholas Spykman "Geography of peace", 1942.
[31] Ibidem

6.3 Power rating scale

In his books "American Strategy in World Politics"[32] and "Geography of the World"[33] Speakman identifies 10 criteria on the basis of which to determine the geopolitical might suggested by it development criteria, for the first time Mahan. They are as follows:

1) Territory surface

2) The nature of boundaries

3) Population size

4) The presence or absence of minerals

5) Economic and technological development

6) Financial strength

7) Ethnic homogeneity

8) Level of social integration

9) Political stability

10) National spirit

If the total result of assessing the geopolitical capabilities of a state according to these criteria turns out to be relatively low, this almost automatically means that this state is forced to enter into a more general strategic alliance, sacrificing part of its sovereignty for the sake of global strategic geopolitical protection.

6.4 Middle Ocean

In addition to reassessing the importance of rimland, Speakman made another important addition to the geopolitical picture of the world, seen from the position of "sea power". He introduced the extremely important concept of the "Midland Ocean". At the heart of this geopolitical view is the emphasized analogy between the Mediterranean in the history of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa in antiquity, and the Atlantic Ocean in the recent history of Western civilization. Since Speakman considered precisely the "coastal zone", rimland, the main historical territory of civilization, the Mediterranean area of antiquity seemed to him an example of a culture that subsequently spread inland (the cultivation of the barbarians of the Land) and to remote territories that are attainable only through sea routes (the cultivation of the barbarians of the Sea).

[32] N. Spykman "America's Strategy in World Politics" (1942).
[33] Op. cit.

The "Midland Ocean" becomes, in this perspective, not a separating factor, but a unifying factor, the "inner sea" (mare internum). Thus, Speakman outlines a special geopolitical reality, which can be conditionally called the "Atlantic continent", in the center of which, like a lake in a land region, the Atlantic Ocean is located. This theoretical "continent", "new
Atlantis "is linked by a common culture Western European origin, ideology of liberal capitalism and democracy , unity of political, ethical and technological destiny.

Speakman especially insisted on the role of the intellectual factor in this "Atlantic continent." Western Europe and the belt of the East Coast of North America (especially New York) are becoming the brains of the new "Atlantic community". The nerve center and power mechanism is the United States and its trade and military-industrial complex. Europe turns out to be a mental appendage of the United States, whose geopolitical interests and strategic line become the only and dominant for all Western powers. The political sovereignty of European states should also be gradually reduced, and power should be transferred to a special authority that unites representatives of all "Atlantic" spaces and is subordinate to the priority supremacy of the United States.

Speakman anticipated the most important political processes of the creation of the "North Atlantic Alliance" (NATO), the decrease in the sovereignty of European powers in the post-war world, the planetary hegemony of the United States, and so on.

6.5 The Architect of the American Victory

Speakman made the basis of his doctrine not so much a geopolitical understanding of the place of the United States as a "Sea Power" in the whole world (like Mahan), perhaps because this has already become a fact, as the need to control the coastal territories of Eurasia: Europe, Arab countries, India, China, etc. .d. for the ultimate victory in a duel between continental and naval forces. If in Mackinder's painting planetary duality was viewed as something "eternal", "irreducible", then Speakman believed that perfect control of the rimland by the "sea powers" would lead to a final and irrevocable victory over the land powers, which from now on would be completely under their control.

In fact, this was the ultimate development of the "anaconda tactics" that Mahan had already argued. Speakman finished the whole concept.

The victory of the United States as a "Sea Force" in the Cold War demonstrated the absolute geopolitical correctness of Speakman, who can be called the "architect of the world victory of liberal-democratic countries" over Eurasia.

At this point, it seems that Speakman's theses regarding the strategic supremacy of the rimland and the importance of the "Middle Ocean" are proven by history itself. But it is also too early to completely discard Mackinder's theory of the permanent striving of the center of Eurasia for political revival and continental expansion.

On the other hand, some of Speakman's ideas (especially his follower Kirk, who developed the rimland theory in even more detail) were supported by some European geopoliticians who saw in his high strategic assessment

"coastal territories" an opportunity to bring Europe back to the list of those countries that decide the fate of the world. But for this it was necessary to discard the concept of the "Middle Ocean".

Despite this theoretical course of some European geopoliticians (which, however, remains very ambiguous), Spykman belongs, without any doubt, to the brightest and most consistent "Atlantists." Moreover, he, together with Admiral Mahan, can be called "the father of Atlanticism" and "the ideological inspirer of NATO."

Chapter 7. Karl Haushofer "Continental Block"

7.1 War and Thought

It was Karl Haushofer (1869 1946) who geopolitics owes much to the fact that it for a long time was considered not simply as "pseudoscience", but andas "misanthropic", "fascist", "cannibalistic" theory.

Karl Haushofer was born in Munich into a family of professors. It decided to become professional military and served in the army as an officer for over twenty years. From 1908 to 1910, he served in Japan and Manchuria as a German military attaché. Here he became acquainted with the family of the Japanese emperor and with the highest aristocracy.

Poor health forced Haushofer to leave a rather successful military career, and he returned to Germany in 1911, where he lived until the end of his life. He took up science, receiving the title of "Doctor" at the University of Munich. Since that time, Haushofer has regularly published books on geopolitics in general, and in particular, the geopolitics of the Pacific region. His first book was "Dai Nihon"[34], dedicated to the geopolitics of Japan.

Through his student Rudolf Hess, Haushofer met Hitler immediately after his imprisonment following an unsuccessful putsch. There is an unconfirmed opinion by historians that Haushofer took part in the writing of "Mein Kampf" in places dedicated to certain geopolitical categories. But conceptual analysis reveals a significant difference between Haushofer's geopolitical views and Hitler's simplistic racist propaganda passages.

For 20 years, starting in 1924, Haushofer published the most important geopolitical journal of great international importance "Geopolitik", later renamed to "Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik".

He published most of his texts in this particular edition. Haushofer's relationship with Nazism was complicated. In some points his views converged with the views of the National Socialists, in others they radically diverged. Haushofer's position in the Third Reich also changed depending on the periods of Nazi rule and on personal relationships.

Until 1936, he was favored (especially the patronage of his younger friend Hess), later the cooling began. After Hess's flight to England, Haushofer fell out of favor, and after the execution of his son Albrecht on charges of participating in the assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944, Haushofer himself was considered almost an "enemy of the people."

Despite this ambiguity in his position, he was ranked by the allies as "prominent Nazis." Unable to withstand so many blows of fate and the collapse of all hopes, Karl Haushofer, together with his wife Martha, committed suicide in 1946.

[34] Karl Haushofer "Dai Nihon", Munich, 1913.

7.2 New Eurasian Order

Haushofer carefully studied the works of Ratzel, Kjellen, Mackinder, Vidal de la Blache, Mahan and other geopoliticians. The picture of planetary dualism "sea forces" against "continental forces" or thalassocracy ("power through the sea") against tellurocracy ("power through the land") was for him the key that opened all the secrets of international politics, to which he was directly involved way. (In Japan, for example, he dealt with those forces that made the most responsible decisions regarding the picture of space.) It is indicative that the term "New Order", which was actively used by the Nazis, and in our time in the form of "New World Order" by the Americans,

The planetary dualism of "Sea Power" and "Land Power" presented Germany with the problem of geopolitical self-identification. The supporters of the national idea, and Haushofer was undoubtedly one of them, sought to strengthen the political power of the German state, which implied industrial development, cultural upsurge and geopolitical expansion. But the very position of Germany in the Center of Europe, the spatial and cultural Mittellage, made it a natural enemy of the Western, maritime powers of England, France, and in the future the USA. The "thalassocratic" geopoliticians themselves also did not hide their negative attitude towards Germany and considered it (along with Russia) one of the main geopolitical opponents of the maritime West.

In such a situation, it was not easy for Germany to count on a strong alliance with the powers of the "outer crescent", especially since England and France had historical claims of a territorial order against Germany. Hence the future national Greater Germany lay in a geopolitical confrontation with the West and especially the Anglo-Saxon world, with which Sea Power was actually identified.

The entire geopolitical doctrine of Karl Haushofer and his followers is based on this analysis. This doctrine is the need to create a "continental bloc" or axis Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo. There was nothing accidental in such a bloc; it was the only full-fledged and adequate response to the strategy of the opposite camp, which did not hide the fact that the creation of a similar Eurasian alliance would be the biggest danger for it. Haushofer wrote in his article "The Continental Bloc":

"Eurasia cannot be stifled as long as its two largest peoples, Germans and Russians, are doing their best to avoid an internecine conflict like the Crimean War or 1914: this is an axiom of European politics."[35]

In the same place he quoted the American Homer Lee. "The last hour of Anglo-Saxon politics will strike when the Germans, Russians and Japanese will unite."

Haushofer carried this idea in different ways in his articles and books. This line was named Ostorientierung, i.e. "Orientation to the East", since it assumed the self-identification of Germany, its people and its culture as a Western continuation of the Eurasian, Asian tradition. It is no coincidence that the British during World War II

[35] Karl Haushofer "Kontinentalblocke: Mitteleuropa-Eurasia-Japan" in "Ausgewaehlte Texte zur Geopolitik", Boppard am Rhein, 1979; in Russian in "Elements" no. 7, op. cit, pp. 32-36.

the wars pejoratively called the Germans "Huns". For the geopolitics of the Haushofer school, this was quite acceptable.

In this regard, it should be emphasized that Haushofer's concept of "openness to the East" did not at all mean "the occupation of the Slavic lands." It was about a joint civilizational effort of the two continental powers, Russia and Germany, which would have to establish a "New Eurasian Order" and restructure the continental space of the World Island in order to completely withdraw it from the influence of the "Sea Power". The expansion of the German Lebensraum was planned by Haushofer not through the colonization of Russian lands, but through the development of gigantic unpopulated Asian spaces and the reorganization of the lands of Eastern Europe.

7.3 Compromise with Thalassocracy

However, in practice, everything did not look so straightforward. Haushofer's purely scientific geopolitical logic, which logically led to the need for a "continental bloc" with Moscow, collided with numerous tendencies of a different nature, also inherent in the German national consciousness. It was about a purely racist approach to history, with which Hitler himself was infected. This approach considered racial affinity to be the most important factor, not geographic or geopolitical specificity. The Anglo-Saxon peoples of England and the United States were seen in this case as natural allies of the Germans, since they were closest to them ethnically. The Slavs and especially the non-white Eurasian peoples turned into racial opponents. To this was added the ideological anti-communism, which was mixed in many ways on the same racial principle, Marx and many communists were Jews, which means that

National Socialist racism came into direct conflict with geopolitics or, more precisely, implicitly pushed the Germans towards a reverse, anti-Eurasian, thalassocratic strategy. From the point of view of consistent racism, Germany should initially have entered into an alliance with Britain and the United States in order to jointly resist the USSR. But on the other hand, Versailles' humiliating experience was still too fresh. All the ambiguity of the Third Reich's international policy follows from this duality. This policy was constantly balancing between
a thalassocratic line, outwardly justified by racism and anti-communism (anti-Slavic mood, attack on the USSR, encouragement of Catholic Croatia in the Balkans, etc.), and a Eurasian tellurocracy based on purely geopolitical principles (war with England and France, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and etc.).

Since Karl Haushofer was engaged, to some extent, in solving specific political problems, he was forced to adjust his theories to political specifics. Hence his contacts in the higher spheres of England. In addition, the conclusion of the Anticommintern pact, i.e. the creation of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, Haushofer outwardly welcomed, trying to present it as a preliminary step towards the creation of a full-fledged "Eurasian bloc". He could not help but understand that the anti-communist orientation of this alliance and the emergence of a peninsular secondary power belonging to the rimland instead of the center of heartland (Moscow) is a contradictory caricature of a genuine "continental bloc."

Nevertheless, such steps, dictated by political conformism, are not indicative of the entire set of Haushofer's geopolitics. His name and ideas

They were fully embodied precisely in the concepts of the "eastern destiny" of Germany, based on a strong and long-term Eurasian union.

Chapter 8. Carl Schmitt "Behemoth versus Leviathan"

8.1 Conservative revolutionary

German Karl Schmitt (1888 1985) is known as an outstanding lawyer, political scientist, philosopher, historian. But all his ideas are inextricably linked with geopolitical concepts, and his main work "Nomos of the Earth"[36], "Land and sea "[37] etc. are devoted precisely to the comprehension of geopolitical factors and their influence on civilization and political history.

Karl Schmitt was close to the German representatives of the Conservative Revolution, a paradoxical trend that combined national-conservative and social-revolutionary elements. The fate of Schmitt is the fate of his books, his school of law and philosophy. Like many other conservative revolutionaries, his relationship with the National Socialist regime was ambivalent. On the one hand, his theories certainly influenced Nazi ideology. His political science books "Political Theology" enjoyed particular success.[38] and "The concept of the political"[39], in which Schmitt gave a detailed criticism of liberal law and the idea of a "rule of law". These texts have already given the outlines of all subsequent intellectual work of Schmitt, they show the utmost political realism, the desire to free political science problems from humanitarian rhetoric, sentimental pathos, and social demagogy. This was in keeping with the National Socialist spirit.

At the same time, Schmitt's entire concept was based on the fundamental idea of "the rights of the people" (Volksrechte), which he contrasted with the liberal theory of "human rights". In his understanding, every nation had the right to cultural sovereignty, to preserve its spiritual, historical and political identity. The same approach was characteristic of some National Socialists, who consider this ideology universal and applicable to all peoples of the earth. But it was pan-Germanism, based on chauvinism and a narrowly nationalist approach, that became the dominant line of the regime. Therefore, Schmitt, with his theory of "the rights of peoples", was subjected to sharp criticism, especially from the ideologues of the SS (in 1936, an aggressively threatening article against him was published in the SS organ "Schwarze Korps").

Schmitt's ideological formation took place in the same atmosphere of ideas of "organicist sociology" as that of Ratzel and Kjellen, but he was also influenced by the romantic theories of the "Light of the North" (Nordlicht), according to which socio-political forms and state formations are not rooted in mechanical the functioning of atomic personalities, united in mathematical conglomerates, but in mythology, in the sacred world of "elements and spirits"[40]. There is a paradoxical combination of "political romanticism" and "strict rationalism" everywhere in Schmitt's theories. A refined mental apparatus is used to express spiritual mythologemes.

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[36] Carl Schmitt "Der Nomos der Erde", Koeln, 1950.

[37] Carl Schmitt "Land und Meer", Leipzig, 1942.

[38] Carl Schmitt "Politische Theologie", Munchen-Leipzig, 1922.

[39] Carl Schmitt "Das Begriff des Politischen", Berlin-Grunewald, 1928; in Russian Karl Schmitt "The concept of political" in "Questions of Sociology", Moscow, 1992, volume 1, no.

[40] Carl Schmitt "Theodor Daueblers" Nordlicht ". Drei Studien ueber die Elemente, den Geiste und die Aktualitaet des Werkes", Muenchen, 1916.

At the Nuremberg Trials, an attempt was made to classify Karl Schmitt as a "war criminals" on the basis of his collaboration with the Hitler regime. In particular, he was charged with "theoretical substantiation of the legitimacy of military aggression." After a detailed acquaintance of the judges with the essence of the case, the charge was dropped. Nevertheless, Schmitt, like Heidegger, Jünger and other "conservative revolutionaries", became persona non grata in the world scientific community, and his work was completely ignored.

Only in the 70s, thanks to the colossal influence on the legal thought of some left, socialist thinkers, works to be rehabilitated. Schmitt gradually became

He is currently recognized as a classic of political science and jurisprudence.

8.2 Earth Nomos

Schmitt, completely in the spirit of the geopolitical approach, asserted the initial connection of political culture with space. Not only the State, but the entire social reality and especially the law derive from the qualitative organization of space.

From here, Schmitt deduced the concept of "nomos". This Greek term "nomos" means "something taken, formed, ordered, organized" in the sense of space. This term is close to the concepts of "relief" by Ratzel and "locality" by the Russian Eurasians (Savitsky). Schmitt shows that "nomos" is a form of organization of being that establishes the most harmonious relationships both within a social ensemble and between these ensembles. "Nomos" is an expression of a special synthetic combination of subjective and objective factors, organically manifested in the creation of political and legal systems. In "nomos" the natural and cultural characteristics of the human collective are manifested in combination with the environment.

In the book "Nomos of the Earth", Schmitt shows how the specificity of this or that earthly space influenced the cultures and states that developed in it. He compares various historical "nomos" with each other, especially emphasizing the fundamental dualism between the attitude of nomads and sedentary peoples to space.

But the most important conclusion from the analysis of the "nomos of the earth" was that Schmitt came close to the concept of a global historical and civilizational confrontation between the civilizations of the Land and the civilizations of the Sea. While exploring the "nomos" of the Earth, he encountered its qualitative, essential opposite to the "nomos" of the Sea. This led him to create a special geopolitical methodology for understanding the political history of the world.

8.3 Land and Sea

In 1942, Schmitt published the most important work "Land and Sea"[41]. Together with the later text "Planetary tensions between East and West and the confrontation between Land and Sea"[42] this constitutes the most important document of geopolitical science.

The meaning of the opposition of Land and Sea in Schmitt boils down to the fact that we are talking about two completely different, irreducible and hostile civilizations, and not about variants of a single civilizational complex. This division is almost exactly the same as the picture drawn by Mackinder, but Schmitt gives the main elements of thalassocracy (Sea Power) and tellurocracy (Land Power) an in-depth philosophical interpretation associated with basic legal and ethical systems. It is curious that Schmitt uses the name "Behemoth" for the "forces of the Land", and for the "forces of the Sea" "Leviathan", as a reminder of two Old Testament monsters, one of which embodies all land creatures, and the other all water, sea ...

"Nomos" of the Earth has existed with no alternative throughout most of human history. All varieties of this "nomos" are characterized by the presence of a strict and stable legal (and ethical) form, which reflects the immobility and fixity of the Land, the Earth. This connection with the Earth, a space in which easily lends itself to structuralization (fixed boundaries, constancy of communication paths, invariability of geographic and relief features), gives rise to essential conservatism in the social, cultural and technical spheres. The totality of versions of the "nomos" of the Earth constitutes what is commonly called the history of "traditional society".

In such a situation, the Sea, Water are only peripheral civilizational phenomena, without intruding into the sphere of "ethical" (or invading occasionally). Only with the discovery of the World Ocean at the end of the 16th century did the situation change radically. Humanity (and first of all, the island of England) begins to get used to the "sea existence", begins to realize itself as an Island in the middle of the waters, a Ship.

But the body of water is sharply different from the land. It is impermanent, hostile, alienated, subject to constant change. The paths are not fixed in it, the differences in orientations are not obvious. "Nomos" of the sea entails a global transformation of consciousness. Social, legal and ethical norms become "fluid". A new civilization is being born. Schmitt believes that the modern era and the technical breakthrough that opened the era of industrialization owe their existence to the geopolitical phenomenon of humanity's transition to the "nomos" of the sea.

Thus, the geopolitical confrontation of the Anglo-Saxon world of the "outer crescent" acquires a socio-political definition from Schmitt. "Nomos" of the sea is a reality hostile to traditional society. The geopolitical confrontation between land powers and sea powers acquires the most important historical, ideological and philosophical meaning.

8.4 Grossraum

Schmitt developed another important geopolitical theory, the theory of "large space" (Grossraum). This concept examines the process of development of states

[41] Carl Schmitt "Der Nomos der Erde", op. cit.
[42] Carl Schmitt "Die planetarische Spannung zwischen Ost und West", 1959 in "Schmittiana-III" von prof. Piet Tommissen, Brussel, 1991; in Russian see Carl Schmitt "Planetary Tensions Between East and West" in "Elements", 1997, no. 8.

as a desire to acquire the largest territorial volume. The principle of imperial integration is an expression of the logical and natural human desire for synthesis. The stages of the territorial expansion of the state, therefore, correspond to the stages of the movement of the human spirit towards universalism.

This geopolitical law applies to both the technical and economic spheres. Schmitt shows that, starting from a certain moment, the technical and economic development of the state requires a quantitative and qualitative increase in its territories. This does not necessarily mean colonization, annexation, or military invasion. The formation of the Grossraum can also take place under other laws on the basis of the adoption by several states or peoples of a single religious or cultural form.

According to Schmitt, the development of the "nomos" of the Earth should lead to the emergence of the Continental State. The stages of movement to the Continent State run from city-states through the states of the territory. The emergence of a land-based continent State, the mainland grossraum, is a historical and geopolitical necessity.

In the 1940 text "Space and Large Space in the law of peoples"[43] Schmitt defined "Big Space" as follows: "The sphere of planning, organization and human activity, rooted in an actual and voluminous trend of future development"[44].
Refining this somewhat vague formulation, Schmitt pointed to the implementation of the American Monroe doctrine as an example of the volitional creation of a "Great Space".

Although Grossraum can, in a certain sense, be identified with the State, or rather with the Empire (das Reich), this concept goes beyond the ordinary state. This is new the form supranational associations, founded on the strategic, geopolitical and ideological factor.

In contrast to Hitler's unification pan-Germanist model and from the Soviet Schmitt's Grossraum internationalism is based on cultural and ethnic pluralism, on broad autonomy, limited only by strategic centralism and total loyalty to the highest authority. At the same time, Schmitt emphasized that the creation of a new "Great Space" does not depend on the scientific value of the doctrine itself, nor on cultural competence, nor on the economic development of the constituent parts or even the territorial and ethnic center that gave impetus to integration. Everything depends only on the political will that recognizes the historical necessity of such a geopolitical step.

Schmitt in this doctrine anticipated the main lines of modern integration policy.

8.5 Total war and the "partisan" figure

Geopolitical motives are discernible in Schmitt in almost all the topics that he considers. In particular, he investigated the connection between the three concepts "total enemy, total war, total state." From his point of view, the "total state" is

[43] Carl Schmitt "Raum und Grossraum im Volkerrecht", 1940; cit. by Julien Freund "Les lignes de force de la pensee politique de Carl Schmitt" dans "Nouvelle Ecole", no. 44, Paris, 1987.
[44] Ibidem

the most perfect form of the state of the traditional type, i.e. the peak of the development of the land "nomos". Despite the possibilities of the historical evolution of such a state up to the scale of the Grossraum, the essential quality remains unchanged in it. The "total state" excludes the principle of "total enemy" and "total war", since the idea of the enemy, the "enemy" (and Schmitt attached great importance to the formulation of the concepts "friend" / "enemy", amicus / hostis) it builds on the basis of itself itself, and therefore, puts forward the concept of "war of forms", in which Jus bellum operates and only limited contingents of professional military personnel participate. The civilian population and private property, in turn, are protected by law and eliminated (at least

The liberal doctrine, which Schmitt unambiguously associated with the New Age and, accordingly, with the "sea civilization", with the "nomos" of the sea, denying the "total state" thereby opens the way for "total war" and the concept of "total enemy". In 1941, in his article "State Sovereignty and the High Seas," he wrote:

"The war on land was subordinated to legal norms, since it was a war between states, that is, between the armed forces of warring states. Its rationalization was manifested in its limitation and in the desire to bring civilians and objects of private property beyond its borders. War at sea on the contrary, it is not a war between strictly defined opponents, subject to legal norms, since it is based on the concept of a total enemy. "[45]

The general geopolitical picture described by Schmitt was reduced to a tense civilizational dualism, to the confrontation between two Anglo-Saxon Grossraums (England + America) and a continental European, Eurasian one. These two "Great Spaces", the thalassocratic and the tellurocratic, are waging a planetary battle with each other to take the last step towards universalization and move from continental to world dominion. At the same time, Schmitt was pessimistic about the possibility of reducing this conflict to some kind of strict legal basis, since the civilizational macroconcepts of both "Great Spaces" are based on mutually exclusive "nomos" "nomos of the Earth" and "nomos of the Sea". The last destructive element is introduced by the development of aeronautics, since "air space"

At the end of his life, Schmitt focused his attention on the figure of the "partisan". This figure, according to Schmitt, is the last representative of the "nomos" of the Earth, remaining true to its original vocation despite the "dilution of civilization" and the dissolution of its legal and cultural foundations. The "partisan" is connected with his native land by informal ties, and the historical nature of this connection dictates to him the foundations of the ethics of war, which are sharply different from more general and abstract standards. With the universalization of the "maritime model" and "trade ethics", which naturally encompass the sphere of military operations, the figure of the "partisan" acquires, according to Schmitt, increasing civilizational significance, since the "partisan" remains the last character in history, who protects (by all means) "

[45] Carl Schmitt "Staatliche Souveraenitaet und freies Meer" in "Das Reich und Europa", Leipzig, 1941.

Chapter 9. Pyotr Nikolaevich Savitsky "Eurasia Middle Earth"

9.1 The fate of the Eurasian

Petr Nikolaevich Savitsky (1895 1968) is perhaps the first (and only) Russian author who, in the full sense of the word, can be called a geopolitician. An economist by education, a student of V. Vernadsky and P. Struve. Before the war, he was close to the cadets. After the revolution he emigrated to Bulgaria, then moved to Czechoslovakia. In 1921, together with Prince N.S. Trubetskoy, he headed the Eurasian movement, in which geopolitical factors played a central role. It was Savitsky who was most of all Eurasianists interested in geopolitics.

The worldview of Savitsky, like most other Eurasians, was shaped by the works of the Slavophiles, Danilevsky and especially Leontiev. It was a kind of revolutionary Slavophilism, coupled with the central idea of the specificity of the historical identity of the "Great Russians", which cannot be reduced to either religious or ethnically Slavic essence. In this aspect, they were closest to Konstantin Leontiev, who formulated the most important thesis "there is Slavism, there is no Slavism", that is, "the ethnic and linguistic closeness of the Slavic peoples is not a sufficient basis to talk about their cultural and characteristic unity." The Eurasian movement on a set of favorite themes and concepts was surprisingly close to the German conservative revolutionaries. Just like the conservative revolutionaries Eurasians sought to combine loyalty to the origins with a creative impulse into the future, rooted in the Russian national tradition with social modernism, technical development and politics of non-traditional forms. This is also the basis of the cautiously positive attitude of the Eurasians towards the Soviet State and towards the October Revolution.

Despite the sympathy for the Soviets, which was characteristic not only of the openly pro-Soviet wing of the Eurasians (the Parisian circle that published the newspaper "Eurasia"), with which Savitsky officially broke off relations, but also for the most moderate and "conservative" elements. After the capture of Prague by Soviet troops in 1945, Savitsky was arrested and sentenced to 10 years in labor camps. In the camps, he met the son of the poet Nikolai Gumilyov, Lev, who became his student, and later one of the best modern Russian ethnographers and historians.

In 1956, Savitsky was rehabilitated and returned to Prague, where he died 12 years later.

9.2 Russia-Eurasia

Savitsky's main idea is that Russia is a special civilizational entity, defined through the quality of the "middle". One of his articles "The Geographical and Geopolitical Foundations of Eurasianism" (1933) begins with the words "Russia has much more reason than China to be called the" Middle State "[46].

[46] Petr Savitsky "Geographical and geopolitical foundations of Eurasianism" in "Elements" No. 3, pp. 51-54

If the “middle” of Germany, Mittellage, is limited to the European context, and Europe itself is only the “western cape” of Eurasia, then Russia occupies a central position within the entire continent. For Savitsky, the “middleness” of Russia is the basis of its historical identity; it is not a part of Europe and not a continuation of Asia. It is an independent world, an independent and special spiritual and historical geopolitical reality, which Savitsky calls "Eurasia".

This concept does not mean a continent or a continent, but an idea reflected in Russian space and Russian culture, a historical paradigm, a special civilization. Savitsky from the Russian pole puts forward a concept that is strictly identical to Mackinder's geopolitical picture, only abstract "land robbers" or "centrostatic impulses emanating from the geographical axis of history" acquire from him a clearly defined outline of Russian culture, Russian history, Russian statehood, Russian territory. Savitsky portrays Russia-Eurasia in the same light as Ratzel's Raum and, more precisely, Schmitt's Grossraum.

If Mackinder believes that a mechanical push comes from the deserts of the heartland, forcing the coastal zones ("inner crescent") to create culture and history, then Savitsky argues that Russia-Eurasia (= Mackinder's heartland) is a synthesis of world culture and world history, deployed in space and time. Moreover, the nature of Russia participates in its culture.

Savitsky understands Russia geopolitically, not as a national state, but as a special type of civilization, formed on the basis of several components of the Aryan-Slavic culture, Turkic nomadism, and the Orthodox tradition. All together creates a kind of unique, "middle" formation, which is a synthesis of world history.

Savitsky considers the Great Russians not just an offshoot of the Eastern Slavs, but a special imperial ethnic formation in which Slavic and Turkic substrates are combined. This moment brings him to the important topic of Turan.

9.3 Turan

The appeal to Turan as a positive orientation was scandalous for many Russian nationalists. Thus, Savitsky indirectly justified the Mongol-Tara yoke, thanks to which "Russia gained its geopolitical independence and retained its spiritual independence from the aggressive Romano-Germanic world." This attitude towards the Turkic world was intended to sharply separate Russia-Eurasia from Europe and its fate, to substantiate the ethnic uniqueness of Russians.

"Without Tatar, there would be no Russia" this thesis from Savitsky's article "Steppe and Settlement"[47] was the key formula of Eurasianism. Hence the direct transition to a purely geopolitical statement:

"Let's put it bluntly: in the space of world history, the West European sensation of the sea, as an equal, albeit polar, is opposed by the only Mongolian

[47] P.N. Savitsky "Steppe and Settlement" in "On the Ways: The Approval of the Eurasians", Berlin, 1922, pp. 341-356

a sense of the continent; meanwhile, in the Russian "explorers", in the scope of Russian conquests and explorations, the same spirit, the same sense of the continent. "[48]

And further:

"Russia is the heiress of the Great Khans, the successor of the cause of Chingiz and Timur, the unifier of Asia. (...) It combines both the historical" sedentary "and" steppe "elements."[49]

The fundamental duality of the Russian landscape, its division into Forest and Steppe, was noticed by the Slavophiles. For Savitsky, the geopolitical meaning of Russia-Eurasia appears as a synthesis of these two realities of the European Forest and the Asian Steppe. Moreover, such a synthesis is not a simple imposition of two geopolitical systems on top of each other, but something integral, original, with its own measure and methodology of assessments.

Russia-Eurasia is not entirely reduced to Turan. She's more than that. But with regard to Europe, which considers everything that goes beyond its "coastal" consciousness to be "barbarism", the self-qualification of Russians as "carriers of the Mongolian spirit" is a provocation that reveals the historical and spiritual superiority of the Eurasians.

9.4 Location

In Savitsky's theory, the concept of "local development" plays an important role. This term is an exact analogue of the concept of Raum, as it is interpreted by Ratzel's "political geography" and German geopolitics (+ Chellen) in general. This concept reflects the "organicism" of the Eurasians, exactly corresponding to the German "organicist" school and in sharp contrast to the pragmatism of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics. If Speakman was familiar with Savitsky's writings, then his resentment about "metaphysical nonsense" would have been even stronger than in the case of Haushofer. So, Savitsky in the text "Geographical Review of Russia-Eurasia" writes:

"The socio-political environment and its territory" must merge for us into a single whole, into a geographic individual or landscape "[fifty.]

This is the essence of "local development", in which the objective and the subjective merge into an indissoluble unity, into something whole. This is a conceptual synthesis. In the same text, Savitsky continues:

"Synthesis is needed. It is necessary to be able to immediately look at the socio-historical environment and the territory it occupies."[51.]

In this, Savitsky is close to Vidal de la Blache. Like the French geopolitician, who substantiated the indivisibility of France by the unity of a cultural type, regardless of the ethnicity of the inhabitants of Alsace-Laure Rin, Savitsky believes that

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[48] Ibidem

[49] Ibidem

[fifty] P.N.Savitsky "Geographical overview of Russia-Eurasia" in the collection "The World of Russia - Eurasia", 1926, pp. 219 - 232

[51] Ibidem

"Russia-Eurasia is a" locality "," a single whole ", a" geographic individual ", at the same time a geographic, ethnic, economic, historical, etc., etc., a" landscape "[52.]

Russia-Eurasia is such a "local development", which is an integral form of the existence of many smaller "local development". This is Schmitt's Grossraum, consisting of a whole hierarchy of lesser Raums.

Through the introduction of the concept of "local development", the Eurasians avoided the positivist need to analytically split historical phenomena, decomposing them into mechanical systems as applied not only to natural, but also to cultural phenomena. The appeal to "locality", to the "geographic individual" allowed Eurasians to avoid too specific prescriptions regarding national, racial, religious, cultural, linguistic, and ideological problems. Intuitively felt by all the inhabitants of the "geographical axis of history", the geopolitical unity thus acquired a new "synthetic" language, not reducible to inadequate, fragmentary, analytical concepts of Western rationalism.

This also revealed Savitsky's continuity of the Russian intellectual tradition, which always gravitated towards understanding "wholeness," "conciliarity," "total unity," and so on.

9.5 Ideocracy

A very important aspect of Savitsky's theory is the principle of "ideocracy". Savitsky believed that the Eurasian state should be built, starting from the initial spiritual impulse, from top to bottom. Consequently, its entire structure should be built in accordance with the a priori Idea, and a special class of "spiritual leaders" should be at the head of this structure. This position is very close to the theories of Schmitt about the "volitional", "spiritual" impulse, which stood at the origins of the emergence of Grossraum.

Ideocracy assumed the supremacy of a non-pragmatic, non-material and non-commercial approach to the state structure. The dignity of a "geographical personality", according to Savitsky, consists in the ability to rise above material necessity, organically including the physical world into a single spiritually-creative impulse of global historical activity.

Ideocracy is a term that encompasses all forms of undemocratic, illiberal rule based on non-materialistic and non-utilitarian motivations. Moreover, Savitsky deliberately avoids clarifying this concept, which can be embodied in theocratic sobornost, and in the people's monarchy, and in the national dictatorship, and in the party state of the Soviet type. This breadth of the term corresponds to the purely geopolitical horizons of Eurasianism, which cover huge historical and geographic volumes. This is an attempt to most accurately express the intuitive will of the continent.

It is clear that ideocracy is the exact opposite of the pragmatic-commercial approach that dominated the doctrines of Mackinder, Mahan, and Speakman. Thus, the Russian Eurasians brought ideological terms to the final clarity, in which

[52] Ibidem

manifested historically the confrontation between the Sea and Land. The sea is a liberal democracy, "trading system", pragmatism. Dry land ideocracy (of all varieties), "hierarchical government", domination of the religious ideal.

Savitsky's views on ideocracy resonate with the ideas of the German sociologist and economist Werner Sombart, who divided all social models and types into two general classes "heroes" and "merchants." At the geopolitical level, the term “hero”, “heroism” loses its metaphorical, pathetic meaning and becomes a technical term to denote the legal and ethical specifics of ideocratic rule.

9.6 USSR and Eurasianism

The role of Peter Savitsky and, more broadly, of Russian Eurasianism in the development of geopolitics as a science is enormous. And it's strange how little attention is paid to this direction in Western textbooks. In Savitsky, we have a completely conscious, responsible and competent geopolitician who fully and reasonably expresses the position of the heartland, starting from the deepest Russian regions. Savitsky's geopolitical doctrine is a direct antithesis to the views of Mahan, Mackinder, Speakman, Vidal de la Blache and other "thalassocrates". Moreover, only in this case we are talking about a complete and detailed presentation of an alternative doctrine, which examines in detail ideological, economic, cultural and ethnic factors. If we use the terminology of Karl Schmitt, then Savitsky and the Eurasians are the spokesmen for the "nomos of the Earth"

Anglo-Saxon Grossraum.

Comparison of Russians' ideas Eurasians from theories German geopoliticians continentalists (Haushofer, Schmitt, etc.), who also tried to build their own geopolitical theory as the antithesis of the strategy of the "Sea Power", shows that the Germans have traveled only half the way in this direction, while the Russians (first of all, Savitsky) we are dealing with a complete and consistent, full-fledged picture of the world. In this sense, a certain law can be derived: "The closer the views of the German continentalists to Russian Eurasianism, the more fully they accept the Ostorientierung, the more consistent and logical their doctrines, the more effective their political projects, created on a geopolitical basis."

In this sense, the closest to Savitsky came the German National Bolsheviks, in particular, Ernst Nikisch, who were well aware of the duality geopolitical position of Germany, whose "middle" is relative and secondary in comparison with the absolute cultural and continental "middle" of the Russians. From this they concluded that Germany cannot claim to be a geopolitical synthesis, that it must make a choice between southwestern, Slavophobic, Catholic and, in some aspects, "thalassocratic" (bourgeois) Germany (together with Austria) and north -Eastern German-Slavic, socialist, Russophile, Protestant and Spartan Prussia. Nikish owns the famous geopolitical thesis "Europe from Vladivostok to Flessing ga", and only this approach on the part of the Germans harmoniously fits into the consistent continental Eurasianism. Naturally, the line of the Austrian Catholic,

historical existence as a result of a nightmarish defeat inflicted by precisely those forces, "eternal alliance" with which alone could provide the Germans with complicity in the world domination of the tellurocracy.

Soviet reality in a geopolitical sense largely coincided with the concepts of Savitsky and other Eurasians, although there is no reliable data on their direct influence on the Soviet leadership. In many respects, the Smenovekhists and National Bolsheviks close to the Eurasians, especially Nikolai Ustryalov, clearly influenced the Bolsheviks and especially Stalin, although they never held high posts and often ended their lives in the camps. Part of the Eurasians Efron, Karsavin, etc. cooperated openly with the USSR, but also did not receive gratitude. However, an analysis of Soviet foreign policy right up to the beginning of perestroika leads to the conclusion that it constantly followed the Eurasian course, never declaring it openly.

And here one can only speculate: either there was some unknown organization within the Soviet regime, which was guided by Savitsky's ideas, adapting them to current political realities and putting them in the official "Marxist" vocabulary, or the objective position of the heartland forced the USSR by inertia to do those steps that a geopolitically conscious continental state of Eurasia should have taken.

Chapter 10. Geopolitics as an instrument of national policy

10.1 Planetary dualism is the basic law of geopolitics

Summing up a brief acquaintance with the ideas of the founders of geopolitical science, several general conclusions can be drawn.

Несмотря на разнообразие точек зрения мы имеем дело все же с некоей единой картиной мира, которая может быть названа геополитической. Эта картина мира стремится включить в анализ исторических процессов, международных и межгосударственных отношений сразу несколько дисциплинарных подходов географиче ский, политологический, идеологический, этнографиче ский, экономический и т.д. В этом состоит основная характеристика всех геополитических доктрин стремление к междисциплинарному синтезу.

The most common methodological formula shared by all geopoliticians is the assertion of a fundamental historical dualism between Land, tellurocracy, "nomos" of the Earth, Eurasia, heartland, "middle earth", ideocratic civilization, "geographical axis of history" on the one hand, and the Sea, thalassocracy , Sea Power, "nomos" of the Sea, Atlantic, Anglo-Saxon world, commercial civilization, "outer or island crescent", on the other. This can be seen as the main law of geopolitics. Outside the postulation of this dualism, all other conclusions lose their meaning. For all the discrepancies in particular aspects, none of the founders of geopolitical science questioned the fact of such a confrontation. In terms of its significance, it is comparable to the law of universal gravitation in physics.

10.2 A geopolitician cannot but be engaged

Another feature of the views of the founders of geopolitics is their constant political engagement. No, practically, not a single geopolitician who would be barred from participating in the political life of his state. Hence the obvious bias of all, without exception. A geopolitician, embarking on scientific research, must definitely determine his own place on the map of geopolitical poles; the angle of view from which he will analyze all world processes will depend on this. In the entire history of geopolitics, we do not meet a single author who would be indifferent to the fate of his state and his people, would not share its basic ethical and historical orientation. This is especially evident at the extreme poles. Anglo-Saxon authors impeccably and unambiguously follow the logic and value system of Sea Power, thalassocracy, formulating their theories from the standpoint of unconditional supporters of Atlanticism; Russian Eurasians are just as consistent in their loyalty to the ideals of the heartland, and they do not even question the absolute ethical and historical superiority of ideocracy and Russia-Eurasia.

The situation is more complicated with the French, who have a theoretical choice of self-identification, either thalassocracy or tellurocracy. In the first case, there follows solidarity with the Anglo-Saxon world, with Sea Power, in the second Germanophilia. Both options imply unconditional national sympathy. Theoretically, both of these tendencies are present among French geopoliticians, but the most harmonious

the geopolitical concept was developed by a group of "Atlantists" who were followers of Vidal de la Blache, who remains the central figure in this area. From a theoretical point of view, its geopolitical antipodes Lavalle and De Gaulle are significantly inferior to him.

Germany also has a twofold situation. If, on the whole, its geopolitical thought is oriented predominantly continental and "Eurasian", this orientation is limited by a complex relationship to the Slavic world, to Asia, and especially to Russia. This limitation is so significant and Germany's attempts to voluntarily equate its mid-European position with the mid-Eurasian, thereby ignoring the historical significance of Russia-Eurasia, are so persistent that in both world wars Germany was forced to fight not only against the thalassocratic powers, but also against its logical Eurasian ally Russia (USSR). We can say that German geopolitics is characterized by "non-Eurasian" continentalism.

The need for a geopolitician to initially determine his own position on the geopolitical map of the world and its belts (Mackinder's scheme in this sense is a very clear illustration) influenced the fact that this science developed almost exclusively among representatives of major powers with ambitions to become "world power" (Weltmacht) , "superpowers", achieve planetary dominance.

Americans Mahan and Speakman, Englishman Mackinder represent the "island crescent". They are the "speakers" of Atlanticism, thalassocracy.

Vidal de la Blache (and his school) represent Atlanticist France. Laval and De Gaulle lean towards continentalism, "Europeanism," anti-Atlanteanism. Hence their mutual Germanophilia, which geopolitically brings them closer together despite the fact that they belonged to two hostile camps: Laval was the head of the Vichy collaborationist government, and De Gaulle was the head of the anti-fascist French army.

The Germans Ratzel, Haushofer, Schmitt identify Germany with the axis of the Land, the tellurocracy, and seek to create a "Great Space" out of Germany, which should oppose the Anglo-Saxon thalassocracy. They are joined by the Swede Rudolf Kjellen, who, however, thinks more like a representative of Central Europe, the German European space, and not as a "narrow Swedish" nationalist. The most radical continentalists are Ernst Nikisch, Friedrich Georg Jünger, Arthur Müller van den Bruck, etc. go even further and believe the future of Germany is only in strategic integration with Eurasian Russia.

Finally, the Russian Eurasians (Savitsky, Trubetskoy, etc.) express the most complete version of continentism, expressing the most radical position of the "nomos" of Sushi, the tellurocracy.

The absence of at least some outstanding names among the geopolitics of other countries (although there were such names in Italy, Spain, Belgium, Romania, Holland, etc.) is explained by the fact that the fundamental geopolitical dualism concerns minor states only indirectly, their influence on the course of the global confrontation is insignificant, and, consequently, the very essence of geopolitics, its acuteness, its relevance, its “fateful” dimension are completely irrelevant for them.

10.3 The fate of scientists the fate of powers

The citizenship of geopolitical scientists in the most direct way affects their views. The connection is obvious here. Geopoliticians, in essence, are those people who, with the greatest insight and responsibility, are able to recognize the historical trends of global development in the spatial sphere, understand the place of their state and their people in this context and formulate a reasonable and most effective project for the future. Therefore, they so often directly or indirectly affect world history, which is carried out, however, by completely different forces, groups, parties, leaders, acting under completely different, momentarily relevant slogans.

But one more pattern is also interesting. The degree of direct influence of geopoliticians on power, the feedback between scientific developments and the political course in international relations of the respective states differs sharply.

Mahan, Speakman and Mackinder held high positions in their states, their political activity had the most immediate results, their direct influence on Anglo-Saxon politics is obvious and enormous. Despite some friction with the scientific world of their countries and some (tactical) concealment of the significance of their ideas for the entire "sea civilization" as a whole, they were honored during their lifetime, they were provided with all kinds of support, their fate and career were demonstratively successful.

The situation is different with continental geopolitics. Vidal de la Blache was considered only a geographer seeking to expand his field of research to a political scale. The attitude of the government towards him is respectful, but on the whole indifferent, although many practical principles (especially those set forth in "Eastern France") have been adopted. He does not enjoy the same prestige as the Anglo-Americans, but his theoretical legacy is taken into account.

For the Germans, especially with Haushofer and Schmitt, the situation is already more serious. Both in the Weimar Republic and under Hitler, attitudes towards them are changing in waves, moving from a certain attention of the authorities to direct repression. Compared to the "thalassocratic" geopolitics, their fate is tragic, their careers are zigzagging, and at certain moments they become victims of even those regimes whose national goals generally coincide with their own. There is no longer honor and respect, but hysterical attention, alternating with persecution.

For the Eurasianists, the picture is even more tragic. There is no direct attention here, not a single mention in official sources, only camps, links, arrests, persecutions with complete disregard. And although until a certain point in Soviet history it seems that the main decisions at the international level are made by the followers of Pyotr Savitsky, who check every step with the publications of the Eurasianists, the turning point comes in 1989 when it turns out that no one in the Soviet leadership is able to coherently explain the logic of traditional foreign policy. and as a result, there is a lightning-fast destruction of the gigantic Eurasian organism, created with such tension by three generations, having endured wars, deprivation, suffering, and unbearable hardships.

The role of the personality of geopoliticians in terms of their influence on power is sharply reduced along the West-East axis. The respect for Mahan and Speakman is contrasted with the constant threats to Schmitt from the SS and the persecution of Haushofer (his son was shot), and even more so from the camps of Savitsky and Karsavin. It amazes that in the end

it was those countries that most of all listened to their geopolitics and appreciated them, achieved amazing results and came close to finally achieving the one-man world domination. Germany paid for the inattention to Haushofer's theses about the "continental bloc" by the fact that it dropped out of history for half a century, suffered a monstrous defeat and fell into political oblivion. The USSR, which did not pay attention to the works of the most responsible, deep and perspicacious Russian patriots, without a fight and resistance found itself in almost the same situation as post-war Germany, world influence came to naught, the space was sharply reduced, the economy and social sphere turned into ruins.

Part II MODERN GEOPOLITICAL THEORIES AND SCHOOLS (second half of the twentieth century)

Chapter 1. Overview

The development of geopolitical thought in the second half of the 20th century generally followed the paths outlined by the founders of this science. The story of Haushofer and his school, over which hung an ominous shadow of intellectual cooperation with the Third Reich, forced the authors involved in this discipline to seek roundabout ways so as not to be accused of "fascism". Thus, the American Colin S. Gray generally suggested using two words to denote geopolitics: the English "geopolitics" and the German "Geopolitik". The first should denote the Anglo-Saxon and pragmatic version of this phenomenon, i.e. the writings of those authors who follow the approach of Mahan, Mackinder and Speakman, and the second "continental option", the legacy of the Haushofer school, taking into account some "spiritual" or "metaphysical" factors.

The American and, more broadly, the Atlanticist (thalassocratic) line in geopolitics developed practically without any breaks with tradition. As the projects of the Americans on becoming a "world power" were being implemented, postwar geopolitics-Atlanticists only refined and detailed particular aspects of the theory, developing applied spheres. The fundamental model of "sea power" and its geopolitical prospects has turned from scientific developments of separate military-geographic schools into the official international policy of the United States.

At the same time, the emergence of the United States as a superpower and entry into the last stage, preceding the final planetary hegemony of thalassocracy, forced American geopoliticians to consider a completely new geopolitical model, in which not two main forces participated, but only one. Moreover, there were fundamentally two options for the development of events, either the final victory of the West in a geopolitical duel with the East, or the convergence of two ideological camps into something single and the establishment of a World Government (this project was named "Mondialism" from the French word "monde", "peace"). In both cases, a new geopolitical understanding of this possible outcome of the history of civilizations was required. This situation gave rise to a special direction in geopolitics "geopolitics of mondialism". Otherwise, this theory is known as the doctrine of the "new world order". It was developed by American geopoliticians since the 70s, and for the first time it was loudly announced by US President George W. Bush at the time of the Gulf War in 1991.

European geopolitics as something independent after the end of World War II practically did not exist. Only during a rather short period of 1959–1968, when the "continentalist" Charles de Gaulle was President of France, the situation changed somewhat. Beginning in 1963, De Gaulle undertook some clearly anti-Atlanticist measures, as a result of which France withdrew from the North Atlantic Alliance and made attempts to develop its own geopolitical strategy. But since this state alone could not resist the thalassocratic world, the question of the intra-European Franco-German

cooperation and strengthening ties with the USSR. Hence the famous Gaullist thesis "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" was born. This Europe was conceived as a sovereign, strategically continental entity, quite in the spirit of moderate "European continentalism."

At the same time, by the beginning of the 70s, when geopolitical research in the United States became extremely popular, European scientists also began to get involved in this process, but at the same time, their connection with the prewar geopolitical school in most cases had already been interrupted and they had to adapt to the norms of the Anglo-Saxon approach. Thus, European scientists act as technical experts of international organizations such as NATO, the UN, etc., engaging in applied geopolitical research and not going beyond narrow specific issues. Gradually, these studies turned into something independent in "regional geopolitics", rather developed in France ("Yves Lacoste school", publisher of the magazine "Herodotus"). This "regional geopolitics" abstracts from the global schemes of Mackinder, Mahan or Haushofer,

The only continuous tradition of geopolitics that has survived in Europe since pre-war times was the property of rather marginal groups, more or less associated with post-war nationalist parties and movements. In these narrow and politically peripheral circles, geopolitical ideas developed, directly going back to “continentalism,” the Haushofer school, and so on. This movement is collectively called the European "new right". Until a certain moment, public opinion simply ignored them, considering them "vestiges of fascism." And only in the last decade, especially thanks to the educational and journalistic activities of the French philosopher Alain de Benois, serious scientific circles began to listen to this trend as well. Despite the considerable distance, separating the intellectual circles of the European "new right" from the authorities and their "dissidence", from a purely theoretical point of view, their works represent a huge contribution to the development of geopolitics. Free from the framework of political conformism, their thought developed relatively independently and impartially. Moreover, at the turn of the 90s, a situation arose that the official European geopolitics (most often from left or extreme left parties) were forced to turn to the "new right", their works, translations and research to restore the completeness of the geopolitical picture. Free from the framework of political conformism, their thought developed relatively independently and impartially. Moreover, at the turn of the 90s, a situation arose that the official European geopolitics (most often from left or extreme left parties) were forced to turn to the "new right", their works, translations and research to restore the completeness of the geopolitical picture. Free from the framework of political conformism, their thought developed relatively independently and impartially. Moreover, at the turn of the 90s, a situation arose that the official European geopolitics (most often from left or extreme left parties) were forced to turn to the "new right", their works, translations and research to restore the completeness of the geopolitical picture.

Finally, Russian geopolitics. Officially recognized as "fascist" and "bourgeois pseudoscience", geopolitics as such did not exist in the USSR. Its functions were performed by several disciplines: strategy, military geography, theory of international law and international relations, geography, ethnography, etc. And at the same time, the general geopolitical behavior of the USSR on the planetary arena betrays the presence of a rather rational, from a geopolitical point of view, behavior model. The USSR's desire to strengthen its positions in southern Eurasia, in the "coastal zone", penetration into Africa, destabilizing actions in South America (designed to split the space controlled by the North American States according to the Monroe Doctrine) and even the invasion of to cut the American "anaconda" striving to bring the strategic borders of "thalassocracy" close to the southern borders of the "geographical axis of history"), etc. Such a consistent and geopolitically grounded policy of the USSR indicates the existence of some kind of "center of decisions" where the

the results of many traditional sciences and on the basis of this "information", "synthesis" to take the most important strategic steps. However, the social localization of this "crypto-geopolitical" center appears to be problematic. There is a version that it was about some secret department of the Soviet GRU.

Actually, geopolitics has evolved exclusionary but marginal "dissident" circles. The most prominent representative of this trend was the historian Lev Gumilyov, although he never used the term "geopolitics" or the term "Eurasianism" in his works, and, moreover, tried in every possible way to avoid direct reference to socio-political realities. Thanks to this "cautious" approach, he managed to publish, even under the Soviet regime, several books on ethnographic history.

After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, geopolitics became relevant again in Russian society. The abolition of ideological censorship made it possible, finally, to call a spade a spade. It is not surprising that the first to take part in the revival of geopolitics were national-patriotic circles (Den newspaper, Elements magazine). The methodology turned out to be so impressive that some "democratic" movements also took over the initiative. Soon after perestroika, geopolitics became one of the most popular topics of the entire Russian society.

Associated with this is the increased interest in the Eurasians and their heritage in modern Russia.

Chapter 2. Modern Atlantism

2.1 Followers of Speakman D.W. Mainig, W. Kirk, S.B. Coen, K. Gray, G. Kissinger

The development of the American, purely Atlanticist line in geopolitics after 1945 was largely a development of the theses of Nicholas Speakman. Just as he himself began developing his theories with Mackinder's corrections, so his followers mostly corrected his own views.

In 1956, a student of Speakman D. Meinig published the text "Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History". Mainig specifically emphasizes that "geopolitical criteria should take special account of the functional orientation of the population and the state, and not just the purely geographical relationship of the territory to the Land and Sea"[53]. This is clearly the influence of Vidal de la Blache.

Mainig says that the entire space of the Eurasian rimland is divided into three types according to their functional and cultural predisposition.
"China, Mongolia, North Vietnam, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Eastern Europe (including Prussia), the Baltic and Karelia areas, organically gravitating towards heartland.

South Korea, Burma, India, Iraq, Syria, Yugoslavia are geopolitically neutral.

Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand are inclined to thalassocratic block.[54] "

In 1965, another follower of Speakman, W. Kirk, published a book[55], reproducing the title of Mackinder's famous article "The Geographical Pivot of History". Kirk developed Speakman's thesis regarding the centrality of rimland to the geopolitical balance of power. Based on Meinig's cultural-functional analysis and his differentiation of "coastal zones" in relation to "tellurocratic" or "thalassocratic" predispositions, Kirk built a historical model in which coastal civilizations play the main role, from which cultural impulses come with a greater or lesser degree of intensity inward continent. At the same time, the "higher" cultural forms and historical initiative are recognized for those sectors of the "inner crescent", which Meinig defined as "thalassocratically oriented".

American Saul Cohen in Geography and Politics in a Divided World[56] suggested introducing an additional classification into the geopolitical method based on dividing the main geopolitical realities into "nucleus" and "discontinuous belts." From his point of view, each specific region of the planet can be decomposed into 4 geopolitical components:

1) “external sea (water) environment, depending on the merchant marine and ports;

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[53] DWMeinig "Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History" in "West Politics Quarterly", IX, 1956 pp. 553-569
[54] Ibidem
[55] W.Kirk "Geographical Pivot of History", Leicaster Universal Press, 1965
[56] SB Cohen "Geography and Politics in a divided world", New York, 1963

2) the continental core (nucleus), identical to "Hinterland" (a geopolitical term meaning "inland regions remote from the coast");

3) a discontinuous belt (coastal sectors oriented either inward or away from the continent);

4) regions geopolitically independent from this ensemble. "[57]

The concept of "discontinuous zones" was taken up by leading American strategists such as Henry Kissinger, who believed that the US political strategy for "discontinuous" coastal zones was to unite the fragments into one whole and thereby ensure full control of Atlanticism over Soviet Eurasia. ... This doctrine is called "Linkage" from the English "link", "link", "link". For the "anaconda" strategy to be completely successful, it was necessary to pay special attention to those "coastal sectors" of Eurasia, which either remained neutral or gravitated towards the interior of the continent. In practice, this policy was carried out through the Vietnam War, the intensification of US-China relations,

As in previous eras, the post-war American Atlanticist geopolitical school constantly maintained a feedback loop with the authorities.

The development of geopolitical views in relation to the "nuclear era" we find in another representative of the same American school, Colin Gray. In his book "Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era"[58] he gives an outline of the military strategy of the United States and NATO, in which he makes the planetary location of nuclear facilities dependent on the geographic and geopolitical characteristics of the regions.

2.2 Atlantists won the Cold War

The geopolitical development of Atlanticism reached its climax by the beginning of the 90s. The "anaconda" strategy demonstrates absolute effectiveness. During this period, one can observe the almost "prophetic" correctness of the first Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians Mackinder and Mahan, corrected by Speakman.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR heralds the triumph of the orientation of the Atlanticist strategy that was pursued throughout the 20th century. The West is winning the Cold War with the East. Sea Power celebrates its victory over heartland.

Geopolitically, this event is explained as follows:

The confrontation between the Soviet bloc and NATO was the first ever pure and unalloyed form of opposition between Land and Sea, Behemoth and Leviathan. At the same time, the geopolitical balance of power reflected not only ideological, but also geopolitical constants.

The USSR as a heartland, like Eurasia, embodied the ideocracy of the Soviet type. Geographically, it was a fairly integrated "Big

[57] Ibidem
[58] Colin S. Gray "The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era", NY, 1977

A space "with colossal natural resources and developed strategic weapons. The main advantage of the USSR was the" cultural and functional "inclinations of the population living in its vast expanses or adjacent to Soviet territory, and the presence of hard-to-reach inland spaces that would make it possible to create reliable defense and technological footholds. Moreover, on both sides, from the North and East, the USSR had sea borders, which are much easier to defend than land ones.

Due to the centralized economy, the USSR achieved commodity and food autarky and the military status of a superpower. As far as possible, he strove to extend his influence to other continents.

But the Eastern Bloc had several fundamental geopolitical flaws. The most important thing was the enormous length of the land borders. If from the South the borders coincided with the ridge of the Eurasian mountains, from Manzhuria to the Tien Shan, Pamir and the Caucasus, then in the West the border passed in the middle of flat Europe, which was a strategic bridgehead of Atlanticism, while its central base was on the western bank of Sredinny Ocean "(Midland Ocean). But even in the southern direction, the mountains served not only as protection, but also as an obstacle, closing the way for possible expansion and access to the southern seas.

At the same time, the Eastern bloc was forced to concentrate military-strategic, economic, intellectual, production forces and natural resources in the same geopolitical center.

This situation was in sharp contrast to the geopolitical position of the West and the center of the United States. (This is especially important, since the position of Western Europe in this alignment of forces was very unenviable; it got the role of a US ground base, adjacent to the borders of the opposite camp, a kind of "cordon sanitaire"). America was completely protected by "maritime borders". Moreover, by strategically integrating its continent, it gained control over a huge part of the Eurasian coast, the rimland. From Western Europe through Greece and Turkey (NATO member countries), Atlanticist control extended to the Far East (Thailand, South Korea, strategically colonized Japan), and this zone smoothly passed into the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the most important military bases on the island of San Diego, in the Philippines , and further, in Guam, the Caribbean and Haiti.

At the same time, the Atlanticists have created a complex differentiated system of geopolitical distribution of power "cores". The United States directly provided military and strategic power. Intellectual, financial and industrial structures, as well as centers for the development of high technologies, were concentrated in Western Europe, free from the burden of ensuring its own military security (except for the maintenance of the police and purely decorative armed forces).

Natural resources came from economically underdeveloped regions of the Third World, from where cheap labor came to a large extent.

Maintaining the status quo immediately after World War II was an offensive position, since, according to the predictions of Atlanticist geopoliticians, such a situation would inevitably lead to the depletion of the continental block.

doomed to complete autarchy and forced to develop all strategic directions simultaneously.

Heartland had only two choices in this situation. The first to carry out a military expansion to the West with the aim of conquering Europe to the Atlantic. After this effort, the USSR could secure calm sea borders and industrial, intellectual and technological potential. In parallel, a similar effort had to be made in a southerly direction, in order to finally reach the warm seas and break the "anaconda ring" of Sea Power. This is a tough path that, if successful, could lead to a stable continental peace and, in the short term, to the collapse of America, deprived of rimland.

Another way was, on the contrary, in the withdrawal of the USSR and its Armed Forces from Eastern Europe in exchange for the withdrawal of NATO forces from Western Europe and the creation of a single, strictly neutral European Bloc (possibly with a limited "dissociative" nuclear potential). This option was seriously discussed in the De Gaulle era.

The same could have been done with Asia. Agree to renounce direct political control over some Central Asian republics in exchange for the creation with Afghanistan, Iran and India (possibly China) of a powerful strategic anti-American bloc oriented inland.

Finally, it would be possible to combine these two options and go peacefully in the West and forceful in the East (or vice versa). It was only important to start both of these geopolitical actions simultaneously. Only in this case it would be possible to hope for a change in the planetary balance of forces from the obvious positional loss of Sushi to its gain. It was necessary at any cost to break through the "containment" by this term during the Cold War, the geopolitical tactics of "anaconda" were called.

But since the USSR did not dare to take this radical geopolitical step, the Atlanticist powers had only to reap the results of their strictly calculated and geopolitically verified long-term positional strategy.

The autarkian Soviet power could not stand it and fell from the all-round overstrain. And the military invasion of Afghanistan without a parallel strategic step in Western Europe (peaceful or non-peaceful), instead of saving the case, finally aggravated the situation.

2.3 Aerocracy and Aetherocracy

Traditional Atlantic geopolitics, placing Sea Power at the heart of its concept, is the "geopolitics of the sea." A global strategy based on this geopolitics has led the West to establish planetary power. But the development of technology led to the development of airspace, which made the development of "air geopolitics" urgent.

In contrast to the "geopolitics of the sea," a complete and fully developed, full-fledged "geopolitics of the air" does not exist. The aeronautics factor is added to the general geopolitical picture. But some correlations in the actualization of the air environment and new types of weapons of strategic aviation, intercontinental missiles and nuclear weapons associated with it have changed significantly.

The development of airspace has to some extent equalized Land and Sea between themselves, since for aircraft and missiles the difference between these spaces is not so significant. (A particularly important step was the creation of aircraft carriers, since this finally severed the air bases from the Land, making them independent of the quality of the earth's surface.)

At the same time, the development of aviation has changed the proportions of the planetary scale, making the Earth much "smaller" and the distances "shorter". At the same time, rocketry and the development of strategic aviation largely relativized the traditional geopolitical factors of sea and land borders, inland bases, etc.

The transfer of weapons to Earth's orbit and the strategic exploration of outer space were the last stage in the "compression" of the planet and the final relativization of spatial differences.

In addition to Land and Sea, current geopolitics has to take into account two more elements, air and ether (outer space). At the military level, these elements correspond to nuclear weapons (air) and the "star wars" program (space). By analogy with tellurocracy (power of the Land) and thalassocracy (power of the Sea), these two newest modifications of geopolitical systems can be called aerocracy (power of Air) and ethericcracy (power of Ether).

Karl Schmitt gave a sketch of these two new spheres. At the same time, his most important and fundamental remark is that both "aerocracy" and "etherocracy" represent the further development of the "nomos" of the Sea, the advanced phases of precisely "thalassocracy", since the entire technical process of mastering new spheres is being led away " liquefaction of the "environment, which, according to Schmitt, is accompanied by the corresponding cultural and civilizational processes, a progressive departure from the" nomos "of Sushi not only in the strategic, but also in the ethical, spiritual, socio-political sense.

In other words, the development of air and space environments is a continuation of purely thalassocratic tendencies, and therefore can be considered as the highest stage of a purely Atlantic strategy.

From this perspective, the nuclear confrontation between the blocs in the Cold War is presented as competition in the conditions imposed by the "naval Force" on the heartland, which is forced to accept the terms of a strategic positional duel dictated by the opposite side. Such a process of active "liquefaction of the elements", coupled with the logic of the development of the Western world in the technological and strategic sense, is parallel to the offensive position of the Atlanticists in their policy of separating the coastal zones from the continental center, in both cases there is an offensive initiative of one geopolitical camp and a defensive reaction of the other. ...

On the intellectual level, this is expressed in the fact that the Atlanticists at the theoretical level are developing "active geopolitics", engaging in this science openly and systematically.

In the case of the West, geopolitics acts as a discipline that dictates the general contours of international strategy. In the case of the Eastern bloc, it has not been

officially recognized, existed and still continues to exist as a "reaction" to the steps of a potential adversary. It was and is "passive geopolitics" responding to the strategic challenge of atantism more by inertia.

If in the case of nuclear weapons and aviation (in the sphere of aerocracy) the USSR was able, at the cost of exerting all internal resources, to achieve relative parity, then at the next stage, in the field of etherocracy, a structural breakdown occurred, and competition in the field of technologies associated with "Star Wars" led to the ultimate geopolitical loss and to defeat in the Cold War.

To understand the essence of geopolitical processes in the nuclear world and in the conditions of the development of orbital spaces, Karl Schmitt's remark that aerocracy and ethericcracy are not independent civilizational systems, but only the development of the "nomos" of the Sea, is fundamental.

2.4 Two versions of the latest Atlanticism

The victory of the Atlantists over the USSR (heartland) meant the entry into a radically new era that required original geopolitical models. The geopolitical status of all traditional territories, regions, states and unions changed dramatically. The comprehension of planetary reality after the end of the Cold War has led Atlantist geopoliticians to two fundamental schemes.

One of them can be called "pessimistic" (for Atlanticism). It inherits the traditional Atlanticist line of confrontation with heartland, which is considered incomplete and not removed from the agenda along with the fall of the USSR, and predicts the formation of new Eurasian blocs based on civilizational traditions and stable ethnic archetypes. This option can be called "neoatlantism", its essence boils down, ultimately, to the continuation of considering the geopolitical picture of the world from the perspective of fundamental dualism, which is only nuanced by the allocation of additional geopolitical zones (except for Eurasia), which may also later become hotbeds of confrontation with the West. The most prominent representative of this neo-Atlanticist approach is Samuel Huntington.

The second scheme, based on the same original geopolitical picture, on the contrary, is optimistic (for Atlanticism) in the sense that it views the situation that has developed as a result of the West's victory in the Cold War as final and irrevocable. This is the basis of the theory of "mondialism", the concept of the End of History and One World, which asserts that all forms of geopolitical differentiation are cultural, national, religious, ideological, state, etc. are about to be finally overcome, and the era of a single universal human civilization based on the principles of liberal democracy will come. The story will end along with the geopolitical confrontation that initially gave the main impetus to history. This geopolitical project is associated with the name of the American geopolitician Francis Fukuyama, who wrote a programmatic article with the expressive title "The End of History". This mondialist theory will be discussed in the next chapter.

Let us analyze the main provisions of the Hunting Tone concept, which is an ultra-modern development of Atlanticist geopolitics, traditional for the West. Significantly, Huntington constructs his Clash of civilization policy paper as a response to Fukuyama's The End of History. It is significant that on

At the political level, this controversy corresponds to the two leading political parties in the United States: Fukuyama expresses the global strategic position of the Democrats, while Huntington is the mouthpiece of the Republicans. This quite accurately expresses the essence of the two newest geopolitical projects, neo-atlantism follows a conservative line, while "mondialism" prefers a completely new approach in which all geopolitical realities are subject to a complete revision.

2.5 Clash of Civilizations: Huntington's Neo-Atlanticism

The meaning of the theory of Samuel P. Huntington, director of the Institute for Strategic Research. John Olin at Harvard University, formulated in his article "The Clash of Civilizations"[59] (which appeared as a summary of the large geopolitical project "Changes in Global Security and American National Interests"), boils down to the following:

The visible geopolitical victory of Atlanticism on the entire planet disappeared with the fall of the USSR the last stronghold of continental powers is actually a slice of only superficial reality. NATO's strategic success, accompanied by ideological design, the rejection of the main competitive communist ideology, does not affect the deep layers of civilization. Huntington in spite of Fukuyame argues that a strategic victory is not a civilizational victory; Western ideology of liberal-democratic democracy, the market, etc. became uncontested only temporarily, since soon civilizational and geopolitical peculiarities, an analogue of the "geographical individual" that Savitsky spoke of, would begin to appear among non-Western peoples.

Rejection of the ideology of communism and shifts in the structure of traditional states, the disintegration of some formations, the emergence of others, etc. will not lead to an automatic alignment of all mankind with a universal system of Atlanticist values, but, on the contrary, will make deeper cultural layers, freed from superficial ideological clichés, relevant again.

Huntington quotes George Weigel: "Desecularization is one of the dominant social factors at the end of the 20th century." And consequently, instead of rejecting religious identification in the One World, as Fukuyama speaks of, peoples, on the contrary, will feel their religious affiliation even more vividly.

Huntington argues that along with the Western (= Atlanticist) civilization, which includes North America and Western Europe, one can foresee the geopolitical fixation of seven more potential civilizations:

1) Slavic-Orthodox,

2) Confucian (Chinese),

3) Japanese,

4) Islamic,

5) Hindu,

[59] Samuel Huntington "Clash of civilizations" in "Foreign Affairs", summer 1993, pp. 22-49

6) Latin American

and possibly 7) African[60].

Of course, these potential civilizations are by no means equivalent. But they all agree that the vector of their development and formation will be oriented in a direction different from the trajectory of Atlanticism and the civilization of the West. So the West will again find itself in a situation of confrontation. Huntington believes that this is practically inevitable and that even now, despite the euphoria of mondialist circles, it is necessary to take as a basis a realistic formula: "The West and The Rest"[61].

The geopolitical conclusions from this approach are obvious: Huntington believes that the Atlanticists should in every possible way strengthen the strategic positions of their own civilization, prepare for confrontation, consolidate strategic efforts, curb anti-Atlantic tendencies in other geopolitical formations, and prevent them from joining into a continental alliance that is dangerous for the West.

He makes the following
recommendations: "The West should

to ensure closer cooperation and unity within the framework of their own civilization, especially between its European and North American parts;

integrate into Western civilization those societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America, whose cultures are close to Western ones;

ensure closer relations with Japan and Russia;

prevent the escalation of local conflicts between civilizations into global wars;

limit the military expansion of Confucian and Islamic states;

suspend the curtailment of Western military power and ensure military superiority in the Far East and Southwest Asia;

use difficulties and conflicts in relations between Islamic and Confucian countries;

to support groups oriented towards Western values and interests in other civilizations;

strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimize Western interests and values, and ensure the involvement of non-Western states in these institutions. "[62]

This is a concise and succinct formulation of the doctrine of neo-Atlanticism.

[60] Ibidem p. 25
[61] Ibidem p. 39
[62] Ibidem p. 49

From the point of view of pure geopolitics, this means strict adherence to the principles of Mahan and Speakman, and the emphasis that Huntington puts on culture and civilizational differences as the most important geopolitical factors indicates his involvement in the classical school of geopolitics, which goes back to the "organic" philosophy, for which initially it was typical to view social structures and states not as mechanical or purely ideological formations, but as "forms of life."

Huntington points to China and the Islamic states (Iran, Iraq, Libya, etc.) as the most likely opponents of the West. This is directly influenced by the doctrines of Meinig and Kirk, who believed that the orientation of the countries of the "coastal zones", rimland and the "Confucian" and Islamic civilizations geopolitically belonged to predominantly rimland is more important than heartland's position. Therefore, unlike other representatives of neo-Atlanticism in particular, Paula Wolfowitz, Huntington sees the main threat not in the geopolitical revival of Russia-Eurasia, heartland or some new Eurasian continental entity.

In the report of the American Paul Wolfowitz (Security Adviser) to the US government in March 1992, it is said about "the need to prevent the emergence on the European and Asian continents of a strategic force capable of resisting the United States."[63], and further explains that the most likely force that is meant here is Russia, and that a "cordon sanitaire" should be created against it on the basis of the Baltic countries. In this case, the American strategist Wolfowitz is closer to Mackinder than to Speakman, which distinguishes his views from Huntington's theory.

In all cases, regardless of the definition of a specific potential adversary, the position of all neo-Atlantists remains essentially the same: victory in the Cold War does not negate the threat to the West emanating from other geopolitical formations (present or future). Consequently, it is premature to talk about the "One World", and the planetary dualism of thalassocracy (strengthened by aerocracy and ethericcracy) and tellurocracy remains the main geopolitical scheme for the 21st century as well.

Huntington's The West and The Rest becomes a new and more general formula for such dualism.

[63] Cit. by "Monde Diplomatique" 1992, annual compilation

Chapter 3. Mondialism

3.1 Prehistory of Mondialism

The concept of "mondialism" arose long before the final victory of the West in the Cold War.

The meaning of mondialism boils down to postulating the inevitability of full planetary integration, the transition from a plurality of states, peoples, nations and cultures to the uniform world of One World.

The origins of this idea can be seen in some utopian and chiliastic movements dating back to the Middle Ages and, further, to deep antiquity. It is based on the idea that at some climax in history there will be a gathering of all the peoples of the earth in a single Kingdom, which will no longer know the contradictions, tragedies, conflicts and problems inherent in ordinary earthly history. In addition to the purely mystical version of the mondialist utopia, there were also rationalistic versions of it, one of which can be considered the doctrine of the "Third Era" of the positivist Auguste Comte or the humanistic eschatology of Lessing.

Mondialist ideas were characteristic most often of moderate European and especially English socialists (some of them were united in the "Fabian Society"). The communists also spoke about a single World State. On the other hand, similar mondialist organizations were created from the end of the 19th century by major figures in world business, for example, Sir Sacil Rhodes, who organized the Round Table group, whose members were supposed to "promote the establishment of a system of free trade throughout the world and the creation of a single World Government. . " Often socialist motives were intertwined with liberal-capitalist ones, and the communists coexisted in these organizations with representatives of the largest financial capital. All were united by the belief in the utopian idea of uniting the planet.

It is significant that such well-known organizations as the League of Nations, and later the UN and UNESCO were a continuation of precisely such mondialist circles that had a great influence on world politics.

During the twentieth century, these mondialist organizations, avoiding unnecessary advertising, and often even of a "secret" nature, changed many names. There was a "Universal Movement for a World Confederation" by Harry Davis, a "Federal Union" and even a "Crusade for a World Government" (organized by British parliamentarian Henry Usborne in 1946).

As all conceptual and strategic power over the West was concentrated in the United States, it was this state that became the main headquarters of Mondialism, whose representatives formed a parallel power structure consisting of advisers, analysts, and centers of strategic research.

This is how the three main mondialist organizations developed, the very existence of which the Western public became aware of only relatively recently. In contrast to formal structures, these groups enjoyed significantly more freedom.

design and research, since they were exempted from the fixed and formal procedures governing the activities of the UN commissions, etc.

The first "Council on Foreign Relations" (abbreviated
CFR). Its creator was the largest American banker Morgan. This unofficial organization was engaged in the development of an American strategy on a planetary scale, with the ultimate goal being the complete unification of the planet and the creation of a World Government. This organization arose back in 1921 as a branch of the Carnegie Endowment for Universal Peace, and all of its high-ranking politicians shared Mondialist views on the future of the planet. Since most of the CFR members were also high-ranking dignitarians of Scottish Freemasonry, it can be assumed that their geopolitical projects also had some kind of humanistic-mystical dimension.

In 1954, a second mondialist structure, the Bilderberg Club or Bilderberg Group, was created. It brought together not only American analysts, politicians, financiers and intellectuals, but also their European colleagues. On the American side, it was represented exclusively by CFR members and was seen as its international continuation.

In 1973, the third most important mondialist structure, the Trilateral Commission, was created by activists of the Bilderberg Group. It was led by the Americans, members of the CFR and the Bilderberg Group, and had, in addition to the United States, where its headquarters is located (345 East 46th street, New York), two more headquarters in Europe and Japan.

The "Trilateral" Commission is named for fundamental geopolitical reasons. It is designed to unite under the auspices of Atlanticism and the United States three "large spaces" leading in technological development and market economy:

1) American space, which includes North and South America;

2) European space;

3) Pacific Space controlled by Japan.

At the head of the most important mondialist groups in Bilderberg and Trilateral is a senior CFR member, the largest banker David Rockefeller, owner of Chase Manhattan Bank.

In addition to him, the constant analysts, geopolitics and strategists of Atlanticism Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissind Ger are at the very center of all Mondialist projects. It also includes the famous George Ball.

The main line of all mondialist projects was the transition to a unified world system, under the strategic domination of the West and "progressive", "humanistic", "democratic" values. For this, parallel structures were developed, consisting of politicians, journalists, intellectuals, financiers, analysts, etc., who were supposed to prepare the ground before this mondialist project of the World Government could be widely publicized, since without preparation it would have come across to the powerful psychological resistance of peoples and states that do not want to dissolve their originality in the planetary melting pot.

The Mondialist project developed and implemented by these organizations was not homogeneous. There were two main versions of it, which, differing in methods, should theoretically lead to the same goal.

3.2 Convergence theory

The first most pacifist and "conciliatory" version of mondialism is known as the "convergence theory". Developed in the 1970s in the depths of the CFR by a group of "left" analysts led by Zbigniew Brzezinski, this theory assumed the possibility of overcoming the ideological and geopolitical dualism of the Cold War through the creation of a new cultural and ideological type of civilization that would be intermediate between socialism and capitalism. between pure Atlanticism and pure continentalism.

Soviet Marxism was seen as a barrier that could be overcome by moving on to its moderate, social democratic, revisionist version by rejecting the theses of "dictatorship of the proletariat", "class struggle", "nationalization of the means of production" and "abolition of private property." In turn, the capitalist West would have to restrict the freedom of the market, introduce partial state regulation of the economy, etc. A common cultural orientation could be found in the traditions of the Enlightenment and humanism, to which both Western democratic regimes and the social ethics of communism (in its softened social democratic versions) are being raised.

The World Government, which could appear on the basis of the "theory of convergence", was conceived as an admission of Moscow to the Atlantic administration of the planet jointly with Washington. In this case, the era of universal peace would begin, the cold war would end, the peoples would be able to relieve the burden of geopolitical tension.

It is important to draw a parallel here with the transition of technological systems from "thalassocracy" to "ethericcracy": Mondialist politicians began to look at the planet not through the eyes of the inhabitants of the western continent surrounded by the sea (like traditional Atlantists), but through the eyes of "astronauts in space orbit." In this case, their gaze was really One World, One World.

The Mondialist centers also had their correspondents in Moscow. The key figure here was Academician Gvishiani, director of the Institute for Systems Research, which was something like a branch of Trilateral in the USSR. But their activities were especially successful among the extreme left parties in Western Europe, which for the most part embarked on the path of "Eurocommunism" and this was considered the main conceptual basis for global convergence.

3.3 Planetary victory for the West

Convergence theories were the ideological foundation to which Mikhail Gorbachev and his advisers who carried out perestroika referred. At the same time, a few years before the beginning of Soviet perestroika, a similar project began to be implemented in China, with which representatives of the Trilateral Commission established a close relationship since the late 1970s. But the geopolitical fates of the Chinese and Soviet "perestroika" were different. China insisted on a "fair" distribution of roles and appropriate shifts in

ideology of the West towards socialism. The USSR took the path of concessions much further.

Following the logic of the American mondialists, Gorbachev began the structural transformation of the Soviet space towards "democratization" and "liberalization." First of all, this affected the countries of the Warsaw Pact, and then the republics of the USSR. Strategic arms reduction and ideological rapprochement with the West began. But in this case, attention should be paid to the fact that the years of Gorbachev's rule fall on the period of the presidency in the United States of the extreme Republicans Reagan and Bush. Moreover, Reagan was the only president in recent years who consistently refused to participate in all mondialist organizations. By convictions, he was a tough, consistent and uncompromising Atlanticist, liberal-market, not inclined to any compromises with the "left" ideologies of even the most moderate democratic or social democratic persuasion. Consequently, Moscow's steps aimed at convergence and the creation of a World Government with a significant weight of representatives of the Eastern Bloc in it, at the opposite pole had the most unfavorable ideological obstacles. The Atlantist Reagan (later Bush) simply used Gorbachev's mondialist reforms for purely utilitarian purposes. Heartland's voluntary concessions were not followed The Atlantist Reagan (later Bush) simply used Gorbachev's mondialist reforms for purely utilitarian purposes. Heartland's voluntary concessions were not followed The Atlantist Reagan (later Bush) simply used Gorbachev's mondialist reforms for purely utilitarian purposes. Heartland's voluntary concessions were not followed
the corresponding concessions from Sea Power, and the West made neither geopolitical nor ideological compromises with self-liquidating Eurasia. NATO did not dissolve, and its forces did not leave either Europe or Asia. Liberal-democratic ideology has further strengthened its position.

In this case, mondialism appeared not as an independent geopolitical doctrine that was realized in practice, but as a pragmatically used tool in the Cold War, the logic of which, based on the theses of Mackinder and Mahan, was not abandoned by the United States.

3.4 "End of History" by Francis Fukuyama

After the collapse of the USSR and the victory of the West, Atlanticism, the mondialist projects had to either die out or change their logic.

A new version of mondialism in the post-Soviet era was the doctrine of Francis Fukuyama, who published the programmatic article "The End of History" in the early 90s. It can be viewed as the ideological basis of neo-mondialism.

Fukuyama offers the following version of the historical process. Humanity from the dark era of the "law of power", "obscurantism" and "irrational management of social reality" moved to the most reasonable and logical order, embodied in capitalism, modern Western civilization, market economy and liberal democratic ideology. History and its development lasted only due to irrational factors, which little by little gave way to the laws of reason, the general monetary equivalent of all values, etc. The fall of the USSR marks the fall of the last bastion of "irrationalism". Connected with this is the end of History and the beginning of a special planetary existence, which will take place under the sign of the Market and Democracy, which will unite the world into a harmonious, rationally functioning machine.

Such a New Order, although based on the universalization of a purely Atlantic system goes beyond the framework of Atlanticism, and all regions of the world are reorganize by centers. beginning a new model, around its most economically developed

3.5 "Geoeconomics" by Jacques Attali

There is an analogue of Fukuyama's theory among European authors. Thus, Jacques Attali, who for many years was the personal adviser to French President François Mitter, and also for some time the director of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, developed a similar theory in his book "Horizon Lines".

Attali believes that at the moment the third era of the "era of money" is coming, which is the universal equivalent of value, since, equating all things with material digital expression, it is extremely easy to manage them in the most rational way. Attali himself associates this approach with the onset of the messianic era, understood in the Judeo-Kabbalistic context (he develops this aspect in more detail in another book specially devoted to messianism, "He will come"). This distinguishes him from Fukuyama, who remains within the framework of strict pragmatism and utilitarianism.

Jacques Attali offers his version of the future, which "has already arrived." The dominance of a single liberal-democratic ideology and market system on the entire planet, together with the development of information technologies, leads to the fact that the world becomes unified and homogeneous, the geopolitical realities that have dominated throughout history recede into the background in the "third era". Geopolitical dualism is canceled.

But the united world still receives a new geopolitical structuralization, based this time on the principles of "geoeconomics". For the first time, the concept of "geoeconomics" was proposed to develop by the historian Fritz Roerig, and it was popularized by Fernand Braudel.

"Geoeconomics" is a special version of mondialist geopolitics, which prioritizes non-geographic, cultural, ideological, ethnic, religious, etc. factors that make up the essence of the geopolitical approach itself, but a purely economic reality in its relation to space. For "geoeconomics" it does not matter at all what kind of people lives there and there, what is its history, cultural traditions, and so on. It all boils down to where the centers of world exchanges, minerals, information centers, and large-scale industries are located. "Geoeconomics" approaches political reality as if the World Government and a single planetary state already existed.

Attali's geoeconomic approach leads to the identification of three most important regions, which in the One World will become the centers of new economic spaces.

1) American space, which finally united both Americas into a single financial and industrial zone.

2) The European space that emerged after the economic unification of Europe.

3) the Pacific region, a zone of "new prosperity", which has several competing centers of Tokyo, Taiwan, Singapore, etc.[64]

According to Attali, there will be no special differences or contradictions between these three mondialist spaces, since both the economic and ideological types will be strictly identical in all cases. The only difference will be the purely geographical location of the most developed centers, which will concentrically structure around themselves the less developed regions located in spatial proximity. So concentric

restructuring can only take place at the "end of history" or, in other terms, with the abolition of traditional realities dictated by geopolitics.

Civilizational-geopolitical dualism is canceled. The absence of a pole opposite to Atlantism leads to a radical rethinking of space. The era of geoeconomics is coming.

In the Attali model, the ideas that formed the basis of the "Trilateral Commission" found their complete expression, which is the conceptual and political instrument that develops and implements such projects.

It is significant that the leaders of Trilateral (David Rockefeller, Georges Bertouin, then the head of the European department and Henry Kissinger) visited Moscow in January 1989, where they were received by the President of the USSR Gorbachev, Alexander Yakovlev, and other high-ranking Soviet leaders, Medvedev, were also present at the meeting. Falin, Akhromeev, Dobrynin, Chernyaev, Arbatov and Primakov. Jacques Attali himself maintained personal contacts with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

One thing is certain: the transition to geoeconomic logic and neo-mondialism became possible only after the geopolitical self-liquidation of the Eurasian USSR.

Neo-mondialism is not a direct continuation of historical mondialism, which initially assumed the presence of left-wing socialist elements in the final model. This is an intermediate option between mondialism proper and Atlanticism.

3.6 Professor Santoro's Post-Catastrophic Mondialism

There are more detailed versions of neomondialysis. One of the most striking is the futurological geopolitical concept developed by the Milan Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) under the guidance of Professor Carlo Santoro.

According to Santoro's model, humanity is currently in a transitional stage from a bipolar world to a mondialist version of multipolarity (understood geoeconomically, like Attali's). International institutions (UN, etc.), which for Fukuyama's optimistic mondialism seem to be sufficiently developed to become the nucleus of the "World Government", Santoro, on the contrary, appear to be ineffective and reflect the outdated logic of bipolar geopolitics. Moreover, the whole world bears the stable imprint of the Cold War, the geopolitical

[64] Jack Attali "Lignes d'horizon", Paris. 1990

the logic of which remains dominant. Santoro foresees that such a situation cannot but end with a period of civilizational catastrophes.

He goes on to outline the alleged scenario of these disasters:

1) Further weakening of the role of international institutions

2) The growth of nationalist tendencies among the countries that were part of the Warsaw treaty and in the Third World. This leads to chaotic processes.

3) Disintegration of traditional blocs (this does not affect the Europe) and progressive disintegration of existing states.

4) The beginning of the era of wars of low and medium intensity, as a result of which new geopolitical formations are formed.

5) The threat of planetary chaos forces various blocs to recognize the need to create new international institutions with huge powers, which actually means the establishment of a World Government.

6) The final creation of the planetary state of international under the auspices of new authorities (World Government)[65].

This model is intermediate between the Mondialist Fukuyama Francis's optimism and the Atlanticist pessimism of Samuel Huntington.

[65] See Prof. Carlo Santoro "Progetto di ricarca multifunzionale 1994 - 1995 - I nuovi poli geopolitici", Milano

Chapter 4. Applied Geopolitics

4.1 "Internal geopolitics" the Yves Lacoste school

The geopolitical renaissance in Europe is associated with the activities of the geographer Yves Lacoste, who in 1976 founded the magazine "Herodotus", where for the first time in post-war Europe geopolitical texts began to be regularly published. It should be especially emphasized that the head was a person close to left-wing political circles, while until that moment only rather marginal right-wing, nationalist circles were engaged in geopolitics in Europe.

In 1983, the journal "Herodotus" introduces the subtitle "Journal of Geography and Geopolitics" into its title, and from that moment begins the second life of geopolitics, now officially recognized as a special political science discipline that helps in a comprehensive analysis of the situation.

Yves Lacoste strives to adapt geopolitical principles to the current situation. Lacoste himself does not share the "organicist approach" characteristic of
continental school, nor a purely pragmatic and mechanistic
geopolitical utilitarianism of Sea Power ideologues. From his point of view, geopolitical considerations serve only to "justify the rival aspirations of the authorities in relation to certain territories and the people inhabiting them."[66.]
This can apply to both international relations and narrowly regional problems.

For Lacoste, geopolitics becomes only an instrument for analyzing a specific situation, and all the global theories that underlie this discipline are reduced to relative, historically determined concepts.

Thus, Lacoste offers a completely new definition of geopolitics, in fact a new discipline. This is no longer continental thinking based on a fundamental planetary civilizational-geographical dualism and
coupled with global ideological systems, but the use of some methodological models that were present in traditional geopolitics in a general context, but taken in this case as something independent. This is the "deglobalization" of geopolitics, reducing it to a narrow analytical method.

This geopolitics is called "internal geopolitics" (la geopolitique interne), since it is often concerned with local problems.

4.2 Electoral "geopolitics"

A kind of such internal geopolitics is a special technique developed to study the relationship between the political sympathies of the population and the territory in which this population lives. The forerunner of this approach was the Frenchman André Siegfried (1875 1959), a politician and geographer. He made the first attempts to investigate "internal geopolitics" in relation to the political sympathies of certain regions. The first formulations go back to him

[66] Yves Lacoste "Dictionnaire Geopolitique", Paris, 1986

patterns that formed the basis of the "electoral geopolitics" of the new Ives school Lacoste.

Siegfried wrote:
"Each batch or, more precisely, each political trend has its privileged territory; it is easy to see that just as there are geological or economic regions, there are also political regions. The political climate can be studied in the same way as the natural climate. I noticed that, despite the deceptive appearance, public opinion, depending on the regions, remains a certain constancy. Under the ever-changing landscape of political elections, deeper and more permanent trends can be traced, reflecting the regional temperament. "[67]

In the Lacoste school, this theory was systematically developed and became a familiar sociological tool that is widely used in political practice.

4.3 Mediacracy as a "geopolitical" factor

Yves Lacoste set himself the task of bringing into geopolitics the latest criteria inherent in the information society. The greatest value among information systems that directly affect geopolitical processes are possessed by the mass media, especially television. In modern society, it is not the conceptual-rational approach that dominates, but the brightness of the "image" ("image"). Political, ideological and geopolitical views are formed in a significant part of society solely on the basis of telecommunications. The mediatic "image" is an atomic synthesis in which

some approaches ethnic, cultural, ideological, political. The synthetic quality of "image" brings it together with the categories that traditionally operates geopolitics.

A news report from some hot spot, about which nothing is known, for example, a resident of a capitol, should, in the shortest possible time, present the geographical, historical, religious, economic, cultural, ethnic profile of the region, as well as place accents in accordance with a narrowly defined political purpose. Thus, the profession of a journalist (especially a television journalist) approaches the profession of geopolitics. The mass media in modern society no longer play a purely auxiliary role, as before, but are becoming a powerful independent geopolitical factor capable of exerting a strong influence on the historical destinies of peoples.

4.4 History of geopolitics

There is another direction in the general process of the "revival" of European geopolitics, the history of geopolitics. It is not geopolitical in the full sense of the word, since it sets as its task the historical reconstruction of this discipline, work with sources, chronology, systematization, bibliographic data, etc. In a sense, this is a "museum approach" that does not pretend to any conclusions and generalizations in relation to the current situation. Such a historical line

[67] Andre Siegfried "Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisieme Republique", Paris, 1913

represented, first of all, by the works of Pierre-Marie Gollois and such authors as Hervé Couteau-Begary, Gerard Chalyan, Hans-Adolphe Jacobsen, etc.

As part of this initiative, the texts of the historical geopolitics Mackinder, Mahan, Challen, Haushofer, etc. are being published and republished.

Historical studies of this kind are often published in the French journal Herodotus and the new Italian geopolitical journal Limes, published by Lucho Caracholo and Michel Corenmann with the participation of the same Lacoste.

4.5 "Applied geopolitics" is not geopolitics

Applied or "internal geopolitics" developed by Yves Lacoste, as well as other prominent specialists, Michel Korenmann, Paul-Marie de la Gors, etc., is characteristic of modern European political science and deliberately avoids conceptual generalizations and futurological developments. This is the fundamental difference between this entire trend, especially developed in France and Italy, from the proper Atlanticist and Mondialist schools located in the United States and England.

Applied geopolitics retains much fewer ties with historical, pre-war geopolitics than Atlanticism and Mondialism, not to mention the "continentist" tradition. This is a purely analytical, political science, sociological methodology and nothing more. Therefore, a distinction should be made between it and the planetary global projects of the geopolitics proper. In essence, we are talking about two disciplines, which are brought together only by terminology and some methods. Ignoring geopolitical dualism, considering it either overcome, or insignificant, or simply going beyond the frames of the main subject of study, "applied geopolitics" ceases to be geopolitics in the proper sense of the word and becomes just a kind of statistical-sociological methodology.

Real geopolitical decisions and projects related to the fate of Europe and the peoples inhabiting it are being developed in other instances associated with the strategic centers of Atlanticism and Mondialism. Thus, the project of European integration was developed exclusively by the efforts of intellectuals who collaborated in the "Trilateral Commission", i.e. in a mondialist supranational organization that has neither a strict legal status nor political legitimacy. The Frenchman Jacques Attali developed his geopolitical theories based on the data of this very organization, of which he was a member, and not on the basis of the "applied" geopolitics of the modern European school.

Chapter 5. Geopolitics of the European "new right"

5.1 Europe of one hundred flags. Alain de Benoit

One of the few European geopolitical schools that has retained a continuous connection with the ideas of the pre-war German geopolitical continentalists is the New Right. This trend originated in France in the late 60s and is associated with the figure of the leader of this movement, the philosopher and publicist Alain de Benoit.

The "new right" is sharply different from the traditional French right-wing monarchists, Catholics, Germanophobes, chauvinists, anti-communists, conservatives, etc. on almost all counts. "New Right" supporters of "organic democracy", pagans, Germanophiles, socialists, modernists, etc. At first, the "left camp", traditionally extremely influential in France, considered this a "tactical maneuver" of the ordinary right, but over time, the seriousness of evolution was proved and recognized by everyone.

One of the fundamental principles of the ideology of the "new right", analogues of which soon appeared in other European countries, was the principle of "continental geopolitics." In contrast to the "old right" and classical nationalists, de Benoit believed that the principle of the centralist State-Nation (Etat-Nation) was historically exhausted and that the future belonged only to the "Great Spaces". Moreover, the basis for such "Great Spaces" should be not so much the unification of different States into a pragmatic political bloc, but the entry of ethnic groups of different scales into a single "Federal Empire" on equal grounds. Such a "Federal Empire" should be strategically united and ethnically differentiated.

The "Big Space" that interested de Benoit the most was Europe. The "new rightists" believed that the peoples of Europe have a common Indo-European origin, a single source. This is the principle of the "common past". But the circumstances of the modern era, in which the tendencies of strategic and economic integration are active, necessary for the possession of genuine geopolitical sovereignty, dictate the need for unification in a purely pragmatic sense. Thus, the peoples of Europe are doomed to a "common future." From this, de Benois concludes that the main geopolitical principle should be the thesis "United Europe of a hundred flags"[68].
In this perspective, as in all the concepts of the "new right", there is a clear desire to combine "conservative" and "modernist" elements, i.e. "right" and "left". In recent years, the "new right" has abandoned this definition, believing that they are "right" as much as the "left".

De Benois's geopolitical theses are based on the affirmation of the "continental fate of Europe." In this he fully follows the concepts of the Haushofer school. From this follows the opposition of "Europe" and "West" characteristic of the "new right". "Europe" for them is a continental geopolitical entity based on an ethnic ensemble of Indo-European origin and having common cultural roots. This concept is traditional. "West", on the contrary, is a geopolitical and historical concept associated with the modern world, denying ethnic and spiritual traditions,

[68] Alain de Benoist "Les idess a l'endroit", Paris, 1979

putting forward purely material and quantitative criteria for existence; it is a utilitarian and rationalistic, mechanistic bourgeois civilization. The most complete embodiment of the West and its civilization is the USA.

This constitutes the concrete project of the "new rightists". Europe should integrate into a "Federal Empire" opposed to the West and the United States, and regionalist tendencies should be especially encouraged, since regions and ethnic minorities have retained more traditional features than megacities and cultural centers affected by the "spirit of the West." At the same time, France should be guided by Germany and Central Europe. Hence the interest of the "new right" in de Gaulle and Friedrich Naumann. At the level of practical politics, since the 1970s, the "new right" has been advocating a strict strategic neutrality of Europe, withdrawal from NATO, and the development of a self-sufficient European nuclear potential.

Regarding the USSR (later Russia), the position of the "new right" has evolved. Starting with the classic thesis "Neither the West, nor the East, but Europe", they gradually evolved to the thesis "First of all Europe, but better even with the East than with the West." On a practical level, the initial interest in China and the projects of organizing a strategic alliance between Europe and China to counter both "American and Soviet imperialism" have been replaced by a moderate "Sovietophilia" and the idea of an alliance between Europe and Russia.

The geopolitics of the "new right" is oriented radically anti-Atlantic and anti-mondialist. They see the fate of Europe as the antithesis of Atlantist and Mondialist projects. They are opponents of "thalassocracy" and the concept of One World.

It should be noted that under the conditions of the total strategic and political domination of Atlanticism in Europe during the Cold War, de Benois's geopolitical position (theoretically and logically flawless) contrasted so much with the "norms of political thinking" that it simply could not get any widespread dissemination. It was a kind of "dissidence" and, like any "dissidence" and "nonconformism," it had a marginal character. Until now, the intellectual level of the “new right”, the high quality of their publications and editions, even the large number of their followers in the European academic environment contrast sharply with the negligible attention paid to them by the authorities and analytical structures serving the authorities with geopolitical projects.

5.2 Europe from Vladivostok to Dublin. Jean Thiriard

A somewhat different version of continental geopolitics was developed by another European "dissident", the Belgian Jean Thiriard (1922 1992). Since the beginning of the 60s, he was the leader of the all-European radical movement "Young Europe".

Thiriard considered geopolitics to be the main political science discipline, without which it is impossible to build a rational and far-sighted political and state strategy. A follower of Haushofer and Nikisch, he considered himself a "European National Bolshevik" and the builder of the "European Empire". It was his ideas that anticipated the more developed and sophisticated projects of the "new right".

Jean Thiriard based his political theory on the principle of "autarchy of large spaces". Developed in the middle of the 19th century by the German economist Friedrich List,

this theory asserted that a full-fledged strategic and economic development of a state is possible only if it has a sufficient geopolitical scale and great territorial potential. Thiriard applied this principle to the current situation and came to the conclusion that the world significance of the European states would be completely lost if they did not unite into a single Empire opposing the United States. At the same time, Thiriard believed that such an "Empire" should not be "federal" and "regionally oriented", but extremely
unified, centralist, corresponding to the Jacobin model. It should become a powerful unified continental State-Nation. This is the main difference between the views of de Benois and Tiriard.

In the late 70s, Thiriard's views underwent some change. An analysis of the geopolitical situation led him to the conclusion that the scale of Europe is no longer sufficient to free itself from the American thalassocracy. Consequently, the main condition for "European liberation" is the unification of Europe with the USSR. From a geopolitical scheme that includes three main zones, the West, Europe, Russia (USSR), he moved to a scheme with only two components, the West and the Eurasian continent. At the same time, Thiriard came to the radical conclusion that it was better for Europe to choose Soviet socialism than Anglo-Saxon capitalism.

This is how the project "Euro-Soviet Empire from Vladivostok to Dublin" appeared.[69] It almost prophetically describes the reasons that should lead the USSR to collapse if it does not take active geopolitical steps in Europe and the South in the very near future. Thiriard believed that Haushofer's ideas regarding the "Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo continental bloc" are highly relevant to this day. It is important that Thiriard set out these theses 15 years before the collapse of the USSR, absolutely accurately predicting its logic and reasons. Thiriard made attempts to bring his views to the attention of the Soviet leaders. But he failed to do this, although in the 60s he had personal meetings with Nasser, Zhou Enlai and the highest Yugoslav leaders. It is indicative that Moscow rejected his project of organizing underground "detachments of European liberation" in Europe for the terrorist struggle against "agents of Atlanticism."

The views of Jean Tiriard lie at the heart of the now intensifying non-conformist movement of the European National Bolsheviks ("Front for European Liberation"). They come close to the projects of contemporary Russian neo-eurasism.

5.3 Thinking continents. Jordis von Lohausen

The Austrian general Jordis von Lohausen is very close to Thiriard. Unlike Tiriard or de Benoit, he does not participate in direct political activity and does not build specific social projects. He takes a strictly scientific approach and limits himself to purely geopolitical analysis. His initial position is the same as that of the National Bolsheviks and the "new right", he is a continentalist and a follower of Haushofer.

Lohausen believes that political power only has a chance to become durable and stable when the rulers think not in momentary and local categories, but

[69] Jean Thiriart "L'Empire Eurosovietique de Vladivistok jusque Dublin", Brussell, 1988

"millennia and continents". His main book is called Courage to Rule. Thinking Continents.[70]

Lohausen believes that global territorial, civilizational, cultural and social processes become understandable only if they are seen in "farsighted" perspective, which is he contrasts historical "myopia". Power in the human historical the society on which the choice depends path and the most important decisions, must be guided by very general schemes that make it possible to find a place for this or that state or people in a huge historical perspective. Therefore, the main discipline required to determine the strategy of power is geopolitics in its traditional sense, operating with global categories, abstracting from analytical particulars (and not the "internal" applied geopolitics of the Lacoste school). Modern ideologies, the latest technological and civilizational shifts, of course, change the topography of the world, but they cannot cancel some of the basic laws associated with natural and cultural cycles, calculated for millennia.

Such global categories are space, language, ethnos, resources, etc.

Lohausen offers the following formula for power: "Power = Strength x Location" He specifies:
"Since Power is Power multiplied by location, only a favorable geographic location provides an opportunity for the full development of internal forces."[71]

Thus, power (political, intellectual, etc.) is directly linked to space.

Lohausen separates the fate of Europe from the fate of the West, considering Europe to be a continental entity temporarily under the control of the thalassocracy. But for political liberation, Europe needs a spatial (positional) minimum. Such a minimum is obtained only through the unification of Germany, the integration processes in Central Europe, the restoration of the territorial unity of Prussia (torn between Poland, the USSR and the GDR) and the further folding of the European powers into a new independent bloc, independent of Atlanticism. It is important to note the role of Prussia. Lohausen (following Nikisch and Spengler) believes that Prussia is the most continental, "Eurasian" part of Germany, and that if the capital of Germany were not Berlin, but Konigsberg, European history would have gone in a different, more correct direction.

Lohausen believes that the future of Europe in a strategic perspective is unthinkable without Russia, and vice versa, Russia (USSR) needs Europe, since without it geopolitically it is incomplete and vulnerable to America, whose location is much better, and therefore, whose power sooner or later is much ahead of the USSR. Lohausen emphasized that the USSR could have four Europeans in the West: "a hostile Europe, a subordinate Europe, a devastated Europe and an allied Europe." The first three options are inevitable if the course of the European policy that the USSR pursued during the Cold War is maintained. Only the desire to make Europe "allied and friendly" at any cost can correct the fatal geopolitical situation of the USSR and become the beginning of a new stage in geopolitical history - the Eurasian stage.

[70] Jordis von Lohausen "Mut zur Macht. Denken in Kontinenten", Berg, 1978
[71] Ibidem

Lohausen's position is deliberately limited to purely geopolitical statements. He omits ideological questions. For example, the geopolitics of Boyar Russia, Tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union represent for him a single continuous process, independent of a change in the ruling system or ideology. Russia is geopolitically a heartland, and therefore, whatever the regime in it, its fate is predetermined by its lands.

Lohausen, like Thiriard, predicted in advance the geopolitical collapse of the USSR, which would be inevitable if he followed his usual course. If the Atlanticist geopoliticians viewed such an outcome as a victory, Lohausen saw in this rather a defeat of the continental forces. But with the nuance that the new opportunities that will open after the fall of the Soviet system can create favorable preconditions for the creation of a new Eurasian bloc, the Continental Empire, in the future, since certain restrictions dictated by Marxist ideology would be removed in this case.

5.4 Eurasian Empire of the End. Jean Parvulesco

A romantic version of geopolitics is presented by the famous French writer Jean Parvulesco. For the first time, geopolitical themes in literature arise already in George Orwell, who, in his dystopia "1984", described futurologically the division of the planet into three huge continental blocks "Eastasia, Eurasia, Oceania." Similar themes are found in Arthur Koestler, Aldous Huxley, Raymond Abellio, etc.

Jean Parvulesco makes geopolitical themes central in all his works, thus opening up a new genre of "geopolitical fiction".

Parvulesco's concept in short is[72]: the history of mankind is the history of Power, power. For access to central positions in civilization, i.e. to Power itself, various semi-secret organizations strive, whose cycles of existence far exceed the duration of ordinary political ideologies, ruling dynasties, religious institutions, states and peoples. These organizations, acting in history under different names, Parvulesco defines as "the order of the Atlanticists" and "the order of the Eurasians". There is a centuries-old struggle between them, in which popes, patriarchs, kings, diplomats, major financiers, revolutionaries, mystics, generals, scientists, artists, etc. take part. All socio-cultural manifestations are thus reducible to primordial, albeit extremely complex, geopolitical archetypes.

This is a geopolitical line brought to its logical limit, the premises of which are clearly traced even among the completely rational and alien to "mysticism" founders of geopolitics as such.

The central role in Parvulesco's stories is played by General De Gaulle and the geopolitical structure he founded, which remained in the shadows after the end of his presidency. Parvulesco calls this "geopolitical Gaullism." This "geopolitical Gaullism" is the French counterpart to the continentalism of the Haushofer school.

[72] Jean Parvulesco "Galaxie GRU", Paris, 1991

The main task of the supporters of this line is the organization of the European continental bloc "Paris Berlin Moscow". In this aspect, Parvulesco's theories merge with the theses of the "New Right" and "National Bolsheviks."

Parvulesco believes that the current historical stage is the culmination of a centuries-old geopolitical confrontation, when the dramatic history of the continental-civilizational duel comes to an end. He foresees the imminent rise of the gigantic continental structure of the "Eurasian Empire of the End" and then a final clash with the "Empire of the Atlantic." This eschatological duel, which he describes in apocalyptic terms, he calls "Endkampf" ("Final Battle"). It is curious that in Parvulesco's texts, fictional characters coexist with real historical figures, with many of whom the author maintained (and still maintains with some) friendly relations. Among them are politicians from De Gaulle's inner circle, British and American diplomats, the poet Ezra Pound, the philosopher Julius Evola,

Despite the fictional form, Parvulesco's texts are of great geopolitical value proper, since a number of his articles, published in the late 70s, strangely accurately describe the situation in the world only by the mid-90s.

5.5 Indian Ocean as a path to world domination. Robert Stoykers

The complete opposite of Parvulesco's "geopolitical visionary" is the Belgian geopolitician and publicist Robert Stoykers, publisher of the two prestigious magazines Orientation and Vuloir. Stoikers approaches geopolitics from a purely scientific, rationalistic standpoint, striving to free this discipline from all "accidental" strata. But following the logic of the "new right" in the academic direction, he comes to conclusions that are strikingly close to the "prophecies" of Parvulesco.

Stoikers also believes that the socio-political and especially diplomatic projects of various states and blocs, in whatever ideological form they may be dressed, are an indirect and sometimes veiled expression of global geopolitical projects. In this he sees the influence of the "Earth" factor on human history. Man is an earthly being (created from the earth). Consequently, the earth and space predetermine a person in his most significant manifestations. This is a prerequisite for "geohistory".

Continental orientation is a priority for Stoikers; he considers Atlanticism hostile to Europe, and connects the fate of European prosperity with Germany and Central Europe[73]. Stoikers is a supporter of active cooperation between Europe and the countries of the Third World, and especially with the Arab world.

At the same time, he emphasizes the enormous importance of the Indian Ocean for the future geopolitical structure of the planet. He defines the Indian Ocean as the "Middle Ocean" located between the Atlantic and Pacific. The Indian Ocean is located exactly in the middle between the east coast of Africa and the Pacific zone, which includes New Zealand, Australia, New Guinea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Indochina. Indian Ocean maritime control is key

[73] Robert Steukers "La Russie, L'Europe et L'Occident" dans "Orientation" No. 4 nov.-dec. 1983

position for geopolitical influence on the three most important "large spaces" Africa, the South Eurasian rimland and the Pacific region. This gives rise to the strategic priority of some small islands in the Indian Ocean, especially Diego Garcia, which is equidistant from all coastal zones.

The Indian Ocean is the area on which the entire European strategy should focus, since through this zone Europe will be able to influence the United States, Eurasia, and Japan, Stoikers argues. From his point of view, the decisive geopolitical confrontation, which should predetermine the picture of the future XXI century, will unfold in this very space.

Stoikers is actively involved in the history of geopolitics, and he owns articles about the founders of this science in the new edition of the "Brussels Encyclopedia".

5.6 Russia + Islam = salvation of Europe. Carlo Terracciano

An active geopolitical center of continental orientation also exists in Italy. In Italy, after the Second World War, the ideas of Karl Schmitt spread more than in other European countries, and thanks to this, the geopolitical way of thinking became very common there. In addition, it was in Italy that the "Young Europe" movement of Jean Tiriard was most developed, and, accordingly, the idea of continental National Bolshevism.

Among the numerous political science and sociological "new right" journals and centers dealing with geopolitics, Milanese "Orion" is of particular interest, where over the past 10 years, geopolitical analyzes of Dr. Carlo Terracciano have been regularly published. Terracciano expresses the most extreme position of European continentalism, closely adjacent to Eurasianism.

Terracciano fully accepts the picture of Mackinder and Mahan and agrees with the strict civilizational and geographical dualism they emphasized. At the same time, he unequivocally takes the side of the heartland, believing that the fate of Europe entirely depends on the fate of Russia and Eurasia, on the East. The Continental East is positive, the Atlantic West is negative. Such a radical approach on the part of a European is an exception even among continental geopolitics, since Terracciano does not even emphasize the special status of Europe, believing that this is a secondary moment in the face of the planetary confrontation between thalassocracy and tellurocracy.

He fully shares the idea of a single Eurasian State, a "Euro-Soviet Empire from Vladivostok to Dublin," which brings him closer to Thiriard, but at the same time he does not share the "Jacobinism" and "universalism" characteristic of Thiriar, insisting on ethno-cultural differentiation and regionalism, which brings him closer, in turn, to Alain de Benoit.

Terracciano's emphasis on the centrality of the Russian factor is side by side with another curious point: he believes that the most important role in the fight against Atlanticism belongs to the Islamic world, especially clearly anti-American regimes: Iranian, Libyan, Iraqi, etc. This leads him to the conclusion that the Islamic world is in the highest degree the exponent of continental geopolitical interests. At the same time, he regards the "fundamentalist" version of Islam as positive.

The final formula that summarizes Dr. Terracciano's geopolitical views is:

Russia (heartland) + Islam vs USA (atlantism, mondialism)[74]

Terracciano sees Europe as a springboard for the Russian-Islamic anti-mondialist bloc. From his point of view, only such a radical formulation of the question can objectively lead to a genuine European revival.

Other employees of Orion and the intellectual center working on its basis adhere to views similar to Terracciano (prof. Claudio Mutti, Maurizzio Murelli, sociologist Alessandra Kolla, Marco Battarra, etc.) , social democratic, communist and anarchist circles in Italy, the newspaper "Umanita", the magazine "Nuovi Angulatsioni", etc.

[74] Carlo Terracciano "Nel Fiume della Storia" in "Orion", Milano, No. 22-30, 1986-1987

Chapter 6. Neo-Eurasianism

6.1 Eurasian passion Lev Gumilev

The brightest student of the Eurasian Savitsky was the famous Russian scientist historian Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev. He did not touch upon geopolitical topics in his works, but his theory of ethnogenesis and ethnic cycles clearly continues the line of the "organicist" approach and, in part, "geographical determinism", which constitute the essence of geopolitics already in Ratzel, Challen, Haushofer, etc.

Especially important are Gumilyov's research in relation to the ancient periods of the ethnic map of Eurasia, the steppe, nomadic peoples and their civilizations. His works form a completely new vision of political history, in which the Eurasian East appears not just as barbaric lands on the periphery of civilization (equated to Western civilization), but as an independent and dynamic center of ethnogenesis, culture, political history, state and technical development. The West and its history are relativized, the Eurasian culture and the constellation of Eurasian ethnic groups are revealed as a multidimensional and completely unexplored world with its own scale of values, religious problems, historical patterns, etc.

Gumilyov develops and brings to the logical limit the general Eurasian idea that ethnically Great Russians, Russians are not just a branch of the Eastern Slavs, but a special ethnos formed on the basis of the Turkic-Slavic fusion. This indirectly implies the validity of Russian control over those Eurasian lands inhabited by Turkic ethnic groups. The Great Russian civilization was formed on the basis of the Turkic-Slavic ethnogenesis, which was realized on the geographical plane as a historical alliance of the Forest and the Steppe. It is the geopolitical combination of the Forest and the Steppe that constitutes the historical essence of Russia, predetermining the nature of its culture, civilization, ideology, and political fate.

Gumilev, following Spengler and Toynbee, singles out the cycles of civilizations and cultures, as well as the corresponding ethnic groups. From his point of view, the ethno-cultural formations of the nation, state, religious communities are like living organisms in everything. They go through periods of birth, adolescence, maturity and aging, and then disappear or turn into the so-called. "relics". This again clearly shows the influence of the "organicist philosophy" common to all continental geopolitical schools.

Gumilev's theories about the causes of ethnogenesis are extremely interesting, i.e. birth of a people or state. To describe this process, he introduces the term "passionarity" or "drive impulse"[75]. It is an inexplicable synchronous surge of biological and spiritual energy that suddenly sets in motion the sluggish historical existence of "old" peoples and cultures, capturing various established ethnic and religious groups in a dynamic rush
spatial, spiritual and technical expansion, which leads to conquests and the fusion of heterogeneous residual ethnic groups into new active and viable forms. High and full-fledged passionarity and the dynamic process of ethnogenesis normally lead to the emergence of a special super-ethnos, which corresponds not to

[75] L. Gumilev "Ethnogenesis and biosphere of the earth", Leningrad, 1990

as much a national-state form of political organization as an empire.

Passionarity is gradually decreasing. "Passionism" (for Gumilyov this is a positive category, which he equates with "heroism", with the ethical striving for disinterested creation in the name of fidelity to the national tradition) is being replaced by "actualism", that is, concern only with the present moment, divorced from tradition and without regard to the fate of future generations. In this phase, a "passionary breakdown" occurs and ethnogenesis enters the negative stage of conservation and the beginning of decay. This is followed by the “futuristic” phase, in which the type of powerless “dreamers”, “dreamers”, “religious escapists”, who lose faith in the environment around them and seek to escape into the “otherworldly,” dominate. Gumilev sees this as a sign of final decline. Ethnicity is degrading

This situation continues until a new "passionary impulse", when a new fresh ethnos appears and provokes a new ethnogenesis, in which the remnants of old structures are melted down. Moreover, some ethnic groups remain in a "relict" state (Gumilev calls them "chimeras"), while others disappear in the dynamics of a new ethnogenetic process.

Especially important is Gumilyov's assertion that the Great Russians are a relatively “fresh” and “young” ethnos, rallying around themselves the “super-ethnos” of Russia-Eurasia or the Eurasian Empire.

Gumilyov's Eurasianism suggests the following geopolitical conclusions (which he himself did not draw for understandable political reasons, preferring to remain strictly within the framework of historical science).

1) Eurasia is a full-fledged "local development", a fertile rich soil of ethnogenesis and cultural genesis. Therefore, it is necessary to learn to consider world history not in unipolar optics "West and all the rest" (as is characteristic of Atlanticist historiography), but in multipolar, and northern and eastern Eurasia are of particular interest, since they are an alternative to the West source of the most important planetary civilizational processes ... In his writings, Gumilev gives a detailed picture of Mackinder's thesis on the "geographical axis of history" and endows this axis with specific historical and ethnic content.

2) The geopolitical synthesis of the Forest and the Steppe, which underlies the Great Russian statehood, is a key reality for the cultural and strategic control over Asia and Eastern Europe. Moreover, such control would contribute to a harmonious balance of East and West, while the cultural limitations of Western civilizations (Forest), with its striving for domination, accompanied by a complete misunderstanding of the culture of the East (Steppe), leads only to conflicts and upheavals.

3) Western civilization is in the last descending stage of ethnogenesis, being a conglomerate of "chimerical" ethnic groups. Consequently, the center of gravity will necessarily shift to younger peoples.

4) It is also possible that in the near future some unpredictable and unforeseen "passionary push" will occur, which will dramatically change the political and

the cultural map of the planet, since the domination of "relict" ethnic groups cannot last long.

6.2 New Russian Eurasians

Gumilyov himself did not formulate geopolitical conclusions based on his picture of the world. This was done by his followers during the period of the weakening (and then the abolition) of the Marxist ideological censorship. This trend in general has received the name "neo-Eurasianism", which, in turn, has several varieties. Not all of them inherit Gumilyov's ideas, but in general, his influence on this geopolitical ideology is colossal.

Neo-Eurasianism has several varieties.

The first (and the most basic and developed) is a complete and multidimensional ideology, which was formulated by some political circles of the national opposition, opposing liberal reforms in the period 1990-1994. We are talking about a group of intellectuals united around the newspaper Den (later Zavtra) and the magazine Elements[76].

This neo-Eurasianism is based on the ideas of P. Savitsky, G. Vernadsky, Vol. Trubetskoy, as well as the ideologist of Russian National Bolshevism Nikolai Ustryalov. The analysis of historical Eurasians is recognized as highly relevant and quite applicable to the present situation. The thesis of a national ideocracy of an imperial continental scale is opposed simultaneously to both liberal Westernism and narrow ethnic nationalism. Russia is seen as the axis of the geopolitical "large space," and its ethnic mission is unambiguously identified with imperialism.

At the socio-political level, this trend unequivocally gravitates towards Eurasian socialism, considering the liberal economy a characteristic feature of the Atlanticist camp. The Soviet period of Russian history is viewed from the Smenovekhov perspective as a modernist form of the traditional Russian national aspiration for planetary expansion and the "Eurasian anti-Atlantist universalism. "Hence the" pro-communist "tendencies of this version of neo-Eurasianism.

Lev Gumilyov's legacy is accepted, but at the same time the theory of passionarity is coupled with the theory of the "circulation of elites" by the Italian sociologist Wilfred Pareto, and Gumilyov's religious studies are corrected on the basis of the school of European traditionalists (Guénon, Evola, etc.).

Traditionalist ideas "crisis modern the world ", "degradation West ", "desacralization of civilization", etc. are an important component of neo-Eurasianism, complementing and developing those moments that were presented by Russian authors only intuitively and fragmentarily.

In addition, European continentalist projects (Haushofer, Schmitt, Nikisch, "new rightists", etc.) are thoroughly studied, due to which the horizons of the Eurasian doctrine extend to Europe, understood as a potentially continental

[76] Francoise Thome "Eurasisme et Neo-Eurasisme" dans "Commentaire", ete 1994, no. 66.

force. This is a motive completely alien to the historical Eurasian emigrants, who wrote their main works in a situation when the United States did not yet have an independent geopolitical significance, and the thesis about the difference between Europe and the West had not yet received proper development. Neo-Eurasianism, listening to European continentalists, recognizes the strategic importance of Europe for the geopolitical completeness and usefulness of the Eurasian "Greater Space", especially considering that it was the factor of the unstable division of the geopolitical map of Europe that led to the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War.

Another feature of neo-Eurasianism is the choice of Islamic countries (especially mainland Iran) as an important strategic ally. The idea of a continental Russian-Islamic alliance underlies the anti-Atlantic strategy on the southwestern coast of the Eurasian continent. At the doctrinal level, this alliance is based on the traditional character of the Russian and Islamic civilizations, which unites them in opposition to the anti-traditional, secular-pragmatic West.

In this direction of neo-Eurasianism, the picture of all geopolitical projects in relation to the current situation is being completed to its completeness, since ideologically, strategically, politically, and positionally, the neo-Eurasian project is the most complete, consistent, complete and historically justified opposition to all varieties of Western geopolitical projects (both Atlanticist and mondialist).

Mondialism and Atlanticism express two varieties of the geopolitical ideology of the Far West. Europeanism and moderate continentalism of European geopoliticians represent an intermediate reality. And finally, the neo-Eurasianism of The Day and especially of The Elements expresses a radically anti-Western point of view that merges with all other alternative geopolitical projects from European National Bolshevism to Islamic fundamentalism (or Islamic "socialism") to national liberation movements in all corners Third World.

Other varieties of neo-Eurasianism are less consistent and represent the adaptation of the entire complex of the above ideas to the changing political reality: either we are talking only about pragmatic economic "Eurasianism" designed to recreate the economic interaction of the former republics of the USSR (project of the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev), or about justification expansionist theses (the "great-power" project of V. Zhirinovsky), or about a purely rhetorical appeal to the "Eurasian community" to preserve the unity of Russian and national minorities (mostly ethnic Turks and Muslims) within the Russian Federation (project of some government officials of Boris Yeltsin) , or about a purely historical interest in the heritage of the circle of Savitsky, Trubetskoy, Suvchinsky, Karsavin, etc. in emigration. But all these versions are necessarily artificial, fragmentary, inconsistent and cannot pretend to be an independent and serious geopolitical ideology and methodology. Therefore, it does not make much sense to dwell on them in more detail.

We only note that any appeals to Eurasianism and Eurasia, no matter how limited meaning those who use them put into these concepts, refer directly or indirectly to that neo-Eurasian project that was developed in opposition circles and formalized in the works of the authors of The Day "and" Elements ", since it is only in this context that the use of the word" Eurasianism "is justified by the continuity of the Russian

the geopolitical school, and the correlation with the general fan of geopolitical projects on a planetary scale that exist outside of Russia.

6.3 Towards a new bipolarity

Neo-Eurasianism, in addition to its intellectual heritage and the general principles of continental geopolitics, faces the latest problems posed in the form of the latest geopolitical projects of the West. Moreover, this geopolitical direction acquires significance precisely to the extent that it is able not only to explain geopolitically the logic of the historical events taking place, but to develop a coherent futurological project that can resist the projects of the West.

The West's victory in the Cold War conceptually means the end of the bipolar world and the beginning of the unipolar world. At the same time, if pure Atlantists (Huntington) assume that this unipolarity will be the relative victorious West (The West) will be forced to constantly settle the growing intercivilizational conflicts with "the rest of the world" (The Rest), then the Mondialists (Fukuyama, Attali) see a problem-free domination The West needs the entire planet as something that has already happened. Even the most controversial version of Professor Santoro presupposes, in the end, the establishment of a World Government.

These are projects of geopolitical winners who today have undeniable advantages and strategic initiative that must be reckoned with to the highest degree. All of them agree on one thing: sooner or later, Western-type universalism should triumph on the planet, i.e. the Atlanticist, thalassocratic value system must become dominant everywhere. The bipolar world of the Cold War is considered to be completely overcome. There is simply no place for Eurasia and Eurasianism in such a picture. All this is logical and follows directly from the works of the first Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians, who sought to weaken the forces of the Land in every possible way, undermining their power and restraining their development by various strategic methods, especially the "anaconda" strategy, i.e. tight control over more and more rimland sectors.

Neo-Eurasianism cannot, while remaining itself, recognize the legitimacy of such a state of affairs and is doomed to seek opportunities to reverse all these processes. And it starts from the very central question with the question of unipolarity. Unipolarity (domination of Atlantism in any form, both in its pure form and through mondialism) dooms Eurasia as a heartland to historical oblivion. Neo-Eurasianism insists that this unipolarity must be opposed.

This can be done only through a new bipolarity.

This requires clarification. There is a point of view that after the end of the confrontation between the United States and the USSR, the world itself will move to a multipolar order, China will rise, demographic processes will bring Islamic countries to the category of geopolitically central ones, the Pacific region will declare its competitiveness with Europe and America, etc. All this is possible, but it does not take into account that such a new multipolarity will take place under the sign of the "Atlanticist system of values", i.e. will represent only the territorial varieties of the thalassocratic system, and in no way a genuine geopolitical alternative. The challenge from the West, the market and liberal democracy is universal. After the victory of the heartland, all the attempts of the peoples and

states to follow some other path, except for the western one, have lost their main support. Both the pro-Soviet regimes and all the "non-aligned" countries that insisted on the "third way" existed only due to bipolarity, due to the gap that existed between the West and the East in their positional geopolitical struggle. The modern victorious West will henceforth dictate ideological and economic conditions to all who claim to be a developed region. Therefore, any multipolarity while maintaining the status quo will be fictitious and mondialistic.

This is well understood by Western strategists, who are well aware that the main geopolitical task of the West at this stage is to prevent the very possibility of forming a large-scale geopolitical block of continental volume, which could be comparable in one way or another with the forces of Atlanticism. This is the main principle of the US military-political doctrine, which is formulated in the report of Paul Wolfowitz. In other words, the West most of all does not want a return to bipolarity. It would be deadly for him.

Neo-Eurasianism, proceeding from the interests of the "geographical axis of history," asserts the exact opposite of the West. The only way out of this situation can be only a new bipolarism, since only in this direction Eurasia could acquire the prospect of true geopolitical sovereignty. Only the new can th bipolarity subsequently open the way to such a multipolarity, which is the would marry framework of the thalassocratic liberal-democratic system, those. true the multipolarity of the world, where every nation and every geopolitical bloc could choose its own system of values, has a chance to be realized only after liberation from the global Atlantic domination through a new planetary confrontation.

At the same time, it is important that the Eurasian continental block cannot become a simple recreation of the Warsaw Pact. The disintegration of the former geopolitical continental structure is irreversible and is rooted in its very structure. The new continental alliance should either include all of Europe up to the Atlantic and several important sectors of the southern coast of Eurasia, India, Iran, Indochina, etc., or ensure the friendly neutrality of these same spaces, i.e. take them out of the control of Atlanticism. A return to the old bipolarism is impossible for many reasons, including ideological ones. The new Eurasian bipolarism must proceed from completely different ideological premises and be based on completely different methods.

This theory of "new bipolarism" is sufficiently developed in neo-Eurasian projects, being a theoretical basis for all non-conformist geopolitical theories of Europe and the Third World. Just as heartland is objectively the only point capable of being a foothold for a planetary alternative to thalassocracy, so neo-Eurasianism is the only theoretical platform on the basis of which a whole fan of planetary strategies can be developed that deny the world domination of Atlanticism and its civilizational system of values: the market, liberal democracy, secular culture, philosophy of individualism, etc.

PART III RUSSIA AND SPACE

Chapter 1. Heartland

Russia, from a strategic point of view, is a gigantic continental mass that is identified with Eurasia itself. After the development of Siberia and its integration, Russia unambiguously coincided with the geopolitical concept of Heartland, i.e. "Central Earth" continent. Mackinder defined the Russian Big Space as the "Geographical Axis of History". Geographically, landscape, linguistically, climatically, culturally and religiously, Russia is a synthetic union of the Eurasian West and the Eurasian East, and its geopolitical function is not limited to summing up or mediating Western and Eastern trends. Russia is something Third, independent and special, neither East nor West. Culturally comprehending the "middle" position of Russia, Russian Eurasians spoke about the special culture of the "Middle Empire",

opposites are removed in a spiritual, vertical synthesis. From a purely strategic point of view, Russia is identical to Eurasia itself, if only because it is precisely its lands, its population and its industrial and technological development that have sufficient volume to be the basis of continental independence, autarky and serve as the basis for full continental integration, which in geopolitical laws must happen to every "island", including the "World Island" itself, i.e. with Eurasia.

In relation to Russia-Heartland, all other Eurasian states and lands are coastal, Rimland. Russia is the "Axis of History", since "civilization" revolves around it, creating its most catchy, expressive and complete forms not in its life-giving continental source, but in the "coastal zone", in the critical zone, where the land space borders on the water space, sea or ocean. From a strategic point of view, Russia is an independent territorial structure, whose security and sovereignty are identical with the security and sovereignty of the entire continent. This cannot be said about any other major Eurasian power, not about China, not about Germany, not about France, not about India. If, in relation to its coastal neighbors or to the states of other "Islands" or continents, China, Germany, France, India, etc. can act as continental forces, then in relation to Russia they will always remain "coastal strips", Rimland, with all the corresponding strategic, cultural and political consequences. Only Russia can speak on behalf of Heartland with full geopolitical justification. Only its strategic interests are not just close to the interests of the continent, but are strictly identical to them (at least at the current stage of the development of the technosphere, this is the case).

Chapter 2. The Rimland Problem

The attitude of Russia to the neighboring continental civilizations of the Romano-Germanic in the West and the three traditional civilizations in the East (Islamic, Hindu and Chinese) has at least two planes, which in no case should be confused with each other, since this will inevitably lead to a multitude of misunderstandings. First, the cultural and historical essence of Russia, its spiritual self-determination, its

"identity" is undoubtedly determined by the formula "neither East nor West" or "neither Europe, nor Asia, but Eurasia" (as the Russian Eurasians put it). Russia is spiritually something Third, something independent and special, which has no expression either in terms of the East or in terms of the West. At this level, the highest interest of Russia is to preserve its uniqueness at all costs, to defend its uniqueness in the face of the challenge of the culture of the West and the traditions of the East. This does not mean complete isolationism, but still limits the range of possible borrowings. Historical realism requires us to courageously admit that the affirmation of “ours,” “ours,” always goes parallel to the denial of “alien,” “not ours." Both affirmation and denial are fundamental elements of the national, cultural, historical and political independence of the people and the state. Therefore, the denial of both the West and the East is culturally a historical imperative for Russia's independence. In this issue, of course, there can be a variety of nuances and discussions, while recognizing the originality, some believe that it is better to open more to the East than to the West ("Asian direction"), others, on the contrary ("Westernizers"), others prefer a complete rejection of all dialogue ("isolationists"), the fourth presuppose equal openness in both directions (some directions of "neo-Eurasianism").

At the strategic and purely geopolitical levels, the situation is completely different. Since Russia-Eurasia at the present historical stage as its planetary opponent has not so much "coastal civilizations", Rimland, as the opposite "Island", Atlanticist America, the most important strategic imperative is the transformation of "coastal territories" into its allies, strategic penetration entering the "coastal" zones, concluding a common Eurasian pact, or at least ensuring the complete and strict neutrality of as many Rimlands as possible in the positional confrontation with the transatlantic West. Here the strategic formula of Russia must be unambiguously the formula "both East and West", since only the continental integration of Eurasia with the center in Russia can guarantee to all its peoples and states real sovereignty, a maximum of political and economic autarchy. At the strategic level, a single opposition is relevant today: either mondialism (the planetary dominance of Americanism and Atlanticism) or continentalism (dividing the planet into two or more Large Spaces enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Russia needs Rimlands to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical power. At the moment, with the current development of military, strategic and economic technologies, no other, non-continental, sovereignty simply cannot exist: maximum political and economic autarchy. At the strategic level, a single opposition is relevant today: either mondialism (the planetary dominance of Americanism and Atlanticism) or continentalism (dividing the planet into two or more Large Spaces enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Russia needs Rimlands to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical power. At the moment, with the current development of military, strategic and economic technologies, no other, non-continental, sovereignty simply cannot exist: maximum political and economic autarchy. At the strategic level, a single opposition is relevant today: either mondialism (the planetary dominance of Americanism and Atlanticism) or continentalism (dividing the planet into two or more Large Spaces enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Russia needs Rimlands to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical power. At the moment, with the current development of military, strategic and economic technologies, no other, non-continental, sovereignty simply cannot exist: or continentalism (division of the planet into two or more Large Spaces enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Russia needs Rimlands to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical power. At the moment, with the current development of military, strategic and economic technologies, no other, non-continental, sovereignty simply cannot exist: or continentalism (division of the planet into two or more Large Spaces enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Russia needs Rimlands to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical power. At the moment, with the current development of military, strategic and economic technologies, no other, non-continental, sovereignty simply cannot exist:

"ethnocratic", purely "isolationist" projects for solving the state problem of Russia in the strategic sphere yield results strictly in line with the mondialist plans for total control over the planet and for the complete strategic, political and economic occupation of Eurasia and Russia.

It is obvious that the transfer of the cultural and historical problems of Russia to the strategic or geopolitical level (that is, endowing the formula "neither East nor West" with a purely geopolitical meaning) is nothing more than a political sabotage aimed at strategically disorienting Russia's foreign policy. Whatever underlies the "narrow-ethnic", "racial-nationalist"
"chauvinistic" models of Russian statehood ignorance, naivety or deliberate work against their people and their independence, the result is complete identity with mondialist goals. Without turning Russia into an "ethnic reservation," the United States will not be able to gain complete control over the world.

The Rimland problem is posed in this way only today, when the entire strategic history of the bipolar world and the planetary Cold War of the USSR and the USA remains behind us. At the time of the peak of the political activity of the Russian Eurasians, the strategic situation was completely different, and very few could look into the future. Therefore, some geopolitical projects of the Eurasians should be viewed with caution. In particular, the Rimland problem was interpreted by them in a cultural rather than a strategic aspect. All this must be taken into account in order for Russia to develop a serious and substantiated geopolitical program, realistic and promising, at the forefront of which should be placed the main geopolitical imperative of independence, sovereignty, independence, autarky and freedom of Great Russia.

Chapter 3. Gathering the Empire

One of the main tenets of geopolitics is the assertion that the geopolitical position of a state is much more important than the features of the political structure of this state. Politics, culture, ideology, the character of the ruling elite, and even religion are viewed in geopolitical optics as important but secondary factors in comparison with the fundamental geopolitical principle of the relationship of the state to space. Often (especially in Russia) this specificity of geopolitics as a science is considered almost "cynicism" or even "anti-national" approach. This is, of course, completely wrong. It's just that geopolitics does not at all pretend to be the only and supreme authority in determining the state and political interests of the nation. Geopolitics is one of several basic disciplines, allowing to adequately formulate the international and military doctrine of the state along with other equally important disciplines. Just as physics, in order to be an exact science, must abstract from chemistry and its laws (this does not mean that physics denies chemistry), so geopolitics, in order to be a strict discipline, must leave aside other, non-geopolitical approaches. , which can and should be taken into account in the final conclusions regarding the fate of the state and the people, along with geopolitics.

One of the most pressing geopolitical demands of Russia is "collecting the Empire." No matter how we relate to "socialism", the USSR, the Eastern Bloc, the Warsaw Pact countries, etc., no matter how we assess the political and cultural reality of one of the two superpowers, from a geopolitical point of view, the existence of the Eastern Bloc was definitely a positive factor. for a possible Eurasian unification, for continental integration and the sovereignty of our Greater Space. It was precisely the geopolitical logic that made the Belgian theorist Jean Thiriard talk about the need to create a "Euro-Soviet empire from Vladivostok to Dublin." Only the Eastern Bloc could become the basis for the unification of Eurasia into an Empire, although the division of Europe and the inconsistency of Soviet policy in Asia were serious obstacles to achieving this goal. According to many modern geopoliticians, the collapse of the USSR was largely due to its strategic vulnerability on the western and eastern borders of the United States controlled the Rimland of the West and the East so skillfully and consistently that, in the end, they did not allow continental integration and contributed to the collapse of the Eastern bloc. The end of the bipolar world is a strategic blow to Eurasia, a blow to continentalism and the possible sovereignty of all Eurasian states. the collapse of the USSR was largely due to its strategic vulnerability on the western and eastern borders of the United States controlled the Rimland of the West and the East so skillfully and consistently that, in the end, they did not allow continental integration and contributed to the collapse of the Eastern bloc itself. The end of the bipolar world is a strategic blow to Eurasia, a blow to continentalism and the possible sovereignty of all Eurasian states. the collapse of the USSR was largely due to its strategic vulnerability on the western and eastern borders of the United States controlled the Rimland of the West and the East so skillfully and consistently that, in the end, they did not allow continental integration and contributed to the collapse of the Eastern bloc itself. The end of the bipolar world is a strategic blow to Eurasia, a blow to continentalism and the possible sovereignty of all Eurasian states.

The imperative of Russia's geopolitical and strategic sovereignty is not only to restore the lost regions of the "near abroad", not only to renew allied relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, but also to include in the new Eurasian strategic bloc the states of the continental West (first of all , the Franco-German bloc, which gravitates towards liberation from the Atlanticist tutelage of the pro-American NATO) and the continental East (Iran, India and Japan).

The geopolitical “gathering of the Empire” is for Russia not only one of the possible paths of development, one of the possible relations of the state to space, but a guarantee and a necessary condition for the existence of an independent state, and, moreover, an independent state on an independent continent.

If Russia does not immediately begin to recreate the Large Space, i.e. to return the temporarily lost Eurasian expanses to the sphere of its strategic, political and economic influence, it will plunge into catastrophe both itself and all the peoples living on the "World Island".

The course of possible events is easy to foresee. If Russia chooses some other path than "the path of gathering the Empire", new powers or blocs of states will begin to take on the continental mission of Heartland. In this case, the vastness of Russia will be the main strategic goal for those forces that will declare themselves a new "citadel of Eurasia." This is absolutely inevitable, since control over the continent is inconceivable without control over the space of the "geographical axis of History". Either China will make a desperate rush to the North to Kazakhstan and Eastern Siberia, or Central Europe will move to the Western Russian lands of Ukraine, Belarus, western Great Russia, or the Islamic bloc will try to integrate Central Asia, the Volga and Ural regions, as well as some territories of Southern Russia. This new continental integration cannot be avoided, since the very geopolitical map of the planet opposes its unipolar, Atlanticist orientation. In geopolitics, the sacred law "a holy place is never empty" is quite legitimate. Moreover, it is not "territorial egoism" or "Russophobia" that will push other Eurasian blocs to expansion into Russian lands, but the inexorable logic of space and Russia's geopolitical passivity. In the sphere of continental strategy, it is foolish to expect that other peoples will stop before territorial expansion into Russian lands just out of respect for the "uniqueness of Russian culture." In this area, only power territorial impulses and positional advantages operate. Even the very fact of hesitation in the question of the immediate "gathering of the Empire" is already a sufficient challenge, a sufficient reason for so that alternative geopolitical Great Spaces would move into Russian borders. This, naturally, will provoke a reaction from the Russians and entail a terrible and unpromising intra-Eurasian conflict; unpromising because it will not even have a theoretically positive solution, since in order to create a non-Russian Eurasia, it is necessary to completely destroy the Russian people, and this is not only difficult, but in fact impossible, as history shows. On the other hand, such a conflict will pave the front line between neighboring states of continental and anti-Atlantic orientation, and this will only strengthen the position of the third force, i.e. USA and their colleagues on mondialist projects. The lack of action is also a kind of action, and behind the delay in "gathering the Empire" (not to mention the possible rejection of Russia's geopolitical expansion), a lot of Eurasian blood will inevitably follow. Events in the Balkans provide a gruesome example of what can happen in Russia on an incomparably grander scale.

The reunification of the Eurasian territories under the auspices of Russia as the "axis of history" today is fraught with certain difficulties, but they are insignificant in the face of the catastrophes that will inevitably come if this "gathering of the Empire" does not begin immediately.

Chapter 4. Warm and cold seas

The process of "gathering the Empire" should initially be guided by a distant goal, which is Russia's access to the warm seas. It was thanks to the containment of Russian expansion in the southern, southwestern and northwestern directions that Atlanticist England was able to maintain its control over all the "coastal spaces" surrounding Eurasia. Russia was geopolitically
a “complete” power in the East and North, where its political boundaries coincided with the natural geographic boundaries of the Eurasian continent. But the paradox was that these coasts are adjacent to cold seas, which is an insurmountable barrier to the development of navigation to the extent that it would seriously compete on the seas with the fleets of the Western Island (England, and later America). On the other hand, the eastern and northern lands of Russia were never sufficiently developed due to natural and cultural characteristics, and all projects for the integration of Russian Asia, from those proposed by Dr. Badmaev to the last Emperor to the Brezhnev BAM, according to some strange pattern, collapsed under the influence of spontaneous or controlled historical cataclysms.

Be that as it may, access to the cold seas of the North and East must be supplemented by access to the warm seas of the South and West, and only in this case Russia will become geopolitically "complete". For this, in fact, numerous Russian-Turkish wars were fought, the fruits of which, however, were reaped not by the Turks and not by the Russians, but by the British, who bleed the last two traditional empires out of three (the third is Austria-Hungary). The last spurt to the South, which is vital for Russia, was the unsuccessful expansion of the USSR into Afghanistan. Geopolitical logic unambiguously shows that Russia will definitely have to return there again, although it would be much better to come as a loyal ally, defender and friend than as a cruel punisher. Only when the coastline becomes the southern and western borders of Russia, it will be possible to speak about the final completion of its continental construction. This does not necessarily have to be about conquests, expansion or annexations. A strong anti-Atlantic parity strategic alliance with the continental European and Asian powers would be sufficient to achieve this goal. Access to warm seas can be obtained not only through a bloody war, but also through a reasonable peace, beneficial to the geopolitical interests of all continental powers, since the project of Eurasian strategic integration will enable all these powers to become really sovereign and independent in the face of an alternative Atlantic Island. , united, in turn, by the strategic doctrine of Monroe. Straits and warm seas were inaccessible to Russia when such an obvious Atlantic factor as the United States, threatening the interests of all of Europe and all of Asia, did not yet exist, and the various powers of the mainland challenged each other for primacy in confronting England and leadership in the matter of territorial strategic unification. The implementation of the Monroe Doctrine in America has highlighted the entire geopolitical significance of Russia, and therefore the alliance with Russia has become a self-evident imperative for all realistic geopoliticians of the mainland in whatever political forms it may be embodied depending on the circumstances. The Threat of Mondialism and Atlantist Globalism and therefore an alliance with Russia has become a self-evident imperative for all realistic geopoliticians of the mainland in whatever political forms it may be embodied depending on the circumstances. The Threat of Mondialism and Atlantist Globalism and therefore an alliance with Russia has become a self-evident imperative for all realistic geopoliticians of the mainland in whatever political forms it may be embodied depending on the circumstances. The Threat of Mondialism and Atlantist Globalism

theoretically opens Russia access to the warm seas through the self-evident alliance of Heartland and Rimland against the overseas invaders.

PART IV THE GEOPOLITICAL FUTURE OF RUSSIA

Chapter 1. The Need for a Radical Alternative

In our society today there are two fundamental projects concerning the Russian future. To one degree or another, they affect all aspects of national life, economy, geopolitics, international relations, ethnic interests, industrial structure, economic structure, military construction, etc.

The first project belongs to radical liberals, "reformers" who take Western society, the modern "trading system" as an example, and fully subscribe to the "end of history" projects developed in the famous eponymous article by Francis Fukuyama. This project denies values such as people, nation, history, geopolitical interests, social justice, religious factor, etc. Everything in it is based on the principle of maximum economic efficiency, on the primacy of individualism, consumption and the "free market". The liberals want to build a new society in place of Russia, which has never existed historically, in which the rules and cultural coordinates will be established by which the modern West, and especially the United States, lives. This camp can easily formulate an answer to any questions regarding a particular aspect of Russian reality based on models already existing in the West, using Western liberal terminology and legal norms, as well as relying on the developed theoretical structures of liberal capitalism as a whole. Some time ago, this position almost dominated ideologically in our society, and even today it is the most famous one, since it coincides in general with the general course and fundamental logic of liberal reforms.

The second project of the Russian future belongs to the so-called. "national-patriotic opposition", which is a diverse and multifaceted political reality, united by rejection of liberal reforms and rejection of the liberal logic preached by the reformers. This opposition is not just national and not just patriotic; it is "pink and white", ie. it is dominated by representatives of the communist statesmen (who have largely departed from the rigid Marxist-Leninist dogma) and supporters of the Orthodox-monarchist,
tsarist type of statehood. The views of both components of the "united opposition" are quite significantly different, but there are similarities not only in the definition of a "common enemy", but also in some mental, ideological clichés shared by both. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the patriotic "opposition" consists of figures from the pre-perestroika system, who bring elements of a purely Soviet mentality even to the "white", "tsarist projects", to which they most often had no historical, family or political relationship before the beginning of perestroika, feeling great in Brezhnev's reality. Be that as it may, the opposition project can be called "Soviet-tsarist", since it is based on some ideological, geopolitical,

administrative archetypes that objectively bring together the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods (at least within the XX century). The ideology of patriots is much more contradictory and confused than the logical and complete constructions of liberals, and therefore it often manifests itself not in the form of a complete concept or doctrine, but fragmentarily, emotionally, inconsistently and fragmentarily. Yet this grotesque conglomerate of intermingled Soviet-tsarist mental debris possesses

some integrity, which, however, is sometimes not easy to structure rationally.

Both of these projects, the liberal and the Soviet-tsarist, are essentially dead ends for the Russian people and Russian history. The liberal project generally presupposes a gradual erasure of the national characteristics of Russians in the cosmopolitan era of the "end of history" and the "planetary market", while the Soviet-tsarist era is trying to revive the nation and the state precisely in those historical forms and structures that, in fact, gradually led the Russians to collapse.

On the other side of both the liberalism of the "reformers" and the Soviet-tsarism of the "united opposition" there is an urgent need for a "third way", for a special ideological project that would not be a compromise, not "centrism" between the two, but a completely radical innovative a futuristic plan that breaks with the hopeless dualistic logic "either the liberals or the opposition" where, like in a labyrinth without an exit, the current public consciousness of Russians rushes about.

It is necessary to cut the Gordian knot and establish a true alternative opposed to both. A great nation is at stake, its interests, its destiny.

Chapter 2. What are "Russian national interests"?

2.1 Russians today have no State

In the present political situation, it is impossible, strictly speaking, to talk about the "strategic prospects of Russia." Moreover, it is impossible to propose any projects regarding the foreign and domestic policy of Russia, since the main question is what is Russia today? remains not only unresolved, but also not taken seriously.

The rapid changes in the entire political, geopolitical, ideological and social order that took place in the former USSR completely overturned all existing legal and political criteria and norms. The collapse of the unified socialist system and later the Soviet state created a field of complete uncertainty in the former Soviet territories, in which there are no clearer guidelines, no strict legal framework, or concrete social prospects. Those geopolitical structures that were formed "automatically" by inertia after the collapse of the USSR are random, transient and extremely unstable. This applies not only to the republics seceding from Moscow, but, first of all, to Russia itself.

In order to make plans regarding the "interests of the state", it is necessary to have a clear idea of what kind of state we are talking about. In other words, it makes sense when there is a clearly defined political entity. In the present situation, there is no such subject in the case of Russians.

The existence of Russia, understood as the Russian Federation (RF), clearly does not meet any serious criteria for determining the status of a "state." The confusion in assessments of the status of the Russian Federation in international politics clearly testifies to precisely this state of affairs. What is RF? Heiress and successor to the USSR? Regional power? Mono-national state? Interethnic Federation? Gendarme of Eurasia? A pawn in American projects? Areas destined for further fragmentation? Depending on the specific conditions, the Russian Federation plays one of these roles, despite the absolute inconsistency of such definitions. At some point, this is a state with a claim to a special role in world politics, at another it is a secondary regional power, in a third field for separatist experiments.

The Russian Federation is not Russia, a full-fledged Russian State. It is a transitional entity in a broad and dynamic global geopolitical process and nothing more. Of course, the Russian Federation may become a Russian State in the future, but it is not at all obvious that this will happen, and it is also not obvious whether one should strive for this.

Be that as it may, it is impossible to talk about the "strategic interests" of such an unstable and temporary phenomenon as the Russian Federation in the long term, and it is all the more ridiculous to try to formulate a "strategic doctrine of the Russian Federation" based on the current state of affairs. The "strategic interests of the Russian Federation" can become clear only after it appears,

the political, social, economic and ideological subject of these interests will be formed and defined. So far this has not happened, any projects in this direction will turn out to be momentary fiction.

The Russian Federation has no state history, its borders are random, its cultural landmarks are vague, its political regime is shaky and vague, its ethnic map is heterogeneous, and its economic structure is fragmentary and partly decomposed. This conglomerate is only the result of the collapse of a more global geopolitical entity, a fragment torn from the whole picture. Even in order to create something stable on this skeleton of the Empire, a real revolution would be needed, similar to the revolution of the Young Turks, who created modern secular Turkey from a fragment of the Ottoman Empire (although the question arises again: is it worth striving for?).

If the Russian Federation is not a Russian State, then the CIS is not. Despite the fact that almost all the territories of the CIS countries (with rare exceptions) were part of the Russian Empire, and therefore were once part of the Russian State, today the CIS countries have a sufficient degree of autonomy and are de jure independent political entities. In relation to these countries, it can be argued (and with even greater grounds) the same thing as in relation to the Russian Federation, these formations do not possess any serious signs of true statehood, are devoid of the attributes of actual sovereignty and represent more of a "territorial process" than stable and definite geopolitical units. Even if we ignore the growing nationalism of the CIS countries, which is often anti-Russian, unnatural, unstable and contradictory fragments themselves, it is not possible to put together a harmonious picture. Belgian geopolitician Jean Thiriard made one precise comparison on this matter. "The USSR was like a bar of chocolate, with marked borders of the slices-republics. After the slices are broken off, it is no longer enough to put them together to restore the entire slab. From now on, this can only be achieved by melting the entire bar and re-stamping."

"The strategic interests of the Russian Federation" is the same empty figure of speech as the "strategic interests of the CIS countries." This has a very indirect relation to the "strategic interests of the Russians".

2.2 The concept of "post-imperial legitimacy"

Despite the non-existence of the Russian State in the full sense, certain legal principles operate throughout the post-Soviet space, on which both the Western reaction to certain actions of the Russian Federation and the momentary logic of the steps of the Russian leadership are based. It is these principles, at first glance, that keep the Russian Federation and, more broadly, the CIS from total chaos. It is about the doctrine of "post-imperial legitimacy". In order to understand the essence of today's geopolitical processes in Eurasia, it is necessary to briefly outline the main theses of this concept.

"Post-imperial legitimacy" is a set of legal norms closely related to the immediately preceding phase of the political development of the region, i.e. with "imperial legitimacy" ("legacy of empire"). The empire (at least the "secular" liberal or socialist) is most often guided in the territorial structure of its colonies by purely administrative and economic features, without taking into account ethnic, religious or national factors. Administrative boundaries within the Empire are rather arbitrary, since they inherently represent

are conditional barriers created only for the convenience of centralized control of the metropolis. During the period of its existence, the empire forces the other powers to recognize their internal administrative system as legitimate. But with the collapse of the Empire, "zones of legal uncertainty" always arise, since the structure that legally regulated the status of its constituent parts ceases to exist.

In the process of "postcolonial" transformations, an international legal concept was formulated, which formed the basis for the classification of the legitimacy and incompetence of post-imperial territorial-political formations. This is the concept of "post-imperial legitimacy". Its meaning boils down to the fact that, despite the absence of the Empire as a whole, its purely administrative components receive a full-fledged legal status, regardless of whether this entity meets the criterion of a full-fledged state or not. This approach is based on the secular liberal idea of the arbitrariness of any state formation as a historical accident. According to this logic, ethnic, religious, cultural and social components are insignificant and insignificant, since the population is understood here as a simple set of economic and statistical units. This reflects the inertia of the "imperial", "colonial" approach, which is used to considering "colonies" and "provinces" as something secondary and

irrelevant, "additional" within the general context.

As a rule, "post-imperial formations" never (or almost never) become full-fledged states and continue to exist as economic and political appendages of the former (or new) metropolis. Almost always, the ruling elite in them is the direct heir (often a protégé) of the colonial administration, the economy is entirely dependent on external factors, and the political and social structure adapts to the model of the former center. The preservation of such "post-imperial legitimacy" often leads to the fact that one and the same autochthonous ethnic group inhabits the territories of different post-imperial states, and several ethnic and religious groups live within one state. In fact, the relative balance of interests is maintained in such cases only by an appeal to an external factor, most often to the explicit or latent power of the former metropolis (or that developed state that may replace it). It is quite indicative that at the last stages of the "liberation" of Africa, the Pan African Congress decided to apply the principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" to all newly formed states, although many large African peoples, in particular, the Bantu, Zulus, etc. turned out to be living in two or three states at once. This was done under the pretext of avoiding ethnic, tribal and religious wars. In fact, it was about the desire of the leaders of the post-imperial administration to keep their artificial elites in power, preventing the creation of new representatives of the organic national hierarchy in the process of the national rise. Given the strategic and socio-economic backwardness of Africa and the lack of fresh and vital state traditions, this approach worked quite successfully.

The principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" is now applied to the countries that emerged from the ruins of the USSR. In the former "union republics," almost everywhere in power are the heirs of the "colonial administration," the compartments of a unified administrative structure that has been broken into pieces, formed entirely in the imperial Soviet context. This elite is alienated from the national and cultural traditions of their peoples and by inertia is oriented towards the preservation of economic and political dependence on the metropolis. The only exception is Armenia, where the logic of the "post-imperial

legitimacy "was violated (in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh), and where, accordingly, purely national political forces have greater weight than in all other CIS countries. In addition, Armenia is the only monoethnic republic of the CIS countries.

At first glance, one might get the impression that the principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" plays into the hands of the Russian Federation and Moscow, since it creates the preconditions for maintaining the influence of the Russian Federation in the "near abroad" and simplifies political and economic relations with geographic neighbors. But in reality, everything is somewhat more complicated. As in the case of the "decolonization" of the Third World countries, the collapse of the Empire weakens the geopolitical power of the metropolis, and some of the colonies and dominions come under the implicit control of another, stronger power, which uses the system of "post-imperial legitimacy" for its own purposes. A striking example of this is the United States, which actually seized under its influence most of the former British, Spanish, Portuguese, French and Dutch colonies during the process of "decolonization". In this way,

On the other hand, "post-imperial legitimacy" puts the Russian Federation itself on a par with other CIS countries, since in this case the national-cultural, religious and ethnic interests of the Russian people, falling under the abstract norms of "post-imperial", purely administrative law and scattered over alien pseudo-state and quasi-national formations. The remains of the imperial administration within the Russian Federation (party-bureaucratic apparatus) turn out to be just as alien to the national context of Russians as in other republics, since the system of the Empire itself was built on other, purely administrative and economic, rather than national and cultural principles. Russians, "freed" from the republics, do not receive freedom and independence, but they lose a significant part of their national community, maintain a dependent position on the remnants of the former nomenklatura and, in addition, are exposed to a new danger of falling under the influence of external political forces of more powerful powers. This last danger was not so close during the period of the Empire's existence, but as a simple "regional power" the Russian Federation is fully exposed to it.

All these considerations call into question the usefulness of the principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" in the current conditions, since this is largely contrary to Russian national interests.

But what criteria should be followed in defining what constitutes "Russian national interests"? Whom should we take as the main subject in relation to which it would be possible to determine what is beneficial and what is not profitable? In what categories should one comprehend Russia today?

2.3 The Russian people are the center of the geopolitical concept

The collapse of the Soviet Empire, the fragility and insolvency of the state of new political formations on its territory (including the Russian Federation) force us to look for a more specific category for understanding "Russian national interests." The only organic, natural, historically rooted reality in this matter can only be the Russian people.

The Russian people is a historical community that has all the features of a full-fledged and stable political entity. The Russian people are united ethnically, culturally, psychologically and religiously. But not only this is the main reason for placing him at the center of the geopolitical concept as a subject of political and social strategy. The Russian people, unlike many other peoples, has developed as the bearer of a special civilization that has all the distinctive features of an original and full-fledged planetary-historical phenomenon. The Russian people is that civilizational constant, which served as an axis in the creation of not one, but many states: from the mosaic of the East Slavic principalities to Muscovite Russia, Peter's Empire and the Soviet bloc. Moreover, this constant determined the continuity and connection between formations, so different politically, socially, territorially and structurally. The Russian people did not just provide an ethnic basis for all these state formations, they expressed in them a special civilizational idea, unlike any other. It was not the state that formed the Russian nation. On the contrary, the Russian nation, the Russian people
experimented in history with different types of state systems, expressing in different ways (depending on the circumstances) the specifics of his unique mission.

The Russian people undoubtedly belong to the messianic peoples. And like any messianic people, it has a universal, all-human meaning that competes not just with other national ideas, but with types of other forms of civilizational universalism. K. Leontiev and Russian Eurasians have developed this idea quite fully.

Regardless of the troubles, transition periods and political cataclysms, the Russian people have always retained their messianic identity, and therefore, have always remained a political subject of history. After another state upheaval, one and the same ancient and powerful Russian force created new political structures, clothed its spiritual impulse in new geopolitical forms. Moreover, as soon as the state structures developed to a critical point, beyond which the final loss of the connection between the political form and the national content dawned, crises and disasters set in, followed by a new geopolitical and social construction, investing the civilizational mission of the Russian people in new images and political constructions.

And in the current transitional period, it is the Russian people that should be taken as the main political subject, from which the scale of geopolitical and strategic, as well as socio-economic interests of Russia should be postponed. The Russian people is Russia today, but not as a clearly outlined state, but as a geopolitical potential, real and concrete on the one hand, but has not yet defined its new state structure, nor its ideology, nor its territorial limits, nor its socio-political structure. ...

Nevertheless, "potential Russia" today has much more fixed characteristics than the ephemeral Russia or the CIS. These characteristics are directly related to the civilizational mission, the implementation of which is the meaning of the life of the Russian people.

Firstly, the Russian people (= Russia) are no doubt responsible for control over the northeastern regions of Eurasia. This Russian "Drang nach Osten und Norden" constitutes the natural geopolitical process of Russian history in recent centuries, which did not stop under any political cataclysms. Mackinder called

Russia is the “geopolitical axis of history,” and this is completely true, since the Russian people really traditionally gravitated towards the civilizational development of all those inland Eurasian spaces that are located in the very center of the mainland mass. From this we can conclude that the strategic interests of the Russians inseparable from the vastness of North-Eastern Eurasia. The this is fundamental principle in determining real prospects geopolitics of Russia (of the Russian people).

Secondly, the Russian people (= Russia) are endowed with a special type of religiosity and culture, which are sharply different from the Catholic-Protestant West and from the post-Christian civilization that developed there. As the cultural and geopolitical antithesis of Russia, one should take precisely the "West" as a whole, and not just one of its constituent countries. Modern Western civilization is universalistically oriented: in all its compartments there is a special cultural unity based on a specific solution to the main philosophical and worldview problems. Russian universalism, the foundation of Russian civilization, is radically different from the West in all major respects. In a sense, these are two competing, mutually exclusive models, opposite poles. Hence,

*Thirdly,*the Russian people (= Russia) have never set as their goal the creation of a mono-ethnic, racially homogeneous state. The mission of the Russians had a universal character, and that is why the Russian people systematically went in history to the creation of an Empire, the boundaries of which were constantly expanding, embracing an ever larger conglomerate of peoples, cultures, religions, territories, regions. It is absurd to regard the planned and pronounced "expansionism" of the Russians as a historical accident. This "expansionism" is an integral part of the historical life of the Russian people and is closely linked with the quality of its civilizational mission. This mission carries a certain "common denominator" that allows Russians to integrate the most diverse cultural realities into their Empire. However, the "common denominator"

Fourth, the Russian people (= Russia) proceeds in their being from an even more global, "soteriological" perspective, which in the limit has a general planetary meaning. This is not about the boundless expansion of the "living space" of Russians, but about the establishment of a special "Russian" type of worldview, which is accented eschatologically and claims to be the last word in earthly history. This is the supreme super task of the nation as a "God-bearing people."

Consequently, theoretically, there is no such people on the planet, such a culture or such territory, whose fate and whose path would be indifferent to the Russian consciousness. This is manifested in the unshakable faith of Russians in the final triumph of Truth, Spirit and Justice, and not only within the framework of the Russian state, but everywhere. To deprive the Russians of this eschatological faith is tantamount to their spiritual emasculation. Russians care about everything and everyone, and therefore, in the final analysis, the interests of the Russian people are not limited to either the Russian ethnos, or the Russian Empire, or even the whole of Eurasia. This

The "transcendent" aspect of the Russian nation must be taken into account when developing a future geopolitical strategy.

Obviously, under the current conditions and with generally accepted Western, secular, quantitatively liberal norms of the legal approach, there is no objective opportunity not only to legally secure the status of the "Russian people" as an independent political entity, but even to introduce such a term into legal and diplomatic use. as "people". Modern international law (copying in its main features Roman law) recognizes only the state and the individual as full-fledged political subjects.

And therefore there is a code of "rights of states" and "human rights", while the very concept of "rights of the people" is absent. This is not surprising, since the secular and quantitative approach cannot take into account such cultural spiritual categories as ethnos, people, etc. A similar quantitative ratio characterized both the Soviet system and the "democratic" world. And since the Russian people in the current period are on the territory where either "post-imperial" or liberal-democratic principles of legitimacy operate, there can be no question of any automatic recognition of the political status of the "people". Consequently, the logic of clarifying and protecting "Russian national interests" requires serious changes in the existing legal practice, and moreover,

Such a transformation would be impossible if we were talking about some one people, underdeveloped and not technologically equipped. In the case of the Russians, this is fortunately not the case. Today, we still have the possibility of political transformations rather independent from the rest of the world, since the availability of strategic types of weapons in Russia makes it possible to resist the pressure of the West to a certain extent. And here everything depends only on the political will and determination of those persons who will take responsibility for the fate of Russia and the Russian people.

Be that as it may, the first step towards identifying the "national interests of the Russian people" is the recognition of this people as an independent political subject, who has the right to decide for himself what is beneficial to him and what is not, and to take geopolitical, socio-economic and strategists accordingly. steps.

3.1 The lack of a "nation-state" among Russians

Russia has never been an analogue of those "nation states" that are characteristic of modern Europe and whose model was projected onto Asia and the Third World as a whole in the colonial and postcolonial era.

The "nation-state" is based on administrative unity and bureaucratic centralism, which form a political community created by the state and closely related to the state. Without a doubt, the first model of the "state-nation" was formed in absolutist France, and then was consolidated in the Jacobin revolutionary model. The "nation-state" initially had an emphatically secular nature and was primarily a political unity. In this concept, the term "nation" was understood as a "totality of citizens" and not as a "people" or "peoples" in an organic, "holistic" sense. This type of state is based on ethnic, confessional and class leveling of the population,

into account neither regional, nor religious, nor racial features. Nominally "state-nation" can be monarchical, democratic and socialist. The essential element is it is not specific political devices, but understanding states as administrative-a centralist authority placed over all socio-ethnic and cultural-religious differences. It should be emphasized that "nation" in this case has a purely and exclusively political meaning, which is sharply different from that which the nationalists put into this concept.

The "nation-state" historically arose in Europe during the period of the final disintegration of imperial unity as a result of the destruction of the last remnants of the imperial system, preserved in the form of feudal regional structures. The "state-nation" is essentially associated with the domination of profane, bourgeois values, which reduce qualitative social differences to a simplified quantitative administrative structure. The "nation-state", as a rule, is ruled not by a "divine idea" (like a theocracy or the Holy Empire), not by a "heroic aristocratic personality" (like a feudal system), but by a "dictatorship of the law" ("nomocracy"), which gives tremendous power lawyers and legal bureaucracy. In fact, the "state-nation"

In Russian history, a "nation-state" never emerged. When this particular model began to take root in Europe since the 18th century, Russia desperately resisted it by any means. The tsarist regime sought to keep the imperial structure as intact as possible, although some concessions to the European model were made constantly. Despite the pro-European Petrine reforms, the Russian Empire retained both theocratic elements and the aristocratic principle, and the transfer of priests and representatives of the nobility to the category of state bureaucrats was never fully implemented in practice (unlike in the countries of Western Europe). The national element opposed such a degeneration of the Empire into a "state-nation", which regularly generated waves of spontaneous or conscious reaction from both the people and

sides of the elite. Even under the same sovereign, reformist and reactionary sentiments often changed in Russia, and from liberal reforms they often turned to mystical restorationist projects (this was most clearly manifested in the reign of Alexander I, the founder of the Holy Union).

Only at the beginning of the 20th century did Russia come close to realizing a "nation-state" on the European model. However, this time too, the process was thwarted by a revolutionary outburst, which absorbed (albeit unconsciously) a deep national protest against a type of state structure in which there would be no place for the manifestation of the people's spiritual mission. Behind the modernist rhetoric of Bolshevism, Russians dimly recognized their own eschatological ideals as the triumph of Idea, Justice, Truth. The Soviet state was perceived by the people as the construction of a "New Empire", "Kingdom of Light", "abode of the spirit", and not as the creation of the most rational device for administering and managing quantitative units. The tragedy and fanaticism of the Bolshevik cataclysms was caused precisely by the "ideality" of the task,
costly organization of human resources.

The USSR did not become a "nation- is he was the successor of the imperial state", national traditions, clothed in purely extravagant external forms and opposed to the later tsarist model, sliding towards ordinary bourgeois society, to the "dictatorship of the law." The Soviet Empire, like any political structure, knew three stages of the "revolutionary stage" of building a unique system (Lenin's youth), a stable stage of strengthening and expanding the state (Stalin's maturity) and a stage of collapse and decrepitude (Brezhnev's old age). Moreover, it was precisely the late Brezhnev period that gave birth to a political and administrative structure that most closely resembles the bureaucratic centralism of a typical "nation-state." During perestroika, the life cycle of this entire Soviet formation ended. At the same time, another stage in the national history of the Russian people ended.

It is important to note that there is such a pattern in Russian history: when it comes to the transformation of Russia into a "state-nation", catastrophes follow, and on a new round the nation finds another (sometimes rather extravagant) way to escape the seemingly inevitable transformation. Russians strive to avoid such a turn of events at any cost, since their political will is incompatible with the narrow norms of rational and average quantitative existence within the framework of a bureaucratic efficient mechanism. Russians are ready to make unthinkable sacrifices and hardships, if only the national idea, the great Russian dream, is realized and developed.

And the nation sees the boundaries of this dream, at least in the Empire.

3.2 Russian people of the Empire

Not a mono-ethnic state, not a nation-state, Russia was almost from the beginning a potentially imperial state. Starting from the unification of the Slavic and Finno-Ugric tribes under Rurik and up to the gigantic scale of the USSR and the territories under its influence, the Russian people steadily followed the path of political and spatial integration, empire building and civilizational expansion. At the same time, it should be emphasized that Russian expansion had precisely a civilizational meaning, and was by no means a utilitarian pursuit of colonies or a banal struggle for "living space

It was not the lack of this “living space” and the economic necessity that prompted the Russian people to expand their borders more and more to the East, South, North, and West. Lack of land has never served as the true reason for Russian imperialism. mission, the geopolitical projection of which consisted in a deep awareness of the need to unite the gigantic territories of the Eurasian continent.

The political integrity of the Eurasian space has a completely independent meaning for Russian history. We can say that Russians feel responsible for this space, for its condition, for its connection, for its integrity and independence. Mackinder rightly considered Russia to be the main land power of our time, inheriting the geopolitical mission of Rome, the Empire of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, etc. This is the "geographical axis of history", which simply cannot but fulfill its geopolitical purpose, regardless of external and transitory factors.

The Russian people are so connected with geopolitical reality that space itself, its experience, its awareness, its spiritual perception has shaped the psychology of the people, becoming one of the main definitions of its identity, its essence.

Real earth space is not a purely quantitative category. The climate, landscape, geology of the area, waterways and mountain ranges are actively involved in the formation of an ethnic and, more broadly, a civilizational type. From the point of view of geopolitics, civilization and its specificity are generally strictly determined by geography and necessarily obey special qualitative laws. Russians are land, continental, North Eurasian people, while the cultural specificity of the nation is such that its "soul" is maximally predisposed to "openness", to the implementation of an "integrating" function, to a subtle and deep process of developing a special continental, Eurasian community.

The cultural factor is a natural complement to Russia's purely geopolitical predetermination. The geopolitical mission is perceived at the cultural level, and vice versa, culture comprehends, shapes and activates the geopolitical impulse. Space and culture are the two most important components of the Russian people as an empire-building people par excellence. It was not blood, not race, not administrative control, and not even religion that made of a part of the Eastern Slavs a special, incomparable community of the Russian people. It was precisely the endless Eurasian expanses and the utmost cultural and spiritual openness that made it. Ethnic, political, ethical, and religious aspects were rethought under the sign of "space and culture". The Russians took shape, developed and matured as a nation precisely in the Empire, in the heroism of its construction, in the exploits of its defense, in campaigns for its expansion. The rejection of the imperial-building function means the end of the existence of the Russian people as a historical reality, as a civilizational phenomenon. Such a refusal is national suicide.

Unlike Rome (the first Rome), Moscow, Russia have a deep teleological, eschatological meaning in their imperial impulse. Hegel developed an interesting concept that the Absolute Idea in an eschatological situation should manifest itself in a final, "conscious" form in the form of the Prussian state. However, on a planetary scale, Prussia, and even Germany, taken separately, are geopolitically insufficient for this concept to be taken seriously. Russia, the Third Rome, religiously, culturally, spatially, and strategically fits perfectly

a similar teleological view of the essence of history and clearly seeks to fulfill this very mission. In the case of Russia, the Absolute Idea of Hegel is the spiritual root of Russian imperialism, which gravitates towards the civilizational development of the continent, Eurasia. It is absurd to apply such serious Hegelian criteria to a "nation-state" which obviously assumes next to itself other "nation-states" with their own goals, myths and interests. To impart a quality of absolute significance to such a relative structure is rather absurd. But in the case of a gigantic Empire based on specific, in many respects paradoxical, and in some ways not entirely clarified principles, a completely different matter, and it is no coincidence that the ancient Empires were called "Holy Empires": the quality of "holiness"

The Russian people moved step by step towards this very goal. At each stage of the expansion of their state, the Russians passed to the next stage of messianic universalism, first by rallying the Eastern Slavs, then including the Turkic stream of the steppes and Siberia, then moving to the South, into deserts and mountains, and finally forming a giant political bloc that controlled the Soviet period, literally, half the world. If we realize that the Russian people in their essence is this imperial building process, the strong-willed geopolitical vector of the creation of the “state of the Absolute Idea”, it will become quite obvious that the existence of the Russian people directly depends on the continuation of this process, on its development, on its intensification. By cutting or suppressing this vector, we will strike the Russians in the very heart, deprive them of their national identity,

3.3 The "regional power" trap

The Russian people, with their civilizational and geopolitical mission, has traditionally been (and is) a serious obstacle to the widespread spread of a purely liberal Western model on the planet. Both the tsarist and Soviet regimes, obeying an inexorable national logic, hindered the cultural and political expansion of the West to the East, and especially deep into the Eurasian continent. Moreover, the seriousness of the geopolitical confrontation has always been reflected in the fact that Russia federated in itself and around itself different countries and peoples into a powerful strategic imperial bloc. It was as a continental Empire that Russia participated in world politics and defended its national and civilizational interests.

At present, after the collapse of the USSR, the West seeks to impose on Russia a different geopolitical function, to turn Russia into a political structure that would be unable to directly participate in world politics and have a broad civilizational mission. In a 1992 report by Paul Wolfowitz to the US Congress, it was unequivocally stated that "the main strategic task of the United States is to prevent the creation of a large and independent strategic entity in the territory of the former Soviet Union capable of pursuing a policy independent of the United States." It was on the basis of such an urgent need of the West that Russia was offered the role of a "regional power".

"Regional power" is a modern geopolitical category that characterizes a large and fairly developed state, whose political interests, however, are limited only to areas directly adjacent to its territory

or included in it. For example, India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, China, etc. are considered regional powers. The specificity of a regional power is that it has more political weight than an ordinary ordinary state, but less weight than a superpower or an empire. In other words, a regional power has no direct influence on planetary civilization and global geopolitical processes, being subordinate in the main strategic lines to the balance of power of more powerful Empires. At the same time, a regional power has a certain freedom in relation to its immediate (weaker) neighbors and can exert political and economic pressure on them (naturally, only in those cases when this does not contradict the interests of the superpowers).

The status of a "regional power" proposed (imposed) on Russia by the West today is tantamount to suicide for the Russian nation. The point is to artificially and under strong external influence to reverse the vector of Russian national history, in the opposite direction, to interrupt the coherent process of the geopolitical formation of Russians as an Empire. Russia as a regional power will be a rejection of that deep impulse of the nation, which underlies its highest and deepest identity. The loss of an imperial scale for Russians means the end and failure of their participation in civilization, the defeat of their spiritual and cultural system of values, the fall of their universalist and messianic aspirations, the devaluation and debunking of the entire national ideology, which revived many generations of the Russian people and gave strength and energy for feats, creation ,

Taking into account the specifics of the national imperial self-identification of Russians, it becomes quite obvious that the acceptance of the status of a "regional power" by Russia cannot become the last line of defense. In this case, the blow inflicted on the national consciousness of Russians will be so strong that the matter will not be limited to the framework of the Russian Federation or a similar territorial space. Having lost their mission, Russians will not be able to find the strength to adequately assert their new, “diminished” identity in a “regional state,” since the assertion of this identity is impossible in the state of the passion that logically arises when a nation loses its imperial scale. Consequently, the processes of disintegration are likely to continue in the "regional power"

Even in order to fix the "regional status" of post-imperial Russia, it will be necessary to awaken a powerful wave of nationalism, moreover, a completely new, artificial nationalism based on energies and ideas that have nothing in common with the traditional and only genuine and justified Russian imperial tendency. You can compare this with the small, "secular" nationalism of the Young Turks, who, on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, created modern Turkey, a "regional power" through the "national revolution". But the nationalism of the Young Turks had nothing to do with the geopolitical and religious nationalism of the Ottoman Empire, and in fact, today's Turkey, both spiritually, ethnically and culturally, is a completely different reality than the Turkish Empire at the beginning of the century.

The same, if not worse, threatens Russia, and most likely attempts to gain a foothold as a "regional power" that has abandoned its civilizational mission and universalist values will give rise to politicians of the "Young Russian" type (by analogy with the Young Turks), who are very likely , will profess a special sectarian ideology that has nothing in common with the main line of the Russian national idea. Such Russian "non-imperial" nationalism, secular and artificial, will

geopolitically play only into the hands of the West, since it will secure a "regional" status for Russia, lead to an illusory and short-term internal stabilization and, at the same time, lay the foundation for future internal Russian ethnic and religious conflicts. But if Turkey has two or three large ethnic communities capable of actively opposing Young Turkish centralism, then hundreds of peoples live in the Russian Federation, who got along well in the imperial model, but did not fit into the framework of "small Russian nationalism." The conclusion is obvious: Russia will gradually be drawn into an endless chain of internal conflicts and wars, and, in the end, will disintegrate.

This will be a natural result of the loss by the Russians of their imperial mission, since this process cannot be limited to a relative shrinking of territories and must necessarily reach its logical limit to the complete destruction of the Russian nation as a historical, geopolitical and civilizational entity.

3.4 Criticism of Soviet statehood

The last form of imperial organization of the Russian people was the USSR and the geopolitical area that depended on it (the countries of the Warsaw Pact). During the Soviet period, the Russian sphere of influence expanded geographically to previously unthinkable limits. Land development and military campaigns included huge territories in the geopolitical zone of the Russians.

In a spatial sense, such expansion, it would seem, should represent the highest form of Russian statehood. And it is impossible to deny the fact that the axial structure of the Soviet Empire was precisely the Russian people, who embodied their specific universalism (at least in part) in the Soviet ideological and socio-political model.

Today, at first glance, it seems that the prospect of genuine Russian national development under current conditions should coincide with the restoration of the USSR and the re-creation of the Soviet model and Soviet statehood. This is partly true and logical, and in this case, the neo-communist movement advocating the re-establishment of the USSR is closer to understanding the geopolitical interests of the Russian people, more clearly and clearly represents the essence of its strategic and civilizational aspirations than some neo-nationalist circles inclined to "Young Russian" (by analogy with the "Young Turk") model of "small", "stripped down", "ethnic" nationalism. Certainly geopolitical restorationism neo-communists are justified, and their nationalism is more organic and "national" than the romantic and irresponsible in form (and subversive in the results) narrow nationalist projects of the Slavophil, Orthodox-monarchist or racist wing of patriots. If the choice lay between the reconstruction of the USSR and the construction of a mono-ethnic or even monocultural Great Russian state, then in the interests of the Russian people it would be more logical and correct to choose the project of the USSR.

However, the reasons for the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of the Soviet Empire require an objective analysis, which in no case can be reduced to identifying external (hostile) and internal (subversive) influences, i.e. to the "conspiracy theory". The external pressure of the liberal-democratic West on the USSR was really enormous, and the activities of "subversive elements" inside the country are extremely effective and well-coordinated. But both of these factors became decisive only in such a situation when the existence

The Soviet Empire entered the stage of an internal crisis that has deep and natural causes rooted in the very specifics of the Soviet system and the Soviet system. Without an understanding of these internal causes of the collapse and their analysis, any attempts to restore the USSR (and even more so to create a New Empire) will be futile and futile. Moreover, any purely inertial conservatism in this matter can only further worsen the state of affairs.

Let's identify several factors that led the Soviet Union to geopolitical and socio-economic collapse.

First, at the ideological level, during the entire existence of the socialist regime, purely national, traditional, spiritual elements were never introduced into the general complex of communist ideology. Being in many respects de facto national-communist, it never transformed into such a de jure, which hindered the organic development of Russian-Soviet society, generated a double standard and ideological contradictions, undermined clarity and awareness in the implementation of geopolitical and socio-political projects. Atheism, materialism, progressivism, "enlightenment ethics", etc. were deeply alien to Russian Bolshevism and the Russian people in general. In practice, these provisions borrowed from Marxism (by the way, and in Marxism itself, which are rather arbitrary elements of some kind of tribute to the old-fashioned positivist humanism in the style of Feuerbach) were perceived by the Russian communists in the key of folk-mystical, sometimes unorthodox eschatological aspirations, and not as rationalistic fruits of Western European culture. However, the ideology of National Bolshevism, which could have found more adequate, more Russian terms for the new social and political system, was never formulated. Consequently, sooner or later, the limitations and inadequacy of such an ideologically contradictory structure should have had a negative impact. This especially made itself felt in the late Soviet period, when senseless dogmatism and communist demagogy finally suppressed all ideological life in society. Such "freezing" the ruling ideology and the stubborn refusal to introduce organic, national and natural components into it, resulted in the collapse of the entire Soviet system. The responsibility for this lies not only with the "agents of influence" and "anti-Soviet", but, first of all, with the central Soviet ideologues of both the "progressive" and "conservative" wings. The Soviet Empire was both ideologically and practically destroyed by the communists. To recreate it in the same form and with the same ideology is now not only impossible, but also meaningless, since even hypothetically, this will reproduce the same premises that have already led to the destruction of the state. The responsibility for this lies not only with the "agents of influence" and "anti-Soviet", but, first of all, with the central Soviet ideologues of both the "progressive" and "conservative" wings. The Soviet Empire was both ideologically and practically destroyed by the communists. To recreate it in the same form and with the same ideology is now not only impossible, but also meaningless, since even hypothetically, this will reproduce the same premises that have already led to the destruction of the state. The responsibility for this lies not only with the "agents of influence" and "anti-Soviet", but, first of all, with the central Soviet ideologues of both the "progressive" and "conservative" wings. The Soviet Empire was both ideologically and practically destroyed by the communists. To recreate it in the same form and with the same ideology is now not only impossible, but also meaningless, since even hypothetically, this will reproduce the same prerequisites that have already led to the destruction of the state.

Secondly, on the geopolitical and strategic level the USSR was uncompetitive in the long run for resisting the Atlanticist Western bloc. From a strategic point of view, land borders are much more vulnerable than sea borders, and at all levels (the number of border troops, the cost of military equipment, the use and deployment of strategic weapons, etc.) After the Second World War, the USSR found itself in an unequal position in terms of compared with the capitalist bloc of the West, grouped around the United States. The United States had a gigantic island base (the American continent), completely controlled and surrounded on all sides by oceans and seas, which were not difficult to defend. Plus, the United States controlled almost all coastal zones in the South and West of Eurasia, creating a gigantic threat to the USSR while remaining practically out of reach for potential destabilizing actions of the Soviet Union. Division of Europe into Eastern (Soviet) and Western (American) only

complicated the geopolitical position of the USSR in the West, increasing the volume of land borders and placing it close to a strategic potential adversary, moreover, in a situation of passive hostility of the European peoples themselves, who found themselves in the position of hostages in a geopolitical duel, the meaning of which was not clear to them. The same took place in the southern direction in Asia and in the Far East, where the USSR had direct neighbors or controlled by the West (Pakistan, Afghanistan, pre-Khomeinist Iran) or rather hostile powers with a non-Soviet socialist orientation (China). In this situation, the USSR could acquire relative stability only in two cases: either by rapidly advancing towards the oceans in the West (towards the Atlantic) and in the South (towards the Indian Ocean), or by creating neutral political blocs in Europe and Asia, not under the control of any of the superpowers. This concept (of neutral Germany) was tried by Stalin, and after his death, Beria. The USSR (together with the Warsaw Pact), from a geopolitical point of view, was too big and too small at the same time. The preservation of the status quo only played into the hands of the United States and Atlanticism, since at the same time the military, industrial and strategic potential of the USSR was increasingly worn out, and the power of the United States, a protected island, was growing. Sooner or later, the Eastern Bloc was bound to collapse. Consequently, the reconstruction of the USSR and the Warsaw Bloc is not only The preservation of the status quo only played into the hands of the United States and Atlanticism, since at the same time the military, industrial and strategic potential of the USSR was increasingly worn out, and the power of the United States, a protected island, was growing. Sooner or later, the Eastern Bloc was bound to collapse. Consequently, the reconstruction of the USSR and the Warsaw Bloc is not only The preservation of the status quo only played into the hands of the United States and Atlanticism, since at the same time the military, industrial and strategic potential of the USSR was increasingly worn out, and the power of the United States, a protected island, was growing. Sooner or later, the Eastern Bloc was bound to collapse. Consequently, the reconstruction of the USSR and the Warsaw Bloc is not only

almost impossible, but also unnecessary, because what is it even in case (practically incredible) success will only lead to a to revival deliberately doomed geopolitical model.

Third, the administrative structure The USSR was based on a secular, purely functional and quantitative understanding of intrastate division. Economic and bureaucratic centralism did not take into account either the regional, much less ethnic and religious characteristics of the inner territories. The principle of leveling and purely economic structuralization of society led to the creation of such rigid systems that suppressed, and at best "preserved" the forms of the natural national life of various peoples, including (and to a greater extent) the Russian people themselves. The territorial principle was in effect even when nominally it was about national republics, autonomies or okrugs. At the same time, the process of regional-ethnic leveling became more and more distinct as the entire Soviet political system was "aging", which towards its last stage was more and more inclined towards the type of the Soviet "nation-state" rather than the Empire. Nationalism, which largely contributed to the creation of the USSR in the early stages, in the end became a purely negative factor, since excessive centralization and unification began to generate natural protest and discontent. Atrophy of the imperial principle, ossification of bureaucratic centralism, striving for maximum
rationalization and purely economic productivity gradually created a political monster from the USSR, which lost its life and is perceived as a forced totalitarianism of the center. Certain communist theses of literally understood "internationalism" are largely responsible for this. Consequently, this aspect of the Soviet model, operating not with a specific ethnos, culture, or religion, but with abstract "population" and "territory" should not be revived in any case. On the contrary, it is necessary to get rid of the consequences of such a quantitative approach as soon as possible, whose echoes so tragically affect today the issue of Chechnya, Crimea, Kazakhstan, the Karabakh conflict, Abkhazia, Transnistria, etc.

Fourth, the economic system in the USSR was based on such a "long" socialist cycle that gradually the return of society to a particular person ceased to be felt at all. Ultimate socialization and detailed control of the state over all economic processes, down to the smallest, as well as

the delegation of the functions of redistribution only to a centralized, purely upper, instance gave rise to a climate of social alienation, apathy, and disinterest in society. Socialism and all its advantages became unobvious, imperceptible, receded into the background before the gigantic construction of a bureaucratic-state machine. The individual and the concrete collective were lost before the abstraction of "society", and the cycle of socialist distribution lost touch with reality, turned into an inexplicable, alienated and seemingly arbitrary logic of a soulless machine. It is not socialism itself that is responsible for this state of affairs, but that version of it that has historically developed in the USSR, especially in its later stages, although the origins of this degeneration should be sought in the doctrine itself, in the theory itself. Totalitarian state socialism deprived the economy of flexibility, people of enthusiasm and a sense of complicity in the creative process, contributed to the instilling of a parasitic attitude towards society, which is now absolutized in the mafia-librarianist attitude. The communists are also responsible for this post-Soviet excesses, who were unable to reform socialism in relation to the national element and maintain a dignified life in it.

These four main aspects of the former Soviet model are the main factors behind the collapse of Soviet statehood, and they are responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Empire. It is quite natural that with a hypothetical reconstruction of the USSR, radical conclusions should be drawn in this regard and the causes that have once historically doomed a great nation to a state catastrophe should be completely eliminated.

However, if the restoration of the USSR will take place under the banner of an ideology that has rejected materialism, atheism, totalitarianism, state socialism, Soviet geopolitical space, and administrative structure,
internationalism, centralism, etc., is it generally legitimate to talk about "USSR" or "Soviet state", about "communism", "restoration", etc.? Wouldn't it be more correct to call this the creation of the "New Empire"?

3.5 Criticism of the tsarist statehood

Today, calls for a return to the tsarist, monarchical model can be heard more and more often. This is quite natural, since the discrediting of Sovietism forces Russians to turn to those forms of statehood that existed before the communist period of Russian history. This model has some positive and some negative aspects. Regardless of the incredible difficulty of restoring the pre-communist state system, this project is being discussed more and more seriously.

Considering the historical logic of the geopolitical development of the Russian nation, it makes sense to talk about the later periods of the Romanov rule, when Russia reached the borders of its maximum territorial imperial volume.

The most positive in this project is the ideological basis of Tsarist Russia, where (albeit nominally) loyalty to the national spirit (Nationality), religious truth (Orthodoxy) and the traditional sacred political structure (Autocracy) was declared. However, according to the just remark of the Russian Eurasians, the Uvarov formula (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Narodnost) was in the last periods of tsarist Russia rather an idealistic slogan than a real one.

the content of political life and social structure. Russian Orthodoxy, shaken by the secular reforms of Peter, in this period was quite far from the ideal of "Holy Russia", being in fact subordinate to state control and largely losing its sacred authority and harmony of the Orthodox symphony. Having lost spiritual independence, the Russian Church was forced to compromise with the secular power embodied in the Synod subordinate to the tsar, and thus was limited in freedom of genuine confession of unearthly Truths.

The autocracy, for its part, increasingly lost its sacred meaning, becoming involved in the solution of purely political problems, sometimes forgetting about its highest mission and religious destiny. Although the desacralization of the tsarist power never, up to the abdication of the last Emperor, in Russia did not reach the level of that empty parody, into which the European monarchies, first of all, the French and English, had turned, still the influence of Europe in this area was very great.

And finally, the "nationality" of the famous slogan was rather purely declarative, and the people themselves were deeply alienated from political life, which manifested itself, for example, in general indifference to the February and later October revolutions, which radically destroyed the monarchical model.

A direct appeal in our conditions to the restoration of this triad will most likely lead to the restoration of that skinny and to a greater extent demagogic compromise, which in practice was hidden behind these three principles in the late Roman era (in which they were, by the way, formulated). Moreover, given the absence of unequivocal contenders for the Russian throne, the unstable and uncertain state of the present Orthodox Church, as well as the abstract meaning of the term "nationality" (which is often understood as just a superficial, folklore style or even a fake for a people of fantasizing intellectuals), it is not difficult to foresee that a return to Uvarov's ideology would be an even greater parody than the pre-revolutionary tsarist regime.

In addition, the tsarist model has a very serious geopolitical flaw, which led to the collapse of the Russian Empire in the same way as the USSR did seventy years later.

A return to the tsarist and, consequently, the "Slavophile" geopolitics in general, is fraught with a terrible threat. The fact is that in the last half century of the reign of the Romanovs, the foreign policy of the ruling house was determined not by the Eurasian traditions of Alexander I and the prospects of the continental Holy Union (based on the alliance of Russia and the powers of Central Europe), but by pro-English and pro-French projects, for the sake of which Russia was drawn into suicidal conflicts on to the side of their natural geopolitical adversaries and against their natural geopolitical allies. Support for Serbian demands, the irresponsible myth of the "Bosphorus and the Dardanelles", the involvement of French masons in the European anti-German intrigues, all this forced Russia to fulfill a political role, not only not characteristic of it, but directly destructive for it. Trying to settle in Eastern Europe on a Slavophil basis and constantly getting involved in a conflict with the Central European powers (natural allies of Russia), the tsarist regime systematically undermined the foundations of the Russian state, and straightforwardly led Russia to geopolitical suicide. This includes the Turkish wars and the war with Japan. Paradoxically, it seems that Russia sought to best serve the Atlanticist interests of progressive France and colonial-capitalist England, instead of fulfilling its natural This includes the Turkish wars and the war with Japan. Paradoxically, it seems that Russia sought to best serve the Atlanticist interests of progressive France and colonial-capitalist England, instead of fulfilling its natural This includes the Turkish wars and the war with Japan. Paradoxically, it seems that Russia sought to best serve the Atlanticist interests of progressive France and colonial-capitalist England, instead of fulfilling its natural

a Eurasian mission and seek an alliance with all similar (both politically and spiritually) conservative and imperial regimes. The Slavophil geopolitical utopia cost Russia the Tsar, the Church and the Empire, and only the arrival of the Eurasian-oriented Bolsheviks saved then the country and people from total degradation, from turning into a "regional power".

An attempt to follow such a late-Roman, "Slavophil" line in our conditions cannot but lead to a similar result. And even the very appeal to pre-revolutionary Russia carries potentially suicidal political motives, much more dangerous for the Russian people than the projects of Soviet restoration.

There is one more factor that is extremely dangerous in the case of monarchist tendencies. We are talking about the capitalist form of the economy that was inherent in Russia at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. Although this was a variation of national capitalism, constrained by state, social and cultural boundaries, rather than a “wild” free market, the economic alienation inherent in any capitalism was extremely strong. The Russian bourgeois firmly took the place of the state and military aristocracy, the clergy, squeezing out the bureaucracy and employees. This type of Russian bourgeois (rather different from the representatives of the traditional, pre-capitalist, feudal merchants) actually opposed the cultural, social and ethical norms that were the essence of the system of Russian national values.

pseudo-patriarchy, which has lost all its vital, sacred content. It was Russian capitalists (and very often of a nationalist, "Black Hundred" orientation) who became the first conductors of English and French influences in Russia, natural agents of the Atlanticist trading model that developed and took shape in Anglo-Saxon and French societies.

The late-Roman state system is a combination of a desacralized monarchist façade, a suicidal Slavophile geopolitics and an Atlantist-oriented market capitalism. In all cases, national rhetoric was only a screen and a figure of speech, behind which stood political and social tendencies, not just far from the true interests of the Russian people, but directly opposite to these interests.

Another element of this model is rather dubious, this is the principle of the provincial administrative division of the Russian Empire. Although in practice this did not interfere with the free development of the peoples that were part of the Russian Empire, and in the normal case, the Russians only helped ethnic groups to form and develop their specific culture, the legal non-recognition of cultural-ethnic and religious autonomies, some rigid state leveling centralism were not the best methods of involving nations in a unanimous and free continental imperialism. Elements of the "nation-state" manifested themselves in the last periods of the Romanovs in the same way as in the last decades of the USSR, and the effect of this was very similar to the alienation of ethnic groups from Moscow (St. Petersburg) and the Russians, separatist sentiments, a surge of "minor nationalism", etc. .d. And as a response

the reaction followed the degeneration of the great Russian messianic will into banal national chauvinism.

In monarchical Russia, it was precisely the cultural and religious side, the nominal fidelity to sacred traditions, the memory of the ideal of Holy Russia, the Holy Kingdom, and Moscow, the Third Rome, which was positive. The Orthodox Church as a bulwark of dogmatic Truth, the symphony of Autocracy, the awareness of the historical mission of the God-bearing Russian people are the spiritual symbols of the true Russian Empire, which have archetypal, enduring value, which, however, should be cleared of formalism, demagoguery and pharisaic taint. But unnatural geopolitics, malleability to capitalization, underestimation of the ethnic and religious factor in small of the intra-imperial peoples, the anti-German, anti-Japanese and anti-Ottoman orientation of the Empire of the late Romanovs, all this should be understood as a dead-end political path that has nothing to do with the true interests of the Russian people, which was proved by the historical collapse of this model.

3.6 Towards a new Eurasian Empire

Based on the previous considerations, certain conclusions can be drawn regarding the prospects of the coming Empire as the only form of a worthy and natural existence of the Russian people and the only opportunity to complete its historical and civilizational mission.

1. The coming Empire should not be a "regional power" or "state-nation". It is obvious. But it should be especially emphasized that such an Empire will never be able to become a continuation, the development of a regional power or a nation-state, since such an intermediate stage will cause irreparable damage to the deep national imperial tendency, will involve the Russian people in a labyrinth of insoluble geopolitical and social contradictions, and this, in in turn, will make it impossible to systematically and consistently, logical imperialism.

2. The new Empire should be built immediately as an Empire, and full-fledged and developed purely imperial principles should already be laid in the foundation of its project. This process cannot be attributed to the distant future, hoping for favorable conditions in the future. There will never be such conditions for the creation of the great Russian Empire, if even now the people and political forces striving to speak on its behalf do not consciously and clearly affirm their fundamental state and geopolitical orientation. An empire is not just a very large state. This is something completely different. This is a strategic and geopolitical bloc that surpasses the parameters of an ordinary state; this is a Superstate. Almost never did an ordinary state develop into an Empire. Empires were built immediately as an expression of a special civilizational will, as a super-goal, as a gigantic impulse for the world. Therefore, today one should definitely say: not the Russian State, but the Russian Empire. Not the path of socio-political evolution,

3. The geopolitical and ideological contours of the New Russian Empire should be determined on the basis of overcoming those moments that led to the collapse of the historically preceding imperial forms. Consequently, the New Empire should: be not materialistic, not atheistic, not economically centric;

a) have either maritime boundaries or friendly blocs on adjacent continental territories;

b) have a flexible and differentiated ethnoreligious structure of the internal political and administrative structure, i.e. take into account local, ethnic, religious, cultural, ethical, etc. peculiarities of the regions, giving these elements a legal status;

c) make the participation of the state in the management of the economy flexible and affect only strategic areas, sharply shorten the social cycle, achieve the organic participation of the people in distribution issues;

(These first four points follow from an analysis of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Empire.)

d) fill the religious-monarchical formula with truly sacred the content, lost under the influence of the secular West on the Romanov dynasty, to carry out the Orthodox "conservative revolution" in order to return to the origins of the true Christian worldview;

e) transform the term "nationality" from a Uvarov formula into the central aspect of the socio-political structure, make the People the main, fundamental political and legal category, oppose the organic concept of the People to the quantitative norms of liberal and socialist jurisprudence, develop a theory of "rights of the people";

f) instead of Slavophil geopolitics, turn to Eurasian projects rejecting Russia's anti-German policy in the West and anti-Japanese policy in the East, and end the Atlanticist line disguised as "Russian nationalism";

g) to prevent the processes of privatization and capitalization, as well as the stock market game and financial speculation in the Empire, to focus on the corporate, collective and state control of the people over the economic reality, to discard the dubious chimera of "national capitalism";

h) instead of the provincial principle, move to the creation of ethno-religious areas with the maximum degree of cultural, linguistic, economic and legal autonomy, strictly limiting them in one political, strategic, geopolitical and ideological sovereignty.

(These five points flow from criticism of the tsarist model.)

The builders of the New Empire must actively resist the "Young Russian" tendencies in Russian nationalism, striving to consolidate the status of a "nation-state" for Russia, as well as with all the nostalgic political forces that contain in their geopolitical projects an appeal to those elements that already led the Empire to disaster.

The existence of the Russian people as an organic historical community is inconceivable without an imperialist, continental creation. The Russians will remain a people only within the framework of the New Empire.

This Empire, according to geopolitical logic, this time should strategically and spatially surpass the previous version (USSR). Consequently, the New Empire should be Eurasian, highly continental, and in the future Worldwide.

The battle for Russian world domination was not over.

4.1 Land and sea. Common enemy

The new Empire, which is to be created by the Russian people, has its own internal geopolitical logic, inscribed in the natural structure of the geographic space of the planet.

The main geopolitical law, formulated most clearly by Mackinder, states that in history, a constant and basic geopolitical process is the struggle of land, continental powers (with a natural form of ideocratic political structure) against island, maritime states (commercial, market, economic system). This is the eternal opposition of Rome to Carthage, Sparta to Athens, England to Germany, etc. Since the beginning of the 20th century, this confrontation between two geopolitical constants began to acquire a global character. The sea, trade pole, drawing all other countries into its orbit, became the USA, and Russia became the land pole. After World War II, the two superpowers finally assigned their civilizational roles. The United States strategically absorbed the West and coastal territories of Eurasia, and the USSR united around itself a gigantic continental mass of Eurasian spaces. From the point of view of geopolitics as a science, the ancient archetypal confrontation between Sea and Land, plutocracy and ideocracy, the civilization of merchants and the civilization of heroes found expression in the Cold War (the dualism of “heroes and merchants,” in the words of Werner Sombart, the author of the book of the same name).

The collapse of the Eastern Bloc, and then the USSR, upset the relative geopolitical balance in favor of Atlanticism, i.e. Western bloc and market civilization in general. However, geopolitical tendencies are an objective factor, and it is not possible to abolish them in a voluntaristic, “subjective” way. Land tendencies, continental impulses cannot be undone unilaterally, and therefore, the creation of a new land, eastern, continental Empire is a potential geopolitical inevitability.

The Atlantic, sea, trade pole of civilization today is certainly extremely strong and powerful, but objective factors make the continental reaction of the East almost inevitable. The land empire potentially always exists and seeks only convenient circumstances to realize itself in political reality.

The New Empire must be built on a clear awareness of this geopolitical inevitability. In this Empire, it is the Russians who will have a natural key function, since they control the lands that are the axial ones in the Eurasian continental mass. The new Empire cannot be any other than the Russian one, since both territorially, and culturally, and civilizationally, and socio-economically, and strategically, the Russians naturally and organically correspond to this planetary mission and go to its implementation throughout their national and state history. Mackinder called the Russian lands "the geographical axis of history", i.e. the space around which the coastal civilization of Eurasia was created (often identified with "civilization" in general) under the influence of the dialectical opposition of sea (external) and land (internal) cultural and political impulses. Some other people or some other country

will be able to act as a pole of the Eurasian continental Empire, only by seizing control over the aggregate of Russian lands, and for this it is necessary to fulfill the almost incredible condition of destroying the Russian people, wiping out the Russian nation. Since this seems unlikely, the Russians need to recognize, realize and take on once again the complex role of the center of the Eurasian Empire.

The geopolitical structure of this Empire should be based on the fundamental principle of the "common enemy" principle. The denial of Atlanticism, the rejection of the strategic control of the United States and the rejection of the supremacy of economic, market-liberal values is that common civilizational base, that common impulse that will open the way for a strong political and strategic alliance, will create the pivotal backbone of the coming Empire. The overwhelming majority of Eurasian states and peoples have a continental, "land" specificity of national history, state traditions, and economic ethics. The overwhelming majority of these states and peoples perceive American political and strategic influence as an unbearable burden that alienates the nations from their historical fate. Despite all the internal civilizations,

Differences in the regional interests of the Eurasian states, in religious, ethnic, racial and cultural orientations are all important factors that cannot be ignored. However, they can be talked about seriously and fully only when the stifling economic and strategic influence of the "common enemy", imposing the model that is alien to practically all Christians, socialists, Muslims, national capitalists, Buddhists, and communists and Hindus. As long as the US dominance persists, all intra-Eurasian conflicts and contradictions are artificial, since such a clarification of relations makes sense only in the absence of a more global factor that, in practice, organizes and controls these conflicts in order to maintain disunity and fragmentation in Eurasia. In this sense, everything "

The "common enemy", Atlanticism, must become the connecting component of the new geopolitical structure. The effectiveness of this factor is beyond doubt, and all the arguments against this consideration either naively do not take into account the objective seriousness and totality of the Atlanticist domination, or deliberately divert geopolitical attention from the only responsible and realistic perspective in favor of secondary regional problems that do not have any solution at all without taking into account the global disposition. forces.

Eurasia is predetermined geographic and strategic unification. This is a strictly scientific geopolitical fact. Russia must inevitably be at the center of such a union. The driving force behind the unification must inevitably be the Russian people. The civilizational mission of the Russians, their universalist ideal, and the logic of the historical formation of the nation and state are in complete harmony with this mission. The new Eurasian Empire is inscribed in a geographic and political predetermination

world history and world geopolitics. It is pointless to argue with this circumstance. The interests of the Russian people are inseparable from the construction of such a continental structure.

The Eurasian geopolitics of the New Empire is not simply a geographic abstraction or an expression of a hypothetical will for unlimited expansion. Its principles and main directions take into account both geopolitical constants, and the current political situation, and really existing international trends, and the strategic balance of forces, and economic and resource patterns. Therefore, the Eurasian imperial project simultaneously carries several dimensions of cultural, strategic, historical, economic, political, etc. It is important to emphasize from the outset that in this or that "pivot" geopolitical alliance, when creating an Empire, we are talking about a completely different degree of integration, depending on the level. In one case, there may be cultural or ethnic rapprochement, in another religious, in the third economic. These questions have a special solution in each specific case. The only universal integrating reality in the future Eurasian Empire will be the categorical imperative of strategic unification, i.e. such a geopolitical alliance, which will allow in all strategic directions to effectively resist Atlantic influences, American geopolitical pressure and political and economic dictatorship.

The strategic unification of the continent in question should ensure control over the maritime borders of Eurasia in all cardinal directions, continental economic, industrial and resource autarchy, and centralized control of the Eurasian armed forces. All other aspects of intra-Eurasian integration will be decided on the basis of flexible, differentiated principles, depending on each specific case. This fundamental consideration must be constantly borne in mind in order to avoid unfounded doubts and objections that might arise if, instead of a strategic alliance, someone mistakenly believes that the matter concerns a political, ethnic, cultural, religious or economic association. By the way, such a substitution with

representatives of "minor nationalism" of all peoples will be quite consciously carried out by the necessity, reproaching the Eurasians and continental empire builders for wanting to dissolve their ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and so on. in a new "internationalist utopia". The Eurasian project in no way leads to the leveling of nations, on the contrary, it proceeds from the need to preserve and develop the identity of peoples and cultures, only in this case it is not about irresponsible romantic dreams of "small nationalists" (which in practice only lead to chauvinism and suicidal ethnic conflicts), but about a serious and objective understanding of the current situation, where this goal can be achieved only under the condition of a radical undermining of the global influence of the Atlanticist West with its market, liberal ideology,

Now it remains only to find out the specifics of this continental project, taking into account the negative factors that thwarted the implementation of this grandiose civilizational plan in previous periods.

4.2 Western axis: Moscow Berlin. European Empire and Eurasia

In the West, the New Empire has a strong geopolitical foothold, which is Central Europe.

Central Europe is a natural geopolitical entity, united strategically, culturally and partly politically. Ethnically, this space includes the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as Germany, Prussia and part of the Polish and Western Ukrainian territories. Germany has traditionally been a consolidating force in Central Europe, uniting this geopolitical conglomerate under its control.

Central Europe, for natural-geographical and historical reasons, has a pronounced "land", continental character, opposed to the "sea", "Atlantic" spaces of Western Europe. In principle, the political influence of Central Europe could spread further south to Italy and Spain, for which there were many historical precedents. It is most logical to regard Berlin as the geopolitical capital of Central Europe as a symbol of Germany, which, in turn, is the symbol and center of this whole entity. Only Germany and the German people possess all the necessary qualities for the effective integration of this geopolitical region with a historical will, a well-developed economy, a privileged

geographical location, ethnic homogeneity, consciousness of their civilization mission. Land and ideocratic Germany traditionally opposed the merchant-maritime England, and the specifics of this geopolitical and cultural confrontation markedly affected European history, especially after the Germans finally managed to create their own state.

England is geopolitically the least European state, whose strategic interests are traditionally opposed to the Central European powers and, more broadly, continental trends in Europe. However, in parallel with the strengthening of the role of the United States and their seizure of almost complete control over the British colonies, the strategic role of England has significantly diminished, and today in Europe this country acts more as an extraterritorial floating base of the United States than as an independent force. Be that as it may, within Europe, England is the most hostile country to continental interests, the antipode of Central Europe, and therefore, the New Eurasian Empire has a political, ideological and economic enemy in its person. It is unlikely that it will be possible to change the civilizational path of this specific country by will which at one time created a gigantic trade-colonial empire of a purely "sea" type and so contributed to the emergence of the entire modern Western civilization based on trade, quantity, capitalism, speculation and the stock market game. This is completely unrealistic, and therefore, in the Eurasian project, England will inevitably become a "scapegoat", since the European processes of continental integration will necessarily take place not just without taking into account British interests, but even in direct opposition to these interests. In this context, a significant role should be played by European and, more broadly, Eurasian support for Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism, up to encouraging separatist tendencies and political destabilization of Great Britain. type and so contributed to the emergence of all modern Western civilization based on trade, quantity, capitalism, speculation and the stock market game. This is completely unrealistic, and therefore, in the Eurasian project, England will inevitably become a "scapegoat", since the European processes of continental integration will necessarily take place not just without taking into account British interests, but even in direct opposition to these interests. In this context, a significant role should be played by European and, more broadly, Eurasian support for Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism, up to encouraging separatist tendencies and political destabilization of Great Britain. type and so contributed to the emergence of all modern Western civilization based on trade, quantity, capitalism, speculation and the stock market game. This is completely unrealistic, and therefore England will inevitably become a "scapegoat" in the Eurasian project, since the European processes of continental integration will inevitably take place not just without taking British interests into account, but even in direct opposition to these interests. In this context, a significant role should be played by European and, more broadly, Eurasian support for Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism, up to encouraging separatist tendencies and political destabilization of Great Britain. and therefore, in the Eurasian project, England will inevitably become a "scapegoat", since the European processes of continental integration will inevitably take place not just without taking British interests into account, but even in direct opposition to these interests. In this context, a significant role should be played by European and, more broadly, Eurasian support for Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism, up to encouraging separatist tendencies and political destabilization of Great Britain. and therefore, in the Eurasian project, England will inevitably become a "scapegoat", since the European processes of continental integration will inevitably take place not just without taking British interests into account, but even in direct opposition to these interests. In this context, a significant role should be played by European and, more broadly, Eurasian support for Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism, up to encouraging separatist tendencies and political destabilization of Great E

France is another controversial geopolitical entity. In many ways, French history was of an Atlanticist character, opposed to continental and Central European trends. France was the main historical enemy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in every possible way supported the fragmented state of the German principalities, gravitating towards "progressivism" and an unnatural type. In general, from the continental tradition, France has always "centralism" anti-traditional and the point of view of undermining the European was in the vanguard, and in many cases French politics was identified with the most aggressive Atlanticism. At least

At least, this was the case until the United States assumed the planetary function of the main pole of Atlanticism.

In France, there is also an alternative geopolitical trend that goes back to the continental line of Napoleon (whom Goethe still perceived as the leader of the overland integration of Europe) and was vividly embodied in the European policy of de Gaulle, who was looking for an alliance with Germany and the creation of a European confederation independent of the United States. In part, this line also inspired Mitterrand's Franco-German projects. Be that as it may, hypothetically, one can imagine such a turn of events that France recognizes the supremacy of the Central European factor and voluntarily joins in a geopolitical European bloc with an anti-American and continental orientation. The territory of France is a necessary component of the Eurasian bloc in the West, since control over the Atlantic coast directly depends on this, and, accordingly, security of the New Empire on the western frontiers. In any case, the Franco-German alliance is the main link in Eurasian geopolitics in the continental West, provided that the interests of Central Europe, namely, its autarky and geopolitical independence, will be of priority here. Such a project is known as the "European Empire". The integration of Europe under the auspices of Germany as the basis of such a European Empire fits perfectly into the Eurasian project and is the most desirable process in the matter of more global continental integration.

All tendencies towards European unification around Germany (Central Europe) will have a positive meaning only if one fundamental condition for creating a strong geopolitical and strategic axis Moscow-Berlin is observed. By itself, Central Europe does not have sufficient political and military potential to gain effective independence from US Atlanticist control. Moreover, in the current conditions it is difficult to expect a genuine geopolitical and national awakening from Europe without the revolutionary influence of the Russian factor. The European Empire without Moscow and, more broadly, Eurasia, is not only incapable of fully organizing its strategic space with a shortage of military power, political initiative and natural resources, but also in a civilizational sense does not have clear ideals and guidelines, since the influence of the Trade System and market liberal values deeply paralyzed the foundations of the national worldview of European peoples, undermined their historical organic value systems. The European Empire will become a full-fledged geopolitical and civilizational reality only under the influence of a new ideological, political and spiritual energy from the depths of the continent, i.e. from Russia. In addition, only Russia and the Russians will be able to provide Europe with strategic and political independence and resource autarchy. Therefore, the European Empire should be formed precisely around Berlin, which is on a straight and vital axis with Moscow. The European Empire will become a full-fledged geopolitical and civilizational reality only under the influence of a new ideological, political and spiritual energy from the depths of the continent, i.e. from Russia. In addition, only Russia and the Russians will be able to provide Europe with strategic and political independence and resource autarchy. Therefore, the European Empire should be formed precisely around Berlin, which is on a straight and vital axis with Moscow. The European Empire will become a full-fledged geopolitical and civilizational reality only under the influence of a new ideological, political and spiritual energy from the depths of the continent, i.e. from Russia. In addition, only Russia and the Russians will be able to provide Europe with strategic and political independence and resource autarchy. Therefore, the European Empire should be formed precisely around Berlin, which is on a straight and vital axis with Moscow.

The Eurasian impulse should come exclusively from Moscow, transferring the civilizational mission (with appropriate adaptation to European specifics) of Russians to Berlin, which, in turn, will begin European integration according to principles and projects inspired by a deep geopolitical continental impulse. The key to the adequacy of the European Empire lies in the unambiguous predominance of Russophile tendencies in Germany itself, as the best German minds understood this, from Müller van den Bruck to Ernst Nikisch, Karl Haushofer and Jordis von Lohausen. And as a continuation of such geopolitical Russophilia, the rest of Europe (and first of all, France) should follow the Germanophil

orientation. Only under such conditions will the western vector of the Eurasian Empire be adequate and durable, strategically secured and ideologically consistent. But it must be admitted that no other unification of Europe is simply impossible without deep contradictions and internal divisions. For example, the current unification of Europe under American, NATO control will very soon make it possible to feel all its geopolitical and economic contradictions, and therefore, it will inevitably be either disrupted, or suspended, or spontaneously acquire an unexpected, anti-American (and potentially Eurasian) dimension that was foreseen Jean Thiriard.

It is important to immediately emphasize that the unification of Europe around Germany must take into account the major political miscalculations of previous attempts, and first of all, the failure of the epic of Hitler and the Third Reich. The geopolitical unification of Europe around Central Europe (Germany) should in no way imply the ethnic domination of the Germans or the creation of a centralized structure of the Jacobin type in the form of a giant German State. According to Tiriard, "Hitler's main mistake was that he wanted to make Europe German, while he should have tried to make it European." This thesis remains absolutely relevant at the present stage, and in general can apply to all neo-imperial processes, including in Russia. The European Empire, organized around Germany, must be precisely European, free from ethnic and linguistic domination of any one people. To be the geopolitical heart of Europe, Germany must acquire a supernational, civilizational, and imperial character proper, abandoning contradictory and impossible attempts to create a racially homogeneous "state-nation." European peoples must be equal partners in building the western foothold of Eurasia and adapt the common imperial impulse to their own national and cultural identity. The European Empire should not suppress European nations, not subjugate them to the Germans or Russians, but, on the contrary, liberate them from the yoke of quantitative, consumer, market civilization, awaken their deep national energies, return them to the bosom of history as independent, living and full-fledged political actors

The creation of the Berlin-Moscow axis as the western supporting structure of the Eurasian Empire presupposes several serious steps towards the countries of Eastern Europe lying between Russia and Germany. The traditional Atlanticist policy in this region was based on Mackinder's thesis about the need to create a "cordon sanitaire" here, which would serve as a conflict buffer zone preventing the possibility of a Russian-German alliance, which is vitally dangerous for the entire Atlanticist bloc. To this end, England and France strove to destabilize the Eastern European peoples in every possible way, to instill in them the idea of the need for "independence" and liberation from German and Russian influences. In addition, the diplomatic potential of the Atlantists by any means sought to strengthen Russophobic sentiments in Germany and German-Phobic in Russia, in order to involve both of these powers in a local conflict over the division of spheres of influence in the intermediate spaces in Poland, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, etc. The current NATO strategists are pursuing the same line, putting forward the idea of creating a "Black Sea - Baltic federation" of states, which would be directly related to Atlanticism and potentially hostile to both Russia and Germany.

The creation of the Berlin-Moscow axis presupposes, first of all, the disruption of the organization of the "cordon sanitaire" in Eastern Europe and an active fight against the carriers of Russophobia in Germany and

Germanophobia in Russia. Instead of being guided by regional interests in the zone of mutual influence and unilaterally supporting the politically and ethnically close peoples of this region, Russia and Germany should resolve all controversial issues jointly and in advance, having developed a common plan for redistributing the geography of influence in this region, and then toughly suppress all local initiatives of the East European nations to revise the Russian-German plans. The main thing to strive for is the categorical elimination of any semblance of a "cordon sanitaire," the deliberate dispelling of the illusions of intermediate states regarding their potential independence from geopolitically powerful neighbors. It is necessary to create a direct and clear border between friendly Russia and Central Europe (Germany), and even in the prospect of creating a single strategic bloc along the Berlin-Moscow axis, this border should retain its geopolitical significance as a limit of cultural, ethnic and religious homogeneity in order to knowingly exclude ethnic or confessional expansion in border areas. Russian-Ukrainian, Russian-Baltic, Russian-Romanian, Russian-Polish, etc. the relationship should initially be viewed not as bilateral, but as trilateral with Germany's participation. The same applies to relations between Germany and the Eastern European countries (peoples); they should also be of a triple character with the obligatory participation of the Russian side (and with the exception in all cases of outside, Atlanticist, American intervention). For example, German-Ukrainian relations must necessarily be German-Russian-Ukrainian; German-Baltic German-Russian-Baltic; German-Polish German-Russian-Polish etc.

The Moscow-Berlin axis will help solve a whole range of major problems that both Russia and Germany are facing today. Russia in such an alliance gets direct access to high technologies, to powerful investments in industry, acquires the guaranteed complicity of Europe in the economic development of the Russian lands. At the same time, economic dependence on Germany will by no means come, since Germany will participate in Russia not as a charitable party, but as an equal partner, receiving in return from Moscow a strategic cover that guarantees Germany political liberation from US domination and resource independence from energy reserves of the Third World, controlled by Atlanticism (this is the basis of the energy blackmail of Europe by the United States). Germany today is an economic giant and a political dwarf. Russia is exactly the opposite of a political giant and an economic cripple. The Moscow-Berlin axis will heal the ailment of both partners and lay the foundation for the future prosperity of Great Russia and Great Germany. And in the long term, this will lead to the formation of a solid strategic and economic structure for the creation of the entire Eurasian Empire, the European Empire in the West and the Russian Empire in the East of Eurasia. At the same time, the well-being of individual parts of this continental structure will serve the prosperity of the whole. And in the long term, this will lead to the formation of a solid strategic and economic structure for the creation of the entire Eurasian Empire, the European Empire in the West and the Russian Empire in the East of Eurasia. At the same time, the well-being of individual parts of this continental structure will serve the prosperity of the whole. And in the long term, this will lead to the formation of a solid strategic and economic structure for the creation of the entire Eurasian Empire, the European Empire in the West and the Russian Empire in the East of Eurasia. At the same time, the well-being of individual parts of this continental structure will serve the prosperity of the whole.

As preliminary steps in the formation of the Moscow-Berlin axis, it makes sense to thoroughly cleanse the cultural and historical perspective of mutual relations from the dark sides of the past history of the Russian-German wars, which were the result of the successful subversive activities of the Atlanticist lobby in Germany and Russia, and not an expression of the political will of our continental nations. In this perspective, it is advisable to return the Kaliningrad region (East Prussia) to Germany in order to abandon the last territorial symbol of the terrible fratricidal war. In order to prevent this action from being perceived by the Russians as another step in geopolitical surrender, it makes sense for Europe to offer Russia other territorial annexations or other forms of expanding the strategic zone of influence,

especially among those states that stubbornly strive to join the "Black Sea-Baltic Federation". The issues of restitution of East Prussia should be inextricably linked with the territorial and strategic expansion of Russia, and Germany, in addition to preserving Russian military bases in the Kaliningrad region, should, for its part, contribute diplomatically and politically to strengthening Russia's strategic positions in the Northwest and West. The Baltic countries, Poland, Moldova and Ukraine as a potential "cordon sanitaire" should undergo geopolitical transformation not after the restitution of Prussia, but simultaneously with it, as elements of the same process of final fixing of the borders between friendly Russia and Central Europe.

Bismarck's words "Germany has no enemy in the East" should once again become the dominant feature of German political doctrine, and the opposite maxim should be accepted by the Russian rulers "on the Western borders, Russia has only friends in Central Europe." However, in order for this to become a reality, and not just good wishes, it is necessary to ensure that it is geopolitics and its laws that become the main basis for making all significant foreign policy decisions both in Germany and in Russia, since only from this point of view it is necessary and inevitable the closest Russian-German alliance can be realized, understood and recognized totally and to the end. Otherwise, an appeal to historical conflicts, misunderstandings and disputes will frustrate any attempt to create a solid and reliable base for the vital Moscow-Berlin axis.

4.3 Axis Moscow Tokyo. Pan-Asian project. To the Eurasian Trilateral Commission

The new Empire must have a clear strategy regarding its eastern component. Therefore, the eastern borders of Eurasia for this Empire have the same strategic importance as the problems of the West.

Proceeding from the fundamental principle of "common enemy", Russia should strive for a strategic alliance with precisely those states that are more burdened than others by the political and economic pressure of the Atlanticist superpower, have a historical tradition of geopolitical projects opposite to Atlanticism, and possess sufficient technological and economic power to to become the key geopolitical reality of the new bloc.

In this perspective, the need for maximum rapprochement with India, which is our natural geopolitical ally in Asia in terms of racial, political and strategic parameters, seems absolutely unconditional. After decolonization, India sought to avoid by any means entering the capitalist bloc and in fact led the movement of “non-aligned countries” seeking in the narrow “no man's” geopolitical space for opportunities to adhere to the “Third Way” policy with undisguised sympathy for the USSR. Today, when tough communist dogma has been abolished in Russia, there are no obstacles at all for the closest rapprochement with India.

India is a continent in itself. The sphere of its geopolitical influence is limited, however, by Hindustan and a small zone in the Indian Ocean, located south of the peninsula. India will inevitably become a strategic ally of the New Empire, its southeastern outpost, although it should be borne in mind that the Indian

civilization is not prone to geopolitical dynamics and territorial expansion, and besides, the Hindu tradition does not have a universal religious dimension, and therefore this country can play an important role only in a limited part of Asia. At the same time, the rather weak economic and technological development of this country does not allow relying on it in full, and therefore, the alliance with it at this stage will not solve any problems of the New Empire. India will be able to serve as a strategic outpost of Eurasia, and this is where its mission is actually exhausted (if we do not take into account its spiritual culture, familiarity with which can help to clarify the most important metaphysical landmarks of the Empire).

India is an important ally of Eurasia, but not the main one. Two geopolitical realities, China and Japan, claim the role of the true eastern pole of Eurasia in today's world. But there is a deep geopolitical antagonism between these countries, which has a long history and corresponds to the typology of the two civilizations. Therefore, Russia must choose one thing. The problem cannot be posed in this way: both China and Japan at the same time. A choice is needed here.

At first glance, China is a land mass, its civilization has a traditional authoritarian (non-commercial) character, and the very preservation of communist ideology during liberal reforms in modern China, it seemed, should finally contribute to the choice of China, as opposed to the capitalist, island Japan. However, history shows that it was China, and not Japan, that geopolitically was the most important base of Anglo-Saxon forces on the Eurasian continent, while Japan, on the contrary, supported an alliance with Central European countries of the opposite orientation.

In order to understand this paradox, one should carefully look at the map and mark on it the geography of the last two world wars. In the northern hemisphere, one can conditionally distinguish four geopolitical zones corresponding to the main participants in world conflicts (countries or blocks of states). The Far West, Atlanticism, unites the United States, England, France and several other European countries. This zone has a completely definite geopolitical orientation, unambiguously identical to the "sea", "Carthaginian" line of world history. This is the space of maximum civilizational activity and the source of all anti-traditional, "progressive" transformations.

The second zone is Central Europe, Germany, Austria-Hungary. This space, directly adjacent to the Atlanticist bloc from the East, from a geopolitical point of view, has all the signs of an anti-Atlantic, continental, land-based orientation and geographically gravitates towards the East.

The third zone is actually Russia itself, which lies in the center of gravity of the continent and is responsible for the fate of Eurasia. The land-based and illiberal, "conservative" essence of Russia is obvious.

And finally, the fourth zone is the Pacific area, where it is Japan that is endowed with a central role, developing rapidly and dynamically and possessing at the same time a rigid system of traditionalist values and a clear understanding of its geopolitical role. At the same time, Japan is oriented essentially anti-Western and anti-liberal, since its value system is something directly opposite to the ideals of the "progressive" Atlanticist humanity.

The Western world (Atlanticism), represented by its deepest ideologues (Mackinder, Mahan, etc.), understood perfectly well that the biggest threat to planetary Atlanticism would be the consolidation of all three zones of Eurasia, from the Central European to the Pacific, with the participation and central role of Russia against the Anglo -Saxon and French "progressivism". Therefore, the main task of the Atlanticist strategists was oppose the three Eurasian zones to their immediate neighbors and potential allies. Both the Russian-German and Russian-Japanese conflicts were actively provoked by the Atlanticists, who acted both inside the Eurasian governments and outside, using diplomatic and power levers. Opponents of Atlanticism, starting with Haushofer, finally came to the conclusion that effective opposition to Atlantism is possible only if the logic imposed on the three Eurasian zones is rejected, i.e. with the categorical refusal of the Russians from German and Japanese phobia, and the Japanese and Germans from Russophobia, no matter what historical precedents the supporters of these "phobias" may resort to.

At the same time, it is Japan, as a symbol of the entire Pacific space, that is of paramount importance in these anti-Atlantic projects, since the strategic position of Japan, the dynamics of its development, the specificity of its value system make it an ideal partner in the planetary struggle against the civilization of the West. China, for its part, did not play a special role in this geopolitical picture, being deprived at first of political independence (British colonization), and then of geopolitical dynamics. It was only during the period of active Maoism that a purely soil-based, Eurasian tendency manifested itself in China itself, when the projects of "peasant socialism", all-Chinese nationalism and a pronounced Sovietophilia prevailed. But this state did not last long, and China, under the pretext of disagreeing with the development of the Soviet model, again returned to fulfilling the dubious geopolitical function of destabilizing the Far Eastern interests of Eurasia and escalating conflicts with Russia. There is no doubt that the Chinese perestroika, which began in the 1980s, was the final turn from the Maoist period to the pro-Atlanticist model, which should have finally consolidated China's break with the USSR and its orientation towards the West. At the same time, the "atlanticization" of modern China was much more successful than in Russia, since economic liberalism without political democratization allowed China to become dependent on Western financial groups without conflict, while preserving the totalitarian system and the semblance of political independence. Liberalism was implanted in China by totalitarian methods, and that is why the reform was a complete success. To the political power of the party oligarchy was added the economic power of the same oligarchy, which successfully privatized the people's industry and national wealth and fused with the international cosmopolitan elite of the Trade System. China's economic successes represent a rather ambiguous reality, since they were achieved at the cost of a deep compromise with the West and are not combined with any clear geopolitical concept that could serve as a guarantee of political independence and independence. Most likely, the new liberal China, which has two serious competitors next to it, economically powerful Japan and strategically powerful Russia, will again, as many times in history, return to a purely Atlanticist function in the Far East, combining for this the political dictatorship and the potential of capitalist development. Moreover, from a purely pragmatic point of view, the strategic alliance of Russia with China to create a single bloc will immediately alienate Japan from the Russians and, accordingly, again make hostile the key Pacific region, on whose participation in the common Eurasian project the final geopolitical success of the confrontation between Land and Sea depends. ...

In the New Empire, the eastern axis should be the Moscow-Tokyo axis. This is a categorical imperative of the Eastern, Asian component of Eurasianism. It is around this axis that the basic principles of the Asian policy of Eurasia should take shape. Japan, being the most northerly point among the Pacific Islands, is located in an extremely advantageous geographical location for strategic, political and economic expansion to the South. The Federation of the Pacific Space around Japan was the main idea of the so-called. "Pan-Asian project", which began to be implemented in the 30s and 40s and was interrupted only because of the defeat of the Axis countries in the war. This pan-Asian project must be revisited today in order to undermine the expansion of American influence in the region and deprive the Atlanticists as a whole of their most important strategic and economic bases.

The Pan-Asian project is the center of the eastern orientation of the New Empire. An alliance with Japan is vital. Axis Moscow Tokyo contrary to Axis Moscow Beijing is priority and promising, opening for continental empire building such horizons, which finally will make Eurasia geopolitically completed war, and the Atlanticist empire of the West will be weakened to the utmost, and perhaps, and will destroy completely.

The anti-Americanism of the Japanese, who perfectly remember the nuclear genocide and clearly understand the shame of the political occupation that has lasted for several decades, is beyond doubt. The principle of the "common enemy" is evident here. In the book by American Serge Friedmann, "Coming war with Japan" (the book is called "Coming war with Japan") seems inevitable. The economic war between Japan and the United States is already underway. Russia, building the Eurasian Empire, cannot have a better ally.

Axis Moscow Tokyo also solves a number of major problems in both countries. First, Russia is acquiring an economic giant equipped with highly developed technology and enormous financial potential as its allies. However, Japan lacks political independence, a military-strategic system, and direct access to resources. Everything that Japan lacks, Russia has in abundance, and everything that the Russians lack, the Japanese have in abundance. By combining efforts to build a continental Empire, the Japanese and the Russians could quickly create an unprecedentedly powerful geopolitical center covering Siberia, Mongolia, Japan itself and, in the future, the entire Pacific region. In exchange for strategic protection and direct access to Eurasian resources, Japan could quickly and effectively help the Russians in the technological development and development of Siberia, laying the backbone of an independent regional organism. Japanese technological and financial assistance would solve many problems in Russia.

In addition, Russia and Japan together could restructure the Far Eastern part of continental Eurasia. Indicative in this respect is the constantly increasing intensity of Mongolian-Japanese contacts based on the unity of origin, racial closeness and spiritual and religious kinship. Mongolia (possibly even Inner Mongolia and Tibet, which are currently under Chinese occupation), Kalmykia, Tuva, Buryatia form a Eurasian Buddhist enclave, which could serve as a strong connecting element between Russia and Japan, provide intermediate links in the Moscow-Tokyo axis. On the one hand, these regions are closely and inextricably linked with Russia, and on the other, culturally and racially close to Japan.

The Buddhist bloc could play a crucial role in creating a solid geopolitical structure in the Far East, which would be the continental link of the Pacific Pan-Asian Union. In the event of aggravation of relations with China, which will inevitably occur at the beginning of the implementation of the Moscow-Tokyo axis, the Buddhist factor will be used as a banner of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Tibet and Inner Mongolia for the expansion of the proper Eurasian continental spaces to the detriment of pro-Atlantic China.

Generally speaking, China has every chance of becoming the geopolitical "scapegoat" in the implementation of the Pan-Asian project. This can be done both by provoking internal Chinese separatism (Tibetans, Mongols, the Muslim population of Xinjiang), and by playing on regional contradictions, as well as with active political support of anti-Atlanticist, purely continental forces of a potential Buddhist (and Taoist) lobby inside China itself, which in the long term may lead to the establishment of such a political regime in China itself, which will be loyal to the Eurasian Empire. In addition, China should be offered a special vector of regional geopolitics, directed strictly to the South towards Taiwan and Hong Kong. Southward expansion compensates in part for the loss of China's political influence in the North and East.

China in the eastern regions of the New Empire should be compared in the West not to England, but to France, since in relation to its Eurasian Empire it will be guided by two criteria in the event of active opposition to Eurasian projects, China will have to be treated as a geopolitical adversary with all the ensuing consequences, but if it succeeds create a powerful pro-Japanese and pro-Russian simultaneously political lobby inside the country, then in the future China itself will become a full-fledged and equal participant in the continental project.

Axis Moscow Tokyo together with the western axis Moscow Berlin will create a geopolitical space that is directly opposite to the main model of Atlanticist ideologists, whose supreme authority today is Trilateral, the Trilateral Commission. The "Trilateral Commission", created by the American circles of the highest political establishment, assumes as a new configuration of the planet the strategic unification of three geopolitical zones, exactly corresponding to the three geopolitical elements of the four, which we discussed above. The three sides of this commission, which seeks to fulfill the functions of the "World Government", correspond to:

1) American zone (USA, Far West, pure Atlanticism),

2) European zone (continental Europe, Central Europe, but under the auspices of France and England, not Germany)

3) the pacific zone (united around Japan).

Thus "Trilateral" seeks to construct a geopolitical model in which Eurasia proper (= Russia) will be surrounded on both sides by reliable geopolitical partners of the United States; three out of four zones covering the northern regions of the planet come under the direct control of the United States. At the same time, between the potential Eurasian adversary of the Atlanticists (Eurasia) and the very center of Atlanticism (USA) there are two service geopolitical spaces (Europe and Japan). It is also important to note that the restructuring in China in the early 80s was started precisely with the filing of the representatives of the Trilateral Commission, who sought to finally return China to the Atlanticist policy.

The Eurasian project proposes something exactly the opposite of Trilateral's plans. The New Empire is the anti-Trilateral, its reverse, inverted model. This is the union of three geopolitical zones centered in Russia, oriented against America. By the same logic, according to which the United States is seeking to geopolitically keep Europe and Japan under its control, realizing all the strategic benefits for American power in such an alignment of forces, Russia, while building a New Empire, should in every possible way strive to create a strong strategic alliance with Europe and Japan, so that achieve their own geopolitical stability, power and guarantee political freedom to all Eurasian peoples. In principle, we can talk about the creation of its own Eurasian "Trilateral Commission" with Russian, European and Japanese branches, in which, however, not Atlanticist and pro-American politicians will participate, but intellectual and political leaders of national orientation who understand the geopolitical logic of the current state of affairs in the world. At the same time, naturally, unlike the Atlanticist Trilateral, the Eurasian Trilateral Commission should have a German, not a Frenchman, as the main representative of Europe.

Taking into account the strategic necessity of the Japanese factor in the Eurasian project, it becomes quite clear that the issue of restitution of the Kuriles is not an obstacle for the Russian-Japanese alliance. In the case of the Kuril Islands, as in the case of the Kaliningrad region, we are dealing with the territorial symbols of the Second World War, alliances and the entire course of which was a complete triumph of the Atlantists, who dealt with all their opponents simultaneously through the extreme exhaustion of the USSR (when such a geopolitical position was imposed on it, which in the long term could not but lead to the collapse of perestroika) and the direct occupation of Europe and Japan. The Kuril Islands are a reminder of the absurd and unnatural fratricidal massacre of the Russians and the Japanese, the earliest possible oblivion of which is a necessary condition for our mutual prosperity. The Kurils must be returned to Japan, but this should be carried out within the framework of the general process of the new organization of the Eurasian Far East. In addition, the restitution of the Kuril Islands cannot be carried out while maintaining the existing alignment of political forces in Russia and Japan. This is the business of only Eurasian, imperialist-oriented politicians who will be able to fully answer for the true national interests of their peoples. But the understanding of the geopolitical necessity of restitution of the Kuriles among the Eurasian elite should be present already now. who will be able to fully answer for the true national interests of their peoples. But the understanding of the geopolitical necessity of restitution of the Kuriles among the Eurasian elite should be present already now. who will be able to fully answer for the true national interests of their peoples. But the understanding of the geopolitical necessity of restitution of the Kuriles among the Eurasian elite should be present already now.

4.4 Axis Moscow Tehran. Central Asian Empire. Pan-Arab project

The policy of the Eurasian Empire in the southern direction should also be oriented towards a firm continental alliance with a force that satisfies both strategically, ideologically, and culturally, the common Eurasian tendency of anti-Americanism. The principle of "common enemy" should be a decisive factor here too.

In the South of Eurasia, there are several geopolitical formations that could theoretically act as the south pole of the New Empire. Since India and China should be attributed to the East zone and connected with the prospect of pan-Asian integration, only the Islamic world remains, stretching from the Philippines and Pakistan to the Maghreb countries, ie. West Africa. In general, the entire Islamic zone is a naturally friendly geopolitical reality in relation to the Eurasian Empire, since the Islamic tradition is more politicized and modernized than

most other Eurasian denominations are well aware of the spiritual incompatibility of Americanism and religion. The Atlanticists themselves consider the Islamic world as a whole as their potential adversary, and therefore the Eurasian Empire has in its person loyal potential allies striving for a common goal of undermining and, in the future, completely ending American, Western domination on the planet. It would be ideal to have an integrated Islamic world as the southern component of the entire Eurasian Empire, stretching from Central Asia to West Africa, religiously united and politically stable, basing its policy on the principle of loyalty to tradition and spirit. Therefore, in the long term, the Islamic Empire in the South ("new caliphate") can become an important element of New Eurasia along with the European Empire in the West,

However, at the moment the Islamic world is extremely fragmented and within it there are various ideological and political tendencies, as well as geopolitical projects that are opposite to each other. The most global are the following currents:

one) Iranian fundamentalism, anti-Atlantist and (continental type, anti-american, geopolitically active),

2) Turkish secular regime (Atlantist type, accentuating pan-Turkist line),

3) pan-Arabism preached by Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, partly Egypt and Saudi Arabia (quite diverse and contradictory projects in each case),

four) Saudi Wahhabi type of fundamentalism (geopolitically in solidarity with Atlanticism),

five) various versions of "Islamic socialism" (Libya, Iraq, Syria, models close to pan-Arabism of the "left" persuasion).

It is immediately clear that the purely Atlanticist poles in the Islamic world, be they "secular" (as in the case of Turkey) or Islamic (in the case of Saudi Arabia), cannot fulfill the functions of the south pole of Eurasia in the global project of the continental Empire. What remains is "Iranian fundamentalism" and "pan-Arabism" (left wing).

From the point of view of geopolitical constants, Iran, of course, has a priority in this matter, since it satisfies all Eurasian parameters; it is a major continental power, closely connected with Central Asia, radically anti-American, traditionalist and emphasizing at the same time the "social" political vector (protection of "mustazafs", "disadvantaged"). In addition, Iran occupies such a position on the map of the mainland that the creation of the Moscow-Tehran axis solves a huge number of problems for the New Empire. By including Iran as the southern pole of the Empire, Russia would instantly have achieved the strategic goal to which it had (by wrong paths) access to the warm seas for several centuries. This strategic aspect, Russia's lack of such an exit, has been the main trump card of Atlanticist geopolitics since the time of colonial England, which completely controlled Asia and the East, taking advantage of Russia's lack of direct access to the southern shores of the continent.

areas of Eurasia, where the British reigned supreme, who easily suppressed any attempts of Russian expansion through control over this coastal zone. However, even if Russia succeeded in doing this, Atlanticist control of Gibraltar would always remain an obstacle to truly large-scale maritime operations and prevent Russia from undermining British power. Only Iran, continentally adjoining Russia and going directly to the Indian Ocean, both then and now, could and can be a radical solution to this major geopolitical problem. Having received strategic access, first of all, naval bases on the Iranian shores, Eurasia will be completely safe from the strategy of the "anaconda ring", i.e. from the implementation of the traditional Atlanticist plan to "strangle"

The creation of the Moscow-Tehran axis at once cuts the "anaconda" in the most vulnerable place and opens up unlimited prospects for Russia to acquire more and more new footholds inside and outside Eurasia. This is the most essential point.

On the other hand, there is the problem of the former Soviet Central Asia, where today three geopolitical tendencies “pan-Turkism” (Turkey, Atlanticism), “Wahhabism” (Saudi Arabia, Atlanticism) and “fundamentalism” (Iran, anti-Atlanticism) compete. For quite understandable reasons, there can be no "pan-Arabism" among the Turkic-speaking peoples of the majority of Central Asia. The presence in parallel with this of a powerful pro-Russian orientation should also be taken into account, but it is difficult to imagine how these Islamic regions, with their awakening national self-awareness, can again join Russia bloodlessly and painlessly. It is quite obvious that among the "non-Promos" tendencies, the New Empire can only rely on a pro-Iranian orientation, which will take this region out of the direct or indirect control of the Atlanticists. At the same time, the strong axis Moscow Tehran will remove all contradictions between Russophilism and Islamism (of the Iranian type), make them one and the same geopolitical trend, oriented towards both Moscow and Tehran at the same time. Parallel to this, such an axis would automatically mean the end of the civil conflict in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which are fueled only by the geopolitical uncertainty of these formations, torn apart
contradictions between the Islamic-Iranian fundamentalist vector and gravitation towards Russia. Naturally, against the background of such a contradiction, petty ethnic tensions are aggravated, as well as the activities of Atlanticist "agents of influence" who, directly or indirectly (through Turkey and Saudi Arabia) seek to destabilize the intra-Asian spaces in their key centers, are facilitated.

Geopolitically Iran is Central Asia, just as Germany is Central Europe. Moscow, as the center of Eurasia, its pole, should, within the framework of the New Empire, delegate to Tehran the mission of guiding the "Iranian peace" (Pax Persica) in this space, the organization of a strong Central Asian geopolitical bloc capable of resisting Atlanticist influence in the entire region. This means that the pan-Turkist expansion, as well as the financial and political invasion of the Saudis, will be abruptly interrupted. Traditionally hostile to both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Iran will fulfill this function much better than the Russians, who will solve their geopolitical problems in this complex center only with the help of strategic support from the Iranian side. But here, as in the case of Germany, we should not talk about the creation of an Iranian Empire or the Iranization of Central Asia.

strategically homogeneous, but ethnically and culturally diverse Islamic formation, inextricably linked with the interests of the entire Eurasian Empire.

In the Moscow-Tehran axis issue, the Armenian issue occupies an important place, since it traditionally serves as a center of destabilization in the Transcaucasus. It should be noted that the Armenians are an Aryan people, clearly aware of their Japhetical nature and kinship with Indo-European peoples, especially Asian ones, i.e. with Iranians and Kurds. On the other hand, the Armenians are a Christian people, their Monophysite tradition fits precisely into the general mood of the Eastern Church (although it is recognized by Orthodoxy as a heretical trend), and they are very vividly aware of the geopolitical connection with Russia. The Armenians occupy lands of extreme strategic importance, as the way from Turkey to Azerbaijan and further to Central Asia lies through Armenia and Artsakh. In the Moscow axis Tehran Yerevan automatically becomes the most important strategic link, additionally connecting Russia with Iran, and cutting off Turkey from the inland spaces. With the possible reorientation of Baku from Ankara to Tehran, the joint Moscow-Tehran project will quickly resolve the Karabakh issue, since all four sides will be vitally interested in the immediate establishment of stability in such an important strategic region. (Otherwise, if the pro-Turkish orientation of Azerbaijan is preserved, this "country" is subject to dismemberment between Iran, Russia and Armenia.) Almost the same applies to other regions of the Caucasus, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Dagestan, etc. which will remain zones of conflict and instability only if the geopolitical interests of Atlanticist Turkey collide with Eurasian Russia. Connecting the Iranian geopolitical line here will instantly deprive the content of the appearance of a collision between "

In this project for the reconstruction of Central Asia, it should be noted that Russian ethnic interests can be protected in the best possible way, since the Central Asian Empire will be built not on the basis of artificial political constructions, fictitious "post-imperial legitimacy", but on the basis of national homogeneity, which implies a peaceful transition to the direct the jurisdiction of Moscow of all territories of Central Asia (especially Kazakhstan), compactly populated by Russians. And those territories whose ethnic composition is controversial will receive special rights on the basis of Russian-Iranian projects within a particular Empire. Consequently, through a Eurasian geopolitical project, the Russians will be able to achieve what appears to be the goal of "minor (ethnic) nationalism," but which this nationalism itself will never be able to accomplish.

It is also important to take into account the need to impose on Turkey the role of a "scapegoat" in this project, since the interests of this state in the Caucasus and Central Asia will not be taken into account at all. Moreover, it is probably necessary to emphasize the support of Kurdish separatism in Turkey itself, as well as the autonomist demands of the Turkish Armenians, in order to wrest the peoples ethnically close to Iran from the secular-Atlanticist control. As compensation, Turkey should be offered either development in a southern direction to the Arab world through Baghdad, Damascus and Riyadh, or provoke pro-Iranian fundamentalists in Turkey itself to a cardinal dimension of the geopolitical course and to enter the Central Asian bloc in the long term under an anti-Atlantic and Eurasian sign. ...

The Moscow-Tehran axis is the backbone of the Eurasian geopolitical project. Iranian Islam is the best version of Islam for entering the continental bloc, and it is this version that should be supported by Moscow as a priority.

The second line of the Eurasian alliance with the South is the Pan-Arab project, which covers part of Asia Minor and North Africa. This block is also vital to continental geopolitics, since this zone is strategically important in terms of control over the southwestern coast of Europe. That is why the British and later American presence in this region is a historical and strategic constant. By controlling the Middle East and North Africa, the Atlanticists have traditionally kept (and keep) continental Europe under political and economic pressure.

However, the integration of the pan-Arab project with the common Eurasian Empire should be entrusted to purely European forces, returning to the projects of Euro-Africa, which, from a purely geopolitical point of view, is not two continents, but one. The European Empire, vitally interested in the deepest penetration into the south of the African continent, should in the long term fully control, relying on the pan-Arab bloc, Africa up to the Sahara, and in the future try to strategically penetrate the entire African continent. In the Euro-African perspective, the Mediterranean Sea is not a true "sea", but only an internal "lake" that does not represent either a barrier or a defense against Atlanticist influence. A detailed polyethnic project should be developed outside Arab Africa, which would help restructure the black continent along national, ethnic and cultural lines, instead of the controversial postcolonial conglomerate that modern African states are. A nuanced pan-African (non-Arab) national project could become a geopolitical addition to the pan-Arab integration plan.

Considering that the model of a purely Iranian fundamentalism is unlikely to become universally acceptable in the Arab world (largely due to the specificity of the Shiite, Aryan version of Iranian Islam), the pan-Arab project should strive to create an independent anti-Atlantic bloc, where Iraq, Libya would become the priority poles. and liberated Palestine (under certain conditions also Syria), i.e. those Arab countries that more clearly understand the American danger and more radically than others reject the market-capitalist model imposed by the West. At the same time, in the pan-Arab project, the "scapegoat" will be, first of all, Saudi Arabia, too rooted in Atlantic geopolitics to voluntarily enter a pan-Arab bloc friendly to Eurasia. For Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, the situation is somewhat different, since the ruling pro-Atlantic forces in these states do not express national tendencies, do not fully control the situation and rely only on American bayonets and American money. With the start of a pan-Arab liberation war at a sufficiently intense level, all these regimes will fall in one hour.

But it is necessary to clearly understand that the most harmonious structure of the pan-Arab space is not so much a matter of Russia, but of Europe, Central Europe, Germany, and more precisely, the European Empire. Russia (more precisely, the USSR) intervened in Arab problems only when it alone represented a Eurasian state in the face of Americanism. In the presence of a powerful European base of the Eurasian orientation, i.e. after the creation of the Moscow Berlin axis, this function should be delegated to Berlin and Europe as a whole. Russia's immediate concern in the Islamic world should be

namely Iran, on the alliance with which the vital strategic and even narrowly ethnic interests of the Russians depend.

Iran, which controls Central Asia (including Pakistan, Afghanistan and the remains of Turkey or "Turkey after the pro-Iranian revolution") together with Russia, is the center of Moscow's priority interests. At the same time, the traditional influence of Russia among the "left" regimes of a pan-Arab orientation (primarily Iraq and Libya) should be used to bring the Arab countries closer to Iran and soon forget the artificial Iranian-Iraqi conflict inspired by the Atlantists.

4.5 Empire of many Empires

The new Empire, the construction of which would correspond to the global, planetary civilizational mission of the Russian people, is a super-project that has many sublevels. This New Empire, the Eurasian Empire, will have a complex differentiated structure, within which there will be varying degrees of interdependence and integration of individual parts. It is quite obvious that the New Empire will not be either the Russian Empire or the Soviet Empire ..

The main integrating moment of this New Empire will be the fight against Atlanticism and a tough rebuff to the liberal-market, "maritime," Carthaginian civilization that is embodied today by the United States and the planetary political, economic and military structures that serve Atlanticism. the creation of a gigantic geopolitical continental bloc, united strategically.

integrating factor of the New Empire. This Empire will be a single and indivisible organism in the military-strategic sense, and this will impose political restrictions on all internal sub-imperial formations. All the blocs that will be part of the New Empire will be politically limited in one categorical prohibition to serve Atlanticist geopolitical interests, withdraw from the strategic alliance, and harm continental security. At this and only at this level, the New Empire will be an integral geopolitical entity.

At the next lower level, the New Empire will be a "confederation of Greater Spaces" or secondary Empires. Of these, four main European Empires in the West (around Germany and Central Europe), the Pacific Empire in the East (around Japan), the Central Asian Empire in the South (around Iran) and the Russian Empire in the Center (around Russia) should be immediately distinguished. It is quite logical that the central position is the main one in such a project, since it is on it that the territorial coherence and homogeneity of all other components of the giant continental block depends. In addition, separate independent Large Spaces will exist in addition to the indicated blocs India, the pan-Arab world, the pan-African union, as well as, possibly, a special region of China, whose status is still difficult to determine even approximately. Each of the secondary Empires will be based on a particular racial, cultural, religious, political, or geopolitical integrating factor, which may be different in each case. The degree of integration of the Empires themselves will also be a variable, depending on the specific ideological base on which this or that Empire will be created.

Within these secondary Empires, the confederal principle will also operate, but this time it will be applied to smaller ethnic, national and regional

units to what, with greater or lesser approximation, can be called a "country" or "state". Naturally, the sovereignty of these "countries" will have significant limitations, first of all, strategic (arising from the principles of the entire continental New Empire), and secondly, associated with the specifics of those Great Spaces, which they will be part of. And in this matter, the principle of extremely flexible differentiation will be applied, taking into account the historical, spiritual, geographic, and racial characteristics of each region.

The Great Russians, for example, can be considered as a separate people or even a "country" within the Russian Empire, along with Ukrainians, Belarusians, possibly Serbs, etc., but at the same time they will all be closely related to the jurisdiction of the Slavic-Orthodox type embodied in a specific state system. At the same time, the Russian Empire will depend on the Eurasian Empire, the New Empire, whose strategic interests will be placed above the national, racial and confessional interests of the Eastern Orthodox Slavs.

The same can be said, for example, of the French, who will remain a people or "country" within the European Empire, along with the Germans and Italians, associated with them by the common European imperial tradition, Christian religion and belonging to the Indo-European race. But the European Empire itself, in turn, will obey the strategic imperatives of the entire great continental New Empire.

The same will be the case in Central Asia, and in the Pacific, and in the Arab world, and in black Africa, and in India, etc.

At the same time, at the global level, the construction of the planetary New Empire will be the main "scapegoat" of the United States, the undermining of its power (up to the complete destruction of this geopolitical structure) will be implemented systematically and uncompromisingly by all participants of the New Empire. In this respect, the Eurasian project assumes Eurasian expansion into South and Central America in order to withdraw it from the control of the North (here the Spanish factor can be used as a traditional alternative to the Anglo-Saxon one), as well as provoking all types of instability and separatism within the borders of the United States (possibly relying on the political forces of African-American racists). The ancient Roman formula "Carthage must be destroyed" will become the absolute slogan of the Eurasian Empire,

The specifics in clarifying the status of this or that people, this or that "country", this or that "Empire of Large Spaces" within the framework of a common continental bloc will become relevant only after geopolitical unification, after the creation of the necessary axes, and only then the Eurasian peoples and states will be able to resolve their internal problems completely freely, without pressure from the Atlanticist forces, which are fundamentally interested in only one thing to prevent peace, harmony, prosperity, independence, dignity and the flowering of Tradition in Eurasia.

Chapter 5. The fate of Russia in imperial Eurasia

5.1 Geopolitical magic for national purposes

Russian national interests can be considered at several levels at the global, planetary, geopolitical, civilizational (this was discussed in the previous sections) and at the narrowly national, specific, socio-political and cultural (this will be discussed in this part). How do the macro-projects of continental imperialism and the ethnic line of the Russian people relate to each other? Something has already been said about this. Here you should consider this problem in more detail.

"Imperial-building orientation", "continentalism", "Eurasianism", all these terms and corresponding projects often frighten off those Russians who are poorly familiar with the symbolism of Russian history, do not delve into the meaning of the historical tendencies of the nation, are used to operating with banal everyday clichés when understanding what are the people and what are their interests. This gives rise to many misunderstandings among the nationalists themselves, provokes empty discussions and empty polemics. In fact, the specificity of Russian nationalism lies precisely in its globality; it is associated not so much with blood as with space, with soil, earth. Outside the Empire, Russians will lose their identity and disappear as a nation.

However, the implementation of the Eurasian plan should by no means lead to the ethnic erosion of the Russians as the "axial" ethnos of the Empire. The Great Russians also need to maintain their ethnic identity, without which the center of the continent will lose its civilizational and cultural certainty. In other words, within the framework of the supranational geopolitical Empire itself, there should be special norms (including legal ones) that would ensure the preservation of ethnic identity for Russians. The specificity of the New Empire should be that, given the central role of Russians in geopolitical integration, this should not be accompanied by a “Russification” of non-Russian territories, since such “Russification”, on the one hand, would distort the meaning of the Empire, reducing it to the level of a giant “state-nation” "and on the other hand,

With regard to the Russian people within the continental bloc, it should be emphasized that its role will not be "isolationist" (despite the projects of "minor nationalism") and not ethno-expansionist (despite the "ethnic imperialists" and, in part, Slavophiles). Of these two projects, it is necessary to take separate sides, discarding others. At the strategic level, it will really be about "expansionism", but not of an ethnic, but of a geopolitical nature, which deliberately excludes any form of Russian or Slavic racism. On the purely ethnic level, on the contrary, the "isolationist" variant should be realized to some extent, while rejecting the political and state isolationism. Russians will exist as a single national community in the space of a supranational imperial complex. Ethnic reality will be consolidated within the people, and the super-ethnic mission will be expressed within the Empire. Only with such a combination can we simultaneously achieve both the preservation of a healthy national core and the maximum expansion of geopolitical influence. In other words, the national factor will be determined on the basis of a completely new combination of ethnic and political

state history of Russians. Ethnic homogeneity existed in Russia only in the early stages of statehood within rather limited territories. The Tsarist model was based on the principle of a certain "Russification", while the Soviets, expanding the geopolitical boundaries of Russia, on the contrary, neglected the ethnic quality of the Russian people. In the New Empire, these factors should appear in a new proportion, corresponding to modern geopolitical and ethnographic conditions, as well as necessary to establish a stable ethnopolitical balance in the Russian people.

Russians in the New Empire play two roles simultaneously:

1) as one of the great nations that are political subjects of the Federal Empire of Nations,

2) as the initiator of continental integration into this Federal Empire of Nations.

Consequently, the Russians find themselves in a privileged position, since, from the ethnic side, being one of several more or less equal ethnic components of the Empire, they are geopolitically at the center of the entire political process. Such a dual function allows, in the course of the implementation of one and the same imperial-building action, to simultaneously increase its extra-ethnic influence and consolidate intra-ethnic forces. Imperialism is the only way to preserve, strengthen and unite the Russian ethnos, without resorting to interethnic conflicts, wars, and revision of political boundaries. All political borders of Eurasia in the process of building the New Empire will be gradually canceled as political borders, and instead of them natural, organic ethnic borders will arise, not having the strictly dividing meaning, as is the case in the case of state borders. These ethnic borders will have nothing to do with what is meant by the word "border" in the modern situation, since they will be based on ethnocultural, confessional lines, not

assuming political domination over minorities for the very reason that these ethnic formations will not have full-fledged political sovereignty, being limited by the strategic interests of the entire Empire, which, in turn, is vitally interested in maintaining peace and harmony within its borders. In other words, the Russians, within the framework of such an Empire, will not acquire their own national state as a political expression of an ethnic community, but they will acquire national unity and a gigantic continental state, in the administration of which they will receive a central role.

The very promotion of such a project immediately removes the threat of those potential conflicts that are ripening due to the division of Russians at the present time in various newborn "states" within the CIS. The imperial-building vector instantly translates the problem of the ratio of Russians and Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, or Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine, or Russians and Tatars in Tatarstan, into a completely different plane than the ethnic one. This ratio ceases to be a political and state problem, which can be resolved only if certain political and territorial damage is inflicted on one side or another (for example, ethnic division of Kazakhstan, separatism within the Russian Federation, military suppression of Chechnya, confessional and national fragmentation of Ukraine, the problem of Crimea, etc.), and becomes a question of the coexistence of different ethnic groups within a single political space. And in this case, the ethnic consolidation of, say, Russians in Kazakhstan with Russians within the Russian Federation will not be considered as an undermining of political sovereignty.

of the "Kazakh national state" in favor of the "Russian national state", but will become an organic cultural and ethnic process that does not infringe upon, but does not elevate either side, for the reason that no "Kazakh national state" or "Russian national state" is simply will not exist. The Soviet model was somewhat similar to this project, but with one important caveat, the concept of "ethnos" was viewed in it as a kind of rudiment, as a historical atavism, deprived, moreover, of the status of an internal political subject. Within the framework of the New Empire, on the contrary, the ethnos, having no direct state expression, will be recognized as the main political value and the supreme legal entity in all internal imperial issues.

Summarizing this question, we can say that operations with global geopolitical projects, at first glance, have nothing to do with the achievement of the narrow ethnic goals of the Russians, in fact, will lead to the best satisfaction of these specific national goals. Refusing insufficient and too small ("the Russian state within the Russian Federation"), not trying to increase this small by conquests and annexations in a bloody, fratricidal war, offering the peoples of Eurasia the construction of a continental bloc on equal terms, Russians will be able to acquire that large and worthy of them. that would otherwise remain forever an unattainable dream.

By giving up the nation state, we will find the unity of the people and the Great Empire. Under current conditions, this is the only way and no other way to save the Russian people from political weakness and ethnic degeneration, to awaken it in all its grandiose volume for planetary achievements and to finally give it back what it really deserves.

5.2 Russian nationalism. Ethnic demography and empire

The Russian people, in a narrow ethnic sense, are in a difficult demographic situation. In the long term, this threatens with dire consequences both for the nation itself and for the future Empire, since the replacement of the Russians as the main carrier of continental unions by some other nation will inevitably lead to the deviation of the continental block from its natural civilizational mission, generate chaos and conflicts in Eurasia. , will deprive the geopolitical structure of the most important cultural and political component.

Such a weak demographic position of Russians is especially alarming in comparison with the demographic growth of the Eurasian South, which, on the contrary, is rapidly developing in quantitative terms. If these tendencies continue in the existing proportion, the Russians will inevitably be driven out of the central positions in the Empire, the homogeneity of the nation will erode and either the ethnic group will be absorbed into the sea of southern peoples, or it will turn into a relict remnant worthy of existence only on a reservation. To this should be added the absence of a compact settlement by Russians of significant Eurasian spaces, which they control only politically and administratively.

This problem should be solved immediately, but it should be especially emphasized that its solution should not precede the creation of the Empire and not follow this creation. The implementation of geopolitical plans from the very beginning must be synchronously accompanied by actions aimed at the demographic growth of Russians and their ethnic regrouping in order to compactly master the fullness of the "living space" of the nation. This goal can be achieved exclusively by political methods, which should both lead directly to the desired result and predetermine economic measures in this area.

A political solution can only be one highlighting the concepts of Russian nationalism. This nationalism, however, should use not state, but cultural and ethnic terminology with special emphasis on such categories as "nationality" and "Russian Orthodoxy". Moreover, this Russian nationalism should have a completely modern sound and avoid any attempts to directly restore those forms that have historically exhausted themselves. It is the nationalism of the populist, ethnic, ethical-religious type, and not "statehood" and not "monarchism" that should be the priority in this situation. It is necessary to instill in all Russians the basic idea that the personal self-identification of each individual person is a secondary, derivative value from the national self-identification. Russians must realize that, first of all, they are Orthodox, secondly Russian and only thirdly people. Hence the hierarchy of priorities in both personal and public life. Above all is the Orthodox self-consciousness of the nation as a Church, then a clear understanding of the indivisibility, integrity, totality and unity of the Russian ethnic organism, consisting not only of the living, but also of ancestors and future generations, and only then, in the last place, the experience of a particular personality as an independent atomic unit.

In practice, the implementation of such nationalism in politics should mean the total churching of Russians and the transformation of all cultural institutions into a continuation of the One Church, not in organizational and administrative, but in spiritual, intellectual and ethical terms. Such churching should deprive culture and science of their profanity detachment from existential foundations, involve them in the process of spiritual economy, turn pragmatic and decentralized technical development into the implementation of the central providential covenant of the Church, into a subordinate instrument of the supermaterial plan. Only in this radical way can Russians be really returned to the bosom of the Church, which lies at the basis of their historical national existence and which in its main outlines has shaped what is called Russian in the highest sense. It is the total restoration of the Orthodox worldview with all the consequences that follow from it that is capable of returning the people to its spiritual source. Any relative revival of the Church as a narrow confessional, religious structure, any restoration limited to cults and external rituals will be ineffective. It is not individuals who are subject to churching within the framework of Russian nationalism, but the whole of Russian culture, science, thought taken together. Only in this way will the collective self-consciousness of the nation be given a spiritual vertical, which, in turn, will turn the problem of demographic growth into a kind of spiritual task based on Orthodox ethics, prohibiting, for example, contraception and abortion. Any relative revival of the Church as a narrow confessional, religious structure, any restoration limited to cults and external rituals will be ineffective. It is not individuals who are subject to churching within the framework of Russian nationalism, but the whole of Russian culture, science, thought taken together. Only in this way will the collective self-consciousness of the nation be given a spiritual vertical, which, in turn, will turn the problem of demographic growth into a kind of spiritual task based on Orthodox ethics, prohibiting, for example, contraception and abortion. Any relative revival of the Church as a narrow confessional, religious structure, any restoration limited to cults and external rituals will be ineffective. It is not individuals who are subject to churching within the framework of Russian nationalism, but the whole of Russian culture, science, thought taken together. Only in this way will the collective self-consciousness of the nation be given a spiritual vertical, which, in turn, will turn the problem of demographic growth into a kind of spiritual task based on Orthodox ethics, prohibiting, for example, contraception and abortion.

The next level is actually ethnic self-awareness, the idea of the people as a single body and a single soul. Moreover, the existence of this single organism should be understood as something super-temporal, not limited by either spatial or temporal categories. Russian nationalism should appeal not only to the present of the nation, but also to its past and its future, taken simultaneously, as

the totality of a single spiritual being. This "being" of the great Russian people in its supra-historical totality should be recognized by every Russian and recognized in himself. The fact of belonging to the Russian nation should be experienced as being chosen, as an incredible everyday luxury, as the highest anthropological dignity. The propaganda of this national exclusivity (without the slightest touch of xenophobia or chauvinism) should become the axis of the political education of the people. First of all, the demographic surge will be provided ideologically, culturally and ethically. The people should be indoctrinated with the idea that by giving birth to a Russian child, each family participates in the national mystery, replenishing the spiritual and mental wealth of the entire people. Children should be understood as a national asset, as a physical expression of the inner energy of a great people.

Taking into account the difficult demographic state of today, it is necessary to start national propaganda as soon as possible and use any political and ideological methods. At the same time, it is necessary to push nationalist tendencies to the limit, provoking a dramatic and rapid awakening of a great and powerful ethnos.

It should be noted that no economic measures by themselves will ever give a positive demographic result without appropriate religious, ethical and ideological support. The demographic decline can be stopped to zero, and then the reverse process can be provoked only with the help of an appropriate ideology, which would focus on changing the consciousness of the people, on transforming their thinking, on introducing hundreds and thousands of symbols into the everyday sphere, explicitly or implicitly orienting people to national interests. Within the framework of the Russian ethnos, Russian nationalism should be the only and total ideology that can have its own different versions and levels, but always remains constant in everything that concerns the setting of the category of "nation" over the category of "individuality." In the end,

This political orientation towards nationalism must also be supported by measures of a purely economic nature, since purely material instruments are also needed to achieve the national goal. Support will be provided to mothers, large families, and social conditions will be provided for a working man in a large family. But this economic component will have an effect only under the condition of the domination of the national ideology, which should not only economically support the demographic growth of Russians, but in general orient the economy in a purely national way, put the material interests of the ethnic group above the individual interests of the individual. In other words, economic support for fertility is a special case of a general trend in the economy, which should be derived from national interests as a whole.

At first glance, an appeal to nationalist ideology should have provoked ethnic conflicts, worsened interethnic relations between Russians and neighboring ethnic groups, and engendered many insoluble contradictions. This, indeed, would have happened if Russian nationalism extended its claims to statehood in the classical sense of the concept. Representatives of other ethnic groups and confessions would hardly want to live in a Russian nationalist Orthodox state. But to live next to the Russian Orthodox people,

professing a national ideology, within the framework of a single continental Empire, united geopolitically and strategically, but flexible and differentiated in the internal structure, on the contrary, does not present any difficulties for anyone, since there will always be a higher authority in front of which ethno-religious the communities have equal status and which is guided by the impartial principles of imperial harmony and justice. The project of the New Empire at the ethnic level consists precisely in the fact that not only the Russian people should triumph and establish a pronounced national-religious ideology, but this also applies to all other peoples that will become part of the Empire. Thus, a conglomerate of "positive nationalisms" with a common denominator of vertical imperial orientation will emerge.

It is important that only in this way the most radical Russian nationalism can be fully realized, since the main obstacles to its development in this case will be removed, none of the neighboring peoples will feel humiliated or oppressed by the Russian nation, since cultural and ethnic and the confessional boundaries between the peoples of the Empire will have no political significance. Russians will live in their national reality, Tatars in theirs, Chechens in theirs, Armenians in theirs, etc. even if we are talking about ethnic enclaves or national minorities among other people. Nationalism, free from the problem of statehood and borders, will only strengthen the mutual understanding of nations, giving them both freedom of contact with each other and freedom of ethnic isolation.

For the survival of the Russian people in the current difficult conditions, for the demographic rise of the Russian nation, to improve its hardest situation in ethnic, biological and spiritual senses, it is necessary to turn to the most radical forms of Russian nationalism, without which all technical or economic measures will remain powerless. But this nationalism will be possible only in organic unity with the principle of the geopolitical continental Empire.

5.3 Russian question after the coming Victory

Apparently, from a theoretical point of view, one should consider the position of the Russians in which they will find themselves after the possible victory of the Eurasian Empire over Atlanticism. Of course, this is such a distant prospect that it is almost pointless now to seriously analyze the problems that will arise in this case. However, it should be borne in mind that the collapse of Atlanticism can occur almost instantly at any stage of Eurasian empire building, since the geopolitical stability of the West is based solely on the correct and skillful handling of geopolitical categories, and by no means on real industrial, economic or military power. The Atlanticist structure is in fact extremely fragile, and one has only to knock out of it one of the strategic axes, for example, Central Europe, the Pacific area or the Eurasian continental South, how the entire gigantic edifice of Atlanticism, so powerful and stable at first glance, will collapse. At the moment when the geopolitical strategy of the Trilateral Commission is at least to some extent blocked by the alternative Eurasian project, one can expect a serious disruption in the functioning of the entire Atlanticist complex, and further events can unfold rapidly and precipitously, as was the case with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and its satellites. Therefore, although the victory over Atlanticism is an extremely distant prospect, several theses should be formulated regarding the position of Russians in a hypothetical post-Atlantist world. will be at least to some extent blocked by an alternative Eurasian project, one can expect a serious disruption in the functioning of the entire Atlanticist complex, and further events can unfold rapidly and landslide, as was the case with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and its satellites. Therefore, although the victory over Atlanticism is an extremely distant prospect, several theses should be formulated regarding the position of Russians in a hypothetical post-Atlantist world. will be at least to some extent blocked by an alternative Eurasian project, one can expect a serious disruption in the functioning of the entire Atlanticist complex, and further events can unfold rapidly and landslide, as was the case with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and its satellites. Therefore, although the victory over Atlanticism is an extremely distant prospect, several theses should be formulated regarding the position of Russians in a hypothetical post-Atlantist world.

First of all, it should be emphasized that the geopolitical defeat of the United States will pose many problems for the Eurasian Empire itself. At this moment, the main factor that underlies the project of geopolitical unification of nations and peoples into the New Empire will disappear, the principle of "common enemy" will disappear. This consolidating energy will lose its significance, and even the very meaning of the further existence of the Eurasian Empire will be questioned. In such a situation, a transition from a new bipolar order of the world Eurasia against the Atlantic to a multipolar model may begin. At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the multipolar model will become possible only after the victory over Atlanticism, and not earlier. As long as Atlantism exists as a force claiming universality, there can be no talk of any multipolar structure. Only within the framework of the New Empire, within the framework of a global Eurasian project and in the course of a strategic confrontation with Atlanticism, objective prerequisites for the emergence of a more or less balanced multipolarity can emerge and not before that. The embryos of multipolarity will be formed only with the implementation of that differentiated imperial model, which will affirm the status of a political subject for some organic, cultural and spiritual categories of people, ethnos, religion, nation in spite of the currently existing dominant system, where it is only about the legal status of states and individuals ("human rights"). The "clash of civilizations" (in the words of Huntington) in a multipolar world will be a reality only if if these civilizations can establish themselves and win their right to exist in the context of an anti-Atlantic strategic alliance. At the present time there is only one "civilization" Atlanticist, Western, liberal-market, opposed to all other historical organic cultural models.

The collapse of Atlanticism will put the peoples of the New Empire, its individual sectors in front of a serious problem: whether to continue to maintain geopolitical unity or to consolidate large civilizational blocs within the Empire as an independent geopolitical reality? But in any case, the national differences of peoples and confessions will come to the fore.

In this case, the best option would be to preserve the imperial structure as the most harmonious system for resolving all internal contradictions. By analogy with the once existing doctrine of Jus Publicum Europeum, i.e. "Civil European Law" common to all peoples of Europe, the Eurasian Empire in the post-Atlantic era could be based on a similar, but expanded doctrine of Jus Publicum Euroasiaticum. Having lost its military-strategic importance, the imperial continental complex could act as the highest legal authority, which would remove the tension between the Eurasian nations, whose ties will inevitably weaken after the victory over the "common enemy". This would be ideal.

But one can also assume the disintegration of continental unity and the formation in the Eurasian spaces of several civilizational blocks of the Russian-Slavic (broader Orthodox), European, Far Eastern, Central Asian, Islamic, etc. The relationship of each of them with the others, and even their boundaries and structures, now, naturally, cannot be foreseen. However, in such a hypothetical perspective, the project of the structure of the Russian nation should already include a model that takes into account in the distant future (and only after the end of Atlanticism) the independent participation of Russians in world history, which returned to its organic and natural course after a long period of the Atlanticist anomaly. In this case, the Russian nation must be ready for the creation of its own statehood, or

to the formation of a wider natural ethno-state formation, sealed by the unity of tradition, culture, religion, fate. The question of the Russian state may arise in full, but this applies exclusively to the post-Eurasian period, which itself is problematic and hypothetical.

But already at the present moment, the Russians should throw all their strength into national consolidation, the spiritual, cultural and religious revival of the people, on its final formation and full-fledged awakening so that in the future (if necessary) it can defend its national Truth not only from enemies, but also from allies in imperialism, with their own historically predetermined national outlook. Russians not only have to preserve their identity in the imperial context, they have to assert it, inflame it and deepen it to the limit. And in the long run, after the collapse of Atlanticism, Russians need to be ready to defend their own civilizational mission, to defend their universal providential national path.

Be that as it may, the Russians will in any case find themselves in a strategically central place in the Eurasian imperial space, and therefore, in terms of the civilizational priorities of the Empire in the post-Atlantist period (if the Empire nevertheless survives), they will find themselves in a privileged position. Consequently, to some extent, this entire Empire will be associated with the Russian Idea, which, indeed, is eschatological and universal by definition, merged with gigantic spaces and cosmic feeling. If the continental bloc begins to disintegrate into its components, the Russians, who have recovered their strength thanks to the nationalist period and the vigorous process of imperialism, will again find themselves in a geopolitically advantageous position, occupying a central position among the liberated peoples and states of the continent, which will make a possible Russian State.

Both of these possibilities should be considered today.

6.1 Priority of nuclear and intercontinental capabilities

In the military-strategic sense, the New Empire can be really created only if the nuclear power of the former USSR, as well as all types of strategic and space weapons, remains in the hands of the Eurasian bloc. This is the main condition not only for the viability of the upcoming continental entity, but also for its very creation, since the integration of states and "large spaces" around Russia, the establishment of the main axes of Eurasia are realized only if Moscow has a strategic potential, which will be the main guarantor of the seriousness of the entire project. ... It is the preservation of the strategic balance between Atlanticism (NATO) and Russia (the military-strategic heir to the USSR and the pole of the new Eurasian bloc) that makes the political plans of the New Empire serious and practically achievable.

At the moment, the strategic potential of the former USSR still retains its proportional comparability with NATO in the field of nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines, some military space programs, and strategic aviation. As soon as this balance is unequivocally shifted in favor of the Atlantists, the Eurasian Empire will become impossible, Russia will finally turn into a simple "regional power" and, consequently, will sharply reduce its territory and scale of influence. After that, no geopolitical axes and political projects can change anything. Only at this stage, while the balance of power of the Cold War in the strategic sphere has not yet changed irreversibly, the geopolitics and policy of Russia really have decisive importance and continental weight. Actually, the possibility of free and independent geopolitical design directly depends on the preservation of the strategic comparability of Russian and Atlanticist potentials. As soon as this proportion is sharply violated, Russia will turn from a subject of geopolitics into its object. In this case, the Russians will only have to maneuver in a situation imposed from the outside, choosing roles and priorities in an essentially “not their” game.

This state of affairs makes the Eurasian project directly related to the quality and potential of the Russian (former Soviet) army. And automatically from this it is possible to conclude that the army in such conditions should in no case depend on the momentary political situation in Moscow. On the contrary, the very quality of the army (naturally, first of all, in the matter of strategic weapons) is the basis of all Russian policy, its axis, and therefore, the structure of the army should predetermine the general contours of this policy, assert purely political guidelines. As long as the strategic balance is maintained to some extent, the army will remain the most important factor in Russian politics, since the country's political status, its weight, its capabilities and its future in such a situation directly depend on the Armed Forces.

At the moment, under the pressure of Atlanticism, a very dangerous process of reorientation of the entire military doctrine from the continental-Soviet structure to the regional-local one is taking place in the Russian army. This means that not the United States and NATO countries, but the countries bordering on Russia, as well as the internal regions of the Russian Federation, which may turn to separatism, are no longer considered as Russia's "potential adversary". This turn of the new military doctrine is actually completely opposite to the only reasonable, from a geopolitical point of view, the position of the Armed Forces, since the "potential

the real opponents "in this case are precisely those countries that should logically have become natural" allies "of the Russians. In other words," potential allies "are viewed as" potential adversaries ", while the main geopolitical" potential adversary "of Russia is the Atlantic bloc is generally discounted.

The military issue is directly dependent on the geopolitical choice. If Russia thinks of its future as an Empire, as an integrator and pole of a new continental bloc, its Armed Forces must, with the need to prioritize, focus on nuclear and strategic weapons to the detriment of more local forms of weapons. The main military operations in the imperial plan will develop in the perspective of the "war of the continents", and therefore, intercontinental missiles (primarily with nuclear warheads), strategic aviation, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, as well as all forms of space military programs acquire a special role. developed as an alternative to SDI. The priority of just such types of weapons would be the best way to promote continental integration and make an alliance with Russia attractive and fundamental for the rest of the Eurasian blocs and countries. It is these types of weapons that are directly related to the ability of Russia to play the geopolitical card at the continental level, and, consequently, on a more specific plan, to solve simultaneously economic problems on the basis of cooperation with the developed regions of Central Europe and Japan. It should not be forgotten that it was precisely the nuclear factor, presented by the United States as a "guarantor of the protection of the West and democracy from Soviet totalitarianism," that was the main driving force of the American economy in the post-war period, when the economic strengths, but the politically and militarily weak Western countries (and Japan) were forced to subsidize the American economy and industry in exchange for the strategic tutelage of Pax Americana. In a sense, Russia already at the moment can offer something similar to both Europe and Japan, with the addition that it is in Russia's interests to promote the political maturation of these two "potential Empires", and not to weaken and tightly control them, as is the case in the case of American, Atlantic domination. Even at a purely pragmatic level, overcoming the economic crisis in Russia is only possible with the active geopolitical use of the strategic factor and appropriate types of weapons. To get "more good goods", it is easier not to repurpose the military-industrial complex for the manufacture of pots, but to continue and intensify the manufacture of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. With appropriate political support, several submarines can bring whole countries with developed industries to Russia, and in a purely peaceful way, while by rebuilding military factories for the production of washing machines, Russia will cause irreparable economic damage to itself.

The redeployment of the army as a whole in a "regional" manner means the development of all non-strategic, conventional types of weapons. If such a military reform is carried out reasonably and consistently (which is hard to believe in our conditions), then the Russians will get an effective mobile army, ready for combat in continental conditions and capable of successfully and smoothly resolving military conflicts on the scale of Afghanistan, Tajikistan or Chechnya. The ineffectiveness of Soviet troops in local conflicts, which could be observed in the Afghan war and in the perestroika conflicts, was the result of the strategic priority in the construction of the USSR Armed Forces, which was focused on a global nuclear conflict, and not on local wars of low and medium intensity. This is natural. Restructuring in the army with the priority of "regional orientation", i. E.

will inevitably lead to the destruction of strategic weapons, since not a single army today, even in the richest and most economically developed country, for example, the United States is able to effectively conduct its construction in two directions at once, strategic and regional. (The incapacity of the Americans in local conflicts has been demonstrated more than once, starting with Vietnam and ending with Yugoslavia and Somalia.) Therefore, at first glance, the "positive" transformation of the army, supposedly in keeping with the spirit of the times, in the long run means the end of the strategic security of the Russians, the loss of some or serious guarantees of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and the complete impossibility of somehow improving its geopolitical state in the future.

Russian national interests today lie in preserving their strategic potential at the intercontinental level at any cost, i.e. to remain a "superpower", albeit in a truncated, reduced version. To ensure this condition, everyone can be sacrificed to make any political, geopolitical, economic and territorial compromises. While maintaining strategic potential, any concession today will be renegotiated in favor of the Russians tomorrow. As long as everything remains the same, all the political steps of the Russian leadership in favor of the West remain theoretically reversible.

The fate of the Russians and their grandiose future today lies not in how many Russians have ended up outside the Russian Federation, and not in our political or economic situation at the moment, but in whether we will have a sufficient level of weapons in order to to defend its independence militarily from the only and natural "potential enemy" of Russia from the United States and the North Atlantic bloc. All other questions follow from here. This is also the basis for an unambiguous determination of whether the implementation of the global Eurasian imperial project is still possible or not.

6.2 What kind of armed forces does the great Russia need?

The hierarchy of the development of the military complex in the perspective of the creation of the Eurasian Empire clearly follows from the main geopolitical provisions:

1) Priority is given to space weapons, which have such a potential scale of territorial impact that the traditional forms of ensuring the military security of a state or a bloc of states retreat before them, completely losing their effectiveness and importance. The development of the Russian version of SDI is of central importance here. Also extremely important are the development of "atmospheric" weapons and experiments with unorthodox types of weapons associated with the impact on the human mental component. This costly and knowledge-intensive sphere of weapons, practically inapplicable in this case in local conflicts, in fact, is the most important axis of the true security of the state and the nation. Without these studies and the corresponding results, the people are practically unprotected in the face of "

2) Next comes nuclear weapons on air carriers, missile potential and strategic aviation. This intercontinental weapons sphere, aimed at a potential conflict with the Atlanticist pole, poses a constant threat to those regions that are reliably protected by sea borders from all others.

forms military invasion. Not by chance, exactly development Soviet rocket science caused such a panic at one time in the United States, and it was the successes in this area that allowed the USSR and the Warsaw Pact to survive for so long after World War II, despite the extremely unfavorable geopolitical situation with land borders. Only
intercontinental types of weapons made the USSR, in some approximation, a "continent", which gave certain grounds for strategic parity with the real continent of the United States.

3) The next level of importance should be considered the Navy. This type of weapon, like intercontinental missiles and strategic aviation, is designed to carry out global military missions in a collision with the "potential adversary" N1 of the United States. At the same time, in the prospect of creating a continental block, the Russian Navy should become the starting point for creating a gigantic system of strategic ports both in the South and in the West (which Russia and the USSR were traditionally deprived of). Aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are paramount in this. The navy should be structurally oriented towards the conduct of combat operations in sea conditions and in coastal zones, i.e. in the space as far as possible from the land base. This should become a priority form of warfare in a potential military conflict, since the main imperative of a successful strategy is, as you know, in the conduct of hostilities either on the territory of a potential enemy, or on neutral territory. At the same time, it is necessary to foresee in advance the geopolitical and strategic specifics of adapting the existing model of the Navy to the conditions of the southern seas and oceans, as well as to the western Atlantic. The Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet will sooner or later lose their importance for Russia as an Empire, since they are important strategic points only for a "regional power", the formation of which in itself is tantamount to strategic suicide for Russia. and also to the western Atlantic. The Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet will sooner or later lose their importance for Russia as an Empire, since they are important strategic points only for a "regional power", the formation of which in itself is tantamount to strategic suicide for Russia. and also to the western Atlantic. The Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet will sooner or later lose their importance for Russia as an Empire, since they are important strategic points only for a "regional power", the formation of which in itself is tantamount to strategic suicide for Russia.

Therefore, control over the Indian Ocean and Atlantic is much more important for the continental block than secondary ports, easily closed by straits or a narrow isthmus between the Baltic and the North Sea. The navy as a whole should be guided, rather, by the Far Eastern and North Sea models, the analogues of which Russia should be ready to reproduce when the time comes, in India, Iran and Western Europe, since these territories are the true geopolitical borders of the imperial (and not regional!) Russia.

4) The ground forces are of the least importance in the imperial perspective and are called upon to play the role of "internal troops" rather than a really important strategic size. In a real intercontinental conflict, ground forces should perform only an auxiliary function, and this determines their place in the hierarchy of military development. The only exceptions in this matter are the airborne troops and special forces, which, due to their mobility and lack of connection with land continental bases, can take an active part in serious

intercontinental operations. Accordingly, the Airborne Forces should be given priority over other land sectors of the army.

Such a structure of the Armed Forces of Russia and the future New Empire, in general terms, reproduces the purely Soviet model of the army in the post-war period. The latter was the result of a natural geopolitical process, which was most clearly understood precisely

the army leadership, which gave an adequate answer to the very geopolitical logic of history, while political and ideological clichés did not allow the party leaders of the USSR to act in accordance with the only logic of the state and strategic development of the Soviet State that naturally suggested itself. The prospect of geopolitical and strategic expansion is inscribed in the very fundamental structure of Russia's geographical position, and it was the army that understood this more fully and clearly than others. Therefore, the USSR Armed Forces, in a general sense, were moving in a completely correct direction both in defining a "potential enemy", and in choosing the priorities for the development of certain types of weapons, and in equipping the army with the latest technologies. In this case, however,

The actual restructuring of the army, proceeding from the concept of "Russia is a regional power", in fact reverses the hierarchy that should exist in the New Empire and that existed in general terms in the USSR Armed Forces.

In the "regional" army of the Russian Federation, priority is given to the ground forces, although the Airborne Forces are also somewhat isolated from the rest of the combat arms.

This is followed by the Navy, and the conversion and reduction are carried out, first of all, at the expense of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, and around the Black Sea Fleet, which is practically devoid of strategic importance, a scandal arises between Moscow and Kiev, which does not have any outcome at all, since the original terms and the goals are fundamentally wrong.

Even less attention is paid to aviation and rocketry, and strategic aviation and intercontinental missiles are being destroyed altogether. In parallel, the renunciation of nuclear weapons is being implemented.

Programs for the deployment of space weapons, which are completely redundant in regional conflicts, are frozen and curtailed, since in a narrow
In the "regional" perspective, they represent only a gigantic senseless item of and state budget expenditures that has no justification.

Comparing the two models of army building priorities, we see that the o are two nor opposites.

One army (the first continental option) is intended to defend the continental bloc, Eurasia, and Russia in its true geopolitical scope from the "potential adversary," which the United States and the Atlanticist bloc have been and remain. Such an army is focused on ensuring the true interests of the Russians and is the guarantor of national independence and freedom. In addition, such an army makes it possible to effectively implement a global Eurasian project, which alone is capable of making Russia's geopolitical position in the world stable and secure, as well as solving major economic problems.

The second army (of the "regional" type) is needed by Russia, understood only as the Russian Federation and interested only in solving local and internal political problems. Such

the army cannot be a true guarantor of national security. Its initial orientation towards a potential conflict with neighboring countries and peoples makes the Russians constantly await a blow from the "hostile neighbor" ("former brotherly people"). Its structure deprives Russians of the opportunity to enter into adequate geopolitical relations with Central Europe and Japan, since it will clearly not be enough to protect these geopolitical formations from potential US aggression in the future. Moreover, such a structure forces the Russians to classify all three participants in the future geopolitical axes of Eurasia, Berlin, Tehran, and Tokyo as "potential adversaries," and, accordingly, provokes the same attitude of these countries towards Russia. And it doesn't matter at all that the army's restructuring will be accompanied by pacifist assurances. In geopolitics, and it stands above purely political considerations when making the most responsible decisions, the nature of the weapons of a country speaks much more expressively than the official and unofficial statements of diplomats and political leaders.

7.1 Technological deficit

One of the reasons for the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War is its serious technological lag in comparison with the countries of the opposite geopolitical camp. The fact is that the technological leap of the Atlanticists was ensured by an effective distribution of roles among the NATO member countries. On the one hand, the United States concentrated in itself a purely military, strategic pole, leaving other capitalist countries to develop their trade, financial and technological aspects, not caring about direct investments of "new high technologies" in the military-industrial complex. The United States often only used ready-made high technologies in relation to its military-industrial complex, and they were created and developed in Europe, Japan and other countries. Countries under the US "tutelage" paid the patron "technological tribute" for geopolitical protection. The USSR, for its part, radically centralized all technological developments almost exclusively within the framework of its military-industrial complex, which made research and newest projects a more complicated matter; they were, as it were, initially prepared in a centralized administrative body and focused on planned goals, and this sharply narrowed the sphere of technological innovation. In other words, the same centralized structure was charged with two tasks at once, a huge effort to create a planetary military strategic complex and the technological support of this complex along with the development of science-intensive industries in parallel spheres. The whole area of high technologies, information programs, computers, etc. was strictly associated with the military-industrial complex, and this deprived it of the sometimes necessary flexibility and independence.

The technological lag of the USSR was inevitable. And today, Russians are fully experiencing the consequences of the failure of the USSR in this area, since the dependence of Russian industry and economy on Western patents, know-how, etc. is getting worse every day. Meanwhile, a certain level of technological development is absolutely necessary for any state striving to have weight in international politics and have an effective, competitive internal economic structure. If we talk about the imperial perspective of the Russian nation, then a high technological level is all the more necessary to ensure all the strategic and geopolitical factors on which any

geopolitical and economic expansion. So, the question is posed: moving in which direction, the Russians could catch up and overcome the technological lag inherited from the USSR, despite the fact that at present it is not decreasing, but on the contrary increasing (brain drain, reduction of state funding for scientific activities, conversion, decline and restructuring in the military-industrial complex, etc.)?

There are three hypothetical possibilities. The first is that Russia renounces all its geopolitical claims to independence, completely surrenders to Atlanticism, and as a "reward" for obedience, it receives from the hands of the Americans access to some "high technologies" that are somewhat outdated and not strategic. secrets. This path has actually been tested on the example of some Third World countries, which thus

indeed were able to make an economic, financial and industrial leap (the so-called "Asian" or "Pacific tiger"). In the case of Russia, the United States will be much more cautious than in relation to the countries of Europe or the Third World, since the geopolitical and historical scale of Russia is so great that economic prosperity and technological breakthrough may at some point again make it a powerful "potential enemy" USA. It is natural to expect that Russians' access to "high technologies", even under conditions of complete surrender and total dismantling of the strategic aspects of the military-industrial complex, will be hampered and sabotaged in every possible way. This path seems to be a dead end.

The second path, typical of supporters of "small nationalism", is to make a technological leap with the utmost effort of internal resources without the help of outside forces. This presupposes the extreme, almost totalitarian, mobilization of the entire people and a sharp deterioration in relations with the West. If at the same time everything is limited to the volume of the Russian Federation and Russia, understood as a "regional power", then such attempts are doomed to failure, since the same problems will arise as in the case of the USSR, the Russians will have to simultaneously defend themselves from the superpower as a "potential adversary. "and develop such subtle areas as high-tech research ourselves. Since the stable and strictly organized USSR did not cope with this, the crisis, destabilized RF will not cope with this, even more so. Moreover, in this case it will be necessary to introduce elements of "totalitarianism", which will inevitably cause a deep internal protest. Hence, this path should also be discarded.

The last option is that high technologies are borrowed from developed European and Asian countries (but not from the United States) in exchange for a strategic alliance and access to Russian resources. There is every chance of success here, and this path will keep the Russians a certain independence from the United States and at the same time will avoid overstrain of the nation, dictatorship and tough measures. Although such a process will immediately arouse rage on the part of the United States, threats to Russia and, most importantly, to its "unfaithful vassals", some countries may go for it if the strategic power of Russia is still comparable to that of the American, and Russian ideology is not overtly imperialist or communist). In addition, high technologies in this case will be exchanged for the most important component of resources for Germany, Japan and other developed countries, access to which is tightly controlled by the United States around the world. Russian resources, Central Asia, Siberia, etc. are vital for these countries, since the United States as a whole is quite independent in this matter. Minerals, raw materials, energy sources, plus powerful strategic military protection, this combination may well persuade some developed countries to go to the closest cooperation in the field of high technologies and provide the Russians with the highest achievements in this area (along with installation and production organization). In the future, the national direction in these issues would also gradually be adjusted, but in any case, an initial impetus is needed here. because the United States as a whole is quite independent in this matter. Minerals, raw materials, energy sources, plus powerful strategic military protection, this combination may well persuade some developed countries to go to the closest cooperation in the field of high technologies and provide the Russians with the highest achievements in this area (along with installation and production organization). In the future, the national direction in these issues would also gradually be adjusted, but in any case, an initial impetus is needed here. because the United States as a whole is quite independent in this matter. Minerals, raw materials, energy sources, plus powerful strategic military protection, this combination may well persuade some developed countries to go to the closest cooperation in the field of high technologies and provide the Russians with the highest achievements in this area (along with installation and production organization). In the future, the national direction in these issues would also gradually be adjusted, but in any case, an initial impetus is needed here. energy sources plus powerful strategic military protection, this combination may well persuade some developed countries to go for the closest cooperation in the field of high technologies and provide the Russians with the highest achievements in this area (along with installation and production organization). In the future, the national direction in these issues would also gradually be adjusted, but in any case, an initial impetus is needed here. energy sources plus powerful strategic military protection, this combination may well persuade some developed countries to go for the closest cooperation in the field of high technologies and provide the Russians with the highest achievements in this area (along with installation and production organization). In the future, the national direction in these issues would also gradually be adjusted, but in any case, an initial impetus is needed here.

This third way is wholly and completely fits into the general Eurasian project, being its concretization at a more practical level. In fact, it means that the creation of the geopolitical axis Berlin Moscow Tokyo is not just a political and geographical plan, but also the best solution to the problem of the technological lag of the Russians.

7.2 Russian resources

Russia is a natural supplier of resources to other countries. This state of affairs has a rather long history and has become, in many respects, the determining factor in the geopolitical status of Russia. Let us consider in more detail the geopolitical significance of the export of resources and the role of resource provision in general.

There is some inequality in the global distribution of resources on the planet.Two zones of the four developed sectors of the North have access to resources and are capable of providing resource autarky, if necessary (USA and Russia), and two are experiencing an acute resource deficit (Europe and Japan). Thus, to a large extent, control over the two resource-poor zones is determined by the relationship with the other two. At the same time, there is another feature of the United States seeks to control the resources of colonial or semi-colonial territories and, with their help, influence developed countries. The United States is trying to save its own resources for themselves and spend them extremely carefully, although, if necessary, it will not be a big problem for the United States to create a resource autarky for itself without a colonial strategy in this area. Russia, on the other hand, traditionally manipulates the export of its own resources. This difference in the position of the two powers has, on both sides, both pluses and minuses. The United States constantly has an inviolable strategic reserve, but at the same time, the colonial resource bases always theoretically have a chance to get out of control. Russia, for its part, can be confident in resource provision, since the resources are located on its territory, but at the same time, exporting them, it always spends its own strategic reserves.

This objective state of affairs in the prospect of creating a continental bloc can be used for the benefit of the Russians in the following way. At the initial stage, Russia can offer its resources to potential partners in the East and West as compensation for the aggravation of relations with the United States, which will inevitably occur already at the first stages of the implementation of the Eurasian project. This will be possible also because a direct land connection can be established with Europe and Japan, independent of the maritime and coastal control, which is the main trump card in the geopolitical strategy of Atlanticism. Naturally, such exports will not be unilateral assistance, since this process should be included in the general geopolitical plan, which presupposes active financial and technological participation of Europe and Japan in the strategic development of Russia itself,

In the future, however, one should focus on ousting the United States from Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific region with a corresponding redistribution of resource-rich territories in favor of the Eurasian partners and Russia itself. This plan is the direct opposite of the "anaconda plan" on the part of the Atlanticists, which provides for strict US control over the South Eurasian, African and Pacific areas in order to prevent the organization of autarkian economic zones for its geopolitical competitors. When the "anaconda" of Atlanticism can be driven back to the American continent, the entire "poor South" of Eurasia will become a natural complement to the more developed Eurasian North. Arabian oil, African minerals and resources of the Pacific will be able to flow directly to the countries of the Eurasian bloc, bypassing the United States. In this case, Russia will not only be able to start accumulating resources for itself, but will also receive new areas in the southern direction. Eurasian Europe will move South to become Euro-Africa, and Japan will establish that "new order" in the Pacific Ocean,

which she planned to implement in the 30s. Russia itself, using the technological experience that it either already has or will acquire during the period of supplying resources to its technologically advanced partners in the block (at the first stage of continental construction), will be able to take an active part in the development of new fields in Central and East Asia and gradually will freeze those deposits that are vital to ensure its own strategic future.

In terms of resources, the plan for the creation of an "anti-Trilater la" (Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo bloc), both in the near and distant prospects, seems to be highly realistic, since the transition period for the Western and Eastern axes (for Berlin and Tokyo), which will experience the most severe pressure from the United States will be softened by the resource potential of Russia, which is capable of creating all the conditions necessary for a full-fledged political and strategic revival of Europe and Japan with its exports of minerals during the transition period. And after that, these "large spaces" themselves will be able to intensify their economic and political expansion in the direction of the North-South. It is especially important that during this transitional period Russia will be able, in turn, to obtain effective technological equipment for field development and to test moving along the easiest way, developed methodology and technical models delivered from the European West and the Japanese Far East. And this factor in the long term will significantly strengthen the strategic autarchy of the Russians, regardless of how events unfold in the future.

Naturally, at the moment the problem of Russian resources is being solved in any way, just not in the way that would be beneficial to Russia. Russians today sell resources at dumping prices, for fictitious money, and foreign goods, either directly to the United States or through their intermediary (American monopoly companies or TNCs implicitly controlled by Atlantists) to the countries of Western Europe. As an alternative, the "nationalists" put forward a generally unrealistic demand to completely stop the export of resources and completely leave for Russia both their development and their consumption. The latter project will require such an exertion of all national forces that it can be realized only under the conditions of a political dictatorship, which is almost unbelievable in the present situation. Here the situation is the same as in the case of high technologies. Only the "third way"

And again, everything rests on the political need for the early creation of a continental Eurasian bloc.

Chapter 8. Economic aspects of the "New Empire"

8.1 Economics of the "third way"

Industrial restructuring in Russia is ripe. There is a significant grain of truth in what the "reformers" say about the inevitability of economic transformations in Russia. The Soviet system, although it was to a certain extent effective and competitive, gradually became so rigid and rigid that it simply could not fail to collapse, and, unfortunately, many effective and positive aspects of socialism as such were buried under its rubble.

The logic of economic transformations in Russia, which began during perestroika, was based on a dualistic approach to economics. On the one hand, there was the existing model of rigid centralist state socialism, "total dirigism", when the state intervened in the slightest nuances of production and distribution, suppressing any private initiatives and excluding all market elements. Such structural rigidity not only made the entire economic system cumbersome and unwieldy (hence the gradual loss in competition with capitalism), but also perverted the basic principle of socialism, which presupposes the effective participation of society in economic process. In economic and philosophical manuscripts, a Marx is warning about such a degeneration of the socialist system can be which can described as "alienation under socialism."

The criticism of such a centralized economy, however, very quickly went to the opposite extreme, i.e. to the absolute apologetics of the liberal capitalist system with its "laws of the market", "invisible hand", "free trade", etc. Liberal reformers (albeit only in theory) decided to move from super-centralization to super-liberalism. If Soviet socialism at its later stages weakened state autarky in its competition with the opposing geopolitical bloc, then market reforms entailed the real destruction of this autarky, which can only be qualified as a "betrayal of national interests." Reforms were necessary, but the dualistic logic of either Soviet socialism or capitalist liberalism put the question on a completely wrong plane from the very beginning, since the dispute acquired a purely theoretical character, and considerations of Russia's geopolitical autarchy were pushed into the background. The proposed liberal reforms in the style of the Chicago Boys programs and von Hayek's theories dealt a devastating blow to the economy. However, the restorationist economic programs, on which the "conservative" opposition insisted to one degree or another, were not much better. In both cases, it was about a polemic between two utopian abstract models, in which the issue of "Russian national interests" was somewhere on the second or even third plane. and von Hayek's theories dealt a devastating blow to the economy. However, the restorationist economic programs, on which the "conservative" opposition insisted to one degree or another, were not much better. In both cases, it was a question of a polemic between two utopian abstract models, in which the issue of "Russian national interests" was somewhere on the second or even third plane. and von Hayek's theories dealt a devastating blow to the economy. However, the restorationist economic programs, on which the "conservative" opposition insisted to one degree or another, were not much better. In both cases, it was about a polemic between two utopian abstract models, in which the issue of "Russian national interests" was somewhere on the second or even third plane.

This was quite logical, since, due to the specifics of their education, Soviet economists were accustomed to dealing with only two economic models, dogmatic Soviet socialism (which they defended for the time being) and liberal capitalism (which they criticized for the time being). Both of these models, in the form in which they were studied and developed, have never been correlated with such a criterion as the "geopolitical interests of the country", since this topic (albeit in a different form) was a priority of the army and ideological structures (especially the GRU and the KGB) ... Shifting the main focus to the economy, the leaders of perestroika

put the question of "national and state security and power" outside the brackets. And as soon as this happened, the country fell into the trap of an incorrectly formulated problem, any solution to which in the given terms was obviously a dead end.

Strictly speaking, the people had to choose not between liberal capitalism and Soviet socialism, but between liberal capitalism, Soviet socialism and a special economic doctrine combining market elements and planning elements, submitting to the main imperative of national prosperity and state security (the "third way"). This "third way" in economics is by no means a compromise, not a syncretic combination of dissimilar elements of two other economic models, but a complete and independent doctrine with a long history and many examples of its implementation in practice. However, this "third way" was practically not mentioned in the framework of public disputes at all. The result of a stubborn refusal to seriously consider such an option is obvious: a ruined and weakened country, a collapsed economy, the growing parasitic dependence of Russia on the Navy and the International Bank, the disintegration of economic and industrial ties, etc. At the moment, there is neither socialism, nor the market, and it is unlikely that something can be corrected, remaining within the framework of the logic that has become dominant in solving the most important economic issues.

The "third way" in the economy is not identical to either the Swedish or the Swiss model, contrary to what some politicians think, who are beginning to realize that the situation is deadlocked. Neither Sweden nor Switzerland are full-fledged geopolitical entities and do not have serious strategic sovereignty, and, consequently, a huge part of the state,
the industrial and military sectors necessary to ensure real autarchy are generally absent in these states. A certain compromise between the socially oriented structure of society and the market economy has indeed been reached in these countries, but here we are talking about a purely artificial model, which was able to emerge precisely due to the complete depoliticization of these countries and a deliberate rejection of an active role in the geopolitical alignment of forces in Europe. Russia will never be able to become "the second Sweden" or "the second Switzerland" in terms of its scale, since its very geopolitical position requires an active role; neutrality in this case is simply impossible. Therefore, it makes no sense to refer to such examples.

The second illusion characteristic of those who intuitively seek models of the "third way" for Russia is China and its reforms. However, even in this case, there is "optical illusion" explained by the lack of objective information about the essence and course of the Chinese reforms. Chinese economic transformations only superficially resemble the "third way" model. In fact, we are talking about the transformation of a society that is generally similar to the Soviet one into a purely liberal system, but without democratic reforms in politics, i.e. while maintaining totalitarian control of the ruling elite over the political situation. The point is that the political totalitarianism of the communist nomenclature smoothly turns into economic, monopoly totalitarianism of the same nomenclature, which at the same time seeks from the very beginning to cut off any possibility of economic competition from below. One model of the "alienation society" smoothly turns into another model of the "alienation society", and political exploitation imperceptibly turns into the economic exploitation of one and the same social group.

It is significant that this type of reform was developed precisely by the "Trilateral Commission", whose representatives have already agreed with the Chinese nomenclature on

the inclusion of China in the future in the mondialist zone of influence with the granting of it the status of a "regional power". To a large extent, this move of the Atlantists was conditioned by the Cold War strategy against the USSR, but at the same time by the desire to support Japan's traditional rival in the Far East and limit the economic expansion of the latter.

The true "third way" in economics found its classic embodiment in the works of Friedrich List, who formulated the principles of "economic autarchy of large spaces." This theory proceeds from the fact that the economic development of capitalist societies is uneven and from the logical consequence of economic colonization by the "richer" countries of the poorer ones; moreover, for the "rich" in such conditions "free trade" is beneficial, and for the "poor" on the contrary. From this, List concluded that at certain stages of the economic development of society, it is necessary to resort to protectionism, dirigism and customs restrictions, i.e. to limit the principle of "freedom of trade" at the international level, in order to achieve the level of national and state independence and strategic power. In other words, it was obvious to List that the economy should be subordinated to national interests, and that any appeal to the "autonomous logic of the market" is only a cover for the economic (and subsequently political) expansion of rich states to the detriment of the poorer, and the subsequent enslavement of the latter. This approach immediately sets clear boundaries in which the "market" principle should operate, and in which the "socialist" one. It is interesting that Rathenau, the author of the German "economic miracle," and Witte, Lenin, and even Keynes formulated their economic principles on the basis of the doctrine of Friedrich Liszt, although they used a language that was closer to or purely capitalist. or communist vocabulary. that the economy should be subordinated to national interests, and that any appeal to the "autonomous logic of the market" is only a cover for the economic (and subsequently political) expansion of rich states to the detriment of the poorer, and the subsequent enslavement of the latter. This approach immediately sets clear boundaries in which the "market" principle should operate, and in which the "socialist" one. It is interesting that Rathenau, the author of the German "economic miracle," and Witte, Lenin, and even Keynes formulated their economic principles on the basis of the doctrine of Friedrich Liszt, although they used a language that was closer to or purely capitalist. or communist vocabulary. that the economy should be subordinated to national interests, and that any appeal to the "autonomous logic of the market" is only a cover for the economic (and subsequently political) expansion of rich states to the detriment of the poorer, and the subsequent enslavement of the latter. This approach immediately sets clear boundaries in which the "market" principle should operate, and in which the "socialist" one. It is interesting that Rathenau, the author of the German "economic miracle," and Witte, Lenin, and even Keynes formulated their economic principles on the basis of the doctrine of Friedrich Liszt, although they used a language that was closer to or purely capitalist. or communist vocabulary. is only a cover for the economic (and subsequently political) expansion of the rich states to the detriment of the poorer, and the subsequent enslavement of the latter. This approach immediately sets clear boundaries in which the "market" principle should operate, and in which the "socialist" one. It is interesting that Rathenau, the author of the German "economic miracle," and Witte, Lenin, and even Keynes formulated their economic principles on the basis of the doctrine of Friedrich Liszt, although they used a language that was closer to or purely capitalist. or communist vocabulary. is only a cover for the economic (and subsequently political) expansion of the rich states to the detriment of the poorer, and the subsequent enslavement of the latter. This approach immediately

The economic hierarchy built by Liszt can be reduced to a simple formula: those aspects of economic life that are comparable in scale with the interests of a private person, an individual, should be governed by market principles and based on "private property". We are talking about housing, small production, small land holdings, etc. As the importance of this or that type of economic activity grows, the form of production should acquire the features of collective ownership, since in this case "private property" and the individual factor may come into conflict with collective interests; there must be a "cooperative" or "corporate" criterion. Finally, economic spheres directly related to the state and its strategic status should be controlled, subsidized and managed by state authorities, since we are talking about interests of a higher level than "private property" or "collective benefit". Thus, in such an economic structure, it is not the elite, not the market and not the collective that determine the economic, industrial and financial appearance of society; it is formed on the basis of the specific interests of a particular state in specific historical conditions, and accordingly, in this model, no dogma cannot exist in principle. as the geopolitical status of the state changes and due to historical and national conditions, the proportions between the volume of these three levels of the economic hierarchy can change significantly. For example, in times of peace and prosperity, the private sector can grow with the collective sector, and the state to decline. Conversely, in difficult periods of national history, when the independence of the entire people is under attack, the powers of the state sector are increased at the expense of some collective economic entities, and these, in turn, squeeze out private entrepreneurship.

It is very interesting that it was the Friedrich List model that was used by historically developed capitalist countries in times of crisis. Thus, even the United States, the radical defenders of the principle of "free trade", periodically resorted to protectionist measures and state subsidies to the industrial sector when periods of "economic depression" began. It was precisely such a period that was the stage of implementation of the New Deal, when the Americans almost literally reproduced the principles of List, although they submitted them in a relaxed version of Keynes, the author of the theory of "economic insulation", which, in general, is nothing but a new name for the theory of "economic autarky of large spaces ". By the way, List himself lived in the United States for a long time and observed the process of capitalist construction in the early phases. Based on these observations, he formulated the basic principles of his theory in relation to Germany. But, of course, the most ambitious results were given by the implementation of List's doctrine in National Socialist Germany, when his ideas were implemented totally and without any liberal or Marxist amendments.

The doctrine of economics "third way" has another important aspect of the ratio of financial and production factors. It is obvious that early capitalism and Soviet-type socialism placed the main emphasis on the development of production, assigning a secondary, subordinate role to the financial system. Developed capitalism, on the other hand, tends to domination of finance capital over production, which, in turn, becomes a secondary issue. The domination of the principle of "labor" sooner or later leads to political violence, the domination of "capital" to economic violence. In the first case, labor is autonomized and divorced from concrete values, in the second, money is autonomized, also losing its connection with value and turning into a credit-interest fiction. "The third way" insists on a cruel link between labor and value (for example, gold reserves and, more broadly, resources), assigning a subordinate, secondary, purely instrumental role to the sphere of consumption and circulation of goods. This combination of labor and value is dictated in this case by the same considerations for ensuring "national power" and state sovereignty as the entire structure of this economic doctrine. You can simplify this idea by the formula "neither luxury, nor poverty", "contentment with a reasonable minimum." This means a more flexible and free approach to work than under Soviet socialism, but more limited opportunities for personal enrichment than under capitalism. This model allows the nation to be independent in strategic areas from other states and economic systems,

It is this version of the "third way" economy that is the only alternative in today's Russia, which is opposed at the same time to rampant liberalism and restorationist projects of neo-communists who do not want to seriously correct outdated and proved ineffective dogmas. If it were not for the instantly emerging associations with the Hitler regime, one could call this project "socialism of the national type." The very fact of putting forward List's theory (developed, however, by such famous economists as Sismondi, Schumpeter, Dumont, etc.) in the context of the current economic situation in Russia would be a great achievement, since here you can find answers to the most pressing questions and put an end to the dead-end dualism of "reformers and anti-reformers" at once. Moreover, the positive aspects of both liberal transformations and structures still preserved from socialism could be perfectly involved in this economic project. But all this will have a positive effect only in the context of a conscious and theoretically worked out doctrinal corpus, and not as pragmatic moves made from case to case.

occasion. The economy of the "third way" should have its own unambiguous political expression, comparable to the "party of liberals" or "party of communists". Any inertial centrism, pragmatism and compromise will certainly be doomed to failure. Friedrich List and his ideas should become the same symbols as Adam Smith and Karl Marx. The "third way" needs such carriers of this ideological dogma, which would be comparable in terms of preparedness, conviction and
awareness with liberals and communists. The principles of "third way" economics are as strict and unambiguous as those of the other two ideologies. All the necessary secondary consequences and applications can be derived from them in a natural and organic way.

The economic tendency of the "third way", the principle of "autarchy of large spaces" presupposes the maximum volume of the national-state formation where this model is applied. List insisted on the impossibility of realizing these theories in states with insufficient demographic, resource, industrial and demographic scope, since autarky in this case would be a simple fiction. On this basis, he once put forward the imperative "Zollverein", "customs integration", which was designed to unite Germany, Prussia and Austria into a single industrial and financial bloc, since only in such a space could one speak of effective competition with the developed colonial powers of that time by England and France.

At the present stage, the standard of a sovereign state is the United States and the political and economic space that is part of the Monroe Doctrine, i.e. continental aggregate of the Americas controlled by the United States. It is obvious that today only its continental counterpart in Eurasia can fully compete with such a transatlantic "large space". Consequently, the economy of the "third way" already in its theory presupposes geopolitical integration, in which the subject is not the "state-nation", but a modern analogue of the Empire. Otherwise, the nation will either overstrain its forces (the cause of the collapse of the USSR), or become dependent on a more powerful and independent neighbor (Europe, Japan, etc.). This consideration shows that for all the logic and self-sufficiency of this theory, the success of its implementation directly depends on a more general geopolitical project, i.e. from the beginning of the creation of the New Empire. Only on such a scale and in such a volume will the "third way" in the economy give maximum results. In addition, the advancement of such an economic model will be the best theoretical denominator for all potential participants in the continental bloc, since even liberal authors (for example, Michelle Albert in the book Capitalism vs. Capitalism) emphasize the fundamental difference between the Rhine-Nippon model (which has many features of the "third way" economy) from the Anglo-Saxon. If Russia also takes this path, the Eurasian chain will be closed in the most natural way. In this case, it will be possible to nominate a new version of the Zollverein,

8.2 Economic regionalism

The Soviet economy was based on the principle of centralism. The highest authority for making all important, less important and completely unimportant decisions was in Moscow, from where regulations and directives came. Such centralism made the economy

clumsy, did not contribute to the development of regional initiatives, restrained the natural growth of the economic potential of the regions. In addition, the Soviet economy everywhere reproduced the standard model of the structure of production and financial relations, taking into account neither regional, nor ethnic, nor cultural characteristics of different regions or districts. Such a rigid system was one of the reasons for the backwardness and economic collapse of Sovietism.

The liberals who replaced the communists, despite their theoretical projects, essentially retained the old state of affairs, only from now on centralism was not planned, but market-based. But, as before, the main economic decisions are carried out centrally, and the main economic routes pass through Moscow, where the liberal government tightly controls the general course of reforms in the regions. One form of abstract reproduction of a given pattern everywhere has been replaced by another, but the principle of centralism in the economic structure remains the same. Incidentally, the failure of market reforms is largely due to precisely this inertial centralism, when Moscow government officials strive to tightly control the economic development of the regions.

A sober analysis of this state of affairs and a comparison of the Russian situation with the most developed economic systems (first of all, the Rhine-Nippon type) lead to the conclusion that it is necessary to radically move away from such an economic approach and turn to an economic model based on a purely regional, regional, local basis. The economic interconnection of all regions of the USSR with each other was an artificially created structure. This relationship, based more on planned-voluntaristic methods than on the principles of maximum efficiency, often held back the autonomous development of the regional economy. The absolute plan also played a role in this. With the breakdown of such a common network and the coming to power of the liberals, many sectors of industry were generally left to themselves and doomed to degradation and extinction, and all the emphasis was placed on the priority development of resource-extracting industries, the products of which could be immediately sold abroad. And Western goods received by the monopoly pseudo-market structures of the liberals of Moscow are again
were distributed centrally across regions. Thus, the regional economy suffered even more, and its dependence on the center, paradoxically, only increased with the departure of the communists.

The implementation of the plans of the "third way economy" should be based on completely different methods. Centralism here should be primarily strategic and political, but by no means economic, since the Empire can achieve the maximum economic effect only when all its components have economic autonomy and develop in the most free and natural way. Just as in the context of the entire continental project as a whole, each of its parts should strive to be as independent and self-sufficient at its level as possible, so within the framework of Russia, an extremely flexible regional economy should be created, built not taking into account the interests of the center or planning requirements. but on the most organic development of those economic potentials that most correspond to the given region.

Based on cultural, ethnic, religious, geographic, climatic, etc. conditions of a particular region, it is necessary to differentiate as much as possible not only the economic or industrial orientation, but also the economic structure itself. Up to the point that on the territory of the Empire there may be regions with a different economic order from the maximum market to almost communist. Those peoples who reject the banking system (Muslims) should design their financial models excluding interest financing of industry, while in other regions, on the contrary, banks can develop and prosper. The most important thing in this project is to reach such a level when each region or oblast will become self-sufficient in meeting the most urgent needs of residents, first of all, we are talking about housing, food, clothing and health. At the same time, one should first achieve regional autonomy in providing the most necessary things, and only then build projects to improve living standards, to improve technologies, and to develop technical and industrial development. Each region must have an elastic and flexible system of self-sufficiency, so that at any moment and under any circumstances and possible crises it has guarantees of a decent minimum for the entire population, regardless of interregional relations or the economic situation in the center.

The strategic global aspect of the economy should be considered in complete isolation from the regional structures working for the self-sufficiency of the population. The state of this population should in no way depend on the priority development in a given region of one or another strategic industry. In other words, the principle "there is always a necessary minimum of life and regardless of anything" must be observed, and the concentration of the region's efforts on one or another strategic global industry can only take place with control over the preservation of independent economic structures that do not in any way come into contact with this industry. In this case, the re-profiling of one or another type of production, abandonment of outdated or ineffective production, territorial relocation of enterprises or reorientation to imports that are profitable in all respects will in no way affect the general living standard of the region, which will be initially and fundamentally guaranteed.

In the competence of the center, only strategic production and planning will remain, which will be implemented not as an axis of the economy, but as an imposition of some kind of global superstructure on an already existing autonomous economic regional network, while both spheres should not influence each other in any way. Housing, social protection or food supply can in no way depend on the economic efficiency of an industrial or strategic enterprise located in a given area (as is the case now). It is necessary to achieve such economic independence of individual regions, even the smallest ones, that all the most pressing economic problems should be solved in isolation from the participation of the population in strategic production. This principle should become dominant in strategic planning,

Regionalism should also be projected onto the financial system, taking, for example, the experience of regional and land banks in Germany, where small financial structures, often limited to one or several villages, demonstrate a miracle of efficiency in the development of the economy, since in such a volume control over loans (which makes the fiscal service redundant), and the volume of loans, interest and repayment periods are determined based on specific organic communal conditions and represent not a quantitative, abstract mechanical, but a vital, ethical element of the economy.

education. In general, the regional financial system can have the most original form, adapting to the logic of the ethnocultural and geographical landscape. The most important thing is to avoid the centralization of capital, to disperse it as much as possible among the autonomous regional financial structures, to make it serve the economy, and not vice versa, to make the economy dependent on it.

It is even possible to introduce two parallel and non-overlapping financial systems, two "currencies": one intended for equipping the strategic imperial sphere, the other for regional needs. In the first case, there will be strict state planning based on specific principles.
financing and production, in another regional market and regional financial fund. State capital and regional capital. Private property should be an atomic component of the regional, regional capital, while state capital, in principle, should not have any common measure with private property. Only in this case will a strict line be drawn between the state, the public and the personal, and, consequently, the stability, flexibility of the internal structure and autarchy of the Empire will be maximized.

On the whole, the economy should be guided by the fundamental principle of ultimate strategic centralism plus extreme regional pluralism and "liberalism."

Chapter 9. Conclusion

The attempt made to sketch in the most general outline a continental project, to highlight the most global and axial moments of Eurasian geopolitics for Russia and the Russian people, of course, needs the most thorough development, which will require colossal work to clarify, argumentation, and illustrate various points and aspects of this topic. For us, however, it was extremely important to present the most approximate version of the only model of the geopolitical future of the Russian people, which, on the other side of the obviously dead-end paths, could bring it to the planetary and civilizational level, corresponding to its mission, its national, spiritual and religious claims. ... Much of this project may seem new, unusual, unusual, even shocking. But the need to touch upon all the most important aspects of the future of the nation made us neglect explanations, refutations of possible criticism, avoid long quotations, listing names and columns with numbers. All of this will be done as needed. In the meantime, it is most important to point out the general outlines of the "third way", the only path that can lead our great people and our great state out of the abyss of chaos and fall to the shining heights of the Russian Heavens.

PART V INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA

Chapter 1. Subject and method

1.1 Domestic geopolitics of Russia depends on its planetary function

A geopolitical analysis of Russia's internal geopolitical problems cannot be carried out without taking into account a more general, global picture of Russia's place in the geopolitical ensemble. Only by keeping in mind the planetary role and importance of Russia can one effectively and consistently disassemble and describe its internal geopolitical structure. Unlike the European school of "internal geopolitics" (Yves Lacoste, etc.), which tends to isolate local and regional problems from taking into account the disposition of forces on a planetary scale, in the case of Russia, one cannot abstract from its global significance, and therefore, all private, its internal problems are adequately formulated (not to mention their solution) only within the framework of a more general, integral geopolitical field.

Russia is not just one of the mainland countries. She is a category that belongs to the basic principles of all geopolitics. Russia heartland, "geographic axis of history", Land. Russia is Eurasia. This value does not depend on blocs, ideology, political orientation, and the specifics of the regime: continentality, its historical, geographical and geopolitical fate. In the case of Russia, the question cannot be raised about the choice between "Atlanticism" and "Eurasianism". It is a Eurasian force and cannot but be. Russia's refusal to fulfill its role in the ensemble of the planet is possible only in the event of its complete geographic destruction, since if the Russian state refuses to fulfill this mission while maintaining the Eurasian continental mass, sooner or later, a new political entity will inevitably arise in the same borders, which will assume the functions of the "geographical axis of history." As long as Russia exists, it remains the axis of the Eurasian vector on a planetary scale.

This character predetermines the angle of consideration of its internal geopolitical problems. These problems stand only in the following vein: how and on what natural (or artificial) geopolitical volume of Russia, if kah save maximum possible, internal geopolitical factors so that increase it by distributing everything in the best possible way to ensure the possibility of planetary geopolitical expansion?

This formulation of the problem in itself sets the conditions for the analysis, it is necessary to emphasize and priority research:

1) the possibilities of the centripetal tendencies of the regions;

2) the possibility of expanding the spatial influence of the center to the periphery and beyond.

This presupposes a clear identification of two basic criteria for the concepts of geopolitical center and geopolitical periphery. The relationship between them is the essence of the study of the internal geopolitics of Russia.

1.2 Internal geopolitics and military doctrine

The military-industrial complex plays a huge role in the geopolitical organization of Russian spaces, since in many (especially sparsely populated) territories, civilian settlements are tied to military camps and bases. The location of the most important industrial centers, also associated with the needs of the so-called. "Defense industry". The entire geopolitical configuration of Russia depends on the model of military doctrine.

This military doctrine, in turn, has two components. The political orientation of the leadership (which can change depending on domestic and foreign policy factors) and geopolitical constants that establish the framework within which variations in the political course are possible. This second component (the geopolitical position of Russia) unambiguously affirms the continental significance of the Russian Armed Forces, the orientation towards the fact that the main “potential enemy” of Russia is precisely the Atlanticist bloc. And this automatically entails a continental orientation of the entire military doctrine, an unconditional priority of strategic types of weapons, an orientation toward a global conflict of a planetary scale. At the same time, it does not matter at all what the political formation of the regime will be. Geopolitical confrontation will not necessarily be duplicated by ideological confrontation. It depends on the specific situation and can influence the verbal formulation of the political course, softening or, on the contrary, accentuating the geopolitical confrontation that persists under any circumstances. Without pretending to be the ultimate formula of military doctrine, geopolitics sets its framework, the violation of which immediately entails a total socio-political crisis and the territorial disintegration of the state.

Even in the case of a complete ideological understanding with Atlanticism, Russia's military doctrine should still identify the United States and the Western camp as a potential enemy number 1, and build the entire structure of the Armed Forces only on the basis of this principle. And this, in turn, will affect the overall structure of Russia's internal geopolitics in a broader sense.

The military doctrine of Russia must be absolutely Eurasian. Only in this case and from this point of view can we responsibly analyze the internal geopolitics of Russia and outline the priority vectors of development. Without this, any analysis will only predict the catastrophic degradation of Russian regions, territorial disintegration, a chain reaction of destruction and geopolitical self-liquidation. Theoretically, such a turn of events cannot be ruled out, and the modern "military doctrine" of the Russian Federation, which does not mention the US and NATO among its "potential adversaries", but includes them among Russia's potential geopolitical allies in the Eurasian bloc, gives many reasons for this. However, from a more general historical and geographical perspective, this condition should be considered as a "temporary anomaly" which will soon be eliminated under any political regime as the kurtosis of a difficult transition period. It is possible to describe a scenario of "geopolitics of catastrophes" that would highlight the phases of disintegration of the "geographical axis of history." But this position should be of more interest to the Atlantic camp, and therefore it is quite natural if such models are studied by the geopoliticians of the thalassocratic powers. Russian geopolitics, which cannot but be Eurasian, should, accordingly, be guided by positive prospects, analyzing the current and future situation, proceeding from the normal historical and geopolitical laws of the development of continental and civilizational dualism. And in this case, you should make a tolerance which would highlight the phases of the disintegration of the "geographical axis of history." But this position should be of more interest to the Atlantic camp, and therefore it is quite natural if such models are studied by the geopoliticians of the thalassocratic powers. Russian geopolitics, which cannot but be Eurasian, should, accordingly, be guided by positive prospects, analyzing the current and future situation, proceeding from the normal historical and geopolitical laws of the development of continental and civilizational dualism. And in this case, you should make a tolerance which would highlight the phases of the disintegration of the "geographical axis of history." But this position should be of more interest to the Atlantic camp, and therefore it is quite natural if such models are studied by the geopoliticians of the thalassocratic powers. Russian geopolitics, which cannot but be Eurasian, should, accordingly, be guided by positive prospects, analyzing the current and future situation, proceeding from the normal historical and geopolitical laws of the development of continental and civilizational dualism. And in this case, you should make a tolerance analyzing the current and future situation, proceeding from the normal historical and geopolitical laws of the development of continental and civilizational dualism. And in this case, you should make a tolerance analyzing the current and future situation, proceeding from the normal historical and geopolitical laws of the development of continental and civilizational dualism. And in this case, you should make a tolerance

(even if at the moment this is not yet the case) that Russia's "military doctrine" corresponds to the general continental logic and is based on strict geopolitical constants.

This circumstance should be borne in mind in the course of the further presentation.

1.3 Center and periphery

Heartland's historic center is not a constant geographic area. The current capital of Russia, Moscow, inherits both the line of the Slavic capitals (Kiev, Vladimir) and the line of the steppe headquarters of Chingiz. As a geopolitical synthesis of the Forest and the Steppe, Russia has two historical and geopolitical traditions at once, the totality of which forms the basis of the originality of the Russian way.

The Petersburg period was also associated with territorial expansion, although the Baltic location of St. Petersburg embodies the European orientation of the state, “geopolitical Westernism”. In the Petersburg period, the territorial expansion of the Russians was less organic and more artificial than before. The nature of the synthesis was not so obvious, although many Eurasian peoples of Asia and Siberia accepted the rule of the "white king" based on the most ancient continental traditions.

Geographically, Moscow most of all meets the Eurasian mission of Russia. It is equidistant from all the main geographic zones that make up the originality of the Russian landscape. Distances to the polar north, east European west, steppe and subtropical south and taiga east are approximately the same. Therefore, it should be considered the “normal” (from a geopolitical point of view) Eurasian capital, continental center. In this respect, the current state of affairs coincides, in general, with geopolitical constants. Moscow is the natural capital of heartland.

At the same time, a cursory cartographic analysis of Russia immediately reveals a certain asymmetry in this situation. The fact is that beyond the Urals (which, however, is not any natural internal Russian border due to the low altitude of the mountains and the homogeneity of the climate on both sides of the ridge), a fairly homogeneous taiga zone extends thousands of kilometers into Siberia, thus turning Moscow into the center is only "European Russia". This purely quantitative view is counterbalanced, however, by other geopolitical considerations.

First, Siberia does not represent the climatic and relief structural diversity that characterizes pre-Ural Russia. From this point of view, all this gigantic space is only a disproportionate extension of the eastern landscape, the scale of which is much larger than the zonal picture of Russia proper. Thus, in the landscape sense, a gigantic spatial volume is reduced to a limited climatic quality.

Secondly, the same disproportion exists at the demographic level as well. Behind the Ural ridge lives the same number of people, which is typical for each of the landscape zones of European Russia clearly distinguished by nature.

Third, the development of this region in terms of communications, cities, communications, etc. also incomparable with its spatial volume.

Therefore, in the current situation, the geopolitical role of Siberia cannot be considered in proportion to its space. This is a special, “reserve space”, which is the last “undeveloped” part of the Eurasian continent.

Thus, given the special quality of Siberia, Moscow is indeed identified with the geopolitical center of the “geographic axis of history”. Note: it was the undeveloped state of Siberia (especially Eastern Siberia) that forced Mackinder to include "Lenaland" in his later works. the space lying east of the Lena River, into a special geopolitical formation that does not, strictly speaking, belong to the heartland.

But already Spengler noted that moment that Siberia is a geographic space, the role of which may become clear gradually and turn out to be decisive in the historical process. He foresaw that it was from Siberia that a special unique culture could develop, which would put an end to the “decline of the West” and its “Faustian” civilization. The same idea was supported by the Russian "Asians", an extreme offshoot of the Eurasianists, who believe that the East (Asia) is more important not only the West, but also Eurasia itself (as, in particular, V. Ivanov and some "pacificists", Pazifiker, the Haushofer school, Kurt von Beckmann, etc.). Thus, in the long term, which implies a change in the demographic and informational state of the development of Siberia and its equalization with the rest of the Russian (or European) regions, it can be assumed that

But at the moment this should be taken into account only as a futurological perspective. (More on this in the chapter on the Russian East).

From the center (Moscow), rays can be directed to various regions of the peripheral Russian lands. These rays are not segments, as their length is not fixed. Centrifugal and centripetal forces affect regions with variable magnitude, depending on many historical factors. Moreover, the physical distances from the geopolitical center (Moscow) do not always correspond to the “geopolitical distances”. These distances depend not only on the quantitative, but also on the qualitative side of ties, on the independence of regional formations, their form, and their cultural and ethnic specifics.

All these rays, converging towards the center, can be reduced to four main categories or "inner axes":

1) Moscow-Vostok

2) Moscow-West

3) Moscow-North

4) Moscow-South

On the other hand, the corresponding peripheral spaces are “zones” or “stripes”, each of which has specific characteristics and a particular structure. These bands can be called, respectively, "Russian East", "Russian West", "Russian North" and "Russian South". The definition of "Russian" is

In this case, not ethnic, but geopolitical meaning, emphasizing the connection of the region with the central “continental axis” Moscow.

The main content of the topic of "internal geopolitics" of Russia will be to clarify the geopolitical structure of these four "peripheral zones" and the quality and nature of the "rays" connecting them with the center. The structure of the zones will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. The nature of the rays, in the most general terms, can be seen now.

1.4 Internal axes ("geopolitical rays")

Four geopolitical rays link Moscow with the periphery of the "Russian space". These beams are of different quality.

They can be divided into two pairs of beams Moscow West and Moscow South, on the one hand, and beams Moscow East and Moscow North, on the other.

The first two rays, from a geopolitical point of view, are "unfinished", "open". They run into a complex geopolitical system of significant territorial volume, which separates the continental mass of Russia from the ideal border of the coastline. The southern and western borders of Russia, from a geopolitical point of view, are broad belts separating the central part from the coastline. In this respect, these two rays represent the most vulnerable directions for Russia, and the entire geopolitical dynamics along these axes is extremely tense, complex, having many levels and dimensions.

The axes Moscow West and Moscow South combine both internal and foreign policy aspects, since here the regions of Russia-Eurasia proper are smoothly moving into zones under the control of other states, and some of these states belong to the opposite planetary block, to the camp thalassocracy.

The second two rays: the axes Moscow North and Moscow East differ sharply from the first pair. Here the border of Russia coincides with the coastline, there are no “laying states”, and therefore the political dynamics in these directions is confined to domestic political themes. In the North and East, Russia has complete geopolitical borders. And the main task in this case is to maintain the status quo.

Moreover, the North and East, precisely due to the oceanic borders, are the reserve and perfectly protected rear areas of the “geographic axis of history,” where at critical moments it is always possible to create additional spatial platforms for geopolitical and strategic restructuring.

The difference between the West and South axes and the North and East axes is not a historical accident. The geographical landscape itself, and later the ethnic and cultural map of the corresponding regions, is a matrix that, as political history progresses, was filled with specific
state content. In the western and southern outskirts of Russia and in the adjacent territories of neighboring countries, developed inflorescences of cultures, states and ethnic groups have developed, with their own political and spiritual traditions, statehood, etc. This is a zone with one side of the rimland. Objective and

artificial prerequisites for "separatism", and that, in turn, on a planetary scale is identified with the thalassocratic strategy.

The North and East of Russia, on the contrary, are extremely landscape homogeneous, and are not densely populated by peoples that do not have developed political and state traditions or have long lost the historical initiative of imperialism (for example, the Altai Turks, Buryats, etc.). Here, Moscow has free access to the seas, but the quality of the seas is appropriate. They are poorly navigable, cold, covered with ice for a significant part of the year, cut off from the central part due to poor communications, their ports are underdeveloped. Certain strategic advantages are offset corresponding disadvantages.

Two pairs of beams give complete geopolitical symmetry. The length of the northern and eastern coasts of Russia is associated with demographic discharged communication underdevelopment. The western and southern borders are land-based, densely populated, varied in landscape and represent voluminous strips of a significant area.

The geopolitical relations between the center and the periphery in Russia are thus divided into two types: purely internal axes with oceanic linear boundaries (North, East) and semi-internal axes with land boundaries of “strip” (“zonal”) quality (West, South). The dynamics "South and West" implies entry into the sphere of international relations, diplomacy, and so on. The dynamics of "North and East" is limited by internal political problems. However, a purely geopolitical approach makes this picture somewhat relative. Where the “independent” state is currently located, the geopolitician sees a “future province”, and vice versa, the coastal part of the territory of one state at some point may become a coastal bridgehead of an alternative geopolitical force (i.e. a new “sovereign” state).

The rays going from the center to the periphery, the "impulses of continental expansion", constantly collide with the opposite force pressure. The Atlantic bloc seeks to limit the centrifugal energy of Moscow, using the "separatist" tendencies of the outlying peoples or neighboring states, while relying on those coastal zones that are already under the confident control of the thalassocracy. In the South and in the West, this opposition is quite distinguishable in concrete political reality. In the North and East, the opposition is less obvious and less obvious. But, nevertheless, it exists in the form of a strategic military presence of the Atlanticists in the oceanic coastal zone (especially nuclear submarines),

2.1 Analysis model

The geopolitical ray Moscow North in a large approximation splits into a whole spectrum of rays radiating from a single center along the entire length of the coast of the Arctic Ocean. Thus, we get a complicated model, in which three problems arise:

1) the ratio of the sectors of the North to each other;

2) their relationship with the Center (Moscow);

3) correlation with other areas of the Russian space (South, East, West)

Geopolitical analysis is split into several sectors and issues at once. At the same time, the main task is not to lose sight of the general complex of the “internal geopolitics of Russia” and an even wider planetary context, taking into account the regional specifics and details as much as possible.

The geopolitical imperative of the Center in relation to the North is to strengthen the strategic control over these areas as much as possible. Given the sparsely populated territories located in the Arctic Circle, and the lack of developed political and state traditions of ethnic groups living there, cultural and political aspects here recede into the background. The most important aspect is military control over the coast (military, air force and naval base), information new message, energy supply and provision of food and housing abundance.

2.2 Geopolitical nature of the Russian Arctic

The climatic character of the northern territories assumes a point, and not "strip", its settlement. Hence, the role of centers increases, acquiring the most important and becoming, to some extent, the equivalent of what is defined in other regions as "territory". This identity of the "center" and "territory" in the North is maximal, since the intermediate spaces are not only of little use for living, but the tundra, cold, lack of villages, paths, etc. are deadly.

Thus, geopolitically, the North is a system of points located in the Arctic zone, a constellation of discrete settlements scattered over a fairly homogeneous (climatically and relief) space. The vast majority of northern lands are tundra, i.e. northern desert with rare vegetation (lichens). This is a permafrost zone.

The nature of the northern space is somewhat close to the "water element". In it, the boundaries between territories have practically no serious significance, since control over a particular land does not provide any special advantages. Given the sparsely populated population, the question of “competition for nomads” among reindeer-herding peoples is automatically removed.

The population of the North is a variety of the most ancient Eurasian ethnic groups that lived in these territories for thousands of years without any special cultural, migration or ethnic dynamics. It is curious that it is in the north of the western border of Russia that the division takes place along ethnic lines: the north of Europe Scandinavia, Germany, Denmark up to England, Ireland and Iceland are inhabited by "developed" peoples of Indo-European origin (young ethnic groups); and starting from Finland and Karelia and up to Chukotka, the Russian North is inhabited by ethnic groups much more ancient and archaic than the population of the European North (Ugrians, archaic Turks and Paleoasians of the Chukchi, Eskimos, etc.). Moreover, as we move east along the coast of the Arctic Ocean, the archaism of ethnic groups increases. Younger Indo-Europeans (or Turks),

From west to east: after the Karelians and Finns (who were still quite actively involved in modern history, albeit in secondary roles), the more archaic Nenets and Komi, then the Khanty and Mansi, Dolgans, Evenks, and then the Chukchi and Eskimos. A huge sector of Eastern Siberia is occupied by Yakutia (Sakha), but the Yakuts themselves (one of the offshoots of the Turks) live much south of the Arctic Circle, and the north of the region itself is almost uninhabited.

From the Ugrians to the Eskimos, the space of the Russian North shows us the historical time slices of civilization.

The notion "Russian North" is a trapezoid repeating the outlines of Eurasia as a whole. It narrows to the west and expands to the east. On the Russian-Finnish border, this territory covers approximately 10 degrees along the meridian, while Chukotka and Kamchatka already cover 20 degrees. But this spatial expansion has little effect on the geopolitical character of the territory; In terms of demographic characteristics, the degree of development, and the quality of communications and the frequency of settlements, this geographically expanding trapezoid to the east gives a mirror picture, since the "narrow" western flank of the northern sector is developed and populated more than the opposite eastern flank.

If Siberia is the geopolitical "reserve" of Russia, then the North, and especially the Siberian North, is the "reserve" of Siberia itself, being the most distant region of Eurasia from civilization. It is an icy, unexplored land, formally described in maps, but not representing any historical sign, having no global cultural dimension (at least within the foreseeable historical limits of the available study of the past). This situation contrasts strangely with the role that "north" plays in the mythologies of many peoples. There he is endowed with the quality of a "great ancestral home", "promised land", "ancient paradise". At this historical moment, it is rather something opposite, cold, inhospitable, hostile to people, an alienated space with rare interspersing of artificial centers of civilization.

2.3 North + North

Administratively, most of the northern lands are autonomous regions of the Russian Federation, except for Karelia, Komi and Yakutia, which have a more independent political status (republics). Politically, the regions are located as follows (from west to east): Karelia, north of the Murmansk region, Arkhangelsk region, the Komi Republic and

Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets Autonomous Okrug), northern sectors of Yakutia, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Magadan Territory, Koryak Autonomous Okrug and Kamchatka.

The similarity of the geopolitical quality of all these territories is a sufficient basis for them to form a certain territorial-strategic block based on certain integration structures. All these areas face typologically similar problems; their development follows the same trajectories. This natural similarity, so vividly manifested even in the most cursory geopolitical analysis, shows the need for some consolidation. This consolidation, a kind of pact of the "Arctic lands", can have several levels from spiritual and cultural to practical and economic.

You can initially outline the general directions of such a block.

Its cultural base can be a purely Eurasian theory of rethinking traditional civilization as a positive model of a social structure that has retained the memory of cosmic proportions. This means that the archaism of the peoples of the North (underdevelopment, lagging behind, primitiveness, etc.) is not a minus, but a spiritual plus. Ancient ethnic groups are not only not subject to "re-education" and inclusion in "modern civilization", but, on the contrary, need the conditions of their existence to be as close as possible to their traditions. Moreover, the concern for these traditions should be partially transferred to the state, which seeks to secure strategic control over these lands.

Parallel to this, the “mythological” aspect of the North as the most ancient homeland of mankind should be adopted, and the project of the “spiritual revival of the North” would then acquire a worthy historical scale. At the same time, the emphasis should be made on the seasonal specifics of the Arctic year, the polar day and the polar night, which were considered by the Hindus and ancient Persians to be the “days of the gods”. Existence in arctic conditions (common to the entire Eurasian North) returns a human being to conditions of a special cosmic rhythm. Hence the spiritual and therapeutic significance of the Arctic zones.

At the material level, and especially in relation to the living conditions of migrants from the South, i.e. mostly Russians, it is necessary to unite the efforts of all northern centers in the development of optimal models of cities and villages, taking into account the climatic specifics. This aspect requires the use of the latest technologies of unconventional energy sources (solar energy, wind farms, etc.), construction know-how for permafrost, communication and transport systems, the development of interregional air transport, etc. Initially, there should be a project for the general Arctic development, the development of a single and most effective formula that would make it possible to modernize settlements in the shortest possible time, make their existence more dynamic and interconnected.

Given the importance of this problem, it would be logical to provide its solution to the Arctic regions themselves, providing state support for the entire project as a whole from the center. The development of an "Arctic formula" is up to the northerners themselves.

Since the North is a geopolitical “reserve of reserves” of Russia, its regions should be prepared for a possible active migration of the population from the South. This concerns the other side of the problem of a new settlement in the North. Sooner or later, given the demographic

processes, it will become necessary, and it is better to start creating structural prerequisites for this now.

The military aspect should be highlighted. The North is a gigantic strategic military zone of Russia, the most important belt of its security. Many missile and strategic aviation bases are concentrated here; Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are the largest naval bases in Russia. This situation is not a consequence of the arbitrariness of the ideological confrontation between the two camps during the Cold War era. The strategic importance of the North in the military sense remains for Russia in any case, since we are talking about the observance of the interests of Eurasia, the heartland. The meaning of the military presence in the North of Russia stems from the continental nature of the structure of the Russian Armed Forces and from the natural awareness of oneself as a continental camp opposing the "forces of the sea." The main importance of these military facilities is to protect the coastal zone from possible sea and air incursions and to provide, if necessary, a nuclear strike on the American continent through the North Pole. This is the shortest distance from Russia to the United States. For the same reason, this territory is a priority zone for the development of missile defense.

At present, the North accounts for a huge percentage of the total industrial product of Russia. At the same time, its central importance in the military-industrial complex is not taken into account. Many minerals in particular, salt, nickel, etc. are mined mainly in the subarctic regions. But there is a huge gap between such industrial development of the North and the lag in other areas of development. Geopolitical logic requires active leveling of the situation. Moreover, it is most convenient to do this within the framework of the "Arctic Pact". In this case, it would be necessary to designate the capital (or several capitals) of the North, in which the intellectual and technological potential would be concentrated, where the main economic, financial and engineering levers would be reduced. This would give the North significant independence from the center, freedom from control in detail,

At all these levels, the need for the integration of the North is clearly emerging. This is important in the spiritual, ethnic, cultural, military-strategic, industrial, social, financial terms. The result of such a multi-level integration (so far existing only potentially) would be the creation of an entirely new geopolitical reality, in which a significant increase in autonomy and regional independence would not weaken the strategic connection with the center. The development of the North would become a path to the future, a springboard for a completely new (based on geopolitics) understanding of space in the long term.

Severnaya Zemlya from a barren desert would once again turn into a polar paradise, strengthening the planetary weight of the continent and creating a model of a society for a “Eurasian future” based on a combination of tradition and development, loyalty to roots and technological modernization.

2.4 North + Center

The first approach to the geopolitical analysis of the North (North + North) is based on separating the “polar trapezium” into a single connected region, which can be considered as an independent spatial figure. This vision of the North allows us to work out the most flexible model of its development, since the most stable

a geopolitical structure is one that consists of self-sufficient autonomous-autonomous (in a limited sense) elements. But even such a relative autarchy requires a certain territorial scale. The “trapezium” of the Russian North meets all the necessary conditions for forming into an independent internal Russian “large space”. Moreover, such integration autonomy can largely compensate for the inevitable strategic centralism for the state.

The second geopolitical approach is to analyze the systemic functioning along the Center-North axis. This axis was and in many respects remains the only and main one in the administrative organization of the northern territories. Certain regions and centers of the North were directly subordinate to Moscow, which controlled all the main vectors of the development of these territories. Such unambiguous centralism did not allow developing the internal geopolitical potential of the North as efficiently as possible, and deliberately made the specialization of regions one-sided and focused on the scale of the entire country. This made it possible to maintain a regime of strict centralism, but significantly hampered the opening of internal possibilities.

Geopolitical logic dictates that the issue of correlation between Center and Periphery (and in our particular case, Moscow in the North) should be deliberately divided into two components:

1) strict centralism in the field of macro-policy and strategic subordination;

2) the maximum emancipation of internal capabilities due to the ultimate cultural and economic autonomy.

In other terms: strategic centralism + cultural and economic regionalism.

In order to develop the most effective model for such a geopolitical distribution of roles, the question of the “capital of the North” arises again, which could serve as an intermediate instance between the Center and all regions. All military communications from bases, military units, ports, etc. would converge to this point. In addition, there could be a "government of the North", a flexible instance of political coordination of all parts of the "polar trapezium", subordinate directly to Moscow, but acting in front of it on behalf of the entire North. This could be the “parliament of the peoples of the North” and the corresponding executive structures. In this case, the most important thing would be to achieve a harmonious combination of military leadership with regional representatives, since the centralist nature of strategic control would then be coupled with the expression of the regional will of the northern lands. The tandem of the military representative of Moscow with the civilian representative of the "peoples of the North" in such a geopolitical capital could become the ideal prototype for the most efficient and operational, flexible, but tightly connected with the center of the organization of the entire Eurasian space. At the same time, interethnic and cultural friction between the peoples of the North in such an integration process will be minimal due to historical and geographic reasons for the fragmentation and mosaic nature of settlement and the small number of ethnic groups.

It is in the North that this model of space reorganization, based on purely geopolitical premises, should be tested. In this case, all the conditions for such a project are evident that all regions of the North belong to Russia, territorial and demographic dissociation, an urgent need for restructuring industrial and economic systems, some of which have dropped out of the general system of national "distribution of labor", demographic crisis, critical situation

with the peoples of the North, the collapse of energy supply systems and communications, the necessary reform of the Armed Forces, etc.

The attitude of Moscow to the North directly depends on the general integration of the northern regions into a single block and for one more reason. Russia has a latitudinal geographic structure, it is elongated along the parallel. The main tendencies of its development had precisely latitudinal dynamics. The Russian State was built on the integration of spaces along latitudes. For this reason, the main communications and systems of ties within Russia were formed in accordance with this model. The latitudinal process was especially clearly expressed in the development of Siberia and the "dash to the Ocean". Therefore, the stability of the internal structure of Russia directly depends on the completeness and dynamics of latitudinal integration. If we take Russia as a whole, then development along the North-South axis is necessary for its continental strategic usefulness. This applies primarily to expansion beyond its borders, since any geopolitical organization of space vertically gives the maximum degree of strategic autarchy. But within Russia itself, such a complete autarchy is completely inappropriate. Here, on the contrary, one should insist on extreme strategic centralism, on the interconnection of regional spaces with the Center. Therefore, a geopolitical law can be formulated: within Russia, the priority is the West-East integration axis, outside Russia, the North-South axis. (In a more nuanced way, this law is formulated as follows: the areas strictly ethnically and politically controlled by Russia and the Russians require latitudinal integration, while the internal Russian lands, compactly populated by other ethnic groups with historically fixed traditions of political separatism, on the contrary, need integration along the meridian basis.) The dynamics along the meridian makes a political entity independent of its neighbors to the left and to the right. This is necessary for the country as a whole, but unnecessary for certain sectors of this country. The dynamics along the parallel, on the contrary, rigidly binds the Center with the periphery; this is useful for the internal political organization of the state, but it leads to conflicts and imbalances at the interstate level.

On the basis of this pattern, one should insist on the latitudinal integration of the Northern regions, given their belonging to a single climatic and relief zone, and not their purely geographic (and even in some cases ethnic) proximity to other (southern, eastern, or western) regions. The latitudinal unification of the North will contribute to its cultural and economic development, but hinder the creation of prerequisites for potential political and strategic sovereignty. Only such a structure will solve the problems of the Periphery Center in the most positive, from a geopolitical point of view, key.

2.5 The Finnish Question

The only international problem associated with the Russian North is the problem of Karelia (and Finland). The Karelian ethnos is close to the Finnish one and is connected with it by cultural and historical unity. If we proceed from the logic of latitudinal integration, the Karelian question seems, at first glance, an anomaly. Two approaches are possible here.

The first is to absolutize the Karelian-Finnish border geopolitically and offer the Karelian Republic to integrate along the North-South axis with the primordially Russian regions around Lake Onega, Ladoga. Such a vector of development is unnatural and should be resorted to only in the worst case, since the artificial rupture of ethnic unity along the administrative line is purely

the political border never gives geopolitical stability to the region. The matter is aggravated by the fact that the Karelian-Finnish border is an easily passable forest and swampy relief and has a huge length; it is extremely difficult, cumbersome and expensive to reliably defend such a border.

The second approach involves the creation of a Karelian-Finnish geopolitical zone, culturally and partly economically united, but representing a strategic pillar of the Eurasian Center. In European languages, there is the term "Finlandization", which appeared during the Cold War. It is understood as a nominally neutral state with a capitalist economy, but strategically leaning towards the USSR, i.e. to heartland. Finland as a state is a highly unstable and far from autarchy formation, naturally and historically included in the geopolitical space of Russia. This manifested itself at various stages in history. The center could agree to broad autonomy of the Karelian-Finnish unification with the only condition of strategic control over the Gulf of Bothnia and the deployment of Eurasian border troops on the Finnish-Swedish and Finnish-Norwegian border. The length of the border would be cut in half, despite the fact that the Finnish-Swedish and Finnish-Norwegian borders are much less homogeneous and easily passable in relief than the Karelian-Finnish ones. In addition, Russia would be able to control the Baltic from the North.

The second approach is preferable in all respects, and it is this tactic that should be used by the Continental Center in all ethnically and culturally mixed zones on the borders of the state. A split ethnic unity automatically means the instability of the border zone, the instability of the borders. The Atlantist adversary will sooner or later try to take advantage of this circumstance in order to carry out ethnic integration for his own purposes, i.e. increase control over rimland and weaken heartland. Therefore, continental forces should actively and aggressively use similar tactics and not be afraid to concede cultural and even economic sovereignty to border peoples in exchange for a strategic presence and political loyalty.

When stable borders cannot be achieved through direct military or political expansion, an intermediate flexible option should be used, which in the anti-Eurasian sense is constantly and successfully used by thalassocracy.

2.6 North and Non-North

The specificity of the geography of the Arctic coast of Russian Eurasia reduces the problem of the correlation of the regions of the North with other regions to a more simplified North-South formula, since latitudinal problems (namely, with the West) arise only in the case of Karelia. The only exception is the problem of Yakutia, which stands apart here, since Yakutia has, although an extremely artificial, but still historically recorded tradition of political separatism. This aspect is reflected in the later classification of Eurasia by Makinder, where he singled out “Lenaland”, “the land of the Lena River,” and Yakutia (Sakha) forms the axis of this region, stretching from the Laptev Sea to the Amur Region and Altai in the south. But the case of Yakutia must be considered separately.

Let's start with the western part of the “northern trapezium”. The Kola Peninsula, Murmansk and the Karelian Republic stand out here. Together with Finland, it all forms one

the geographical and geopolitical sector, which would be most efficiently integrated into an independent and complete system, in which the Murmansk region and Murmansk itself would have the strategic priority and quality of the military center of decisions, and the Karelian-Finnish space would be endowed with broad cultural and economic sovereignty. In this case, the Murmansk region could be increased at the expense of the northern regions of Finland, Finnish Lapland. The balance between Murmansk (the strategic projection of Moscow) and the Karelian-Finnish space would be a concrete expression of the Eurasian arrangement of the continent as an example of “new Finlandization” in the post-Cold War conditions.

We will consider further movement to the south of this block in the chapter devoted to the Russian West. It should be noted that in any case, the fundamental strategic axis in this case will be the Murmansk - Moscow axis.

Next: Arkhangelsk Territory. An exception to the general rule should be made here and the importance of integration not only along the North North latitude, but also along the meridian should be emphasized. The fact is that the Arkhangelsk Territory is located strictly above the Central European part of Russia, and therefore, the very idea of the possible sovereignty of this vertical sector from the White Sea to the Black Sea in relation to Russia is generally ruled out, since this region is actually Russia. Therefore, Arkhangelsk and the Arkhangelsk Territory are in the strategic position that is most consistent with the principle of strategic integration of the North in the interests of the Center. The Moscow-Arkhangelsk axis is the only one of the entire spectrum of internal “geopolitical beams” and is not just a military-strategic structure. Here it is necessary to achieve maximum and multifaceted integration with the South, all the way to Moscow, try to create a smooth transition from (relatively) densely populated areas of the Vologda Oblast to the point settlements of Pomorie. The migration of the Russian population to the North, its active development, development and transformation should begin precisely from Arkhangelsk. This largest port is in the most advantageous position in comparison with all other settlements of the North, therefore it is most logical to choose Arkhangelsk as the “capital of the Arctic Pact”. The development of the Moscow Arkhangelsk axis should be comprehensive and priority. The consistency and effectiveness of the entire "Arctic Pact" will depend on the quality and dynamics of this unique (from the entire North) meridian integration. The migration of the Russian population to the North, its active development, development and transformation should begin precisely from Arkhangelsk. This largest port is in the most advantageous position in comparison with all other settlements of the North, therefore it is most logical to choose Arkhangelsk as the “capital of the Arctic Pact”. The development of the Moscow Arkhangelsk axis should be comprehensive and priority. The consistency and effectiveness of the entire "Arctic Pact" will depend on the quality and dynamics of this unique (from the entire North) meridian integration. The migration of the Russian population to the North, its active development, development and transformation should begin precisely from Arkhangelsk. This largest port is in the most advantageous position in comparison with all other settlements of the North, therefore it is most logical to choose Arkhangelsk as the “capital of the Arctic Pact”. The development of the Moscow Arkhangelsk axis should be comprehensive and priority. The consistency and effectiveness of the entire "Arctic Pact" will depend on the quality and dynamics of this unique (from the entire North) meridian integration. therefore, it is most logical to choose Arkhangelsk as the “capital of the Arctic Pact”. The development of the Moscow Arkhangelsk axis should be comprehensive and priority. The consistency and effectiveness of the entire "Arctic Pact" will depend on the quality and dynamics of this unique (from the entire North) meridian integration. therefore, it is most logical to choose Arkhangelsk as the “capital of the Arctic Pact”. The development of the Moscow Arkhangelsk axis should be comprehensive and priority. The consistency and effectiveness of the entire "Arctic Pact" will depend on the quality and dynamics of this unique (from the entire North) meridian integration.

To the east, the northern zone includes two administrative formations, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug and the Komi Republic. The integration of these spaces with each other has no contraindications, especially when taking into account the insignificant population of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. The proximity to Arkhangelsk allows the most active and priority development of this region within the framework of a common project. The development of the islands of Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land is of particular importance. These Arctic lands are of colossal strategic importance in the context of intercontinental confrontation. These are the Russian territories closest to the Pole and, accordingly, to the United States, which are used as military strategic bases. As in the case of Karelia and Murmansk, the northernmost areas are controlled by mainly by the military, while the civil administration is more developed to the south. The whole region as a whole has the center of Vorkuta, to which the main communications and communication routes converge.

Vorkuta is a large industrial and strategic center, which is located not far from the Yamalo-Nenetsky district, where there is no center of a similar scale. Consequently, Vorkuta could also control the gigantic territory of the Kara Sea coast.

up to the mouth of the Yenisei and the basin of the Ob estuary. In this area, the Yamalo-Nenets Okrug is geographically close to the Khanty-Mansiysk Okrug, and both of them are part of a single geopolitical sector.

It should be emphasized that the southern border of the "Northern Trapezium" in the case of the Komi Republic has a very important geopolitical significance. In this case, the integration processes of this North Ural region with the rest of the Urals (and the northern Volga region) are not only unreasonable, but frankly harmful, since Tatarstan is located to the southwest (beyond the Permian Komi District), where separatist tendencies have a long history. Being placed in the middle of Russian lands, Tatarstan does not pose a particular danger, but in all similar cases, “separatist logic” forces us to seek access to the seas or foreign territories, and any vertical integration processes in this case may sooner or later turn out to be extremely dangerous. Here we should go the opposite way (rather than in the case of the Arkhangelsk region) and try to tear off the entire North Ural region and its neighboring sectors in the east and west from the Volga region and the Urals as much as possible. In this case, the "northern trapezium" must be strictly separated from the entire continental space located to the south.

To the east lie the lands of the Yenisei Basin, which administratively fall into the Taimyr and Evenk Autonomous Okrugs and the northern part of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the former Turukhansk Territory. In this area, Norilsk stands out, which can be defined as the center for this entire gigantic region. In this case, the meridian dynamics along the North-South axis is not excluded, since South Siberia from Omsk to Lake Baikal is densely populated by Russians, and integration in this direction cannot pose any particular danger. This whole block lies in the intermediate territory, where the zone of more or less uniform settlement of the territory ends and Mackinder's Lenaland proper, the “no man's land”, begins. This zone and all the more eastern territories are a gigantic continental desert, lifeless tundra in the north and impenetrable taiga in the south. This is "potential space". From the south, it was partially developed by both the Russian and ancient Turkic-Mongol peoples with a relatively developed political culture. But in the North itself it represents "no man land". This situation cannot be changed quickly and in one leap, and, therefore, the gigantic region centered in Norilsk for a certain time will represent the “internal border” of continental Russia in the northeast, a strategic outpost of the Center in the North. This logically leads to the need to especially develop specifically Norilsk, which has an extremely important geopolitical significance. It bears the function of control over Taimyr (and Severnaya Zemlya Island) in the north and the Yenisei basin in the south, and in addition, a smaller zone should start from this point, i.e.

Lenaland Mackinder includes Yakutia, Chukotka, Kamchatka, Magadan Territory, Khabarovsk Territory, Amur Region and Primorsky Territory, Sakhalin Island and the Kuriles. The entire space is divided into two geopolitical regions - a fragment of the "northern trapezium", on the one hand, and South Yakutia, Priamurye, Primorsky Krai and the southern half of Khabarovsk Krai, on the other. Both spaces are qualitatively completely different. The southern part, especially the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, is relatively densely populated, has ancient political traditions, and is home to quite active Eurasian ethnic groups. From the point of view of technical development and, at the same time, in the climatic sense, this southern sector is an extension of Southern Siberia.

The exact opposite is the northern part of Lenaland. This is the most undeveloped and "wildest" part of Eurasia, a giant continental stratum, with rudimentary infrastructure and virtually no population. The only major center of the entire region is Magadan, but it is a port very weakly connected with the vast continental expanses of Kolyma and Northern Yakutia. Anadyr in Chukotka is also not a center in the full sense of the word and is also not connected with the continent. This sector is a separate continent, brilliantly protected by sea borders, possessing numerous minerals, but at the same time completely undeveloped and undeveloped, which is in a potential state. This part of Siberia is taken out of the scope of history, and it is to her that Spengler's futurological prophecy about the "coming Siberian civilization" is more related. This unique sector of the Old World, which has not yet said its word in the history of civilizations and has not shown its geopolitical function in any way.

Such underdevelopment of this region is explained on the basis of the so-called. "Potamic theory of civilization", according to which the cultural development of a region occurs much faster in cases where the main river beds in it are not parallel to each other, but intersect. Siberia (especially Eastern Siberia) is a classic confirmation of this principle, since in it all large rivers flow in the same direction, without crossing. However, developmental delay is not a purely negative characteristic. The historical lag helps to accumulate (on the basis of a rational understanding of the history of other territories and nations) the most important historical experience. Under certain circumstances, this can be a guarantee of an unprecedented takeoff.

The northern half of lenaland, from a purely geographic point of view, involves consideration as a single geopolitical complex. And here a very important question arises. Around what center can this future geopolitical formation be formed? What orientation will it adhere to? The very fact of Mackinder's doubts about whether or not lenaland should be included in the "geographical axis of history" indicates the possibility of alternative solutions to the situation. This is enough for the continental strategy to pay particular attention to this sector.

It is clear that the maximum task is to include this area in the "Arctic Pact" under the control of the Center (Moscow) and to correlate with other, secondary centers of the Northern Belt. But there are two obstacles here:

1) the absence in the center of this region of some major strategic point around which integration systems could be built;

2) the axial position of Yakutia (the Republic of Sakha) in this region, which is especially complicated by the presence of even nominal, but historically recorded “separatism” among the Yakuts.

In this case, the ratio of the northern half of the "Arctic trapezium" to the South for the first time acquires a truly dramatic character, since Yakutia has such a strategic location that provides all the prerequisites for becoming an independent region, independent from Moscow. This is ensured by the long coastline, and the meridian structure of the republic's territories, and its technical isolation from the rest of the Siberian regions. Under a certain set of circumstances, it is Yakutia that can become the main base of the Atlanticist

strategy, starting from which the thalassocracy will restructure the Pacific coast of Eurasia and try to turn it into a classic rimland, controlled by "sea power". The increased attention of Atlanticists to the Pacific area and the highly indicative allocation by Mackinder of Lenaland in a special category, and then the inclusion of this territory in the rinmland zone in the maps of Atlanticists Speakman and Kirk, all this indicates that at the first opportunity all this is weakly associated with the center of the region, anti-continental forces will try to withdraw from the Eurasian control.

In this regard, the following measures should be taken:

1) Sharply limit the legal political sovereignty of Yakutia.

2) Divide Yakutia into two or more regions, and it is most important to administratively separate the region of the coast of the Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea from the continental basin of the Lena River. It is also important to maximize the zone separating the borders of Yakutia from the Pacific coast and strengthen strategic control over these coastal zones.

3) Establish special strict control over this entire territory by the representative of Moscow.

4) Organize the industrial and financial integration of Yakutia into non-Yakut regions, make the region as dependent as possible on the Center or on its projections in the North and South of Siberia.

These steps presuppose such a reorganization of this territory, which would create here a completely new geopolitical structure, a new center and new radial ties. In other words, without waiting for the reorganization of Lenaland according to the Atlanticist scenario, as long as this region remains part of Russia, we should immediately proceed to the construction of continental Lenaland according to the Eurasian model.

The problem of the North-South ratio has a special solution for this sector, here not only it is necessary to limit contacts along this axis, but to reorganize the entire northern space anew, tearing off its polar and coastal zones from the continental spaces of Yakutia. This is not only a preventive geopolitical move, it is a geopolitical attack, a positional war for Lenaland, for the future of Siberia, for its continental, Eurasian destiny. So far, this issue may have domestic political significance. It must not be allowed to acquire international significance and become foreign policy.

2.7 Summary

The northern belt of the Eurasian continent, which is part of Russia, is the most important geopolitical reality, the importance of which will steadily increase with the development of general planetary dynamics. At the same time, this region is especially important for Russia to assert its global geopolitical status.
"Geographical axis of history".

Only when defining atlantism, thalassocracy as its main of the geopolitical enemy, the entire system of the North acquires real strategic content. If one refuses to recognize geopolitical dualism at the level of military doctrine or international politics, the whole topic instantly loses its meaning. Wherein

not only the rapid degradation of the Russian North is inevitable, but also in the long term its fragmentation and even the rejection of certain regions from Russia.

The general rhythm of geopolitical processes at the present time is such that the issue of geopolitical reorganization of the North in accordance with the above geopolitical constants is highly topical and urgent. Even in order to maintain the status quo, it is necessary to immediately begin the geopolitical reorganization of all these spaces.

The fate of Russia is directly linked to the geopolitical fate of the North. This law is the basis for her future geopolitics.

The North is the future, this is fate.

3.1 "Inner East" (scope of the concept)

Analyzing the geopolitical problems of the Russian East, we will apply the same method as in the case of the North, dividing the issue into three components:

1) Center - East

2) Links of the sectors of the East with each other

3) The links of these sectors with other regions and geopolitical zones of Russia.

But first, it is necessary to define what is meant by "Russian East". We must immediately emphasize the difference between the East as a purely geographical concept and the cultural, civilizational, historical East. So, in the cultural East it is customary to include all territories of North Africa, the Middle East, Western Asia, Central Asia up to Pakistan and further to the Philippines (Islamic world) and India, while it is customary to apply the concept to China and Indochina, as well as to the countries of the Pacific region "Far East". From a Russian perspective, geographically, all of this represents the South, stretching from the far Maghreb West to the Pacific Far East.

On the other hand, within the framework of Russia itself, the "East" is completely different geographic and geopolitical realities - this is a territory stretching from the Volga region (Tataria) through the Urals, Siberia, right up to the Pacific Ocean. This geopolitical category can be called "Russian East" or "Inner East". Studying the internal geopolitics of Russia, one should take as the “East” precisely this second concept, the “inner East”, the geographical territories lying to the East of the Center (Moscow).

In this case, the Caucasus and Central Asia will fall into the category of the “South” and will be considered in the corresponding chapter.

Considering that we consider the internal geopolitics of Russia as an “open system” that does not coincide with the administrative borders of the Russian Federation, proceeding from the method of “geopolitical rays”, the allocation of geopolitical zones often falls on the territory of neighboring states, in the event that there is a geopolitical, ethnic and geographical and landscape unity. For this reason, the "inner East" of Russia should include both the South Urals and North Kazakhstan from Aktyubinsk to Semipalatinsk at approximately 50th latitude. In addition, Mongolia, Xinjiang and Manchuria are geopolitically part of the South sector in relation to Russia. Consequently, all of South Siberia, Altai, Tuva, Buryatia, Priamurye and Primorye (plus the southern half of the Khabarovsk Territory) are included in the strip of the "Inner East" together with the Central Siberian regions,

Thus, the "inner East" should be considered a rectangle stretching from Kazan and the Urals to the Pacific Ocean.

3.2 Belt of "Russian Siberia" (structure)

Climatically, the Russian East differs sharply from the North. This is an area with a temperate continental climate. In the Volga region and in the Urals, as well as in Siberia and Primorye, the forest zone is mainly located. A narrowing wedge of steppes goes from Northern Kazakhstan to Lake Baikal. Altai and Amur region are massifs of low mountains. Most of the territories are quite densely populated and represent reliefs favorable for living and economic management.

The ethnic composition of the inner East of Russia is as follows: the overwhelming majority are Russians, scatteredly living in the national republics and compactly in most of the Siberian lands. Several ethnic zones can be distinguished, coinciding in general terms with the corresponding autonomies and republics.

Tatarstan is located in the Volga region, a fairly monolithic ethno-national entity that preserves the traditions of political independence and a certain rivalry with Russia. This is the most vulnerable (from the point of view of maintaining the integrity of Russia) region, since the national identity of the Tatars is very developed. The most important factor that makes the problem of "Tatar separatism" still secondary is the geographical location of Tatarstan in the middle of the continental space without sea borders or proximity to a non-Russian state. As long as this geopolitical situation persists, this does not pose a particular danger to Russia. But in any case, the historical tradition of the Tatars requires increased attention to this region and the implementation of such a policy of the Center in relation to Kazan, thanks to which the geopolitical system of Tatarstan would be connected with purely Russian regions (perhaps not territorially adjacent). At the same time, on the contrary, integration processes with Bashkiria, Udmurtia, Mordovia and Mari-el should be hindered. In addition, it makes sense to accentuate the territorial division of Tatarstan according to cultural and ethnic characteristics, since the Tatars are an ethnic group both in terms of racial and cultural and religious factors. It also makes sense to encourage Russian migration to this republic. since the Tatars are an ethnic group, both in terms of racial and cultural and religious factors. It also makes sense to encourage Russian migration to this republic. since the Tatars are an ethnic group, both in terms of racial and cultural and religious factors. It also makes sense to encourage Russian migration to this republic.

Tatars are Turks and Muslims, and this makes them a geopolitical part of the Turkic-Islamic world. In this respect, the Center faces a problem that dominates the entire geopolitics of the South (which will be discussed in the corresponding chapter). The complete separation of Tartary from this reality is impossible either through assimilation or through active geographic isolation. Therefore, the "Tatar question" is included as a separate article in the broader problem of Russia and Islam. The common denominator in solving all similar situations is the search for a geopolitical balance of interests between the “geographical axis of history” and the Islamic world. In this respect, anti-Atlanticism is, in all cases, without exception, the common denominator that makes it possible to establish a long-term planetary alliance.

More broadly, the Eurasian power of Russia is based on a combination of Slavic and Turkic elements, which gave rise to the Great Russian ethnos itself, which became the axis of the "continental state" identified with the heartland. Therefore, in the future, these two ethnic groups, Slavs and Turks (+ Ugrians and Mongols) remain the pillars of Eurasian geopolitics. Their future is in the development of political and ethnic integration,

and therefore the accentuation of ethnocultural differences, and especially the desire to give these differences a political form, contradict the logic of the historical fate of both Russians and Tatars. This topic should become the axis of relations between Moscow and Kazan, and it is possible that this will require the creation of a special “geopolitical lobby” expressing the interests of Eurasia also politically (or metapolitically).

Almost the same considerations apply to Bashkiria, located south of Tatarstan. It is also home to a Turkic ethnos professing Islam. The only difference is that the Bashkirs do not have such a manifested separatist tradition and such a developed national identity as the Tatars, who were the most active and "advanced" ethnic group in the entire Volga region. For this reason, the Tatar-Bashkir ties can in no way contribute to geopolitical stability in this sector of the “inner East” of Russia, and the Center must do everything possible to integrate Bashkiria into the South Ural regions inhabited by Russians and tear it away from its orientation toward Kazan. ... At the same time, it makes sense to emphasize the originality of the purely Bashkir culture, its uniqueness, and its difference from other Turkic-Islamic forms. The strengthening of geopolitical ties between Tatarstan and Bashkiria is extremely dangerous for Russia, since the southern administrative border of Bashkiria lies not far from Northern Kazakhstan, which (with the most unsuccessful development of the geopolitical situation) could theoretically become a springboard for Turkic-Islamic separatism. In this case, the most terrible thing threatens the heartland to be torn apart by a Turkic (pro-Turkish, i.e. pro-Atlantic) wedge right in the middle of the continental space. In this sense, the orientation of Tatarstan to the south, attempts to integrate with Bashkiria, and even the rapprochement of Bashkiria with the Orenburg region are extremely negative tendencies, which the continental policy of the Center must prevent at any cost. Bashkiria should strengthen latitudinal ties with Kuibyshev and Chelyabinsk, while meridian contacts with Kazan and Orenburg should, on the contrary, weaken.

Further, from the Southern Urals (Chelyabinsk) to Krasnoyarsk stretches a strip of lands actively populated and developed by Russians. From west to east, a geopolitical axis clearly looms, which historically corresponded to the path of the Russians conquering Siberia: Chelyabinsk Omsk Novosibirsk Tomsk Kemerovo Krasnoyarsk Irkutsk. This entire belt is a developed industrial zone, and a city like Novosibirsk is also the largest intellectual center. Moreover, in an ethnic sense, this is almost a purely Russian zone. A similar situation is repeated on the eastern side of Lake Baikal, where along the Baikal-Amur Mainline from Chita to Khabarovsk and further south to Vladivostok, there is a continuation of the same strip starting in the South Urals. The only deviation is Buryatia,

Directly south of this purely Russian belt lies a parallel zone with a significant admixture of the Turkic (east of the Mongolian) population. It begins in Northern Kazakhstan, from Aktyubinsk reaches through the territory of Kazakhstan to Semipalatinsk and Ust-Kamenogorsk and continues on Russian territory in Altai (the cradle of the Turkic ethnic group), in Khakassia, Tuva and Buryatia. At the same time, from Altai to Transbaikalia (Chita), this Turkic-Mongolian belt landscape and, to a large extent, ethnically smoothly passes into Mongolia, with which no obvious geographical border actually exists. From a geopolitical point of view, this entire lower belt is an integral part of the strategic space of "Russian Siberia", and therefore it should be viewed as a continuation of the "Russian East" to the south.

located from the eastern border with Mongolia to the Ussuri River. Logically, it should have been strategically controlled by Russia, since otherwise it would inevitably become a pretext for positional collisions between the “geopolitical axis of history” and territories geopolitically included in rimland, and China undoubtedly belongs to the category of rimland (in this neither which geopolitician never had a shadow of doubt).

The same geopolitical principle is valid for the named strip of "Russian Siberia": this entire territorial sector must be actively integrated into a single geopolitical field, and the priority direction here will be latitudinal integration along the long axis Chelyabinsk Khabarovsk (the meridian short axis Khabarovsk Vladivostok is a continuation of this line in a special geopolitical sector). All this space of gigantic length constitutes the main strategic advantage of Russia as a truly Eurasian power. Thanks to this South Siberian corridor, Russia gets the opportunity to firmly connect the regions of the Center with the Pacific coast, thereby providing a potential highway for the full development of Siberia and the final exit of Moscow to the Pacific Ocean. This strip is the control lever of the entire Eurasia, including Europe, since the organization of a high-tech continental connection from the Far East to the Far West allows in this way to restructure planetary reality, so that thalassocratic control over the oceans from the outside will lose its key importance. The resources of Siberia will connect in the future with the high technologies of continental Europe and developed Japan, and when this can be realized, the planetary domination of the thalassocracy will come to an end.

The latitudinal integration of Siberia (the Chelyabinsk-Khabarovsk axis) is the most important strategic advantage that only Russia has. With the development of this area, the entire geopolitical history of the future can begin, and in this case Spengler's prophecies will come true.

In a narrower, “internal” sense, the development of the integration of “Russian Siberia” makes it possible to expand geopolitical control along the meridian as well. The southern "Turkic-Mongolian" belt will be associated with more northern purely Russian territories, while the broadest ethnocultural autonomy will be accompanied by economic integration and strategic domination of the Russian Chelyabinsk-Vladi East axis. Moreover, this process should include such administratively heterogeneous entities as Kazakhstan, autonomous okrugs and republics on the territory of the Russian Federation, Mongolia and, possibly, some regions of Chinese Manchuria.

At the same time, a similar meridian vector is assumed in the northern direction, where the situation differs only in that the autochthonous non-Russian population is much more discharged, politically less developed and has no fresh historical experience of political sovereignty. In the Khanty-Mansi and Evenk districts, as well as in the Khabarovsk Territory, the limit of the northern expansion of the belt of “Russian Siberia” is set by a parallel process of internal integration of the “northern trapezium”. This integration, in contrast to the complex geopolitical function of “Russian Siberia” (the Chelyabinsk – Khabarovsk axis), which has three vectors of development (latitudinal, northern and southern) and in a number of cases collides with established and rather independent political forms (states), has a simple purely latitudinal character.

to the north and the overall integration of the "northern trapezoid" will depend on unpredictable factors.

All these geopolitical vectors of development are not, in fact, something new and unexpected, since they turn out to be only a continuation of the large-scale historical processes of Russia's movement to the east and the formation of a Eurasian power. The Russian way to the Pacific Ocean is not accidental, and the territories of the Russian development of Siberia also follow a clear geographical logic. This path corresponds to the relief border of the Forest and the Steppe, on the geopolitical synthesis of which the Russian State itself is based. The Russian conquerors of Siberia moved along the "edge" of the northern taiga forests bordering the steppe (or forest-steppe), settling on the lands most suitable for habitation and agriculture. From Chelyabinsk to Baikal, this landscape sector is a tapering wedge. And from Baikal to the Pacific coast it is a continuous zone of northern forests, gradually and imperceptibly turning into tropical forests. At the same time, the percentage of highlands and mountain ranges increases.

This zone from Lake Baikal to the mouth of the Amur again returns to the Lenaland problem, which already arose when we were dismantling the Yakut sector of the northern trapezoid.

3.3 Positional battle for Lenaland

As in the case of Yakutia (when analyzing the geopolitics of the Russian North), when approaching Eastern Siberia, stretching east of the Yenisei, we are faced with a number of geopolitical problems. Looking ahead, we note that for the third time we will face difficulties even when we come to the analysis of the easternmost sector of the “Eurasian South”.

Already from a purely geographical point of view, behind Lake Baikal, a serious change in the relief begins in comparison with all more western sectors of Eurasia. There, between the continental forests in the north and tropical (mountain) forests in the south, there were necessarily steppe zones, which created a natural symmetry, with the allocation of the central region, the first (steppe) peripheral circle and border reliefs of tropical forests and mountains. This picture persists from Moldova to Altai, to the north, the steppe layer simply disappears. In the case of Eastern Siberia, we are dealing with a completely new geopolitical and landscape region that requires different positional solutions. Parallel to the unexpected landscape "challenge" (smooth transition of continental forests to tropical forests against the background of mountains, hills and hills) reveals an extremely unfortunate ethnopolitical picture of the presence in the region of several internal and external national formations, whose geopolitical loyalty to Russia is not so obvious. Against the background of the extremely weak population of the entire Lenaland region by Russians, the geopolitical picture becomes extremely alarming.

First, the territory of Buryatia. It breaks the continuity of the Russian Siberian belt proper, protruding far to the north from Lake Baikal. Buryats are Lamaists, and at critical moments in Russian history they tried to establish an independent theocratic state on their territory, oriented towards Mongolia and Tibet. In itself, this still does not give grounds for concern, but a new problem arises here: the territorial proximity of the southern borders of Yakutia to the northern borders of Buryatia. The Yakuts belong to the Turkic group, are significantly Christianized, but they often preserve ancient shamanic traditions. At the same time, some groups also profess Lamaism. Given the access of Yakutia to the sea and the border of Buryatia with Mongolia, all this represents

there is a danger of the emergence of a potential geopolitical bloc, which would have more prerequisites for relative geopolitical independence than Tatarstan or some of the North Caucasian peoples, whose separatism is obvious. If we add to this the proximity of the Pacific coast, which is extremely sparsely populated by the Russians, then the danger is doubled due to the possible control of the thalassocracy over coastal zones (or sectors of zones, potential corridors from Lenaland'a to the Pacific Ocean). And finally, the matter is further aggravated by the fact that a rather thin strip of the Amur Region separates the south of Yakutia from the northeastern border of China, which gives grounds for opening a direct geopolitical corridor from the southern Chinese shores of the Indian Ocean to the Laptev Sea in the North.

All these potential geopolitical configurations are extremely alarming. There is no doubt that such a picture cannot but seem extremely tempting to Atlanticist strategists, since Lenaland, the richest in land, resources and unique in terms of strategic opportunities, finds itself in a very vulnerable
geopolitical point of view, position, and any weakening of Russian control over this region can immediately cause the irreversible rejection of a giant piece of the Eurasian continent from the very geographical axis of history. To prevent these events, it is not enough just to strengthen the military contingent located in the Far East or in the Amur region. It is necessary to take large-scale geopolitical steps, since this is nothing less than a potential positional war. What you should pay special attention to:

1) It is important to strengthen the strategic presence of representatives of the Center in the south of Yakutia. This is achieved through directed migration and systematic "colonization" of lands by peoples from more western regions.

2) The same should be done with the lands lying to the north of Lake Baikal. In this case, dangerous boundaries will be pushed apart.

3) At the same time, it is necessary to intensively develop the north of the Irkutsk region and the entire Amur region, implementing a plan for the purposeful "colonization" of these territories.

These three measures need to be backed up by an increased military presence in the designated zone and an intensification of strategic, economic and technological expansion to the west and east. All this is intended to smooth out the dangerous narrowing of the "Russian belt".

4) It is necessary to intensify positional pressure on northeastern China, to take preventive pressure on this area, which would initially prevent any geopolitical inclinations of China towards northern expansion.

5) It is necessary to strengthen as much as possible demographically and strategically the sector located between the cities of Blagoveshchensk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Khabarovsk, in order to create a massive shield here from potential thalassocratic (from the sea) or Chinese (from land) geopolitical aggression.

6) It is important to back all these measures by maximizing the intensification of Russian-Mongolian relations, since the barren and otherwise unattractive Mongolia for the geopolitics of this region is a key and most important territory. Massive Russian military presence along the entire Mongolian-China

border, and especially on its eastern part, would minimize the geopolitical risk of rejection of Lenaland.

Let us recall that the geopolitics of the North intended to concentrate special efforts in the same sector only from the north, from the coast of the Arctic Ocean. The combination of both geopolitical strategies and their parallel implementation will allow Russia to lay a positional foundation for the distant future, when the importance of these lands will be so obvious that the planetary significance of Eurasia as a whole will depend on control over them.

The geopolitical battle for Lenaland should begin now, although widespread attention will be drawn to the region at a later date. But if you do not lay down the correct geopolitical and strategic model in the first place, it will be much more difficult to resolve the conflict after it starts, and maybe it will turn out to be impracticable.

In geopolitics, major battles are won long before they turn into an open form of political or international conflict.

3.4 Capital of Siberia

The Siberian integration project raises the question of the geographic center of this process, i.e. about the point that could become the plenipotentiary representative of Moscow beyond the Urals and serve as an attraction for all other regions. Novosibirsk is most suitable for this role, which is not only the largest city in all of Siberia, but also the most important intellectual center of the all-Russian scale.

From Novosibirsk, the western axis goes to Yekaterinburg, the capital of the Urals, and the eastern axis goes to Irkutsk, then Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Thus, the most important function of communication of the entire “Russian belt of Siberia,” in which it is the main link, falls on Novosibirsk. Axis Moscow Novosibirsk is becoming the most important power line of the "internal geopolitics" of Russia, the main "ray" along which the reciprocal process of exchange of centrifugal energy flows from the Center and centripetal from the periphery is carried out.

It makes sense to close the Ural region with the center in Yekaterinburg directly to Moscow, and not make it an intermediate instance in communication between the central part of Russia and Siberia. The geopolitical position of Novosibirsk is so important that this city and the regions adjacent to it should have a special status and special powers, since it is from here that secondary geopolitical rays should diverge throughout Siberia to the north, south, east and west.

It makes sense to make an exception from such secondary centralization only for the Primorsky Territory and the southern sectors of the Khabarovsk Territory. This is a very special area, tightly connected with Lenaland issues and the positional struggle for control over it. In this regard, special status should be granted to Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, and they should be directly linked to Moscow (like Yekaterinburg).

It is convenient to organize additional strategic axes Novosibirsk Norilsk and Khabarovsk Magadan to interact with the “northern trapezium”. Thus, the East will be strategically linked to the North.

The East, like the North, is a springboard for the geopolitics of the future. Here lies the fate of Eurasia. At the same time, the favorable climate of “Russian Siberia” makes it more predisposed to start the grandiose project of creating a new continental model from here. New cities and highways should be built here, new lands and deposits should be developed and new military bases created. At the same time, it is important to initially lay in the project a harmonious combination of the two principles of relief, landscape, ethnocultural factor, and finally, ecology, on the one hand, and technical and strategic criteria, on the other. Archaic traditions should be combined with the latest technological developments. It is necessary to take into account the places of the most ancient human settlements in these lands and correlate with them the choice for the development of industries and military bases.

This logic leads to the open prospect of the emergence of a new center in Siberia, which has not yet been manifested or conceived. And with the development of the entire Russian East, with the actualization of the Pacific Ocean as the “ocean of the future”, it is possible that the question will arise of transferring the capital of all Eurasia to these lands, to the unprecedented and not yet existing brilliant capital of the New Millennium.

The time will come when Moscow will lose its “middle” significance, become insufficient in the geopolitical sense, too “western”. And then the question of the New Capital in Siberia will receive not just a nationwide, but a general continental, global significance.

However, it should not be overlooked for a moment that such a prospect is only possible if the positional struggle for Lenaland is won, without which the geopolitical revival of Eurasia is unthinkable.

Chapter 4. New geopolitical order of the South

4.1 The "new geopolitical order" of the South

The geopolitics of the southern regions (as well as the western ones) is connected with the planetary mission of Russia-Eurasia to an even greater extent than the problems of the North and the East. If even when considering the North and East, geopolitically belonging to the internal Russian territories, the foreign policy factor arose constantly, then in the case of analyzing the problems of the South (as well as the West), it simply does not make sense to talk only about the “internal geopolitics” of Russia, since all internal Russian realities so connected here with foreign policy that their separation is simply impossible without completely violating the severity of the overall geopolitical picture.

With regard to the South, the "geographical axis of history" has only one imperative - geopolitical expansion all the way to the shores of the Indian Ocean. This means the centrality and uniqueness of meridian development, the unambiguous dominance of the North – South axis. From a geopolitical point of view, the entire space separating Russian territory from the southern coastline of Eurasia is a strip whose area must be reduced to zero. The very existence of a rimland, which is not a line but a stripe, is an expression of a thalassocratic influence that is opposite to the basic impulse of continental integration. If the rimland of Eurasia in the north and east of Russia is reduced to zero volume, and the continent here is geopolitically complete (the only thing that remains is to maintain the positional status quo, anticipating the possibility of the line becoming a strip under the influence of the thalassocratic impulse), the rimland in the south (and west) is an open problem. In the east and north of Russia, rimland has an actual line, but a potential line, and in the south and west, on the contrary, a current line, but a potential line. In the first case, the main imperative is defense and defense, preservation, conservation of the state of affairs and preventive geopolitical moves. In the second case, we are talking, on the contrary, about actively offensive geopolitics, about expansion, an overall “offensive” strategy. but a potential line. In the first case, the main imperative is defense and defense, preservation, conservation of the state of affairs and preventive geopolitical moves. In the second case, we are talking, on the contrary, about actively offensive geopolitics, about expansion, an overall “offensive” strategy. but a potential line. In the first case, the main imperative is defense and defense, preservation, conservation of the state of affairs and preventive geopolitical moves. In the second case, we are talking, on the contrary, about actively offensive geopolitics, about expansion, an overall “offensive” strategy.

In the South of all Eurasia, Russia must establish a "new geopolitical order" based on the principle of general continental integration. Therefore, all the established political formations of the South, Islamic countries, India, China, Indochina, should be considered as a theater of continental positional maneuvers, whose ultimate task is to strategically rigidly connect all these intermediate regions with the Eurasian Center with Moscow.

This gives rise to the concept of “open rays” going from the Center to the periphery, which do not stop at the Russian borders proper, but must be drawn all the way to the southern ocean coast. Those segments of "rays" that fall on Russian territories are relevant, for those countries that are strategically in solidarity with Russia, are semi-relevant, and for those states that follow their own geopolitical path or (in the worst case) are included in the zone of direct Atlanticist control. nym. The general logic of Eurasian geopolitics in this direction boils down to making the entire length of the rays actual or semi-actual.

On this basis, the entire coast of the Eurasian continent from Anatolia to Korea should be viewed as a potential “Russian South”.

4.2 Zones and mountain-boundaries

The imperative of geopolitical expansion in the southern direction also predetermines the structure of the composition of those regions that are included in the administrative borders of Russia or in the states allied with Russia (CIS). Therefore, the analysis of the periphery of actual and semi-actual geopolitical rays should not for a moment be distracted from the initial trend dictated by the laws of geopolitics.

The "Russian South", in a more limited sense, are the following zones:

1) North of the Balkan Peninsula from Serbia to Bulgaria;

2) Moldova and South and East Ukraine;

3) Rostov region and Krasnodar region (port of Novorossiysk);

4) the Caucasus;

5) Eastern and northern coast of the Caspian Sea (territory of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan);

6) Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan;

7) Mongolia.

Continental strategic control has been established over these zones. But all of them should be viewed as bases for further geopolitical expansion to the south, and not as “eternal” borders of Russia. From a geopolitical point of view, the presence of coastal strips not controlled by the heartland is a constant threat to the reduction of even those territories that are currently quite tightly connected to the Center of Eurasia. The collapse of the USSR and the emergence of independent political entities based on the former Soviet republics provide an impressive example of how the refusal to expand outward to the southern shores of the continent (the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan) inevitably entails a rollback of Moscow's reliable borders far to the north, deep into the continent. But the weakening of the continental presence never creates a vacuum or an increase in the sovereignty of the "liberated" territories, since their provincial status deliberately excludes their geopolitical autarchy. The tellurocratic influence of Moscow is automatically replaced by the thalassocratic influence of Atlanticism (in one form or another).

Consequently, the structure of the entire inner belt of the “Russian South” should initially be viewed as a potential offensive bridgehead.

However, the matter is complicated by the fact that practically all border territories are in mountainous (often high-mountainous) areas.

In the north of the Balkan Peninsula, these are the Balkan Mountains, east of the Caucasus, then the Kopetdag and Hindu Kush ridge, then the Pamir, Tien Shan, Altai. The mountainous relief of the southern border of Russia-Eurasia, which largely predetermined the entire history of the East, is currently one of the most important geopolitical trump cards of Atlanticism. The ancient Indo-Europeans divided the entire Eurasian East into two components of northern Turan

(everything above the Eurasian ridge) and southern Iran (lying below this ridge). In fact, this division strictly corresponds to the modern geopolitical terms heartland (Turan) and rimland (Iran). Several millennia later, the southern front of Russia poses the same geopolitical problem that was characteristic of the dialectic of the relations "steppe nomads against the settled farmers of Persia."

But in this case, the situation radically changed in the sense that a settled Slavic northern Forest was added to the steppe Turan, balancing and fixing the dynamics of the Turanian nomads. The sedentary Indo-Europeans (Slavs) closed the steppe from the north with cultural forms, in many respects repeating the archetypes of the Iranian south. Russia as Eurasia, as a synthesis of the Forest and the Steppe, is qualitatively superior to Turan, and therefore the problem of Iran (wider than non-Russian Central Asia) acquires a different civilizational and geopolitical meaning. This is especially evident since the moment of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which radically broke with the atlantist thalassocratic politics of the shah's regime.

All these geopolitical aspects suggest the need for a radically new approach to the problem of the "Eurasian mountains", which should lose the function of a strategic border, become not an obstacle on the path of continental integration, but a bridge to it.

The need to change the function of the mountains in southern Russia (and its strategic area) is a pillar of the future Eurasian geopolitics. Without such a preliminary operation, Eurasia will never achieve real world domination, moreover, it will never even come close to a genuine equal dialogue with thalassocracy.

4.3 Balkans

Since most of the southern lands of Russia and its strategic area fall on lands that are racially, culturally and religiously different from the civilization of the Russians (except for the Balkans and Ukraine), then geopolitically the axes should be strictly meridian. Hence the conclusion: one should promote all vertical (longitudinal) integration processes and prevent all horizontal (latitudinal) ones, i.e. in a sphere that is ethnically and politically different from the actual Russian spaces, the principle should be applied directly opposite principle, dominant in conditions ethno-cultural uniformity.

We outline the main forms of geopolitical structure "Russian South" (in a wide sense), taking turns examining all local geopolitical systems from west to east.

Balkan Peninsula. There are four special areas here:

a) Bosnian-Croatian (the most western and Atlantic oriented, pure rimland);

b) Serbian (located to the east and clearly Eurasian-oriented);

c) Bulgarian (even more eastern, with elements of the "Levantine version rimland ', this model is most clearly represented by Turkey and the continental Eurasian synthesis);

d) Greek (Orthodox, but part of the Atlantic bloc).

The “new geopolitical order” (continental and Eurasian) in this area (as elsewhere) is based on encouraging all integration processes along the North – South axis. This means that we should maximize the strengthening of ties between Belgrade Athens and Sofia Athens. Since the entire Balkan region is a mosaic and extremely complex configuration, the project of an all-Slavic southern federation consisting of Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbian Bosnia, which would be a theoretically ideal solution, is unlikely to be implemented in the near future. Moreover, it presupposes a dangerous process of latitudinal integration, which in such ethnically complex regions is always problematic. Let us recall, for example, the fierce Balkan wars of the beginning of the century between the Orthodox states of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece and the constantly arising problem of Macedonia, which is a "bone of contention" within the potentially continental and Eurasian Orthodox powers. Therefore, the example of the medieval Serbian "empire" of Nemanjić can be taken as a positive geopolitical paradigm. Moreover, all the significant successes of Greece in global geopolitical projects (in particular, the conquests of Alexander the Great) were fed by the energies coming from the north of the Balkans, the Macedonian dynasty, and earlier the Dorian type of Indo-European Sparta. Within the framework of the small model of the entire Balkan Peninsula, the Serbs (and, in part, the Bulgarians) represent a Eurasian impulse, act as carriers of the idea of a heartland. Situated to the south, Greece is geopolitically stretched between this northern continental impulse and a strong historical identity with rimland.

intracontinental impulses, which could be based on confessional closeness with Orthodox Russia.

If in the long run one can imagine a common Balkan Federation, Eurasianically oriented, then the geopolitical program at least can be formulated as the creation of an irregular rhombus Sofia Moscow Belgrade Athens (and again Sofia), in which two rays, Russian-Serbian and Russian-Bulgarian, emanate from the Center. and they converge in Athens. At the same time, the issue of Macedonia could be resolved by granting it a special status in order to remove the stumbling block between all three Orthodox Balkan and potentially Eurasian (to varying degrees) states. This logically follows Moscow's vital interest in the Macedonian problem.

If you look at the whole picture from the opposite point of view, from the position of the Atlantists, it will immediately become obvious that it is important for the thalassocracy to give all geopolitical processes exactly the opposite character.

First, it is important for the "sea power" to support the pro-Atlantic forces in the north of the Balkans (Croats and Muslims), and in addition, to tear Serbia and Bulgaria away from the geopolitical union with Greece. For this, it is most convenient to use Macedonia, which can destroy all continental projects in this region. And if Turkey is connected to the Bulgarian problem, i.e. contribute to the improvement of Turkish-Bulgarian relations to the detriment of the Bulgarian-Russian, then the entire Eurasian continental policy will fail here. This should be taken into account by the geopoliticians of Eurasia.

4.4 The problem of sovereign Ukraine

Next comes the Ukrainian question. The sovereignty of Ukraine is such a negative phenomenon for Russian geopolitics that, in principle, it can easily provoke an armed conflict. Without the Black Sea coast from Izmail to Kerch, Russia gets such an extended coastal strip, really controlled by someone unknown, that its very existence as a normal and independent state is called into question. The Black Sea does not replace access to the "warm seas" and its geopolitical significance drops sharply due to the stable Atlanticist control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, but at least it makes it possible to secure the central regions from the potential expansion of Turkish influence, being extremely convenient, reliable and an inexpensive border.

Ukraine, as an independent state with some kind of territorial ambitions, poses a huge danger to the whole of Eurasia, and without a solution to the Ukrainian problem, it is pointless to talk about continental geopolitics at all. This does not mean that the cultural, linguistic or economic autonomy of Ukraine should be limited, and that it should become a purely administrative sector of the Russian centralized state (as, to some extent, was the case in the tsarist empire or under the USSR). But strategically, Ukraine should be strictly a projection of Moscow in the south and west (although more details about possible models of restructuring will be discussed in the chapter on the West).

The absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast is the total and unlimited control of Moscow along its entire length from Ukrainian to Abkhazian territories. It is possible to divide this entire zone on an ethno-cultural basis as much as you like, granting ethnic and confessional autonomy to the Crimean Little Russians, Tatars, Cossacks, Abkhazians, Georgians, etc., but all this only with absolute control of Moscow over the military and political situation. These sectors must be radically divorced from the thalassocratic influence coming from the west and from Turkey (or even Greece). The northern coast of the Black Sea should be exclusively Eurasian and centrally subordinate to Moscow.

4.5 Between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea

The Caucasus itself consists of two geopolitical levels: the North Caucasus and the territory of the three Caucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The entire region of Russian lands from Taganrog to Astrakhan adjoins this sector, i.e. all Russian lands located between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, which also includes a wedge of Kalmykia.

This entire region is an extremely important strategic junction, since the peoples inhabiting it have enormous social dynamics, ancient geopolitical traditions, and it itself directly borders on Atlanticist Turkey, strategically controlling, for its part, the border zone, which, from the point in terms of relief, belongs to a single space of the Caucasus mountain range.

This is one of the most vulnerable points of the Russian geopolitical space, and it is no coincidence that these territories have traditionally been the arena of brutal military operations.

between Russia-heartland and rimland countries Turkey and Iran. Control over the Caucasus opens, as a first approximation, access to the "warm seas", and every (even the most insignificant) movement of the border to the south (or north) means a significant gain (or loss) of the entire continental power, tellurocracy.

Three horizontal strata of this entire region - Russian lands, the North Caucasus as part of Russia and the Caucasus proper - also have their potential continuation even further south. This additional, purely potential belt, located beyond the borders of not only Russia, but also the CIS, consists of South Azerbaijan (located on the territory of Iran) and the northern regions of Turkey, which are largely inhabited by Kurds and Armenians. This entire region presents the same ethno-cultural problem for Turkey and Iran as the Caucasian ethnic groups that are (or were) part of Russia. Consequently, there are all objective prerequisites for the expansion of continental influence deep into the Caucasian area.

So, between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, four levels or strata are distinguished, suggesting a differentiated approach from the side of the Center.

The first layer, the Russian one, should be maximally connected in latitudinal orientation, creating a rigid structure Rostov-on-Don Volgograd Astrakhan. This is the most important link in the Russian space as a whole, since to the north it rests on the central part of Russia, and even further north on Arkhangelsk, the most important northern port and the potential capital of the “northern trapezium”. Due to the relatively close distances from the Central European part and due to the demographically dense population and technical development, the Rostov-on-Don Volgograd Astrakhan triangle is the most important outpost of Russia in the South. This is a kind of replacement for the Eurasian Center itself, a secondary center connected by a continuous territory with deep spaces. That is why this region should become the geopolitical core of the entire Caucasian strategy of Eurasia, and for this it should be strengthened technologically, strategically and intellectually. It is desirable to create a special cohesive Russian zone here, administratively and politically integrated.

At the same time, some problems arise with the northern regions of Kalmykia, which, however, are rather poorly populated. It makes sense to include these northern steppe regions into a common integration belt, geopolitically "stretching" them directly between Rostov-on-Don and Astrakhan in order to close the triangle from below with the top in Volgograd. Thus, geographically and geopolitically, the borders of ancient Khazaria, which controlled this entire region at the beginning of the first millennium, will be reproduced. You can conditionally call this geopolitical formation the "Khazar triangle".

In the transition from the purely Russian zone of the "Khazar triangle", which should follow a latitudinal (horizontal) logic, although closely connected with the north and with the Center itself (Moscow), the vector of integration radically changes its character. The entire North Caucasus and everything that lies to the south of it must obey exclusively the meridian orientation. The strategic centers of the "Khazar triangle" should develop independent geopolitical chains, deploying strictly to the south. From Rostov through Krasnodar to Maikop, Sukhumi and Batumi. From Stavropol to Kislovodsk, Nalchik, Ordzhonikidze, Tskhinval and Tbilisi. From Astrakhan to Makhachkala.

Any latitudinal delimitation of ethnic regions of the Transcaucasus should be supported, while longitudinal integration, on the contrary, should be strengthened. So, it is important by any means to tear off the active separatist Chechnya from Dagestan (and Ingushetia), closing the access to the Caspian Sea.

If we leave Chechnya only Georgia, which lies in the south, then it will be geopolitically controlled from all sides, and it will be possible to control it also from the Orthodox Georgia. Dagestan and Ingushetia should also be tied to Georgia, in part, which could lead to the creation of an autonomous North Caucasian zone, economically developed, but strategically fully controlled by Russia and Eurasianically oriented. A general redistribution of the North Caucasus could also solve the Ossetian problem, since new ethnic formations (for example, united Ossetia) would lose the meaning of national-state formations, acquiring a purely ethnic and cultural, linguistic and religious meaning. Following the same meridian logic, it is important to link Abkhazia directly with Russia.

All these steps are aimed at one geopolitical goal of strengthening the Eurasian tellurocratic complex and preparing its planetary triumph in a duel with Atlanticism. Therefore, this whole plan can be called "the new geopolitical order in the Caucasus." It presupposes a rejection of the traditional approach to existing political entities as "nation-states", i.e. strictly fixed administrative formations with constant boundaries and a complete power structure. The “new geopolitical order in the Caucasus” presupposes a complete redistribution of the currently existing political realities and the transition from the model of state-state or nation-nation relations to a purely geopolitical system Center-periphery, and the structure of the periphery should be determined not by political, but by ethno-cultural differentiation.

This can be done through a plan to create a "Caucasian Federation", which would include both the three Caucasian republics of the CIS and internal Russian autonomous formations. At the same time, the center would yield to the entire region of cultural and economic autarky, but would ensure the most severe strategic centralism. This would lead to an extremely flexible system that would be based not on violence, occupation or uniformization of the Caucasian diversity, but on the awareness of the unity and commonality of the continental destiny.

Armenia, which is Russia's traditional and reliable ally in the Caucasus, plays a special geopolitical role. Armenia serves as the most important strategic base for preventing Turkish expansion to the north and east into the regions of the Central Asian Turkic world. And on the contrary, in the offensive geopolitical aspect, it is important as an ethnocultural community, continuously continuing to the south, to the territory of Turkey, where a significant part of ancient Armenia and its main shrine is Mount Ararat. Racial and linguistic kinship ties Armenians to Kurds, another major ethnic factor that can be used to provoke geopolitical upheavals within Turkey. At the same time, it is extremely important to create a land corridor crossing the entire Caucasus and reliably connecting Armenia with the “Khazar triangle”.

Armenia is important in another sense as well. Based on the historical and ethnic closeness with Iran, it is Armenia that could serve as one of the most important links for the spread of the Eurasian impulse from the Center to the Iranian rimland. This means the creation of the Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran axis.

Azerbaijan should also be tied to Iran (and by no means to Turkey), accentuating Shiism, ethnic affinity with Iranian South Azerbaijan and historical ties. Thus, the most important strategic beam Moscow Tehran through Yerevan would be duplicated by the beam Moscow Baku Tehran, forming a rhombus, in many respects

symmetrical to the Balkan rhombus. In general, there are many geopolitical parallels between the Balkans and the Caucasus. And the most important thing: it is here that the action of the most important geopolitical law is most clearly manifested; latitudinal processes provoke terrible conflicts, longitudinal ties lead to stability and stability. This is especially expressive in the Yugoslav war and in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Karabakh problem itself is somewhat similar to the problem of Macedonia. And therefore, in order to stabilize the entire region, Moscow should establish the most direct ties with Karabakh in order to make this territory a point of balance for the entire Caucasian geopolitical system. For this, the Karabakh negotiations should have four sides optimally: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia and Iran with the exclusion of all Atlanticist participants,

4.6 New geopolitical order in Central Asia

Central Asia is considered to be a huge piece of Eurasian land, stretching from the North Kazakh steppes to the coast of the Arabian Sea. From the former Soviet Central Asian republics, this zone, through the Kopet Dagh and Pamir ridge, extends south to flat Iran and southeast to Afghanistan. Central Asia is the geopolitical space that, rather than anyone else, can lead the heartland to the cherished goal of the Indian Ocean. If Moscow managed to win a positional war with thalassocracy in this direction, many parallel issues would be automatically resolved: integration into the continental block of India, Iraq's strategic support against Turkey, a direct corridor to the Middle East, etc. All this makes this area central to the issue of geopolitical restructuring of the Eurasian South.

Note that Central Asia is divided by a ridge of mountains not only politically and geopolitically, but also racially. The former Soviet zone of Central Asia (with the exception of Tajikistan) is inhabited by the Sunni Turks, the heirs of Turan, many of whom continue to predominantly engage in nomadism and animal husbandry. "Non-Soviet" Central Asia Iran, Afghanistan (and even ethno-culturally related Pakistan) is inhabited by sedentary Indo-Europeans. Thus, geopolitical unity has a distinct racial boundary.

This entire area is divided into three parts:

1) Central Kazakhstan (south of the 50th parallel, since the lands included in the "Russian East" are located to the north of it);

2) Desert Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and mountainous Kyrgyzstan

(these are purely Turanian lands);

3) Iran Afghanistan Pakistan India (this is Iran in the extended sense of "Ariana", "land of the Aryans").

The new Eurasian order in Central Asia is based on linking all these lands from north to south with a rigid geopolitical and strategic axis. At the same time, as always in such cases, it is important to structure the space exclusively in the meridian direction, contributing to the longitudinal convergence of individual regions.

Starting from the north, we are talking about the connection of the whole of Kazakhstan with the Russians in the South Urals and Western Siberia. This connection should serve as the supporting structure of the entire Central Asian area. The consistent and thoughtful integration of Kazakhstan into a common continental bloc with Russia is the basis of all continental politics. At the same time, the most important point is initially the task of rigidly interrupting any influence of Turkey on this region, preventing any projects of "Turanian" integration emanating from Atlanticist Turkey and proposing a purely latitudinal geopolitical development of the former "Soviet" Central Asia, opposed to the Indo-European North (Russia) and the Indo-European South (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India). Turanian integration is a direct antithesis of geopolitical Eurasianism and consists in the splitting of tellurocratic forces into three components: western (European Russia), eastern (Russian Southern Siberia and the Far East) and southern (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan). Such "Turanism" is intended to split the racial and geopolitical alliance of the Forest and the Steppe, which gave rise to both the Russian State and the Great Russian ethnos, and in relation to Iran and Afghanistan, it tears apart the religious unity of the Islamic world. Proceeding from this, heartland should declare a tough geopolitical positional war on Turkey and the bearers of "pan-Turanism" in which the Islamic Aryan Iran will be Russia's main ally. Central Asia should be "stretched" vertically between the two global Indo-European realities between the Russians and the Persians. At the same time, one should strive in every possible way to highlight local autonomist cultural tendencies throughout the Turkic space, to support regionalist forces in the autonomous regions, to aggravate tensions between clans, tribes, "ulus", etc. Everywhere in this area, one should try to close territories, districts, industrial complexes, economic cycles, strategic objects in the territory located outside the Turkic area, or in a strictly meridian direction. So, for example, Karakalpakstan in the west of Uzbekistan should be territorially integrated not in the eastern direction (Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent), but in the northern (Kazakhstan) and southern (Turkmenistan). On the same principle, the border areas between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan Samarkand should be restructured, The Fergana Valley is historically and ethnically connected with the Tajik territories no less than with the Uzbek ones. The same is true for southern Kyrgyzstan.

Geopolitical hinge throughout Central Asian geopolitical strategy tellurocracy should be Tajikistan. This area combines the most important aspects of the whole Russian "Drang nach Suden", "dash to the South". Tajiks are Muslims of Indo-European origin, ethnically close to Iranians and Afghans. Those. they represent in this region a fragment of the "Iranian" world. At the same time, Tajikistan was part of Russia and the USSR, i.e. was integrated into the continental proper, Eurasian geopolitical system. Therefore, the fate of this small mountainous country, ancient Sogdiana, symbolizes the success (or failure) of establishing a new Eurasian order in Central Asia.

The de facto border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan should not be taken as a strict line. This is not a historical fact, but a geopolitical task, since in the interests of the heartland it would be generally to abolish any strict restrictions here, moving the strategic line far to the south, and rebuilding the entire intermediate region on the basis of ethnocultural, tribal and regional boundaries. Afghanistan does not have a tradition of a complete centralized statehood. It is inhabited by many nomadic and sedentary tribes (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc.), connected more by religion (Islam) than by statehood and politics. Therefore, the geopolitical return of Russia to Afghanistan is inevitable and predetermined by the

geography. The only thing is that it is necessary to rely not so much on military power as on a well-thought-out geopolitical strategy, on the preparation of a conscious and voluntary strategic alliance on both sides, caused by the need for a common confrontation between the thalassocracy, the "forces of the West," Muslims. In this process, Tajikistan plays the role of the main base, and its territory becomes a geopolitical laboratory in which two oppositely directed impulses converge, the Islamic impulse of the Indo-European Eurasian South and the Russian geopolitical impulse coming from the heartland from the north. Here, in Tajikistan, in Dushanbe or in another city, a joint Russian-Islamic strategy for the reorganization of the more northern "Turan" should be worked out.

Thus, it is logical to draw another ray from the Eurasian Center: Moscow Dushanbe Kabul Tehran, along which an unprecedented geopolitical reality should develop.

Part of Tajikistan Gorno Badakhshan is located very close to Pakistan and India, which converge almost to the same point together with China (Xinjiang). Despite the fact that these zones are almost impassable, as they are located very high in the Pamir mountains, the Gorno-Badakhshan region itself has a deep geopolitical meaning. It is inhabited by the Ismailis, an Islamic heretical sect that is an expression of the most extreme Shi'ism, i.e. the most Indo-European (from a spiritual point of view) version of Islam. Badakhshani Ismailis are settled close to the regions of Pakistan, and this state (although officially Sunni) is ethnically Hindus converted to Islam. And this indicates that they, of course, are closer to Indo-European tendencies within the framework of this religion, if not frankly "Shiite", then "Cryptoshiite". Not so far away is Indian Kashmir, which is also inhabited by Hindu Muslims and Shaivists. Uighur Muslims also inhabit the Xinjiang region in China. Therefore, the religious specificity of Badakhshan and its strategic position makes it possible for the heartland to actively participate in solving the most important geopolitical problems that converge precisely in this area, the Pakistani-Indian wars, the potential Uyghur Islamic separatism in China, the national liberation struggle in Tibet, the Sikh movement in slightly more southern Punjab, etc. All the threads of this critical Asian knot converge in Tajikistan, or rather, in Badakhshan. Hence, an additional and independent axis Moscow Khorog (the capital of Badakhshan) suggests itself. Moreover,

This entire complex area should be restructured under the most active influence of the “geographic axis of history” of Russia on the basis of the tellurocratic model, i.e. contrary to the plans that the thalassocratic Atlantic elements have in this regard. It is known that it was England that supported the separatist movement of Indian Muslims, which led to the secession of Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani conflicts are also beneficial to the Atlanticists, as it allows them to strengthen their political and economic influence in both regions, taking advantage of geopolitical contradictions and

making the entire region dependent on the military-strategic presence of the Americans and the British. At the moment, Pakistan, India, and China are steadily part of the rimland controlled by the Thalassocrates. The geopolitical role of Tajikistan and Badakhshan is to radically change this state of affairs and organize a Eurasian system of continental integration throughout this space. At the same time, in the ideological sphere, it is extremely important to take into account the slightest ethno-religious and cultural-linguistic nuances, and in the military-strategic sphere, it is necessary to strive for rigid and uncontested centralism.

In a political sense, the anti-Americanism of fundamentalist Iran and the strict "neutrality" of India give serious grounds for the success of the Eurasian strategy. The rest depends on the geopolitical will of Moscow and, more broadly, Russia-Eurasia.

4.7 The Fall of China

China is Russia's most dangerous geopolitical neighbor in the South. In some ways, its role is similar to that of Turkey. But if Turkey is a member of NATO frankly, and its strategic Atlanticism is obvious, then with China everything is more complicated.

China's geopolitics was initially ambivalent. On the one hand, he belonged to the rimland, the “coastal zone” of the Pacific Ocean (on the eastern side), and on the other hand, he never became a thalassocracy and, on the contrary, always focused on continental archetypes. Therefore, there is a stable political tradition to call China the "Middle Empire", and this term characterizes just continental tellurocratic formations. At the same time, China is separated from the Indian Ocean by the Indochina Peninsula, on which an inflorescence of states with a frank thalassocratic orientation is located.

In the course of the development (colonization) of the East by the West, China gradually turned into a semi-colony with the marion of the exact pro-English government of the last generations of the Qing dynasty emperors. From the beginning of the 19th century until 1949 (the victory of the CPC over the Kuomintang), China's geopolitics followed purely Atlanticist tendencies (while China acted not as an independent thalassocracy, but as a Eurasian coastal base of the West). The victory of the Communist Party changed the state of affairs, and China for a short time (1949 1958) reoriented to a Eurasian pro-Russian policy. However, due to historical traditions, the Eurasian line was soon abandoned, and China preferred "autarky". It remained to wait for the moment when the Eurasian orientation weakened so much that the potential Atlanticism and geopolitical identity of China as a rimland would become evident. This happened in the mid-1970s, when China began active negotiations with representatives of the Mondialist Trilateral Commission. This meant a new entry of China into the structure of Atlanticist geopolitics.

Without denying the possibility of China, under certain circumstances, to re-enter the path of the Eurasian Alliance, one should not particularly count on this. Purely pragmatically, contacts with the West are much more profitable for China than with Russia, which will not be able to contribute to the technological development of this country, and such “friendship” will only bind China's freedom of geopolitical manipulation in the Far East, Mongolia and Southern Siberia. In addition, the demographic growth of China poses the problem of "free territories" to this country, and the lands of Kazakhstan and Siberia (almost unoccupied) seem to be extremely attractive in this perspective.

China is dangerous for Russia for two reasons, as a geopolitical base of Atlanticism and in itself, as a country of increased demographic density in search of "no-man's spaces". In either case, heartland has in this case a positional threat, the location of which is extremely dangerous China occupies the lands located south of Lenaland.

In addition, China has a closed racial and cultural specificity, and in historically foreseeable periods it has never participated in the Eurasian continental building.

All these considerations, regardless of political specifics, make China a potential geopolitical adversary of Russia in the South and East. This should be recognized as a geopolitical axiom. Therefore, the geopolitical task of Russia in relation to the easternmost sector of its “inner” southern belt is to maximize its zone of influence to the south, creating the widest possible “border zone”. In the future, Eurasia should extend its influence all the way to Indochina, but it is almost impossible to achieve this through a mutually beneficial union. And this is the fundamental difference between China and Islamic Asia (with the exception of Turkey) and India. If the Eurasian alliance with other southern sectors of Eurasia should be based on consideration of mutual interests, i.e. be the result of a conscious and voluntary union, based on the awareness of the commonality of the geopolitical mission, in the case of China we are talking about power positional geopolitical pressure, provocation of territorial disintegration, fragmentation, political and administrative redistribution of the state. The same approach applies to Turkey. China and Turkey are potential geopolitical adversaries. Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Korea, Vietnam and Japan are potential geopolitical allies. This involves the use of two different geopolitical strategies. In the case of opponents, one should strive to cause harm; in the case of allies, it is necessary to reveal the commonality of geopolitical goals. The same approach applies to Turkey. China and Turkey are potential geopolitical adversaries. Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Korea, Vietnam and Japan are potential geopolitical allies. This involves the use of two different geopolitical strategies. In the case of opponents, one should strive to cause harm; in the case of allies, it is necessary to reveal the commonality of geopolitical goals. The same approach applies to Turkey. China and Turkey are potential geopolitical adversaries. Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Korea, Vietnam and Japan are potential geopolitical allies. This involves the use of two different geopolitical strategies. In the case of opponents, one should strive to cause harm; in the case of allies, it is necessary to reveal the commonality of geopolitical goals.

It is now easy to deduce the priorities of Russia's "internal geopolitics" in the space from Badakhshan to Vladivostok.

The main model here is the separation of northern Thai territories from more southern lands. Geopolitical analysis immediately provides a strong basis for this. China's northwest lies in Xinjiang, an ancient country with a long history of political autonomy. Numerous states have historically existed here, replacing each other. Moreover, at the moment these lands are inhabited by the Uighurs of the Turkic ethnic group professing Islam. The Chinese maintain control in these areas through direct forceful pressure, direct colonization, oppressing the local population and suppressing all their attempts to defend religious and ethnic autonomy. The ideas of the annexation of Xinjiang to Russia already existed among the Russian emperors as part of the project for the development of Siberia. We should return to this line. South of Xinjiang stretches Kun-Lun and Tibet, where we again face a similar situation Tibet is a separate country with a special population, specific religion, ancient political and ethnic traditions. Beijing's power here is also artificial and based on outright violence, as in Xinjiang. Russia is geopolitically directly interested in actively supporting separatism in these areas and in starting an anti-Chinese national liberation struggle in this entire area. In the future, all these territories would harmoniously fit into the Eurasian continental federation, since neither geography nor history connects them with Atlanticism. Xinjiang and Tibet must enter the tellurocracy belt. This will be the most positive geopolitical Beijing's power here is also artificial and based on outright violence, as in Xinjiang. Russia is geopolitically directly interested in actively supporting separatism in these areas and in starting an anti-Chinese national liberation struggle in this entire area. In the future, all these territories would harmoniously fit into the Eurasian continental federation, since neither geography nor history connects them with Atlanticism. Xinjiang and Tibet must enter the tellurocracy belt. This will be the most positive geopolitical Beijing's power here is also artificial and based on outright violence, as in Xinjiang. Russia is geopolitically directly interested in actively supporting separatism in these areas and in starting an anti-Chinese national liberation struggle in this entire area. In the future, all these territories would harmoniously fit into the Eurasian continental federation, since neither geography nor history connects them with Atlanticism. Xinjiang and Tibet must enter the tellurocracy belt. This will be the most positive geopolitical because neither geography nor history connects them with Atlanticism. Xinjiang and Tibet must enter the tellurocracy belt. This will be the most positive geopolitical because neither geography nor history connects them with Atlanticism. Xinjiang and Tibet must enter the tellurocracy belt. This will be the most positive geopolitical

decision and will create reliable protection for Russia even if China does not abandon its anti-Eurasian geopolitical projects. Without Xinjiang and Tibet, China's potential geopolitical breakthrough into Kazakhstan and Western Siberia becomes impossible. Moreover, not only the complete liberation of these territories from Chinese control, but even the first stages of destabilizing the situation in these regions will already be a strategic gain for Russia.

To the east is the Mongolian sector of Russia's strategic ally. Here it is important to act preemptively and to prevent the very possibility of an increase in the pro-Chinese factor in Mongolian politics. Mongolian steppes and deserts perfectly protect South Siberia from China. At the same time, Mongolia's ties with Xinjiang and Tibet should be intensified in order to create the prerequisites for a new configuration of the entire region with an orientation towards the gradual ousting of China and its geopolitical influence. For this purpose, it is possible to put forward a project of the Mongol-Tibetan Federation, which could also include Buryatia, Tuva, Khakassia and the Altai Republic. The unity of the Lamaist tradition of these peoples for Moscow is an important tool for the anti-Chinese geopolitical strategy.

The last zone of the southern belt is Manchuria, a territory located in northeastern China. And here we are faced with a weak (for China) geopolitical link. Ancient states with a tradition of political independence also existed on this territory. Already in the 20th century, Japan again recreated the Manchu state with its capital in Harbin, which was a continental foothold for Japan's invasion of China. For Russia, the existence in Manchuria of a special political state not controlled by China is highly desirable. Since Japan itself is one of the potential geopolitical allies of Eurasia, efforts could be combined in this matter.

Tibet Xinjiang Mongolia Manchuria together constitute the security belt of Russia. The main task in this region is to make these lands controlled by the heartland, using at the same time Russia's potential geopolitical allies India and Japan, as well as the local population suffering from the Beijing dictate. For China itself, this belt is a strategic foothold for a potential "dash to the North," to Kazakhstan and Siberia. These are lands adjacent to Lenaland from the south, around which a geopolitical positional confrontation of the leading world forces will inevitably unfold. Russia must tear this bridgehead away from China, throw China southward and offer it, as geopolitical compensation, the development along the North-South axis in the southern direction of Indochina (except Vietnam), the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia.

4.8 From the Balkans to Manchuria

Eurasia should "press" on the South throughout the entire space from the Balkan Peninsula to Northeastern China. This entire belt is a strategically important security zone for Russia. The peoples inhabiting different sectors of this space are different ethnically, religiously and culturally. But all of them, without exception, have elements that bring them closer to the geopolitical formula of heartland. For some, this is Orthodoxy, for others, historical belonging to a single state, for others, ethnic and racial closeness, for the fourth, a common enemy, for the fifth, a pragmatic calculation. This diversity of the South dictates the need for extremely flexible geopolitics and extremely developed argumentation justifying the need for

ties, alliances, etc. None of the criteria is a priority here, you cannot rely only on one of the factors ethnos, religion, race, history, profit, etc. In each case, you should act differently. The highest criterion in this case remains geopolitics and its laws, which should subordinate all other considerations, and not become only an instrument of foreign (or domestic) policy based on some separate and independent principles. Only in this case will Eurasia be able to achieve stability, and Russia will reliably ensure its continental security and fulfill its tellurocratic mission.

5.1 Two West

The problem of organizing space in the West of Eurasia is the theme that forms the basis of all geopolitics as a science. Western Europe is the rimland of Eurasia, and the rimland is the most complete, unambiguous and historically identifiable. In relation to Russia itself as a heartland, the West as a whole is the main planetary enemy that sector of "coastal civilization" that has fully assumed the function of a complete thalassocracy and has identified its historical fate with the sea. England was at the forefront of this process, but all other European countries that took up the baton of industrialization, technical development and the value standards of the "commercial system" also sooner or later entered this thalassocratic ensemble.

During the historical formation of the final geographical picture of the West primacy from the island of England passed to the continent especially to the USA. of America, thus, the NATO bloc became the maximum So in its strategic, embodiment of thalassocracy in ideological, economic and USA and controlled cultural aspects.

This ultimate geopolitical fixation of planetary forces places the pole of Atlanticism and thalassocracy across the Atlantic, on the American continent. Europe itself (even Western, including England itself) from the center of thalassocracy becomes a "buffer zone", "coastal belt", "strategic appendage" of the United States. Such a transfer of the thalassocratic axis across the ocean somewhat changes the geopolitical configuration. If a century ago Europe (England and France) was the main enemy of Russia, then after the Second World War this region lost its independent strategic importance, turning into a strategic colony of the United States. This transformation is strictly consistent with the "view from the sea", which characterizes the typically colonial attitude towards the mainland of any thalassocracy. Whereas previously the “coastal” nature of Europe was a potential characteristic, activated by a special geopolitical entity "the Isle of England", now this exactly corresponds to the current picture of the distribution of forces. The United States, a geopolitical reality that emerged from Europe as its almost artificial projection, has become a completely independent pole, the West in the absolute sense of the word, turning Europe from a metropolis into a colony. All this is in full accordance with the classical logic of thalassocratic geopolitics.

Thus, at present, the geopolitical problem of the planetary West, in the broadest sense, is breaking up for Russia into two components, the West as America and the West as Europe. From a geopolitical point of view, these two realities have different meanings. The West, like America, is a total geopolitical adversary of Russia, the pole of the opposite trend to Eurasia, the headquarters and center of Atlanticism. A positional geopolitical war with America has been and is the essence of all Eurasian geopolitics since the middle of the 20th century, when the role of the United States became apparent. In this regard, the position of the heartland is clear, it is necessary to oppose the Atlanticist geopolitics of the United States at all levels and in all regions of the earth, trying to weaken, demoralize, deceive and, ultimately, defeat the enemy as much as possible.

internal American reality, encouraging all kinds of separatism, various ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements, extremist, racist, sectarian groups, destabilizing the internal political processes in the United States. At the same time, it makes sense at the same time to support isolationist tendencies in American politics, the theses of those (often right-wing republican) circles that believe that the United States should confine itself to its internal problems. This state of affairs is highly beneficial for Russia, even if "isolationism" is carried out within the framework of the original version of the Monroe Doctrine, i.e. if the US limits its influence to two Americas. This does not mean that Eurasia should at the same time abandon the destabilization of the Latin American world, seeking to bring certain regions out of US control. All levels of geopolitical pressure on the United States should be involved simultaneously, just as the anti-Eurasian policy of Atlanticism simultaneously "sponsors" the processes of the collapse of the strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), state unity (USSR) and further ethno-territorial fragmentation, under the guise of regionalization of Russia, carrying out its progressive decay up to complete destruction. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and reasonable. All this is the central task of Russia's "foreign geopolitics" relative to the United States, therefore a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work. as the anti-Eurasian policy of Atlanticism simultaneously "sponsors" the processes of the collapse of the strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), state unity (USSR) and further ethno-territorial fragmentation, under the guise of regionalization of Russia, carrying out its progressive disintegration to the point of complete destruction. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and reasonable. All this is the central task of Russia's "foreign geopolitics" relative to the United States, therefore a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work. as the anti-Eurasian policy of Atlanticism simultaneously "sponsors" the processes of the collapse of the strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), state unity (USSR) and further ethno-territorial fragmentation, under the guise of regionalization of Russia, carrying out its progressive disintegration to the point of complete destruction. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and reasonable. All this is the central task of Russia's "foreign geopolitics" relative to the United States, therefore a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and reasonable. All this is the central task of Russia's "foreign geopolitics" relative to the United States, therefore a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and reasonable. All this is the central task of Russia's "foreign geopolitics" relative to the United States, therefore a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work.

The second reality, also called the West, has a different meaning. This is Europe, the geopolitical meaning of which has changed dramatically over the past decades. Traditionally the metropolis for other parts of the planet, Europe for the first time found itself in the situation of a strategic, cultural, economic, political, etc. colony. American colonialism differs from the more explicit and harsh forms of the past, but its meaning remains the same. Europe at the moment does not have its own geopolitics and its own geographic will, its functions are limited to the fact that it serves as an auxiliary base for the United States in Eurasia and the site of the most probable conflict with Eurasia. This situation automatically leads to the fact that the anti-American line becomes a common geopolitical alternative to European states, uniting them in a single project, which never existed before. The unification of Europe in Maastricht is the first signal of the emergence of Europe as a whole and independent organism, claiming to regain its historical significance and geopolitical sovereignty. Europe does not want to be either Russian or American. After the end of the Cold War, this will has manifested itself in full force.

Now the question arises: what, in general terms, is the attitude of Eurasia to its western peninsula?

From a purely geopolitical point of view, Eurasia is clearly interested in taking Europe out of the control of Atlanticism, the United States. This is a priority. In the West, Russia should have sea borders; this is a strategic imperative of the geopolitical development of Eurasia. It was the absence of such borders, the presence of a land line instead of them, crossing Europe in the middle, artificially and violently, that ultimately led to the geopolitical loss of the USSR. Therefore, the task is not to repeat mistakes and to correct the situation. Eurasia will only be free from Sea Power when its strategic borders in the North, East, South and West become oceans, just as in the case of America. Only then will the duel of civilizations proceed on equal terms.

Therefore, Russia has two options, either the military occupation of Europe, or such a reorganization of the European space that will make this geopolitical sector a reliable strategic allies of Moscow, while preserving its sovereignty, autonomy and autarky. The first option is so unrealistic that it should not be seriously discussed. The second option is difficult, but feasible, since half a century spent by Europe in the position of an American colony left a serious mark on the European consciousness.

A friendly Europe as a strategic ally of Russia can emerge only if it is united. Otherwise, the Atlantic adversary will find many ways to split and split the European bloc, provoking a conflict similar to the two world wars. Therefore, Moscow should contribute to the European unification as much as possible, especially by supporting the Central European states, first of all, Germany. The alliance between Germany and France, the Paris Berlin axis (de Gaulle's project), is the backbone around which it is most logical to build the body of New Europe. Germany and France have a strong anti-Atlanticist political tradition (both right-wing and left-wing political currents). Being for the time being potential and hidden, she will at some point declare herself loudly.

Moscow's task is to wrest Europe from the control of the United States (NATO), to promote its unification, to strengthen integration ties with Central Europe under the sign of the main foreign policy axis Moscow Berlin. Eurasia needs an allied friendly Europe. From a military point of view, it will not pose a serious threat on its own (without the United States) for a long time to come, and economic cooperation with neutral Europe will be able to solve most of the technological problems of Russia and Asia in exchange on resources and strategic military partnership.

Based on this external geopolitical tasks, should analyze and the internal political situation of Russia in its western regions.

5.2 Destroy the "cordon sanitaire"

The main formula for the analysis of the geopolitics of the “Russian West” is the principle: “European for Europe, Russian for Russia”. Here, in general, one should act in the same way as in the case of the Islamic world, new borders are inevitable, some regions should be divided anew, but in all cases the main task is to create friendly-neutral formations in the West, with maximum ethnocultural, economic and social freedom. but with strategic dependence on Moscow. The task is to "finlandize" the whole of Europe at the most, but it is necessary to start with the reorganization of the spaces adjacent directly to Russia.

A complex problem immediately arises here: the “cordon sanitaire”. Atlanticist geopoliticians are well aware of the strategic danger of an alliance between Russia and Europe (especially Germany) and traditionally seek to prevent this in every possible way. The most effective method of thalassocracy is the "cordon sanitaire", i.e. a strip of several border states hostile to both the eastern and western neighbors, and directly related to the Atlanticist pole. Poland and Eastern European countries traditionally act as such a "cordon sanitaire"
located south of Czechoslovakia, Romania, etc. The idea of such a "cordon" was developed by geopolitician Mackinder and was very successfully implemented at the beginning

century and before the Second World War. Moreover, in both cases, the goal was achieved in the end, between the two continental powers, Russia and Germany, a conflict ensued, as a result of which strategic victories went to the Atlanticists. America owes its place at the head of the West precisely to two world wars that bled Europe and especially weakened Germany and Russia (the main rivals of Atlantism).

It is obvious that such a “cordon sanitaire” will arise even now, created from small, embittered, historically irresponsible peoples and states, with maniacal claims and servile dependence on the thalassocratic West.

We are talking about the emergence of a geopolitical strip between the Baltic and the Black Sea, consisting of states that cannot enter Europe as a full-fledged component, but are strenuously pushing away from Moscow and Eurasia. Applicants for members of the new "cordon sanitaire" are the Baltic peoples (Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians), Poland (including West Prussia), Belarus (this idea is being lobbied by the Catholic anti-Eurasian minority), Ukraine (especially the Western Uniato-Catholic), Hungary, Romania (also influenced by the Uniates), Czech Republic and Slovakia. At the same time, it is clear that almost everywhere we are talking about the Catholic sector of Eastern Europe, which traditionally belonged to the zone of influence of the West. At the same time, we are dealing with the same countries that more than once in geopolitical history acted as levers of destruction of the continental formations of the Russian Empire,

The task of Eurasia is to prevent this cordon from existing. This is in the interests of both Europe and Russia. These formations themselves, if we consider them as state ones, are bankrupt, ethnically and confessionally contradictory, strategically and economically underdeveloped, deprived of resources. In other words, these fictitious states make sense only as strategic zones artificially supported by Atlanticism. Everywhere there are factors that tie them to Eurasia (either Orthodoxy, or the awareness of Slavic kinship, or the presence of a Russian population, or historical closeness, or several components at once, etc.), but there are also opposite factors that bring them closer to the West (Catholicism , Uniatism, ethnic otherness, political traditions of sovereignty, etc.). While these formations are something whole, they cannot prefer either of the two orientations, and that is why they become in the full sense of the word "cordon sanitaire". Integration with the East is hindered by some elements, integration with the West by others. Hence the constant internal and external instability provoked by these countries, which plays into the hands of thalassocracy and is a constant obstacle in the way of Eurasian geopolitics and the continental block.

The only way to eliminate the "cordon sanitaire" is to completely redistribute new state structures on the basis of purely geopolitical factors. This does not have to automatically mean the annexation of territories to other states. We can talk about the creation on the spot of states of federations or several states, whose geopolitical orientation will, however, be unambiguous. It will be easier for small formations, united both ethnically and culturally and confessionally, to integrate into large geopolitical blocs, and in the presence of strong allied relations between Russia and Europe, new borders will not mean a real threshold, a rupture. Moreover, only the absence of a "cordon sanitaire" can make these common Eurasian relations normal, turn the space from "Dublin to Vladivostok" into a zone of Eurasian cooperation,

5.3 Baltic Federation

Let us consider in more detail the entire western belt adjacent to Russia. The entire space is divided into several sectors. The Scandinavian belt, which runs from Norway to Finland, lies farthest to the north. With regard to Finland, we will discuss the general geopolitical project in the chapter on the North. Here we are talking about the creation of a Karelian-Finnish ethno-territorial entity with maximum cultural autonomy, but strategic integration into the Eurasian bloc. Norway and Sweden, as well as the Baltic republics, belong to a different geopolitical context, broader than the Karelian-Finnish issues.

Here we are faced with a more general theme of the geopolitics of the Baltic and Scandinavia. The most convenient thing in this case would be to follow the Swedish geopolitician Rudolf Kjellen (who invented the term “geopolitics”) and consider the entire Baltic region as a northern extension of Central Europe, structured around Germany. Kjellen believed that Scandinavian geopolitics could not have any other development than a strategic union with Germany based on ethnic, cultural and geographic community. But the connecting element of the whole structure should be Prussia, the German state with the dominance of the Protestant denomination, common to the Scandinavians. The Protestant-Scandinavian bloc should be a northern extension of Prussia, Berlin. Therefore, all this space, having begun to realize itself as a single whole, cannot do without the geopolitical restoration of Prussian unity. At the moment, Prussia does not exist, its lands are distributed between Germany, Poland and Russia. Consequently, the most important prerequisite for the creation of a "neutral" politically and Moscow-friendly Baltic Federation is missing. Hence the practical impossibility of organizing this region in accordance with Eurasian principles.

On a purely theoretical level, the problem is solved in two stages:

1) A new ethno-confessional space is being recreated within the boundaries of historical Prussia. Moscow and Berlin are the initiators. From this follows the loyalty of the named axial figure in relation to Russia, which will give life to this formation, having ceded part of the Prussian lands acquired during the Second World War (the Kaliningrad region).

2) Around Prussia, the process of strategic unification of the Baltic states into a single bloc begins. The block includes Norway, Sweden, Germany, Estonia, Finland-Karelia, Denmark, possibly Holland. The special status is delegated to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. A prerequisite is the withdrawal of all countries from NATO and the creation of a demilitarized zone in the Baltic. In the future, strategic control will be transferred to Moscow and the Armed Forces of "neutral" Europe, i.e. to the Eurasian defense complex.

The only weak elements in this system are Poland and Lithuania, where Catholicism is the predominant denomination. These lands were the main lever of thalassocratic geopolitics against Eurasia and the possibility of creating a continental bloc. Moreover, there is a precedent in history of significant political independence of the Polish-Lithuanian principality, and some historians (in particular, Spengler) even spoke about the existence of a special "Baltic civilization", geographically coinciding, in general terms, with historical borders

Poland and Lithuania. Only certain historical conditions did not allow this civilization to develop completely and made it "abortive" (Spengler's term). It must be admitted that this problem does not have a positive solution at all, since it is formulated as follows: either the Polish-Lithuanian space will exist as an independent geopolitical reality (and then it will become an insurmountable obstacle on the path of the pro-Eurasian Baltic unity with the axis in Prussia), or its fragments will be integrated into other geopolitical blocs, while it itself will be dismembered and crushed in the bud. Any integration on a Catholic basis in this region will create tension both in relation to the East (Moscow), and in relation to the North (Protestant world of Scandinavia), and in relation to the West (Germany). Hence,

Protestant, Orthodox religious circles, ethnic minorities. Moreover, ethnic tensions in Polish-Lithuanian relations are an extremely valuable element that should be exploited and, if possible, exacerbated.

If the re-creation of Prussia would solve, for the most part, the problems with Poland, which in such a situation would only have a path to the south (since the Baltic region would be under German-Russian control), then the situation with Lithuania is even more complicated, since it is the northernmost fragment of the Catholic world, it has a long coastline in the Baltic and separates the Russian space from the northern tip of Central Europe, not belonging to either world. Obviously, Atlanticist geopoliticians will not fail to take advantage of this circumstance and will try to make Lithuania the cause of discord and the main obstacle to the reorganization of Europe. It is possible to limit the negative consequences of Lithuania's geopolitical location for the Eurasian project only partially,

5.4 Catholics-Slavs enter Central Europe

Going down to the south, we find ourselves in the Slavic-Catholic or Uniate region, which stretches from Poland through Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, Volhynia, Galicia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to Croatia and Slovenia in the west of the Balkan Peninsula. This space is geopolitically adjacent to Hungary, Austria and Bavaria, inhabited by Catholics, Hungarians and Germans, respectively. The Uniate Church also exists in Orthodox Romania. This predominantly Slavic space, despite its ethnic and racial kinship with Russia, has never identified itself with the East Slavic statehood, and even less so with the Eurasian empire of Moscow. Ethnic kinship in this case is not a sufficient basis for geopolitical integration.

Culturally Slavic Catholic peoples formed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and ethnic tensions with it, which led to the disintegration, arose only when Vienna itself lost the idea of its supranational imperial geopolitical mission and became more and more identified with ethnic "Germanism" ... The only exception is only Bohemia, Moravia and Bosnia, where the Slavs were initially aware of their spiritual difference from the German-Catholic beginning, which was expressed in

the Hussite wars, reformation fermentations and outbursts of sectarianism (in the case of the Bosnian Bogomil Serbs). From a geopolitical point of view, all these peoples belong to Central Europe and should be structured around the Central European Center, which naturally is Germany. Direct impact on these areas of Moscow can never become a priority, since ethnic proximity only emphasizes cultural, historical and spiritual and confessional differences.

Based on these considerations, Russia needs to relinquish direct control over the countries of Eastern Europe, leaving them to German control. At the same time, Moscow should not only passively wait for this to happen by itself, but actively promote organic processes in this area in order to become, together with Berlin, the initiator and implementer of the entire process, thereby acquiring a geopolitical share in solving all delicate problems. At the same time, it will be necessary to abandon domination over some regions of Western Ukraine, Galicia and Transcarpathia, densely populated by Uniates and Catholics. The same applies to some regions of Belarus. Refusing direct political domination over some territories, in return Moscow should receive the right of a strategic presence on the westernmost borders of the entire Central European region. This is the essence of the whole reorganization of Eastern Europe. Moscow should agree to provide the entire Catholic-Slavic space with the possibility of integration into Central Europe under the leadership of Berlin, i.e. close this zone according to the North-South principle. The only important thing is to remove Lithuania from this ensemble (for the reasons that we have already mentioned, so that the entire Central European structure should be patronized strictly by two parties (Russia and Germany), with the complete exclusion of the West of thalassocracy, since otherwise this entire belt will acquire the opposite meaning , having turned into a "cordon sanitaire" (although it is created precisely to prevent the emergence of such a "cordon"). Moscow should agree to provide the entire Catholic-Slavic space with the possibility of integration into Central Europe under the leadership of Berlin, i.e. close this zone according to the North-South principle. The only important thing is to remove Lithuania from this ensemble (for the reasons that we have already mentioned, so that the entire Central European structure should be patronized strictly by two parties (Russia and Germany), with the complete exclusion of the West of thalassocracy, since otherwise this entire belt will acquire the opposite meaning , having turned into a "cordon sanitaire" (although it is created precisely to prevent the emergence of such a "cordon"). Moscow should agree to provide the entire Catholic-Slavic space with the possibility of integration into Central Europe under the leadership of Berlin, i.e. close this zone according to the North-South principle. The only important thing is to remove Lithuania from this ensemble (for the reasons that we have already mentioned, so that the entire Central European structure should be patronized strictly by two parties (Russia and Germany), with the complete exclusion of the West of thalassocracy, since otherwise this entire belt will acquire the opposite meaning , having turned into a "cordon sanitaire" (although it is created precisely to prevent the emergence of such a "cordon").

5.5 Unification of Belarus and Great Russia

The map, which takes into account the confessional structure of Eastern Europe, clearly shows how, as it moves south, the Orthodox population is shifting more and more to the west, crowding out the Catholic. Some Serbian lands reach the Adriatic coast, and in addition, there is a certain percentage of Orthodox Christians among the Albanians (the founder of independent Albania was the Orthodox priest Fan Noli).

These territories, which include Belarus, the central part of Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria, have a dual geopolitical nature; geographically, they belong to the southern sector of Central Europe, and culturally and confessionally to Russia-Eurasia. The spiritual identity of these peoples was formed from the opposition to Islam in the south and Catholicism in the west, their national idea is inseparably linked with Orthodoxy. In such a situation, Moscow can neither fully delegate geopolitical control over the region of Germany, nor declare its direct political influence on these countries. Moreover, not everything is going smoothly in Russian-Moldovan and Russian-Romanian relations (not to mention Ukraine). Russia has the closest historical contacts with Serbia, but it is impossible to build on them the tactics of integrating the entire region, since Serbia has traditionally rather strained relations with its Orthodox neighbors. In addition, we highlighted the general picture of Russia's geopolitical strategy in the Balkans in the chapter on the South. Here it is necessary to more specifically consider the territories occupied by Belarus, Ukraine and Romania (with Moldova).

With regard to Belarus, the geopolitical picture is quite clear. With the exception of a small part of the Polonized Belarusians (Catholics and Uniates, as well as Poles), the overwhelming majority of the population definitely belongs to the Russian space and should be considered as a subject of the central Eurasian ethnos, i.e. as "Russians" in cultural, religious, ethnic and geopolitical senses. Linguistic specificity, some ethnic and cultural peculiarities do not change the overall picture. Therefore, Moscow should integrate with Belarus in the most close way, not forgetting that the promotion of the cultural and linguistic identity of Belarusians is an important positive moment in the entire system of Eurasian integration. In relation to ethnic groups belonging to a single state, this principle should be observed just as strictly, as in the case of border peoples or neighbors. The only painful step in Belarus that needs to be taken to prevent centrifugal and subversive tendencies is the allocation of some areas densely populated by Catholics and Uniates into a special administrative category, up to granting them significant autonomy sufficient to enter the Central European space. The desire at all costs to keep Belarus as a whole under the direct and strict control of Moscow will lead to the fact that both in it and on the part of its western neighbors Russia will have the smoldering coals of a potential geopolitical conflict, which in this case (unlike, for example, Lithuania) can be resolved in the interests of all interested parties. which needs to be undertaken to prevent centrifugal and subversive tendencies is the allocation of some areas densely populated by Catholics and Uniates into a special administrative category until they are given significant autonomy sufficient to enter the Central European space. The desire at all costs to keep Belarus as a whole under the direct and strict control of Moscow will lead to the fact that both in it and on the part of its western neighbors Russia will have the smoldering coals of a potential geopolitical conflict, which in this case (unlike, for example, Lithuania) can be resolved in the interests of all interested parties. which needs to be undertaken to prevent centrifugal and subversive tendencies is the allocation of some areas densely populated by Catholics and Uniates into a special administrative category until they are given significant autonomy sufficient to enter the Central European space. The desire at all costs to keep Belarus as a whole under the direct and strict control of Moscow will lead to the fact that both in it and on the part of its western neighbors Russia will have the smoldering coals of a potential geopolitical conflict, which in this case (unlike, for example, Lithuania) can be resolved in the interests of all interested parties. densely populated by Catholics and Uniates until they were granted significant autonomy, sufficient to enter the Central European space. The desire at all costs to keep Belarus as a whole under the direct and strict control of Moscow will lead to the fact that both in it and on the part of its western neighbors Russia will have the smoldering coals of a potential geopolitical conflict, which in this case (unlike, for example, Lithuania) can be resolved in the interests of all interested parties. densely populated by Catholics and Uniates until they were granted significant autonomy, sufficient to enter the Central European space. The desire at all costs to keep Belarus as a whole under the direct and strict control of Moscow will lead to the fact that both in it and on the part of its western neighbors Russia will have the smoldering coals of a potential geopolitical conflict, which in this case (unlike, for example, Lithuania) can be resolved in the interests of all interested parties.

Belarus should be viewed as a part of Russia, and therefore integration with it should be carried out along the West-East axis, which is a priority in all cases of the internal organization of an ethnically homogeneous space. The real western border of Russia should run much further to the west, therefore, in a full-fledged geopolitical picture, the Belarusian lands are more likely to belong to the central region than to the western outskirts.

5.6 Geopolitical decomposition of Ukraine

The question of Ukraine is more complicated, although the model of the geopolitical composition of this state is very similar. Here, however, an important role is played by the geopolitical scale of Ukraine, which is a gigantic territorial entity that exceeds in volume many major European powers. Separatism and the tendencies of political sovereignty are incomparably more active in Ukraine. Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning. It has neither a special cultural message of universal significance, nor geographical uniqueness, nor ethnicity.
exclusivity. The historical meaning of Ukraine is reflected in its very name "Ukraine", i.e. "Outskirts", "border areas". In the era of Kievan Rus, the territories of present-day Ukraine were the center of statehood of the Eastern Slavs, for whom at that time Vladimir (later Moscow) was the eastern outskirts ("Ukraine"), and Novgorod was the northern. But as Russia turned from a Slavic state into a Eurasian empire, the geopolitical functions of the largest centers radically changed their meaning. Moscow became the capital of the empire, and Kiev turned into a secondary center where Eurasian and Central European influences converged. There could be no question of any synthesis of cultures. Most likely, the more archaic, purely Russian Orthodox strata were subjected to a dynamic more
The "modernist" impact of Western Europe, especially through Poland in the west and Austria-Hungary in the southwest. Undoubtedly, Ukrainian culture and language are peculiar and unique, but they lack any universal meaning. Cossack settlements, which formed, to a large extent, the Ukrainian ethnos, were distinguished by their independence, a special ethical, economic and social order. But all these

elements are not enough for geopolitical independence, and the Potamic map of Ukraine, where the main rivers (Dniester, Dnieper, etc.) flow parallel to each other, explains the slow development of Ukrainian statehood.

For this reason, the independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its present-day borders) can only make sense as a “cordon sanitaire”, since elements opposite in geopolitical orientation will not allow this country to fully join either the eastern or the western bloc, i.e. neither to Russia-Eurasia, nor to Central Europe. All this dooms Ukraine to a puppet existence and geopolitical service of a thalassocratic strategy in Europe. In this sense, the role of Ukraine is similar to the role of the Baltic republics. On this basis, at one time, the project of creating a "Black Sea-Baltic federation" was seriously discussed. a typical "cordon sanitaire" of a subversive geopolitical entity that serves to provoke instability in Eastern Europe and to prepare the prerequisites for a series of armed conflicts.

The further existence of a unitary Ukraine is unacceptable. This territory should be divided into several zones, corresponding to the gamut of geopolitical and ethnocultural realities.

1) Eastern Ukraine (everything that lies east of the Dnieper from Chernigov to the Sea of Azov) is a compactly populated territory with a predominance of the Great Russian ethnic group and the Orthodox Little Russian population. This entire territory is undoubtedly close to Russia, culturally, historically, ethnically and religiously connected with it. This well-developed, technically advanced region may well constitute an independent geopolitical region, with broad autonomy, but in an unconditional and strongest alliance with Moscow. Here, meridian integration is preferable, the connection of the Kharkov region with the more northern (Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk regions) of the Russian territories proper and the spread of the structure to the south.

2) Crimea is a special geopolitical entity, traditionally characterized by ethnic mosaicism. Little Russians, Great Russians and Crimean Tatars settled in Crimea in a very complex configuration and represent three geopolitical impulses that are quite hostile to each other. The Great Russians are oriented emphatically pro-Moscow (more aggressively than the rest of Ukraine, even Eastern). Little Russians, on the contrary, are extremely nationalistic. In general, Crimean Tatars are oriented more towards Turkey and are rather hostile to Russia. Taking into account the geopolitical orientation of the Crimean Tatars is out of the question, since Turkey is in all respects a direct geopolitical adversary of Russia. But the presence of Tatars in Crimea cannot be ignored either. Direct annexation of Crimea to Russia will cause an extremely negative reaction of the Little Russian population and create problems of integrating this peninsula into the Russian system through the Ukrainian territories, which is hardly realistic at all. Leaving Crimea to "sovereign Ukraine" is also impossible, since this creates a direct threat to Russia's geopolitical security and generates ethnic tension in Crimea itself. Taking into account all these considerations, the conclusion suggests itself that it is necessary to give Crimea a special status and ensure maximum autonomy with direct strategic control of Moscow, but with

taking into account the socio-economic interests of Ukraine and the ethnocultural requirements of the Crimean Tatars.

3) The central part of Ukraine from Chernigov to Odessa, where Kiev also falls, is another complete region, where the Little Russian ethnos and language dominate ethnically, but Orthodoxy is the predominant confession. This Orthodox Little Russia is an independent geopolitical reality, culturally related to Eastern Ukraine and certainly part of the Eurasian geopolitical system.

4) Western Ukraine is heterogeneous. In the North it is Volyn, a separate region, south of the Lviv region (Galicia), even south of Transcarpathia (western ledge), and finally, the eastern part of Bessarabia. All of these regions are fairly independent areas. Volyn is dominated by Uniates and Catholics; this region culturally belongs to the Catholic geopolitical sector of Central Europe. The picture is almost the same in Galicia and Transcarpathia, although these more southerly lands represent a separate geopolitical reality. Volyn is historically connected with Poland, and Galicia and Transcarpathia with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Bessarabian lands of Ukraine are inhabited by a mixed population, where Little Russians and Great Russians are interspersed with Romanians and Moldovans. This region is almost entirely Orthodox and is an Orthodox belt, obliquely leaving from Great Russia to the Balkans to Serbia. The entire sector Bessarabia to Odessa follows Attributed to from the Central Ukrainian geopolitical space, so his it would be more logical to include in the meridian left-bank belt of the Dnieper, the western border of which stretches from Rivne to Ivano-Frankivsk along the North-South axis and further along the Dniester to Odessa in the south.

Thus, Western Ukraine, in the narrow sense of this concept, consists of three regions of Volyn and Galicia and Transcarpathia. Being geographically close, they differ in relief (Transcarpathia is a mountain range, like Slovakia), ethnic composition and political traditions. These regions, which today actively influence the general political atmosphere of Ukraine, actively pursuing an anti-Moscow, pro-Western geopolitical line, should be granted a significant degree of autonomy (up to political) in order to tear these “subversive” territories from the Orthodox and generally pro-Russian all-Ukrainian space as a central one. and eastern. The strategic border of Russia on these parallels cannot depend on the location of the Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Hungarian or Ukrainian-Slovak border. This strategic border should run much to the west, at least at the western tip of Central Europe, and at best across the Atlantic. It is from this perspective that the entire geopolitical

restructuring of this region, since, acting as the initiator of geopolitical transformations in Eastern Europe and as the main partner of Germany, Russia should insist, first of all, on the condition of removing this entire region from under Atlanticist control and creating in this place a complex of the Eurasian continental defense, consisting of military-strategic cooperation between Russia and Europe as a whole.

Volyn, Galicia and Transcarpathia can form a common "Western Ukrainian federation", the degree of integration within which can be set arbitrarily, depending on specific circumstances. Here, the most important thing is to draw a cultural and confessional border between Central Ukraine (actually

Kiev land) and Western Ukraine in order to avoid disharmonious Central European Catholic or Uniate influence on Orthodox territories.

The Ukrainian factor is the most vulnerable point in the western belt of Russia. If in other places the danger of destroying the geopolitical consistency of the heartland is potential, and the positional struggle for the Eurasian geopolitical system sets itself only preventive goals, the fact of the existence of a “sovereign Ukraine” at the geopolitical level is Russia's declaration of a geopolitical war (and this is not so much Ukraine itself, how much Atlanticism and Sea Power). The point is not that Ukraine itself deliberately chooses the role of the Atlanticist "cordon sanitaire", although in some cases this cannot but be a deliberate step, but that in practice it begins to fulfill this role,

The Ukrainian problem is the main and most serious problem facing Moscow. If the problems of the North and the “polar trapezium” are connected with the distant future of Russia and Eurasia, if the development of Siberia and the battle for Lenaland are important for the near future, if, finally, the positional strategy of reorganizing the Asian South has an urgent but preventive value for Russia, the geopolitics of the West and the center of this geopolitics, the “Ukrainian question,” requires Moscow to immediately respond, since it is a question of delivering a strategic strike to Russia already in the present, to which the “geographical axis of history” simply has no right not to respond.

Considering that simple integration of Moscow with Kiev is impossible and will not provide a stable geopolitical system, even if this happens despite all objective obstacles, Moscow should be actively involved in the reconstruction of the Ukrainian space according to the only logical and natural geopolitical model.

5.7 Romania and Moldova integration under what sign?

Romania and Moldavia are two parts of a single geopolitical region, inhabited by a single Orthodox ethnos, the descendants of the Dacians, who speak the language of the Latin group and have largely absorbed the cultural, linguistic and racial elements of the Slavic environment. From a geopolitical point of view, the integration of Romania and Moldova is inevitable, but at the same time Moscow should strive to carry out this unification for its own purposes in order to include this space in the zone of its direct strategic control. The culture of Romania is, on the whole, a typical Orthodox model, directly linking these lands with Eurasia. The only obstacle to the perfect integration of these lands into Russia is the language factor and geopolitical proximity to Catholic regions. Moreover,

Through Romania, Moldova and Central Ukraine, there is a continuous strip inhabited by Orthodox peoples, connecting the lands of Russia with Serbia, the outpost of Eurasia in the Balkans. It is in the interests of Eurasia to turn this entire region into a single strategic and cultural region, in fact, into one country. This requires Moscow to initiate the Moldovan-Romanian integration, the sign of which should initially be defined as Orthodox and Eurasian. At the same time, it is important that the Romanian Orthodox enclave from the east and from the west is closed by the Slavic Orthodox peoples, Ukrainians and Serbs, thus ensuring

continuity of territorial integration based not so much on ethnicity as on confessional and cultural kinship. At the same time, such an "Orthodox bloc" from the Dniester to Montenegro, in the center of which a united Romania should be located, should be formed in cooperation with Berlin, which is given the more western part of Central Europe from Prussia through the Czech Republic and Slovakia to Hungary and Austria, and then to Croatia, i.e. to the Adriatic. If we add to this the eastern protrusion of Poland and East Prussia, which goes to Germany to the north, then the natural continuation of Russia to the west in the Balkan region would be logical and acceptable, not violating the geopolitical balance of Central Europe, which geopolitically belongs to the sphere of influence of Germany.

5.8 Condition: soil, not blood

All these actions follow from the general picture of European geopolitics, in which the regions of Central Europe (under the auspices of Germany) and Western Europe in a narrow sense are clearly distinguished. Russia has no points of direct contact with Western Europe, so the implementation of the Eurasian strategy in this region (of which France is a key element) depends on the construction of a pan-European structure along the Berlin-Paris axis. But the Eurasian factor in Western Europe cannot be Moscow's line. Moscow comes out here only through Berlin, and the Eurasian continentalist and anti-Atlanticist tendencies are here described by one term "Germanophilia". For the French, one cannot demand a more distinct "Eurasianism" than "Germanophilia", since Western Europe comprehends the problems of heartland through German continentalism.

However, this does not mean that Russia should be indifferent to Western European problems. It is in its interests to withdraw the whole of Europe from under the Atlanticist influence, which means that Moscow should actively promote the alignment of Western Europe with Central Europe, i.e. to Germany.

At the same time, Germany itself should initially put forward a fundamental requirement: all integration processes in Central Europe, where Berlin's geopolitical domination is frank, as well as all transformations in Western Europe, aiming to orient the European powers towards Germany, should exclude the principle of ethnic domination of Germans in cultural , political, confessional or ideological area. Europe should be European, and Central Europe should be Central European, i.e. the entire linguistic, ethnic and spiritual identity of the peoples of Europe must flourish and be encouraged by Berlin, whose priority must be exclusively geopolitical and social, and by no means racial. Moscow is also responsible for many Central European ethnic groups due to racial kinship with them (Slavism). Moreover, it is ethnocentrism and national the racial arrogance of the Germans has more than once led to bloody conflicts in Europe. Throughout the entire geopolitical reorganization of Europe, Russia must act as a guarantor that Berlin will strictly separate geopolitics and race, "soil and blood" in order to knowingly rule out tragedies like Hitler's adventure. Any signs of German nationalism in matters of the geopolitical reorganization of Europe must be mercilessly suppressed by Berlin itself; all processes must take place on the basis of the strictest observance of the "rights of peoples", full autonomy of cultures, religions and languages. Any signs of German nationalism in matters of the geopolitical reorganization of Europe must be mercilessly suppressed by Berlin itself; all processes must take place on the basis of the strictest observance of the "rights of peoples", full autonomy of cultures, religions and languages. Any signs of German nationalism in matters of the geopolitical reorganization of Europe must be mercilessly suppressed by Berlin itself; all processes must take place on the basis of the strictest observance of the "rights of peoples", full autonomy of cultures, religions and languages.

Moscow must make the same demands on itself and on its allies. The ethnic origin should be encouraged and actively supported by the geopolitical center only in a positive aspect, as an affirmative reality, as national self-identification. Of course, one cannot expect the complete disappearance of interethnic tensions and the manifestation of negative aspects of national self-assertion, but it is precisely at this moment that the principle of geopolitical centralism should actively come into play as the supreme supra-ethnic arbiter, deciding internal problems, proceeding from the vital political and strategic interests of the Eurasian whole.

This principle is universal for all regions in which the New Eurasian Order should be established, both internal to Russia and external. But in the case of the West, Europe, this is especially important, since ethnic problems in these spaces are at the heart of all the most terrible conflicts that rocked the 20th century.

PART VI EURASIAN ANALYSIS

Chapter 1. Geopolitics of Orthodoxy

1.1 East and West Christian ecumene

The most essential point in determining the geopolitical specifics of Orthodoxy is that we are talking about the Eastern Church. Within the boundaries of the Christian world, before the discovery of America, which geographically coincided with the northwest of the Eurasian continent, the Middle East and North Africa, a demarcation line is clearly traced between the Orthodox space and the Catholic space. This division is certainly not a historical accident. The Orthodox world is spiritually and qualitatively related to the East, while Catholicism is a purely Western phenomenon. And if this is so, then the theological formulations themselves, which underlay the final division of the churches in 1054, must contain elements of a geopolitical nature.

The dispute about the "filioque", i.e. about the procession of the Holy Spirit only from the Father or from the Father and Son[77], in theological terms anticipates the future development of two types of Christian and post-Christian civilizations: rationalistic individualistic Western and mystical-collectivist eastern. Adoption in the West, amendments to the Nicene Creed with respect to the "filioque" finally consolidated the orientation towards the rationalistic theology of the so-called. "subordinationism", that is to the introduction into the Divine reality of hierarchically subordinate relations that belittle the mysterious and superintelligent nature of the Trinity.

In parallel with the question of the "filioque", an important point of disagreement was the idea of the supremacy of the Roman throne and the highest theological authority of the Pope. This was also one of the consequences of the Catholic "subordination", which insists on a strict straightforward hierarchy even in those matters that are under the sign of the providential action of the Holy Spirit to save the world. This position completely contradicted the idea of linguistic autonomy of local Churches and, in general, the ultimate freedom in the field of spiritual realization, traditional for Orthodoxy.

And finally, the last most important aspect of the division of the churches into Eastern and Western was Rome's rejection of the patristic doctrine of the Empire, which is not just a secular administrative apparatus, rudely subordinate to the church authorities, as the popes wanted to present it, but a mysterious soteriological organism actively participating in the eschatological drama. as "an obstacle to the coming of the Antichrist", "catechon", "holding", as mentioned in the Second Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Thessalonians.

The superintelligence of Divine action (the primacy of apophatic mystical theology), the spiritual and linguistic freedom of local churches (dating back to the glossolalia of the apostles on the day of Pentecost) and the doctrine of the sacred role of the Empire and emperors (the theory of Orthodox symphony) are the main points that determine the specifics

[77] Let us recall that the Orthodox believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds only from the Father (although it is expelled by the Son), while the Catholics maintain that from the Son, filioque in Latin means “and from the Son”.

Orthodoxy, in contrast to Catholicism, in fact denies these aspects of Christianity.

All these differences are noticeable long before the final rupture, but it was possible to maintain a certain balance until 1054. From that moment on, the geopolitical dualism of the Christian ecumene was completely determined, and both the Orthodox and Catholic worlds went their own ways.

Until 1453 (the date of the capture of Constantinople by the Turks), the Orthodox Church was geopolitically identified with the fate of the Byzantine Empire. The world of Catholicism covered Western Europe. Until that time, Rome and Constantinople were two Christian "large spaces" (if expressed in geopolitical terminology) with their own geopolitical, political, economic and cultural interests, as well as with clearly fixed and unambiguous theological specificity, reflecting and predetermining the difference between churches from all intellectual dogmatic unambiguity and logical interconnection. The West was based on the rationalistic theology of Thomas Aquinas, the East continued the line of mystical theology, apophaticism and monastic cleverness,

Palamas versus Thomas Aquinas is a theological formula that reflects the essence of the geopolitical dualism of the Christian East and the Christian West. The mystical contemplation of the Tabor light, the symphony of the authorities and the liturgical glossolalia of the local churches (Orthodoxy) against rationalistic theology, papal diktat in worldly affairs of European kings and the domination of Latin as the only sacred liturgical language (Catholicism). There is a geopolitical confrontation between the two worlds, which have differently directed cultural orientation, psychological dominant and different, specific political structure.

This is the most general outline of the foundations of Orthodox geopolitics. Obviously, in such a situation, the main task of Byzantium and the Orthodox Church was to preserve their structure, protect the limits of their political and spiritual influence, and defend their independence. Moreover, Orthodoxy in such a situation had two main geopolitical opponents:

1) the non-Christian world, whose pressure was manifested both in the raids of the barbarians on the outskirts of the empire, and in the massive pressure of the Islamized Turks;

2) the Christian world of the West, considered not just as the land of "Latin heresy", but also as a world of apostasy, apostasy, as a country of people who knew the truth and salvation, but rejected them and betrayed them.

In such an initial and complete picture of the geopolitical place of Orthodoxy, it is very easy to discern all the geopolitical problems that will worry the Eastern Church and the Orthodox states for many centuries after the collapse of Byzantium. The Byzantine emperors at some point faced the double threat of "Turkish turban or Latin miter". Taking into account the peculiarity of theological attitude towards the West and Rome, it is easy to understand those Orthodox who made a choice in favor of the "Turkish turban" in those cases when the third was not given. By the way, many Orthodox Christians perceived the fall of Constantino Pole as God's punishment for the geopolitical step of Byzantium, which tried to get closer to Rome by adopting the "filioque" in the so-called.

"Union of Florence" (although this recognition was denounced upon the return of the ambassadors to Constantinople).

1.2 Post-Byzantine Orthodoxy

After the fall of Constantinople, the entire geopolitical picture changed dramatically. Despite the fact that the Patriarch of Constantinople remained the head of the Orthodox Church, the harmony of the entire structure was broken. Let us recall that one of the cornerstones of Orthodoxy was the doctrine of the soteriological function of the Empire, and since the Orthodox Empire (and, accordingly, the Orthodox Emperor, Basileus) no longer existed, the Church was forced to enter a new, special and rather paradoxical period. its existence. From that moment on, the entire Orthodox world is divided into two parts, which have deep differences not only from a geopolitical, but also from a theological point of view.

The first sector of the post-Byzantine Orthodox world is represented by those Churches that found themselves in the zone of political control of non-Orthodox states, especially in the Ottoman Empire. Until the collapse of this empire, these Churches were administratively included in the so-called. the Orthodox Millet, which included Orthodox Greeks, Serbs, Romanians, Albanians, Bulgarians, and Arabs. The supreme figure among these Orthodox was considered the Patriarch of Constantinople, although along with him existed the Patriarch of Alexandria (the archpastor of Orthodox Greeks and Arabs living in Egypt) and the Patriarch of Antioch (the head of the Orthodox Arabs in the territory of modern Syria, Iraq and Lebanon). The small Jerusalem Patriarchate, as well as the autocephalous Churches of Cyprus and Mount Sinai, had a special status.[78].The Patriarchate of Constantinople is located in the Phanar quarter, and from this word comes the collective name of the Greek clergy subordinate to this Patriarchate "Phanariots". Note that since 1453 this sector of the Orthodox world has been in an ambiguous position both at the geopolitical and theological levels, since the absence of Orthodox statehood directly affects the eschatological vision of Orthodox political history and means the Church's stay in the world as in a "sea of apostasy". where nothing prevents the mystical arrival of the "son of perdition". The inevitable rejection of the Orthodox symphony of powers turns the Greek Orthodox Church (and other churches associated with her political fate) into something other than what she was originally. It means, that its theological and geopolitical orientations are changing. Its sacred nature is also changing.

A clear understanding of the relationship between theology and politics in a full-fledged Orthodox doctrine forced Russia to embark on the path that it has been following since the 15th century, and which is closely connected with the theory of the "Moscow of the Third Rome." Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church is the second sector of post-Byzantine Eastern Christianity, which has a completely different geopolitical and even spiritual nature.

The establishment of the Patriarchate in Russia and the proclamation of Moscow as the "Third Rome" is directly related to the mystical fate of Orthodoxy as such. Russia after the fall

[78] Separately, we should consider the Georgian Orthodox Church, which has retained its relative independence from the Turks.

Constantinople remains the only geopolitical "large space" where both Orthodox politics and the Orthodox Church existed. Russia becomes the successor of Byzantium both for theological reasons and at the geopolitical level. Only here were preserved all three main parameters that made Orthodoxy what it was, in contrast to both the Latin West and the political domination of non-Christian regimes. Consequently, along with the mystical status of "an obstacle to the arrival of the son of perdition," Moscow inherited the entire completeness of the geopolitical problems of Constantinople. Just like Byzantium, Russia faced two hostile geopolitical realities with the same "Latin miter" and the same "Turkish turban". But in this case, all the fullness of historical responsibility fell on the Russian tsars, the Russian Church and the Russian people. The fact that this responsibility was transferred to Moscow after the fall of Constantinople endowed the whole situation with a special eschatological drama, which was reflected not only in the psychology of Russians in the last five centuries, but also in the specifics of the geopolitical orientation of the Russian state and the Russian Church. Parallel to this, the concept of the Russian people as a "god-bearer" was formed.

But at the same time, a new problem arose: relations with the Orthodox world outside of Russia and the status of the Patriarch of Constantinople in relation to the Patriarch of Moscow. The fact is that the non-Russian Orthodox faced a dilemma: either to recognize Russia as the "ark of salvation," a new "Holy Land," a "catechon," and, accordingly, to submit to the spiritual authority of Moscow, or, on the contrary, to deny the possibility of the existence of an "Orthodox kingdom" as such and treat Moscow as an illegitimate usurpation of the Byzantine eschatological function. According to this choice, Moscow had to build its relations with the rest of the churches. We can say that, in fact, from that moment on, the Orthodox world was divided into two parts, differing both geopolitically and theologically. It is known that in the Constantinople sphere of influence the anti-Moscow line won, which means that the Phanariote clergy adapted the Orthodox doctrine to those conditions when there was no question of political projection. In other words, Greek Orthodoxy changed its nature, turning from an integral spiritual and political teaching into an exclusively religious doctrine of individual salvation. And henceforth, the rivalry between Constantinople and Moscow was, in fact, a confrontation between two versions of Orthodoxy, a full-fledged one, in the case of Moscow, and a reduced one, in the case of Constantinople. into an exclusively religious doctrine of individual salvation. And henceforth, the rivalry between Constantinople and Moscow was, in fact, a confrontation between two versions of Orthodoxy, a full-fledged one, in the case of Moscow, and a reduced one, in the case of Constantinople. into an exclusively religious doctrine of individual salvation. And henceforth, the rivalry between Constantinople and Moscow was, in fact, a confrontation between two versions of Orthodoxy, a full-fledged one, in the case of Moscow, and a reduced one, in the case of Constantinople.

Moreover, changes in the quality of Greek Orthodoxy brought it closer, in a sense, to the line of Rome, since one of the three main points of dogmatic contradictions (the question of "catechon") disappeared by itself. The spiritual rapprochement of the Phanariots with the Vatican was accompanied by their political rapprochement with the Turkish administration, in which many Orthodox Greeks traditionally held high positions. Such a bifurcated existence, coupled with rivalry with the Russian Church for influence over the Orthodox world, in fact, deprived Greek Orthodoxy of its independent geopolitical mission, made it only one of the secondary geopolitical factors in a more general non-Orthodox context of political intrigues of the Ottoman authorities and papal legates.

Be that as it may, since the 15th century the term "geopolitics of Orthodoxy" has become almost identical to the term "geopolitics of Russia."

At the same time, it would be wrong to view the entire non-Russian Orthodox world as controlled by the Phanariote policy. In various parts of it, there were

opposing sentiments, which recognized Orthodox Russia as theological and eschatological primacy. This was especially true of the Serbs, Albanians, Romanians and Bulgarians, in whom Russophile and Phanariot geopolitical tendencies traditionally competed. This was manifested with all its might in the 19th century, when the Orthodox peoples that were part of the Ottoman Empire made desperate attempts to restore their national and political independence.

1.3 Petersburg period

But between the fall of Constantinople and the beginning of the struggle for the independence of the Orthodox Balkan peoples, an event took place that is of great importance for Orthodoxy in the broadest sense. We are talking about the Russian schism and the immediately following reforms of Peter the Great. At that moment, a qualitative change in the status of Orthodoxy took place in Russia, and henceforth the dogmatic foundations of the Eastern Church, which had remained unshakable for about 200 years, were shaken. The fact is that the transfer of the capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg and the abolition of the Patriarchate together with the establishment of the Synod meant that Russia ceased to be a dogmatically legitimate Orthodox Empire in the theological and eschatological sense. In fact, a transition was made from a strictly Orthodox geopolitical model to a kind of Protestant state. From now on, Russian Orthodoxy has also turned into a kind of ambiguous reality, which only partially coincides at the geopolitical level with the Russian State. But although the dogmatic background was openly shaken, the general logic of Russian geopolitics continued the original line, albeit at a different level, since secular and purely political interests began to unambiguously dominate the religious and eschatological issues. In parallel, in the West itself, the traditional Catholic model also gave way to the strengthening of purely national-political formations, nation-states, so that theological problems there, too, were erased and faded into the background in the face of more practical, mercantile and narrowly political interests. However, the geopolitical alignment, predetermined dogmatically in the schism of the churches, remained in total the same,

Protestantism is geopolitically divided strictly into two sectors - Prussian Lutheranism and Anglo-Swiss-Dutch Calvinism. With the outward similarity and synchronicity of both outbursts of protest against Rome, Lutheranism and Calvinism have almost polar opposite meanings. The Lutheran camp, concentrated in the Prussian state, was founded both dogmatically and mystically on the criticism of the Vatican from the point of view of radicalization of the premises of the "New Testament", and in general terms this reproduced the traditional claims of Orthodoxy towards Catholicism. Lutheran Prussia was geographically located between Orthodox Russia and Catholic Western Europe. Calvinism, which became the state religion of England (and later greatly influenced the political system in the United States), was based, on the contrary, on the emphasized Old Testament approach and criticism of Rome from these positions. It is no coincidence that both geographically Calvinism and the sects following from it gravitated towards the extreme West both in Europe and on the other side of the Atlantic.

The post-Petrine Russia of the Romanovs was closer to the Prussian model, i.e. departing from Orthodox dogma proper, it stopped halfway to Catholicism, which, moreover, was gradually losing ground to the nation-states. At the same time, the main geopolitical tension was concentrated between Russia, on the one hand, and the Austrian Empire and the British Empire, on the other. On a religious level, it is

was the opposition of Orthodoxy to Catholicism (Austria) and Calvinism (England). Absolutist, and then revolutionary France played a special role in all this, striving to spread republican ideas and the Enlightenment. At the same time, it is important to note that if Russia had some common geopolitical interests with Austria (in particular, the confrontation with Turkey), then the strategy of England was in almost everything opposite to the strategy of Russia up to the support of the British by us in the Ottoman Empire.

Be that as it may, even post-Petrine Russia inherited the main features of Byzantine geopolitics, although the dogmatic completeness of the "Third Rome" concept was violated. From now on, it was only possible to speak of an inertial continuation of what was once a full-fledged and theologically grounded path of the "God-bearing people" in history. In parallel with this transformation, material and narrowly political interests began to play an increasing role in foreign policy, and religious factors themselves were often used as a pretext for one or another political move focused exclusively on the welfare of the state in its secular aspect.

1.4 National liberation of Orthodox peoples

In the 19th century, many Orthodox peoples were Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Romanians, etc. began to actively free themselves from the political control of the Turks. The religious factor played a significant role in this, turning into one of the main motives of the national liberation struggle.

The emergence of new Orthodox states and the destruction of the Ottoman empire was the result of several geopolitical and ideological factors:

1) The degradation of the political power of the Turks allowed the development of the national feeling of the Greeks and other Balkan peoples, which, in turn, was facilitated by the spread of the ideas of the Enlightenment; France, the cradle of "modernist trends", played an important role in this.

2) Russia, as a geopolitical adversary of Turkey, actively used the situation to undermine its enemy from within; Russian agents in Greece and the Balkans focused their efforts on supporting the demands of the Orthodox, which was accompanied by external geopolitical pressure from Russia.

3) A kind of religious renaissance of the Orthodox peoples began, and the idea of the struggle for political and national independence was accompanied by messianic presentiments of an eschatological nature.

During this period, the political and ideological concepts of Greater Greece (or Great Idea, Megale idea), Greater Bulgaria, Greater Serbia ("drawing"), Greater Romania, etc. were formed.

1.5 Megale Idea

Supporters of Magna Graecia strove for the complete conquest of Greek territories from the Turks and the re-establishment of the "New Byzantium", the restoration of royal power and the return of the Patriarch of Constantinople to his leading role in all Orthodox

the world. As a result of a fierce struggle and a national uprising, the Greeks were able to conquer a small independent state for themselves in 1830 around the Peloponnese and Morea, which, after the Balkan Wars in 1913, actually doubled its territory. At the same time, the implementation of the "Great Idea" collided with the geopolitical interests of other Orthodox peoples, since the Greeks demanded the annexation of Macedonia, Thrace and other territories, which were also claimed by the Bulgarians and Serbs. The culmination of this plan was the liberation of Constantinople (Istanbul) from the Turks. But the whole project ended in disaster after the defeat of Greece in the war with Turkey Ataturk, who defeated the Greeks and forced the Greek population of Anatolia to massively move to Greek lands.

It is very important to note that the national liberation struggle of the Greeks was in no way welcomed or inspired by the Phanariot clergy and the Patriarchate of Constantinople, who were in political solidarity with the Ottoman Empire rather than with Russian geopolitics or the Balkan peoples striving for freedom. Moreover, the collapse of the Turkish Empire was a disaster for the spiritual supremacy of the Phanariots in the Orthodox world outside of Russia. Therefore, Greek nationalism and the Great Idea, although distinctly Orthodox in character, were initially promoted by some special secret organizations of the Masonic type, in which the most important role was played by Russian agents of influence and at the same time supporters of the French Enlightenment. In other words, The Orthodox idea in Greece during the critical period of its liberation from Turkish rule was the property of some kind of parallel religious structure associated with the Greek diaspora in Russia and other Mediterranean regions. It is also curious that the Greek aristocracy, genetically and politically connected with the Phanariots, after gaining independence, focused more on Austria and Germany, while the Greek bourgeoisie, in whose midst the "Great Idea" matured, was a fierce supporter of an alliance with Russia. In this, again, a certain solidarity of the official Greek post-Byzantine Orthodoxy with the Vatican line is clearly discernible. genetically and politically connected with the Phanariots, after gaining independence, it focused more on Austria and Germany, while the Greek bourgeoisie, in whose midst the "Great Idea" matured, was a fierce supporter of an alliance with Russia. In this, again, a certain solidarity of the official Greek post-Byzantine Orthodoxy with the Vatican line is clearly discernible. genetically and politically connected with the Phanariots, after gaining independence, it focused more on Austria and Germany, while the Greek bourgeoisie, in whose midst the "Great Idea" matured, was a fierce supporter of an alliance with Russia. In this, again, a certain solidarity of the official Greek post-Byzantine Orthodoxy with the Vatican line is clearly discernible.

1.6 "Inscription"

The idea of a Greater Serbia, based on the historical precedent of a huge Balkan state created in the 14th century by the Serbian dynasty of Nemanjić, was revived again during the Serbian liberation struggle. At first, the rebellious Serbs liberated a small territory, Shumadiya, from Ottoman rule, and after that they began a struggle to create an independent Slavic state in the Balkans, with the domination of Serbs and the Orthodox dynasty. Since 1815 years the Serbs have achieved independence, which, however, carried with myself some two different geopolitical orientations embodied in two Serbian dynasties Obrenovi whose and Karadjordjeviches. Obrenovichi, although were Orthodox, focused on close to Austria, and an important role in this issue was played by the activity of some political and intellectual circles from Vojvodina, the territory closest to Austria. The Karageorgievich, on the other hand, gravitated exclusively towards Russia. In 1903, not without the participation of Russian special services, the Obrenovic dynasty was overthrown, and Serbia turned to the pro-Russian line. By 1920, Yugoslavia, a huge Balkan state, which united many Balkan peoples under Serbian rule, including Catholic Croats and Slovenes, Orthodox Macedonians, Muslims of Bosnia and Albanians, was created under Karageorgie Vici. In addition, in the north of Yugoslavia, the Catholics-Hungarians came under Serbian control. However, this geopolitical structure turned out to be unstable, since the non-Orthodox peoples of Yugoslavia (not without

assistance of Austrian and Turkish agents of influence) began to oppose the ethnic domination of the Serbs and the religious primacy of Orthodoxy. This confrontation reached particular intensity during the Second World War, when pro-German Croatia and Bosnia actually carried out genocide of Orthodox Serbs.

1.7 Greater Romania

The Greater Romania project also appeared in the Orthodox environment, and it was not only about complete liberation from Turkish control (although Moldova and Wallachia were never officially part of the Ottoman Empire), but also about opposing the policy of the Phanariots, who sought to subordinate the Romanian clergy to their influence. In this current, anti-Turkish and anti-Phanariotic sentiments were supported by Russia, which was facilitated by the belonging to the Russian territories of Bessarabia, inhabited by Romanians. At the same time, Uniate tendencies intensified in Romania since the 18th century. Uniatism is the idea of subordination of the Orthodox Church to the Vatican while preserving the Orthodox rituals, but, in fact, in this approach, the Vatican alone wins geopolitically, while Orthodoxy is unequivocally losing. It is no coincidence therefore, that Uniatism was viewed by the Orthodox as a tactical move of Catholicism, seeking to expand its missionary, political and spiritual influence in the East at the expense of Orthodox peoples. And in Romania itself, Uniatism, which was widespread especially in Transylvania, was initially accompanied by cultural tendencies of Romanization, the glorification of the Romanesque essence of Romania, the Latin roots of the language, etc. Uniatism in Romania was based on Catholic Austria, and Orthodoxy was supported, of course, by Russia. It is indicative that the Greek Orthodox, Phanariots, pursued in Romania, in fact, a pro-Turkish policy that contradicted both Austro-Catholic and Russian-Orthodox geopolitical interests. The idea of Greater Romania had an unambiguously Orthodox subtext, and under this banner the Romanians fought for national independence. It is important that

In the confessional sphere, Uniatism, coupled with an orientation towards Latin culture, gravitates towards Rome and Western Europe, while Romanian Orthodoxy follows the pro-Moscow line. Interestingly, after the Sovietization of Romania in 1948, the formally atheistic communist regime took the unambiguous position of Romanian Orthodoxy, subordinating the Uniate confessions to it and subjecting the Catholic minorities to certain repressions.

1.8 Great Bulgaria

The beginning of the movement of the Orthodox and at the same time the national revival of the Bulgarians can be dated to 1870, when, under pressure and with the support of Russia, the Bulgarian Exarchate was created, which aimed to unite the Orthodox living in the Balkans into a geopolitical bloc, politically hostile to the Ottoman Empire and spiritually opposing the Patriarchate of Constantinople and domination of Phanariots.

In parallel with gaining geopolitical independence, Bulgaria developed a nationalist project "Bulgaria of the Three Seas", which implied the annexation of Macedonia, Thrace and Constantinople. Traditionally being Russophile, Bulgarian Orthodoxy at some points in history deviated from this line in order to achieve narrowly national goals, and, like the Uniates of Romania, the Obrenovich dynasty in

Serbia, the Greek aristocracy and some other Eastern European forces sided with Central Europe, acting as an ally of Austria-Hungary against Russia.

Interestingly, as new Orthodox states emerged in the Balkans, their geopolitical orientation constantly fluctuated between Russia and Austria, i.e. between Russian Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. Moreover, the formal reason for such a stable dualism was some controversial territories and, first of all, Macedonia. Because of Macedonia, friction constantly arose between Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, and Russia's support for one side or the other in this conflict automatically threw the other side into the arms of Austria.

1.9 Orthodox Albania

The settlement of the Albanians was the traditional border between the Byzantine and Catholic worlds. In this people, there are 4 confessions, Sunni Albanians (Turkic Albanians), Bektashi Albanians (members of a Sufi organization, which, as in some exceptional cases, has a clan, and not only initiatory character), Catholic Albanians and Orthodox Albanians. Despite the fact that Orthodox Albanians are a minority, it was this group that stood at the center of the national liberation struggle, and the independent state of Albania arose thanks to the Orthodox bishop Fan Noli, who became the first Albanian ruler in 1918. Fan Noli was an unequivocal supporter of Russia, and Russian Orthodoxy actively supported him in all his endeavors. Orthodox Albanians united under their control the entire nation, regardless of denomination, but their main opponents and rivals were not so much the Catholics as the Greek Orthodox clergy, traditionally rooted in Albania! And again, using the example of Albania, we are faced with geopolitical dualism in the post-Byzantine Orthodox world, where the geopolitical interests of the Greek and Russian Churches are opposed.

Fan Noli retained his pro-Russian orientation after the October Revolution, for which he was overthrown by Ahmed Zog, the future king of Albania. During the occupation of Albania by fascist Italy, the Albanian Orthodox were persecuted by the pro-Catholic authorities, but after the "Sovietization" the Orthodox Church again received state support, now from the communist authorities. Only in 1967, during the "cultural revolution" and the Maoist deviation, Soviet Albania declared itself "the first exclusively atheistic state in the world" and began direct persecution of believers of all confessions.

1.10 Geopolitical lobbies in Orthodox countries

A general overview of the geopolitical tendencies of the Balkan Orthodox countries reveals the most important regularity: in each such state there are at least two geopolitical lobbies, the nature of which is associated with certain religious characteristics.

First, there is a pro-Russian lobby everywhere, oriented towards the geopolitics of the Russian Orthodox Church, which in turn inherits (albeit with reservations) the Moscow Third Rome line. This lobby is oriented against Rome and any rapprochement with it (which means against Austria, Hungary and Catholic Germany, i.e. against the Catholic sector of Central Europe), but at the same time, stands on

anti-Turkish and anti-"Phanariot" positions, opposing themselves to one degree or another to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In some cases (as, for example, in Greece itself) this lobby includes not only Orthodox circles, but also some secret societies of the Masonic type.

Secondly, in the same countries there is an opposite lobby, which, whether or not being Orthodox, sympathetically relates to the rapprochement with Rome, to the orientation towards Central Europe, Austria, and ultimately towards Uniatism or even Catholicism.

Thirdly, everywhere there are traces of Turkish influence, which was supported by England in this region, which means that Anglo-Saxon geopolitics in this case has a southern orientation and is based on Phanariotic tendencies in modern Orthodoxy in the Balkan countries, traditionally associated with the Ottoman administration.

The breakup of Yugoslavia gives us an example of the geopolitical alignment in the Balkans. The Russophile line is embodied in the position of Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs. Croatia and Slovenia are guided by Central Europe, and the Anglo-Saxons (USA and England) actively support the Bosnian Muslims, the heirs of the Turks. At the same time, the question of Macedonia arises again, about which again disputes arise between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. The Albanian problem, in particular, in Kosovo, is making itself felt with renewed vigor. The Transnistrian tragedy and anti-Russian sentiments in present-day Romania and Moldova again force us to pay special attention to the Uniate and pro-Catholic lobby, which alone can be the bearer of anti-Moscow sentiments and Latin tendencies in these areas.

1.11 Russian Orthodox Church and Soviets

The relationship between Orthodoxy and the Soviet regime is an extremely difficult question. On the one hand, there is a point of view that the Soviet period, in spite of everything, inherited from pre-revolutionary Russia a geopolitical line that strictly coincides in the most important aspects with the geopolitics of the Russian Church. It can be conditionally defined as "sergianism" after the name of the Patriarch of Moscow Sergius, who formulated the famous thesis, which became the starting point of internal church disputes that have not subsided even today: "Your successes are our successes" (in an appeal to the atheistic anti-Christian regime of J. Stalin). This "Sergian" formula is far from being as paradoxical and monstrous as Orthodox conservatives want to present it. The fact is that the Bolshevik Revolution entailed such changes in the church life of Russia, which amaze with their symbolism. The Patriarchate was simultaneously restored, the capital was moved to Moscow (a symbolic return to the idea of "Moscow the Third Rome"), the miraculous acquisition of the "Sovereign" icon in Kolomenskoye, the Moscow residence of the Russian tsars, marked the return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of the royal power, restored in its supernatural dimension after two hundred years of St. Petersburg period. At the same time, the Bolsheviks inherited the entire Russian geopolitics, strengthened the state and expanded its borders. In parallel, the spiritual renewal of the Church proceeded, through persecution and suffering that restored the forgotten fieryness of religious feeling, the practice of confession, the feat of martyrdom for Christ. the capital was moved to Moscow (a symbolic return to the idea of "Moscow the Third Rome"), the miraculous acquisition of the "Sovereign" icon in Kolomenskoye, the Moscow residence of the Russian tsars, marked the return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of the royal power, restored in its supernatural dimension after two hundred years St. Petersburg period. At the same time, the Bolsheviks inherited the entire Russian geopolitics, strengthened the state and expanded its borders. In parallel, the spiritual renewal of the Church proceeded, through persecution and suffering that restored the forgotten fieryness of religious feeling, the practice of confession, the feat of martyrdom for Christ. the capital was moved to Moscow (a symbolic return to the idea of "Moscow the Third Rome"), the miraculous acquisition of the "Sovereign" icon in Kolomenskoye, the Moscow residence of the Russian tsars, marked the return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of the royal power, restored in its supernatural dimension after two hundred year St. Petersburg period. At the same time, the Bolsheviks inherited the entire Russian geopolitics, strengthened the state and expanded its borders. In parallel, the spiritual renewal of the Church proceeded, through persecution and suffering that restored the forgotten fieryness of religious feeling, the practice of confession, the feat of martyrdom for Christ. marked a return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of the royal power, restored in its supernatural dimension after the two hundred year St. Petersburg period. At the same time, the Bolsheviks inherited the entire Russian geopolitics, strengthened the state and expanded its borders. In parallel, the spiritual renewal of the Church proceeded, through persecution and suffering that restored the forgotten fieryness of religious feeling, the practice of confession, the feat of martyrdom for Christ. marked a return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of the royal power, restored in its supernatural dimension after the two hundred year St. Petersburg period. At the same time, the Bolsheviks inherited the entire Russian geopolitics, strengthened the state and expanded its borde

The second point of view considers Soviet Russia as a complete antithesis of Orthodox Russia, and considers "Sergianism" to be conformism with the Antichrist and apostasy. This approach excludes the possibility of considering the Soviet period as a continuation

geopolitics of Orthodoxy. The bearer of such an ideology in its most distinct form is the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and the sectarian True Orthodox Church, whose positions stem from the eschatological identification of Bolshevism with the coming of the Antichrist. It is curious that such an approach denies Orthodoxy in the political dimension and typologically coincides with the position of the Phanariots, who deny the need to correlate the Orthodox Church with politics, which is the basis of a full-fledged Orthodox doctrine. At the same time, this approach is combined with sympathy for the "white" movement, which was geopolitically based on the support of the Entente, Western European and, especially, the Anglo-Saxon countries. And it is no coincidence that the center of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad is located in the United States. Geopolitically so "Orthodox"

1.12 Summary

After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the geopolitics of Orthodoxy was deprived of the unambiguous theological and eschatological function that it had in the era of the "millennial kingdom" from the 5th to the 15th centuries. Two hundred years of "Moscow of the Third Rome" adjoin this "holy" period, which for the Orthodox consciousness is not identical to the period of a full-fledged Tradition. After the split and Peter's reforms, a more ambiguous period begins, throughout which Russia nevertheless follows, in the most general terms, the former geopolitical line, while losing doctrinal rigor. The entire post-Byzantine period is characterized by dualism within the framework of Orthodoxy itself, where Russian Orthodoxy is directly related to the geopolitics of the Russian States, opposes the Greek-Phanariotic line of Constantinople, which embodies Patriarchy, the type of Orthodoxy, strictly separated from implementation and political performing instrumental functions in the general structure of the Ottoman system.

Russia itself is adopting the Byzantine tradition of confrontation with the "Latin miter and Turkish turban" and is forced to defend the interests of Orthodoxy alone at the geopolitical and state levels. This line forces Russia to participate in Balkan politics, where it faces a range of geopolitically hostile tendencies, including persistent "Phanariotic" anti-Russian influence.

And finally, in the Soviet period, geopolitics, paradoxically, continues the general planetary strategy of the Russian State, expanding the spheres of influence of Russia at the expense of countries and peoples traditionally hostile to Orthodoxy. Of course, there can be no question of the dogmatic continuity of the Soviets in relation to the Russian Orthodox Church, but one should not forget that the dogmatic evidence was hopelessly lost already under Peter, but shaken during the period of schism. And if we take the point of view of "sergianism", we can consider the geopolitical successes of the Soviet superpower, which conquered half of the world, traditionally hostile to Russian Orthodox Christians and our state, as successes of the Russian Church and Orthodox geopolitics. This last thesis is, without a doubt, highly controversial, but just as controversial is, strictly speaking, post-Petrine Russia with a truly Orthodox state. Although in the first and second cases, there is a clear geopolitical continuity.

In our time, when there is neither tsarist nor Soviet Russia, but there is a dying and crippled country, plundered and sold to the West, our eternal enemy, a country, we are able to comprehend the entire geopolitical history of Orthodoxy impartially and objectively and identify its constants, which should be outlined on the tablets of the new statehood, the authorities wishing to be called "Russian".

Chapter 2. State and territory

2.1 The Three Most Important Geopolitical Categories

Most of the controversy surrounding the new geopolitical picture of the world is centered around three fundamental categories:

1) "state-nation" ("Etat-Nation"), i.e. traditional historically established centralist state (such as France, Italy, Germany, Spain, etc.);

2) region, i.e. an administrative, ethnic or cultural space that is part of one or more nation-states (Etat-Nation), but at the same time has a significant degree of cultural and economic autonomy (for example, Brittany in France, Flanders in Belgium, Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque country in Spain, etc.);

3) Large Space, "commonwealth" or "community", which unites several nation-states ("Etat-Nation") into a single economic or political block.

Many "Europeanists", both left and right, believe that the category of "nation-state" (Etat-Nation), i.e. the traditional centralist state has generally outlived its usefulness, and that emphasis should be placed on the other two modalities on regionalism and even autonomy, on the one hand, and on the continental unification of regions into a single block, on the other hand. It is indicative that the points of view of polar political spectra converge here: the "new left" consider Etat-Nation too "right", too "totalitarian" and "repressive", too "conservative", which should be abandoned in the name of progress, and " the new right ", on the contrary, the same state-nation (Etat-Nation) is referred to as too" modernist ", too anti-traditional stage of European history, when the truly traditional European Empire was destroyed by the nihilistic and secular French absolutism. In addition, the "new right" sees in regionalism a return to ethnic traditions and to the principle of ethnocultural differentiation, which is the axis of the entire "new right"
thoughts.

With another On the other hand, there is a fairly broad category of politicians who
on the contrary, defend the values of the "nation-state" (Etat-Nation). And again adherence to state centralism can unite both "right" and "left". But, as a rule, this position is not taken by the "new", but by the "old" right and left. Characteristically, in France, the opponents of European unification were three political forces: the Le Pen National Front (far right), the Marchais communists (far left) and the socialist-centrists with national sympathies of Jean-Pierre Schevenman. It follows from this that the most distant ideological and political sympathies can be combined within the framework of one and the same geopolitical project.

And, nevertheless, each political force has its own understanding of the three fundamental versions of the geopolitical structure of modern society. It would be interesting to construct a diagram of how all three projects are evaluated in the perspective of their own ideologies by different forces. For clarity, we will say

about extreme positions, which, naturally, become overgrown with nuances and shades as we approach the political center.

2.2 Regionalism of right and left

The general complex of leftist ideologies is focused on weakening the influence of the state, administrative and political structures on public life. This presupposes the principle of decentralization, a gradual evolution from one center of power to several and, in the long term, to a large number of them. At one time, this theory was developed by the famous anarchist Proudhon. The left seeks to weaken and gradually abolish totalitarian and authoritarian forms of government, which means that their geopolitical orientation is directed against the preservation of the traditional state, with its borders, bureaucratic apparatus, repressive bodies, etc. All this stems from the main ideological orientation of the left towards "humanism", towards the value of the atomic individual, and not towards some super-individual structures that limit his freedoms.

This liberal tendency of the left denies to the limit the very notion of "state", and itself concept "nation" as historical relic. This principles opposed to the "humanistic" idea of "human rights", ceased to which has long been be an abstract philanthropic slogan and became ratified in pretty an aggressive ideological complex openly directed against the traditional forms of collective existence of people as members of a nation, people, state, race, etc. Hence, the emphasis on regionalism is logical for the left, since the administrative independence of the territorial parts of the state, from their point of view, brings the value standard closer to the individual, removes the aura of unconditional authority and control functions from broad social categories.

Obviously, this tendency of the left contradicts the national-state ideologists, i.e. "statists" and "nationalists", for whom it is the historical and political unity of the people, embodied in Etat-Nation, that seems to be the highest value. The confrontation between statist nationalists and liberal regionalists is a constant of stormy polemics regarding the main geopolitical projects in practically all countries where political processes are developing actively and dynamically.

But there is also "right-wing regionalism" closely related to the problem of tradition and ethnicity. Such a regionalism is based on the premise that the modern centralist state is only a tool for the cultural and ideological leveling of its members, that it has long lost its sacred functions and turned into a repressive apparatus oriented against the remnants of genuine cultural, ethical and ethnic traditions. "Right regionalists" see decentralization as an opportunity to revive, in part, the ritual, cult form of life of peoples, traditional crafts, to restore such forms of government that were characteristic of traditional civilization before the advent of a purely modern world. In fact, such "right-wing regionalism" exactly corresponds to the concept of "soil-cultivation". Basically,

Thus, a second line of political confrontation is emerging: "right-wing regionalists", who often appeal to ethnic and racial purity, and "left-wing statists," who believe that the best way to introduce "progressive", "liberal" values into society is state centralism, which protects society from possible restoration of survivals "overcome by progress".

2.3 The New Big Space: Mondialism or Empire?

With regard to supra-state integration, there is also pretty contradictory political layout. On the one hand, there is a "mondialist project" that implies the complete abolition of traditional states and the creation of a planetary civilizational field controlled from a single center, which can be conditionally called a "world government." In principle, such a project is the logical conclusion of liberal trends seeking to destroy all traditional social structures and artificially create a single

a "common human" space, consisting not of peoples, but of "individuals", not of states, but of technocratic associations and industrial laborers. It was in this light that the mondialist stamps of the beginning of the century, the United States of Europe, dreamed of by both the capitalist liberals (Monet, Coudenoff-Calegri, etc.) and the communists (Trotsky, etc.), were seen in this light. Later, these same ideas inspired both the designers of Maatstricht and the ideologists of the "new world order".

But parallel to such a mondialist perspective, there is an alternative, advocated by non-conformist political forces. We are talking about the theorists of the New Empire, who consider modern nation-states to be the result of the tragic disintegration of traditional empires, which alone can fully correspond to the truly sacred organization of society based on qualitative differentiation, on spiritual hierarchy, on a corporate and religious basis. This understanding of the "New Big Space" follows not from a purely quantitative approach to integration (as in the Mondialists), but from a certain spiritual and supranational principle that would be transcendental in relation to existing historical formations and could unite them in a higher sacred synthesis. As the case may be, the "imperial project"

Consequently, here, too, there are two opposing political poles, which see similar geopolitical realities, but in a reverse perspective.

	LEFT (Democrats)	RIGHT (conservatives)
small space	*regionalism, separatism*	*ethnicism, traditionalism, soil cultivation*
average space	*enlightened centralist the state*	*nation-state, "statism", nationalism*
big space	*mondialism*	*Empire*

So, we have identified in each of the geopolitical projects two radically different, opposite approaches, which together predetermine all the main possibilities of the ideological struggle around fundamental issues. Thanks to this scheme, it is possible to classify various political alliances between forces that are quite distant from each other.

2.4 Geopolitics of Russia

The general problem of the geopolitical structure of the modern world is directly related to Russia, where we are meeting with the same basic geopolitical projects. The three categories of regionalism, the nation-state and the Big Space have direct analogs in our geopolitical reality.

Regionalism corresponds to separatist tendencies within the Russian Federation, both in the case of national republics and districts, and in the case of claims for full autonomy of purely territorial entities (projects of the Siberian, Ural and other republics).

The centralist-state model is defended by the supporters of the geopolitical project "Russia within the Russian Federation".

Those who advocate the restoration of the USSR, the re-establishment of the Russian Empire within the USSR, or the creation of the Eurasian Empire belong to the category of ideologists of the New Big Space.

As in the general scheme, the supporters of a particular project do not necessarily have the same political convictions. Moreover, each project can have two polar signs, which are conventionally defined as "right" and "left".

Let's try to outline the positions of the "right" and "left" in Russian political life in their attitude to the three geopolitical options.

The separatist tendencies on the extreme "left" flank are exploited by the forces that also stood behind the collapse of the USSR. Considering the Soviet state a bulwark of "reactionism" and "totalitarianism," Russian liberals have long put forward the ideas of "Russia within the 14th century," etc., which implied the fragmentation of Russian territories into separate fragments, both on ethnic and purely geographic lines. For such "leftists" the unity of the Russian nation and the power of the Russian state not only do not represent any historical value, but, on the contrary, are viewed as an obstacle on the way to universal human "progress." This regionalist project is defended by some extreme liberals who openly want the disintegration of the Russian Federation.

This ultraliberal version is consonant with some of the ideas of a certain part of the opposite, extremely nationalist camp, which believes that the Russians need to create a compact monoethnic state based on the principles of racial purity and ethnic isolationism. This is the idea behind the creation of the "Russian Republic". Among the non-Russian ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of the Russian Federation, there are essentially similar projects for the creation of independent mono-national states.

The "left" version of the national-state program within the Russian Federation embodied the post-Gorbachev Russian leadership, convinced that it is most profitable to use centralist methods to carry out reforms, subjugating all Russian

regions of Moscow's hard line. State centralism, according to these forces, is the best and fastest way to transform the socio-political reality of Russia in such a way as to bring it to "universal", "progressive", and, in fact, "Western" and "Atlanticist" standards. In regionalism, "left" centralists naturally see a danger for the implementation of their goals, since decentralization and autonomization of regions can contribute to the creation of regimes that would reject the logic of liberal reforms and propose other, alternative (conditionally "right") socio-political projects. Imperial expansion is also unacceptable for these forces, since the restoration of the USSR could entail corresponding ideological consequences.

The movement of "right-wing" statists exists and is actively gaining strength. These are patriots who have resigned themselves to the collapse of the USSR and believe that the creation of a powerful centralized Russian state from the Russian Federation will serve to unite the nation, organize a powerful independent autarchic space. The "right" statesmen reject both separatism and imperialism, believing that the fragmentation of the Russian Federation means the loss of the territories belonging to them by the Russians, and the imperial expansion will introduce many foreign elements and threaten the national domination of the Russians.

There are also two poles among the theorists of rebuilding the Empire. The "left" Russian mondialists, who are mainly guided by Gorbachev and his lobby, consider it necessary to create a "single democratic space" as soon as possible, both on the territory of the CIS and more broadly, within the framework of the Eurasian space.

The "right" understanding of the New Big Space was embodied in the political programs of the opposition, irreconcilable towards the regime. Most representatives of this opposition, both national communists and traditional imperialists, believe that Russia within the Russian Federation is not only a territorially insufficient geopolitical entity, but a fundamentally false decision in the issue of protecting the strategic interests of Russia as a great power. "Right" Eurasianism proceeds from a purely imperial understanding of the historical mission of Russia, which must either be an independent autarkian "continent" or deviate from its historical and geopolitical predestination.

So, we can bring all the options for geopolitical projects regarding the future of Russian statehood into one scheme, taking into account the ideological orientation certain forces.

	Russian conservatives, patriots	Russian liberals, reformers
Russian regionalism	*"Russian Republic"*	*"ethnic republics", separatism within the Russian Federation*
Russian centralism	*patriots within the Russian Federation*	*"liberal reforms under an authoritarian center"*
Eurasian Big Space	*"Eurasian Empire", "restoration of the USSR"*	*"left mondialism", "united democratic space"*

Chapter 3. Geopolitical problems of the near abroad

3.1 Laws of Large Space

The fundamental law of geopolitics is the principle of Large Space, outlined by Mackinder and Haushofer and developed by Karl Schmitt. According to this principle, the national sovereignty of a state depends not only on its military strength, technological development and economic base, but also on the size and geographical location of its lands and territories. The classics of geopolitics have written hundreds of volumes, proving that the problem of sovereignty directly depends on the geopolitical independence, self-sufficiency, and autarchy of the region. Those peoples and states that really strive for sovereignty must first of all solve the problem of territorial self-sufficiency. In our era, such self-sufficiency can only be enjoyed by very large states located in regions

During the period of confrontation between capitalism and socialism, the need for blocks, Large Spaces was obvious. No one doubted that a country could be “non-aligned” only at the cost of its elimination from the sphere of planetary geopolitics through marginalization and shifting to the periphery. In addition, all the “non-aligned” still made a choice in favor of one camp or another, although less radical than the direct supporters of socialism or capitalism. The destruction of one superpower certainly seriously changes the geopolitical space of the earth. But at the same time, the principle of Large Spaces by no means loses its strength. On the contrary, today the geopolitical project of "mondialism" is becoming more and more widespread, the meaning of which is reduced to the transformation of the entire surface of the earth into
One Big Space, controlled from the American center.

3.2 Pax Americana and the geopolitics of mondialism

The project of a pro-American, "Atlanticist" Great Space, creature planetary Pax Americana or the establishment of a "new world order" with a single "world government" are, in fact, geopolitical synonyms. It is such a plan that is being developed and implemented today in the international policy of the West, and first of all, the United States. It is obvious that the mondialist concept of the Big Space completely excludes any form of genuine state and political sovereignty of any peoples and states. Moreover, the bipolar world gave incomparably more degrees of freedom (sovereignty) to states included in the sphere of influence of one of the two Great Spaces than is planned in the mondialist project, if only because the planetary confrontation forced not only to suppress the satellite states, but also bribe them.

The current situation confronts each state and each people (and especially before the states and peoples that previously belonged to the geopolitical bloc opposite to the Atlantic West) a vital alternative, either integration into a single Big Space under the leadership of the Atlanticists, or the organization of a new Large Space capable of resisting the last superpower ... The issue of true geopolitical sovereignty is directly related to this alternative, but at the same time, there can be no complete sovereignty for an individual people or state in either of the two cases. When adopting the mondialist model, any sovereignty is deliberately excluded altogether, since the "world government" becomes an uncontested and the only center of power, and in this case only the planetary pseudo-empire of the "new world order" is sovereign. All of its parts become colonies. When organizing a new Large Space, we are dealing with relative sovereignty within the framework of a large geopolitical entity, since this possible Large Space will be relatively free in determining the ideological and ideological dominant. This means that the peoples and states that will enter this bloc will be able to rely at least on ethnocultural sovereignty and on direct participation in the creation and development of a new macrodeology, while the mondialist version of the "new world order" is already ideologically complete and elaborated and is proposed to all peoples of the earth as a colonial analogue of the liberal-market American model. When organizing a new Large Space, we are dealing with relative sovereignty within the framework of a large geopolitical entity, since this possible Large Space will be relatively free in determining the ideological and ideological dominant. This means that the peoples and states that will enter this bloc will be able to rely at least on ethnocultural sovereignty and on direct participation in the creation and development of a new macrodeology, while the mondialist version of the "new world order" is already ideologically complete and elaborated and is proposed to all peoples of the earth as a colonial analogue of the liberal-market American model. When organizing a new Large Space, we are dealing with relative sovereignty within the framework of a large geopolitical entity, since this possible Large Space will be relatively free in determining the ideological and ideological dominant. This means that the peoples and states that will enter this bloc will be able to rely at least on ethnocultural sovereignty and on direct participation in the creation and development of a new macrodeology, while the mondialist version of the "new world order" is already ideologically complete and elaborated and is proposed to all peoples of the earth as a colonial analogue of the liberal-market American model. since this possible Large Space will be relatively free in determining the ideological and ideological dominant. This means that the peoples and states that will enter this bloc will be able to rely at least on ethnocultural sovereignty and on direct participation in the creation and development of a new macrodeology, while the mondialist version of the "new world order" is already ideologically complete and elaborated and is proposed to all peoples of the earth as a colonial analogue of the liberal-market American model. since this possible Large Space will be relatively free in determining the ideological and ideological dominant. This means that the peoples and states that will enter this bloc will be able to rely at least on ethnocultural sovereignty and on direct participation in the creation and development of a new macrodeology, while the mondialist version of the "new world order" is already ideologically complete and elaborated and is proposed to all peoples of the earth as a colonial analogue of the liberal-market American model.

3.3 The paradox of Russia

The peculiarity of the current geopolitical situation is that the initiative to destroy the Eurasian Great Space, which until recently existed in the form of a socialist camp, came from the very center of this camp, from the capital of Eurasia, Moscow. It was the USSR, represented by Gorbachev, who initiated the inclusion of the Eurasian bloc in the mondialist project. The ideas of "perestroika", "new thinking", etc. at the geopolitical level, it meant full acceptance of the model of a single Big Space and a conscious transition from a bipolar world to a unipolar one. First, the socialist camp was destroyed, the Eastern Bloc was curtailed. Then the geopolitical self-liquidation was continued and those regions that are now commonly called the "near abroad countries" were thrown away from Russia.

Be that as it may, Russia, as the heart of the Eurasian Island, as the Heartland, in the current geopolitical situation, better than all other regions could resist the Atlanticist geopolitics and be the center of an alternative Great Space. But the fact of her geopolitical self-liquidation forced her to leave for a while (hopefully, for a short time) from her central roles in the geopolitical confrontation. Therefore, it is necessary to examine other possibilities of creating an alternative Great Space so that states and peoples that refuse the mondialist project can take some independent steps without waiting for Russia's geopolitical awakening. (By the way, these steps could only hasten this awakening).

3.4 Russia remains the "Axis of History"

The geopolitical choice of an anti-mondialist alternative outside the temporarily paralyzed Russia should still take into account the key strategic and geographic function of precisely the Russian lands and the Russian people, and hence the opposition to modern mondialists, which to some extent control the Russian

the political space should not turn into general Russophobia. Moreover, the fundamental geopolitical interests of the Russians, culturally, religiously, economically, and strategically, coincide with the prospect of an alternative anti-mondialist and anti-Atlanticist Great Space. For this reason, the national tendencies of the political opposition within Russia will inevitably be in solidarity with all anti-monetary projects of geopolitical integration outside Russia.

3.5 Mitteleuropa and the European Empire

One of the possible alternatives to the new Great Space is Europe, which certain political and ideological circles oppose the West to the Anglo-Saxon world, and first of all, the United States. Such an anti-Western Europe is not a pure utopia, since such a project has been repeatedly implemented in history, although each time with certain errors or distortions. So, in the XX century, the Axis countries represented the backbone of just such a Europe, although the Anglophilia and Francophobia of certain circles in the German leadership (along with other circumstances) prevented the full implementation of this project. After World War II, a similar attempt was made by De Gaulle, and France owes this policy to the fact that it is not officially a member of NATO today. Be that as it may, the idea of anti-Western, traditional, imperial Europe is becoming more and more relevant today, when the presence of American troops on the European continent is no longer justified by the presence of a "Soviet threat" and takes on the character of an open American occupation. According to the level of its technical and economic development, Europe is a serious adversary to America, and with increasing pressure from below the natural geopolitical interests of Europeans, the mondialist and pro-American elite of European states may retreat, and Europe will begin an independent geopolitical life. The tendencies towards political emancipation and the search for an ideological alternative are growing in Europe every day, while the chances of creating an independent European Large Space are increasing. when the presence of American troops on the European continent is no longer justified by the presence of a "Soviet threat" and takes on the character of an open American occupation. According to the level of its technical and economic development, Europe is a serious adversary to America, and with increasing pressure from below the natural geopolitical interests of Europeans, the mondialist and pro-American elite of European states may retreat, and Europe will begin an independent geopolitical life. The tendencies towards political emancipation and the search for an ideological alternative are growing in Europe every day, while the chances of creating an independent European Large Space are increasing. when the presence of American troops on the European continent is no longer justified by the presence of a "Soviet threat" and takes on the character of an open American occupation. According to the level of its technical and economic development, Europe is a serious adversary to America, and with increasing pressure from below the natural geopolitical interests of Europeans, the mondialist and pro-American elite of European states may retreat, and Europe will begin an independent geopolitical life. The tendencies towards political emancipation and the search for an ideological alternative are growing in Europe every day, while the chances of creating an independent European Large Space are increasing. Europe, in terms of its technical and economic development, is a serious adversary to America, and with increasing pressure from below the natural geopolitical interests of Europeans, the mondialist and pro-American elite of European states may retreat, and Europe will begin an independent geopolitical life. The tendencies towards political emancipation and the search for an ideological alternative are growing in Europe every day, while the chances of creating an independent European Large Space are increasing. Europe, in terms of its technical and economic development, is a serious adversary to America, and with increasing pressure from below the natural geopolitical interests of Europeans, the mondialist and pro-American elite of European states may retreat, and Europe will begin an independent geopolitical life. The tendencies towards political emancipation and the search for an ideologic

3.6 Germany the heart of Europe

The European Great Space should be formed around the most continental of the European powers around Germany, or more precisely, around Mitteleuropa, i.e. Central Europe. Germany's geopolitical interests have traditionally been opposed to the Atlanticist tendencies of the West. This applied to both continental and colonial aspects geopolitics. Germany always was adversary Anglo-Saxon colonial conquests and sought to create a continental ubo land, autarkian civilization, founded on the traditional, hierarchical and soil values. Mitteleuropa, represented by the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the Habsburgs, was the last European trace of the Great Roman Empire, to which the roots of European civilization in its state and social aspect go back. As a matter of fact, the Roman Empire was a Great Space that united Western and Central Europe into a single geopolitical organism. And today the idea of a European Empire is directly related to Germany and the countries within the zone of German influence.

One important geopolitical conclusion can be drawn from these theses. For all Western countries of the "near abroad" (both the Baltic republics and Ukraine and Moldova), an anti-mondialist geopolitical union is possible only by joining

a bloc of Central Europe (if, of course, the situation in Russia itself does not change) while focusing on Germany. In this case, the western regions of the USSR will have a chance to become the eastern border regions of the European Greater Space and will be able to possess some semblance of sovereignty (although much less than within Russia or in a possible new Eurasian Bloc centered in anti-mondialist Russia).

The European Empire will be able to guarantee these regions a certain cultural, linguistic and economic autonomy and save them from the leveling mondialist System, which destroys even hints of difference, autarchy and the preservation of national identity in a liberal-market, plutocratic structure. However, there will be no question of any political or state independence. Moreover, the European Empire with a German center will always be under the threat of an outbreak of German nationalism, although this is fraught with its collapse, as Hitler's "pan-Germanism" was fraught with defeat.

3.7 "Join Europe"

Most of all, this prospect is close to Western Ukraine and Estonia, since only these areas, in fact, belong historically and religiously to Western culture and consider their geopolitical interests to be identical with those of Central Europe. As for other "near abroad countries", Belarus and the eastern and central regions of Ukraine politically and culturally belong to the zone of Russia-Eurasia, and if there is a cultural difference in something, then it can be reduced to particular details, by no means that does not imply a change in the geopolitical bloc from the East to the Central (Central Europe) and can be settled within the framework of ethno-cultural (but not state!) autonomy. Lithuania, for its part, has always played a special role in the geopolitics of Eastern Europe, performing a double function in relation to Russia, she acted as the bearer of Western culture, in relation to Central Europe, on the contrary, together with Poland, she manifested herself as an eastern force defending Balto-West Slavic independence from German pressure. From a geopolitical point of view, in recent centuries Lithuania has become either German or Russian, and the only thing that it has long been (and cannot be) is Lithuanian, since it does not have sufficient geopolitical prerequisites to meet the conditions sovereignty put forward by modernity.

Partly the same can be said about Latvia, although, unlike Lithuania, it has never played any independent role in geopolitical history at all, being the periphery of outside influences in the Baltic.

As for Moldova, this territorial entity also never had its own statehood, and any independent political and state tradition among the Romanians, as well as among the Moldovans, is completely absent. However, historically, Romania (including some lands of Moldova) was part of the geopolitical bloc of both Russia-Eurasia and Central Europe (represented by Austria-Hungary), therefore, Romania had a certain precedent for an alliance with Central Europe. Although the Orthodoxy of the overwhelming majority of Moldovans and Romanians brings them closer to the East and Russia.

3.8 Boundaries of "freedom" and lost advantages

The prospect of the western countries of the "near abroad" entering the European Empire and their adhesion to Central Europe is possible and historically justified, although in almost all cases (excluding Estonia as the colonial lands of the Teutonic Order, inhabited by the descendants of silent and obedient autochthonous Finno-Ugric workers, and Western Ukraine) The Eastern bloc of Russia-Eurasia, from a purely geopolitical point of view, is many times preferable, since culturally these regions are more connected with the East than with Central Europe. Thus, the alliance of the Western "near abroad countries" with Central Europe can serve as an intermediate variant of an anti-mondist geopolitical orientation if Russia continues to abandon its integration mission.

It should be noted that, of course, these countries will not receive any political sovereignty in the event of joining the hypothetical "European Empire", since the Big Space, providing geopolitical, economic and military protection, requires its subjects, in turn, to renounce political - national independence, from the right to pursue their own ideological or diplomatic policy that runs counter to the interests of the Empire. No matter how it affects the representatives of "small nationalism", in our situation only superstates, continental Empires, taken as a whole, can be sovereign.

3.9 "Sanitary cordon"

The geopolitical problem of the Western "near abroad countries" has one more aspect - the Atlantic factor, acting directly and imposing on these countries political moves beneficial to mondialism and Americanism. There are several levels in this matter. Let's start in order.

The United States has the prospect of real world domination only if there is no other Great Space on the planet anymore. Hence, it follows that American geopolitics has as its main goal the destruction of a potential geopolitical strong bloc and the creation of obstacles to its formation. In history, we have a precedent for such a policy in the person of England, which has always sought to create a "cordon sanitaire" or "cordons sanitaire" on the continent. The "cordon sanitaire" is the territory of states and peoples, which is located between two large geopolitical formations, whose union or mutual entry into the Great Space could pose a dangerous competition to the interested power (formerly England, today the United States). The countries of the "cordon sanitaire" as a rule, they are simultaneously the cause of conflicts between the two continental powers, and their geopolitical independence is de facto impossible, and therefore they are forced to seek economic, political and military support on the side. The essence of the policy of the third major geopolitical force in this situation is to make a "cordon sanitaire" a zone of tension between two close Great Spaces, provoking an escalation of the conflict through diplomatic influence on the governments of "intermediate" countries. The most radical version of the "cordon sanitaire" is a situation in which the "intermediate" country strives for complete independence from both continental neighbors, which in practice means becoming a colony of a third "distant" power.

The most famous example of the "cordon sanitaire" was at the beginning of the century the countries located between Russia and Germany and controlled by England. They broke up the Great Space of Central Europe and the Great Space of Russia-Eurasia, serving as direct agents and satraps of the countries of the European West. The same move was repeated many times in other more local situations. In our time, the United States, by virtue of a direct geopolitical necessity, is forced to make the "cordon sanitaire" the main instrument of its foreign policy. In the report of the American security adviser Paul Wolfowitz to the US government (March 1992), it was explicitly stated about "the need to prevent the emergence of a strategic force on the European and Asian continents capable of opposing the United States," and in this sense it was indicated that the countries "

3.10 Transformation from province to colony

The policy of the "cordon sanitaire" can be expressed in the formula "independence from the near and dependence on the far." It should be clearly understood that there can be no talk of any genuine independence or sovereignty here, although short-sighted "petty nationalism" can temporarily identify such "colonial dependence on a third power" with the success of "national liberation struggle ". It should also be recalled that in the case of small states in our perfectly governed world there can be no victory, but also no full-fledged, unanimous struggle.

The countries of the "near abroad" that got out of Moscow's control due to various geopolitical circumstances, among which their internal struggle for independence played an insignificant role (if any), have every chance of becoming a "cordon sanitaire" of the US mondialist policy on the continent, and it means losing the confidence of your neighbors and incurring the curse of "double betrayal." Moreover, in this case, they will turn from provinces into colonies. What will happen in this case with their national culture is generally scary to imagine, since mondialism will offer instead a universal colonial surrogate, cultural "co-colonization". The "cordon sanitaire" will have puppet overseers as rulers.

Thus, for the countries of the "near abroad" the prospect of becoming a "cordon sanitaire" means the loss of any geopolitical independence, since the "pug" itself will pay for the possibility of a "sanitary pug" to tease the "continental elephant" with complete political, cultural and economic slavery from overseas chiefs "new world order" (and plus, a completely natural reaction of the "elephant" in the very near future).

The prospect of a "cordon sanitaire" in relation to the Western countries of the "near abroad" is obvious. Its formula is "neither Germany, nor Russia" (ie, "neither Central Europe, nor Eurasia"). Since Germany as an independent geopolitical force today is a pure potential, it is fair to assume that behind the concept of "independence" ("sovereignty") of Western countries of the "near abroad" should be seen just a transition to

service to mondialism and Americanism. At least this is the current geopolitical picture. In other words, the Western countries of the "near abroad", which are really striving for "independence" (and not "doomed to independence" by the treacherous policy of Moscow), are most likely consciously choosing the role of a "cordon sanitaire" in the service of the United States. This is especially true for those "countries" which traditionally had rather hostile relations with Germany.

The countries of the "cordon sanitaire" from the "near abroad" are entering into an alliance with the West (with Western Europe), bypassing Central Europe, and this is the clearest sign of their Atlanticist, mondialist orientation.

In principle, the same is true for the eastern countries of the "near abroad". However, in order to adequately understand their geopolitical prospects, it is necessary to dwell in more detail on the geopolitical forces of the East.

3.11 Asia before a choice

In the East, there are the following potential geopolitical forces that can claim to become Large Spaces: China, Iran, Turkey and the Arab world. Let us analyze briefly the specifics of each of these Great Spaces in relation to the eastern countries of the "near abroad".

It must be said that China's geopolitics is a special topic that cannot be covered in a few lines. Since the "near abroad" of the East is a region of the spread of Islam, the prospect of forming a single Big Space with China fades into the background before the possibilities of Islamic geopolitical coalitions. At least, this is the situation at the moment, which does not exclude, however, a sharp activation of the Chinese factor as an integrating factor in the near future.

Within the framework of the Islamic world proper, three geopolitical factors that have global prospects are relevant for the eastern countries of the "near abroad", and each of these factors has its own pronounced ideological characteristics. This is continental Islamic, revolutionary Iran; secular, atlantist,
profane-nationalist Turkey; and the Arabic "Saudi" theocratic version of Islam. Of course, there are other geopolitical opportunities in the Arab world (Iraq, Syria, Libya), but none of them at the moment can claim to be an integrating Great Space in relation to the countries of Central Asia. Generally speaking, an orientation toward Saudi Arabia can be conditionally and geopolitically equated with an orientation toward "Arab (non-socialist) Islam."

Eastern countries of the "near abroad" have the prospect of three possible geopolitical integrations within the Asian bloc.

3.12 Continental Perspectives of the "Islamic Revolution"

Iran is today a unique country that plays the role of Central Europe in the West in Asia. It is characteristic that the Iranians themselves sharply distinguish themselves both from the West and from the East, understanding by the "West" the "profane mondialist civilization of Europe", and by the "East" "India, China and ... Russia."

Iranian Islam is a dynamic and powerful force that has a vivid anti-mondialist orientation and claims to the global World Islamic Revolution. In the geopolitical sense, Iran is a purely continental power that has, strategically, economically and ideologically, every chance of becoming the core of a large Eurasian bloc.

The orientation of the Central Asian republics towards Iran (and, first of all, Azerbaijan with its oil and giant nuclear Kazakhstan) could well create preconditions for true continental sovereignty. A pro-Iranian coalition would be a Central Asian analogue of Central Europe (compare: Central Asia Central Europe), since historical precedents, ideological principles, and cultural and religious homogeneity of these continental regions are sufficient grounds for the strength and effectiveness of such a union.

It is important to note that the pro-Iranian Big Space potentially includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, and this, in turn, opens a strip of territorial continuity with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Iran has direct borders with Turkmenistan.

3.13 The "Pan-Turkism" Trap

The orientation towards Turkey is of a completely different character, often accompanied by "Pan-Turkism" (since the Central Asian peoples of the "near abroad" are predominantly "Turkic").

Turkey as a state arose on the site of the Ottoman Empire not as its continuation, but as a parody of it. Instead of a polycentric imperial multinational Islamic structure, Kemal Ataturk created an eastern version of the French Etat-Nation, the State-of-the-Nation, with a secular, atheistic, profane and nationalist system. Turkey was the first state in the East to abruptly break with its spiritual, religious and geopolitical tradition. In fact, Turkey, being a NATO member today, is an eastern outpost of Atlanticism and mondialism, a "cordon sanitaire" between the Asian East and the Arab world. The geopolitical model that Turkey is proposing is integration into the Western world and an atheistic, mondialist civilization. But since Turkey itself, striving to enter "Europe", so far only "

Turkey's path is the path of serving the Atlanticist superpower and adopting the mondialist model of a planetary Great Space controlled by the "world government. "It may be objected that the card of" pan-Turkism "played by Turkey has an outwardly traditionalist character. This is partly true, and the projects of" Great Turkey from Yakutia to Sarajevo "are really actively developed by Turkish propaganda. It should be noted that the seriousness of these projects could only give a radical change in the political, ideological and economic course

today Turkey, and this presupposes nothing less than a Revolution and a 180-degree turn of geopolitical interests. Without excluding such a possibility, it should be noted that there is still a small probability of such a course of events in the near future. But at the same time, such a prospect, promoted in the present, can lead to a very specific geopolitical result - the turn of the eastern countries of the "near abroad" from Iran, to the choice of a secular, atheistic model of society, to gradual integration into the pro-Atlantist "cordon sanitaire". "Pan-Turkism" is as ambiguous as "Pan-Slavism" or "Pan-Germanism", i.e. like all ideologies that put a national attribute above geopolitical, spatial and religious
interests of peoples and states.

3.14 Oil dollars and mondialism

Saudi Arabia, the stronghold of purely Arab Islam and the Islamic theocracy, on the ideological level is a special "Wahhabi" model
authoritarian, moralistic and "purist" Islam, typologically very close to Protestant forms of Christianity. East Asian contemplation, asceticism and religious passion are replaced here by ritualism and the domination of an almost secular ethics. According to Islamic fundamentalist Heydar Jemal, “Saudi Arabia in its current state is the direct opposite of the world of“ continental Islam. ”Geopolitically, the interests of Wahhabi Saudi Arabia quite coincide with a certain version of the Mondialist project, since the economic and military well-being of this country is based on the support of the United States, who protect the dynastic interests of Saudi kings in the military and economic spheres Example of military support war against Iraq Economic "support" is as follows. The entire economy of Saudi Arabia is oil. All Arab oil traditionally enters the world market through Anglo-American hands. The development of Eurasian deposits and their development could theoretically compete with the Saudis, enrich the Eurasian states and make Europe and Japan independent from the United States. Thus, the United States, which controls the European economy through control of Arab oil, and the Saudi kings, who base their economies on American petrodollars, have the same interests. enrich the Eurasian states and make Europe and Japan independent from the United States. Thus, the United States, which controls the European economy through control of Arab oil, and the Saudi kings, who base their economies on American petrodollars, have the same interests. enrich the Eurasian states and make Europe and Japan independent from the United States. Thus, the United States, which controls the European economy through control of Arab oil, and the Saudi kings, who base their economies on American petrodollars, have the same interests.

The Saudi Wahhabi theocracy many times acted as an obstacle to the creation of an Arab Great Space proper, since this contradicted both the interests of the dynasty and the interests of the Atlantists. The Saudis have even more reason to fear the Eurasian continental Islamic Great Space. Revolutionary Iran is generally considered the Saudis' number one ideological enemy. Thus, the geopolitical interests of Saudi Arabia in the eastern countries of the "near abroad" are directly opposite to the emergence of the Asian Islamic Big Space. This means that the path to Arab-Islamic integration under the "Wahhabi" banner for the Asian republics will in fact also be included in the Mondialist project, but not in the secular-nationalist version of "Pan-Turkism", but in the moral-theocratic version. In a sense, this path is also nothing more than inclusion in the "cordon sanitaire". Only in this case, the "temptation" is not nationalism, but the religious factor (and money).

Summing up all these considerations, we can say that the eastern countries of the "near abroad" have only one positive way of creating a new Great Space, this is the way of the "Islamic Revolution" with an orientation towards Tehran. In this case, it can be solved

national conflicts and the restoration of religious tradition and religious order has been carried out. At the geopolitical level, this will mean the creation of a powerful continental bloc, fully capable of withstanding the mondialist projects in these regions. Moreover, even the first steps taken in this direction will cause a chain reaction in the Arab world, which threatens the mondialists with the loss of control in the entire Islamic ummah. In addition, such a geopolitical alliance will inevitably awaken the anti-mondialist forces of Central Europe (Iran's natural and main ally in the West) and Russia-Eurasia.

3.15 At least two poles or ... death

In the modern geopolitical situation, the question is extremely acute: either a planetary "new world order" led by the United States, where all states and peoples will be impersonal and obedient "cogs" of the mondialist
a technocratic, atheist-commercial "Disneyland" cosmopolitan model, or the immediate creation of geopolitical opposition to Atlanteanism and mondialism and the organization of potentially anti-mondialist, traditional and soil peoples and states into an alternative block (or several blocks). Today the situation is so critical that it is almost unimportant how and under what sign an alternative Large Space may arise. If it does arise, and if it really resists mondialism, then this alone will be enough to expand, diversify and multiply geopolitical alternatives in order to increase the internal degrees of freedom within the anti-mondialist opposition. It should always be remembered that for the United States "

The situation today is so serious that there is no need to choose between "good" and "best". If Russia can restore geopolitical independence and get rid of the Atlanticist leadership, great. In this case, the countries of the "near abroad" will have a wonderful opportunity to re-enter Russian Eurasia, this time devoid of the ideological negativity of ambiguous Marxism. In addition, the voluntary and conscious return of the present "near abroad" will be the guarantor of the coming cultural, religious, linguistic, economic, and even, perhaps, political (but not state) autonomy. This would be the simplest and best option. Moreover, the exposure of the true colonial goals of the mondialists in this catastrophic transition period will, of course,

If this does not happen, then another Big Space, or Central Europe under the flag of Germany, or a united Central Asia under the sign of the "Islamic Revolution" may become the detonator of the anti-monetary geopolitical project. In principle, there remains the prospect of an anti-mondialist uprising in the Arab world and in Latin America, although militarily these potential Great Spaces are not sufficiently equipped to compete with the Superpower.

For the countries of the "near abroad" the problem of the Large Space is central and vital. The entire future of the nation, religion, culture, freedom, prosperity, and security depends on the choice of geopolitical orientation there. The question is extremely acute. Today, all responsible people should understand that the adoption of the mondialist model means nothing more and less than the complete and final destruction of the identity, identity, the historical face of their states and nations, the end of their national history.

Chapter 4. Perspectives of the Civil War

4.1 National interests and the mondialist lobby

The problem of a possible civil war in Russia is becoming more and more urgent, and today it is necessary to study this terrible issue from an analytical point of view on the other side of both alarmist emotions and pacifist exhortations. Worst of all (if a civil conflict in Russia nevertheless breaks out) to be completely unprepared for it, lost in a complex and contradictory alignment of forces, capable of misleading even the most astute and ideologically consistent patriots.

In this issue, as in all other important aspects of the political life of the nation and the state, we must begin by recalling the fundamental points that determine the general contours of the current state of the geopolitical situation. The main imperative for the existence of the state and the nation is the principle of sovereignty, independence and political freedom. And it is precisely the requirements of national sovereignty that are synonymous with national interests. Russia and the Russian people have in the context of the political history of the world their unique place, their mission, their role, and the free and full-fledged fulfillment of the national state purpose is the main meaning of the very existence of the people as an organic community.

But we live in a special era when the internal national policy of the state is inextricably linked with the foreign policy context, and perhaps never in history has external pressure on national and state formations been so strong and persistent. Moreover, almost the most important doctrine in the modern political establishment of the West has become the theory of mondialism, i.e. such an organization of people's lives all over the world, in which there should be no national-state formations, no sovereignty, national interests. The mondialist world community is to be headed by the cosmopolitan elite, who governs not societies but the mathematical sum of atomic individuals. Consequently, the mondialist vector is initially oriented against any nation-state formations,

The mondialist factor is, of course, directed not only against Russia (other nations and states are also obstacles for it), but it was Russia, as a powerful geopolitical entity, that until recently was the main bastion preventing the gradual spread of mondialist control from the West to the whole world. Of course, the Soviet system in certain aspects also possessed Mondialist features, and one of the projects of the Western Mondialists consisted precisely in the gradual, “evolutionary” inclusion of the USSR into the general planetary system of the “new world order”. This famous theory of convergence was most likely the main reference point for those forces that began perestroika. But the soft version of Russia's "mondialization" did not "work" for one reason or another, and then the mondialist policy towards Russia took the form of aggressive pressure and openly subversive activity. The hard and super-fast collapse of the USSR deprived convergen

tions of "levers of control, and the mondialist policy passed to openly aggressive, Russophobic forms.

The Mondialist vector is an extremely important point for understanding the current situation in Russia. If earlier external influence on our country was exerted by other national-state formations seeking to weaken the power of the Russian state or win it over to their side in certain international conflicts; If earlier potential adversaries of Russia (overt and secret) were geopolitical forces, on the whole comparable in structure to itself, now the main external factor has become a special form of pressure, which does not have any clear national-state or geopolitical outlines and represents is a supranational, global utopian socio-political project, behind which are invisible manipulators with enormous economic and political power. Of course traditional

foreign policy factors also continue to operate (the mondialist project has not yet been fully implemented), but their significance and weighty pale in comparison with the totality of mondialist pressure, fade into the background. For example, Russia's relations with Germany, Japan or China today are not a matter of two parties, but of at least three Russia, another state and the world mondialist lobby, acting both directly and through their "agents of influence" in political formations. clarifying bilateral problems among themselves. Moreover, it is precisely the “third force,” mondialism, that most often turns out to be decisive, since its means of influence and structures of influence are incomparably more debugged and effective than the corresponding mechanisms of “archaic” national-state formations.

Thus, in Russia, both in domestic and foreign policy, two fundamental elements can be distinguished behind the adoption of certain decisions, behind the organization of certain processes, behind the determination of certain orientations of Russian political and socio-economic life. : these are mondialist "agents of influence" and groups guided by national and state interests. Based on the foregoing, it is obvious that both poles are opposite to each other in the most important thing: some seek to minimize the sovereignty and independence, autarky of Russia (up to its complete abolition in the mondialist cosmopolitan context of the "new world order"), others, on the contrary, are focused on assertion, strengthening and expansion of national-state sovereignty, to maximize the withdrawal of the nation from the planetary Mondialist structure, hostile, by definition, to the existence of any full-fledged autarkian society. Of course, in real politics, these two poles almost never meet in their pure form, most power structures are mixed systems where both tendencies are present, but, nevertheless, these two poles determine the main power tendencies, which are in constant and rigid counteraction, veiled by compromises, naivety, narrow-mindedness or corruption of "uninitiated" extras from politics.

So, we have identified two poles in the current political picture of Russia. They correspond to two different points of view on the possibility of a civil war in Russia. And it is these two forces that will ultimately be the main subjects of a potential conflict, the main opponents, the main parties, although their confrontation may be hidden under a more private and confused distribution of roles. The example of the first civil war in Russia shows that in this case the national and anti-national forces did not act under their own banners, but

under a complex and contradictory system of social, political and ideological orientations that hide the true geopolitical motives and tendencies. In order not to repeat the mistakes of the past, it is necessary to objectively analyze the terrible prospect of a new civil war, on the other side of political or ideological sympathies.

4.2 Variants of the alignment of forces

Let's highlight the main plots of the civil war in Russia, define the acting forces and immediate motivations, outline its hypothetical variants.

1) The first (and most unlikely) variant of a civil war could develop along the line of confrontation: *nation-state forces* vs *mondialist lobby.*

Indeed, such a division of roles would be quite logical, given the complete incompatibility of the main orientations of both. The Mondialists are striving in every possible way to weaken Russia's sovereignty, undermine its economic and political independence, make it dependent on the cosmopolitan mondialist establishment, and deprive it of the ability to freely carry out its national mission. On the contrary, nationalists and statesmen want to strengthen autarky, to achieve maximum political independence and economic and social self-sufficiency. Naturally, it is impossible to peacefully combine these two tendencies, since they contradict each other in everything in general and in particular.

However, such a version of a civil war ("cosmopolitans against nationalists") cannot become national and global at all, since the mondialist ideology is fundamentally incapable of instilling fanaticism in the masses and raising any significant part of the population to defend their ideals. In peaceful conditions, of course, inertia, indifference and general passivity can be auxiliary factors for mondialists, but in the event of a bloody conflict, shooting and murder, an appeal to the deeper layers of the human psyche is necessary, fanaticism and sacrifice are necessary. On the contrary, nationalists can easily count on the support of the overwhelming majority of the people in the event of an open and widespread armed confrontation with the mondialists, if, of course, the conflict acquires a national character,

In other words, a civil war according to the "mondialists-nationalists" scenario in any case will not become a real and total civil war, since the mondialists in their pure form do not and will not have a strong ideologically cohesive and politically active basis capable of organizing the masses to resist the nationalists. If such a conflict flared up, then its outcome would be swift and unambiguous: the national - state forces would quickly deal with the anti - national lobby, designated as such and facing the people who rose up for the patriotic idea. In principle, such a civil war would be almost bloodless and very brief, and after the destruction of the Mondialists, the internal source of conflict would be eliminated, and the political and social life of the state would develop strictly within the boundaries of national interests.

But the mondialist lobby hardly does not understand its true position and the suicidal nature of such a scenario, which means that it will try to avoid such a turn of events at any cost. That is why this option is almost unbelievable.

2) The second variant of the civil war is determined by the formula: *RF against one (or several) of the republics of the near abroad.* Such a situation can easily arise due to the extreme instability of the new state formations on the territory of the former USSR. These states, the overwhelming majority of which do not have any more or less stable state and national tradition, created within completely arbitrary boundaries that do not coincide with either ethnic, socioeconomic or religious territories of organic societies, will inevitably be thrown into deep internal and external crisis. In principle, they will not be able to acquire any genuine sovereignty, since their strategic capabilities do not allow them to defend their independence without resorting to external assistance. The collapse of the political, social and economic systems in them is inevitable, and naturally,

In this case, most likely, it is from their side that a challenge will be thrown to Russia, to which the Russian Federation will be forced to respond with varying degrees of aggressiveness. This process is likely to be of a chain nature, as the explosion of interethnic or territorial conflicts affecting Russia and the Russians will inevitably echo in other former Soviet republics.

Obviously, the national interests of the Russians and the orientation of the mondialist lobby within Russia (and within the new republics), in this case, will not clash directly and openly with each other. For the Russians, the main enemy in such a war will be their immediate neighbors. At the same time, it is absolutely not necessary that the mondialist lobby will play to defeat the Russian Federation in this case. Such a conflict, called by American strategists "wars of low intensity" (or even "medium (!) Intensity"), may well satisfy the interests of the mondialist lobby if it destabilizes the strategic and geopolitical situation in Russia and, more broadly, Eurasia, becoming a local, protracted and ambiguous. In this case, Russian national interests will not necessarily be fulfilled either, even if the civil war will be held under patriotic and nationalist slogans. As in the case of Afghanistan, Russia's armed conflict with neighboring regions will only weaken Russian influence in these states and undermine the attractiveness of the integration impulse of the neighbors to unite with Russia into a single geopolitical Eurasian bloc. At the same time, the similarity of the cultural and social type between the population of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics will make this conflict fratricidal and truly civil. In the case of the Slavic republics (first of all, Ukraine), this will also be an internal national tragedy. Russia's armed conflict with neighboring regions will only lead to a weakening of Russian influence in these states and undermine the attractiveness of the integration impulse of the neighbors to unite with Russia into a single geopolitical Eurasian bloc. At the same time, the similarity of the cultural and social type between the population of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics will make this conflict fratricidal and truly civil. In the case of the Slavic republics (first of all, Ukraine), this will also be an internal national tragedy. Russia's armed conflict with neighboring regions will only lead to a weakening of Russian influence in these states and undermine the attractiveness of the integration impulse of the neighbors to unite with Russia into a single geopolitical Eurasian bloc. At the same time, the similarity of the cultural and social type between the population of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics will make this conflict fratricidal and truly civil. In the case of the Slavic republics (first of all, Ukraine), this will also be an internal national tragedy.

Thus, this version of the civil war is contradictory and ambiguous. Russian national interests, the imperative of sovereignty, will not necessarily be strengthened in such a development of events, and the mondialist, Russophobic lobby, for its part, may even benefit from this, creating a belt of "low intensity wars" around the Russian Federation, discrediting Russians at the international level and undermining and so the precarious socio-economic stability of the state. Of course, this does not mean that Russia should not act as a defender

Russian and pro-Russian-oriented peoples in the near abroad. But in doing all this, it should be especially concerned about expanding its geopolitical and strategic influence. Even if the Russians manage to win back a part of the primordially Russian lands from their neighbors, the price for this may be the emergence of new hostile states, which will be thrown back into the camp of Russia's main opponents, i.e. mondialists, and in this case, the new imperial integration that Russia needs will be postponed indefinitely.

3) The third option is similar to the first in its structure, only here the civil war can begin *within the framework of the Russian Federation itself between representatives of the Russian and non-Russian ethnic groups*[79]. The scenario may be similar to the previous one: the Russian population is subjected to aggression by foreigners in any national district or internal republic; ethnic solidarity encourages other Russians to take part in the conflict; other national non-Russian regions are drawn into armed confrontation on ethnic grounds; the civil war takes on the character of a "low-intensity war." In this case, it is even more dangerous for Russia, since the result may be a violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation or, at least, provoking ethnic hostility towards the Russians of foreigners where they can be "suppressed". At the same time, other state and national entities will inevitably be drawn into the conflict against the Russians, which can make it protracted and long-term.

This version of the civil war generally contradicts the national interests of the Russians, since in it, in fact, the further disintegration of the Russian space into ethnic components will be legalized, which in the future will reduce the geopolitical quality of the once imperial people to a purely ethnic, almost "tribal" level. For a tough Russophobic mondialism aimed at undermining Russian national-state autarchy, such an option would be sufficient
attractive, since it presupposes instilling in Russians not a state, but a narrowly ethnic self-identification, which will inevitably narrow the strategic scope of Russia. On the other hand, in this case, too, there is a certain risk for the mondialists, since the explosion of ethnic self-awareness can hit the "agents of influence" as well. For Russian patriots, however, such a conflict is unprofitable from any side.

4) The fourth option is also internal Russian, but is not based on ethnic hatred, but *on regional, administrative-territorial contradictions.* Moscow's centralist policy on political, economic and social issues cannot but cause a powerful confrontation between the regions, which in the general process of disintegration are striving to obtain maximum autonomy. Here, as in the case of ethnic tensions, the collapse of the Soviet empire deprives the centralist and integrative idea of its legitimacy, evidence, and attractiveness. In addition, the current policy of the center, having adopted the command totalitarian style of the previous system, actually abandoned the second half of the center-region relations, which consisted in assistance and social
administrative support.

[79] Note that this text was written in December 1993, i.e. a year before the start of the Chechen war.

The center wants to take and control as well as before, but now it actually gives nothing in return. Economically, the regions only lose from this, since the field of their possibilities is narrowing and depends on the center. But to this is added the political peculiarity of the regions, where the anti-national character of the mondialist reforms is felt much more painfully than in the cosmopolitan megalopolises of the capitals.

The first steps towards separatism by the regions have already been made, although these attempts were thwarted by the center. However, it is highly likely that at some point Russians in southern Russia, Siberia, or elsewhere will want to create an "independent state" free from the political and economic dictatorship of Moscow. This may be based on purely economic expediency, the sale of regional resources or locally produced goods bypassing Moscow in some cases can dramatically improve the local situation. On the other hand, a "regional revolution" can also put forward political tasks, for example, rejection of the extreme liberal policy of the center, preservation of social guarantees, strengthening of the national aspect in ideology. All this makes the possibility of civil conflict at this level quite real.

This version of the Civil War is no less ambiguous and contradictory, like the previous two. Indeed, on the one hand, the demands of the regions wishing to isolate themselves from Moscow, the center of reforms, have some features of patriotism and nationalism, and meet the interests of the people; The mondialist forces of the center, opposing the regions, will at the same time defend not national, but anti-national interests, since the control of the liberals over the entirety of Russian territories is beneficial, first of all, to the designers of the "new world order." But, on the other hand, regional separatism will lead to the disintegration of Russian state territories, weaken the nationwide power, prepare the fault lines within the single Russian people. The Mondialists can deliberately go to the provocation of such a conflict if their control over Russia is weakened,

National forces should act on this issue proceeding from exactly the opposite logic. As long as the power of the center is strong, one should solidarize with the regional demands, supporting their desire for autonomy from the center. But at the same time, from the very beginning, the need for strategic and political integration of all regions should be emphasized on the basis of the prospects for the restoration of the empire. As the mondialist lobby in the center weakened, patriots should smoothly change their orientation, insist on the inadmissibility of civil conflict and call on the regions to unite.

Be that as it may, a civil war on a regional basis can in no way correspond to national interests, as well as the two previous scenarios.

The following point should be specially mentioned. The fifth version of the civil war also suggests itself, in which forces would be distributed not according to ideology, nationality and territoriality, but according to socio-economic criteria, for example, “new rich” versus “new poor”. In principle, such an option is not excluded, and in the future all the prerequisites for it may arise. But in the current state of society, the purely economic factor is obviously not dominant. Despite the terrible economic cataclysms, the general impoverishment of labor

layers and grotesque enrichment of the "new Russians", Russian society has not yet formulated its demands in economic terms. Geopolitical, national, ideological aspects are incomparably more effective and relevant. It is they who are able to bring the masses into the square and make them take up arms. The economic crisis serves as an excellent background for civil conflict, it can in certain cases serve as an impetus for cataclysms, but other non-economic theses will be the main lines of force. Appeals to the nation, ethnos, patriotism, freedom today are capable of relativizing the purely material side of life, making it secondary. But even in the case where the material side turns out to be dominant, due to the discrediting of Marxist and socialist doctrines, will not be able to express its demands in the form of a consistent and fiery political ideology. Most likely, the economic factor in possible conflicts will be a concomitant rather than a defining category.

4.3 Summary of the analysis

Unfortunately, a civil war in Russia is possible. The fundamental contradictions between national-state interests and the plans of mondialism can hardly be resolved peacefully and amicably. In order to seriously talk about a "consensus" or "truce" between these forces, it is necessary either to completely destroy the carriers of national-state tendencies (and this is possible only together with the destruction of the Russian state and the Russian nation itself), or to do away with the representatives mondialist lobby.

That is why the unleashing of a civil war in Russia or the creation of a belt of "low-intensity wars" on its territory can at any time become the main project of the mondialist lobby. At the same time, there is no doubt that representatives of this lobby will try to do everything possible to remain in the shadows themselves, speaking under some other banner (both separatist and centralist).

Three variants of the civil war of the Russian Federation against the near abroad, the Russian population of the Russian Federation against foreigners, the regions against the center are fundamentally unacceptable for all those who are really concerned about the national and state interests of Russia and the Russian people. All these three options are fraught with a further split in the geopolitical and strategic space of Russia, even if certain territories come under Russian control. Therefore, the civil war in these three scenarios, the patriots must prevent in any way. Not to mention the fact that from a moral point of view, it is not beneficial to them. And since this is so, it is logical to assume that it is the mondialists who will have a hand in provoking such conflicts (if they begin to flare up).

For the mondialist lobby, something like the civil war in Russia may be beneficial for several more reasons. The beginning of a military conflict with the direct participation of the Russians would allow liberals from the center to:

1) introduce a political dictatorship under the pretext of "saving the fatherland" and forcibly get rid of political opponents;

2) write off the economic collapse for the war and force the economy to function under the direct control of the center;

3) to divert public attention from the activities of the "reformers", which is becoming dangerously obvious today;

4) knowingly suppress a possible future alliance of Russians with neighboring national-state Eurasian and European formations under the sign of continental solidarity against the Atlanticist domination of the West and mondialist projects.

All this makes one believe that the bearers of a tough version of mondialism in Russia will sooner or later resort to a "civil war," especially if the position of the liberal regime becomes more and more precarious. At the same time, it is important to note that in this case, a "restructuring" will inevitably occur within the mondialist lobby itself, and part of it will come out under patriotic, and perhaps even nationalist and chauvinist slogans.

It is difficult to say exactly when the first explosions might occur. It depends on many spontaneous and artificial factors. But even if nothing like this happens for some time, the potential threat of such a turn of events will be more than relevant, since the mondialist lobby not only exists in Russia, but also controls the most important levers of state and political power.

Only the first version of the "civil war" of the mondialists against the nationalists could be short, almost bloodless and beneficial for the patriots, for Russia. Moreover, a direct clash of the nation with its internal enemies would inevitably give victory to the national forces. In fact, it would not be a "civil war" in the full sense of the word, but a short outburst of active confrontation, as a result of which the possibility of a full-fledged civil war, if not completely destroyed, would be postponed indefinitely. But for this it is necessary to provoke the mondialist lobby to appear under its own banners, and patriotic forces should also rally on behalf of the clearly defined and precisely named Russian national state interests. This is certainly not easy (almost impossible) to do. On the one hand, the mondialists themselves are not so naive as to speak publicly about hatred of the country in which they operate and about their desire to destroy it, and on the other hand, representatives of national-state forces are often unable to intelligibly and consistently, but at the same time, concisely and convincingly, to formulate the foundations of their ideological position. This is hindered by adherence to obsolete Soviet-communist clichés, heightened emotionality, a weak ability for analytical thinking, ignorance of the fundamental principles of geopolitics, etc. representatives of national-state forces are often unable to formulate the foundations of their ideological position intelligibly and consistently, but at the same time succinctly and convincingly. This is hindered by adherence to obsolete Soviet-communist clichés, heightened emotionality, a weak ability for analytical thinking, ignorance of the fundamental principles of geopolitics, etc. representatives of national-state forces are often unable to formulate the foundations of their ideological position intelligibly and consistently, but at the same time succinctly and convincingly. This is hindered by adherence to obsolete Soviet-communist clichés, heightened emotionality, a weak ability for analytical thinking, ignorance of the fundamental principles of geopolitics, etc.

Genuine civil peace cannot be based on a compromise if the two sides of this compromise are in all direct opposites. As long as the mondialist system of values is dominant, all its flanks, right, left, centrists, with all their differences, do not question their general orientation. Yes, in such a situation "peace" is possible, but at the cost of the death of the state and the radical exclusion of national forces from the dialogue. If the national-state system of values becomes dominant, then it will be possible to talk about the search for a compromise between national capitalists, national socialists, national communists, national monarchists or national theocrats, but in this case, anti-national, mondialist, Russophobic forces will be excluded from the dialogue, placed ideologically outside the law.

Our society is fraught with terrible civil conflict. If we still have the ability to influence the course of events, to choose, then we must choose the lesser of evils.

Chapter 5. Geopolitics of the Yugoslav conflict

5.1 Symbolism of Yugoslavia

It is well known that Yugoslavia is the territory in Europe from which the most serious and large-scale European conflicts begin. At least this was the case in the twentieth century. The Balkans is a knot where the interests of all major European geopolitical blocs converge, and that is why the fate of the Balkan peoples symbolizes the fate of all European peoples. Yugoslavia is Europe in miniature. Among the peoples inhabiting it, you can find exact analogs of the largest continental forces.

Serbs represent Orthodox Russia (= Eurasia) in the Balkans. Croats and Slovenes of Central Europe (i.e. Germany, Austria, Italy, etc.). Muslim Albanians and Bosnians are remnants of the Ottoman Empire, which means Turkey and even the Islamic world as a whole. And finally, the Macedonians are a mixed Serbo-Bulgarian ethnos, which is a symbol of the Great Orthodox Yugoslavia (based on the unification of Serbia and Bulgaria), which did not manage to develop historically, despite the Serbo-Bulgarian projects that existed at the beginning of the century.

5.2 Three European powers

In the most general terms, we can say that the geopolitical map of Europe is divided into three fundamental areas.

First the area is the West. The continental West proper is represented, first of all, by France and Portugal. In a broader sense, it includes England and the transatlantic non-European United States. Although there may be internal contradictions between the continental West (France), the insular West (England) and the overseas West (America), in relation to the rest of the European geopolitical formations, the West most often acts as a single geopolitical force.

Second the area is Central Europe (Mitteleuropa). It includes the states of the former Holy Roman Empire of the German Nations, the former lands of Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, etc. Central Europe is characterized by a geopolitical confrontation with both the European West and the East.

Finally, *third* the area is Russia, which acts in Europe not only on its own behalf, but also on behalf of all the Eurasian peoples of the East.

Generally speaking, a fourth Islamic geopolitical area from the Maghreb countries of North Africa to Pakistan and the Philippines could be distinguished, but this geopolitical bloc is non-European, and in addition, in the 20th century, its geopolitical influence on Europe was not very significant, although it is possible that in In the future, the Islamic world will again (as it was in the Middle Ages) become an important component of European geopolitics.

Three geopolitical European formations create permanent zones of tension on the continent, which run on the conditional and constantly changing borders between the European West and Central Europe (Mitteleuropa), on the one hand, and between Central Europe and Russia-Eurasia, on the other.

A certain number of geopolitical alliances or, on the contrary, confrontations, which constitute the constants of European international politics, can be outlined.

The European West can confront Central Europe as its closest neighbor to the East. This geopolitical tendency is most clearly embodied in the confrontation between absolutist France (Etat-Nation) and imperial Austria-Hungary. Later, this contradiction was expressed in numerous Franco-German conflicts. On the other hand, there is the theoretical possibility of a Franco-German geopolitical alliance, the ideas of which inspired both Vichy and de Gaulle. It is significant that the West can sometimes, in the struggle against Central Europe, enter into an alliance with the European East (Russia-Eurasia). In other cases, it is Russia that becomes the main geopolitical enemy of both the European West and Central Europe.

Central Europe (Germany) also in relation to its eastern geopolitical neighbor can be both in a state of confrontation (which is always directly or indirectly beneficial to the European West) and in a state of union (which always creates a danger for the West).

And finally, Russia's geopolitical preferences in European politics can be oriented both in an anti-German way (France, England and even the United States logically become allies in this case), and in an anti-Western one (then a Russian-German alliance is inevitable).

These are, in a rough approximation, the main geopolitical factors of European politics. It is absolutely necessary to take them into account when analyzing the Balkan problem, since all these three tendencies collide with each other in the Yugoslav conflict, creating a potential threat of a new big European war.

5.3 True Croats

Croats (as well as Slovenes) were traditionally part of Austria-Hungary, an ethnic group fully integrated into the Catholic sector of German Central Europe. Their natural geopolitical fate is linked precisely with this European bloc. Therefore, the gravitation of the Croats towards Germany and Austria is by no means an accidental opportunistic arbitrariness, but following the logic of the historical existence of this people. The collapse of Austria-Hungary and the creation of Yugoslavia were the result of the long struggle of the European West against Central Europe, and this explains the pragmatic support of the Serbs by the French. (Option: West together with East against Central Europe). Those Croats who welcomed the creation of Yugoslavia went, in a sense, against their geopolitical and religious tradition, and it is no coincidence that most of them, through Masonic institutions, were guided precisely by the "Great East of France" and its geopolitical projects aimed at the triumph of the forces of the West in Europe. During the creation of Yugoslavia, as well as in the entire alignment of forces during the First World War, the dominance of precisely the Western tendency can be traced, successfully using the forces of the East (both Serbia and greater Russia) against Central Europe.

During the creation of Yugoslavia, the Croats became the first victims of such a policy, and it is not surprising that they later met the Germans as liberators (as, indeed, the Ukrainian Catholics and Uniates, who always gravitated towards the zone of Central European influence). But the support of the Western forces by France for the Serbs (by the way, this support was also carried out, first of all, through Masonic channels) was very ambiguous, since the Serbs themselves, in turn, became hostages of such a geopolitical entity in the Balkans, the integrity of which could be preserved only through force control.

With the actual crisis of the eastern bloc (i.e. the entire zone of influence of Russia-Eurasia) during the perestroika period, the integration forces in Yugoslavia weakened somewhat, and the Croats (along with the Slovenes) were not slow to declare their geopolitical alienness in relation to Serbian Yugoslavia, understood in two ways and as an artificial creation of the West, and as an outpost of the East in Central Europe.

Thus, the Croats at the geopolitical level defend the principle that Central Europe remains itself, i.e. an independent, independent and territorially united European region. Although it should be noted that the idea of Croatia's transformation into an independent ethnically homogeneous dwarf Balkan State-Nation (Etat-Nation) of the French model is already deliberately laying a mine under the geopolitical unity of the Central European space, which can harmoniously exist only as a flexible, but integral structure, and not as a fractional a conglomerate of selfish microstates. In other words, the geopolitical trend of the Croats will be full only in the case of its supranational orientation, and this also presupposes a peaceful solution to the problem of the Serb minority in Croatia. Croatian nationalism,

5.4 The truth of the Serbs

The geopolitical perspective of the Serbs has an unambiguously pro-Russian, Eurasian character. Through the religious and ethnic factor, Serbia is directly adjacent to Russia, being its geopolitical continuation in the south of Europe. The fate of the Serbs and the fate of the Russians at the geopolitical level is one and the same fate. Therefore, in order for the Serbs to return to the origins of their European mission, they need to turn to the East, to Eurasia, to understand the meaning and goals of Russian geopolitics. At the same time, it is not naive and artificial Pan-Slavism, the inconsistency of which the Russian philosopher Konstantin Leontyev has perfectly demonstrated, but the project of Great Eurasia with the axis of Russia, a kind of ecumenical-continental Orthodox neovyzantism, should be the guiding star of truly Serbian geopolitics.

One constant trend can be traced in the geopolitical history of Europe, the clarification of which will help to understand what is a positive decision for Serbia. This tendency is as follows: the alliance of the East and Central Europe against the West is always beneficial to both sides. Equally beneficial to the continental West (France), an alliance with Central Europe (Germany) against the West, insular and overseas (Anglo-Saxon world). In other words, the priority given to geopolitical

The East (even relative to the East, after all, Central Europe, for example, is the East in relation to France) is almost always beneficial not only to the East itself, but also to the Western member of this union. Conversely, a geopolitical alliance with the priority of the Western trend (France with England and the United States against Germany, France with Germany against Russia, etc.) ties the knots of more and more European conflicts and wars.

Taking these considerations into account, we can say that the geopolitical orientation of the Serbs should turn as a reference point to the Bulgarian geopolitics, which almost always combined Russophilia with Germanophilia, creating in Southern Europe a space of political stability and harmony, which could gradually open up Central Europe access to the Muslim south, which means putting an end to the domination of the Atlanticist West in this region. Moreover, Serbia must realize the ambiguity of the support that the West once gave it, and the price of which is clearly visible in the anti-Serb sanctions of Western countries. Only geopolitical unity with other Orthodox Eastern European peoples (and, first of all,

As in the case of the Croats, the idea of a purely Serbian State-Nation will also not solve any problems if this Serbian state perceives its Germanophobia and orientation towards the West from the Yugoslavia created by the Freemasons.

5.5 The truth of Yugoslav Muslims

Bosnia's Yugoslav Muslims and Albanians represent the Islamic, “Ottoman” geopolitical factor in Europe. It is important to note that Turkey, whose influence is most felt among the Yugoslav Muslims, is undoubtedly the exponent of extreme Western, Atlantic tendencies in Europe. If the West, trying to use the European East (Russia) against Central Europe, still could not completely suppress the independent geopolitical self-manifestation of this continental region and often faced, on the contrary, the expansion of Russia-Eurasia (either through the Russian-German alliance, or directly through the creation of the Warsaw bloc), then secular pseudo-Islamic Turkey became a reliable instrument in the hands of Atlanticist politicians. And more broadly, the Atlanticist influence on the geopolitics of Islamic countries is extremely great. Therefore, the anti-Serb demonstrations of Yugoslav Muslims mark an incomparably more global continental conflict of Northern Eurasia (Russia and its geopolitical area) with the South. It is important to note that such a conflict contradicts the interests of the South itself, since in this case it becomes the same instrument in the hands of the Atlanticist West, which was the Eurasian East (represented by the Serbs) against Central Europe (represented by Austria-Hungary and its representatives, the Croats).

The only logical way out for the Yugoslav Muslims of Bosnia and Albanians would be to turn to Iran and the continuity of its policy, since only this country is currently pursuing a geopolitics focused on independence, independence and continental harmony, acting in accordance with its own logic, regardless of the interests of the Atlanteans. stov in this region. By turning to Iran, Yugoslav Muslims will be able to gain a proper geopolitical perspective, since a radically anti-Western, continental and traditionalist Iran

is a potential ally of all eastern-oriented European blocs from Russia-Eurasia to Central Europe. Moreover, the orientation towards Iran of the European Eastern Great Spaces could dramatically change the state of affairs in the entire Islamic world and dramatically weaken American influence there, which would not only play into the hands of the Europeans, but would also free the Islamic peoples from the economic and military dictatorship of the Anglo-Saxon Atlantists.

Only with such an orientation of the Yugoslav Muslims, their geopolitical presence in Europe could become harmonious, logical and conflict-free. We can say that this problem is divided into three stages. First stage: reorientation of Muslims from Turkey to Iran. The second stage: strengthening the geopolitical union of Central Europe with Iran and the Islamic world as a whole. And the third stage: the geopolitical Eurasian alliance of the East and Central Europe. Moreover, these stages can take place in parallel, each at its own level. It is especially important to understand here that the problem of the small Balkan people cannot be geopolitically solved without the most serious and global geopolitical transformations. It should never be forgotten that it is with small in size, but gigantic in symbolic significance, local conflicts that all world wars begin.

5.6 Truth of the Macedonians

The Macedonian problem of modern Yugoslavia is rooted precisely in the artificiality of the really existing "Yugoslavia", which was the "state of the South Slavs" in name only. The Macedonians, who are an ethnos intermediate between Serbs and Bulgarians and professing Orthodoxy, should have entered, as a natural component, into the real Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Bulgaria. But the existence of two Slavic states of the Jacobin type in the Balkans instead of one federal, "imperial", Slavic state of the Eurasian orientation led to the fact that the small Macedonian people found themselves on the border between two political regions with rather different political specifics.

At the present moment, the matter is further aggravated by the fact that Jacobin nationalism is growing in present-day Bulgaria, which has more than once pitted the Orthodox Balkan powers against each other and prevented them from turning to the only true neo-Byzantine geopolitics. Initially, the Atlanticist lobby (both Catholic and English) was actively involved in this process, which makes itself felt in modern Bulgaria, albeit in different forms.

In essence, Western tactics remain the same here as at the beginning of the century. Then, having destroyed Austria-Hungary, the West did not allow the creation of a large Slavic community, playing the card of "Balkan nationalisms" of Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Romanian, etc. Today, the same geopolitical forces of the West are again dealing a double blow to Central Europe and to Yugoslavian unity, provoking Croatian separatism in the West and Macedonian in the East.

In the case of Macedonia, as in all other Balkan conflicts, a way out can be found only through the global integration process of organizing the European Large Spaces, and not through straightforward separatism and the creation of dwarf pseudo-states. The accession of Macedonia to Bulgaria will also in no way solve the problem, but will only prepare a new, this time really interstate, inter-Slavic conflict.

5.7 Priorities of the Yugoslav War

Deeply symbolic and extremely significant, the Yugoslav conflict requires every country, every European political and geopolitical force to determine and define its priorities in this matter. Here we are talking not only about the sentimental, confessional, historical, ethnic or political inclinations of certain people, peoples and states. We are talking about the future of Europe, about the future of Eurasia.

The supporters of the priority of Central Europe and the Germanophiles initially took a pro-Croatian position. This choice was based on a geopolitical analysis of the reasons for the creation of Yugoslavia, on the rejection of the Masonic policy of France in Central Europe, on the understanding of the need to naturally recreate a single Central European space after the end of the Yalta era, during which Europe was artificially divided into two, not three geopolitical camps. This explains the presence of many European national revolutionaries among the Croats.

But the logic of preference for Central Europe did not take into account one very important consideration. The fact is that, in addition to the instrumental role of the geopolitical East in the execution of the West's plans against Central Europe, there has always been a fundamental, deep and soil-based proper Eurasian geopolitics of this Great Space, the geopolitics of Orthodox Russia, oriented towards its own continental interests, and in the distant future, on a new Sacred Union. When, in the process of a fierce internal conflict between Serbs and Croats, the Serbian self-consciousness was fully awakened, when the blood of the Serbian people once again aroused from the unconscious depths the most ancient geopolitical, national and spiritual archetypes, when the idea of Great Serbia, Spiritual Serbia became relevant, the instrumental mission of Yugoslavia ended

While the Serbs fought Central Europe (represented by the Croats), the Atlanticists from Paris to New York applauded Federal Yugoslavia everywhere, or at least reproached the Croats for "nationalism" and "pro-fascism." As soon as the Serbs crossed a certain line, and their struggle took on the character of a struggle against the very idea of the West, against Atlanticism, Serbia was immediately declared the main obstacle to building a "New World Order", and harsh political and economic sanctions followed against it.

To make the final choice, it is necessary to turn again to the geopolitical law already formulated by us above, according to which continental harmony is real only with the priority of the East, with the choice of Eurasia as a positive orientation, since even the idea of Central Europe, which is positive in itself, is opposed to Russia. Eurasia is becoming negative and destructive, as it was clearly revealed in the deep and tragic mistake of Hitler, who began an anti-Eastern, anti-Russian expansion, which, in the end, turned out to be beneficial only for the Western, Atlantic bloc, destroyed Germany and gave rise to the embryos of a crisis in Russia. Therefore, in the Yugoslav conflict, geopolitical priority should be given to the Serbian factor, but, naturally, to the extent that the Serbs follow the Eurasian, pro-Russian geopolitical tendency,

Europe and facilitating the establishment of a German-Russian alliance against the West. Serbian Germanophobia combined with Masonic Francophilism, no matter how plausible pretexts they hide behind, will never be able to give grounds for a positive solution to the Yugoslav problem.

In other words, the greatest preference is must be given away Serbs traditionalists rooted in the Orthodox faith conscious of their Slavic spiritual heritage and focused on the creation of a new harmonious pro-Russian geopolitical structure with a uniquely anti-Western and anti-Atlantic orientation.

On the other hand, one should carefully consider the demands of the Croats and their attraction to the Central European region. If they have anti-Atlantic tendencies, the Croats can in the future become a positive intra-European force.

The Bosnian factor in the reorientation of Yugoslav Muslims from Turkey to Iran must also be taken into account in order to "turn poison into medicine" on this basis to initiate a completely new European policy in the Islamic world, directly opposite to the US economic and military imperialism in Islamic countries.

And finally, the Macedonians, instead of being the bone of contention for the southern Orthodox Slavs, should become the embryo of Serbo-Bulgarian unification, the first step towards the creation of a true Great Yugoslavia.

An impartial geopolitical analysis of the Yugoslav problem leads to such conclusions. Of course, in the horror of a fratricidal war, it is difficult to preserve common sense, the streams of blood awaken in hearts only rage and a desire for revenge. But sometimes, perhaps, only a cold, reasonable analysis, taking into account historical roots and geopolitical patterns, can offer the right way out of the dead end of a fratricidal war, while emotional solidarity with one or another will only aggravate the hopelessness of a bloody nightmare. In addition, such an analysis clearly shows that the true enemy, provoking the entire intra-Slavic genocide, remains in the shadows, behind the scenes, preferring to watch from afar how one Slavic people destroys another, sowing discord, closing the possibility of union and fraternal peace for many years, destroying Bolshoi The spaces of the most powerful

The true initiators of the Yugoslav massacre are the Atlanticist forces of the West, guided by the principle "in the camp of the enemy one must set one against another and in no case should unity, union and fraternal unity be allowed." This must be understood by all the participants in the complicated Yugoslav war for Europe so that it does not finally become a war against Europe.

5.8 Serbia is Russia

The importance of the Yugoslav events also lies in the fact that, on the example of a small Balkan country, the scenario of a gigantic continental war that could break out in Russia is being played out. All geopolitical forces participating in the Balkan conflict have their counterparts in Russia, only in an incomparably larger spatial volume. Croats and Slovenes, striving to enter Central Europe, have their geopolitical synonyms for Ukrainians, although the affinity of these latter with Great Russia dates back not several decades, but several

centuries, and confessional friction, except for the Uniates and Ukrainian Catholics, does not exist here. Be that as it may, judging by certain tendencies, some forces in Kiev are beginning to "gravitate toward the Russian East" and seek to get closer to the European space, economically controlled by Germany. Russians and other nations living in Ukraine may become hostages of the "mid-European" policy of these republics, in which case their fate will be similar to that of the Serbs in Croatia.

This comparison, among other things, shows that in geopolitical and diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Belarus, Russia should
be guided by their fundamental understanding of the problem of Central Europe, i.e. first of all, Germany. To be realistic in this matter, one should proceed in its solution not from pathetic slogans about "the unity of the blood brothers of the Slavs" (how this "unity" happens can be seen from the example of the Serbo-Choir massacre), but from a deep analysis of the logic of Russian-German relations , since both Ukraine and even Poland are not independent geopolitical formations, but only border regions of the two Great Spaces of Eurasia - Russia and Central Europe. We must not forget that the conflict in this border zone is extremely beneficial for another geopolitical force in the West. It is no coincidence that Anglo-Saxon diplomacy has always considered all territories from Romania to the Baltic states as a "sanitary belt"

The Serbo-Muslim conflict is an analogue of a possible Russian-Islamic confrontation in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and it is important to note that in this case, too, the Muslim republics that were part of the USSR are a zone of competitive geopolitical influence of Turkey and Iran. As in the case of the Yugoslav Muslims, this comparison shows that the republics oriented towards Iran are more likely to come to geopolitical harmony with the main Russian bloc of the Eurasian continent. On the contrary, the geopolitical factor of Turkey, which is currently playing the role of a conductor of Atlanticist policy in this region, is inevitably associated with dramatic and conflict situations.

The example of Yugoslavia shows what threatens Russia in the event of a similar course of events, and the fact that these events are really unfolding in the same channel, today no one doubts anymore. The only difference is in the speed, which is the greater, the smaller the space and the fewer peoples. In order to prevent a gigantic "Yugoslavia" in Russia, a bloody massacre monstrous in scale and consequences, it is necessary to give an answer to fundamental geopolitical questions in advance, to determine the Russian continental strategy, which should be guided by knowledge of the Russian political tradition and understanding of the main geopolitical tasks of Russia-Eurasia, " Geographical Axis of History ". At the same time, inertia, passive following the fatal course of events will not only be destructive for the entire system of continental security,

Chapter 6. From sacred geography to geopolitics

6.1 Geopolitics is an "intermediate" science

Geopolitical concepts have long been the most important factors in modern politics. They are built on general principles that make it easy to analyze the situation of any particular country and any particular region.

Geopolitics in the form in which it exists today is unquestionably secular, "profane" and secularized science. But, perhaps, it is she, among all other modern sciences, that has retained the greatest connection with Tradition and with traditional sciences. René Guénon said that modern chemistry is the result of the desacralization of the traditional science of alchemy, and modern physics is magic. In the same way, we can say that modern geopolitics is a product of secularization, desacralization of another traditional science of sacred geography. But since geopolitics occupies a special place among modern sciences, and it is often referred to as "pseudosciences", its profanation is not as perfect and irreversible as in the case of chemistry or physics. The links with sacred geography are clearly visible here. Therefore, we can say

6.2 Land and sea

The two initial concepts in geopolitics are land and sea. It is these two elements, Earth and Water, that lie at the heart of a person's qualitative understanding of earthly space. In the experience of land and sea, land and water, man comes into contact with the fundamental aspects of his existence. Dryness is stability, density, fixity, space as such. Water is mobility, softness, dynamics, time.

These two elements are the most obvious manifestations of the material nature of the world. They are outside of man: everything is solid and liquid. They are inside him: body and blood. (It's the same at the cellular level.)

The universality of the experience of earth and water gives rise to the traditional concept of the Heavenly firmament, since the presence of the Upper Waters (a source of rain) in the sky also presupposes the presence of a symmetrical and obligatory element of earth, land, and heavenly stronghold. Be that as it may, the Earth, the Sea, the Ocean are the main categories of earthly existence, and humanity cannot but see in them some basic attributes of the universe. As the two main terms of geopolitics, they retain their meaning both for civilizations of the traditional type and for purely modern states, peoples and ideological blocs. At the level of global geopolitical phenomena, Land and Sea gave rise to the terms: thalassocracy and tellurocracy, i.e. "power through the sea" and "power through land".

Every state, every empire bases its strength on the preferred development of one of these categories. Empires are either "thalassocratic" or "tellurocratic". The first assumes the presence of a metropolis and colonies, the second the capital and provinces on the "common land". In the case of "thalassocracy", its territories are not united in one land space, which creates a discontinuity factor. The sea is and

strong and weak point of "thalassocratic power". Tellurocracy, on the other hand, has the quality of territorial continuity.

But geographic and cosmological logic immediately complicate the seemingly simple scheme of this division: the pair "earth - sea", when its elements are superimposed on each other, gives the ideas of "sea land" and "earth water". Sea land is an island, i.e. the basis of the naval empire, the pole of thalassocracy. Earth water or land water are rivers that predetermine the development of the land empire. It is on the river that the cities are located, and therefore the capital, the pole of the tellurocracy. This symmetry is both symbolic and economic-economic and geographical at the same time. It is important to note that the status of the Island and the Continent is determined not so much on the basis of their physical size, but on the basis of the specifics of the typical consciousness of the population. Thus, the geopolitics of the United States is insular in nature, despite the size of North America,

Another detail is also important: historically, thalassocracy is associated with the West and the Atlantic Ocean, and tellurocracy with the East and the Eurasian continent. (The above example of Japan is explained, therefore, by a stronger "attraction", the influence of Eurasia.)

Thalassocracy and Atlanticism became synonymous long before the colonial expansion of Great Britain or the Portuguese-Spanish conquests. Even before the wave of sea migrations began, the peoples of the West and their cultures began to move eastward from the centers located in the Atlantic. The Mediterranean was also developed from Gibraltar to the Middle East, and not vice versa. And on the contrary, excavations in Eastern Siberia and Mongolia show that it was here that the most ancient centers of civilization existed, which means that it was the central lands of the continent that were the cradle of Eurasian mankind.

6.3 Landscape symbolism

In addition to the two global categories Land and Sea, geopolitics also operates with more specific definitions. Among the thalassocratic realities, marine and oceanic formations are distinguished. Thus, the civilization of the seas, for example, the Black or the Mediterranean, is very different in quality from the civilization of the oceans, i.e. island powers and peoples inhabiting the shores of the open oceans. A more frequent division is also river and lake civilizations associated with continents.

Tellurocracy also has its own specific forms. Thus, one can distinguish between the civilization of the Steppe and the civilization of the Forest, the civilization of the Mountains and the civilization of the Valleys, the civilization of the Desert and the civilization of Ice. Varieties of landscape in sacred geography are understood as symbolic complexes associated with the specifics of the state, religious and ethical ideology of certain peoples. And even in the case when we are dealing with a universalist ecumenist religion, anyway its concrete embodiment in a particular people, race, state will be subject to adaptation in accordance with the local sacred-geographic context.

Deserts and steppes are the geopolitical microcosm of the nomads. It is in the deserts and steppes that the tellurocratic tendencies reach their peak, since the "water" factor is minimized here. It is the empires of the Desert and the Steppe that should logically be the geopolitical foothold of the tellurocracy.

The empire of the Steppe can be considered the empire of Genghis Khan, and the typical example of the empire of the Desert is the Arab Caliphate, which arose under the direct influence of the nomads.

Mountains and mountain civilizations are most often archaic, fragmentary formations. Mountainous countries are not only not sources of expansion, but on the contrary, victims of the geopolitical expansion of other tellurocratic forces are drawn to them. No empire has mountainous regions as its center. Hence the so often repeated motif of sacred geography: "the mountains are inhabited by demons." On the other hand, the idea of preserving the remnants of ancient races and civilizations in the mountains is reflected in the fact that the sacred centers of tradition are located in the mountains. One could even say that in the tellurocracy mountains are associated with some kind of spiritual power.

The symbolism of the hill became the logical combination of both concepts of mountains as an image of the priestly and the plain as an image of the royal. low to medium elevation. The hill is a symbol of royal power, rising above the secular level of the steppe, but not going beyond the state interests (as is the case in the case of the mountains). The hill is the seat of the king, duke, emperor, but not a priest. All the capitals of large tellurocratic empires are located on a hill or on hills (often seven according to the number of planets; five according to the number of elements, including ether, etc.).

The forest in sacred geography, in a sense, is close to the mountains. The very symbolism of the tree is related to the symbolism of the mountain (both denote the axis of the world). Therefore, the forest in tellurocracy also performs a peripheral function; it is also a "place of priests" (druids, magi, hermits), but at the same time it is a "place of demons", i.e. archaic remnants of a vanished past. The forest zone also cannot be the center of a land empire.

The tundra is the northern counterpart of the steppe and desert, but the cold climate makes it much less important from a geopolitical point of view. This "peripherality" reaches its apogee in ice, which, like mountains, are zones of deep archaism. It is significant that the shamanic tradition of the Eskimos presupposes a lonely retreat into the ice, where the other world is revealed to the future shaman. Thus, the ice is a priestly zone, the threshold of another world.

Given these initial and most general characteristics of the geopolitical map, it is possible to define different regions of the planet in accordance with their sacred quality. This method is also applicable to local features of the landscape at the level of a particular country or even a separate area. It is also possible to trace the similarity of ideologies and traditions among the most seemingly different peoples in the event that the indigenous landscape of their habitat is the same.

6.4 East and West in sacred geography

The sides of the World in the context of sacred geography have a special qualitative characteristic. In different traditions and in different periods of these traditions, the picture of sacred geography can change in accordance with the cyclical phases of the development of this tradition. At the same time, the symbolic function of the Cardinal points often varies. Without going into details, we can formulate the most universal law of sacred geography in relation to the East and West.

The East in sacred geography on the basis of "cosmic symbolism" is traditionally considered the "land of the Spirit", the land of paradise, the land of fullness, abundance, the "homeland" of the sacred in its most complete and perfect form. In particular, this idea is reflected in the text of the Bible, which refers to the eastern location of "Eden". Exactly this understanding is characteristic of other Abrahamic traditions (Islam and Judaism), as well as many non-Abrahamic traditions of Chinese, Hindu and Iranian. "East is the abode of the gods," says the sacred formula of the ancient Egyptians, and the very word "east" (in Egyptian "neter") meant at the same time "god". From the point of view of natural symbolism, the East is the place where the sun rises, "rises", the Light of the World, the material symbol of the Divine and the Spirit.

The West has exactly the opposite symbolic meaning. This is the "land of death", "the world of the dead", "green country" (as the ancient Egyptians called it). The West is the "kingdom of exile," "the well of alienation," as the Islamic mystics put it. The West is the "anti-East", the country of "decline", decline, degradation, transition from the manifested to the unmanifest, from life to death, from completeness to poverty, and so on. West is the place where the sun sets, where it "sets".

In accordance with this logic of natural cosmic symbolism, ancient traditions organized their "sacred space", founded their cult centers, burials, temples and buildings, comprehended the natural and "civilizational" features of the geographic, cultural and state territories of the planet. Thus, the very structure of migrations, wars, campaigns, demographic waves, empire building, etc. was determined by the original, paradigmatic logic of sacred geography. Nations and civilizations were lined up along the East-West axis, possessing hierarchical characteristics, the closer to the East, the closer to the Sacred, to Tradition, to spiritual abundance. The closer to the West, the greater the decline, degradation and mortification of the Spirit.

Of course, this logic was not absolute, but at the same time, it was not secondary and relative, as many "profane" researchers of ancient religions and traditions mistakenly believe today. In fact, sacred logic and adherence to cosmic symbolism were much more conscious, meaningful and effective among the ancient peoples than is commonly believed today. And even in our anti-sacred world, at the level of the "unconscious", the archetypes of sacred geography are almost always preserved intact and awaken at the most important and critical moments of social cataclysms.

So, sacred geography unambiguously affirms the law of "qualitative space", in which the East is a symbolic "ontological plus", and the West is the "ontological minus".

According to Chinese tradition, East is yang, masculine, light, solar principle, and West is yin, feminine, dark, lunar principle.

6.5 East and West in modern geopolitics

Now let's see how this sacred-geographical logic is reflected in geopolitics, which, being a purely modern science, fixes only the actual state of affairs, leaving behind the scenes the sacred principles themselves.

Geopolitics in its original formulation by Ratzel, Kjellen and Mackinder (and later by Haushofer and the Russian Eurasians) proceeded precisely from the peculiarities of various types of civilizations and states, depending on their geographic location. Geopoliticians have documented the fact of a fundamental difference between the "insular" and "continental" powers, between the "western", "progressive" civilization and the "eastern", "despotic" and "archaic" cultural forms. Since the question of Spirit in its metaphysical and sacred understanding is never raised in modern science at all, geopoliticians leave it aside, preferring to assess the situation in other, more modern terms than the concepts of "sacral" and "profane", "traditional"

Geopoliticians record the fundamental difference between the state, cultural and industrial development of the regions of the East and the regions of the West in recent centuries. The picture is as follows. The West is the center of "material" and "technological" development. At the cultural and ideological level, it is dominated by "liberal democratic" tendencies, an individualistic and humanistic worldview. At the economic level, priority is given to trade and technical modernization. It was in the West that the theories of "progress", "evolution", "progressive development of history" first appeared, completely alien to the traditional world of the East (and those periods of the history of the West when a full-fledged sacred tradition existed in it, as, in particular, it took place in Middle Ages). Coercion at the social level in the West acquired a purely economic character, and the Law of Idea and Power was replaced by the Law of Money. Gradually, the specificity of the "ideology of the West" was molded into the universal formula of the "ideology of human rights", which became the dominant principle of the westernmost region of the planet of North America, and above all, the United States. At the industrial level, this ideology corresponded to the idea of "developed countries", and at the economic level, the concept of "free market", "economic liberalism". The totality of these characteristics, with the addition of a purely military, strategic association of different sectors of Western civilization, is defined today by the concept but at the economic level the concept of "free market", "economic liberalism". The totality of these characteristics, with the addition of a purely military, strategic association of different sectors of Western civilization, is defined today by the concept and at the economic level, the concept of "free market", "economic liberalism". The totality of these characteristics, with the addition of a purely military, strategic association of different sectors of Western civilization, is defined today by the concept "Atlanticism". In the last century, geopoliticians talked about "Anglo-Saxon type civilization "or about the" capitalist, bourgeois "Atlanticist" democracy ". In that type has found its purest embodiment formula "geopolitical West".

Geopolitical East presents by myself straight opposite geopolitical West. Instead of modernizing the economy, it is dominated by traditional, archaic forms of production of the corporate, guild type ("developing countries"). Instead of economic coercion, the state most often uses "moral" or simply physical coercion (the Law of Idea and the Law of Power). Instead of "democracy" and "human rights," the East gravitates towards totalitarianism, socialism and authoritarianism, i.e. to various types of social regimes, united only in the fact that in the center of their systems there is not an "individual", a "man" with his "rights" and his purely "individual values", but something extra-individual, extrahuman, be it "society", "nation", "people", "idea", "world outlook", "

"non-individualistic-power"). Typical forms of such anti-Western

civilizations were the USSR, communist China, Japan until 1945 or Iran Khomeini.

It is interesting to note that Rudolf Kjellen, the author who first used the term "geopolitics", illustrated the difference between the West and the East in this way. “The typical American sentence,” Challen wrote, is “go ahead,” which literally means “forward.” This reflects the inner and natural geopolitical optimism and “progressism” of American civilization, which is the ultimate form of the Western model. Russians usually repeat the word “nothing.” (in Russian, in the text of A.D. Kjellen) This is the manifestation of "pessimism", "contemplation", "fatalism" and "adherence to tradition" characteristic of the East. "

If we return now to the paradigm of sacred geography, we will see a direct contradiction between the priorities of modern geopolitics (concepts such as "progress", "liberalism", "human rights", "trading system", etc., have become positive today for the majority. terms) and priorities of sacred geography, assessing the types of civilization from a completely opposite point of view (concepts such as "spirit", "contemplation", "obedience to superhuman strength or superhuman idea", "ideocracy", etc. in sacred civilization were purely positive and still remain so for the peoples of the East at the level of their "collective unconscious"). Thus, modern geopolitics (with the exception of the Russian Eurasians, the German followers of Haushofer, Islamic fundamentalists, etc.) assesses the picture of the world in exactly the opposite way than traditional sacred geography. But at the same time, both sciences converge in describing the fundamental laws of the geographical picture of civilization.

6.6 Sacred North and Sacred South

In addition to sacred-geographical determinism along the East-West axis, the problem of another, vertical, axis of orientations of the North-South axis is extremely important. Here, as in all other cases, the principles of sacred geography, the symbolism of the cardinal points and the continents corresponding to them have a direct analogue in the geopolitical picture of the world, which either develops naturally in the course of the historical process, or is consciously and artificially constructed as a result of the purposeful actions of the leaders of certain other geopolitical entities. From the point of view of "integral traditionalism", the difference between "artificial" and "natural" is generally quite relative, since Tradition has never known anything similar to Cartesian or Kantian dualism, strictly separating "subjective" and "objective" ("phenomenal" and "noumenal"). Therefore, the sacred determinism of the North or South is not only a physical, natural, landscape-climatic factor (that is, something "objective") or only an "idea", a "concept" generated by the minds of certain individuals (that is, something " subjective "), but something third, surpassing both the objective and subjective pole. We can say that the sacred North, the archetype of the North, in history bifurcates into the northern natural landscape, on the one hand, and the idea of the North, "Nordism", on the other hand. generated by the minds of certain individuals (ie, something "subjective"), but something third, surpassing both the objective and subjective pole. We can say that the sacred North, the archetype of the North, in history bifurcates into the northern natural landscape, on the one hand, and the idea of the North, "Nordism", on the other hand. generated by the minds of certain individuals (ie, something "subjective"), but something third, surpassing both the objective and subjective pole. We can say that the sacred North, the archetype of the North, in history bifurcates into the northern natural landscape, on the one hand, and the idea of the North, "Nordism", on the other hand.

The most ancient and primordial layer of Tradition unambiguously affirms the primacy of the North over the South. The symbolism of the North refers to the Source, to the primordial Nordic paradise, from where all human civilization originates. Ancient Iranian and Zoroastrian texts speak of the northern country "Aryan Vaeja" and its capital "Vara", from where the ancient Aryans were expelled by glaciation, which was sent on them by Ahriman, the spirit of Evil

and the enemy of the light Ormuzd. The ancient Vedas also speak of the Northern Land as the ancestral home of the Hindus, of Sveta-dvipa, the White Land, lying in the far north.

The ancient Greeks spoke of Hyperborea, the northern island with the capital Tula. This land was considered the birthplace of the luminous god Apollo. And in many other traditions one can find traces of the most ancient, often forgotten and become fragmentary, Nordic symbolism. The main idea traditionally associated with the North is the idea of a Center, a Fixed Pole, a point of Eternity, around which not only space revolves, but also time, a cycle. The North is a land where the sun does not set even at night, a space of eternal light. Every sacred tradition reveres the Center, the Middle, the point where opposites converge, a symbolic place that is not subject to the laws of cosmic entropy. This Center, the symbol of which is the Swastika (emphasizing the immobility and constancy of the Center and the mobility and variability of the periphery), in each tradition was called differently, but he was always directly or indirectly associated with the symbolism of the North. Therefore, we can say that all sacred traditions are the essence of the projection of the United Northern Primordial Tradition, adapted to various historical conditions. The North is the side of the Light, chosen by the original Logos in order to manifest itself in History, and any subsequent manifestation of it only restored the original polar paradise symbolism.

Sacred geography correlates the North with spirit, light, purity, completeness, unity, eternity.

The South symbolizes something exactly the opposite of materiality, darkness, confusion, deprivation, plurality, immersion in the flow of time and becoming. Even from a natural point of view, in the polar regions there is one long half-year Day and one long half-year Night. This is the Day and Night of gods and heroes, angels. Even degraded traditions remembered this sacred, spiritual, supernatural side of the North, considering the northern regions to be the abode of "spirits" and "otherworldly forces". In the South, the Day and Night of the gods split into many human days, the original symbolism of Hyperborea is lost, and the memory of it becomes a factor of "culture", "tradition". In general, the South is often related to culture, i.e. with that sphere of human activity, where the Invisible and Purely Spiritual acquires its material, rough, visible outlines. The South is the realm of matter, life, biology and instinct. The South decomposes the northern purity of Tradition, but retains its traces in materialized form.

The North-South pair in sacred geography is not reduced to an abstract opposition of Good and Evil. Rather, it is a confrontation between the Spiritual Idea and its coarse, material embodiment. In the normal case, with the primacy of the North recognized by the South, there are harmonious relations between these sides of the world. The North "spiritualizes" the South, the Nordic envoys give the Southerners a Tradition, lay the foundations of sacred civilizations. If the South refuses to recognize the primacy of the North, a sacred confrontation begins, a "war of the continents", and, from the point of view of tradition, it is the South that is responsible for this conflict by its transgression of sacred norms. In the Ramayana, for example, the southern island of Lanka is considered the abode of the demons who kidnapped Rama's wife Sita and declared war on the continental North with the capital Ayodhya.

It is important to note that the North-South axis in sacred geography is more important than the East-West axis. But being more important, it relates to the most ancient stages of cyclical history. Great War of the North and South, Hyperborea and

Gondwana (ancient paleocontinent of the South) belongs to the "antediluvian" times. In the last phases of the cycle, it becomes more hidden, veiled. The ancient paleo-continents of the North and South are also disappearing. The confrontation relay passes to the East and West.

The change from the vertical North-South axis to the horizontal East-West, which is characteristic of the last stages of the cycle, nevertheless retains a logical and symbolic connection between these two sacred-geographic pairs. The North-South pair (ie Spirit-Matter, Eternity-Time) is projected onto the East-West pair (ie Tradition and Profanism, Source and Sunset). East is a horizontal projection of the North downwards. West is a horizontal projection of the South upward. From such a transfer of sacred meanings, one can easily obtain the structure of the continental vision inherent in the Tradition.

6.7 People of the North

The Sacred North defines a special human type, which may have its own biological, racial incarnation, but may not have it. The essence of "Nordism" lies in the ability of a person to raise every object of the physical, material world to its archetype, to its Idea. This quality is not a simple development of the rational principle. On the contrary, the Cartesian and Kantian "pure reason" is just not able to naturally overcome the fine line between "phenomenon" and "noumenon", but it is this ability that lies at the basis of "Nordic" thinking. A man of the North is not just white, "Aryan" or Indo-European by blood, language and culture. The Man of the North is a specific type of being endowed with the direct intuition of the Sacred. For him, space is a fabric of symbols, each of which points to the hidden Spiritual First Principle. A man of the North is a "solar man", Sonnenmensch, who does not absorb energy like a black substance, but releases it, pouring out streams of creation, light, strength and wisdom from his soul.

The purely Nordic civilization disappeared along with the ancient Hyperborea, but it was its messengers who laid the foundations of all existing traditions. It was this Nordic "race" of Teachers that stood at the origins of religions and cultures of peoples of all continents and skin colors. Traces of the Hyperborean cult can be found among the Indians of North America, and among the ancient Slavs, and among the founders of Chinese civilization, and among the Pacific aborigines, and among blond Germans, and among the black shamans of West Africa, and among the red-skinned Aztecs, and among the cheek-cheeked Mongols. There is no such people on the planet that does not have the myth of the "solar man", Sonnenmensch. The true spiritual, super-rational Mind, the divine Logos, the ability to see his secret Soul through the world are the defining qualities of the North. Where there is Sacred Purity and Wisdom, the North is invisibly present there,

6.8 People of the South

The Man of the South, the Gondwana type, is the exact opposite of the "Nordic" type. The man of the South lives surrounded by consequences, secondary manifestations; he is in the cosmos, which he reveres but does not understand. He worships the outside, but not the inside. He carefully preserves the traces of spirituality, its embodiment in the material environment, but is unable to move from the symbolic to the symbolized. A man of the South lives with passions and impulses, he puts the spiritual above the spiritual (which he simply does not know) and respects Life as the highest authority. The man of the South is characterized by a cult

Great Mother, matter that generates a variety of forms. The civilization of the South is the civilization of the Moon, receiving its light from the Sun (North), preserving and transmitting it for some time, but periodically losing contact with it (new moon). Man of the South Mondmensch.

When the people of the South are in harmony with the people of the North, i.e. recognize their authority and their typological (and not racial) superiority, civilizational harmony reigns. When they claim the supremacy of their archetypal relationship to reality, a distorted cultural type arises, which can be collectively defined as idolatry, fetishism, or paganism (in the negative, derogatory sense of the term).

As in the case of paleo-continents, pure northern and southern types existed only in ancient times. The people of the North and the people of the South confronted each other in the original eras. Later, entire peoples of the North penetrated into the southern lands, sometimes founding the pronounced "Nordic" civilizations of ancient Iran and India. On the other hand, southerners sometimes went far to the North, carrying their cultural type, the Finns, Eskimos, Chukchi, etc. Gradually, the initial clarity of the sacred-geographical panorama was dimmed. But in spite of everything, the typological dualism of "people of the North" and "people of the South" persisted at all times and in all eras, but not so much as an external conflict between two different civilizations, but as an internal conflict within the same civilization. The type of the North and the type of the South, starting from a certain moment in the sacred history,

6.9 North and South in the East and in the West

The type of people of the North could be projected to the South, to the East, and to the West. In the South, the Light of the North gave birth to great metaphysical civilizations, like the Indian, Iranian or Chinese, which in the situation of the "conservative" South for a long time preserved the Revelation entrusted to them. However, the simplicity and clarity of northern symbolism turned here into complex and varied intricacies of sacred doctrines, rituals and ceremonies. However, the further to the South, the weaker the traces of the North. And among the inhabitants of the Pacific islands and southern Africa, "Nordic" motifs in mythology and rituals are preserved in an extremely fragmented, rudimentary and even distorted form.

In the East, the North manifests itself as a classical traditional society based on the unambiguous superiority of the super-individual over the individual, where the "human" and "rational" are obliterated in the face of the superhuman and super-rational Principle. If the South gives civilization the character of "stability", then the East defines its sacredness and authenticity, the main guarantor of which is the Light of the North.

In the West, the North manifested itself in heroic societies, where the tendency to fragmentation, individualization and rationalization inherent in the West as such overcame itself, and the individual, becoming a Hero, went beyond the narrow framework of the "human-too-human" personality. The North in the West is personified by the symbolic figure of Hercules, who, on the one hand, frees Prometheus (a purely Western, godless, "humanistic" tendency), and on the other hand helps Zeus and the gods defeat the giants who rebelled against them (that is, serves for the benefit of the sacred norms and spiritual Order).

South, on the other hand, is projected into all three orientations in exactly the opposite way. In the North, it gives the effect of "archaism" and cultural stagnation. Even the northern, "Nordic" traditions themselves, under the influence of the southern, "Paleo-Asian", "Finnish" or "Eskimo" elements, acquire the character of "idolatry" and "fetishism". (This, in particular, is characteristic of the German-Scandinavian civilization of the "Skald era".)

In the East, the forces of the South are manifested in despotic societies, where the normal and just Eastern indifference to the individual turns into a denial of the great Superhuman Subject. All forms of totalitarianism in the East are both typologically and racially related to the South.

And finally, in the West, the South manifests itself in extremely coarse, materialistic forms of individualism, when atomic individuals reach the limit of anti-heroic degeneration, worshiping only the "golden calf" of comfort and egoistic hedonism. It is obvious that it is precisely this combination of two sacred-geopolitical tendencies that gives the most negative type of civilization, since in it two orientations are superimposed, already negative in themselves, the South vertically and the West horizontally.

6.10 From continents to meta-continents

If in the perspective of sacred geography the symbolic North unambiguously corresponds to the positive aspects, and the South to the negative, then in a purely modern geopolitical picture of the world, everything is much more complicated, and in some way, even vice versa. Modern geopolitics under the term "North" and "South" understands completely different categories than sacred geography.

First, the paleo-continent of the North, Hyperborea, has not existed on the physical level for many millennia, remaining a spiritual reality, towards which the spiritual gaze of initiates seeking the original Tradition is directed.

Secondly, the ancient Nordic race, the race of "white teachers" who came from the Pole in the primordial era, does not at all coincide with what is commonly called the "white race" today, based only on physical characteristics, on skin color, etc. The North of Tradition and its original population, "Nordic autochthons" have long ceased to represent a concrete historical and geographical reality. Apparently, even the last remnants of this primordial culture disappeared from physical reality several millennia ago.

Thus, the North in Tradition is a metahistorical and metageographic reality. The same can be said about the "Hyperborean race"; it is a "race" not in a biological, but in a purely spiritual, metaphysical sense. (The theme of "metaphysical races" was developed in detail in the writings of Julius Evola).

The continent of the South and the South as a whole Traditions have long ceased to exist in their pure form, as well as its most ancient population. In a certain sense, almost the entire planet became the "South" from a certain moment, as the influence on the world of the original polar initiatory center and its messengers decreased. The modern races of the South are the product of numerous mixtures with the races of the North, and skin color has long ceased to be the main distinguishing feature of belonging to one or another "metaphysical race."

In other words, the modern geopolitical picture of the world has very little in common with the fundamental vision of the world in its super-historical, over-temporal section. The continents and their populations in our era have completely moved away from those archetypes that corresponded to them in primordial times. Therefore, between real continents and real races (as the realities of modern geopolitics), on the one hand, and meta-continents and metaras (as realities of traditional sacred geography), on the other hand, today there is not just a difference, but almost an inverse correspondence.

6.11 The "rich North" illusion

Modern geopolitics uses the concept of "north" most often with the definition of "rich", "rich North", as well as "developed North". This is understood as the entire totality of Western civilization, which focuses on the development of the material and economic side of life. The "rich North" is rich not because it is smarter, more intellectual or spiritual than the "South", but because it builds its social system on the principle of maximizing material benefits that can be derived from social and natural potential, from exploitation of human and natural resources. The "Rich North" is racially linked to those peoples who are white, and this trait underlies various versions of overt or implicit "Western racism." (especially Anglo-Saxon). The successes of the "rich North" in the material sphere were elevated to a political and even "racial" principle precisely in those countries that were at the forefront of industrial, technical and economic development, ie. England, Holland, and later Germany and the USA. In this case, material and quantitative well-being was equated to a qualitative criterion, and on this basis the most ridiculous prejudices about "barbarism", "primitiveness", "underdevelopment" and "subhumanity" of the southern (i.e., not belonging to the "rich North ") peoples. This "economic racism" was especially evident in the Anglo-Saxon colonial conquests, and later embellished versions of it entered the most crude and contradictory aspects of National Socialist ideology. Moreover, often Nazi ideologists simply mixed vague guesses about purely "spiritual Nordism" and "spiritual Aryan race" with vulgar, mercantile, biological-commercial racism of the English type. (By the way, it was this substitution of the categories of sacred geography with the categories of material and technical development that was the most negative side of National Socialism, which led it, in the end, to political, theoretical and even military collapse). But even after the defeat of the Third Reich, this type of racism of the "rich North" by no means disappeared from political life. However, it was primarily the United States and its Atlanticist collaborators in Western Europe that became its bearers. Sure,

In fact, the "rich North" geopolitically means those countries in which the forces that are directly opposite to Traditions, the forces of quantity, materialism, atheism, spiritual degradation and mental degeneration have won. "Rich North" means something radically different from "spiritual Nordism", from the "Hyperborean spirit". The essence of the North in sacred geography is the primacy of spirit over matter, final and total

the victory of Light, Justice and Purity over the darkness of animal life, the arbitrariness of individual preferences and the filth of low egoism. On the contrary, the “rich North” of mondialist geopolitics means purely material well-being, hedonism, a consumer society, a problem-free and artificial pseudo-swarm of those whom Nietzsche called “the last people”. The material progress of technical civilization was accompanied by a monstrous spiritual regression of a truly sacred culture, and therefore, from the point of view of Tradition, the "wealth" of the modern "developed" North cannot serve as a criterion of true superiority over the material "poverty" and technical backwardness of the modern "primitive South".

Moreover, the "poverty" of the South at the material level is very often inversely associated with the preservation of truly sacred forms of civilization in the southern regions, which means that spiritual wealth is sometimes hidden behind this "poverty". At least two sacred civilizations continue to exist in the South to this day, despite all the attempts of the "rich (and aggressive) North" to impose their own standards and development paths on everyone. This is Hindu India and the Islamic world. There are different points of view regarding the Far Eastern tradition, as some see, even under the cover of "Marxist" and "Maoist" rhetoric, some traditional principles that have always been decisive for the Chinese sacred civilization. Be that as it may, even those southern regions

6.12 The Third World Paradox

The "Poor South" in mondialist projects is actually synonymous with the "Third World". This world was named "third" during the Cold War, and this very concept suggested that the first two "worlds", the developed capitalist and the less developed Soviet, were more important and significant for global geopolitics than all other regions. In principle, the expression "Third World" has a derogatory meaning, since, according to the very logic of the utilitarian approach of the "rich North", such a definition actually equates the countries of the "Third World" with "no man's" bases of natural and human resources, which should only be subjugated, exploited and used for their own purposes. At the same time, the "rich North" he skillfully played on the traditional political, ideological and religious characteristics of the "poor South", trying to put at the service of his purely materialistic and economic interests those forces and structures that in their spiritual potential far exceeded the spiritual level of the "North" itself. He almost always succeeded, since the very cyclical moment in the development of our civilization favors perverse, abnormal and unnatural tendencies (according to Tradition, we are now in the very last period of the "dark age", Kali Yuga). Hinduism, Confucianism, Islam, the autochthonous traditions of the "non-white" peoples became for the material conquerors of the "rich North" only obstacles to the realization of their goals, but at the same time they often used certain aspects of the Tradition to achieve mercantile goals, playing on contradictions, religious characteristics or national problems. Such a utilitarian use of aspects of Tradition for purely anti-traditional purposes was even more evil than outright denial of the entire Tradition as a whole, since the highest perversion consists in making the great serve the insignificant.

In fact, the "poor South" is "poor" at the material level precisely because of its essentially spiritual orientation, which deviates to material aspects.
existence is always a secondary and unimportant place. The geopolitical South in our era has retained, in general terms, a purely traditionalist attitude towards objects of the outside world, an attitude of calm, detached and, in the end, indifferent in direct opposition to the material obsession of the "rich North", despite its materialistic and hedonistic paranoia. People of the "poor South" in the normal case, being in Tradition, and still live fuller, deeper and even more luxurious, since active participation in the sacred Tradition endows all aspects of their personal life with that meaning, that intensity, that saturation that they have long been deprived of. representatives of the "rich North", tormented by neuroses, material fear, inner emptiness, complete aimlessness of existence,

It could be said that the relationship between North and South in the original times is polar opposite to the relationship between them in our era, since it is the South that still retains ties with Tradition, while the North has finally lost them. But nevertheless, this statement does not quite cover the completeness of the real picture, since the true Tradition cannot tolerate such humiliating treatment in relation to itself, which is practiced by the aggressive-atheistic "rich North" with the "Third World". The fact is that Tradition is preserved in the South only inertially, fragmentarily, partially. She takes a passive position and resists only defending herself. Therefore, at the end of time, the spiritual North does not fully move to the South; in the South, spiritual impulses that once came from the sacred North only accumulate and remain. In principle, an active traditional initiative cannot come from the South. Conversely, the mondialist "rich North" managed to strengthen its pernicious influence on the planet in such a way due to the very specificity of the northern regions, predisposed to activity. The North has been and remains a place of power for the most part, so geopolitical initiatives coming from the North are of true effectiveness.

The "Poor South" today has all the spiritual advantages over the "rich North", but at the same time it cannot serve as a serious alternative to the profane aggression of the "rich North", cannot offer a radical geopolitical project capable of disrupting the pathological picture of modern planetary space.

6.13 The Role of the "Second World"

In the bipolar geopolitical picture of the “rich North” “poor South” there has always been an additional component that had an independent and very important significance. This is the "second world". Under the "second world" it is customary to understand the socialist camp, integrated into the Soviet system. This "second world" was neither a truly "rich North", since certain spiritual motives implicitly influenced the nominally materialist ideology of Soviet socialism, nor a truly "Third World", since, in general, an orientation toward material development, "progress "and other purely profane principles were at the heart of the Soviet system. Geopolitically, the Eurasian USSR was also located both on the territories of "poor Asia" and on the lands of a rather "civilized" Europe. During the period of socialism, the planetary belt of the "rich North" was opened in the east of Eurasia, complicating the clarity of geopolitical relationships along the North-South axis.

The end of the "Second World" as a special civilization presupposes two alternatives for the Eurasian spaces of the former USSR either to integrate into the "rich North" (represented by the West and the United States), or to slide to the "poor South", i.e. turn into the "Third World". A compromise variant of the withdrawal of part of the regions to the "North" and part to the "South" is also possible. As always in recent centuries, the initiative to redistribute geopolitical spaces in this process belongs to the "rich North", which, cynically using the paradoxes of the "Second World" concept itself, draws new geopolitical boundaries and redistributes zones of influence. National, economic and religious factors serve only as tools for the mondialists in their cynical and deeply materialistically motivated activities. It is not surprising that, in addition to false "humanistic" rhetoric, almost openly "racist" arguments are used more and more often to instill in Russians a complex of "white" arrogance towards Asian and Caucasian southerners. Correlated with this is the reverse process - the final throwing away of the southern territories of the former "Second World" to the "poor South" is accompanied by a game on fundamentalist tendencies, on people's craving for Tradition, for the revival of religion.

The "Second World", disintegrating, breaks down along the line of "traditionalism" (southern, inertial, conservative type) and "anti-traditionalism" (actively northern, modernist and materialistic type). Such a dualism, which is only outlined today, but will soon become the dominant phenomenon of Eurasian geopolitics, is predetermined by the expansion of the Mondialist understanding of the world in terms of the "rich North" and "poor South". An attempt to save the former Soviet Large Space, an attempt to simply preserve the "Second World" as something independent and balancing on the verge between North and South (in a purely modern sense), cannot be crowned with success until the very fundamental concept of modern geopolitics, understood and conscious in its real form,

The "second world" disappears. It no longer has a place in the modern geopolitical picture. At the same time, the pressure of the "rich North" on the "poor South" is growing, which is left alone with the aggressive materiality of technocratic civilization in the absence of an intermediate instance that has existed until now of the "Second World". Some other fate than a total split according to the rules dictated by the "rich North" for the "Second World" is possible only through a radical rejection of the planetary logic of the dichotomous North-South axis, taken in a mondialist key.

6.14 Project "Resurrection of the North"

The "rich mondialist North" is globalizing its dominance over the planet through the split and destruction of the "Second World". In modern geopolitics, this is called the "new world order". The active forces of anti-tradition consolidate their victory over the passive resistance of the southern regions, at the cost of economic backwardness, preserving and protecting Tradition in its residual forms. The internal geopolitical energies of the Second World face a choice either to integrate into the system of the "civilized northern belt" and finally cut ties with sacred history (left mondialism project), or turn into an occupied territory with the permission of partial restoration of some aspects of tradition (right mondialism project).

As an alternative project, one can theoretically formulate a different path of geopolitical transformations based on the rejection of the mondialist North-South logic and on the return to the spirit of true sacred geography as much as possible at the end of the dark age. This is the project of the "Great Return" or, in another terminology, "The Great War of the Continents".

In the most general terms, the essence of this project is as follows.

one) "*The rich North "is not opposed to the" poor South ", but to the" poor North ".* "Poor North" is the ideal, sacred ideal of returning to the Nordic origins of civilization. Such a North is "poor" because it is based on total asceticism, on radical devotion to the highest values of the Tradition, on complete sacrifice of the material for the spiritual. The "Poor North" geographically exists only in the territories of Russia, which, being, in essence, the "Second World", socially and politically opposed until the last moment
the final acceptance of the mondialist civilization in its most "progressive" forms. The Eurasian northern lands of Russia are the only planetary territories not fully developed by the "rich North", inhabited by traditional peoples and constituting the terra incognita of the modern world. The path of the "Poor North" for Russia means a refusal both from incorporation into the mondialist belt, and from the archaization of its own traditions and from their reduction to the folklore level of ethno-religious reservation. The "Poor North" must be spiritual, intellectual, active and aggressive. In other regions of the "rich North", potential opposition from the "poor North" is also possible, which can manifest itself in radical sabotage on the part of the Western intellectual elite of the fundamental course. "

2) "*The Poor South ", unable to stand up to the" rich North "on its own, enters into a radical alliance with the" poor (Eurasian) North "and begins a liberation struggle against the" northern "dictatorship.* It is especially important to strike at the representatives of the ideology of the "rich South", i.e. by the forces that, working for the "rich North", advocate "development", "progress" and "modernization" traditional countries, which in practice will only mean more and more departure from the remains of the sacred Tradition.

3) "*Poor North "Eurasian Of the East together from the poor South ", circumferentially the whole planet, concentrate their forces in the fight against the "rich North" of the Atlanticist West.* At the same time, ideologically, an end is forever put on the vulgar versions of Anglo-Saxon racism, the glorification of the "technical civilization of white peoples" and accompanying mondialist propaganda. (Alain de Benois expressed this idea in the title of his famous book "The Third World and Europe: We Are United in the Struggle" "L'Europe, Tiersmonde meme combat"; it naturally refers to "spiritual Europe", about "Europe of peoples and traditions ", and not about" Maatstricht Europe of merchants. ") The intellectuality, activity and spirituality of the true sacred North returns the traditions of the South to the Nordic Source and raises the" Southerners "to a planetary revolt against the only geopolitical enemy. Passive

the resistance of the "southerners" thus acquires a fulcrum in the planetary messianism of the "northerners", who radically reject the vicious and anti-sacral branch of those white peoples who have taken the path of technical progress and material development. A planetary supraracial and supranational Geopolitical Revolution breaks out, based on the fundamental solidarity of the Third World with that part of the Second World that rejects the project of the “rich North”.

PART VII TEXTS OF GEOPOLITICS

Halford George Mackinder

GEOGRAPHIC HISTORY[80]

When, in the distant future, some historian wants to investigate the times that we are now experiencing and present them in a summarized formula, as we do today with respect to the dynasties of ancient Egypt, then it is very possible that he will call the last four hundred years the "era of Columbus" and will say that it ended shortly after 1900. Today it has become downright commonplace to speak of geographical research as something practically completed. It is also believed that geography should be reduced exclusively to careful survey and philosophical synthesis. For four hundred years, objects on the geographical map of the world have received fairly accurate and accurate outlines, and even in the areas of both poles, the expeditions of Nansen and Scott significantly reduced the possibilities of new and incredible discoveries. At the same time, the beginning of the twentieth century is qualified as the end of a great historical era, and this applies not only to its achievements, no matter how great they may be. The missionary, the conqueror, the farmer, the miner and, finally, the engineer literally followed in the footsteps of the travelers, which is why we can confidently say that the world in its most distant limits was already open before we started talking about its actual political development. In Europe, North and South America, Africa and Australasia, there is hardly a place where you could drive pegs into the ground, presenting title to the site. This is possible only in the course of a war between civilized and semi-civilized powers. Even in Asia, we are probably becoming spectators of the last acts of a play begun by Ermak's horsemen, Vasco de Gama's Cossacks and sailors. For comparison, we can contrast the era of Columbus with the preceding centuries, citing as its characteristic feature the expansion of Europe, which met practically no resistance, while medieval Christianity was driven into the framework of a small region and was under the threat of an external attack by barbarians. From today onwards, in the post-Columbian era, we will have to deal with a closed political system, and it is quite possible that this system will have a global scale. Each explosion of social forces, instead of dissipating in the surrounding unexplored space and the chaos of barbarism, will echo loudly from the opposite side of the globe, so that in the end all the weak elements in the political and economic organism of the Earth will be destroyed. There is a big difference between when a projectile hits a pit; and when it falls into an enclosed space between the rigid structures of a huge building or ship. Perhaps at least a partial understanding of this fact will finally divert the attention of statesmen from territorial expansion and force them to focus on the struggle for a coordinated creation.

That is why it seems to me that in the present decade we are for the first time in a position where we can try to establish, with a certain degree of certainty, the connection between the broadest geographic and historical generalizations. For the first time, we can grope for some real proportions in the correlation of events taking place on the world stage, and find out a formula that in one way or another will express certain aspects of the geographical conditionality of world history. If we

[80] Halford Mackinder "Geographical Pivot of History" in "Geograghical Journal", 1904.

lucky, then this formula will acquire practical value and with its help it will be possible to calculate the prospects for the development of some competing forces of the current international political life. The famous phrase that the empire spreads to the west is only an empirical attempt of this kind. So today I would like to describe those characteristic physical features of the world, which, in my opinion, are very closely related to human activity, and also to present some of the main phases of history organically connected with them, even when they were still unknown to geography. I do not set myself the goal of discussing the influence of this or that factor or engaging in regional geography, but rather I want to show the history of mankind as a part of the life of the world organism. I admit that I can only reach one aspect of truth here, and I am not at all inclined to indulge in excessive materialism. The initiative is manifested by man, not nature, but it is nature that exercises control to a greater extent. My interest lies more in the study of the universal natural factor than in the study of the causes of universal history. It is quite clear that here one can only hope for the first approximation to the truth, and therefore I will accept with humility all the remarks of my critics.

The late Professor Freeman said that the only history to be taken into account is the history of the Mediterranean and European races. In some respects, this is, of course, true, for it was among these races that ideas arose that led to the fact that the descendants of the Greeks and Romans began to dominate the whole world. However, in another and no less important respect, such a limitation considerably constrains thought. Ideas that shape a nation as opposed to a simple crowd of human beings are usually accepted under the pressure of general unhappiness, or else when there is a general need to resist outside force. The idea of England was driven into the states of Heptarchy by Danish and Norman conquerors, the idea of France was imposed by the Huns on the Franks, Goths and Romans who were arguing among themselves at the Battle of Chalon and later, during the Hundred Years War with England; the idea of Christianity was born out of persecution in the Roman Empire and was brought to its logical conclusion during the era of the Crusades. The idea of the United States was only embraced by the local patriotism of the colonists during the protracted War of Independence; the idea of a German empire was adopted, and even then reluctantly, in southern Germany after its struggle with France in alliance with northern Germany. What I can describe as a literary conception of history perhaps unwittingly leaves out of sight the original movements, whose pressure played the role of a stimulating impulse in the atmosphere in which great ideas were grown. Some disgusting person performs some important social function in uniting his enemies, so that it was thanks to the pressure of external barbarians that Europe was able to create its own civilization.

The most important contrast visible on the political map of modern Europe is the contrast represented, on the one hand, by the vast expanses of Russia, which occupies half of this continent, and a group of smaller territories occupied by Western European countries, on the other. From a physical point of view, there is, of course, a similar contrast between the uncultivated lowlands of the east and the wealth of mountains and valleys, islands and peninsulas that together make up the rest of this region of the globe. At first glance, it may seem to you that in these familiar facts we have such an obvious connection between the natural environment and political organization that it is hardly worth talking about it, especially if we mention that on the Russian Plain, a cold winter is opposed by a hot summer, and

the conditions of human existence thus bring additional uniformity to life. And nevertheless, several historical maps, contained, for example, in the Oxford Atlas, will show us that the rough coincidence of the European part of Russia with the East European Plain is not accidental, and this did not happen in the last hundred years, but in earlier times. there was a completely different trend in political unification. Two groups of states usually divided this country into northern and southern political systems. The fact is that orographic maps do not express that special physical originality that until recently controlled the movement and settlement of a person on the territory of Russia. As the blanket of snow gradually recedes north from these wide plains, it is replaced by rains, which are especially strong in May and June on the Black Sea coast, however, in the Baltic and White Sea areas, they pour more often in July and August. A long dry summer reigns in the south. The consequence of this climatic regime is that the northern and northwestern regions are covered with forests, whose thickets are occasionally interspersed with lakes and swamps, while the south and southeast are endless grassy steppes, where trees can be seen only along the banks of rivers. The line separating these two regions runs diagonally to the northeast, starting at the northern end of the Carpathians and ending in the southern regions of the Urals rather than in its northern part. Outside of Russia, the border of these huge forests runs westward, passing almost in the middle of the European isthmus, whose width (that is, the distance between the Baltic and Black Seas) is 800 miles. Behind him, in the rest of European territory, forests occupy the valleys of Germany in the north, while in the south the steppes form the great Transylvanian bastion of the Carpathians and extend as far as the Danube, where the Romanian cornfields now sway, and all the way to the Iron Gate. A separate steppe region, known among local residents as "Pashta" and now actively cultivated, occupied the Hungarian Plain; it is bordered by a chain of wooded Carpathian and Alpine mountains. In the west of Russia, with the exception of the Far North, the clearing of the forest, the draining of marshes and the rise of undeveloped land relatively recently determined the nature of the landscape, to a large extent smoothing out the difference that was so noticeable before. while in the south, the steppes form the great Transylvanian bastion near the Carpathians and extend to the Danube, where the Romanian fields now sway, and up to the Iron Gate. A separate steppe region, known among local residents as "Pashta" and now actively cultivated, occupied the Hungarian Plain; it is bordered by a chain of wooded Carpathian and Alpine mountains. In the west of Russia, with the exception of the Far North, the clearing of forests, the draining of marshes and the rise of undeveloped lands have relatively recently determined the nature of the landscape, smoothing to a large extent the difference that was so noticeable before. while in the south, the steppes form the great Transylvanian bastion near the Carpathians and extend to the Danube, where the Romanian fields now sway, and up to the Iron Gate. A separate steppe region, known among local residents as "Pashta" and now actively cultivated, occupied the Hungarian Plain; it is bordered by a chain of wooded Carpathian and Alpine mountains. In the west of Russia, with the exception of the Far North, the clearing of forests, the draining of marshes and the rise of undeveloped lands have relatively recently determined the nature of the landscape, smoothing to a large extent the difference that was so noticeable before. it is bordered by a chain of wooded Carpathian and Alpine mountains. In the west of Russia, with the exception of the Far North, the clearing of forests, the draining of marshes and the rise of undeveloped lands have relatively recently determined the nature of the landscape, smoothing to a large extent the difference that was so noticeable before. it is bordered by a chain of wooded Carpathian and Alpine mountains. In the west of Russia, with the exception of the Far North, the clearing of forests, the draining of marshes and the rise of undeveloped lands have relatively recently determined the nature of the landscape, smoothing to a large extent the difference that was so noticeable before.

Russia and Poland arose in forest glades. At the same time, from the 5th to the 16th century, an uninterrupted series of Turanian nomads headed here through the steppes from remote and unknown corners of Asia to the range formed by the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea: Huns, Avars, Bulgarians, Magyars, Khazars, Pechenegs, Cumans, Mongols, Kalmyks. During the reign of Attila, the Huns established themselves in the middle of the Pashta, on the most remote "Danube" islets of the steppe, and from there they struck north, west and south on the settled population of Europe. Much of modern history can be written as a commentary on the changes, directly or indirectly, as a consequence of those raids. It is possible that it was then that the Angles and Saxons were forced to cross the sea and found England in the British Isles. For the first time francs, the Goths and the inhabitants of the Roman provinces were forced to stand shoulder to shoulder on the battlefield at Chalon, with the common goal of fighting the Asians; thus they involuntarily constituted modern France. Venice was founded as a result of the destruction of Aquileia and Padua; and even the papacy owes its immense prestige to the successful mediation of Pope Leo in his meeting with Attila in Milan. Such was the result produced by a crowd of ruthless and culture-less horsemen who flooded the uncontrollable plains, it was a blow freely delivered by an Asian hammer to an unoccupied space. The Avars followed the Huns. It was in the fight against them that Austria was founded, and as a result of the campaigns of Charlemagne, Vienna was fortified. Then came the Magyars, and thanks to their incessant raids from the steppe camps,

The Bulgarians became the ruling caste in the lands south of the Danube, leaving their name on the map of the world, although their language disappeared into the language of their Slavic subjects. Probably the most long-term and effective settlement in the Russian steppes was the settlement of the Khazars, who were contemporaries of the great Saracen movement: Arab geographers knew the Caspian Sea or the Khazar Sea. But, in the end, new hordes came from Mongolia and for two hundred years the Russian lands located in the forests north of these territories paid tribute to the Mongol khans or "Steppe", and thus the development of Russia was delayed and distorted at that time. when the rest of Europe was rapidly striding forward.

It should also be noted that the rivers running from these forests to the Black and Caspian Seas run across the entire steppe path of the nomads, and that from time to time along the course of these rivers there were random movements towards the movements of these horsemen. Thus, the missionaries of the Greek Church ascended the Dnieper to Kiev, just as shortly before that the northerners of the Varangians descended the same river on their way to Constantinople. However, even earlier, the Germanic tribe of the Goths appeared for a short time on the banks of the Dniester, passing through Europe from the shores of the Baltic in the same southeast direction. But these are all passing episodes, which, however, do not negate broader generalizations. For ten centuries, several waves of nomadic horsemen left Asia through a wide passage between the Urals and the Caspian Sea, crossing the open spaces of the South of Russia and, having acquired permanent residence in Hungary, fell into the very heart of Europe, thus introducing in the history of the neighboring peoples a moment of indispensable confrontation: this was the case with the Russians, Germans, French, Italians and Byzantine Greeks. The fact that they stimulated a healthy and powerful reaction instead of destructive opposition under widespread despotism was made possible by the fact that the mobility of their power was due to the steppe itself and inevitably disappeared when mountains and forests appeared around them.

This mobility of the power was characteristic of the Viking sailors. Descending from Scandinavia to the southern and northern coasts of Europe, they penetrated deep into its territory, using river routes for this. However, the scope of their actions was limited, since, in all fairness, their power extended only to the territories directly adjacent to the water. Thus, the sedentary population of Europe was caught in the grip between the Asiatic nomads from the east and the brigands who were crushing on three sides. By their very nature, neither side could overcome the other, so both of them had a stimulating effect. It should be noted that the formative influence of the Scandinavians was in second place after the similar influence of the nomads, because it was thanks to them that England and France began a long journey to their own unification, while a united Italy fell under their blows. Once upon a time, Rome could mobilize its population using roads, but now Roman roads have fallen into disrepair and did not change until the eighteenth century.

It seems that even the invasion of the Huns was by no means the first in this "Asian" series. The Scythians from the stories of Homer and Herodotus, who ate the milk of mares, most likely led the same lifestyle and probably belonged to the same race as the later inhabitants of the steppe. Celtic elements in the names of the rivers Don, Donets, Dnieper, Dniester and Danube could probably serve as a definition of concepts among people with similar habits, although not from the same race, but it does not seem that the Celts came from the northern forests, like the Goths and Varangians of subsequent times. However, a huge wedge of population, which anthropologists call brachycephalic, pushed westward from brachocephalic Asia through central Europe all the way to France, probably took root between

northern, western and southern groups of the dolichocephalic population and, quite possibly, it comes from Asia.

Meanwhile, the influence of Asia on Europe is imperceptible until the moment when we start talking about the Mongol invasion of the fifteenth century, however, before we analyze the facts concerning all this, it is advisable to change our "European" point of view so that we can represent the Old Light in all its integrity. Since the amount of precipitation depends on the sea, the middle of the greatest land masses are climatically dry enough. That is why it should come as no surprise that two-thirds of the world's population is concentrated in relatively small areas along the edges of the great continents in Europe near the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian and Pacific Oceans in India and China. Across the whole of North Africa up to Arabia stretches a wide strip of land that is almost unpopulated due to the practical absence of rain. Central and South Africa for most of their history were as separated from Europe and Asia as America and Australia. In fact, the southern border of Europe was and is more the Sahara than the Mediterranean, since it is this desert that separates white people from black people. The vast lands of Euro-Asia, thus enclosed between the ocean and the desert, amount to 21,000,000 square miles, that is, half of all the lands on the globe, if we exclude the deserts of the Sahara and Arabia from the calculations. There are many remote desert areas scattered throughout Asia, from Syria and Persia northeast towards Manchuria, but there are no deserts among them that can be compared with the Sahara. On the other hand, Euro-Asia is characterized by a very remarkable distribution of river flows. In most of the north and center, these rivers were practically useless for the purposes of human communication with the outside world. Volga, Oaks, Yaxart flow into salt lakes; Ob, Yenisei and Lena to the cold northern ocean. There are six great rivers in the world. In these same areas there are many, albeit smaller, but also significant rivers, such as the Tarim and Helmund, which again do not flow into the Ocean. Thus, the center of Euro-Asia, dotted with specks of desert, is, on the whole, a steppe area, representing vast, albeit often scarce, pastures, where there are not so few oases fed by rivers, but it should be emphasized once again that its entire territory is yet not penetrated by waterways coming from the ocean. In other words, in this large area we have all the conditions to support a rare, but in the aggregate very significant population of nomads, riding horses and camels. In the north, their kingdom is limited by a wide strip of sub-arctic forests and swamps, where the climate is too harsh, with the exception of the western and eastern extremities, for the development of agricultural settlements. In the east, forests go south to the Pacific coast along the Amur River to Manchuria. It's the same in the West; in prehistoric Europe, forests occupied the main territory. Bounded thus in the northeast, north and northwest, the steppes run without interruption for 4,000 miles from the Hungarian Pashta to the Malaya Gobi in Manchuria, and, with the exception of the westernmost tip, they are not crossed by rivers flowing into the ocean accessible to them, so that we can ignore the recent efforts to develop trade at the mouth of the Ob and Yenisei. In Europe, Western Siberia and Western Turkestan, the steppe lies close to sea level, in some places even below it. Further east, in Mongolia, they stretch in the form of a plateau; but the transition from one level to another, over bare, flat and low areas of arid central lands, does not present significant difficulties.

The hordes that ultimately attacked Europe in the mid-fourteenth century gathered their forces 3,000 miles from there, in the steppes of Upper Mongolia. Devastation committed over several years in Poland, Silesia, Moravia, Hungary, Croatia

and Serbia, were, nevertheless, only the most distant and at the same time fleeting results of the great movement of the nomads of the east, associated with the name of Genghis Khan. While the Golden Horde occupied the Kipchak steppe from the Aral Sea through the passage between the Ural ridge and the Caspian Sea to the foot of the Carpathians, another horde that descended southwest between the Caspian Sea and the Hindu Kush into Persia, Mesopotamia and even Syria founded the Ilkhan state. Later, the Third Horde attacked North China, capturing China. India and Mangi or South China were temporarily covered by the magnificent barrier of the Tibetan mountains, with whose effectiveness nothing in the world, perhaps, can be compared, unless, of course, you take into account the Sahara and the polar ice. But at a later time, in the days of Marco Polo in the case of Manga, in the days of Tamerlane in the case of India, this obstacle was bypassed. It so happened that in this well-known and well-described case, all the inhabited regions of the Old World sooner or later felt the expansive power of a mobile power that had arisen in the steppe expanses. Russia, Persia, India or China either paid tribute or took over the Mongol dynasties. Even the Turkish state, which was emerging in Asia Minor, endured this yoke for more than half a century.

Like Europe, records of earlier incursions persisted in other borderlands of Euro-Asia. China repeatedly submitted to the conquerors from the north, and India to the conquerors from the northwest. At least one invasion of Persian territory has played a special role in the history of all Western civilization. Three or four hundred years before the arrival of the Mongols, the Seljuk Turks, who appeared from the region of Asia Minor, spread here over vast spaces, which can be conventionally called a region located between the five seas of the Caspian, Black, Mediterranean, Red and Persian Gulfs. They established themselves in Kerman, Hadaman, Asia Minor, overthrew the rule of the Saracens in Baghdad and Damascus. It became necessary to punish them for their treatment of the pilgrims who went to Jerusalem, which is why Christendom undertook a whole series of military campaigns, known collectively as the cross. And although the Europeans failed to achieve their goals, these events so excited and united Europe that we can well consider them the beginning of modern history.This was another example of the advancement of Europe, stimulated by the need to respond to the pressure exerted on it from the very center of Asia.

The concept of Euro-Asia, which we thus obtain, means extended lands encircled by ice in the north, riddled with rivers everywhere and covering an area of 21,000,000 square miles, i.e. more than three times the size of North America, whose central and northern regions are 9,000,000 square meters. miles, and more than double the territory of Europe. However, it does not have satisfactory waterways leading to the ocean, although on the other hand, with the exception of subarctic forests, it is generally suitable for the movement of all kinds of nomads. To the west, south and east of this zone are the border regions that make up a wide crescent and are accessible for navigation. In accordance with the physical structure, the number of these regions is four, and it is by no means unimportant that, in principle, they coincide, respectively, with the spheres of distribution of the four great religions of Buddhism, Brahmanism, Islam and Christianity. The first two lie in the monsoon zone, with one of them facing the Pacific Ocean, the other towards the Indian Ocean. The fourth, Europe, is irrigated by rains coming from the West, from the Atlantic. These three regions, totaling less than seven million square meters. miles, is inhabited by more than a billion people, in other words, two-thirds of the world's population. The third sphere, which coincides with the zone of the five seas or, as it is more often called, the region of the Middle East, suffers even more from a lack of moisture due to These three regions, totaling less than seven million square meters. miles, is inhabited by more than a billion people, in other words, two-thirds of the world's population. The third sphere, which coincides with the zone of the five seas or, as it is more often called, the region of the Middle East, suffers even more from a lack of moisture due to These three regions, totaling less than seven million square meters. miles, is inhabited by more than a billion people, in other words, two-thirds of the world's population. The third sphere, which coincides with the zone of the five seas or, as it is more often called, the region of the Middle East, suffers even more from a lack of moisture due to

its proximity to Africa and, with the exception of oases, is, accordingly, sparsely populated. To some extent, it combines the features of both the border zone and the central region of Euro-Asia. This zone is devoid of forests, its surface is dotted with deserts, so it is quite suitable for the life of nomads. The features of the border region are traced in it insofar as the sea bays and rivers flowing into the ocean make it accessible to the maritime powers, allowing, however, they themselves exercise their domination at sea. That is why here periodically there arose empires belonging to the "border" category, the basis of which was the agricultural population of the great oases of Egypt and Babylon. In addition, they were connected by waterways with the civilized world of the Mediterranean and India. But as you would expect, these empires fell into the zone of action of a series of migrations unprecedented hitherto, some of which were carried out by the Scythians, Turks and Mongols who were leaving Central Asia, while others were the result of the efforts of the peoples of the Mediterranean, who wanted to seize the land routes leading from the western to the eastern ocean. This place is the weakest link for these early civilizations, since the Isthmus of Suez, which divided the maritime powers into western and eastern, and the arid deserts of Persia, stretching from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, provided a constant opportunity for nomadic associations to get to the coast of the ocean that separated on the one hand, India and China, and on the other hand, themselves from the Mediterranean world. Whenever the oases of Egypt, Syria and Babylon fell into decay, the inhabitants of the steppes were able to use the flat plains of Iran as outposts, from where they could strike through the Punjab directly to India, through Syria to Egypt, and through the destroyed bridge of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to Hungary. Vienna stood on the main road to inner Europe, resisting the raids of nomads, both those who came by a direct road from the Russian steppes, and those who penetrated by winding paths that ran south of the Black and Caspian Seas.

So, we have illustrated the obvious difference between Saracen and Turkish control in the Middle East. The Saracens were a branch of the Semitic race, people who inhabited the valleys of the Nile and Euphrates and small oases in southern Asia. Taking advantage of the two opportunities provided to them by this land, horses and camels, on the one hand, and ships, on the other, they created a great empire. In various historical periods, their fleet controlled the Mediterranean Sea as far as Spain, as well as the Indian Ocean as far as the Malay Islands. From this central, strategic point of view, a position located between the western and eastern oceans, they tried to conquer all the border regions of the Old World, repeating in some ways Alexander the Great and anticipating Napoleon. They were even able to threaten the steppe. But the Saracen civilization was destroyed by the Turks, completely separated from Arabia,

Oceanic movement was a natural rival to the camel and horse movement seen inland. It was on the development of oceanic rivers that the Potamic stage of civilization was based: Chinese on the Yangtze, Indian on the Ganges, Babylonian on the Euphrates, Egyptian on the Nile. On the basis of the development of the Mediterranean Sea was based what is called the "sea" stage of civilization, the civilization of the Greeks and Romans. The Saracens and Vikings were able to control the oceans precisely because of their ability to swim.

The most important result of the discovery of the route to India around the Cape of Good Hope was that it had to link the western and eastern coastal shipping of Euro-Asia, even in such a roundabout way, and thus to some extent

neutralize the strategic advantage of the central position occupied by the steppe inhabitants by pressing them from the rear. The revolution, begun by the great sailors of Columbus's generation, endowed Christendom with an unusually broad mobility, which, however, did not reach the coveted level. The single and extended ocean surrounding divided and insular lands is, of course, the geographical condition that provided the highest degree of concentration of command at sea and in the whole theory of modern naval strategy and politics, as Captain Mahan and Mr. Spencer wrote in detail. Wilkinson. The political result of all this was to change the relationship between Europe and Asia. We must not forget that in the Middle Ages, Europe was squeezed between the impenetrable sands in the south, the unexplored ocean in the west, ice or endless forests in the north and northeast, and in the east and southeast, it was threatened by the extraordinary mobility of nomads. And now it has risen above the world, reaching out to thirty-eight seas and other territories and spreading its influence around the Eurasian continental powers, which until now have threatened its very existence. New Europeans were created on free lands, open among water spaces, and what Britain and Scandinavia used to be for Europeans, now America and Australia and to some extent even trans-Saharan Africa, now adjoining Euro-Asia, are becoming. Britain, Canada, the United States, South Africa, Australia, and Japan are a ring of island bases for trade and naval forces out of reach of the land powers of Euro-Asia. and in the east and southeast it was threatened by the extraordinary mobility of the nomads. And now it has risen above the world, reaching out to thirty-eight seas and other territories and spreading its influence around the Eurasian continental powers, which until now have threatened its very existence. New Europeans were created on free lands, open among water spaces, and what Britain and Scandinavia used to be for Europeans, now America and Australia and to some extent even trans-Saharan Africa, now adjoining Euro-Asia, are becoming. Britain, Canada, the United States, South Africa, Australia, and Japan are a ring of island bases for trade and naval forces out of reach of the land powers of Euro-Asia. And now it has risen above the world, reaching out to thirty-eight seas and other territories and spreading its influence around the Eurasian continental powers, which until now have threatened its very existence. New Europeans were created on free lands, open among water spaces, and what Britain and Scandinavia used to be for Europeans, now America and Australia and to some extent even trans-Saharan Africa, now adjoining Euro-Asia, are becoming. Britain, Canada, the United States, South Africa, Australia, and Japan are a ring of island bases for trade and naval forces out of reach of the land powers of Euro-Asia. And now it has risen above the world, reaching out to thirty-eight seas and other territories and spreading its influence around the Eurasian continental powers, which until now have threatened its very existence. New Europeans were created on free lands, open among water spaces, and what Britain and Scandinavia used to be for Europeans, now America and Australia and to some extent even trans-Saharan Africa, now adjoining Euro-Asia, are becoming. Britain, Canada

Nevertheless, the latter continue to exist, and well-known events have once again emphasized their importance. While the "sea" peoples of Western Europe covered the surface of the ocean with their ships, went to distant lands and in one way or another levied tribute to the inhabitants of the oceanic coast of Asia, Russia organized the Cossacks and, coming out of its northern forests, took control of the steppe, putting up its own nomads against the nomads -Tatar. The era of the Tudors, which saw the expansion of Western Europe in the sea, also saw how the Russian state moved from Moscow towards Siberia. The thrust of the horsemen across Asia to the east was an event as fraught with political consequences as the overcoming of the Cape of Good Hope, although the two events did not correspond to each other for a long time.

Perhaps the most striking coincidence in history was that both sea and land expansion of Europe continued, in a sense, the ancient confrontation between the Greeks and the Romans. Several failures in this area had far more far-reaching consequences than Rome's failure to Latinize the Greeks. The Teutons were civilized and adopted Christianity from the Romans, the Slavs from the Greeks. It was the Romano-Teutons who subsequently sailed the seas; and it was the Greco-Slavs who rode across the steppes, conquering the Turanian peoples. So the modern land power differs from the sea power even in the source of its ideals, and not in material conditions and mobility. [81].

Following the Cossacks, Russia appeared on the scene, calmly parting with its loneliness, in which it stayed in the forests of the North. Another change of extraordinary internal importance that occurred in Europe in the last century was the migration of Russian peasants to the south, so that if earlier agricultural settlements

[81] This statement was criticized during the discussion that followed the reading of the report. As I revise this paragraph, I still think that it is basically true. Even a Byzantine Greek would have been different if Rome had subdued all of ancient Greece. Without a doubt, the ideals in question were more Byzantine than Hellenic, but they were not Roman, that's for sure. (author's note)

ended at the border with the forests, now the center of the population of all of European Russia lies south of this border, in the middle of wheat fields that replaced the steppes located there and west. This is how the unusually important city of Odessa arose, developing at a purely American pace.

A generation ago, it seemed that the steamer and the Suez Canal increased the mobility of maritime powers in comparison with land ones. Railways played mainly the role of an appendage of ocean trade. But now transcontinental railways are changing the state of land powers, and nowhere do they work more efficiently than in the closed central regions of Euro-Asia, in the vast expanses of which one cannot find a single suitable log or stone for their construction. Railways perform unprecedented miracles in the steppe, because they directly replaced the horse and camel, so that the necessary stage of development of the road was skipped here.

In a trade situation, it should not be forgotten that the oceanic route, although relatively cheap, usually drives the goods through four stages of the manufacturing factory, the shipper's shipyard, the recipient's shipyard and the retail warehouse, while the continental railroad leads directly from the factory. from the manufacturer to the importer's warehouse. Thus, intermediate ocean trade leads, all other things being equal, to the formation of a zone of penetration around the continents, whose internal border is roughly indicated by a line along which the price of four operations, ocean transport and rail transport from the neighboring coast is equal to the price of two operations and transport by continental rail road.

Russian railways run 6,000 miles from Verballen in the west to Vladivostok in the east. The Russian army in Manchuria is a remarkable testament to mobile land power, just as Britain is the example of a naval power in South Africa. Of course, the Trans-Siberian Railway is still the only and far from secure communication line, but this century will not end yet, as the whole of Asia will be covered with a network of railways. The spaces on the territory of the Russian Empire and Mongolia are so large, and their potential in terms of population, grain, cotton, fuel and metals is so high that it will undoubtedly develop its own, albeit somewhat remote, huge economic world, inaccessible for ocean trade.

Running such a quick glance over the main trends in history, do we not see clearly the consistency in terms of geography? Isn't this vast region of Euro-Asia, inaccessible to ships, but accessible to nomads in ancient times, which should now be covered by a network of railways, is not the pivotal region in world politics? Here there have been and continue to exist conditions promising (albeit limited by a certain factor) for the development of military and industrial powers. Russia replaces the Mongol Empire. Its pressure on Finland, Scandinavia, Poland, Turkey, Persia, India and China replaced the steppe raids emanating from one center. In this world, it occupies a central strategic position, which in Europe belongs to Germany. She can strike and simultaneously receive blows from all directions, with the exception of the north. The final development of her mobility associated with railways is only a matter of time. And no social revolution will change its attitude to the great geographical boundaries of its existence. Soberly understanding the limits of their power, the rulers of Russia parted with Alaska, for for Russian politics it is, in fact, the rule

not to own any overseas territory, just like Britain is to rule over the oceans.

Outside this pivot area, there is a large inner crescent made up by Germany, Austria, Turkey, India, and China, and an outer one by Britain, South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada, and Japan. In the present state of balance, the pivot state, Russia, is not tantamount to the peripheral states, and here France can act as a counterbalance. The United States has just become the Eastern Power. They influence the balance of power in Europe not directly, but through Russia, and there is no doubt that they will build the Panama Canal in order to make the resources of the Mississippi and Atlantic available for pumping into the Pacific Ocean. From this point of view, the line of real separation between east and west should be sought precisely in the Atlantic.[82].

The violation of the balance of power in favor of the axial state, expressed in its expansion into the border territories of Euro-Asia, makes it possible to use boundless continental resources for building a fleet. Thanks to this, a world empire will soon appear before our eyes. This can happen if Germany wants to join Russia as an ally. That is why the threat of such an alliance should push France into the embrace of the maritime powers, and then France, Italy, Egypt, India and Korea will form such a strong alliance in which the navy will support the army that ultimately force the Axis allies to deploy their ground forces, keeping them from the concentration of all power on the seas. To make a more modest comparison, it is reminiscent of what Wellington did during the fighting from the Torres Verdas base. And won't India, after all, be able to play the same role in the British Empire system? And is this the idea behind the concept of Mr.Amery, who said,

This system can be decisively influenced by the development of the vast capabilities of South America. On the one hand, they can strengthen the position of the United States, and on the other, if, of course, Germany can effectively challenge the Monroe Doctrine, they can separate Berlin from what I have described as Axis politics. Regional combinations of powers are irrelevant here. I argue that, from a geographic point of view, they make a kind of circular rotation around a pivot state, which is always great in one way or another, but has limited mobility compared to the surrounding border and island powers.

I spoke of all this as a geographer. The real balance of political power at any given moment is, of course, on the one hand, the result of geographic conditions (as well as economic and strategic), and, on the other hand, the relative size, courage, equipment and organization of the competing peoples. If we accurately calculate the amount of all this, then we can predict the outcome of the rivalry in advance, without resorting to the force of arms. Geographic indicators in calculations are more common and more constant than human ones. That is why we hope to find a formula that applies equally to past history and to today's politics. Social movements at all times have worn

[82] This thesis of Mackinder was completely refuted in the coming decades. Already in the First World War, that is, after only ten years, the United States showed itself as a purely Western, Atlantic power, opposite to the Eastern, Eurasian, continental and Pacific vectors of geopolitics. The line of dividing the East and West runs strictly along the Pacific Ocean, and not in any way along the Atlantic (A.D.).

approximately the same physical features, for I doubt that the gradually increasing dryness of the climate, if it will be proved, has changed the environment in Asia and Africa in historical time. The movement of the empire to the west seems to me rather a short-term rotation of the frontier powers around the southwestern and western corners of the axial region. The problems of the Near, Middle and Far East depend on the unstable balance between internal and external powers in those parts of the border crescent where local states are hardly counted.

In conclusion, it should be noted that replacing Russian control with some new type of inland control will not reduce the significance of this axial position. If, for example, the Chinese, with the help of Japan, defeated the Russian Empire and conquered its territory, they would create a yellow danger to world freedom by adding oceanic expanses to the resources of the great continent, thus gaining an advantage that has not yet been received by the Russian master of this pivot region.

Peter Savitsky

GEOGRAPHICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF EURASISM[83]

Russia has much more reason than China to be called the "Middle State" ("Zhong-go", in Chinese). And the further time passes, the more these bases will stick out. Europe for Russia is nothing more than a peninsula of the Old Continent, lying to the west of its borders. Russia itself on this continent occupies its main space, its torso. At the same time, the total area of European states, taken together, is close to 5 million square kilometers. The area of Russia, in the redistribution of at least the modern USSR, significantly exceeds 20 million square meters. km. (especially if we include the territory of the Mongolian and Tuvinian People's Republics of the former "Outer Mongolia" and "Ryankhoi Territory", which are actually part of the Soviet Union at the moment).

With rare exceptions, Russian people of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. they forgot about the trans-Ural spaces (one of those who remembered about them was the brilliant Russian chemist D.I. Mendeleev). Nowadays other times have come. The entire "Ural-Kuznetsk Combine", with its blast furnaces, coal mines, new cities for a hundred thousand other people, each is being built beyond the Urals. Turksib is being erected there. Nowhere is the expansion of Russian culture so widespread and so spontaneous as in another part of the Trans-Urals in the so-called. "Central Asian republics" (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan). The entire torso of the Russian lands comes to life "from the arrows of Negorely to the Suchan station". The Eurasians have their share of the credit for this turn of events. But at the same time, the nature of the Russian world, as the central world of the Old Continent, is clearly revealed. There were moments when it seemed that between the western periphery of Europe, which included the Russian Douralie ("European Russia" of the old geographers) and Asia (China, India, Iran) there is a void. The Eurasian attitude of Russian modernity fills this void with the beating of living life. Already from the end of the XIX century. the direct route from Europe to China and Japan lies through Russia (the Great Siberian Railway). Geography indicates with complete certainty that the roads from Europe (in any case, northern) to Persia, India and Indochina should be laid. These possibilities have not yet been realized. The Trans-Persian Railway, cutting through Persia from the Northwest to the Southeast and connected to the railway network of both British India and Europe (via the Transcaucasus, Crimea and Ukraine), was close to implementation on the eve of World War II. Currently, due to political circumstances, it has moved into the area of groundless projects. There is no connection between the railways of Russian Turkestan ("Central Asian republics") and India. There is no orientation of the Russian railway network towards transit European-Indian traffic. But sooner or later, such a movement will become a fact, be it in the form of railways. paths, car lines or air links. For these latter, the shortest distances given by Russia are of particular importance. The more weight will be acquired by air communications with the desire to fly in a straight line characteristic of this kind of communication, the clearer the role of Russia-Eurasia as a "middle world" will become. The establishment of transpolar lines can further enhance this role. In the far north, Russia is an enormous neighbor of America. With the opening of paths across the pole, or rather above the pole, it will become a connecting link between Asia and North America.

[83] GARF fund PN Savitsky № 5783 (ed.).

Subsequent articles speak of the desire of the Eurasians to give a spiritual synthesis of Eastern and Western principles. Here it is important to point out the correspondences that the field of geopolitics shows to this aspiration. Russia Eurasia is the center of the Old World. Eliminate this center and all its other parts, this whole system of continental margins (Europe, Western Asia, Iran, India, Indochina, China, Japan) turns into a "scattered temple", as it were. This world, lying to the east of the borders of Europe and to the north of "classical" Asia, is the link that solders them all into unity. This is obvious in the present, it will become more evident in the future. The connecting and unifying role of the "middle world" was reflected in history as well. For a number of millennia, the political dominance in the Eurasian world belonged to the nomads. Having occupied the entire space from the borders of Europe to the borders of China, contacting simultaneously with Western Asia, Iran and India, the nomads served as intermediaries between the scattered, in their original state, the worlds of sedentary cultures. And, say, the interactions between Iran and China have never been as close in history as in the era of Mongol rule (XII-XIV centuries). And thirteen or fourteen centuries before that, exclusively and only in the nomadic Eurasian world, the rays of the Hellenic and Chinese cultures crossed, as the latest excavations in Mongolia showed. By force of unavoidable facts, the Russian world is called to a unifying role within the Old World. Only to the extent that Russia - Eurasia fulfills this vocation, can the whole set of various cultures of the Old Continent transform into an organic whole, the opposition between East and West is removed. This circumstance is not yet sufficiently understood in our time, but the relationships expressed in it lie in the nature of things. The tasks of unification are, first of all, the tasks of cultural creativity. In the person of Russian culture in the center of the Old World, a new and independent historical force has grown to a unifying and conciliatory role. It can solve its task only in interaction with the cultures of all surrounding peoples. In this regard, the cultures of the East are as important to her as the cultures of the West. Such an appeal simultaneously and evenly to the East and the West is a feature of Russian culture and geopolitics. For Russia, these are its two equal fronts - western and southeastern. The field of view, covering equally and fully the entire Old World can and should be Russian, for the most part,

We return, however, to phenomena of a purely geographic nature. Compared to the Russian "torso", Europe and Asia are equally the outskirts of the Old World. Moreover, Europe, from the Russian-Eurasian point of view, is, according to what has been said, everything that lies to the west of the Russian border, and Asia is everything that lies to the south and southeast of it. Russia itself is neither Asia nor Europe. This is the main geopolitical thesis of the Eurasians. And therefore there is no "European" and "Asian" Russia, but there are parts of it lying to the west and east of the Urals, as there are parts of it lying to the west and east of the Yenisei, etc. The Eurasians continue: Russia is neither Asia nor Europe, but is a special geographical world. How is this world different from Europe and Asia? Western, the southern and southeastern margins of the old continent are distinguished both by the considerable indentedness of their coasts and by the variety of relief forms. The same cannot be said about his main "torso", which, according to what has been said, constitutes Russia-Eurasia.

It consists primarily of three plains (White Sea-Caucasian, West Siberian and Turkestan), and then of the regions lying to the east of them (including the low mountainous countries east of the Yenisei River). The zonal composition of the western and southern margins of the continent is marked by "mosaic-fractional" and not very simple outlines. Forested, in a natural state, the terrain is replaced here in a quaint sequences, on the one hand, steppe and desert regions, on the other

tundra regions (on high mountains). This "mosaic" is opposed in the middle plains of the Old World by a relatively simple, "flag-like" arrangement of zones. With this last designation, we indicate that, when plotted on a map, it resembles the outline of a flag subdivided into horizontal stripes. Desert, steppe, forest and tundra replace each other in the direction from south to north. Each of these zones forms a continuous latitudinal strip. The general latitudinal division of the Russian world is also emphasized by the predominantly latitudinal strike of the mountain ranges bordering the named plains from the south: the Crimean ridge, Caucasian, Kopetdag, Parapamiz, Hindu Kush, the main ranges of the Tien Shan, ridges on the northern outskirts of Tibet, In-Shan, in the Great Chinese wall. The last of the ridges we named, located in the same line as the previous ones, they border from the south an elevated plain occupied by the Gobi desert. It connects with the Turkestan plain through the Dzungar gate.

In the zonal structure of the Old World continent, you can notice the features of a peculiar east-west symmetry, which affects the fact that the state of the phenomena on its eastern outskirts is similar to the same situation on the western outskirts and differs from the nature of the phenomena in the middle part of the continent. Both the eastern and western ocarins of the mainland (both the Far East and Europe) at latitudes between 35 and 60 degrees. northern latitude in their natural state are forest areas. Here, the boreal forests are in direct contact and gradually transform into the forests of the southern flora. We do not see anything like this in the middle world. In it, forests of southern flora are found only in the areas of its mountain border (Crimea, Caucasus, Turkestan). And they never come into contact with the forests of northern flora or boreal, being separated from them by a continuous steppe-desert strip. The middle world of the Old World can be defined, thus, as an area of a steppe and desert strip stretching in a continuous line from the Carpathians to the Khingan, taken together with its mountainous frame (in the south) and areas lying to the north of it (forest and tundra zones). The Eurasians call this world Eurasia in the exact sense of the word (Eurasia sensu stricto). It must be distinguished from the old "Eurasia" by A. von Humboldt, covering the entire Old Continent (Eurasia sensu latiore).

The western border of Eurasia runs along the Black Sea-Baltic jumper, i.e. in the area where the mainland narrows (between the Baltic and Black Seas). Along this cofferdam, in a general direction from northwest to southeast, there are a number of indicative botanical and geographical boundaries, for example, the eastern border of yew, beech and ivy. Each of them, starting on the shores of the Baltic Sea, then goes to the shores of the Black Sea. West of the named borders, i.e. where the above-mentioned species grow, the strike of the forest zone along its entire length from north to south has a continuous character. To the east of them begins division into a forest zone in the north and a steppe zone in the south. This border can be considered the western border of Eurasia, i.e. its border with Asia in the Far East passes in the longitudes of the wedging out of the continuous steppe strip as it approaches the Pacific Ocean, i.e.

The Eurasian world is the world of "a periodic and at the same time symmetric system of zones." The boundaries of the main Eurasian zones are closely related to the occurrence of certain climatic boundaries. For example, the southern border of the tundra corresponds to a line connecting points with an average annual relative humidity of about 79.5% at 1 pm. (The relative humidity at 1 pm is especially important for the life of vegetation and soils.) The southern border of the forest zone runs along a line connecting points with the same relative humidity of 67.5%. The southern border of the steppe (at its contact with the desert) meets the same

relative humidity at 1 pm at 55.5%. In the desert, it is everywhere below this value. Here, attention is drawn to the equality of the intervals covering the forest and steppe zones. Such coincidences and the same rhythmic distribution of intervals can be established by other criteria (see our book "Geographical Features of Russia", Part 1, Prague 1927). This gives reason to speak about the "periodic system of the zones of Russia-Eurasia." It is also a symmetric system, but not in the sense of the east-west symmetries, which we spoke about in the previous one, but in the sense of the south-north symmetries. The treelessness of the north (tundra) here corresponds to the treelessness of the south (steppe). The calcium content and the percentage of humus in soils from the middle parts of the chernozem zone decrease symmetrically to the north and south. Symmetrical distribution of the phenomena is also noticed by the sign of soil color. It reaches its highest intensity in the same middle parts of the horizontal zone. Both to the north and to the south, it weakens (passing through shades of brown to whitish). On sands and stony substrates from the border between the forest and steppe zones, they symmetrically diverge: steppe islands to the north and "island" forests to the south. Russian science defines these phenomena as "extrazonal". The steppe areas in the forest zone can be characterized as a "yugoniferous" phenomenon, the island forests in the steppe are the "northern-bearing" phenomena. The north-bearing formations of the steppe correspond to the south-bearing formations of the forest zone. and to the south it weakens (passing through shades of brown to whitish). On sands and stony substrates from the border between the forest and steppe zones, they symmetrically diverge: steppe islands to the north and "island" forests to the south. Russian science defines these phenomena as "extrazonal". The steppe areas in the forest zone can be characterized as a "yugoniferous" phenomenon, the island forests in the steppe are the "northern-bearing" phenomena. The north-bearing formations of the steppe correspond to the south-bearing formations of the forest zone. and to the south it weakens (passing through shades of brown to whitish). On sands and stony substrates from the border between the forest and steppe zones, they symmetrically diverge: steppe islands to the north and "island" forests to the south. Russian science defines these phenomena as "extrazonal". The steppe areas in the forest zone can be characterized as a "yugoniferous" phenomenon, the island forests in the steppe are the essence of the "northbearing" phenomenon. The north-bearing formations of the steppe correspond to the south-bearing formations of the forest zone.

Nowhere else in the Old World are the gradual transitions within the zonal system, its "periodicity" and, at the same time, "symmetry" expressed so clearly as on the plains of Russia-Eurasia.

The Russian world has an extremely transparent geographic structure. In this structure, the Urals do not at all play the defining and dividing role that the geographic "wampuka" ascribed to it (and continues to attribute it). The Urals, "due to their orographic and geological features, not only do not separate, but on the contrary tightly connect" Pre-Ural and Trans-Ural Russia ", proving once again that geographically both of them together constitute one indivisible continent of Eurasia." The tundra, as a horizontal zone, lies both to the west and east of the Urals. The forest stretches on one side and the other. The situation is no different with regard to the steppe and desert (this latter borders both from the east and from the west the southern continuation of the Ural Mugodzhara). At the border of the Urals, we do not observe a significant change in the geographic situation. Much more essential is the geographic limit of the "intermoria", ie. spaces between the Black and Baltic Seas on the one hand, the Baltic Sea and the coast of northern Norway on the other.

The peculiar, extremely clear and at the same time simple geographic structure of Russia-Eurasia is associated with a number of important geopolitical circumstances.

The nature of the Eurasian world is minimally favorable for all sorts of "separatisms", be they political, cultural or economic. The "mosaic-fractional" structure of Europe and Asia contributes to the emergence of small closed, isolated worlds. Here there are material prerequisites for the existence of small states, special cultural structures for each city or province, economic regions with great economic diversity in a narrow space. The situation is completely different in Eurasia. The wide-cut sphere of "flag-like" arrangement of zones does not contribute to anything like this. Endless plains accustom one to the breadth of the horizon, to the scope of geopolitical combinations. Within the steppes, moving on land, within the forests on the water of the numerous rivers and lakes here, people were here in constant migration, constantly changing their habitat. Ethnic and cultural

the elements were in intensive interaction, crossing and mixing. In Europe and Asia, at times it was possible to live only in the interests of one's own bell tower. In Eurasia, if it succeeds, then in the historical sense for an extremely short period. In the north of Eurasia, there are hundreds of thousands of square meters. km. forests, among which there is not a single hectare of arable land. How can the inhabitants of these spaces live without contact with more southern regions? In the south, in no less space, there are steppes suitable for cattle breeding, and partly for agriculture, while, however, that in an area of many thousands of square meters. km. there is not a single tree here. How can the population of these regions live without economic interaction with the north? The nature of Eurasia prompts people to a much greater extent the need for political, cultural and economic unification, than we see in Europe and Asia. It is not for nothing that it was within the framework of the Eurasian steppes and deserts that such a "unified" way of life existed in many respects, like the way of life of nomads throughout the entire space of its existence: from Hungary to Manchuria and throughout history from the Scythians to the modern Mongols. It is not for nothing that such great political unifying attempts as the Scythian, Hunnic, Mongolian (XIII-XIV centuries) and others were born in the vastness of Eurasia. These attempts covered not only the steppe and desert, but also the forest zone lying to the north of them and the more southern region " mountain bordering "Eurasia. It is not for nothing that the spirit of a kind of "brotherhood of peoples" blows over Eurasia, which has its roots in centuries-old contacts and cultural mergers of peoples of various races from the Germanic (Crimean Goths) and Slavic to the Tungus-Manchurian, through the links of the Finnish, Turkish, Mongolian peoples. This "brotherhood of peoples" is expressed in the fact that there is no opposition between "higher" and "lower" races, that mutual attraction is stronger here than repulsion, that "the will to a common cause" easily awakens here. The history of Eurasia, from its first chapters to its last, is solid proof of this. These traditions were adopted by Russia, in its main historical business. In the XIX and early XX centuries. they were at times clouded by deliberate "Westernism", which required the Russians to feel themselves "Europeans" (which in fact they were not) and to treat other Eurasian peoples as "Asians" and "an inferior race". This interpretation did not lead Russia to anything but disasters (for example, Russian Far Eastern adventure of the early XX century). It is to be hoped that by now this concept has been completely overcome in the Russian consciousness and that the last survivors of Russian "Europeanism," still hiding in emigration, are devoid of any historical significance. Only by overcoming deliberate "Westernism" opens the way to a real brotherhood of the Eurasian peoples: Slavic, Finnish, Turkish, Mongolian and others.

Eurasia has played a unifying role in the Old World before. Modern Russia, perceiving this tradition, must resolutely and irrevocably abandon the old methods of unification, belonging to the obsolete and overcome era of methods of violence and war. In the modern period, it is about the ways of cultural creativity, about inspiration, illumination, cooperation. The Eurasians are talking about all this. Despite all modern means of communication, the peoples of Europe and Asia are still, to a large extent, each sitting in his own cage, living in the interests of the bell tower. The Eurasian "local development", according to its basic properties, teaches one to a common cause. The appointment of the Eurasian peoples by their example to draw other peoples of the world along these paths. And then those ties of ethnographic kinship,

Indo-European relations of the Russians, the Near Asian and Iranian relations of the Eurasian Turks, those points of contact that exist between the Eurasian Mongols and the peoples of East Asia. All of them can be useful in building a new, organic culture, although the Old, but still (we believe) young, but fraught with a great future of the Light.

Jean Thiriard

SUPERHUMAN COMMUNISM

(Letter to a German reader)[84]

Modern history will further operate with the concept of not a territorial, but a continental state. Already in 1962-1963. in my book "Europe, an empire with a population of 400 million," I described in some detail the ways of creating Europe "from Dublin to Bucharest." As a witness to the so-called "crusade" of 1941-1945, I already in 1963 emphasized that such a Europe would have to avoid conflict with the East at all costs, moreover, not even harbor antagonism towards it.

The acceleration of the course of history forces me to say today that now the talk should no longer be about peaceful coexistence between Western Europe and the USSR, but about the creation of a united Europe from Vladivostok to Dublin. It is necessary to understand that Russia is one of the European countries, and that it is the only European power independent of the world American empire.

Our historical thinking should be distracted from the type of ideology of the present USSR. Marxist communism is not something terrible, but something stupid. This ideology must disappear under the pressure of facts. It will disappear, because one fine day, which, apparently, is not far off, the Soviet leadership will become convinced that the endemic weakness of the USSR's economy is due precisely to Marxist dogmas. If the Soviet leadership wants to stay in power, and this depends on whether the Soviet Union survives, then it will have to turn towards the "historical way of thinking" and get rid of the dogmatism weakening it.

The Lubeck-Sofia line continues to be a historical absurdity. It inevitably reminds of the division of Germany in the middle of the 17th century. between Protestant and Catholic states, which, since the time of Richelieu and Mazarin, allowed France to delay the creation of the Second Reich by 250 years.

Just as the Treaty of Westphalia once enabled France to interfere in German affairs, so the Yalta Treaty allowed the United States to intervene in European affairs. Some Germans are now ready to obey the Americans unquestioningly. It is only worthy of contempt. Bonn has been emptying the State Department chamber pot for 30 years. In addition, there are two other tendencies in today's Germany: a tendency towards neutralism, on the one hand, and towards nationalism, on the other.

Let us first consider the question of German nationalism. Germany was not defeated in 1945. In a dramatic situation, her courage took on a Shakespearean character. Her martial prowess is undeniable. In June 1940, the French ruling class fled Paris without looking back. In April 1945, the German leadership was killed in battles on the streets of Berlin. In 1945 Germany was not defeated, but crushed. Finally. For only 12 years, Germany existed as a single formed state, while England, France, Spain have been such for centuries. But if Germany was crushed in 1945, then she herself strove for this. Hitler wanted to create a Germanic Europe. The idea of a "European" Europe was beyond his comprehension. An exceptional person in many

[84] December 1982 The text of this letter was handed over to A. Dugin directly by its author in 1992 (ed.)

relationship, he showed utter myopia on this issue. As a provincial from Central Europe, he was unable to appreciate the immense importance of the Mediterranean to geostrategy. In addition, he could not rise to the idea that other peoples could also have outstanding qualities. His contempt for the Russian man, for the Slav, was the reason for his underestimation of the courage of the Russian soldier. Goebbels' propaganda portrayed the Russians as a dubious cross between Tatars, Mongols, and Kalmyks. The photo services of the Propaganda Department and cameramen of the "RK" front tried to outdo each other in this area.

Today I subscribe to the magazine "Revue militaire sovietique" (Soviet Military Review). In contrast to the publications of Goebbels' propaganda, Soviet soldiers are portrayed here "with pretty faces, just like our guys": tall, with light, short-cropped hair and a "cheerful look." Dr. Goebbels did not tell us that they are descendants of the Varangians. Those Varangians who could freely join the SS troops. They fully corresponded to the racial characteristics by which candidates for these elite units of the Third Reich were selected.

Popular pictures also change with the change of the political system and the historical era. Today, the consolidated Tel Aviv-Washington propaganda department portrays the Soviet army as an army that in Afghanistan does nothing but rape, burn, and kill only children, women and the elderly.

When I was young, I had an acute experience of the failed Franco-German rapprochement in 1940-1942. Receiving Admiral Darlan at Bertechsgaden on May 14, 1941, Hitler was still under the impression of Hess's escape to England (May 11, 1941). Hitler was not generous, he was not capable of ensuring that the Franco-German conflict ended without a vanquished and France was not destroyed. The same France, which still owned African, especially Mediterranean colonies and an absolutely whole fleet. In alliance with France, Hitler could, passing through Syria, capture Iraq, thereby defeating England in the Mediterranean. The English fleet would then be forced to withdraw from the Mediterranean. "Everything was possible" the very next day after the Mers-el-Kebir massacre on July 3, 1940, when the British fleet dealt with the unarmed sailors of Admiral Zhansul. In the week that followed, Hitler could easily have drawn France into his war against England. But for this it was necessary to have generosity and think in a European way. Hitler was not a great European. He was only a great German.

I have experienced and suffered all this. I took an active part in the events, but not on the side of Germany, but on the side of National Socialism. Many of us were then disappointed, and some also felt fooled. And yet we fought to the end on the side of Reich. Many of my comrades paid for this with their lives: some died on the Eastern Front, others were shot immediately after the end of the war in May 1945. Thanks to influential lawyers, I was able to easily get off with three years of ordinary prison, which was almost a gift. From this whole story, I concluded that nationalism that subdues, exploits and humiliates the vanquished, does incalculable harm. Hitler was unable to rise to a unifying nationalism.

German and French nationalisms have brought a lot of misfortune and harm. Therefore, today the slightest manifestation of German nationalism must be ruthlessly suppressed in the name of European interests.

Germany has nothing to complain about being defeated in 1945. She herself went for it, humiliating the Poles and Russians and despising the French.

Hitlerite Germany was mistaken in choosing Mussolini's Italy as an allies. This union cost her a whole series of follies and mistakes. Mussolini prevented the slightest rapprochement between France and Germany. That is why Germany and, in particular, a number of prominent Nazi Anglophiles made a mistake in choosing an enemy. Rudolf Hess unsuccessfully, too literally, applied the concepts of General Haushofer, whose adjutant he was during the First World War 1914-1918. In 1940, Germany's merciless enemy was not mainland France, but the naval power England. It is England that for the past five centuries has been the primordial and main enemy of Europe.

In 1945, the Third Reich suffered a complete collapse. But not only Germany lost this war. We all lost it. At first, the Dutch were expelled from their colonies. Then France and England and finally Belgium. After the shameful loss of Algeria in 1962, France finally ceased to exist as an independent power. We all lost this war together. Already from the end of 1941, the British began to oust the French from the countries of the Middle East (Syria). In retaliation, the French helped the Zionists expel the British from Palestine. Even before 1945, the British and French tried to deprive Italy of its African colonies. Finally, in 1960, at the behest of Washington, the Belgians left Congo, the richest country in all of Africa. Our nationalist feuds have led to the death of the whole of Europe, or at least multiethnic Europe. Now it's time to create a mono-national,

Combining Haushofer's clear geopolitical concepts with the might of the Soviet army, one must try, going from east to west, to accomplish what Hitler was unable to do, going from west to east. We need to rid communism of its ineffectiveness due to Marxist and Leninist dogmas. Communism of the Soviet type must be cleansed of Marxism, improved and mutated.

It is necessary to carry out a synthesis of non-Marxist communism with non-racist national socialism. I am against ineffective communism, but for an effective one. This is precisely the essence of national communotarism. This synthesis should reflect the ingenious understanding of the essence of empire by Alexander the Great and Caesar: the empire is an integrating, flexible nationalism. The defeated becomes a partner, assistant and, finally, a compatriot. I'm talking about "imperial communism", a kind of New Rome or "Great Prussia", about an empire that will express the idea of a state with a more perfect functional structure, about an empire, the right to join which will not be given to every state.

This does not exclude the danger of the emergence of classical Russian nationalism, which was a way of suppressing and exploiting other peoples. If the USSR tries to impose on us a Europe of the Russian type, then this attempt will fail even faster than the attempt of Hitler's Germany. On the contrary, if the USSR tries to apply the principles of "Soviet" nationalism of the imperial type, integrating nationalism, it will have a much better chance of success. The concepts of "Great Russia" and "Soviet empire" reflect two opposing concepts, namely, the concept of overwhelming and integrating nationalism. Suppressive nationalism engenders, strengthens and exacerbates the nationalism of neighboring states. He breeds his own

opponents, their antagonists. If the genocide he is carrying out fails, such nationalism is doomed to failure due to the internal contradiction inherent in it.

For the overwhelming majority of people, the change in the concept of "territorial" (overwhelming) nationalism to the concept of "continental" nationalism is imperial a difficult, if not impossible, mental operation.

Suppressive nationalism is reminiscent of evolutionary choices made arthropods. It works according to a hard-coded program. He set his own limit. In contrast, integrative nationalism, reflecting the "imperial concept," resembles vertebrates. In theory, its territorial expansion can be unlimited. Whether at the top level of concept or at the bottom level of ideology, the choice of arthropods as opposed to the choice of vertebrates can be found in a number of areas, from religion to the formation of nations, including the development of political theories. Thus, the Jewish religion, based on a racial approach, shares the fate of arthropods. From a demographic point of view, it has received only very limited distribution. On the contrary, the Christian and Islamic religions, not limited by either linguistic or racial criteria, have become widespread.

The expansion of Hitlerite Germany, limited by racial and linguistic boundaries, also followed the path of arthropods. It ended with a fatal indigestion inability to digest 200 million Slavs. Yesterday's "Derulede" and the current "Debre", as well as sighing on a helmet with a shishak or on a swastika, should also be enrolled in the class of arthropods. All of them are gripped by the shell of their rigid ideologies. As for European nationalism, it serves as an analogy for the evolution of vertebrates. It is a kind of open system. It is characterized by flexibility and integration ability. To understand it requires a level of thinking that is absolutely inaccessible to most "ordinary nationalists".

Here we come to the question of the eternal attempt to neutralize, "Finlandize" Germany.

Life is ruthless to the weak. The same can be said for history. Today's Europe, torn apart in May by narrow-minded nationalists (French, German, British, etc.), is a potential "battlefield." In this it is similar to Germany in the middle of the 17th century. As they once spoke of "Puppet Germany" pulled by the string by Richelieu and Mazarin, so today one can speak of "Europe manipulated by Washington."

All those who slavishly resign themselves to American domination in Europe (especially in West Germany, where it is completely overt) and are ready to go to the "Finlandization" of West Germany, can be called masochists from history. In 1840, when the best representatives of Germany were fighting for the unification of the Second Reich, such masochists extolled the virtues of the Peace of Westphalia (a two-hundred-year plan for the conclusion of a treaty). Thus, a certain Christoph Hack glorified the historical insignificance of Germany. This type of people willing to buy the world at the cost of historical castration is not new at all.

Today we need to look for rapprochement with the Soviet Union. It is necessary to negotiate first about rapprochement, then about unification and, finally, about merging with him. We are talking about completely frank negotiations. We don't need peace between a cat and a mouse.

West Germany must be entitled to equality and dignity within Western Europe. For this it is necessary to discard the Jewish-American theses of the "guilty people" and the original sin of the Germans. This is biblical nonsense. The image of inhuman Germany is carefully cultivated with the help of all media in France, England, Belgium, Holland, Italy. This propaganda aims to divide Western Europe, to prevent its unification, rearing old wounds.

The armed forces of West Germany, the Bundeswehr, are reduced today to the position of the colonial infantry (like the Senegalese in the 1914-1918 war) of the United States.

Today's Germany must muster up the courage to cast out the evil spirits and tell itself that National Socialism ultimately belongs to the past. In any case, Hitler committed no more crimes than those who stained their hands in blood by bombing Hamburg or aimlessly destroying Dresden in 1945, not to mention the 1,500 women, children and old people who were recently killed innocently in Lebanon. Everyone should be held accountable for their misdeeds, but in the end the time comes when these misconduct should be the subject of study not by politicians, but by historians. This time has come for Germany. Almost all the surviving participants in the 1939-1945 war. have already died. The new generation of Germans must not take on Hitler's legacy. On the one hand, Germany must not completely absolve itself of responsibility for war crimes, on the other hand, today it has the right to demand compliance with the principle of the statute of limitations in relation to itself. Germany must no longer accept its role as stepdaughter of the Common Market or NATO. A stepdaughter whose adoptive parents are "terrible".

Western Europe must strive for armed neutrality and avoid unarmed neutrality. Only masochists, naive people and eunuchs can advocate such neutrality. Europe should put out 400,000 American soldiers stationed there. The risk of war lies in the American military presence in Europe. The Pentagon, subordinate to the State Department and patronizing the State of Israel, could play "atomic poker" in Europe in response to Soviet actions in the Mediterranean or some other part of the world.

If nuclear weapons are in the hands of Europeans (including, of course, the West Germans), then the Soviet Union is at an incomparably greater risk of nuclear conflict than if it were in the hands of Americans stationed in Europe. Europe is an age-old battlefield, a testing ground. There is something to think about here. We learned the horrors of war both in Russia in 1941-1943 and at home in 1943-1945. Here they know what war is, and they decide on it only as a last resort. In Washington, the capital of a country whose shores have not seen an enemy gunboat for almost two centuries, they do not know what war is.

Europe must base its policy on an alliance with the East, an alliance driven by geopolitical considerations. Europe, stretching from west to east, cannot stop on the Lubeck-Sofia line. At the same time, the great Soviets, going from east to west, cannot stop at this artificially established line. Our distant future can be read on a geographical map. The border, which runs along the Lubeck-Sofia line, is a defense line that is extremely vulnerable in the event of a maneuver warfare. The presence of such a border is very dangerous from a geostrategic point of view. It is very difficult to protect her. This explains the importance that the USSR attaches to classic weapons. "Flank" Lubeck-Sofia is the only weak point of the Soviet defense on the distant approaches. From all

the other sides of the USSR are well defended thanks to their climate (in the north) and vast distances (in the south). In terms of classical military science, an American army based in West Germany might be compared to a single Soviet army stationed in Canada between Montreal and Winnip. In this purely hypothetical case, the bulk of the American ground forces would be located between Minneapolis and Boston.

The "natural" shores of the USSR (as opposed to the borders) are the Canary Islands, the Azores, Ireland, Iceland. The same applies to Western Europe.

A "cultured" or "economically developed" nation is inconceivable without relying on a "politically strong" nation. From 1648 to 1870 Germany was an example of a "cultured" nation, famous for its porcelain and musicians. At the same time, it served as a battlefield for anyone. There is no nation without an army, and today there is no army without nuclear weapons. Having lost their colonies, countries such as England and France are now only PARODIES for the great powers. From now on, nations with a population of less than 200-300 million have no international weight. History offers us two options to choose from:

1) the Soviet Union is conquering Western Europe, or it has to do it as a preventive war;

2) the war is avoided, and Western Europe, freed from Washington's political hirelings, goes to a political alliance with the East.

Collaboration, partnership, union and finally unification. Germany, which today stands with one foot in the West and the other in the East, is best able to cope with the role of mediator.

In Germany, there is a leftist nationalist movement that emerged in West Berlin during the break between the happening and the drug party. Father Brandt has already dishonored his country and his race. Now we can admire the romantic fantasies of his son Peter. The transformation of the Bundeswehr into a Yugoslav-style "National People's Army" is sheer fun. Even in the event of reunification (I admit such a hypothesis), Germany would become only a dwarf power, such as Mitterrand's France or Thatcher's England, boasting of their "independence" from the USA, USSR and China. Miserable young people, drawn to Peter Brandt, want to return to the days of romantic Germany before 1848, Germany before Fichte. In 1982, it is no longer just about Germany - the "battlefield", but the whole of Europe - the "battlefield".

The religious war between "Marxist communism" and "democracy" blinds most of these people, and this blindness prevents them from realizing geopolitical reality. To prevent Europe from becoming a "battlefield", it is necessary to shift the direction of a possible Soviet offensive to Gibraltar, Dublin and Casablanca. We must seek agreement with the Soviet Union and lay the foundations for effective cooperation right now. The site of a protracted war should be a part of Africa between latitude 20 degrees north and latitude 20 degrees south. Even if these zones are partially devastated, this will not greatly affect the future of humanity.

To avoid the destruction of Europe, we must deliberately go for close cooperation with the USSR, cooperation, and not a swindle offered by Hitler to the French in 1940-1942. Western Europe and the USSR must create a kind of "community of destinies" dictated by geography, a marriage of convenience, a forced marriage.

The USSR and Western Europe should work together as soon as possible to counterbalance the Monroe doctrine. Our Monroe Doctrine should be "... not a single soldier, not a single American soldier in the Mediterranean." European problems must be solved by the Europeans themselves. Russians are the same Europeans as the Germans, French, British and other European peoples.

We need to get Americans to leave Europe for more than just geopolitical reasons. Their presence in Europe can be compared to the Carthaginian conquest of Sicily by the side of the Roman Republic. By staying in Europe and increasing the risk of war, Americans will not be able to cope with the crisis in their society that is just beginning. We run the risk of getting infected from them. This crisis of society is due to the collapse of three spheres:

1) the technical and economic system,

2) politics based on persuasion, demagoguery, in a word, "democracy",

3) an obsessed culture.

The technical and economic system is a reflection of the materialistic world, the world of science, rationalism, foresight. The second sphere, the sphere of politics, defies any logical analysis, any rationalistic approach. Here the argumentation of persuasion prevails (in the first sphere, logical-experimental argumentation prevails). As for culture, today it should rather be attributed to the field of psychiatry. At least in the USA. Only a totalitarian system can balance these three spheres.

It is high time to introduce the concept of rationalism into politics. In my next work, The Euro-Soviet Empire, I will devote an entire chapter to the question of whether politics, metapolitics, should be based on power or pleasure (pleasure).

North America has made its final choice in favor of hedonism, and its entire policy is directed towards "the means of pleasure." Such a choice would lead humanity to a dead end. All that remains is to make the communists wiser and explain to them what the metapolitics would be, directed at the "means of action" or, in other words, at the means of force.

Hobbes has already shown that freedom rests on strength. In our era of scientific and technological revolution, we can add to this that power serves knowledge (space research, fundamental research in the field of physics), and knowledge gives strength.

If we want to create homo novus, then we have to make a choice between power and pleasure. Marx's dream was to give everyone what they need. Today, this dream can be easily fulfilled. Achieving abundance is a problem of planning and will. It would take no more than a quarter of a century to solve it. This abundance would lead either to the emergence of a hedonistic society, doomed to decline (USA), or to the transformation of an ordinary person into a homo novus.

Huxley and Orwell noted only the possible negative side of Brave New World. The positive side of it remained unknown to them.

Remember also Koestler's prophecy: "The thesis winners, the antithesis of the defeated, the synthesis of winners and losers become united citizens of a gigantic new Eurasian homeland."

I would change it: "The thesis is racist national socialism, the antithesis of Marxist communism, the synthesis of great European national bolshevism, in other words, elite imperial communism, which rejected Marx as an ideologist and Hitler as a limited short-sighted nationalist ... "

National Socialism was splendid school efficiency, that the most efficiency, which so n Marxist communism is not enough.

Ordinary communism needs to make a child so that an extraordinary offspring is born, a kind of "gifted monster", "superhuman communism."

As early as 1941, Koestler knew who should be his father.

Carl Schmitt

PLANETARY TENSION BETWEEN EAST AND WESTERN LAND AND SEA CONFRONTATION[85]

The confrontation between East and West, which is quite obvious today, includes contradictions of various kinds: economic interests, a qualitative difference between the ruling elites and the incompatibility of fundamental intellectual attitudes. All these contradictions are growing, mutually reinforcing each other. However, the connection between economic, sociological and spiritual tensions manifested itself in all the great wars of human history. The peculiarity of modern antagonism is that this tension has become global and encompasses the entire planet. Therefore, today it is absolutely necessary to adequately analyze the historical and geopolitical background on which this intense confrontation is based.

We are talking about the opposite of East and West. At the same time, it is obvious that we cannot talk only about geographical differences. In the course of our research, we will thoroughly analyze what kind of opposition is being discussed here, and show that there are two different types of intense confrontation: historical-dialectical and static-polar.

The opposite of East and West is not a polar opposite. The Earth has North and South poles, but neither East nor West. In the conditions of our planet, the geographic opposition of West and East is not something fixed and static; it is only a dynamic relationship associated with the daily "decay of light". Geographically, America is West in relation to Europe; in relation to America, China and Russia are the West; and in relation to China and Russia, the West is Europe. In a purely geographical sense, there are no clear poles, and therefore, based on geography alone, it is completely impossible to understand the really existing planetary hostile tension between East and West and to think about its underlying structure.

one.

You can follow the path of studying the historical, cultural and moral specifics of the present East and the present West, and thus isolate a number of antitheses, which, no doubt, are very important. Here I would like to use one term introduced into circulation by the geographer John Gottman in his brilliant work "La politique des Etats et leur geographie"[86]: the concept of regional iconography (iconography of space) iconographie regionale. Different pictures of the world and ideas that have arisen as a result of different religions, traditions, different historical past, different social models form autonomous spaces. In this sense, not only paintings and works of plastic art belong to the iconography of a certain space, but also all visible forms of public and private life. The essential importance of art in this regard was recently pointed out by Luis Diez del Corral, in his book "The Rape of Europa", which can be called an encyclopedia of European iconography. The difference between understanding the form in those or

[85] Carl Schmitt "Die planetarische Spannung zwischen Ost und West", 1959 in "Schmittiana-III" von prof. Piet Tommissen, Brussel, 1991 (ed.).
[86] -The Politics of States and Their Geography "(fr.) (Ed.).

other cultural regions, and especially in the sphere of the structure of power and state structure, were investigated by Carlos Ollero. In the concept of "iconography of space", we can include, in addition to various forms of social life, also all other typical forms of manifestation of human existence, systems of characteristic implications, allusions, symbolic language of feelings and thoughts in the form in which they are characteristic for certain territories with a special unique culture.

This also includes images of the past, myths, sagas and legends, just like all symbols and taboos that are topographically localized in one definite space and only because of this acquire historical reality. Gottman speaks in this connection about the "circulation of iconography", i.e. about the dynamic influence of territorial cultures on each other over time. Thus, the famous theory of the "circulation of elites" by Pareto is replaced by the equally important theory of circulation of iconography.

The use of the word (and concept) "iconography" seems to me in this case quite appropriate and fruitful, primarily because this term most accurately reveals the essence of the confrontation between East and West. The attitude to the image, the icon reveals the essential qualities of the East and West in their deepest dimension:

The East traditionally acts as an opponent of visual images, paintings and icons, while the West, on the contrary, as a stronghold of veneration for icon painting and, more broadly, painting.

When it comes to iconoclasm or the prohibition on the image of God, an educated European recalls events from the history of Byzantium, about the struggle around the iconoclastic heresy of the time of King Leo (717-741) and about the recognition of icon painting by Charlemagne. The ban also comes to mind to depict God in the Old Testament and in Islam. Some have gone so far as to discover here an initial contradiction between verbal and visual expression, which they, in turn, elevate to an even more general contradiction between hearing and sight, acoustics and visuals, and the word and hearing are unambiguously identified with the East, and the image and sight with the West.

The use of the term "iconography", in the above-mentioned overarching sense, should save us from such simplifications. In reality, there is no geographical place where the visual dimension of reality is absent, and the image, image, icon and iconography are present everywhere. Therefore, only the opposite tendency is possible, denying the value of the visual image, i.e. iconoclasm in the broadest sense. Moreover, the problem of iconoclasm is by no means limited to Byzantium or Islam. The West also knows many and very aggressive forms of the iconoclastic spirit. Wyclifites and Hussites, sectarian Baptists and Puritans, religious modernists and rude rationalists, all these iconoclastic movements arose and developed in the West. This conflict is on a planetary scale, this main dispute in world history reached in the era of great geographical discoveries and the colonization of the New World, and outwardly it manifested itself in the struggle between two confessional forms of Roman Catholicism and northern Protestantism, the line of the Jesuits and the Calvinists. Let's try to consider the iconographic aspect of this conflict, which will lead us to a deeper understanding of its meaning.

The meaning of the Reconquista was to reclaim space on the Iberian Peninsula for the free veneration of the Image of the Most Pure Mother of God. Once I wrote that the Spanish sailors and conquistadors of the New World saw a symbol of their historical achievements in planting everywhere the image of the Immaculate Virgin Mary. Some readers got me wrong. One Catholic author even wrote on this subject:

"Schmitt talks about all the Christian accessories of the Conquest that can only mislead readers." For me, the icon of the Virgin Mary is not "all sorts of Christian accessories." Moreover, the veneration of the Icon of the Most Pure One is of great importance to me, which becomes clearer if we take into account the above considerations about the connection between the visual image, the icon, and the essence of the Western tradition. I undertake to assert that all the religious wars of Europe of the XVI-XVII centuries, including the Thirty Years War in German lands, were in reality wars for and against the medieval Catholic veneration of the icon of the Virgin Mary. Should the iconoclasm of the English Puritans be considered a purely Eastern phenomenon in this context, and the veneration of Bavarian icons, Spanish and Polish Catholics a sign of their Western spiritual nature? In the Byzantine controversies around the iconoclastic heresy, the theological level of the Christian dogma of the Trinity was touched upon. The spiritual problem was the complexity of the iconographic combination in the Deity of Unity and Trinity. But nevertheless, it would be wrong to strictly identify the Trinity dogma exclusively with the West, and abstract monotheism with the East. Of course, at certain points in history, this coincidence was almost complete. The Frankish monks supplemented the Christian Creed of the West with a formula according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son, and the indignation of the Filioque Greek patriarchs led to a great schism between the Western and Eastern Churches. The spiritual problem was the complexity of the iconographic combination in the Deity of Unity and Trinity. But nevertheless, it would be wrong to strictly identify the Trinity dogma exclusively with the West, and abstract monotheism with the East. Of course, at certain points in history, this coincidence was almost complete. The Frankish monks supplemented the Christian Creed of the West with a formula according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son, and the indignation of the Filioque Greek patriarchs led to a great schism between the Western and Eastern Churches. The spiritual problem was the complexity of the iconographic combination in the Deity of Unity and Trinity. But nevertheless, it would be wrong to strictly identify the Trinity dogma exclusively with the West, and abstract monotheism with the East. Of course, at certain points in history, this coincidence was almost complete. The Frankish monks supplemented the Christian Creed of the West with a formula according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son, and the indignation of the Filioque Greek patriarchs led to a great schism between the Western and Eastern Churches.[87] Proceeding from this, one could consider that the Filioque was the action of the West against the East, but this is refuted, on the one hand, by the special teaching of the Trinity and the Mother of God of the Syrian Church Fathers, and on the other hand, by the views of the Western Arians, who generally denied the divine nature of Christ. Thus, the impressive iconographic difference between East and West in the matter of Trinity becomes less unconditional and absolute.

Traditional iconography is not static; new factors invade it. For example, the industrial invasion of technology. Modern psychoanalysis can also be viewed as a manifestation of the iconoclastic tendency. The Spanish psychoanalyst Juan José López Ibor has undertaken a very interesting study of this area, based on our iconographic approach to the problem. In addition, almost all modern painting, both abstract and preserved the remnants of objectivity, carries in itself the destruction of the traditional understanding of the image, visual image, icon. All three phenomena are related to technique, psychoanalysis and contemporary painting. If you undertake a study of this relationship, comparing it with the actual confrontation between East and West, you can come to amazing, sensational conclusions. The only obstacle on this path is the impossibility of strictly identifying the East with iconoclasm, and the West with icon veneration. To fully understand the structure of the world dualism West-East, we still need to proceed from other criteria.

2.

[87] The Catholic Schmitt believes that the Filioque only emphasizes the Trinity of the Godhead and strengthens the iconographic orientation of Christian dogma, while the rejection of this innovation in the Orthodox Church seems to him to be an expression of the iconoclastic, Old Testament spirit. This is a completely incorrect thesis, refuted even by such a historical observation as the widespread distribution and veneration of icons among Orthodox peoples, and especially in Russia, where the icon still plays such a colossal role in religious practice, which it did not play even during the heyday of Catholicism in Europe. Moreover, the introduction of the Filioque was precisely the expression of that abstract monotheism and rationalistic theology that have nothing to do with the assertion of the fullness of the Trinity and the primacy of the Image. For more details on this, see A. Dugin "

The history of the planetary confrontation between East and West in its entirety can be reduced to the fundamental dualism of the elements: Earth and Water, Land and Sea.

What we call the East today is a single mass of solid land: Russia, China, India, a huge piece of Land, "Middle Earth"[88], as the great English geographer Sir Halford Mackinder called it. What we call the West today is one of the world's Oceans, a hemisphere containing the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The opposition of the sea and continental worlds is the global truth that underlies the explanation of civilizational dualism, which constantly generates planetary tension and stimulates the entire process of history.

At the climax of world history, clashes between the belligerent powers turn into wars between the elements of the Sea and the elements of Land. This was already noticed by the chroniclers of the war of Sparta and Athens, Rome and Carthage. However, until a certain time, everything was limited to the area of the Mediterranean Sea. People did not yet know huge spaces, great oceans, planetary conflicts. Immediately, we note that it is necessary to make a conceptual distinction between the elements of the Sea and the elements of the Ocean. Of course, there are partial parallels, and many refer in this sense to the famous passage from the first philippic of Demosthenes (38.41). I myself do not fully share the causticity of Plato, who said about the Greeks that "they sit on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea like frogs."

However, there is a significant difference between an inland maritime civilization and an oceanic civilization. That tension between East and West, that planetary formulation of the problem of conflict, which are characteristic of our period of history, have no analogues in the past. The confrontation between Land and Sea (like the Ocean) reaches the final world-historical volume only when mankind assimilates the entire planet.

The planetary nature of the battle between Land and Sea was first revealed during the wars of England against revolutionary France and Napoleon. True, then the division into Land and Sea, East and West was not yet as clear as it is today. Napoleon was ultimately defeated not by England, but by continental Russia, Austria and Prussia. "Nomos" of the Earth[89] still consisted then in the balance between the forces of the Land and the Sea; Sea alone could not achieve a decisive victory on its own. In 1812, when the clash reached its climax, the United States declared war not on Napoleon, but on England. Then there was a rapprochement between America and Russia, and both of these young states sought to distance themselves from both Napoleon and England. The contradiction between the Land and the Sea, between the East and the West is not yet

[88] In the beginning Mackinder used the term "Pivot area", "Pivot area", later "Heartland", "Heartland". (HELL.)

[89] "Nomos" is a fundamental category of Karl Schmitt, the axis of his theory of history, law, geopolitics. "Der Nomos der Erde" is the title of his main work. Nomos in the Greek verbum occasionalis from the verb nemein meaning "to take, possess, divide, distribute, equip, etc." Etymologically, it corresponds to the German nehmen and Nahme, i.e. "take", "taken". Related to the word Nahme, i.e. "name". In the Russian language, this idea is most closely reflected by the word "have" and the Old Slavonic "imat" ("take"), from which "name", "property", "estate", from where "to raise", "take over", "take away", and even "understand" (compare the French saisir to grab, grasp, take, understand). In some ways close to the meaning of the words "divide", " It is possible to correlate the concept of "nomos" in Schmitt with the concept of "structure" in the French structuralists, and in this case one cannot exclude direct plagiarism (naturally, on the part of the French). It is known that Schmitt greatly influenced the largest European Hegelian Alexander Kozhev, who, in turn, was the teacher of Marcuse. (HELL.) It is possible to correlate the concept of "nomos" in Schmitt with the concept of "structure" in the French structuralists, and in this case one cannot exclude direct plagiarism (naturally, on the part of the French). It is known that Schmitt greatly influenced the largest European Hegelian Alexander Kozhev, who, in turn, was the teacher of Marcuse. (HELL.)

Crystals were then called into a pure confrontation of the elements, which happened only at the time of the conclusion of the Alliance in 1949.

But already at the time of Napoleon, the regularity of the political conflict, predetermined by the difference in civilizational elements, was quite clearly manifested, i.e. such a conflict, where it was necessary to choose between Land and Sea. In July 1812, when Napoleon was approaching Moscow, Goethe composed a panegyric supposedly to Queen Marie Louise, but, in fact, to her wife, the French emperor:

"Where thousands of people are confused, one person (Napoleon) decides everything."

The German poet continues, referring to the global aspect of the confrontation between Land and Sea:
"Where the twilight of the centuries gathers,

He (Napoleon) scatters them with the light of the spiritual gaze. All the

insignificant has disappeared

Only the Land and the Sea matter here. "("

Worueber trueb Jahrhunderte gesonnen Er

uebersieht's im hellsten Geisteslicht. Das

Kleinliche ist alles weggeronnen,

Nur Meer und Erde haben hier Gewicht. ")
Goethe was on the side of Napoleon. For him it was the side of Land, Earth. But Napoleon was also identified with the West. The West was then still Land and by no means the Sea. The German poet sincerely hoped that the West would remain the embodiment of land, continental power, and Napoleon, like the new Alexander, would conquer coastal territories from the forces of the Sea, and then "The land would come into its own."

So Goethe, a typical representative of the West, in the summer of 1812 made a choice in favor of Land, Land versus Sea. Of course, in accordance with his worldview, he understood the confrontation between the Earth and the Sea as a static, polar tension, and not as a dialectical unique historical moment. In this case, the difference between static polarity and historical dialectics, which we talked about at the very beginning of the article, is extremely important.

3.

Goethe thought in terms of static polarity. But the polar tension differs significantly from the historical-dialectical tension. The static of polar tension presupposes synchronicity, constancy, in which the interaction of opposite poles constitutes a fixed structure that remains essentially the same for all external changes arising from specific historical situations. It's kind of an eternal return.

Concrete-historical approach examines, on the contrary, the chain of logical and historical interconnection between the specifics of a particular question and the answer given to it. Question and answer provide a dialectic of the historically concrete and determine the structure of historical situations and eras. Such a dialectic does not have to be identified with the Hegelian logic of concepts or with a fatally given pattern of the natural course of events.

We are interested here, however, in the study of the structure of the planetary dualism concretely existing in our world (and not in the general theory of the historical process). Historical thinking is thinking in one-time, one-time historical situations and, therefore, one-time truths. All historical parallels serve only the best recognition of this uniqueness, otherwise they become only dead functional elements of an abstract system that simply does not exist in real life. It is absurd and unrealistic to make assumptions of this kind: what would happen if events took a different turn than they took in real history. For example, what if the Saracens had won the Battle of Poitiers? What if Napoleon had not lost the Battle of Waterloo? What, if winter 41/42 were not so cold? Such ridiculous assumptions, which can be found even among famous historians, are absurd already because they completely overlook the uniqueness and uniqueness of any historical event. The structure of polar tension is always actual, eternal, like an eternal return.

Historical truth, on the other hand, is true only once. It cannot be true more than once, since it is precisely in its singleness that its historicity lies. The disposability of historical truth is one of the secrets of ontology, as Walter Varnach put it. The dialectical structure of the question and answer, which we are talking about here, trying to explain the essence of history, does not in any way weaken or abolish the quality of the single-occurrence of a historical event. On the contrary, it only strengthens it, since we are talking about a unique concrete answer to an equally unique concrete question.

If the confrontation between Land and Sea, expressed in modern planetary dualism, were exclusively static polar, i.e. included in the chain of natural balance and eternal return, it would be only a fragment of a purely natural process. The elements in nature separate and reunite, mix and stratify. They replace each other and pass into each other in an incessant cycle of metamorphosis, which reveals more and more images and forms of the essence of the always identical polar tension. If the matter were reduced only to such a natural static dualism, the actual confrontation between East and West would be just a special form of expression of the eternal circulation of elites, a problem of iconography. Eternal return and eternal transformation does not know a specific truth, a unique situation, a historical moment. Static-polar

opposition excludes historical uniqueness. But in a concrete story, everything is different. In certain epochs, capable and powerful peoples and groups appear that seize and divide land in the process of friendly treaties or wars, manage their territory, graze cattle, etc. From this the Nomos of the Earth is formed. It is limited by its unique here and now, and the tension between the elements that we are talking about, between the Land and the Sea, only generates a natural, objective context in which this Nomos takes shape.

If we take the Earth and the Sea (and the creatures inhabiting them) as exclusively natural elements, then it is obvious that by themselves they cannot generate a hostile

confrontation, which would have a purely historical event meaning. The inhabitants of the Sea and the inhabitants of the Land cannot be absolute enemies by nature. It happens that land animals devour the sea, but it is absurd in this case to talk about some kind of enmity. The fish themselves quite often devour each other, especially the large small ones. And the inhabitants of Sushi do not treat each other much better. Therefore, it cannot be argued that there is a natural hostility between Land and Sea. Rather, in a purely natural state, these two elements exist completely irrespective of and indifferent to each other, and to such an extent that it is completely absurd to speak of such a specific and intense relationship as enmity. Every living being is in its element, in its environment. The bear is not inherently hostile to the whale, and the whale does not declare war on the bear. Even marine and land predators know their boundaries and the limits of their habitat. The bear does not encroach on the possessions of a lion or a tiger; even the most daring animals know their place and seek to avoid unpleasant encounters. Those who cite the relationship of cats with dogs as an example of natural enmity only prove once again that such a natural enmity is sharply different from human. When a dog barks at a cat and a cat hisses at a dog, their conflict has a completely different meaning than human enmity. The most important difference is that humans, in contrast to animals, are able to deny the presence of the very human quality in their opponents, while animals do not. Being a dog spiritually and morally does not call into question the existence of a cat and vice versa. The bear does not encroach on the possessions of a lion or a tiger; even the most daring animals know their place and seek to avoid unpleasant encounters. Those who cite the relationship of cats with dogs as an example of natural enmity only prove once again that such a natural enmity is sharply different from human. When a dog barks at a cat and a cat hisses at a dog, their conflict has a completely different meaning than human enmity. The most important difference is that humans, in contrast to animals, are able to deny the presence of the very human quality in their opponents, while animals do not. Being a dog spiritually and morally does not call into question the existence of a cat and vice versa. The bear does not encroach on the possessions of a lion or a tiger; even the most daring animals know their place and seek to avoid unpleasant encounters. Those who cite the relationship of cats with dogs as an example of natural enmity only prove once again that such natural enmity is sharply different from human. When a dog barks at a cat and a cat hisses at a dog, their conflict has a completely different meaning than human enmity. The most important difference is that humans, in contrast to animals, are able to deny the presence of the very human quality in their opponents, while animals do not. Being a dog spiritually and morally does not call into question the existence of a cat and vice versa. only once again prove that such natural hostility is sharply different from human. When a dog barks at a cat and a cat hisses at a dog, their conflict has a completely different meaning than human enmity. The most important difference is that humans, in contrast to animals, are able to deny the presence of the very human quality in their opponents, while animals do not. Being a dog spiritually and morally does not call into question the existence of a cat and vice versa. only once again prove that such natural hostility is sharply different from human. When a dog barks at a cat and a cat hisses at a dog, their conflict has a completely different meaning than human enmity. The most important difference is that humans, in contrast to animals, are able to deny the presence of the very human quality in their opponents, while animals do not

However, it is significant that it is the fables from the life of animals that especially vividly illustrate specifically human political situations and relations. Generally speaking, from a philosophical point of view, the problem of animal fables is interesting in itself. Transferring purely human political situations to the animal kingdom, we demythologize, clarify them, deprive ideological and rhetorical veils. Precisely due to the fact that relations among animals have a completely different meaning than relations among people, such an allegorical device, when people act as animals, and animals as people, allows you to discover what is hitherto hidden through a conscious departure from straightforward and one-dimensional analysis. Reincarnation into a beast alienates a person from a human, but through such alienation, the human becomes only more distinct and convex.

When transferring the duality of the Land-Sea to humanity, it would seem that it should be a question of sea conflicts between the people of the Sea and land conflicts between the people of Land. In fact, the situation is completely different, starting from the moment when the historical planetary tension reaches a certain critical level. Unlike animals, humans and only humans are capable of waging war between the peoples of the Land and the peoples of the Sea. When the enmity reaches its climax, hostilities take over all possible areas, and war from both sides unfolds both on the Land and on the Sea. Each side is forced to pursue the enemy deep into the hostile elements. When the third, air element is mastered, the conflict is transferred to it, and the war becomes an air war. But the original subjects of the conflict do not lose their quality, therefore, it seems to me quite reasonable to speak precisely about the opposition of the element of the Earth and the element of the Sea. When the planetary-historical confrontation approaches its peak, both sides exert all their material, mental and spiritual forces to the limit. Then the battle extends to all space adjacent to the opposing sides. And the spontaneous natural difference between Land and Sea in this case turns into a real war between these elements.

Enmity between people has a special tension that is many times greater than the tension characteristic of hostility in the kingdom of nature. In man, all aspects of nature are transcended, acquire a transcendental (or transcendental, whatever you like) dimension. This additional dimension can also be called "spiritual" and recall Rimbaud, who said: "Le combat spirituel est aussi brutal que la bataille des hommes"[90]. Be that as it may, enmity between people can reach incredible degrees. This highest degree of hostility is clearly manifested in civil wars, when the enemy is so criminalized, morally, legally and ideologically, that in fact it is placed outside all human laws. In this, some kind of peculiar only to man, a purely supernatural element, transcendental in relation to his natural dimension, makes itself felt; this element generates incredible tension and transforms natural polarity into a concrete historical dialectic.

The word "dialectics" here expresses that special quality (peculiar only to humanity), which is cardinally different from all natural forms of polarity. The word "dialectics" indicates the "question-answer" structure, which alone can adequately describe a historical situation or a historical event. The historical situation can only be understood as a challenge to a person and his response to this challenge. Each historical action is a person's answer to a question posed by history. Every human word is an answer. Each answer gains meaning through the question to which it is intended to answer; for one who does not know the question, the word remains meaningless. And the meaning of the question, in turn, lies in the specific situation in which it was posed.

All of this is reminiscent of RJ's Question-Answer Logic. Collingwood, and in fact, that's what we mean. Collingwood used question-and-answer thinking to define the specific meaning of the story. He did this with brilliant precision, since for him this definition meant the crown of the philosophical path to overcome his own ahistorical natural-scientific positivism. Collingwood's idea was excellent, but the English scientist was too deeply affected by the English definition of science inherent in the 19th century to be able to overcome the psychological-individualistic interpretation of the question-answer problem. Only this factor can explain his painful, complex attacks of Germanophobia, which have spoiled his latest work. "[91]. But the great merit of his "question-answer logic"

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[90] "Spiritual battle is as cruel as human war" (fr.).

[91] Schmitt himself, in turn, could be accused of Russophobia based on equally untenable (by and large) prejudices, but stemming from another source: from his confessional adherence to Catholicism and the geopolitical absolutization of Central Europe. Armin Mehler in his brilliant book "The Conservative Revolution in Germany 1918 1932" convincingly showed how the geopolitical division of Europe into three zones Western Europe (England, France), Central Europe (Germany, Austria), Eastern Europe (Russia) is projected on the cultural assessments of its neighbors are inhabitants of these three zones. For the British and French, the Germans are barbarians who have just emerged from the forests, the "Huns", the wild descendants of Attila. For the Germans themselves, the Russians appear to be such barbarians. But for the Russians, the Germans, who seem to be barbarians to the French and British, are seen as soulless automata, bearers of a purely Western civilization and culture (i.e., as classical, exaggerated Europeans). The Germans themselves, for the lack of vitality and historical inspiration, reproach the French and the British. Incidentally, this geopolitical typology of European ethnic groups predetermined the concept of "young peoples" (taken up by the German conservative revolutionaries from Dostoevsky), which recognizes as such Russians and Germans. In other words, accusations of barbarism could be interpreted in a positive way, as was the case in the Russophile (mainly Prussian, Protestant or pagan) camp of the Conservative Revolution in Germany, to which Arthur Müller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler and, especially , Ernst Nikish and the national bol shevik. But despite his Russophobia, Schmitt carriers of a purely Western civilization and culture (i.e., as classical, exaggerated Europeans). The Germans themselves, for the lack of vitality and historical inspiration, reproach the French and the British. Incidentally, this geopolitical typology of European ethnic groups predetermined the concept of "young peoples" (taken up by the German conservative revolutionaries from Dostoevsky), which recognizes as such Russians and Germans. In other words, accusations of barbarism could be interpreted in a positive way, as was the case in the Russophile (mainly Prussian, Protestant or pagan) camp of the Conservative Revolution in Germany, to which Arthur Müller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler and, especially , Ernst Nikish and the national bol shevik. But despite his Russophobia, Schmitt exaggerated Europeans). The Germans themselves, for the lack of vitality and historical inspiration, reproach the French and the British. Incidentally, this geopolitical typology of European ethnic groups predetermined the concept of "young peoples" (taken up by the German conservative revolutionaries from Dostoevsky), which recognizes as such Russians and Germans. In other words, accusations of barbarism could be interpreted in a positive way, as was the case in the Russophile (mainly Prussian, Protestant or pagan) camp of the Conservative Revolution in Germany, to which Arthur Müller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler and, especially , Ernst Nikish and the national bol shevik. But despite his Russophobia, Schmitt exaggerated Europeans). The Germans themselves, for the lack of vitality and historical inspiration, reproach the French and the British. Incidentally, this geopolitical typology of European ethnic groups predetermined the concept of "young peoples" (taken up by the German conservative revolutionaries from Dostoevsky), which recognizes as such Russians and Germans. In other words, accusations of barbarism could be interpreted in a positive way, as was the case in the Russophile (mainly Prussian, Protestant or pagan) camp of the Conservative Revolution in Germany, to which Arthur Müller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler and, especially , Ernst Nikish and the national bol shevik. But despite his Russophobia, Schmitt exaggerated Europeans). The Germans themselves, for the lack of vitality and historical inspiration, reproach the French and the British. Incidentally, this geopolitical typ

remains unconditional. However, it should be emphasized that the question is not raised here by an individual person or a group of people, and certainly not at all arbitrarily taken by a historian who studies the past, but by History itself, which in its qualitative aspect consists of questions and answers. The question is itself a historical event, from which the next event arises through a specific human response. Exactly to the extent that people accept the challenge and question of history and to what extent they try to respond to them with their attitude and their actions, to the extent that they demonstrate their ability to take a risky part in history and, therefore, are subjected to its judgment. In a word: they pass from a natural state to a historical one.

Arnold Toynbee developed a question-answer logic into a cultural-historical concept of a challenge-response structure[92] (challenge-response-structure).

Toynbee developed the concept of a "question" to the concept of "challenge", and the concept of "answer" to "recall." This was the most important stage in clarifying the essential characteristics of the historical, since here it is clearly not just a statically polar, natural tension that was analyzed by the non-historical individually - psychological natural-science schools of thought, but tension understood dialectically. On the basis of his method, Toynbee singles out more than twenty cultures or higher civilizations, each of which is based on a specific historical answer, the response of people to the question posed by history, the challenge it has thrown. For example, in the case of Egypt, the challenge was the natural specifics of the Nile Valley, attachment to the river, and the constant threat of enemy invasions. The development and organization of the space of the Nile Valley, protection from external, barbaric influences and the Egyptian civilization based on this with its cults of gods, dynasties, pyramids and sacred art were all a concrete response to the challenge.

The methodology of cognition gained from such an approach extremely much, since from now on it became possible to study the dialectical structure of any historical situation. But Toynbee himself could not avoid the characteristic fallacy that significantly damaged his concept. When he begins to describe the mechanism of interaction between the twenty civilizations or cultures identified by him, the most essential aspect of the historical, the structure of history itself, the unique disposability of each specific situation and its resolution disappears in his analysis. There are no universal laws of world history. This abstract attempt to subdue living history dry

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deserves respect and study from the Russians, just as he himself, being an ardent German nationalist, easily forgives the Germanophobia of the Englishman Collingwood for the sake of intellectual merit. (A.D.)

92 In Russian, there are no two words that would correspond to the English terms "answer" and "response". We in this place translate them as "answer" and "feedback". Both terms mean "answer". By the way, there is no such difference in German either, so Schmitt uses the English term "response" in the text whenever he refers to Toynbee and the German word "Antwort" when he implicitly means Collingwood. In the English language itself, the presence of two terms is explained not by a clear semantic separation, but by the Romance duplication (response) of the Germanic word (answer). In the Russian translation, we preferred to translate both words as "answer" in the future, so as not to overload the text terminologically (especially since we showed the artificiality of such a distinction). Response as a response-response, according to Schmitt, describes the human response to the challenge of history in a way that is more abstracted from the natural sciences, from which Collingwood's concepts were never completely free. However, as the presentation progresses, Schmitt himself begins to use both terms as synonyms, choosing one or the other, rather, for reasons of a purely stylistic nature. The same can be said about a couple of terms "question" and "challenge", question and challenge. In this case, Schmitt almost unambiguously prefers the word "challenge", which he sometimes translates into German Ruf, Anruf, then leaves in the original English form challenge. In Russian philosophical literature, this term is always translated as "challenge". (HELL.) more abstracted from the natural sciences, from which Collingwood's concepts have never been completely freed. However, as the presentation progresses, Schmitt himself begins to use both terms as synonyms, choosing one or the other, rather, for reasons of a purely stylistic nature. The same can be said about a couple of terms "question" and "challenge", question and challenge. In this case, Schmitt almost unambiguously prefers the word "challenge", which he sometimes translates into German Ruf, Anruf, then leaves in the original English form challenge. In Russian philosophical literature, this term is always translated as "challenge". (HELL.) more abstracted from the natural sciences, from which Collingwood's concepts have never been completely freed. However, as the presentation progresses, Schmitt himself begins to use both terms as synonyms, choosing one or the other, rather, for reasons of a purely stylistic nature. The same can be said about a couple of terms "question" and "challenge", question and challenge. In this case, Schmitt almost unambiguously prefers the word "challenge", which he sometimes translates into German Ruf, Anruf, then leaves in the original English form challenge. In Russian philosophical literature, this term is always translated as "challenge". (HELL.) in the course of the presentation, Schmitt himself begins to use both terms as synonyms, choosing one or the other, rather, for reasons of a purely stylistic nature. The same can be said about a couple of terms "question" and "challenge", question and challenge. In this case, Schmitt almost unambiguously prefers the word "challenge", which he sometimes translates into German Ruf, Anruf, then leaves in the original English form challenge. In Russian philosophical literature, this term is always translated as "challenge". (HELL.) in the course of the presentation, Schmitt himself begins to use both terms as synonyms, choosing one or the other, rather, for reasons of a purely stylistic nature. The same can be said about a couple of terms "question" and "challenge", question and challenge. In this case, Schmitt almost un

patterns or statistical probability within a narrowly functional system is fundamentally wrong.

In reality, we are dealing only with one-off specific situations. And the specific situation of our own epoch is determined by the fact that in it the confrontation between East and West has acquired the character of planetary dualism, planetary enmity. When we try to figure out the nature of the dialectical tension generated by this dualism, we are not trying to derive a general law or statistical probability, let alone construct a system. When we use the word "dialectic", "dialectical", we run the risk of being misunderstood and ranked among the narrowly Hegelian school. This is not entirely true. The historical dialectic of Hegel, in fact, makes it possible to comprehend the disposability and uniqueness of a historical event, which is evident at least from Hegel's phrase that that the incarnation of the Son of God is a central event in all of human history. This makes it clear that history for Hegel was not just a chain of objective laws, but also had a subjective dimension of active participation. But in the general Hegelian systematization, historical uniqueness is often lost, and a specific historical event is dissolved in a one-dimensional thought process. This remark is enough to clarify our understanding of the term "dialectic" and to prevent automatic enrollment in the Hegelians, which is quite typical for the "technical", automatic way of thinking of our contemporaries. But in the general Hegelian systematization, historical uniqueness is often lost, and a specific historical event is dissolved in a one-dimensional thought process. This remark is enough to clarify our understanding of the term "dialectic" and to prevent automatic enrollment in the Hegelians, which is quite typical for the "technical", automatic way of thinking of our contemporaries. But in the general Hegelian systematization, historical uniqueness is often lost, and a specific historical event is dissolved in a one-dimensional thought process. This remark is enough to clarify our understanding of the term "dialectic" and to prevent automatic enrollment in the Hegelians, which is quite typical for the "technical", automatic way of thinking of our contemporaries.

In addition to a misunderstanding of the essence of historical dialectics, characteristic of Hegelianism in general, one should also be wary of the mania typical of the 19th century for the formulation of laws and the discovery of laws. Almost all Western sociologists and historians, except for Alexis de Tocqueville, have suffered from this disease. The need to deduce from each concrete historical situation a general law of development has covered the scientific discoveries of even the most perspicacious thinkers of the last century with an almost impenetrable veil of vague generalizations.

The elevation of a concrete historical fact to some kind of universal human law was the price that the 19th century compensated for its scientific and natural positivism. Scientists simply could not imagine some kind of truth outside the universal, precisely calculated and measurable functional law. Thus, Auguste Comte, a modern historian endowed with a brilliant intuition, correctly defined the essence of his era, presenting it as the result of a development consisting of three stages: from theology through metaphysics to positivism. This was a perfectly correct observation, precisely defining the one-off, three-point step taken by Western thought from the 13th to the 19th century. But the positivist Auguste Comte could himself believe in the truth of the principle he formulated only after he declared, that the law of the three stages applies to all of humanity and throughout its history. Karl Marx, in turn, made a very accurate diagnosis of the state of affairs that was characteristic of the second stage of the industrial revolution in the middle of the 19th century in Central and Eastern Europe; but the trouble is that he elevated his considerations into a universal world historical doctrine and proclaimed a simplified thesis about the "class struggle", while, in fact, it was just a specific moment of the techno-industrial revolution associated with the invention of railways, telegraph and steam engine. Already in the 20th century, Oswald Spengler significantly limited the significance of his discovery regarding the deep historical parallels between the present era and the era of the Roman civil war and the period of the Caesars by

four.

Industrialization and technical development are the fate of our land today. So, let's try to identify a one-off historical question, a great challenge and a concrete answer generated by the industrial and technological revolution of the last century. In doing so, we discard all the superficial conclusions that involve us in risky systems of causation. We have isolated from the general concept of tension a purely dialectical tension that is different from the polar-static one. But this concept of dialectical tension should not be understood as a banal product of Hegelianism, natural science or normative constructs. Toynbee's formula for "call-recall" should also be used only as a tool, since we need, first of all,

Here we will be helped by the text of Arnold Toynbee in 1953 with an expressive title: "The World and the West" ("The world and the West")[93]. This work provoked fierce criticism and controversy, which we prefer to pass over in silence, since we are only interested in the confrontation between Earth and Land. Toynbee speaks of our era, singling out the West as a separate category, opposed to the rest of the world.

He sees the West as an aggressor who, for four and a half centuries, has been expanding its industrial and technical power to the East in four main directions: Russia, the Islamic world, India and East Asia. For Toynbee, it seems very important that this aggression was carried out through a technique freed from the norms of Christian tradition (entfesselte Technik). The fact that the East itself has begun to make widespread use of technology means for Toynbee the beginning of his active self-defense in the face of the West. True, in the 17th century the Jesuits made an attempt to preach the Christian religion to the Hindus and the Chinese not as the religion of the West, but as a universal religion, equally related to all people. Toynbee believes that this attempt, unfortunately, failed due to dogmatic differences between the various Catholic missions and the centralized Jesuit preaching network. The meaning of the October Communist Revolution, according to Toynbee, is that the East began to arm itself with European technology freed from the Christian religion. Toynbee calls this technique "a piece of European culture that broke away from it by the end of the 16th century." Let us note this most important, absolutely precise formulation.

Let us now clarify in the light of the "question-answer logic" what was the challenge and the response that historically manifested itself in our era through the industrial-technical breakthrough.

Where does the industrial revolution come from? The answer to what question is it? What are its origins and its homeland, its origin and its motivation? It comes from the island of England and dates back to the 18th century. Let's repeat the well-known dates 1735 (the first coke oven), 1740 (the first cast steel), 1768 (the first steam engine), 1769 (the first modern factory in Nottinge), 1770 (the first spinning machine), 1786 (the first mechanical loom), 1825 (first steam locomotive). The great industrial revolution comes with

93 This formula "The World and the West" (and the geopolitical concept implicitly contained in it) clearly echoes the work of Samuel Huntington "Clash of civilizations", one of the chapters of which is similarly titled "The West and the Rest". The American conservative Huntington is clearly under the influence of Toynbee and, apparently, considers himself to be his successor. (HELL.)

the island of England, which has become the main industrial country in the world since the 19th century. This historical phenomenon, which we must constantly bear in mind, was already noticed by the first German sociologist Lorenz von Stein in 1842.

He wrote about this:

“Surprisingly and completely unexpectedly, at the same time that the ideas of freedom and equality are spreading in France, the first machines appear in England. Together with them, a completely new era opens up for the whole world in matters of welfare, production, consumption and trade. a truly revolutionary force in the material world, and from this material world subordinate to them, they began to spread their power deep into, into all spheres of the spiritual world. "

"Surprisingly and completely unexpectedly" and precisely "in England"! In these words, one can hear the surprise of a young German greedy for knowledge, who begins to realize the historical situation of his people and in Paris, Louis Philippe understands that the political revolution, spreading since 1789 throughout the European continent, is only a pale ideological epiphenomenon in comparison with the industrial one. a revolution spreading from England and representing a truly revolutionary force. Thus was born the remarkable phrase just quoted from the chapter under the significant title "Proletariat". In the same text, for the first time, a scientific understanding of the problem of the fundamental difference between labor and property is introduced into the European discussion.

So the industrial revolution comes from eighteenth-century England. What was the historical situation on this island at the time? England was an island that separated from the European continent in the 16th century and took the first steps towards a purely marine existence. This, from a historical point of view, is the most essential for us. Everything else is just a superstructure, a superstructure. Whichever external event we choose as the final step towards a purely marine existence, the capture of Jamaica by Cromwell in 1655, the final exile of the Stuarts in 1688 or the European peace in Utrecht in 1713, the main thing is the following: one European people from a certain point ceased count the island on which he lived, part of a somewhat remote European Land and realized it as a base for a purely marine existence and for sea domination over the world's oceans. Beginning in the 16th century, England entered the era of great geographical discoveries and began to conquer colonies from Portugal, Spain, France and Holland. She defeated all her European rivals not by virtue of moral or power
superiority, but only solely due to the fact that she made an decisive and
irrevocable step from the solid land to the open sea, and in the such a situation
conquest of land colonies was ensured by the control of spaces. over sea

It was a one-time, unique, historical response to an equally one-time, unique historical challenge, to the great challenge of the century of European geographical discoveries. For the first time in human history as we know it, a challenge has arisen that is not limited to specific rivers, shores, or inland seas; for the first time it had a planetary, global character. Most European nations have grasped this challenge in continental, land-based terms. The Spaniards created their gigantic overseas empire; at the same time, it remained essentially land-based and was built on vast mainland masses. The Russians broke away from Moscow and conquered a gigantic

the country of Siberia. The Portuguese, despite their amazing achievements in navigation, also failed to move to a purely marine existence. Even the heroic epic of the era of Portuguese discoveries, Comoens's Lusiada, speaks of the Indian Ocean in much the same way that Aeneas Virgilia speaks of the Mediterranean. The Dutch were the first to embark on global naval adventures and remained at the forefront for a long time. But the base was too weak, the rootedness in the politics of the land powers was too deep, and after the conclusion of peace in Utrecht in 1713, Holland was finally tied to the Land. The French entered a two-hundred-year war with England and, in the end, lost it. England was not particularly worried about the continent (the least hampered by the continent), and she finally and successfully moved to a purely marine existence.

The former European island threw away the traditional, land-based picture of the world and began to consistently view the world from the position of the Sea. The land, as a natural living space of a person, has turned into something else, into a coast stretching deep into the continental expanses, into a backland. Back in the 15th century, during the time of the Maid of Orleans, the English knights, like the knights of other countries, in a fair fight, got their own trophies. Until the 16th century, the British were sheep breeders who sold wool to Flanders, where it was made into fabrics. And this people turned into a nation of "sea lovers" and founded not only a sea, but an oceanic, world empire. The island ceased to be a separately located fragment of the Land and turned into a Ship anchored near the continent. In place of the old, land Nomos of the Earth, a new Nomos entered,

What fell away from European culture in the 16th century was, contrary to Toynbee, not a "technical splinter", but something completely different. The European island broke away from the European continent, and the new world of the Sea, summoned by the island, rose up against the traditional world of the continental Land. This peace of the Sea gave birth to a counterbalance to the world of Land, and the peace (Frieden, peace) on earth became like scales in his hands. This was an expression of a concrete response to the challenge of the opened World Ocean. And on this island of England, which took up the challenge and took a decisive step towards sea existence, the first machines suddenly appeared.

five.

The ship is the basis of the marine existence of people, just as the House is the basis of their land existence. The Ship and the House are not antitheses in the sense of static polarity; they represent different responses to different challenges of history. Both the Ship and the House are created with the help of technical means, but their main difference is that the Ship is an absolutely artificial, technical means of transportation based on the total domination of man over nature. The sea is a kind of natural environment that is sharply different from the land. The sea is more alienated and hostile. According to the biblical story, man received his habitat precisely through the separation of the Earth from the Sea. The sea remained fraught with danger and evil. Here we refer readers to the comments on the first chapter of the "Book of Genesis" in the third volume of "Church Dogma" by Karl Barth. Let us only emphasize that in order to overcome the ancient religious horror of the Sea, humanity had to make a significant effort. The technical effort made to overcome this is fundamentally different from any other.

technical effort. A person who dares to embark on a sea voyage, the word "pirate" originally meant someone who is capable of such a risk, should have, according to the poet, "triple armor on the chest" (aes triplex circa pectus). Man's overcoming of the inertial resistance of nature, which constitutes the essence of cultural or civilizing activity, differs sharply in the case of shipbuilding and the development of the Sea and in the case of cattle breeding and construction of dwellings on the Land.

The center and grain of land existence, with all its specific standards of dwelling, property, marriage, inheritance, etc. all this is Home. All these specific standards grow from the specifics of land existence and especially from agriculture. A fundamental legal institution, the Dominium property gets its name from the House, Domus. This is obvious and known to all lawyers. But many lawyers, however, do not know that the German word Bauer (paganus, peasant) does not come directly from the word "Ackerbau" (plowing), but from the word "Bau", "Gebaude", "aedificium", i.e. "building", "building", "house". It originally meant the person who owned the house. So, in the center of land existence is the House. In the center of marine existence, the Ship floats. Home is peace, Ship movement. Therefore, the Ship has a different environment and a different horizon. The people living on the Ship have completely different relationships both with each other and with the environment. Their attitude towards nature and animals is completely different from the people of Sushi. Land man tames beasts elephants, camels, horses, dogs, cats, donkeys, goats and "everything that belongs to him" and makes them domestic animals. Fish cannot be tamed, they can only be caught and eaten. They cannot become pets, since the very idea of the House is alien to the sea. goats and "everything that belongs to him" and makes them domestic animals. Fish cannot be tamed, they can only be caught and eaten. They cannot become pets, since the very idea of the House is alien to the sea. goats and "everything that belongs to him" and makes them domestic animals. Fish cannot be tamed, they can only be caught and eaten. They cannot become pets, since the very idea of the House is alien to the sea.

In order to understand the bottomless difference between land and sea existence, we gave a cultural and historical example. Now we are trying to find an answer to the question why the industrial revolution, with its characteristic emancipation of the technical impulse (entfesselte Technik), originated in the conditions of the marine life. Terrestrial existence centered on Home has a completely different relationship to technology than marine existence centered on the Ship. The absolutization of technical progress, the identification of any progress exclusively with technical progress, in short, what is meant by the expression "liberated technical impulse", "liberated technology" all this could arise, grow and develop only on the basis of marine existence, in the climate of marine existence. Those that the island of England accepted the challenge of the opening world ocean and brought the transition to a purely marine existence to its logical conclusion, it gave a historical answer to the question posed by the era of great geographical discoveries. At the same time, it was both a prerequisite for the industrial revolution and the beginning of an era, whose problems we are all experiencing today.

Specifically, we are talking about the industrial revolution, which is our common destiny today. This revolution could not be realized anywhere and never, except in England of the XVIII century. The industrial revolution just means the emancipation of technical progress, and this emancipation becomes understandable only on the basis of the specifics of marine existence, in which it is, to some extent, reasonable and necessary. Technical discoveries have been made at all times and in all countries. The technical giftedness of the British does not exceed the giftedness of other peoples. It is only a question of how to use the technical discovery and within what limits; in other words, in which system of standards should this discovery be placed. Under the conditions of marine existence, technical discoveries are made more easily and freely, since

how they do not have to be built into the fixed structure of norms inherent in overland existence. The Chinese invented gunpowder; they were no more stupid than the Europeans, who also invented it. But in the conditions of a purely overland, closed existence of the then China, this led to its use exclusively for games and fireworks. In Europe, the same thing led to the discoveries of Alfred Nobel and his followers. The British, who made in the 18th century all their famous discoveries that led to the industrial revolution, coke ovens, steel production, a steam engine, a loom, etc., were no more genius than other peoples from other countries and other eras who lived on land laws and made similar discoveries independently of the British. Technical discoveries are not revelations of a mysterious higher spirit. They are largely dictated by time. But whether they are forgotten or develop, it depends on the human context in which they were made. I'll put it more specifically: the technical discoveries that underlie the industrial revolution will only actually lead to the industrial revolution, where a decisive step towards marine existence is taken.

The transition to a purely marine existence already carries in itself and in its direct consequences the emancipation of technology as an independent and self-sufficient force. Any development of technology in the previous periods of land existence has never led to the emergence of such a principle as the Absolute Technique. At the same time, it should be emphasized that coastal and inland sea forms of culture do not yet mean a transition to a purely marine existence. Only when the Ocean is explored does the Ship become the real antithesis of the House. An unconditional belief in progress (understood as technological progress) is a sure sign that the transition to a marine existence is complete. In the historically, socially and morally infinite space of marine existence, a chain reaction of an endless series of discoveries arises by itself. This is not about the difference between nomadic and sedentary peoples, but about the contradiction between the Land and the Sea, two opposite elements of human existence. Therefore, it is wrong to speak of "sea nomads" on a par with nomads on horses, camels, etc. It is inappropriate to transfer land conditions to the elements of the Sea. The living space of mankind in its supernatural, historical sense is radically different in all parameters, external and internal, depending on whether we are talking about land or sea existence. From whatever position we look at this difference, from Sea to Land or from Land to Sea, it manifests itself in a completely differently structured power civilizational and cultural field; it should be noted that culture itself is more related to the Land, and civilization to the Sea but about the contradiction between the Land and the Sea, two opposite elements of human existence. Therefore, it is wrong to speak of "sea nomads" on a par with nomads on horses, camels, etc. It is inappropriate to transfer land conditions to the elements of the Sea. The living space of mankind in its supernatural, historical sense is radically different in all parameters, external and internal, depending on whether we are talking about land or sea existence. From whatever position we look at this difference, from Sea to Land or from Land to Sea, it manifests itself in a completely differently structured power civilizational and cultural field; it should be noted that culture itself is more related to the Land, and civilization to the Sea but about the contradiction between the Land and the Sea, two opposite elements of human existence. Therefore, it is wrong to speak of "sea nomads" on a par with nomads on horses, camels, etc. It is inappropriate to transfer land conditions to the elements of the Sea. The living space of mankind in its supernatural, historical sense is radically different in all parameters, external and internal, depending on whether we are talking about land or sea existence. From whatever position we look at this difference, from Sea to Land or from Land to Sea, it manifests itself in a completely differently structured power civilizational and cultural field; it should be noted that culture itself is more related to the Land, and civilization to the Sea on a par with nomads on horses, camels, etc. It is inappropriate to transfer land conditions to the elements of the Sea. The living space of mankind in its supernatural, historical sense is radically different in all parameters, external and internal, depending on whether we are talking about land or sea existence. From whatever position we look at this difference, from Sea to Land or from Land to Sea, it manifests itself in a completely differently structured power civilizational and cultural field; it should be noted that culture itself is more related to the Land, and civilization to the Sea on a par with nomads on horses, camels, etc. It is inappropriate to transfer land conditions to the elements of the Sea. The living space of mankind in its supernatural, historical sense is radically different in all parameters, external and internal, depending on whether we are talking about land or sea existence. From whatever position we look at this difference, from Sea to Land or from Land to Sea, it manifests itself in a completely differently structured power civilizational and cultural field; it should be noted that culture itself is more related to the Land, and civilization to the Sea the historical sense is radically different in all parameter

Two of the most important phenomena of the 19th century can be illuminated in a new light with the help of the theory of the specifics of marine life. We are talking about classical political economy of the late 18th and early 19th centuries and Marxism. As the industrial revolution developed, the revealed vastness provoked more and more new steps along the path of liberated technical progress. The so-called classical political economy was a conceptual superstructure developed from the first stage of the industrial revolution. Marxism, in turn, based its teaching on this superstructure of classical political economy. He developed it and developed a conceptual superstructure for the second stage of the industrial revolution. In this capacity, Marxism was adopted by the elite of Russian professional revolutionaries, who

94 A clear allusion to Oswald Spengler, who opposed civilization and culture. (HELL.)

managed to make a revolution in the Russian Empire in 1917 and transfer the double superstructure to the conditions of their agrarian country. In all this, it was not at all about the practical implementation of pure teaching and about the logical implementation of the objective laws of historical development. It was about the fact that an industrially backward agrarian country felt the need to arm itself with modern industrial technology, since otherwise it was provided with the role of extraction for other more developed industrialized major powers. Thus, from an ideological superstructure of the second stage of the industrial revolution, Marxism has turned into a practical tool for overcoming the industrial and technical insecurity of a huge country, as well as for displacing the old elite, which clearly did not cope with the fulfillment of the historical task.

But the consistent bringing to the logical end of the principles of classical political economy was only one aspect of Marxist teaching. The roots of Marxism remained Hegelian. One place in Hegel's "Foundations of the Philosophy of Law" in paragraph 243 contains the meaning of the whole problem. This is a famous place. This paragraph describes the dialectic of a bourgeois society, unhindered by its own laws, and emphasizes that "this society inevitably carries a progressive growth in population and industry." Hegel argues that such a society "with all its wealth will never be rich enough, that is, based only on its internal capabilities, it will never be able to prevent the growth of poverty and the increase in the number of the poor population." At the same time, Hegel openly refers as an example to the then England. In paragraph 246, he continues:

"According to this dialectic, a concrete bourgeois society is forced to go beyond its borders in order to look among other peoples who are lagging behind either in the level of development of industrial means or in technical skills, consumers of their products, and, consequently, means for their own existence."[95]

Such are the famous paragraphs 243 246 of Hegel's "Foundations of the Philosophy of Law", which received their final development in Marxism. But, as far as I know, no one has paid attention to the deepest meaning of paragraph 247, immediately following the one just quoted. It states the fundamental
the opposition between Land and Sea, and the deployment of this 247 paragraph could be no less significant and important than the deployment of paragraphs 243 246 in Marxism. Here the link between industrial development and marine life is affirmed. This 247th paragraph contains the following crucial sentence:

"Just as for a marriage, the first condition is solid land, Land, since for industry, the Sea is the most vital element of its life."

Here I interrupt my exposition, and give the attentive readers the opportunity to see in it the beginning of the development of the 247th paragraph from Hegel's "Foundations of the Philosophy of Law", similar to how the deployment of paragraphs 243,246 created Marxism.

[95] The main points of Lenin's theory of "imperialism as the highest stage of development of capitalism" and the fundamental principles of the concept of "autarchy of large spaces" (and more broadly, "economic nationalism") by Friedrich List are easily deduced from this position. It is curious that the German conservative revolutionaries drew practically the same conclusions from the development of List's theses as Lenin did from Hegel and Marx. In both cases, it was about a planetary anti-imperialist struggle for the "rights of peoples" against Anglo-Saxon thalassocratic colonialism. By the way, Karl Schmitt was the main theorist of "peoples' rights". The geopolitical application and development of this principle is characteristic of Haushofer. (HELL.)

Our analysis raises a new question and with it a new danger. The desire naturally suggests itself to pose the following problem: what is the actual challenge of history? And then there is a dangerous temptation to answer this question in the old way, adequate and correct in the previous era. People tend to cling to something that has proven to be true and effective. They categorically refuse to understand that on the part of humanity a new answer to a new question can only be a guess, and more often than not, as in the case of Columbus's travels, a blind guess. Man has an irresistible need to treat the last chronologically historical experience as something eternal. When we Germans invaded France in 1914, it seemed to us that events will henceforth develop as in 1870-71 until our decisive victory. When in 1870-71. the besieged French made a sortie from Paris, they were sure that everything would again go according to the scenario of the victorious revolution of 1792.When US Secretary of State Stimson in 1932 proclaimed his famous doctrine, the Stimson Doctrine, he believed that the situation as a whole resembled in an enlarged scale of 1861 and the beginning of the War of Independence.

A sense of history should protect us from such mistakes. Paradoxically, it is in those countries that have advanced further along the path of liberated technology that the opinion is widespread that from now on, with the help of technical means, a breakthrough into new endless spaces of space begins. Compared to this breakthrough into space, the five-hundred-year breakthrough of the era of great geographical and technical discoveries will seem an insignificant period of time. People are planning an attack on the stratosphere and flights to the moon. Our planet itself, the Earth, is gradually transforming into a spaceship floating in outer space.

This opinion seems to me to be a repetition of an old answer, a development of the answer that was given once to the challenge of the opened world Ocean. People see today's challenge as a massive repetition of the discovery of America. Psychologically, so to speak, this is understandable. Then new continents and oceans of the earth opened up. Today I do not see any opening of space, I do not hear any cosmic challenge. Let's not talk about flying saucers. Liberated technology can bite into space indefinitely and violently, and this will not result in a new historical challenge, and even less so as a response to such a challenge. Of course, liberated technique generates a monstrous impulse of power and the desire to overcome it. But this momentum is not the same as a challenge. It is true that modern technology gives rise to artificial needs all the time, but that only means

It is this ultra-modern development of the old answer that is historically unhistorical and anachronistic. However, it is quite natural that the victorious in the previous era completely ignores the new challenge of history. And how can a winner understand that his victory is a one-time truth? Who will teach him this? I came to the conclusion: it's already good if we refuse to give the old answer to the new question. It is already a lot if we comprehend the new world not according to the "new world" scheme that existed yesterday. Personally, I see a new challenge on the wrong side of the stratosphere. I notice that liberated technique limits people rather than opens up new spaces for them. Modern technology is necessary and useful. But today it is far from being the answer to any challenge. She only satisfies new ones, partly generated by herself, needs. As for the rest, it itself is being questioned today, which means that this is precisely why it cannot be the answer. Everyone says that modern technology has made our land ridiculously

small. New spaces, from where a new challenge will emerge, should therefore be on our earth, and not outside it in outer space. The one who is the first to succeed in enslaving the liberated technique is more likely to give an answer to the current challenge than the one who, with its help, will try to land on the Moon or Mars. The taming of liberated technique is a feat for the new Hercules. From this area I hear a new challenge, the challenge of the Present.

(translated from German by A.D.)

my daughter

LAND and SEA

contemplation of world history

one

Man is a terrestrial, terrestrial creature.
He stands on the ground, walks on the ground, he moves on its solid, unshakable surface. This is his self-standing and his soil; thanks to her, he acquires and has his own point of view; this determines his impressions and the very way of perceiving the world. Not only his outlook, but even the form of his gait and movements, his image and appearance, he acquires and retains as a being born and living on earth. Therefore, the celestial body on which he lives, he calls "Earth", although it is known that almost three quarters of the Earth's surface is water and only one quarter of the earth itself; however, even the largest land areas are just islands in the ocean of water. Ever since we know that the Earth is in the shape of a ball, we speak of the "Globe" as a matter of course. If you had to imagine a "sea ball" or "water ball"

All our existence on this side, joy and suffering, happiness and misfortune - is for us earthly life and, accordingly, heaven on earth and the earthly vale of sorrow. Thus, it is quite understandable that in the multitude of myths and legends in which peoples have preserved their most ancient experience and deepest memories, the Earth appears as the great mother of people. She is called the oldest of all deities. The sacred books tell us that man was taken from the earth and must again become the dust of the earth. The earth is his mother's womb, he himself is thus the son of the earth. In his neighbors, he sees earthly fellows, citizens of the Earth. Among the traditional four elements - Earth, Water, Fire and Air - the element of the Earth most of all determines a person and is predetermined for him. The thought of that of the four elements, some other than the earth can decisively shape human existence, at first glance looks like only a fantastic possibility. Man is not a fish or a bird, much less some kind of creature made of fire, even if we assume that such can exist.

Does it follow from what has been said that the essence of human existence and the very being of man is purely earthly, and all other elements are only additional elements of the second order? The matter is not so simple. The answer to the question of whether something other than the earth can constitute the hallmark of human presence in the world lies closer than we think. One has only to go to the seashore and look into the distance - and the grandiose sea surface along the entire horizon will capture your gaze. It is noteworthy that when a person stands on the shore, he naturally directs his gaze from the land side to the sea, and not vice versa, from the sea side to the land. In deep, often unconscious memories of people, water and sea are the secret root cause of everything. The myths and legends of most peoples contain memories not only of the land of those born, but also about the gods and people who came out of the sea. Everywhere is narrated about the sons and daughters of the seas and waters. Aphrodite, the goddess of feminine beauty, emerged from the foam of the waves of the sea. The sea gave birth to other creatures, and we will later get to know the “children of the sea” and the wild “captors of the sea”, which bear little resemblance to the enchanting picture of the foam of the born female beauty. You see here a completely different world, unlike the world of earthly firmament and land. Now you can understand why poets, natural philosophers and natural scientists seek the beginning of all life in water, and Goethe proclaims in solemn verses: little like a bewitching picture of the foam born of female beauty. You see here a completely different world, unlike the world of earthly firmament and land. Now you can understand why poets, natural philosophers and natural scientists seek the beginning of all life in water, and Goethe proclaims in solemn verses: little like a bewitching picture of the foam born of female beauty. You see here a completely different world, unlike the world of earthly firmament and land. Now you can understand why poets, natural philosophers and natural scientists seek the beginning of all life in water, and Goethe proclaims in solemn verses:

Everything arose out of water,
Everything is preserved by water,
Ocean, grant us
your eternal protection!

The Greek natural philosopher Thales of Miletus (c. 500 BC) is most often called the founder of the doctrine of the origin of all living things from the water element. But this view is both younger and older than Thales. It is eternal. In the last 19th century, the great German scientist Lorenz Oken taught about the origin of people and all living things from the sea. And in the genealogical charts constructed by Darwinian naturalists, fish and land animals go side by side and one after the other in a different sequence. The inhabitants of the sea appear here as the ancestors of humans. The most ancient and ancient history of mankind, most likely, confirms this hypothesis about the origin of life. Authoritative researchers have discovered that along with the "autochthonous", that is, those born on land, there are also "autotassic", that is, exclusively by the sea, determined by the peoples, never travelers on land and did not want to know anything about the solid land, which was the border of their purely marine existence. On the islands of the Pacific Ocean, among the Polynesian seafarers, Kanaks and Samoa, you can still find the last remains of this kind of fish-people. All their being, the world of ideas, language took shape under the decisive influence of the sea. All our ideas about space and time, formed in the conditions of a solid land surface, seemed to them as alien and incomprehensible as for us, the inhabitants of the land, the world of those purely sea people means a barely comprehensible other world. Kanaks and Samoa, the last remains of this kind of fish-people can still be found. All their being, the world of ideas, language took shape under the decisive influence of the sea. All our ideas about space and time, formed in the conditions of a solid land surface, seemed to them as alien and incomprehensible as for us, the inhabitants of the land, the world of those purely sea people means a barely comprehensible other world. Kanaks and Samoa, the last remains of this kind of fish-people can still be found. All their being, the world of ideas, language took shape under the decisive influence of the sea. All our ideas about space and time, formed in the conditions of a solid land surface, seemed to them as alien and incomprehensible as for us, the inhabitants of the land, the world of those purely sea people means a barely comprehensible other world.
In any case, the question arises: what is our element? Are we children of the earth or the sea? It is impossible to answer this question unambiguously. Prehistoric myths Natural science hypotheses of modern times and the results of a historical study of the era of the first written monuments leave both possibilities for an answer open.

2

The word "element" in any case requires a little additional explanation. Since the time of the aforementioned philosopher Thales, since the era of Ionian philosophy, that is, from about 500 BC, it is customary for European peoples to talk about the four elements or elements. Since then, this idea of the quaternary of elements - Earth, Water, Air and Fire - has remained alive and ineradicable to this day, despite all the scientific criticism. Modern natural science has abolished these four primordial elements; it distinguishes today more than ninety completely differently structured "elements" and understands by this word every source material, indissoluble and insoluble by the methods of today's chemistry. Thus, the elements studied today by natural science experimentally and theoretically, have only a common name with those four original primary elements. Not a single physicist or chemist will dare today to assert that any of the four primary elements is the only primary cause, the original material of the universe, as Thales of Miletus spoke about water, Heraclitus of Ephesus about fire, Anaximenes of Miletus about air, and Empedocles from Akragant taught about the connection of the elements, which he called "the roots of all things." The mere question of what exactly the words root cause, source material, roots of things mean here would lead us into a discussion and Empedocles of Acragant taught about the combination of the elements, which he called “the roots of all things”. The mere question of what exactly the words root cause, source material, roots of things mean here would lead us into a discussion and Empedocles of Acragant taught about the combination of the elements, which he called “the roots of all things”. The mere question of what exactly the words root cause, source material, roots of things mean here would lead us into a discussion
an immense amount of physical, natural science, metaphysical and epistemological problems. For the needs of our historical contemplation, we can still

confine ourselves to the idea of this quaternary of elements, or elements. For for us these elements are simple and descriptive names. These are generalizing meanings indicating various kinds of fundamental possibilities of human existence in the world. Therefore, we have the right to use them even today, especially when we are talking about domination by sea and domination by land, about sea and continental powers, meaning the elements of water and earth.

Thus, the "elements" of the Earth and the Sea, which are discussed below, cannot be thought of only as natural-scientific quantities. In this case, they would immediately disintegrate into chemical components, that is, they would turn into historical nothing. Variants of historical fulfillment predetermined by these elements, especially sea or terrestrial forms of existence, also do not unfold with a mechanical predestination. If a person were a living organism, without a trace reducible to the effects of the surrounding world, he would be either an animal, or a fish, or a bird, or fantastic mixtures of these elementary forms, in accordance with the influence of natural elements. Pure type samples corresponding to the four elements, especially purely marine or purely terrestrial people, would have very little in common with each other, they would oppose each other in complete isolation, moreover, this isolation would be the more hopeless, the less impurities the given type would contain. Confusion would give good or bad types and generate sympathy or enmity like chemical affinity or contrast. The existence and destiny of man would be determined by a purely natural order, as is the case in the case of an animal or a plant. One could only state that some devour others, while the rest peacefully coexist in biological symbiosis. There would be no human history as a human act and human decision. as is the case with an animal or a plant. One could only state that some devour others, while the rest peacefully coexist in biological symbiosis. There would be no human history as a human act and human decision. as is the case with an animal or a plant. One could only state that some devour others, while the rest peacefully coexist in biological symbiosis. There would be no human history as a human act and human decision.

We know, however, that the human being is not reducible to a purely natural order. He has the gift of mastering his own being and consciousness in the process of historical accomplishment. He knows not only birth, but also the possibility of spiritual rebirth. In trouble and danger, when an animal and a plant helplessly die, he is able to be reborn to a new life through intellectual effort, volitional decision, confident analysis of the situation and inference. He has free space for his power and his historical power. He is given a choice, and at certain moments in history he is able to choose the element to which he adheres through his own deed and his own efforts, as to a new form of his historical existence, and in which he settles. In this sense, he learned well, as the poet says, "the freedom to choose the path,

3

World history is the history of the struggle of continental powers against sea powers and sea powers against continental powers. Admiral Castex, a French military scientist, prefaced his strategy book with a general heading: Sea against Earth, la Mer contie la Terre. Thus, he is in line with a long tradition.

The initial antagonism of land and sea was noticed for a long time, and even at the end of the 19th century, the then existing tension in relations between Russia and England was loved to be portrayed as a battle between a bear and a whale. The whale here stands for a huge mythical fish, Leviathan, about which we will hear something else, while the bear means one of the many representatives of land animals. According to the medieval interpretations of the so-called Kabbalists, world history is nothing more than a struggle between a powerful whale, Leviathan, and the equally powerful land animal Behemoth, which was imagined in the form of a bull or an elephant. Both names - Leviathan and Behemoth - are borrowed from the book of Job (chapters 40 and 41). So, Kabbalists claim that

The Hippopotamus tries to tear the Leviathan with its horns and teeth, while the Leviathan tries to clamp the mouth and nose of the Hippopotamus with its fins so that it cannot eat and breathe. This is the most graphic, which only the myth allows, depicting the blockade of a continental power by a naval power, which closes all naval approaches to land in order to cause famine. This is how the two belligerent powers kill each other. However, the Jews, - say the Kabbalists further, - then celebrate a thousand-year “feast Leviathan ”, which is described in the famous poem by Heinrich Heine. In order to give a historical interpretation of this feast of Leviathan, the Kabbalist Isaac Abravanel is most often quoted. He lived from 1437 to 1508. at the time of great discoveries, he was the treasurer first to the king of Portugal, then to the king of Castile and died a respected man in Venice in 1508. Thus, he knew the white light and all the riches of the world and knew what he was talking about.

Let us cast a cursory glance at some events in world history from the point of view of this struggle between land and sea.

The world of Greek antiquity arose from the travels and wars of the seafaring peoples, "it was not for nothing that the sea god fed them." The dominant maritime power on the island of Crete drove the Persians out of the eastern Mediterranean and created a culture, all the inexplicable charm of which was revealed to us during the excavations of Knossos. A millennium later, in the naval battle of Salamis (480 BC), the free city of Athens defended itself from its enemy - "the Persians who rule all" - behind wooden walls, that is, on ships, and was saved thanks to this naval battle. His own reign was defeated in the Peloponnesian War by continental Sparta; the latter, however, precisely because of its continental character, was unable to unite the cities of Hellas and lead the Greek empire. Rome, on the contrary, which was from the very beginning an Italian peasant republic and a purely continental state, turned into a real empire in the process of fighting the maritime and commercial domination of Carthage. The history of Rome, as a whole, and especially during this period of the long struggle between Rome and Carthage, was often compared with other historical situations and cataclysms. Such comparisons and parallels can be instructive, but they often lead to strange contradictions. For example, parallels to the worldwide English empire are found now in Rome, now in Carthage. Comparisons of this kind are in most cases a double-edged sword that can be taken and turned on either side. Vandals, Saracens, Vikings and Normans snatched sea domination from the hands of the fading Roman Empire. After many unsuccessful attempts, the Arabs conquered Carthage (698 BC).) and founded the new capital Tunisia. Thus began their centuries-old domination over the western Mediterranean. The Eastern Roman Byzantine Empire, ruling from Constantinople, was a coastal empire. At her disposal was a strong fleet and a mysterious weapon of war - the so-called Greek fire. However, all this served exclusively for defensive purposes. In any case, in its capacity as a naval power, it could do something that the empire of Charlemagne could not afford - a purely all this served purely defensive purposes. In any case, in its capacity as a naval power, it could do something that the empire of Charlemagne could not afford - a purely all this served purely defensive purposes. In any case, in its capacity as a naval power, it could do something that the empire of Charlemagne could not afford - a purely

continental; Byzantium was a real “restraining”, “catechon”, despite its weakness, it “held” Islam for many centuries, thereby preventing the possibility of the conquest of Italy by the Arabs. Otherwise, the same thing would have happened to Italy as happened then to North Africa - the ancient Christian culture would have been destroyed, and Italy would have been swallowed up by the world of Islam. In the Christian-European area, a new maritime power subsequently emerged, which rose thanks to the crusades: Venice.

Thus, a new mythical name invades world history. For almost half a millennium, the Republic of Venice has been considered a symbol of maritime domination and wealth that has grown from maritime trade. She achieved brilliant results in the field of big politics, she was called “the most outlandish creature in the history of economics.

of all times ”. Everything that prompted fanatical Anglomaniacs to admire England in the 18th and 20th centuries was already the reason for their admiration for Venice: enormous wealth; an advantage in diplomatic skill, with the help of which a naval power is able to cause complications in the relations of continental powers and to wage their wars with someone else's hands; an aristocratic basic law that gave the appearance of a solution to the problem of the internal political order; tolerance for religious and philosophical views; a refuge for freedom-loving ideas and political emigration. It also includes the enchanting splendor of sumptuous feasts and the beauty of the fine arts. One of these festivals especially captured the human imagination and contributed to the glorification of Venice in the world - this was the legendary “Betrothal to the Sea,” the so-called sposalizio del mare.
Every year, on the day of the Ascension of the Lord, the Doge of the Republic of Venice went to the open sea on a luxurious state ship, and threw a ring into the waves as a sign of union with the sea. The Venetians themselves, their neighbors, as well as the peoples who lived far from Venice, saw in this a convincing symbol through which the power born of the sea and the wealth born of the sea acquired a mythical consecration. However, we will still have the opportunity to be convinced of how things really were with this beautiful symbol when we see it again in its original light.
This fabulous queen of the sea shone brighter and brighter from 1000 to 1500. In 1000, the then emperor of Byzantium, Nicephorus Phocas, could, with some reason, assert about himself: "Until now, you were in a marriage union with the sea, from now on it belongs to me." Between these two dates lies the era of Venetian maritime rule over the Adriatic, the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean. In this era, a legend arose that attracted an endless number of travelers and famous romantics of all European nations, poets and people of art, such as Byron, Musset, Richard Wagner, Barré, to Venice in the 19th and 20th centuries. Nobody can
avoid the glamor of this legend, and least of all would like to temper the radiance of its glory. But if we ask if we are dealing here with a case of a purely marine existence and a genuine choice in favor of the sea element, then we will immediately see how constrained the sea power is, limited by the Adriatic and the Mediterranean basin, when one day the vast expanses of the world's oceans open up.

four

The German philosopher of geography Ernst Kasch, whose mind was entirely dominated by the vast world of Hegel's ideas, classified empires according to the factor of water in his Comparative Geography (1845). He distinguishes three stages of development, three acts of the great drama. For him, world history begins with the "Potanic" time, that is, with the culture of the river floodplains of the Near and Middle East in the Euphrates and Tigris two rivers and on the Nile River, in the Assyrian, Babylonian and Egyptian kingdoms of the East. This is followed by the so-called thalassic period of the culture of the inland seas and the Mediterranean basin, to which the Greek and Roman antiquities and the Mediterranean Middle Ages belong. With the discovery of America and the beginning of voyages around the world, the last and highest stage begins, the era of oceanic culture, the carriers of which are the Germanic peoples. To clarify the essence of the matter, we, however, will use a three-part scheme that distinguishes between a river, an inland sea and an ocean. Then we will see more clearly why the maritime domination of Venice remained entirely at the second, thalassic stage.

It is a holiday like the aforementioned “Betrothal to the Sea” that makes this difference clear. Such symbolic actions of connection with the sea are also found among other peoples dependent on the sea. For example, the Indian tribes of Central America, engaged in fishing and navigation, brought sacrifices to the deities of the sea.

in the form of rings and other jewelry, in the form of animals and even people. I, however, do not think that the same rituals were practiced by the real “captors of the sea”. It does not follow that they were less prone to piety or less needy to conjure divine powers. But they did not think about the ceremony of betrothal or marriage to the sea precisely because they were real children of the sea. They felt identical to the elements of the sea. The same symbolic betrothal or marriages show, on the contrary, that the sacrificer and the sacrificed deity are different, even opposite, beings. With the help of such a sacrifice, a hostile element should be appeased. In the case of Venice, the ceremony makes it clear that the meaning of the symbolic act is not a product of the primordial maritime existence; to a much greater extent, there is a distinct style of holiday symbols created by the highly developed coastal and lagoon culture. Ordinary navigation and a culture based on the use of an advantageous seaside location are still something different than the transfer of all historical being from land to sea, the choice of the sea as an element of existence. The domination of Venice in the coastal zone begins in the year 100 with a sea voyage to Dolmatia. Venetian domination over the hinterland, for example over Croatia and Hungary, has always been problematic, just as naval domination over land can be. And in the field of shipbuilding technology, the Republic of Venice did not leave the Mediterranean and the Middle Ages until its decline in 1797. Like the peoples of the Mediterranean, Venice knew only a rowing ship, a galley. Shipping on large monuments came to the Mediterranean from the Atlantic Ocean. The Venetian fleet was and remains a fleet of large galleys driven by rowing power. The sail was used only as an additional element in case of a favorable tailwind, as it was already in ancient times. A particular navigational achievement was the improvement of the compass to its modern form. Thanks to the compass, “the ship has acquired something reasonable, by virtue of which a person enters into communication and becomes related to the vehicle” (Kapp). Only now can the most remote areas of land on all oceans come into contact, so that the earth's circle opens up. But the modern compass, the appearance of which in the Mediterranean was earlier attributed most often to 1302 and to the Italian sea city of Amalfi, in any case was not invented in Venice.

As I said, and I repeat again, we do not want to diminish the radiance and glory of Venice. But we must understand the meaning of what is happening when the people, in the totality of their entire historical existence, makes a choice in favor of the sea as an alien element to themselves. The way of waging naval battles of that time most clearly demonstrates what is being discussed here, and how little can we talk about the elementary transfer of all human existence from land to sea in the then Mediterranean. In an ancient naval battle, rowing ships attack each other and try to ram and board each other. Therefore, naval combat is always close combat. "The ships grab each other like a pair of struggling men." In the battle of Milah, the Romans first took enemy ships on board, throwing the flooring from the boards and thus erecting a bridge, through which they could enter an enemy ship. The sea battle thus turned into a land battle on ships. On the ship's boards, they were cut with swords as if on a stage. This is how the famous naval battles of antiquity were played out. In a similar way, although with the help of more primitive hand weapons, the Malay and Indian tribes fought their naval battles.
The last major naval battle of this kind was at the same time the last glorious feat of Venetian history - it was the naval battle at Lepanto (1571). Here the Spanish-Venetian fleet met with the Turkish and won the most convincing victory at sea ever won by Christians over Muslims. Battle

took place in the same place, at Actium, where, shortly before the beginning of our era (30 BC), the flotilla of the East and West, Antony and Octavian, entered the battle. The naval battle of Lepanto was fought basically with the same naval-technical means as the battle of Actium one and a half millennia ago. In close combat on the ship's boards, selected foot units of the Spaniards, the famous third, fought with the Janissaries, the elite troops of the Ottoman Empire.
The change in the way of waging war at sea took place only a few years after the Battle of Lepanto, precisely during the defeat of the Spanish armada in the English Channel. The small sailing ships of the British showed their advantage over the large ships of the Spanish fleet. However, the leaders in the field of shipbuilding technology were not the British at that time, but the Dutch. During the period from 1450 to 1600, the Dutch invented more new types of ships than all other peoples. The mere discovery of new parts of the world and oceans was not enough to lay the foundations for dominance in the world's oceans and ensure the choice of the sea as the element of existence.

five

Not noble does on pompous ships, but wild adventurers and “froths of the sea”, brave whale hunters plying the oceans and brave sailing ship drivers are the first heroes of a new marine existence. In the two most important areas - whaling and shipbuilding - the Dutch were at first far ahead of everyone else.

Here I must first give praise to the whale and the whale hunter. It is impossible to talk about the great history of the sea and about man's choice in favor of the sea element without mentioning the fabulous Leviathan and his equally wonderful pursuit. Of course, this is a huge topic. My feeble praise reaches neither the whale nor the hunter. How can I take the liberty of telling the two wonders of the sea in an appropriate way - oh the most powerful of all living beasts and the most courageous of all hunters of humanity?
I dare to do so only because I can rely on the authority of two great heralds and heralds of both these maritime wonders - the significant French historian Jules Michelet and the great American writer Herman Melville. In 1861, the Frenchman published a book about the sea - a hymn to the beauty of the sea and the world of its undiscovered wonders, to the riches of the seabed of all continents, which had not yet been seized and used by the "fierce king of this world", man. Melville is to the world's oceans what Homer is to the eastern Mediterranean. In the exciting story "Moby Dick" (1851), he described the story of the great whale, Moby Dick, and the captain Ahab hunting for him, thus creating the greatest epic of the oceanic element. I am certainly aware that, when on occasion I use here instead of the word "whale" the phrase "fish-whale" and instead of "hunter of a whale" sometimes say "hunter of whale fish", it will be considered an amateurish and imprecise word usage. They will start teaching me about the zoological nature of the whale, which, as any schoolchild knows, is a mammal, but not a fish. Already in the "System of Nature" published in 1776 by old Linnaeus, one could read that the whale fish is warm-blooded, breathes with lungs, and not with gills, like an ordinary fish; that the female whale gives birth to an already highly developed living cub and for almost a whole year lovingly takes care of him and feeds him with her milk. I in no way want to argue with scientists-specialists in the vast science of whales, with cetologists, but I just want to briefly, without any discussion, explain why I do not completely reject the old name "whale fish". It goes without saying that a whale is not a fish like pike or herring. Nevertheless, calling this strange monster a fish, I lay bare all the absurdity of the fact that such a warm-blooded giant is devoted to the elements of the sea, although he is not predisposed to this by his

physiological structure. Just imagine for a moment the opposite case: a huge creature breathing with gills is running on land! The largest, strongest and most powerful marine animal plows the world's oceans from the north to the south poles, breathes with its lungs and, being a mammal, gives birth to live babies in this sea world! It is also not an amphibian, but it is a real mammal, and yet at the same time a fish in its habitat. In the period we are considering, namely from the 16th to the 19th century, the hunters for this huge fish were true Hunters with a capital letter, and not just some banal “whalers” or “whalers”. This is not indifferent for our topic.

The French whale eulogy Michelet, in his book on the sea, describes the love and family life of whales with particular insight. The male whale is an agile lover of the female whale, the most tender husband, the most caring father. He is the most humane of all living beings, he is more humane than a man who exterminates whales with barbaric cruelty. But how innocent the fishing methods were in those days, in 1861, when Michelet wrote about it! However, even then the steamers and guns violated the equality of whale and man and reduced the poor whale to a convenient target for shooting. And what would the humane friend of people and animal lover Michelet say when he sees today's industrial production of whale oil and the sale of whale carcasses! For what today, after the World War of 1914-1918, was formed and is increasingly being improved under the name of "pelagic", deep fishing, it is no longer possible to call it not only hunting, but even fishing. Today, huge ships with a displacement of up to 30,000 tons are sent to the South Pole of the Earth in the Polar Sea,
equipped with electrical appliances, cannons, mines, aircraft and
radio equipment, like floating food pans. The whale has disappeared there, and there the dead animal is processed industrially right on the ship. So poor Leviathan would soon disappear from our planet. In 1937-1938. In London, an international agreement was finally reached, which defines the well-known rules for whaling, establishes fishing areas, provides other conditions in order to protect at least the surviving whales from further unscheduled extermination.

The whale hunters in question were, on the contrary, true hunters, not trivial catchers, and certainly did not kill whales by mechanical means. They chased their prey from the waters of the North Sea or from the Atlantic coast on sailing ships and rowing ships across the vast expanses of the world's oceans, and the weapon with which they entered the battle with the mighty and cunning sea giant was a harpoon thrown by a human hand. It was a life-threatening battle between two living creatures, and both of them, not being fish in the zoological sense, moved in the elements of the sea. All the means at hand that a person used in this struggle were then still driven by the muscular power of the person himself: a sail, an oar and a harpoon, a deadly throwing spear. The whale was strong enough to to smash the ship and the boat to pieces with one blow of its tail. He could oppose human cunning with a thousand of his own tricks. Herman Melville, who himself served as a sailor on a whaling ship for many years, describes in his "Moby Dick" how between a hunter and his victim, one might say, a personal bond and an intimate relationship of friendship-enmity. Here, a person is increasingly immersed in the spontaneous abyss of sea existence, thanks to the struggle with other inhabitants of the sea. These whale hunters sailed from north to south of the globe and from the Atlantic to the Pacific. All the while following the mysterious paths of the whale, they discovered islands and continents without making a big fuss out of it. Melville has one of these navigators, having become acquainted with the book of the pioneer of Australia, Captain Cook, says the following words: this Cook writes books about things, which a whale hunter would not even enter in his logbook. Michelet asks: Who showed people the ocean? Who opened

oceanic zones and straits? In a word: Who discovered the globe? The whale and the whale hunter! And all this regardless of Columbus and the famous gold diggers, who are looking with great hype for what has already been found by the noble fishermen of the North, from Brittany and from the Basque country. Michelet says this and goes on: These whale hunters are the greatest manifestation of the human spirit. Without a whale, anglers would always be only on the coast. The whale fish lured them into the oceans and granted them independence from the coast. Thanks to the whale, sea currents were opened and a passage to the North was found. Keith led us.
Then, in the 16th century, on our planet, two different types of hunters were simultaneously at the mercy of the awakening of the elements. On the ground, those were Russian hunters for fur-bearing animals, who, following the fur-bearing animals, conquered Siberia and went overland to the East Asian coast; at sea, North and West European whale hunters who hunted all the world's oceans and, as Michelet rightly points out, made the globe visible. They are the first-borns of a new, spontaneous existence, the first real “children of the sea”.

6

This change of eras marks the most important event in the field of technology. And here the Dutch are ahead of everyone. In 1600, they were the undisputed master of shipbuilding. They invented new sailing techniques and new types of sailing ships that abolished oars and opened up possibilities for navigation and navigation, corresponding to the size of the world's newly discovered oceans.
Around 1595, a new type of ship appears in North Holland from the West Frisian city of Hoorn. It was a boat with straight sails, sailing not only with a fair wind, like an old sailboat, but also to the side of the wind, which knew how to use the wind in a very different way than previous ships. Ship tackles and the art of sailing are now being improved to an unprecedented degree. “The shipping of the Middle Ages ends in a disastrous way,” says Bernhard Hageborn, a historian of the development of ship types, about this event. This is a true turning point in the history of the relationship between the Earth and the Sea. This achieved everything that the material from which the ship and the rigging were made then allowed to achieve. A new turn in the technique of shipbuilding came only in the 19th century. “Like a revelation,” says Hageborn, - it must have seemed to the sailors the moment when one day they left a large sail and saw how rich opportunities a small sail opens before them. " Thanks to this technical achievement, the Dutch became the "cabbies" of all European countries. They also inherited the trade of the German Hansa. Even the world power Spain was forced to charter Dutch ships to support its transatlantic transport.

In the 16th century, in addition, a new warship appears, and this opens a new era of naval military strategy. Equipped with guns, the sailboat is fired from the sides with volleys of the enemy. Thus, a naval battle becomes an artillery battle from a long distance, requiring great skill in sailing a sailboat. Only now can we really talk about a naval battle, for the battle of the crews of rowing galleys, as we have seen, is only a land battle on a ship. Associated with this is a completely new tactics of naval combat and warfare at sea, a new art of "evolutions" necessary before, during and after a naval battle. The first scientific, in a modern sense, book about this new art was published in Lyon in 1697 under the title “L'art des armecs navales ou trait des evolutions navales”; its author was a French Jesuit priest Paul Ost. It provides a critical overview of the naval battles and naval maneuvers of the Dutch, British and French during the war of Louis 14 with the Dutch. Subsequently, other French

research this issue. Only in the 18th century, in 1782, an Englishman, represented by Clerk d'Heldine, was included in a number of famous theorists of naval tactics.

All Western and Central European peoples have contributed to the common achievement of discovering a new land and resulting in worldwide European hegemony. The Italians improved the compass and created navigational maps; the discovery of America took place primarily thanks to the power of knowledge and the mind of Toscanelli and Columbus. The Portuguese and Spaniards equipped the first great exploration expeditions and sailed around the world. Great German astronomers and remarkable geographers contributed to the formation of a new picture of the world; the name “America” was invented in 1507 by the German cosmographer Waltzemüller, and the enterprise of foreigners in Venezuela was a great colonial start, which, however, could not cope with the Spanish resistance. The Dutch were leading whaling and shipbuilding techniques. France had especially wide opportunities both because of its geographical position on three coasts - the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the English Channel - and because of its economic potential and because of the penchant for navigation of the population of its Atlantic coast. The French Viking Jean Fleury in 1522 dealt the first tangible blow to Spanish world hegemony and captured two jeweled ships that Cortez sent from America to Spain; French discoverer Jean Cartier already in 1540 discovered Canada, the “new France” and took possession of it for his king. A particularly important part in the awakening of the sea energies of that era were the Huguenot corsairs, natives of La Rochelle. France for many decades surpassed England in the field of military construction of sailing ships in the 17th century,

The achievements of the British in shipping are, of course, also very significant. But English sailors began to sail south of the equator only after 1570. Only in the last third of the 16th century did the great awakening of the English corsairs to sail overseas and to America begin.

7

All kinds of "captors of the sea", pirates, corsairs, adventurers engaged in sea trade, along with whale hunters and sailing ship drivers, constitute the shock column of that spontaneous turn to the sea, which was carried out during the 16-17 centuries. Here we have the next brave kind of "children of the sea". Among them are famous names, heroes of sea stories and tales of robbers, such as Franz Drake, Heckwins, Sir Walter Rally or Sir Henry Morgan, glorified in many books; the fate of each of them was indeed quite rich in adventure. They took over the Spanish fleets of silver, and this one topic in itself is already quite intriguing. There is an extensive literature about pirates in general and about many great names in particular, and even a dictionary about them has been compiled in English under the funny title “The Pirate`s Who's Who”.

Whole categories of these brave sea robbers have indeed gained fame in history, for they struck the first blows at the Spanish hegemony throughout the world and at the Spanish monopoly in trade. Thus, the Huguenot pirates in the French naval fortress of La Rochelle, along with the Dutch sea guez, fought against Spain during the time of Queen Elizabeth. Then they were the so-called Elizabethan corsairs, who made a significant contribution to the defeat of the Spanish armada (1588). The corsairs of Queen Elizabeth were followed by those of King James I, among them was Sir Henry Mainvering, first one of the most notorious sea robbers, then pardoned by the king in 1616 and, finally, the winner of pirates, awarded with positions and honors. Next are filibusters and wild pirates, who set off on their distant voyages from

Jamaica and from the waters of the Caribbean, the French, Dutch and English, among them Sir Henry Morgan, who sacked Panama in 1671, was knighted by King Charles II and became the royal governor of Jamaica. Their last feat was the conquest of the Spanish naval fortress of Cartagena in Colombia, which they, together with the French Royal Navy, took by assault in 1697 and sacked in a horrific manner after the departure of the French.

In this kind of "captors of the sea" the sea element is manifested. Their heroic era lasted approximately 150 years, from about 1550 to 1713, that is, from the time the Protestant states began to struggle against the world domination of Catholic Spain and until the conclusion of the Utrecht Peace. Sea robbers have existed at all times and on all seas and oceans, starting with the pirates mentioned above, expelled by the Cretan state from the eastern Mediterranean many millennia ago, and up to the Chinese Junks, who captured and robbed merchant ships in East Asian waters back in 1920-1930 ... But the corsairs of the 16th and 17th centuries still occupy a special place in the history of piracy. Their time ended only with the conclusion of the Utrecht Peace Treaty (1713), since then the system of European states was consolidated. The naval fleets of the naval powers could now exercise effective control, and the new world hegemony of England erected at sea for the first time became apparent. Nevertheless, even before the 19th century, there were corsairs who fought privately, with the permission of their governments. But the organization of the world progressed, the technique of shipbuilding and navigation improved, became more and more knowledge-intensive, and piracy is still, as one English expert in naval affairs put it, "the pre-scientific stage of naval wars." Having ceased to rely on his own fist and his own calculations, the pirate has now turned into a pitiful criminal. Of course, there have always been some exceptions. These include the French captain Misson, who in 1720 tried to create an outlandish kingdom of humanity in Madagascar. However, in general, after the Utrecht Peace, the pirate was pushed to the sidelines of world history. In the 18th century, he is just a dissolute subject, a rude criminal type, who can still serve as a character in fascinating stories, like Stevenson's "Mysterious Island", but no longer plays any role in history.

On the contrary, corsairs of the 16th and 17th centuries play a very significant role in history. In the worldwide confrontation between England and Spain, they are active warriors. They were considered real criminals by their enemies, the Spaniards; they were hung up when they were caught. Likewise, their own government cold-bloodedly sacrificed them when they became uncomfortable or when it was dictated by considerations of a foreign policy order. Often it was only chance that decided whether such a corsair would end his life as a royal nobleman, a high-ranking dignitary, or a pirate sentenced to be hanged. In addition, various names, such as pirate, corsair, Privateer, Merchant-Adventurer, are difficult to distinguish in practice and are used one instead of the other. In the proper sense of the word, from a legal point of view, there is a big difference between a pirate and a corsair. For, unlike a pirate, The corsair has a document confirming his rights, the powers of his government, an official letter of privateer from his king. He has the right to fly the flag of his country. The pirate, on the other hand, swims without any legal reason. Only a black pirate banner suits him. But no matter how clear and clear this distinction may seem in theory, in practice it is easily erased. Corsairs often overstepped their rights and sailed with fake letters of marque, and sometimes with letters of attorney from non-existent governments. Something else is more essential than all these legal issues. All these Rochellois, sea gueuze and filibusters, had a political enemy, namely Spain, the great Catholic power. As long as they stay on their own for the most part they thoroughly rob only the ships of the Catholics and, with a clear conscience, regard this as a God-pleasing deed blessed by the Lord. Thus, they enter a huge

the world historical front, to the front of the struggle of the then world Protestantism against the then world Catholicism. The fact that they kill, rob and plunder, therefore, needs no justification. In the general context of this pivotal era, they in any case occupy a definite position and, thus, acquire their historical significance and their place in history.

eight

English kings - both Queen Elizabeth and Stuart James and Charles - and the English statesmen of this time did not have any other historical consciousness of their era, compared to most of their contemporaries. They pursued their policies, took advantage of the advantages provided, made profits and sought to hold any position. They used the right, if it was on their side, and indignantly protested against injustice and lawlessness, if the right was on the side of their opponents. All this is completely natural. Their ideas about God and the world, about justice and legality, their awareness of the historical development that had come into motion were - with such ingenious exceptions as Thomas More,

Queen Elizabeth is deservedly considered the great founder of English naval domination. She entered the struggle against the world hegemony of Catholic Spain. During her reign, the Spanish armada was defeated in the English Channel (1588); she inspired and honored heroes of the sea such as Francis Drake and Walter Rally; from her hands in 1600 the English East India Trade Campaign received trade privileges, which subsequently conquered all of India under British rule. During 45 years of her reign (1558-1603) England became a wealthy country, which it was not before. Earlier the British were engaged in sheep breeding and sold wool to Flanders; now fabulous trophies of English pirates and corsairs rushed from all seas to the English islands. The queen rejoiced at these treasures - they replenished her wealth. In this respect, all the time she was a girl, she did the same thing that did the many English nobles and bourgeoisie of her era. All of them were involved in a large mining business. Hundreds of thousands of British and British women then became "corsair capitalists", corsairs capitalists. This also applies to that spontaneous turn from land to sea, which we are talking about here.

The Killigrew family of Cornwell provides us with a perfect example of this flourishing of early pirate-booty capitalism. His views and way of life give us a picture of the dominant estates at that time and the real "elite" much more vital and accurate than many official acts and official documents conditioned by the era. These Killigrews are typical of their time in a completely different sense than most diplomats, lawyers and poets crowned with fame, and in any case, it should be noted that among the representatives of this family there are prominent intellectuals, and the Killigrew surname is still presented more than ten times in the bibliographic national lexicon of England. Let's spend some time in this society of the elite.

The Killigrew family lived in Arwenack in Cornwall, South East England. The head of the family during the time of Queen Elizabeth was Ser John Killigrew, Vice Admiral of Cornwall and hereditary royal steward of Pendennis Castle. He worked closely with William Cecil, Lord Burleigh, the Queen's first minister. Already the father and uncle of the vice admiral and the manager were pirates, and even against his mother, as the English chroniclers reliably tell us, a criminal case was opened on charges of piracy. One part of the family worked on the shores of England, the other in

Ireland. Numerous cousins and other relatives on the shores of Devon and Dorset. To this is to add friends and drinking companions of all kinds. They organized attacks and predatory raids, ambushed ships approaching their shore, watched over the division of booty, and traded in profit shares, posts and positions. The large house in which the Killigrew family lived in Arwenac stood in close proximity to the sea in a deserted part of Falmouth port and had a secret passage to the sea. The only building located nearby was the aforementioned Pendennis Castle, the residence of the royal steward. The castle was equipped with hundreds of cannons and served as a refuge for pirates in case of emergency. By the time the noble Lady Killigrew became a hardworking and skillful assistant to her husband, she was already helping her father, brilliant “gentleman pirate”. She provided shelter for pirates in her house and was a hospitable hostess. In all local ports, shelters and lodging sites were provided.

The royal authorities rarely harassed the Killigrew family, or even more so, hindered her in her pursuits. Only once, in 1582, did it come to such an intervention, which I would like to briefly describe. A Hanseatic ship with a displacement of 144 tons, owned by two Spaniards, was carried by a storm to the port of Falmouth. Since England at that moment was not at war with Spain, the Spaniards fearlessly anchored, and just opposite the house in Arvenac. Lady Killigrew saw the ship from her window, and her trained eye saw at once that the ship was laden with precious Dutch cloth. On the night of January 7, 1852, Killigrew's armed men, led by a noble lady, attacked the unfortunate ship, killed the crew, threw the corpses into the sea, returned to Arvenak with valuable Dutch cloth and other booty. The ship itself is unclear how it ended up in Ireland. Both Spaniards the owners of the ship, fortunately, were not on the boat during the battle, as they spent the night in a small hotel on the shore. They filed a lawsuit in the local English court in Cornwell. After some research, the court concluded that the ship was probably stolen by unknown criminals, while other circumstances of the case could not be investigated. But since the Spaniards had connections among politicians, they managed to transfer the case to a higher authority in London, so a second preliminary investigation was ordered. Lady Killigrew, along with her assistants, was brought to trial in another area. She was found guilty and sentenced to death. Two of her accomplices were executed, the lady herself was pardoned at the last moment. They filed a lawsuit in the local English court in Cornwell. After some research, the court concluded that the ship was probably stolen by unknown criminals, while other circumstances of the case could not be investigated. But since the Spaniards had connections among politicians, they managed to transfer the case to a higher authority in London, so a second preliminary investigation was ordered. Lady Killigrew, along with her assistants, was brought to trial in another area. She was found guilty and sentenced to death. Two of her accomplices were executed, the lady herself was pardoned at the last moment. They filed a lawsuit in the local English court in Cornwell. After some research, the court concluded that the ship was probably stolen by unknown criminals, while other circumstances of the case could not be investigated. But since the Spaniards had connections among politicians, they managed to transfer the case to a higher authority in London, so a second preliminary investigation was ordered. Lady Killigrew, along with her assistants, was brought to trial in another area. She was found guilty and sentenced to death. Two of her accomplices were executed, the lady herself was pardoned at the last moment. But since the Spaniards had connections among politicians, they managed to transfer the case to a higher authority in London, so a second preliminary investigation was ordered. Lady Killigrew, along with her assistants, was brought to trial in another area. She was found guilty and sentenced to death. Two of her accomplices were executed, the lady herself was pardoned at the last moment. But since the Spaniards had connections among politicians, they managed to transfer the case to a higher authority in London, so a second preliminary investigation was ordered. Lady Killigrew, along with her assistants, was brought to trial in another area. She was found guilty and sentenced to death. Two of her accomplices were executed, the lady herself was pardoned at the last moment.

This is the true story of Lady Killigrew. Even in the fourteenth year of Queen Elizabeth's reign, most of the tonnage of the English fleet was involved in robbery or illegal trade, and the total displacement of ships that were in legal trade enterprises amounted to hardly more than 50,000 tons. The Killigrew family is a perfect example

of the patriotic front of the great era of sea robbers, in which an old English prophecy of the 13th century came true: "Lion cubs will turn into sea fish." So, lion cubs at the end of the Middle Ages bred mainly sheep, from whose wool they got cloth in Flanders. Only in the 16th and 17th centuries did this people of sheep breeders really turn into a people of “captors of the sea” and corsairs, “children of the sea”.

nine

The British are comparatively late in achieving success in ocean voyages. The Portuguese began sailing a hundred years earlier, but they sailed mainly along the coast. Since 1492, the Spaniards begin the great Conquest, the conquest of America. They were quickly followed by French sailors, Huguenots and the British. But only in 1553, with the founding of the Muscovy Company, England began to pursue a transatlantic policy, with the help of which it succeeded in several

crowd out other great colonial powers. As mentioned above, it was only after 1570 that the British began to swim south of the equator. Almost the first evidence that England is beginning to acquire a new English world outlook is Hacklate's book Principles of Navigation; it came out in 1589. In whale fishing and shipbuilding, the teachers of the British, as well as of other peoples, were also the Dutch.

Nevertheless, it was the British who were the ones who in the end outstripped everyone, defeated all rivals and achieved world domination over the oceans. England became the heiress. She became the heir to the great hunters and sailboat drivers, explorers and discoverers of all other peoples of Europe. British rule over land through the sea absorbed all the brave exploits and achievements in navigation, committed by German, Dutch, Norwegian and Danish sailors. True, the great colonial empires of other European peoples continued to exist in the future. Portugal and Spain retained vast possessions overseas, but lost their maritime dominance and control over sea communications. With the landing and consolidation of Cromwell's troops in Jamaica in 1655, the general political world-oceanic orientation of England and the overseas victory over Spain were resolved. Holland, which reached the heyday of its sea power around 1600, a hundred years later, in 1700, became more of a land, continental country. She had to build strong field fortifications and defend against Louis XIV on land; its governor, William III of Orange, in 1689 becomes the king of England at the same time; he moved to the islands and was now pursuing not a Dutch proper, but an English policy. France could not stand that great exodus to the sea, which was associated with Huguenot Protestantism. She still belonged to the Roman spiritual tradition, and when, with the conversion of Henry IV to Catholicism and thanks to the St. Bartholomew's Night in 1572, the case was decided in favor of Catholicism, thus, in the end, the final choice was made not in favor of the sea, but in favor of land and land. True, France possessed a very large fleet and could, as we have seen, cope with England even under Louis XV. But after the French king dismissed his distinguished minister of trade and naval forces, Colbert, in 1672, it was no longer possible to reverse the choice in favor of land. The long colonial wars of the 18th century only confirmed this. Meanwhile, Germany lost all its power and strength in the wars of religion and because of the political failures of the then empire. Thus England became the heir, the universal heir to the great awakening of the European peoples. How could this be possible? This cannot be explained with the help of well-known analogies with previous historical examples of maritime domination, and nothing is given by parallels with Athens or Carthage, Rome, Byzantium or Venice. Here we have a case that is unique by its very nature. Its originality, its incomparability lies in the fact that England carried out the transformation of the elements at a completely different moment in history, in a completely different way than the previous maritime powers. She really separated herself from the earth and founded her existence in the element of the sea. Thanks to this, she won not only many naval battles and wars, but gained the upper hand in something completely different and infinitely greater - in a revolution, namely, in a unique revolution, in a planetary revolution. Here we have a case that is unique by its very nature. Its originality, its incomparability lies in the fact that England carried out the transformation of the elements at a completely different moment in history, in a completely different way than the previous maritime powers. She really separated herself from the earth and founded her existence in the element of the sea. Thanks to this, she won not only many naval battles and wars, but gained the upper hand in something completely different and infinitely greater - in a revolution, namely, in a unique revolution, in a planetary revolution. Here we have a case that is unique by its very nature. Its originality, its incomparability lies in the fact that England carried out the transformation of the elements at a completely different moment in history, in a completely different way than the previous maritime powers. She really separated herself from the earth and founded her existence in the element of the sea. Thanks to this, she won not only many naval battles and wars, but gained the upper hand in something completely different and infinitely greater - in a revolution, namely, in a unique revolution, in a planetary revolution.
space.

10

What is this revolution of space?
A person has a certain idea, the idea changes under his "Spaces"; this is the influence of large historical transformations.
Equally diverse spaces correspond to different life forms.

Already within the same era, the everyday picture of the surrounding world of individual people differs depending on their profession. A resident of a large city thinks of the world completely differently than a peasant; the whale hunter has a completely different living space than the opera singer, and the pilot sees the world and life again not only in a different light, but also in different measures, depths and horizons. Differences in ideas about space will become even deeper and more significant if you compare entire peoples and different eras of human history. Scientific stories about space can mean a lot here, and very little. For centuries, scientists, who even then considered the Earth a ball, were held for the mentally ill and pests. In modern times, various sciences with growing specialization also developed their own special concepts of space. Geometry, physics, psychology and biology follow special, far from each other paths here. If you ask scientists, they will answer you that mathematical space is something completely different from the space of the electromagnetic field, the latter, in turn, is completely different from space in a psychological or biological sense. This gives half a dozen concepts of space. There is no wholeness here and the danger of dismemberment and chattering of an important problem in the isolated coexistence of different concepts lies in wait. The philosophy and epistemology of the 19th century also do not provide any comprehensive and simple answer and practically leave us in a dead end. that mathematical space is something completely different from the space of the electromagnetic field, the latter, in turn, is completely different from space in the psychological or biological sense. This gives half a dozen concepts of space. There is no wholeness here and the danger of dismemberment and chattering of an important problem in the isolated coexistence of different concepts lies in wait. The philosophy and epistemology of the 19th century also do not provide any comprehensive and simple answer and practically leave us in a dead end. that mathematical space is something completely different from the space of the electromagnetic field, the latter, in turn, is completely different from space in the psychological or biological sense. This gives half a dozen concepts of space. There is no wholeness here and the danger of dismemberment and chattering of an important problem in the isolated coexistence of different concepts lies in wait. The philosophy and epistemology of the 19th century also do not provide any comprehensive and simple answer and practically leave us in a dead end. There is no wholeness here and the danger of dismemberment and chattering of an important problem in the isolated coexistence of different concepts lies in wait. The philosophy and epistemology of the 19th century also do not provide any comprehensive and simple answer and practically leave us in a dead end. There is no wholeness here and the danger of dismemberment and chattering of an important problem in the isolated coexistence of different concepts lies in wait. The philosophy and epistemology of the 19th century also do not provide any comprehensive and simple answer and practically leave us in a dead end.

But states and the forces of history do not wait for the data of science in the same way as Christopher Columbus did not wait for Copernicus. Every time, in view of a new attack of historical forces, through the release of new energies, new lands and oceans fall into the field of vision of all mankind, the spaces of historical existence also change. Then new scales and dimensions of political-historical action, new sciences, new dispensations, new life of new or revived peoples arise. This spread can be so intense and striking that not only the measures, scales and proportions change, not only the outer eye of a person, but also the very structure of the concepts of space. Then we can already talk about the revolution of space. However, with each historical change, in most cases, a modification of the picture of space is associated.

We can quickly clarify this general position for ourselves using three historical examples: the consequences of the conquest of Charlemagne, the Roman Empire in the first century AD and the influence of the Crusades on the development of Europe.

eleven

During the campaigns of conquest of Alexander the Great, a new huge spatial horizon appeared to the Greeks. The culture and art of Hellenism are its consequences. The great philosopher Aristotle, a contemporary of this change in space, saw that the world inhabited by people was increasingly closing in from the East and from the West. Aristarchus of Samos, who lived some time later (310 - 230), already assumed that the sun is a fixed star and stands in the center of the earth's orbit. Founded by Alexander, the city of Alexandria on the Nile has become a center of tremendous discoveries in the technical, mathematical and physical fields. Here taught Euclid, the founder of Euclidean geometry; Chiron carried out amazing technical inventions here. Here studied Archimedes of Syracuse, the inventor of large combat mechanisms and the discoverer of natural science, and the head of the Library of Alexandria, Eratosthenes (275 - 195), already at that time correctly calculated the location of the equator and scientifically proved that the Earth has the shape of a ball. This is how Copernicus's teaching was anticipated. And yet the Hellenistic world was not enough

vast for the planetary spatial revolution. His knowledge remained the lot of scientists, for he had not yet absorbed the world's oceans into his existential reality. When three hundred years later, Caesar, leaving Rome, conquered Gaul and England, the North-West appeared and the outlet to the Atlantic Ocean was opened. This was the first step towards today's concept of the European space. In the first century of the Roman era of the Caesars, especially, of course, in the time of Nero, the consciousness of the deepest change became so powerful and tangible that, at least in the prevailing state of mind, one could already talk about almost revolutionary changes in the picture of space. This historical moment falls on the first century of our era and therefore deserves special attention. The visible horizon has moved east and west, north and south. The wars of conquest and civil wars took place from Spain to Persia, from England to Egypt. Regions and peoples far removed from each other came into contact with each other and found the unity of a common political destiny. Soldiers from all parts of the empire - from Germany and from Syria, from Africa or from Illyria - could make their general the Roman emperor. The Isthmus of Corinth was cut through, ships bypassed the Arabian Peninsula from the south, Nero sent a scientific expedition to the sources of the Nile. The written evidence of this expansion of space is the map of the world of Agrippa and the geography of Strabo. The fact that the Earth has the shape of a ball was no longer realized only by individual astronomers or mathematicians. The famous philosopher Seneca, teacher, educator and: after all, the victim of Nero, then captured in wonderful words and poetic lines the almost planetary consciousness of that era. He pointed out with all clarity that it is enough for a small number of days to sail from the extreme coast of Spain with its own, favorable, that is, the easterly wind, in order to reach India located in the East on the way to the West. Elsewhere, in the tragedy Medea, he utters a striking prophecy in verse form:

Hot Indus and cold Araxes touch. The Persians
drink from the Elbe and the Rhine.
Thetis will reveal new worlds (novos orbes),
And Thule will no longer be the extreme limit of the Earth.

I have quoted these lines because they express that all-encompassing sense of space that was present in the first century AD. For the beginning of our era was really the border of epochs, with which was associated not only the consciousness of the fullness of time, but also the consciousness of the filled earthly space and the planetary horizon. But at the same time, the words of Seneca throw a mysterious bridge into modern times and in the era of discoveries; for they have survived and have come down to us through centuries of space twilight and through the shallowing of the European Middle Ages. They conveyed to thinking people a sense of greater space and universal space, and even contributed to the discovery of America. Like many of his contemporaries, Christopher Columbus knew the words of Seneca, they prompted him to set off on a brave voyage to the New World. He intended, sailing to the West, reach the East, and really reached it. The expression “new world,” new world, novus orbus, which Seneca uses, was immediately applied to the newly discovered America.

The death of the Roman Empire, the spread of Islam, the invasions of the Arabs and Turks caused a century-long spatial twilight and the shallowing of Europe. Isolation from the sea, the absence of a fleet, and complete continental isolation are characteristic of the early Middle Ages and its system of feudalism. During the period from 500 to 1100, Europe became a feudal-agrarian continental massif; the European ruling stratum, the feudal lords, entrusted their entire spiritual culture, including reading and writing, to the Church and the clergy. The famous rulers and heroes of this era could neither read nor write;

for this they had a monk or chaplain. In a maritime empire, the rulers probably could not have remained illiterate as long as they were in such a purely material mass of land. However, as a result of the Crusades, the French, English and German knights became acquainted with the countries of the Middle East. In the North, new horizons opened up thanks to the expansion of the German Hansa and the spread of the German Knightly Order, a system of transport and trade communications, called the "world economy of the Middle Ages", arose here.
This spatial expansion was also a cultural transformation of the deepest kind. New forms of political life are emerging throughout Europe. In France, England and Sicily, centralized governing bodies are being created, in some way already anticipating the modern state. In upper and central Italy, a new urban culture is taking shape. Universities are developing, which teach theology and still unknown jurisprudence, and the revival of Roman law creates a new educated layer of lawyers, and undermines the monopoly of the clergy on education, typical of the feudal Middle Ages. In the new, Gothic art, in architecture, plastic art, in painting, a powerful rhythm of movement replaces the static space of the previous Romanesque art and places in its place a dynamic field of forces, space of movement and gesture. The Gothic vault is a device in which parts and elements are mutually balanced by their weight and hold each other. In contrast to the motionless, heavy masses of Romanesque buildings, there is a completely new spatial feeling. But even in comparison with the space of the ancient temple and the space of the subsequent architecture of the Renaissance, Gothic art reveals only its inherent strength and movement that transform space.

12

You can find other historical examples, but all of them pale in the face of the deepest and richest in consequences of changes in the planetary picture of the world in all the world history known to us. This change occurs in the 16th and 17th centuries, during the era of the discovery of America and the first circumnavigation of the world. Now, in the literal sense of the word, a new world, the New World, is emerging, and the general worldview of the first Western and Central European peoples of mankind is changing radically. This is the first true spatial revolution in the all-encompassing sense of the word, covering the whole earth, the whole world and all of humanity.
She is incomparable with any other. It was not just just a particularly extensive in quantitative terms, the spread of the geographical horizon, which naturally came about as a result of the discovery of new parts of the world and new oceans. Much greater changes in the overall perception of mankind have undergone the overall picture of our planet and thus the general astronomical view of the entire universe. For the first time in its history, a person could hold a real, whole globe like a ball. Thought about that. that the Earth should have the shape of a ball seemed to the man of the Middle Ages and even to Martin Luther as an amusing and frivolous fantasy. Now the globular image of the Earth has become a tangible fact, an irrefutable experience and an indisputable scientific truth. Now the earth, so stationary before, revolved around the sun as well. But even that was not yet the real thing to come, fundamental transformation of space. The breakthrough into space and the idea of an endless empty space were decisive.

Copernicus was the first to prove scientifically that the Earth revolves around the Sun. His work "De revolutionibus orbium coelestium" on the rotation of the celestial orbits was published in 1543. Although he thereby changed the whole picture of our solar system, he still firmly adhered to the opinion that the universe as a whole, space is a limited

space. Thus, the world has not yet changed in the global cosmic sense, and the very idea of space has not changed with it. Several decades later, the borders fell. In a philosophical sense, Giordano Bruno suggested that our solar system (in which the planet Earth revolves around the Sun) is just one of the many solar systems of an endless starry sky. As a result of Galileo's scientific experiments, such philosophical speculations acquired the status of mathematically provable truth. Kepler calculated the paths of motion of the planets, although he himself was seized with horror at the thought of the infinity of such spaces, where planetary systems move without any center. With the advent of Newton's doctrine, a new concept of space was firmly established in all free-thinking Europe. While,

Thus, people can imagine empty space, which was previously impossible, even if some philosophers talked about “emptiness”. Before, people were afraid of emptiness; they suffered from the so-called horror vacui (fear of space). From now on, people have forgotten their fear and do not find anything more special in the fact that they themselves and their universe exist in emptiness. Such a scientifically proven representation of the universe in an endless, empty space even brought the writers of the 18th century Enlightenment, and above all Voltaire, into a state of special pride. But try to really imagine at least once a really empty space! Not only airless, but absolutely empty space devoid of any subtle and animate matter! Try at least once to really distinguish between space and matter in your mind, separate them from each other and think one without the other! You might as well try to conceive of absolute Nothing for yourself. The Enlighteners had a lot of fun about this horror vacui. But it was probably just a completely understandable fear of nothing and the emptiness of death, horror in the face of a nihilistic way of thinking and of nihilism in general.

This kind of change, which is present in the thought of an infinite, empty space, cannot be explained only as a consequence of the ordinary geographical expansion of the ecumene. It is so fundamental and revolutionary that it also allows us to say something exactly the opposite, namely, that the discovery of new continents and the first voyages around the earth were only external discoveries and consequences of deeper changes. This is the only reason why the landing on an unknown island could bring to life an entire era of discoveries. Newcomers from the West and the East often landed on the coast of the American continent. As you know, the Vikings from Greenland reached the shores of America for about 1000 years, and the Indians discovered by Columbus also migrated to America from somewhere. But America was “discovered” only in 1392 by Columbus. "Pre-Columbian" discoveries not only did not contribute to the planetary spatial revolution, but also had absolutely nothing to do with it. Otherwise, the Aztecs would not have remained in Mexico, and the Incas in Peru; one day they would appear in Europe with a map of the globe in their hands, and we would not open them, but, on the contrary, they would open us. For the space revolution to take place, it takes more than a simple landing in a previously unknown area. For its accomplishment, it is necessary to change the ideas about space, which would cover all levels and areas of human existence. What this means allows us to understand the consideration of the unusual boundary of the eras that took place in the 16-17 centuries. Otherwise, the Aztecs would not have remained in Mexico, and the Incas in Peru; one day they would appear in Europe with a map of the globe in their hands, and we would not open them, but, on the contrary, they would open us. For the space revolution to take place, it takes more than a simple landing in a previously unknown area. For its accomplishment, it is necessary to change the ideas about space, which would cover all levels and areas of human existence. What this means allows us to understand the consideration of the unusual boundary of the eras that took place in the 16-17 centuries. Otherwise, the Aztecs would not have remained in Mexico, and the Incas in Peru; one day they would appear in Europe with a map of the globe in their hands, and we would not open them, but, on the contrary, they would open us. For the space revolution to take place, it takes more than a simple landing in a previously unknown area. For its accomplishment, it is necessary to change the ideas about space, which would cover all levels and areas of human existence. What this means allows us to understand the consideration of the unusual boundary of the eras that took place in the 16-17 centuries. For its accomplishment, it is necessary to change the ideas about space, which would cover all levels and areas of human existence. What this means allows us to understand the consideration of the unusual boundary of the eras that took place in the 16-17 centuries. For its accomplishment, it is necessary to change the ideas about space, which would cover all levels and areas of human existence. What this means allows us to understand the consideration of the unusual boundary of the eras that took place in the 16-17 centuries.

In these centuries of epoch-making changes, European humanity is gaining a new understanding of space in all forms of its creative spirit. Renaissance painting abolishes the space of medieval Gothic painting; artists now place the people and objects they have painted inside such a space that gives

perspective empty bottomlessness. People and things now rest and move from now on inside space. In comparison with the space of the Gothic painting, this really means a different world. The fact that artists now see differently, that their vision is changing, is filled with the deepest meaning for us. For great artists do not just portray something beautiful for someone. Art is a historical step in the awareness of space, and a real artist is a person who sees people and objects better and more correctly than other people, more correctly, first of all, in the sense of the historical truth of his own era. But it is not only in painting that a new space is emerging. Renaissance architecture creates its buildings completely different from the Gothic space with a classic geometric layout; its plastic freely places sculptures of human figures in space, while sculptures from the Middle Ages are located at the columns and in the corners of buildings. Baroque architecture is again in the dynamics of movement, aspiration and therefore retains some connection with the Gothic, but nevertheless it remains firmly chained in a new, modern space that arose as a result of the spatial revolution and was decisively influenced by the Baroque style itself. Music extracts its melodies and harmonies from old tonalities and places them in the sound space of our so-called tonal system. Theater and opera allow their characters to move in the empty depths of the stage space, which is separated by a curtain from the space of the auditorium. Thus, without exception, all the spiritual currents of these two centuries - Renaissance, Humanism, Reformation,

It would not be a great exaggeration to say that the new understanding of space embraces all areas of human life, all forms of being, all types of creative human abilities, art, science, technology. The enormous changes in geographic appearance of the Earth constitutes only the external profound transformation, aspect of the signified so promising and fraught many consequences collocation as "spatial revolution". Henceforth, inevitably comes what was called the rational superiority of the European, the spirit of Europeanism and "Occam's rationalism." It manifests itself among the peoples of Western and Central Europe, destroys the medieval forms of human society, forms new states, fleets and armies, invents new machines and mechanisms, enslaves non-European peoples and puts them in a dilemma: either accept European civilization or descend to the level of the common people of the colony.

13

Any habitual arrangement is an arrangement of space. The compilation, constitution of a country or part of the world is spoken of as its basic, primary ordering, its nomos[96].

So, the actual, true primary ordering is based in its most important essence on certain spatial boundaries and limitations, on certain measures and a certain division of the earth. At the beginning of every great epoch, therefore, there is a great seizure of lands. In particular, any significant change and

[96] The Greek noun Nomos comes from the Greek verb Nemein; like this verb, it has three meanings. First, Nemein means to take. Therefore, Nomos means, first of all, “capture”, “capture”. Just as the Greek Legein-Logos corresponds to the German Sprechen-Sprache, so the Greek Nemein-Nomos corresponds to the German take-take, capture. Seizure is at first the seizure of land, later also the seizure of the sea, the conquest of the sea, about which much has been said in our contemplation of world history, and in the field of industry it means the seizure of industry, that is, the seizure of industrial means of production.

a shift in the face of the Earth is associated with changes in world politics and with a new redivision of the world, a new seizure of land.

Such a striking, unprecedented spatial revolution, which took place in the 16th and 17th centuries, should have led to an equally unheard-of, unparalleled land grab. The European peoples, who then opened new, seemingly endless spaces and who rushed into the distance of these spaces, treated the non-European and non-Christian peoples they discovered as if they were ownerless goods, which became the property of the first European invader they came across. All conquerors, be they Catholics or Protestants, referred to their mission to spread Christianity among non-Christian peoples. However, such a mission could have been attempted without conquest and plunder. No other justification or justification was found. Some monks as, for example, the Spanish theologian Francesco de Vitoria, in his lecture on the Indians (De Indis 1532), argued that the right of peoples to their territory does not depend on their religion and defended the rights of the Indians with surprising frankness. This does not change anything in the general historical picture of the European colonial conquests. Later, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the task of the Christian mission turned into the task of spreading European civilization among uncivilized peoples. From such justifications arose Christian-European international law, that is, the community of Christian peoples of Europe opposed to the rest of the world. They formed a "community of nations", an interstate order. International law was based on the distinction between Christian and non-Christian peoples, or, a century later, civilized (in the Christian-European sense) and uncivilized peoples. A people uncivilized in this sense could not become a member of this international legal community; he was not a subject. but only the object of this international law, that is, it belonged to one of the civilized nations as a colony or colonial protectorate. Of course, you should not think of the “community of Christian European nations” as a flock of peaceful sheep. They fought bloody wars among themselves. Yet this does not abolish the historical fact of the existence of Christian-European civilizational unity and order. World history is the history of colonial conquests, and with each land grab, the invaders not only negotiated, but also argued, often even through bloody civil wars. This is also true of most colonial conquests. Moreover, wars are waged with the greater intensity, the more value the object of conquest is. Here it was about the seizure of a new world, the New World. The Spanish and French throughout the 16th century slaughtered the indigenous population in the most brutal way, for example in Florida, and did not spare either women or children. The Spaniards and the British waged a century-long grueling war between themselves, in which the violence and atrocities that people are capable of against each other, it seemed, reached the highest possible degree. Moreover, they also did not feel any remorse from the fact that they used non-Europeans, Indians or Muslims as overt or secret assistants or even allies. Outbursts of hatred are extraordinary; each other was called murderers, thieves, rapists and pirates. There is only one single charge missing, which was usually willingly made against the Indians; Christian Europeans did not accuse each other of cannibalism. For the rest, all the richness of the language is used to designate the most evil, deadly enmity. And yet it loses all meaning in view of the all-conquering reality of joint European colonization of the new world, the New World. The meaning and essence of Christian-European international law, its initial ordering consisted precisely in the division and distribution of a previously unknown land. Among themselves, the European peoples were, without reasoning, united in that they considered the non-European territory of the land as a colonial territory, that is, as an object of their capture and use. This Christian Europeans did not accuse each other of cannibalism. For the rest, all the richness of the language is used to designate the most evil, deadly enmity. And yet it loses all meaning in view of the all-conquering reality of joint European colonization of the new world, the New World. The meaning and essence of Christian-European international law, its initial ordering consisted precisely in the division and distribution of a previously unknown land. 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the aspect of historical development is so important that the era of discoveries can just as well, and, probably, be even more accurately designated as the era of colonial conquests, the conquest of new lands. War, says Heraclitus, connects, and truth is a quarrel.

Secondly, Neimen means: division and distribution of what is captured (what is taken). Thus, the second meaning of Nomos: the main division and distribution of land, territory and the order of property rights resting on this.
The third meaning is: exploitation, that is, the use, processing and sale of the territory obtained during the division, production and consumption. Capture - Allocation - Use are, in this sequence, the three basic concepts of each specific sequencing. For more on the meaning of Nomos, see the book Der Nomos der Erde. Koln. 1950 (L. Auflage. Berlin. 1974)

fourteen

The Portuguese, Spaniards, French, Dutch and English fought among themselves for the division of the new land. The fight was fought not only by force of arms; it also took the form of a diplomatic and legal dispute over obtaining a more advantageous property right. In this matter, in contrast to the indigenous people, one could, of course, show exceptional generosity and magnanimity. They landed on the shore, erected a cross or carved the king's coat of arms on a tree, erected a pillar brought with them with an image of the coat of arms, or placed a coat of arms in a hole between tree roots. The Spaniards loved to announce with all solemnity to the crowd of natives who had fled that this country henceforth belonged to the crown of Castile. Symbolic takeovers of this kind were supposed to secure the acquisition of legal title to vast islands and entire continents. No government, be it Portuguese, respected the rights of natives and indigenous people on their own territory. Another question is the dispute between the European colonizing peoples. Here, everyone referred to any legal document that was in his hands at that moment and, if it turned out to be beneficial, then to contracts with the natives and their leaders.

As long as Portugal and Spain, the two Catholic powers, determined the state of affairs in the world, the Pope could act as the creator of legal acts, initiator of new colonial conquests and arbiter in the dispute between the colonial powers. Already in 1493, that is, almost a year after the discovery of America, the Spaniards managed to achieve the publication by the then Pope Alexander VI of an edict, in which the Pope, by the power of his apostolic authority, granted the King of Castile and Leon and his heirs the newly discovered West Indian countries in as the secular fiefdom of the Church. In this edict there was a definite line running across the Atlantic Ocean one hundred miles west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands. Spain received from the Pope all the lands open to the west of this line into fiefdom. The following year, Spain and Portugal agreed in an agreement with Tordesillas that all land east of the line should belong to Portugal. So immediately the division of the New World begins on a huge scale, although Columbus had discovered by that time only a few islands and coastal regions. At that time, no one could imagine the real picture of the entire Earth, but the redistribution of the Earth began to be carried out in full measure and in accordance with all the rules. The papal dividing line of 1493 was at the beginning of the struggle for a new initial ordering, for a new nomos of the Earth. For more than a century, the Spanish and Portuguese have invoked papal authorizations (in their quest) to reject all claims of the French, Dutch and English who followed him. Brazil, discovered by Cabral in 1300, became, naturally, the property of Portugal,

ended up in the eastern, Portuguese hemisphere due to the later transfer of the dividing line to the West. However, the other colonizing powers did not feel bound by the terms of the agreement between Portugal and Spain, and the authority of the Pope was not enough to instill in them respect for the colonial monopoly of both Catholic powers. Thanks to the Reformation, the peoples who adopted Protestantism openly broke with any dependence on the Roman throne. So the struggle for the colonization of the new land turned into a struggle between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, between the worldwide Catholicism of the Spaniards and the worldwide Protestantism of the Huguenots, Dutch and British.

fifteen

In contrast to the indigenous inhabitants of the recently opened countries, the Christian colonialists did not form a united front with each other, for in this case there was no common combat-ready enemy. The more fierce, but also more significant in the historical sense, the more pronounced and formalized was the now developing religious war between the Christian peoples -
colonialists, a worldwide battle between Catholicism and Protestantism. Thus outlined and with these participants, it appears as a religious war, and in reality it also was. But that doesn't tell the whole story. In its true light, it appears to us in its entirety only when we, in this case, pay attention to the opposition of the elements and to the separation of the world of the open sea from the world of earthly firmament that was beginning at that time.

Some of the participants in this great religious struggle served as prototypes for stage characters for great writers. A favorite theme of playwrights was the confrontation between the Spanish king Philip II and Queen Elizabeth of England. Both of these characters are found separately in various tragedies by Schiller; their direct confrontation is repeatedly described in the same play. It serves as an excellent material for spectacular theater scenes. But in this way it is impossible to grasp the deep contradictions, the initial situations of friendship-enmity, the last elementary forces and confrontations of the elements. In Germany at that time there were no stage heroes for this. Only one single German of this era so poor in deeds in the life of Germany (1550-1618) became the hero of a significant tragedy: King Rudolph II. You've probably heard a little about him and really, it cannot be said that he continues to live in the historical memory of the German people. Nevertheless, his name belongs to this context and the great German playwright Franz Grillparzer rightfully places him at the center of the action of his tragedy “Fratricide in Habsburg”. But the whole problematic and all the greatness of both Grillparzer's tragedy itself and his heroes lies precisely in the fact that Rudolf II was not an active hero, but a kind of delayer, a moderator. It had something of a “catechon,” a concept. already mentioned by us once in a different context. But what can Rudolph do in general in the situation in which Germany found itself then? The mere fact that he realized the absence of a foreign policy threat against Germany was already a lot, and the only achievement was that

The peculiarity of the position of Germany at that time was precisely in the fact that she did not decide on the choice of allies and could in no way take any side in this religious war. It included in itself the confrontation between Catholicism and Protestantism, but this intra-German contradiction was something other than the worldwide confrontation between Catholicism and Protestantism, decisive for the colonization of the New World. Germany was still the birthplace of Luther and the country of origin of the Reformation. But the struggle of the colonial powers long ago overcame the initial

the opposition of Catholicism and Protestantism, and, bypassing the intra-German problematic, reached a much more accurate and profound opposition of the teachings of the Jesuits and Calvinism. Now it was the distinction between friend and foe, serving as the yardstick for all world politics.

Lutheran German princes and estates, primarily the Protestant ruler of the empire, the Elector of Saxony, tried to remain faithful to the Catholic king. When, under the onslaught of the Calvinists, a military alliance of the Evangelical German estates, the so-called Union, arose, and the Catholic estates formed a counter front, the so-called League, the Elector of Saxony, a Lutheran by religion, did not know which side to side with. As early as 1612, negotiations were underway for him to join the Catholic League. The Lutheran hatred of Calvinists was no less than their hatred of the Papists, and no less than the hatred of Catholics for Calvinists. This is not only due to the fact that Lutherans in practice generally followed the principle of submission to authority more than the much more active Calvinists. The real reason is that Germany was at that time barred from participating in the European colonization of the New World and was forcibly drawn by external forces into the world clash of Western European colonial powers. At the same time, the advancing Turks threatened her in the South-East. The Jesuits and Calvinists of Spain, Holland and England presented Germany with alternatives completely alien to German development proper. Non-Jesuit Catholics and non-Calvinist Lutherans, such as the German princes and estates, tried to avoid participating in an internally alien dispute. But this required determination and enormous strength of our own. In the absence of such, they found themselves in a situation that was most accurately designated as "passive neutrality." The consequence of this was that Germany turned out to be a battlefield of internally alien transatlantic forces for colonies without real participation in this war. Calvinism was the new warlike religion; the awakening of the elements of the sea captured him as a proportionate faith to him. He became a faith of the French Huguenots, Dutch freedom fighters and English Puritans. He was also the creed of the great Elector of Brandenburg, one of the few German rulers who knew a lot about naval battles and colonies. Inland Calvinist communities in Switzerland, Hungary and elsewhere did not play a role in world politics unless they were associated with these marine energies. He was also the creed of the great Elector of Brandenburg, one of the few German rulers who knew a lot about naval battles and colonies. Inland Calvinist communities in Switzerland, Hungary and elsewhere did not play a role in world politics unless they were associated with these marine energies. He was also the creed of the great Elector of Brandenburg, one of the few German rulers who knew a lot about naval battles and colonies. Inland Calvinist communities in Switzerland, Hungary and elsewhere did not play a role in world politics unless they were associated with these marine energies.

All non-Calvinists were horrified by the Calvinistic doctrine, and above all, by the harsh belief in the chosenness of people from eternity, in "predestination to salvation." But in secular language, belief in predestination is just an extremely intensified consciousness of belonging to a different world than this one - condemned to death and depraved. In the language of modern sociology, this is the highest degree of self-awareness of the elite, confident in their position, confident that their time has come. To put it more simply, more humanely, this is the confidence that you are saved, and salvation is still the meaning of the whole world history that defines any idea. Filled with this confidence, the Dutch Gezi sang their lovely song:

"The land will become the sea, the land will become the sea, but it will be free."

When the elemental energies of the sea awakened in the 16th century, their effect was so strong that they quickly began to determine the political history of the world. At that moment, they had to speak the spiritual language of their time. They could no longer remain just whale hunters, fishermen and captors of the sea. They had to find a spiritual ally for themselves, an ally of the most radical and courageous, someone who would really do away with the images of the previous era. It could not have been the German Lutheranism of that time. The latter developed with a tendency towards territoriality and general shallowing. In any case, the decline of the Hansa and the end of German domination in the Baltic coincides as clearly in Germany with the era of Luther as the growth of the world power of Holland and the great decision of Cromwell - with the era

Calvinism. And something else comes to mind. Most of the previous historical research is still influenced by land study methods. They always mean only solid land and the development of states, in Germany even only territorial-state development, while often still limited in their subject of research to small states and small spaces. But as soon as we turn our gaze to the sea, we will immediately see a meeting, a coincidence in time, or, if I may say so, a world-historical brotherhood that connects political Calvinism with the awakening sea energies of Europe. Religious wars and theological slogans of this era also contain in their essence a clash of elemental forces that influenced the transfer of world-historical existence from land to sea.

While on the coastal side of the historical achievement the process of seizing new lands was on a large scale, another, no less important part of the new limit of our planet was completed at sea. This was done through the English conquest of the sea. At sea, this was the result of the pan-European awakening of these centuries. He determined the main line of the first planetary ordering of space, the essence of which is the separation of the earth from the sea. The earth now belongs to a dozen sovereign states, the sea belongs to all or, finally, in reality, only one state: England. The arrangement of the earthly firmament, the land consists in the fact that it is divided into the territories of states; the open sea, on the contrary, is free, it means free from state formations and is not subject to any territorial supremacy. These are the decisive facts of the arrangement of space, on the basis of which Christian European international law has developed over the past three centuries. This was the basic law, the nomos of the land of this era.

It is only in the light of this primordial fact of the British conquest of the sea and the separation of the sea from the land that many famous and often quoted words and phrases take on their true meaning. This is, for example, the saying of Sir Walter Rally: "He who rules the sea dominates the world trade, and the one who rules the world trade owns all the riches of the world and in fact the world itself." Or: “All trade is world trade; all world trade is sea trade. " This also includes the words about freedom, spoken during the heyday of the British sea and world power: "All world trade is free trade." It cannot be said that all this was so wrong, but all this refers to a certain era and to a certain international situation and becomes unjust then, when they try to make absolute and eternal truths out of it. But above all, the conflict between land and sea is revealed in the comparison of sea and land wars. Of course, war on land and war at sea have always differed from each other strategically and tactically. However, their opposite becomes from now on the expression of different worlds and opposing legal norms.

Since the 16th century, the states of the European continent have developed certain methods of waging land war, which are based on the idea of war as a relationship between states. On both sides of the front line there is state-structured, military power, and armies fight each other in open field combat. Only the troops participating in the battle confront each other as enemies, while the civilian population does not participate in hostilities. It is not an enemy and is not considered an enemy as long as it does not participate in a war. War at sea, on the other hand, involves the destruction of the enemy's trade and economy. The enemy in such a war is not only the belligerent enemy, but also any subject of a hostile state and, finally, even a neutral country leading

trade with the enemy and having economic relations with him. Ground warfare tends to be a decisive open field battle. Of course, even during a war at sea, the matter can reach a naval battle, but its typical means and methods are shelling and blocking the enemy's shores and capturing enemy and neutral merchant ships in accordance with the prize law. By their very nature, these means, typical of naval warfare, are directed against both military personnel and civilians. In particular, the food blockade, which condemns the entire population of the blockaded area to starvation equally, without distinguishing between military and civilian, men and women, old people and children.

In reality, these are not only two sides of the international legal order, but two completely different worlds. But since the British conquest of the sea, the British and the peoples dominated by English ideas have become accustomed to this state of affairs. The idea that a continental power would be able to exercise world domination over the entire globe was unheard of and unbearable for their perception of the world. Another thing is world domination, based on the world existence separated from the land and embracing the world's oceans. A small island on the northwestern side of Europe became the center of a world empire as it lifted off the ground and made the decisive choice in favor of the sea. In a purely marine existence, he found the means of world domination, extending to all ends of the Earth. After that, how the separation of the earth from the sea and the strife of both elements once became the fundamental law of the planet, on this foundation a huge framework of scientific opinions, arguments and scientific systems was erected, through which people substantiated the wisdom and rationality of this state of affairs, losing sight of the primary fact of the British conquest of the sea and temporary conditionality of this fact. Such systems were developed by great scientists, specialists in the field of political economy, lawyers and philosophers, and all of this seemed quite obvious to most of our great-grandfathers. They were no longer able to imagine any other economic science and other international law. Here you have the opportunity to make sure that the huge Leviathan also has power over the minds and souls of people. And this is the most amazing thing in its power. on this foundation a huge framework of scholarly opinions, arguments and scientific systems was built, through which people justified the wisdom and rationality of this state of affairs, losing sight of the primary fact of the British conquest of the sea and the temporal conditionality of this fact. Such systems were developed by great scientists, specialists in the field of political economy, lawyers and philosophers, and all of this seemed quite obvious to most of our great-grandfathers. They were no longer able to imagine any other economic science and other international law. Here you have the opportunity to make sure that the huge Leviathan also has power over the minds and souls of people. And this is the most amazing thing in its power. on this foundation a huge framework of scholarly opinions, arguments and scientific systems was built, through which people justified the wisdom and rationality of this state of affairs, losing sight of the primary fact of the British conquest of the sea and the temporal conditionality of this fact. Such systems were developed by great scientists, specialists in the field of political economy, lawyers and philosophers, and all of this seemed quite obvious to most of our great-grandfathers. They were no longer able to imagine any other economic science and other international law. Here you have the opportunity to make sure that the huge Leviathan also has power over the minds and souls of people. And this is the most amazing thing in its power. by means of which people justified the wisdom and rationality of this state of affairs, overlooking the primary fact of the British conquest of the sea and the temporary conditionality of this fact. Such systems were developed by great scientists, specialists in the field of political economy, lawyers and philosophers, and all of this seemed quite obvious to most of our great-grandfathers. They were no longer able to imagine any other economic science and other international law. Here you have the opportunity to make sure that the huge Leviathan also has power over the minds and souls of people. And this is the most amazing thing in its power. by means of which people justified the wisdom and rationality of this state of affairs, overlooking the primary fact of the British conquest of the sea and the temporary conditionality of this fact. Such systems were developed by great scientists, specialists in the field of political economy, lawyers and philo

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England is an island. But only by becoming the bearer and focus of a spontaneous exodus from the world of earthly firmament to the world of the open sea, and only as the heir to all the sea energies released at that time did she become the island that is meant when it is emphasized again and again that England is an island. And only having become an island in a new, hitherto unknown sense of the word, England seized the world's oceans and won at that first stage of the planetary revolution of space.

Needless to say, England is an island. But by one setting of this very little has been said about the geographical fact. There are many islands with completely different political destinies. Sicily is also an island, as are Ireland, Cuba, Madagascar, and Japan. How many contradictory tendencies in world history are combined in these few names, each of which names an island! In a sense, all continents, including the largest ones, are just islands, and the entire inhabited land is washed by the ocean, as the ancient Greeks already knew about. England itself has always been an island in the same geographical sense, with all the vicissitudes of historical fate, since it separated from the mainland many millennia ago - probably 18,000 BC. It was an island when it was inhabited by the Celts and when it was conquered for Rome by Julius Caesar, under the Norman

conquest (1066) and during the time of the Maid of Orleans (1431), when the British held most of France.

The inhabitants of this island had a sense of island security. From the Middle Ages, wonderful expressions and poetic lines have come down to us, in which England is compared to a fortified castle washed by the sea, like a defensive moat. In Shakespeare's poems, this insular sense of self found its most beautiful and famous expression:

"This second Eden, this crowned island, almost paradise,
This bastion built by nature itself,
This pearl in the setting of sea silver, Which serves
as a wall and a moat, protecting the house. "

It is clear that the British often quote such lines, and that especially the expression "this pearl in the setting of sea silver" could become winged ..

But this kind of expression of the English insular consciousness refers to the old island. The island is still regarded as a piece of land separated from the earth and washed by the sea. The insular consciousness still remains purely terrestrial, terrestrial and territorial .. It even seems that insular feeling manifests itself as a particularly pronounced territorial sense of the earth. It would be a delusion to consider any island inhabitant, any Englishman, even today, a born "captor of the sea". We have already seen the change in the fact that the people of sheep breeders became in the 16th century a people of the children of the sea. This was a fundamental transformation of the political and historical nature of the island itself. It consisted in the fact that the land began to be considered now only from the point of view of the sea, while the island from a separated land area became part of the sea, a ship or, more precisely, fish. It is difficult for an observer on the continent to imagine a consistently marine view of things, a purely marine perception of the earth. Our everyday language, in the formation of its meanings, naturally has the earth as its starting point. We saw this already at the very beginning of our contemplation. The image of our planet is the image of the earth; we forget that he can also be the image of the sea. In connection with the sea, we are talking about seaworthy routes, although there are no paths or roads here, as on land, but only communication lines. We imagine a ship on the high seas in the form of a piece of land that floats on the sea, in the form of a "floating section of state territory," as it is called in the language of international law. A warship appears to us as a floating fortress, and an island like England is a castle surrounded by the sea like a moat. Sea people consider all this to be completely false interpretations, the product of the fantasy of land rats. A ship is as little like a piece of land as a fish is like a swimming dog. In the eyes, determined exclusively by the sea, the earth's firmament, land is just a coast, a coastal strip plus "hinterland" (unoccupied territory). Even the whole land, considered only from the point of view of the open sea, proceeding from a purely marine existence, appears as a simple accumulation of objects thrown by the sea to the shore, an eruption of the sea. A typical example of such a way of thinking, striking for us, but typical for the people of the sea, is the statement of Edmund Bergs: "Spain is nothing but a whale washed ashore in Europe." All significant relations with the rest of the world, and especially with the states of the European continent, had to change from the fact that that England went over to a purely marine existence. All measures and proportions of British policy were henceforth incomparable and incompatible with those of other European countries. England became the ruler of the seas and erected a British world-wide empire that stretched to all ends of the world, based on English maritime rule over all the land. The English world thought of naval bases and lines of communication. What

it was for other peoples the soil and homeland, it seemed to this world a simple hinterland, an unoccupied territory. The word continental acquired the additional meaning of backwardness, and the population of the continent became “backward people,” a backward people. But the island itself, the metropolis of such a world empire based on a purely marine existence, thereby loses its roots, is torn off from the soil. HE turns out to be able to sail to another part of the earth, like a ship or a fish, for it is still only the transportable center of a world empire scattered across all continents. Disraeli, a leading British politician during the reign of Queen Victoria, said in relation to India that the British Empire was more Asian than European. He was also the one who, in 1847, in his novel Tancred, put forward a proposal that that the English queen should settle in India. “The Queen must equip a large fleet, set out with her retinue and all the ruling class, and move her imperial seat from London to Delhi. There she will find a huge ready-made empire, a first-class army, and a lot of steady income. " Disraeli was Abravanel (cf. above) of the 19th century. Some of what he said about Judaism and Christianity and about race as the key to all of world history was diligently promoted by non-Jews and non-Christians. So he knew what he was talking about when he put forward such proposals. He felt that the island was no longer part of Europe. The fate of the island was no longer necessarily connected with the European fate. He could hit the road and change his place of residence as the metropolis of the world maritime empire. The ship could weaken and drop anchor in another part of the world. A huge fish, the Leviathan, could move and explore other oceans.

eighteen

After the Battle of Waterloo, when Napoleon was defeated in a 20-year war, the era of undisputed maritime rule of England came. This era continued throughout the 19th century. It reached its culmination in the middle of the century, after the Crimean War, which ended with the Paris Confederation of 1856. The era of free trade was also a time of free flowering for English industrial and economic supremacy. Free sea spaces and free world trade, a free market combined in the concept of freedom, the personification and guardian of which could only be England. In this era, admiration and imitation of the English example throughout the world also reached its climax.

The inner dimension touched the elemental essence of the huge Leviathan. However, then it still remained unnoticed. Quite the opposite, as a result of the tremendous upswing in the world economy, the positivist era, blinded by rapidly growing wealth, believed that this wealth would continue to grow and end in a thousand-year paradise on earth. However, the change that affected the essence of Leviathan was precisely the result of the Industrial Revolution. The latter began in England in the 18th century with the invention of machines. The first coke oven blast furnace (1735), the first cast steel (1740), the steam engine (1768), the spinning machine (1770), the mechanical loom (1786), all first in England - these are some examples that make it clear how great was the industrial superiority of England over all other peoples. The inventions of the steamboat and railroad followed in the 19th century. England was ahead of everyone here too. A huge maritime power became at the same time a huge machine power. Her dominion over the world now seemed final. We have already seen above how significant progress was in the development of maritime affairs in a short period from the battle in the galleys at Lepanto (1571) to the destruction of the Spanish armada in the English Channel (1588). An equally significant step forward was made in the period between the Crimean War, when England, France and Sardinia fought against how significant was the progress in the development of maritime affairs in a short period from the battle of the galleys at Lepanto (1571) to the destruction of the Spanish armada in the English Channel (1588). An equally significant step forward was made in the period between the Crimean War, when England, France and Sardinia fought against how significant was the progress in the development of maritime affairs in a short period from the battle of the galleys at Lepanto (1571) to the destruction of the Spanish armada in the English Channel (1588). An equally significant step forward was made in the period between the Crimean War, when England, France and Sardinia fought against

Russia in 1854-1856 and the American Civil War in 1861-1863, in which the northern industrial states conquered the agricultural South of the country. In the Crimean War, they fought with the help of sailing ships, the war for the secession of the South was fought with the help of armored steamers. Thus, the era of modern industrial and economic wars opened. England was in the lead here and almost until the end of the 19th century retained a huge superiority. But progress in this era meant at the same time a new stage in the elementary relationship between land and sea.

For the Leviathan has now turned from a huge fish into a machine. In fact, it was an essential transformation, unheard of in its kind. The machine has changed man's attitude to the sea. The brave type of personality, which until now determined the size of the sea power, has lost its old meaning. Brave exploits of sailors of sailing ships, high art of navigation, severe education and selection of a certain breed of people - all this has lost all meaning due to the reliability of a modern technical sea traffic. The sea was still strong. But the effect of that powerful impulse that turned the people of sheep breeders into pirates waned and gradually ended. The apparatus of the machine stood between the elements of the sea and human existence. Naval domination, based on the machine industry, is clearly something other than a naval power, growing daily in a fierce and direct struggle with the elements. A sailboat requiring only human muscular strength and a ship propelled by steam wheels represent two different ways of communicating with the elements of the sea. The Industrial Revolution turned the children of the sea into the manufacturers and servants of the machine. Everyone felt the change. Some lamented the end of an old age of heroes and took refuge in the romance of pirate stories. Others rejoiced at technological progress and rushed to compose utopias of a paradise constructed by people. With all the evidence we are establishing here the fact of an essential damage to a purely maritime existence, the secret of British world domination. But the people of the 19th century did not see this. For being a fish or a machine, Leviathan in any case grew stronger and more powerful, and his kingdom seemed to have no end.

nineteen

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the American admiral Mahan made a remarkable attempt to extend the previous situation of British domination over the sea into the era of the machine. Mahan is a significant historian, author of Influences of the Maritime Power in History. This is how he entitled his main work, which was also published in German and received recognition in the circles of the German navy, especially from its founder, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz.

In one of his works, dated July 1904, Mahan talks about the possibilities of reuniting England with the United States of America. He sees the deepest basis for such a reunification not in a common race, language or culture. He in no way underestimates these considerations, which have so often been cited by other writers. But for him they are just desirable additional circumstances. Decisive for him is the need to preserve Anglo-Saxon domination of the world's oceans, and this can only happen on an island basis, by uniting the Anglo-American states. England itself has become too small as a result of modern development, so that it is no longer an island in the former sense. On the contrary, the United States of America is a true island in the modern sense. Because of their length - says Mahan - this is still not realized. But this is in line with today's scales and ratios of quantities. The insular nature of the United States should help ensure that naval dominance can be maintained and continued on a broader basis. America is the one

a large island on the basis of which the British conquest of the sea must be immortalized and continued on an even larger scale as Anglo-American domination of the world.

While a politician like Disraeli wanted to move the worldwide British empire to Asia, the American admiral was hatching the idea of being sent to America. This was characteristic of the type of thinking natural to the Anglo-Saxon sailor of the 19th century. The admiral felt epoch-making changes, saw tremendous changes in measures and sizes that inevitably came with the development of industry. But he did not see that the industrial revolution is just the most important moment - the elementary connection between man and the sea. Thus, it turns out that he continues to think in the old way. His larger island had to preserve, mothball, an inherited, obsolete tradition in a completely new situation. An old, too small island and the whole complex of sea and world domination erected on its basis must be taken in tow by a new island,

As significant as Mahan's personality is and as impressive as his construction of the larger island, she does not comprehend the true meaning of the new ordering of space. She is not a product of the spirit of the old seafarers. It proceeds from the conservative need for geopolitical security, nothing more remains in it from those energies of the awakening of the elements that made possible the world-historical union between brave sailing and the Calvinist faith in predestination in the 16th and 17th centuries.

twenty

Industrial development and new technology could not remain at the level of the 19th century. Progress did not end with the invention of the steamboat and the railroad. The world has changed faster than the prophets of the machine faith expected, and entered the era of electrical engineering and electrodynamics. Electrical engineering, aviation and radio have caused such a revolution in all ideas about space that a new stage of the first planetary spatial revolution, if not even the second, a new revolution of space has clearly begun.

In a short period of time from 1890 to 1914, Germany, a state of the European continent, caught up with and even surpassed England in the most important fields of activity, in mechanical engineering, shipbuilding and locomotive building, after Krupp already in 1868 demonstrated his advantage over the British in the field of production weapons. Already the World War of 1914 passed under the sign of a new one. Of course, the peoples and their governments entered it without being conscious a revolutionary era for the space, as if it were about one of the past wars of the 19th century, in which they participated. In highly industrialized Germany, English ideals of legislation still dominated, and English ideas were considered indisputable, while a huge agrarian country, such as tsarist Russia, entered the First World War and the Raw Material War in 1914, without having its own modern engine-building plant on its vast territory. ... In fact, the advancement from a steam vessel to a modern warship was no less than a step from rowing galleys to a sailing ship. Man's attitude to the elements of the sea has changed again in the most profound way.

When the plane appeared, a new, third dimension was conquered, added to the land and the sea. Now man has risen above the surfaces of earth and sea and acquired a completely new means of transportation and an equally new weapon. Measures and proportions have changed again, and the possibilities of human domination over nature and over other people have expanded to boundless limits. It is understandable why the Air Force was named “spatial weapon”. For

the revolutionary changes they make in space are especially strong, immediate and visual.

But if, in addition, we imagine that the air space above the earth and the sea is not only plowed by airplanes, radio waves of stations of all countries at the speed of a second freely penetrate the atmospheric space around the globe, then there is every reason to believe that now not only a new, third dimension, but even a third element was added, air as a new element of human existence. Then to both mythical animals - Leviathan and Behemoth - it would be worth adding a third: the big Bird. But we shouldn't be so reckless in making such promising statements. For if we ponder over what technical and mechanical means and energies are used to exercise human domination in airspace and imagine the internal combustion engines that drive airplanes,

This is not the place to settle the question of two new elements added to the land and the sea. Here serious considerations and speculative reasoning, hypotheses and conjectures are still too tightly intertwined, for them there is still an immense field of possibilities. Indeed, according to one teaching of the times of antiquity, the whole history of mankind is only a path through the four elements. If we try to soberly follow our theme, we will be able to state two things with all the evidence and reliability. The first concerns the change in the idea of space, which took place in a new period of the spatial revolution. This transformation takes place with a depth no less than the already familiar change of the 16-17 centuries. Then people put the world and the universe in empty space. Today we no longer imagine space as simply a bottomless extension devoid of any conceivable content. Space has become for us a force field of human energy, action and result. Only today a thought, incredible in any other era, becomes possible for us; it was expressed by the German philosopher of our time: "The world is not inside space, but space is inside the world."

Our second rule concerns the original relationship between land and sea. Today the sea is no longer an element, as it was in the era of whale hunters and corsairs. Today's vehicle technology and media have made it a space in the modern sense of the word. Today, any ship owner can know at any time and day where his ship is located in the ocean. Thus, in contrast to the era of sailing, the world of the sea has radically changed for man. But if this is so, then comes the division of sea and land, on which the former connection of sea world domination was based. The very basis of the British conquest of the sea is disappearing, and with it the former nomos of the earth.

Instead, a new nomos of our planet is being formed uncontrollably and irresistibly. It is caused by the new attitudes of man to the old and new elements, and the changed measures and relations of human existence force his formation. Many will see this as only death and destruction. Some will think they are at the end of the world. In reality, we are only experiencing the end of the old relationship between land and sea. However, human fear of the new is often as great as the fear of emptiness, even if the new overcomes emptiness. Many see only senseless chaos where, in reality, a new meaning paves the way for an order commensurate with itself. The old nomos, of course, is leaving, and with it the whole system of inherited sizes, norms and relationships. But the future is not only lack of measure or hostile to Nomos nothing.

> And here the gods are present and rule, Their measure is great.

Leipzig, 1942.
Translated from German by Y.Korinets

PARTISAN'S THEORY

Intermediate remark on the notion of Political

Dedicated to Ernst Forsthoff on his 60th birthday 13 September 1962

Foreword

This essay on The Theory of the Partisan has its origins in two lectures I gave in the spring of 1962 - March 15 in Pamplona, at the invitation of the Estudio General de Navarra, and March 17 at the University of Zaragoza, as part of the Catedra Palafox events, at the invitation of its director, Professor Luis Garcia Arias. The lecture was printed in Catedra publications at the end of 1962.

Subtitle An interim note on the notion of the Political can be explained in terms of a particular moment of publication. The publisher is currently preparing to re-publish my 1932 text. In recent decades, numerous investigations have emerged on this topic. This essay is not such a consequence; this is an independent, albeit sketchy work, the theme of which inevitably translates into the problem of distinguishing between friend and foe. Thus, I only wanted to present this development of my lectures in the spring of 1962 in an unassuming form of an interim comment and thus make them accessible to all those who have so far followed closely the complex discussion of the concept of the political.

February 1963
Carl Schmitt

Introduction. A look at the original position 1808/13

The starting point for our reflections on the problem of the partisan is the guerrilla, which the Spanish people led in 1808-1813 against the army of a foreign conqueror. In this war, the people - the pre-bourgeois, pre-industrial, pre-conventional people - first encountered a modern, well-organized, regular army, derived from the experience of the French Revolution. Thanks to this, new spaces of war were opened, new concepts of warfare were formed, and a new doctrine of war and politics arose.

The guerrilla fights in an irregular manner. But the distinction between regular and irregular struggle depends on the precision of the regular and finds its concrete opposite and thus also its concept only in modern organizational forms that arise from the wars of the French Revolution. At all times, humanity has fought wars and battles; at all times there were rules for waging war and rules for fighting, and as a result of this also breaking the rules and neglecting the rules. Especially at all times of decomposition, for example, during
Thirty Years' War on German soil (1618-48), then in all civil wars and in all colonial wars in world history, phenomena that can be called partisan are again and again revealed. Only in this case it should be borne in mind that, for the theory of the partisan as a whole, the strength and significance of his irregularity is determined by the strength and significance of the partisan questioned by the regular. It is this Regular State, as well as the Regular Army, that acquires a new, precise definition both in the French state and in the French army thanks to Napoleon. Countless wars of white conquerors against the American Indians from the 17th to the 19th century, however, as well as

the methods of the Riflemen during the American War of Independence against the regular English army (1774-83) and the Vendée civil war between the Chuan and Jacobins (1793-96), without exception, all date back to the pre-Napoleonic stage. The new military art of Napoleon's regular armies arose out of a new, revolutionary way of waging war. To one Prussian officer of that time, the entire campaign of Napoleon in 1806 against Prussia was presented only as "One big politicking1".

The 1808 Spanish guerrilla guerrilla was the first to dare to fight irregularly against the first modern regular armies. Napoleon defeated the regular Spanish army in the fall of 1808; the Spanish guerrilla proper began only after this defeat of the regular army. A complete, documented history of Spanish guerrilla warfare is not yet available.2 This is, according to Fernando Solano Costa (in his cited footnote essay Los Guerrilleros) necessary, but also very difficult, since the general Spanish guerrilla was made up of about 200 regional small wars in Asturias, Aragonia , Catalania, Navarre, Castile, etc., led by numerous fighters whose names are shrouded in many myths and legends, among them Juan Martin Diez, who, like Empecinado, became a terror to the French and made the road from Madrid to Saragossa unreliable. 3 This guerrilla war was fought by both sides with the most terrible brutality, and it is not surprising that many of the texts of the friends of the French are printed as works of guerrillas. However, no matter how myth and legend correlate, on the one hand, and documented history, on the other, the lines of our starting position are clear in any case. According to Clausewitz, often half of the total French military force was in Spain and half of it, namely 250-260,000 men, were drawn into guerrilla; their number is estimated by the Gomez de Arteche at 50,000; others offer much lower numbers. - the lines of our starting position are clear in any case. According to Clausewitz, often half of the total French military force was in Spain and half of it, namely 250-260,000 men, were drawn into guerrilla; their number is estimated by the Gomez de Arteche at 50,000; others offer much lower numbers. - the lines of our starting position are clear in any case. According to Clausewitz, often half of the total French military force was in Spain and half of it, namely 250-260,000 men, were drawn into guerrilla; their number is estimated by the Gomez de Arteche at 50,000; others offer much lower numbers.

The situation of the Spanish partisan in 1808 is characterized primarily by the fact that he dared to fight on his small native soil, while his king and the king's family did not yet know exactly who the real enemy was. In this respect, the legitimate government behaved then in Spain no differently than in Germany. In addition, the upper clergy and the bourgeoisie were everywhere afrancesados (friends of the French), that is, the situation in Spain is characterized by the fact that the educated layers of the aristocracy sympathized with the foreign conqueror. And in this respect, parallels come to light with Germany, where the great German poet Goethe created hymns to the glory of Napoleon, and where German education has never completely understood for itself which side it is on. In Spain, Guerrillero dared to fight a hopeless fight, poor man, the first typical case of irregular cannon fodder conflicts of political importance to the whole world. All this as an overture belongs to the theory of the partisan.

At that time, the spark came from Spain to the north. She did not stir up the same fire there that provided the Spanish guerrilla with its worldwide historical significance. But it had such an impact there, whose development today, in the second half of the 20th century, is changing the face of the Earth and humanity. She gave rise to the theory of war and enmity, which consistently reaches its climax in the theory of the partisan.

First, in 1809, during the brief war waged by the Austrian monarchy against Napoleon, a systematic attempt was made to imitate the Spanish example. The Austrian government in Vienna staged national propaganda against Napoleon with the help of famous publicists, among whom were Friedrich Gentz and Friedrich Schlegel. Spanish works were translated into German and circulated.4 Heinrich von Kleist hurried here and continued anti-French propaganda in Berlin after this Austrian war in 1809. During these years, until his death in November 1811, he became the actual poet of national resistance to a foreign conqueror. His drama "The Battle of Teutoburg" ("Die Hermannsschlacht") is the greatest partisan creation of all time. He also composed a poem to Palafox

(An Palafox), placing the defender of Zaragoza on a par with Leonidas, Arminius and Wilhelm Tell.5 That the reformers in the Prussian General Staff, above all Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, were deeply shocked by the Spanish example and tried to keep it in mind in their reorganizations, is known and will be dealt with below. In the world of ideas of these Prussian officers of the general staff of 1808-1813, there are also the seeds of the book On War, thanks to which the name of Clausewitz acquired an almost mythical sound. His formula about war as a continuation of politics contains already in a condensed form the theory of the partisan, whose logic was brought to the end by Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, as we will show below.

The real guerrilla war of the people, which should be mentioned in connection with our partisan problem, came only in Tyrol, where Andreas Hofer, Speckbacher and the Capuchin priest Haspinger were active. The Tyroleans became a powerful torch, as Clausewitz put it.6 However, this era of 1809 quickly ended. And in the rest of Germany, things did not come to a guerrilla war against the French. A strong national impulse, manifested in individual revolts and partisan detachments, very quickly and without a trace resulted in the path of regular war. The battles of the spring and summer of 1813 took place on the battlefield, and the outcome was realized in a battle face to face in October 1813 near Leipzig.

The Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 re-established, as part of an overall restoration, the concept of the European law of war.7 This was one of the most striking restorations in world history. It was a huge success, so that the right of war of the guarded continental war on land as early as the First World War of 1914-18 determined the European practice of waging war on land. Even today, this right is called the classic law of war, and it deserves this name. For it knows clear distinctions, first of all, the distinction between war and peace, participants in war from non-participants in war, enemy and criminal. The war is waged between states as a war of regular, state armies, between sovereign carriers of jus belli, who in the war see themselves as enemies and do not discriminate against each other as criminals, so that peace is possible and even remains the normal, self-evident end of the war. In the face of such classical correctness - as long as it has real effective power - the partisan could only be a peripheral phenomenon, which he actually was during the entire First World War (1914-18).

The horizon of our consideration

When I speak about modern theories of the partisan on occasion, I must emphasize, in order to clarify the topic, that the old theories of the partisan, in contrast to modern theories, do not actually exist at all. In the classical law of war of the old European international law, there is no place for the partisan in the modern sense. He or - as in the war for dynastic reasons of the 18th century - the kind of light, especially mobile, but regular detachment, or he, as a particularly disgusting criminal, simply stands outside the law and hors la loi. As long as there was still something from the concept of duel and chivalry in the war, it could not be otherwise.

With the introduction of universal military service, of course, all wars become, in theory, people's wars, and then situations soon arise that are difficult and often even insoluble for the classical law of war, such as the situation of a more or less improvised levee en masse, or a volunteer corps or "free shooters ". This will be discussed later. In any case, the war remains fundamentally guarded (gehegt), and the guerrilla is outside of this guarding (Hegung). Now even his essence and his existence is that he is outside any protection.

The modern guerrilla does not expect from the enemy no justice, no mercy. It turned away from the traditional enmity of a tamed and guarded war and moved into the realm of another, real enmity, which grows through terror and anti-terror to extermination.

Two kinds of war are especially important in the context of the guerrilla phenomenon and, in a sense, are even related to this phenomenon: civil war and colonial war. In the phenomenon of the partisan of our time, this relationship is downright specific. Classical European international law pushed these two dangerous forms of manifestation of war and enmity to the periphery. The jus publicum Europaeum war was an interstate war fought by one regular state army with another. Open civil war was considered an armed uprising that was suppressed by a state of siege by the police and regular army units. The colonial war did not escape the attention of the military science of European countries such as England, France and Spain. But all this did not question the state's regular war as a classical model.8

It is especially necessary to mention here Russia. During the entire 19th century, the Russian army waged many wars with the Asian highlanders and was never limited to an exclusively regular war of the armies, as the Prussian-German army did. In addition, Russian history knows the autochthonous partisan struggle against the Napoleonic army. In the summer of 1812, Russian partisans under military leadership prevented the French army from advancing towards Moscow; in the autumn and winter of the same year, Russian peasants killed the fled, frozen and hungry Frenchmen. All this lasted for a little over six months, but it was enough to become a historical event that had a huge impact, however, more because of the political myth and its various interpretations than because of its paradigmatic impact on the scientific theory of war. We must mention here,

Tolstoy was not an anarchist like Bakunin or Kropotkin, but his impact was all the more important. His epic War and Peace contains more myth-making power than any political doctrine or any documented history. Tolstoy elevates the Russian partisan of 1812 to the carrier of the elemental forces of the Russian land, which throws off the famous Emperor Napoleon along with his brilliant army as annoying harmful insect. Uneducated, only Tolstoy's illiterate man is not a stronger, but also more intelligent than everyone strategist and tactician, above all is more intelligent than the greatest commander Napoleon, who becomes a puppet in the hands of a historical achievement. Stalin took up this myth of the indigenous national guerrilla struggle during World War II with Germany and placed it in the very specific service of his communist world politics. This signifies a substantially new stage in the appearance of the partisan, at the beginning of which is the name of Mao Tse-tung.

Fierce partisan battles have been taking place over vast areas of the Earth for thirty years. They began already in 1927, before the Second World War, in China and other Asian countries, which later defended against the Japanese invasion of 1932-1945. During the Second World War, Russia, Poland, the Balkans, France, Albania, Greece and other territories became the arena for such wars. After World War II, the partisan struggle continued in Indochina, where it was especially productively organized against the French colonial army by the Vietnamese communist leader Ho Chi Minh and the winner of Dien Bien Phu, General Vo Nguyen Giap, then in Malaya, the Philippines and Algeria, in Cyprus by colonel Griwas,

and in Cuba by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. Currently, in 1962, the Indo-Chinese countries of Laos and Vietnam are territories of guerrilla warfare, which daily develops new methods of defeating the enemy and deceiving the enemy. Modern technology supplies more and more powerful weapons and means of destruction, more and more advanced means of transportation and methods of transferring information, both for the partisans and for the regular army, which is fighting the partisans. In the diabolical circle of terror and anti-terror, the suppression of the partisan is often only a reflection of the partisan struggle itself, and again and again the old thesis, which is mostly cited as Napoleon's order to General Lefebvre of September 12, 1813, turns out to be correct: the partisan must be fought with partisan methods; il faut operer en partisan partout ou il ya des partisans.

Below it will be necessary to dwell on some special issues of international legal regulation. The main thing is clear as it is; application to specific situations of rapid development is controversial. In recent years, an impressive document of the will to total resistance has emerged, not only of will, but also of detailed guidance for specific execution: the Swiss manual for waging small wars for everyone (Kleinkriegsanleitung fur jedermann), published by the Swiss union of non-commissioned officers under the title Total resistance and compiled by the captain H. von Dach (2nd ed., Biel, 1958). Over 180 pages, this work provides guidance on active and passive resistance to alien invasion, with precise instructions on sabotage, underground life, how to hide weapons, organizing putsches, escaping surveillance, etc. The experiences of the last decades have been carefully used. This modern guide to the conduct of war for everyone indicates that their "resistance to the highest degree" adheres to the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the four Hague Accords of 1949. This is self-evident. It is also not difficult to calculate how a normal standing army would react to the practical use of that local warfare instruction (eg, p. 43: silent assassination of a sentry with an ax) until it feels defeated.

The word and concept of partisans

A brief enumeration of some famous names and events, with which we began the first description of the horizon of our consideration, allows us to reveal the immense wealth of material and problems. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify some signs and criteria so that the discussion does not become abstract and limitless. We mentioned one such sign at the beginning of our presentation, when we proceeded from the assumption that the partisan is an irregular fighter. The regularity of the phenomenon is expressed in the soldier's uniform, which is more than professional attire as it demonstrates the dominance of publicity; along with the uniform of the soldier, openly and demonstratively carries weapons. A hostile soldier in uniform is the real target of the modern guerrilla.

The next sign suggests itself today is an intense political engagement, which characterizes the partisan in contrast to other fighters. The intensely political character of the partisan must be pointed out simply because he must be distinguished from the ordinary robber and malicious criminal, whose motives are personal enrichment. This conceptual criterion of a political nature has (in exact inversion) the same structure as that of a pirate in the face of international legal norms for waging war at sea. The concept of a pirate includes the non-political nature of the nasty lifestyle, including robbery and personal gain. Pirate possesses, as lawyers say, animus furandi. The guerrilla fights on the political front, and it is the political nature of his lifestyle that revives the original

the meaning of the word partisan. This word comes from the word party and indicates a connection with a somehow fighting, belligerent or politically active party or group. This kind of ties with the party is especially pronounced in revolutionary epochs.

A revolutionary war presupposes belonging to a revolutionary party and total coverage. Other groups and unions, especially the modern state, can no longer integrate their members and subjects as totally as a revolutionary fighting party embraces its active fighters. In the extensive discussion about the so-called total state, it has not yet become finally clear that today, not the state as such, but the revolutionary party as such is a real and, in fact, the only totalitarian organization.9 From the point of view of purely organizational, in the sense of the strict functioning of the order and it is even necessary to say that another revolutionary organization is superior to another regular army in this respect and that a certain confusion must arise in the international law of war, when the organization as such is made the criterion of regularity, as happened in the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. The partisan in German is called Parteiganger (party member), the one who goes with the party, and what this means specifically, differs at different times, both in relation to the party or front with which someone goes, and in terms of his accompaniment (Mitgehens), contiguity (Mitlaufens), comradeship (Mitkampfens), and possibly fellowship (Mitgefangenwerdens). There are parties waging war, but there are also parties of the trial, parties of parliamentary democracy, parties of opinion and parties of shares, etc. In Romance languages, the word can be used both as a noun and as an adjective: in French they even speak of a partisan of some opinion; in short, from the general, ambiguous designation suddenly turns out to be a word of great political importance. This suggests a linguistic parallel with such a general word as status, which can suddenly mean the state (Staat). In an era of decay, as in the 17th century during the Thirty Years' War, the irregular soldier becomes close to bandits and vagrants; he fights at his own peril and risk and becomes the character of a rogue novel, like the Spanish Picaro Estebanillo of Gonzalez, who took part in the Battle of Nördlingen (1635) and talks about it in the style of a soldier Schweik. You can read about this in Grimmelshausen's Simplicius Simplicissimus, you can see it on the engravings and etchings by Jacques Callot. In the 18th century, the "Parteiganger" belonged to the pandurs and hussars and other types of light troops who, as mobile troops, "fight separately" and wage the so-called small war. as opposed to a slow big war of the line troops. Here the distinction between regular and irregular is considered purely military-technical and in no way is equivalent to the opposition legal-illegal in the legal sense of international law and

state law. In the case of the modern partisan, both pairs of opposites (regularly-irregularly, legally-illegally) are mostly erased and
intersect.

Mobility, speed and stunning alternation of attack and retreat, in a word: increased mobility is still a hallmark of the partisan today, and this sign is even enhanced by the introduction of technology and motorization. However, both opposites are eliminated by the revolutionary war, and there are
numerous semi- and para-regular groups and formations. Fighting with weapons in the hands of the guerrilla, always remains dependent on cooperation with the regular organization. Fidel Castro's combat associate in Cuba, Ernesto Che Guevara, stresses this very persistently.10 As a result of this, thanks to interaction
regular and irregular, some intermediate steps are obtained. This also happens in those cases when in no way a revolutionary government calls for the protection of national territory from a foreign conqueror. People's war and

small wars are intertwined here. In the regulations for such troops, since the 16th century, there has been a designation of partisans.11 We will also get acquainted with two important examples of the formal regulation of the people's war and the landsturm, which are trying to regulate the guerrilla. On the other hand, a foreign conqueror also publishes instructions on suppressing enemy partisans. All norms of this kind are faced with a complex problem of international law, i.e. legal for both sides irregular regulation, regarding the recognition of the partisan as a participant in the war and his consideration as a prisoner of war, and, on the other hand, the observance of the rights of the military occupation authorities. We have already made it clear that there are some legal differences arising here. We will return to the dispute about the "free shooters" of the German-French war of 1870-1871, after as we take a look at the international legal situation (p. below). The tendency to change or abolish inherited concepts - classical concepts, as they like to say today - is universal and in the face of the rapid change in the world, it is all the more comprehensible.12 The “classical” (if you can call it that) concept of the partisan did not remain aloof from this trend. In the 1961 book Partisan, which was very important for our topic, by Rolf Schroers, an illegal fighter of the Resistance movement and an underground activist becomes a type of partisan. as such deserves attention. Irregularity has been replaced by illegality, and military struggle has been replaced by resistance. This means, as it seems to me,

In some cases, the reinterpretation reaches the general symbol and the abolition of the concept. Then any individualist or non-conformist can be called a partisan, regardless of whether he even thinks about taking up arms.14 As a metaphor, this is perfectly acceptable; I myself used it to characterize spiritual and historical figures and situations.15 In a figurative sense, “to be human is to be a fighter,” and a consistent individualist fights independently and at his own peril and risk. Then he becomes his own party. This kind of abolition of concepts is noteworthy signs of the times that require a separate
research.16 But for the theory of the partisan, which is meant here, there must be some criteria so that the topic does not dissipate in abstract universality. These criteria are: irregularity, increased mobility of active combat and increased, increased intensity of political engagement.

I would like to adhere to one more, fourth characteristic of a true guerrilla, a characteristic that Jover Zamora described as a telluric character. This, despite all the tactical mobility and maneuverability, is important for the fundamentally defensive situation of the partisan, who changes his essence if he identifies himself with the absolute aggressiveness of the ideology of the world revolution or technicist ideology. Two interpretations of the topic that are especially interesting for us, the book by Rolf Schroers (note 13) and the dissertation by Jurg.H.Schmid on the international legal position of the partisan (p.), Completely coincide with this criterion. His rationale for telluric the nature of such a phenomenon as a partisan seems to me necessary in order to make defense obvious in terms of position in space, i.e. limiting hostility and warn against the absolute requirement of abstract justice.

With regard to the partisans who fought in Spain, Tyrol and Russia in 1808/13, this is already clear. But the partisan battles of World War II and subsequent years in Indochina and other countries, associated with the names of Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro, give an understanding of the fact that the connection with the soil, with the autochthonous population and with the geographical originality of the country - mountains, forest, jungle or desert - remains quite relevant. The partisan remains separated not only from

pirate, but also from the corsair to the same extent that land and sea remain separated as different elementary spaces of human work and military clash between nations. Land and sea have not only different ways of waging war and not only different kinds of theaters of military operations, but also developed different concepts of war, the enemy, and trophies.17 The partisan will represent a specifically terrestrial, land-based type of active fighter, at least for as long as possible anti-colonial wars on our planet. 18 The telluric character of the partisan will be more clearly outlined below in comparison with the figures that are typically maritime in legal terms (p.
) and in the analysis of the spatial aspect (p.).

But even an autochthonous guerrilla of agrarian origin is drawn into the force field of irresistible, technical and industrial progress. His mobility is so enhanced by motorization that he is in danger of being completely deprived of any soil. During the Cold War, he becomes an invisible combat technician, saboteur and spy. Already during the Second World War, there were detachments of saboteurs with partisan training. Such a motorized partisan loses its telluric character and is only a transportable and replaceable instrument of a powerful center that creates world politics, which puts it into action for an explicit or invisible war and, as appropriate, turns it off again. This possibility also belongs to his present existence and should not be ignored in the theory of the partisan.

By these four criteria - irregularity, increased mobility, the intensity of political engagement, telluric character - and with reference to the possible consequences of the ongoing technicalization, industrialization and loss of the agrarian character, we, from a conceptual point of view, described the horizon of our consideration. It stretches from the Guerrillero of the Napoleonic era to the well-armed guerrilla of modern times, from Empecinado through Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh to Fidel Castro. This is a large area, constantly growing material in historiography and military science. We will use it as far as we can, and try to get some scientific conclusions for the guerrilla theory.

A look at the international legal situation

The partisan fights in an irregular manner. But certain categories of irregular fighters are equated with the regular armed forces and enjoy the rights and advantages of regular participants in the war. This means: their fighting is not illegal, and when they are captured by the enemy, they have the right to demand special treatment as prisoners of war and wounded. The legal status was found in the Hague Charter of Land War of October 18, 1907, a generalization that is now generally accepted. After World War II, this matter was developed in four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, of which the second regulates the fate of the wounded and sick in land war and naval war, the third - the treatment of prisoners of war, and the fourth - the protection of civilians in war. They have been ratified by many countries in the Western world and the Eastern bloc;

The Hague Land War Charter of October 18, 1907, under certain conditions, equated the militia, volunteer corps and combat comrades of spontaneous popular indignations with the regular armed forces. Later, when analyzing the Prussian differences with partisans, we will mention some of the difficulties and ambiguities of this regulation. The development that led to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is characterized by the fact that it recognizes ever more widespread weakening so far purely

state, European international law. All new categories of participants in hostilities are now considered participants in the war. And the civilians of the region occupied by the enemy's troops - that is, the partisan's own combat area fighting behind enemy lines - now enjoy greater legal protection than under the 1907 land war charter. Many comrades-in-arms who until now were considered partisans are now on an equal footing with regular fighters and have their rights and advantages. As a matter of fact, they can no longer be called partisans. However, the concepts are still unclear and hesitant.

The wording of the Geneva Conventions takes into account the European experience, but does not take into account the partisan wars of Mao Tse-tung and the later development of modern guerrilla warfare. In the first years after the date of 1945, it was not yet clear what such an expert as Hermann Foertsch realized and formulated: that military actions after 1945 took a partisan character, since the owners of the atomic bomb avoided its use for humanitarian reasons, and those who did not possess it could counting on these fears is the unexpected impact of both the atomic bomb and humanitarian considerations. The concepts of the Geneva norms that are important for the partisan problem are abstracted from certain situations. They are (as stated in the authoritative and all-important commentary of Internationalen Roten Kreuzes, Bd. 111,1958, S.

There was no intention here to fundamentally change the 1907 land war charter of the Hague. Here, they even adhere in principle to four classical conditions for equalization with regular troops (responsible commanders, a permanent solid visible insignia, open carrying of weapons, observance of the rules and customs of the law of war). The Convention for the Protection of Civilian Population should, however, be valid not only for interstate wars, but also for all international armed conflicts, and so, for civil wars, uprisings, etc. But by doing so, it is only necessary to create a legal basis for humanitarian interventions by the International Committee of the Red Cross (and other non-party organizations). Inter arma caritas. Article 3 paragraph 4 of the Convention strongly emphasizes that the legal position, le statut juridique, conflicting parties are not affected by this (Pictet, aaO, 111, 1955, S. 39/40). In an interstate war, the occupying authorities of an area occupied by troops still retain the right to instruct the local police in that area to maintain order and suppress irregular hostilities, thus pursuing the guerrillas "no matter what ideas inspire them" (Pictet 1V,

1956, S. 330).

Thus, the distinction of a partisan - in the sense of an irregular fighter who is not equated with regular troops - is fundamentally preserved today. The partisan in this sense does not have the rights and advantages of the participants in the war; he is a common law criminal and can be rendered harmless by summary punishment and reprisals. This was also fundamentally recognized in the trials of war criminals after World War II, mainly in the verdicts of the Nuremberg trials against German generals (Jodl, Leeb, List), and it goes without saying that everything beyond the necessary suppression of the partisan brutality, terror , collective punishment or even participation in genocide remain war crimes.

The Geneva Conventions expand the circle of persons equated to regular fighters, first of all by the fact that they equalize members of the "organized resistance movement" and police officers and members of volunteer corps, and thus assign them the rights and advantages of regular participants in the war. Moreover, more than once the military organization is unambiguously made a condition (Article 13 of the Convention on the Wounded, Article 4 of the Convention on Prisoners of War). Convention for the protection of civilians

equates "international conflicts", which are resolved by force of arms, to interstate wars of classical European international law, and thus touches the core of the legal institution typical of the previous law of war, occupatio bellica. To such expansions and weakenings, which can only be cited here as examples, are added important transformations and changes that follow by themselves from the development of modern military technology and, with reference to partisan warfare, operate even more intensively. What does, for example, mean, for example, the provision on "open carrying" of weapons for a resistance fighter, who is instructed by the above-quoted "guide to guerrilla warfare" of the Swiss Union of NCOs (p. 33): "Move only at night and hide in the woods during the day! "Or what does it mean to require a visible insignia everywhere in a night battle or in a battle with the use of long-range weapons of modern military equipment? Many similar questions arise when the consideration is conducted from the point of view of the partisan problem and when the aspects identified below (p.) Are not overlooked
changes in space and technical and industrial development.

The protection of civilians in a military-occupied area is diverse. The occupation authorities are interested in peace and order in the area occupied by their military. They adhere to the fact that the population of the occupied area is not obliged to be faithful, but, perhaps, is obliged to obey the orders of the occupation authorities permissible by the law of war. Even the employees - and the police themselves - must continue to work correctly and must be treated accordingly by the occupation authorities. All this is a difficultly balanced, difficult compromise between the interests of the occupying authorities and the interests of their military adversary. The guerrilla violates this kind of order in an occupied area in a dangerous way. Not only because his real combat area is an area in the rear of the enemy front, where he incapacitates transport and supplies, but also, moreover, if the population of this area more or less supports and hides it. "The population is your greatest friend" - is listed in the just cited "Guide to guerrilla warfare for everyone" (p. 28). Then the protection of such a population is potentially also the protection of the guerrilla. So it becomes clear why in the history of the development of the law of war, when discussing the Hague Charter of Ground War and its further development, a typical grouping, an alignment of forces took place all the time: large military powers, that is, potential occupation authorities, demanded strict maintenance of order in the region occupied by the troops, in while smaller states that feared military occupation - Belgium, Switzerland, Luxembourg - tried to achieve the fullest possible protection of the resistance fighters and the civilian population.

strongly suggests the question of whether there may be cases in which the population needs protection from the guerrilla.

Thanks to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, changes took place within the classic, precisely regulated and regulated legal institution of occupatio bellica, the consequences of which remain largely unforeseen. Resistance fighters, who were previously treated as guerrillas, are equated with regular fighters, if only they are organized. In contrast to the interests of the occupation authorities, the interests of the population of the occupied area are so strongly emphasized that - at least in theory - it has become possible to consider any resistance to the occupation authorities, including partisan resistance, as long as it arises from respectable motives, as not illegal. On the other hand, the occupying authorities must continue to have the right to repressive measures. The partisan in this situation will not act truly legally,

to act truly illegally, but he will act at his own peril and risk, and in this sense will act risky.

When the word risk is used and risky in a general, unspecified sense, then it is necessary to establish that in an area occupied by the enemy's military and saturated with partisans, it is by no means only a partisan who lives risky. In a general sense of insecurity and danger, the entire population of such an area is at great risk. Employees who, in accordance with the Hague Charter of Land Warfare, wish to continue to work correctly, face additional risks in terms of actions and inaction, and in particular the police officer finds himself at the point of intersection of dangerous, conflicting requirements: the enemy occupying authorities require him to obey while maintaining security and order which are violated by the partisan; his own nation-state demands loyalty from him and after the war will bring him to justice; population, to whom he belongs, expects loyalty and solidarity, which, referring to the activities of the police officer, can lead to completely opposite practical conclusions if the police officer does not dare to become a partisan himself; and finally, the guerrilla and the occupier will quickly enroll him in the diabolical circle of their repression and anti-repression. In the abstract, risky action (or inaction) is not a specific hallmark of the guerrilla.

The word risky acquires a clarified meaning due to the fact that the risky [subject] acts at his own risk and consciously resigns himself to the bad consequences of his action or inaction, so that he cannot complain about injustice if bad results overtake him. On the other hand, he has the opportunity - as far as we are not talking about illegal actions - to compensate for the risk by concluding an insurance contract. Insurance law remains the legal homeland of the concept of risk, its scientific and legal topos. A person lives among a variety of dangers, and to give a danger with legal consciousness the name risk means to make it and the person affected by it insured. In the case of the guerrilla, this would probably lead to the failure of the irregularity and illegality of his actions, even if they were prepared to

Reflecting on the concept of risk is essential for situations such as war and enmity. We have introduced this word into the international legal doctrine of war in the book by Josef L. Kunz “Kriegsrecht und Neutralitatsrecht” (1935, S. 146, 274). But there this word does not refer to war on land and does not at all refer to the partisan. These things are not mentioned at all in the book. If we do not remember insurance law as the legal homeland of the concept of risk and forget the imprecise and unclear uses of this word - for example, a comparison with an escaped prisoner who "risks" being shot - then we will find that a specifically fruitful use of the concept in the sense of the law of war J. Kunz's “risky” means only the maritime law of war and its typical figures and situations. War at sea is largely an economic war; in contrast to war on land, it has its own space and its own concepts of enemy and trophies. Even the improvement in the plight of the wounded in the Geneva regulation of August 1949 led to two, separate for land and sea, conventions.

Risky in this specific sense are two participants in the war at sea: a neutral blockade breaker and a neutral smuggling carrier. When referring to them, the word risky is clear and precise. Both kinds of participants in the war embark on "a very profitable but risky commercial adventure" (J. Kunz aaO, p. 277): they risk the ship and the cargo in the event of capture. At the same time, they do not have an enemy, even if they themselves are regarded as an enemy in the sense of international legal norms for waging war at sea. Their social ideal is a good deal. Their field of activity is the free sea. They do not think about how to protect their home, hearth and homeland from strangers.

invader, which refers to the prototype of the autochthonous partisan. They also enter into insurance contracts to compensate for their risk, and the hazard rates are correspondingly high and adapt to changing risk factors, such as submarine sinking: very risky, but reliable and expensively insured.

One should not withdraw such a successful word as risky from the conceptual field of the maritime law of war and dissolve it in a general concept that erases all clear outlines. For us, who insist on the telluric character of the partisan, this is especially important. If earlier I once called the marauders and lovers of the sea of the beginning of capitalism "partisans of the sea" (Der Nomos der Erde, S. 145), today I would correct this as a terminological inaccuracy. The partisan has an enemy and "risks" in a completely different sense than the blockade breaker and smuggler. He risks not only his life, like any regular participant in the war. He knows, and does not stop at the fact that the enemy puts him outside the law, outside the law and outside the concept of honor.

This, of course, is done by the revolutionary fighter who declares the enemy a criminal and declares all the enemy's notions of law, law and honor to be an ideological deception. Contrary to everything characteristic of the Second World War and the post-war period up to the present day, the combinations and mixtures of both types of partisan - defensive autochthonous defender of the homeland and aggressive on a global scale, revolutionary activist - the opposite remains. It rests, as we shall see, on fundamentally different concepts of war and enmity that are embodied in the different kinds of guerrillas. Where war is fought on both sides as a non-discriminatory war of one state against another, the guerrilla is a peripheral figure who does not explode the boundaries of the war or change the overall structure of the political process. However, if the war is waged against the criminalizations of the military adversary as a whole, if the war is waged, for example, as a civil war of a class enemy against a class enemy, if its main goal is to overthrow the government of a hostile state, then the revolutionary action of the explosion of criminalization of the enemy affects in such a way that the partisan becomes true war hero. He carries out the death sentence for the criminal and for his part risks being seen as a criminal or a saboteur. This is the logic of justa causa war without justus hostis acknowledgment. Thanks to her, the revolutionary partisan becomes a true central figure in the war. then the revolutionary effect of the explosion of the criminalization of the enemy is reflected in such a way that the partisan becomes a true hero of the war. He carries out the death sentence for the criminal and for his part risks being seen as a criminal or a saboteur. This is the logic of justa causa war without justus hostis acknowledgment. Thanks to her, the revolutionary partisan becomes a true central figure in the war. then the revolutionary effect of the explosion of the criminalization of the enemy is reflected in such a way that the partisan becomes a true hero of the war. He carries out the death sentence for the criminal and for his part risks being seen as a criminal or a saboteur. This is the logic of justa causa war without justus hostis acknowledgment. Thanks to her, the revolutionary partisan becomes a true central figure in the war.

However, the guerrilla problem becomes the best touchstone. Different types of guerrilla warfare can be so mixed and merged in the practice of today's warfare, they remain so different in their fundamental premises that the criterion of grouping into friends and enemies justifies itself when applied to them. Earlier, we recalled a typical grouping that was evident in the preparation of The Hague Charter of Land War: large military powers against small neutral countries. During the discussions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, it was with great difficulty that a compromise formula was reached, equalizing the organized resistance movement and the volunteer corps. And here the typical grouping was repeated when it was a question of consolidating the experience of the Second World War in international legal norms. And this time the big military powers, potential occupiers confronted small states fearing occupation; however, this time with a modification as unusual as it was symptomatic: the largest land, continental power in the world, the most powerful potential occupier, the Soviet Union, was now on the side of the small states.

The rich material and well-documented work of Jurg H. Schmid “Die volkerrechtliche Stellung der Partisanen im Kriege” (Zurcher Studien zum Internationalen Recht Nr. 23, Polygraphischer Verlag AG. Zurich, 1956) wants to put “under the guise of law” “Keeping guerrillas by civilians ”- this refers specifically to Stalin's partisans (S. 97, 157). In this Schmid sees “the quintessence of the problem

partisan “and the legal creative achievement of the Geneva Conventions. Schmid would like to eliminate "certain reflections of the right of occupation" still left over from the previous understanding of occupation power, in particular, as he says, "the glorified duty to obey orders." For this purpose, he uses the doctrine of legal but risky military action, which he re-emphasizes as risky but illegal military action. Thus, he reduces the risk of the partisan, to whom he, at the expense of the occupation authorities, confers as many rights and privileges as possible. How he thinks to avoid the logic of terror and anti-terror, I do not see; the case is that he simply criminalizes the military enemy of the guerrilla. All this as a whole is an extremely interesting intersection of two different statuts juridiques, namely a war participant and a civilian, with two different types of modern warfare, namely open and cold war between the population and the occupation authorities, in which the Schmid partisan (following Mao) takes part a deux mains. Surprisingly, and here lies the true breakdown of the axis of the concept that this de-legalization of the Stalinist partisan at the expense of classical international law is simultaneously associated with a return to pure war of states of the Portalis-Rousseau doctrine, about which Schmid claims that it is only "in her children's shoes" prohibited a civilian from committing hostilities (S.157). This is how the partisan becomes insured. that this de-legalization of the Stalinist partisan at the expense of classical international law is simultaneously associated with the return to pure war of states of the Portalis-doctrine of Rousseau, about which Schmid claims that she only "in her children's shoes" prohibited a civilian from committing hostilities (S.157) ... This is how the partisan becomes insured. that this de-legalization of the Stalinist partisan at the expense of classical international law is simultaneously associated with the return to pure war of states of the Portalis-doctrine of Rousseau, about which Schmid claims that she only "in her children's shoes" prohibited a civilian from committing hostilities (S.157) ... This is how the partisan becomes insured.

The four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 are the fruit of a humane mindset and humane development that deserves admiration. Assigning to the enemy not only humanity, but even legitimacy in the sense of recognition, they remain on the basis of classical international law and in line with its tradition, and such a work of humanity is not incredible. Their basis remains the state conduct of war and the defense of war built on this, with its clear distinctions between war and peace, military and civilians, enemy and criminal, war of states and civil war. However, by diminishing or even questioning these essential distinctions, they open the door to the kind of war that deliberately destroys those clear separations from one another.

Theory Development / Prussian Disagreements with Partisans

In Prussia, Germany's leading military power, the uprising against Napoleon in the spring of 1813 was filled with strong national sentiment. The great moment passed quickly; however, in the history of partisanship, it is so significant that we will have to discuss it in particular later.

First, we need to pay attention to an indisputable historical fact: the Prussian and Prussian-led German army from 1813 until the end of World War II provides a classic example of the organization of the army, which radically supplanted the idea of partisanism. Thirty years of German colonial rule in Africa (1885-1915) were not militarily important enough to seriously introduce the problem to the brilliant theorists of the Prussian General Staff. The Austrian-Hungarian army knew guerrilla warfare in the Balkans and had regulations for a small war. On the contrary, the Prussian-German army invaded Russia during World War II on June 22, 1941, without thinking about guerrilla warfare. She began her campaign against Stalin with the maxim: the military unit suppresses the enemy; marauders are rendered harmless by the police. Only in October 1941 were the first special instructions to suppress the partisans followed; in May 1944, a year before the end of the four-year

war, the first complete regulations of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces were issued.

In the 19th century, the Prussian-German army became the most famous, exemplary military organization of the then Eurocentric world. But she owed this glory solely to military victories over other regular European armies, especially over the armies of France and Switzerland. She met with irregular war only during the German-French war of 1870-1871 in France, in the guise of the so-called frantiers, who in German were called partisans (Heckenschutzen) and mercilessly treated them in accordance with the law of war, as is, incidentally, any regular army did too. The stricter the discipline in a regular army, the more correctly it distinguishes between military and civilians and considers only the uniformed enemy as an enemy, the more sensitive and nervous it becomes. if, on the other side, civilians who are not wearing uniforms take part in the struggle. The military then react with harsh repressions, shootings, hostage-taking and destruction of settlements and consider this a fair self-defense against treachery and perfidy. The more respect a regular, uniformed adversary is treated as an enemy, and the more they do not confuse him even in the bloodiest struggle with a criminal, the more viciously the irregular fighter is treated as a criminal. All this naturally follows from the logic of the classical European law of war, which distinguishes between military and civilians, war participants and civilians, and which mobilizes a rare moral strength - not to declare the enemy as such a criminal. taking hostages and destroying settlements and consider it fair self-defense against treachery and perfidy. The more respect a regular, uniformed adversary is treated as an enemy, and the more they do not confuse him even in the bloodiest struggle with a criminal, the more viciously the irregular fighter is treated as a criminal. All this naturally follows from the logic of the classical European law of war, which distinguishes between military and civilians, war participants and civilians, and which mobilizes a rare moral strength - not to declare the enemy as such a criminal. taking hostages and destroying settlements and consider it fair self-defense against treachery and perfidy. The more respect a regular, uniformed adversary is treated as an enemy, and the more they do not confuse him even in the bloodiest struggle with a criminal, the more viciously the irregular fighter is treated as a criminal. All this naturally follows from the logic of the classical European law of war, which distinguishes between military and civilians, war participants and civilians, and which mobilizes a rare moral strength - not to declare the enemy as such a criminal. the more angrily the irregular fighter is treated as a criminal. All this naturally follows from the logic of the classical European law of war, which distinguishes between military and civilians, war participants and civilians, and which mobilizes a rare moral strength - not to declare the enemy as such a criminal. the more angrily the irregular fighter is treated as a criminal. All this naturally follows from the logic of the classical European law of war, which distinguishes between military and civilians, war participants and civilians, and which mobilizes a rare moral strength - not to declare the enemy as such a criminal.

A German soldier learned of the franchisee in France in the fall of 1870 and the following winter of 1870/71, after an important victory he won over the regular army of the Emperor Napoleon111 at the Battle of Sedan on September 2. If everything went according to the rules of the classical, regular war of the armies, then one would have to expect that after such a victory the war would be over and that peace would be concluded. Instead, the defeated government of the emperor was deposed. The new Republican government, led by Leon Gambett, proclaimed a national uprising against the foreign invader, “Krieg a outrance”. It very hastily recruited more and more armies and threw more and more masses of poorly trained soldiers onto the battlefields. In November 1870, it even achieved military success at Loire. Since they did not count on the long-term conduct of the war, the position of the German armies became threatening, and the foreign policy position of Germany was threatened. The French population fell into a state of patriotic unrest and began to participate in the struggle against the Germans in various forms. The Germans arrested respected persons and the so-called nobility (Notable) as hostages, shot frantiers who came across them with weapons in their hands, and put pressure on the population through all kinds of repression. This was the starting point for more than half a century of dispute between lawyers in the field of international law and the official propaganda of both sides for and against the frantier. The controversy flared up again in World War I as a Belgian-German dispute over franchises. Entire libraries have been written about this issue,

All of this is indicative of the guerrilla problem, as it shows that regulation - if it should, following the facts, comprehend the state of affairs and if it should not only issue glissando judgments about price and general restrictive conditions - is legally impossible. The traditional European preservation of an interstate war comes from the 18th century from certain concepts, which, although they were suspended by the French Revolution, were all the more effectively confirmed by the restoration of the Vienna Congress. These dating back to the era of the monarchy

ideas about a war to be guarded and about a legitimate enemy can be legalized between states only if the states of both sides waging a war adhere to them both in domestic and interstate politics in the same way, that is, if their internal and interstate concepts of regularity and irregularity , legality and illegality are substantively the same or, at least in some way, homogeneous in their structure. Otherwise, interstate rationing, instead of promoting the achievement of peace, will only supply pretexts and slogans for mutual accusations. This simple truth has gradually become clear since the First World War. But the façade of the inherited conceptual inventory is still very strong ideologically. For practical reasons, states are interested in using so-called classical concepts, even if these latter are otherwise dismissed as old-fashioned and reactionary. In addition, the jurists of European international law stubbornly pushed out of their minds the picture of the new reality that had been discernible since 1900.21

If all this is generally valid for the distinction between the European war of the old-style states and the democratic popular war, then all the more it applies to the impromptu national people's war a outrance, as proclaimed by Gambetta in September 1870. 1907 Hague Land War Charter
- not otherwise than all of his predecessors in the 19th century - did not try to reach a compromise, referring to the frantier. It requires certain conditions in order to recognize an improvised warrior, dressed in an impromptu uniform, a participant in the war in the international legal sense: responsible commanders, a permanent, far visible insignia and, above all, the open carrying of weapons. The ambiguity of the concepts of the Hague regulation and the Geneva Conventions is great and confuses the problem.22 The guerrilla is still the one who avoids openly carrying weapons, who fights from around the corner, who uses both the enemy's uniform and a stable or free insignia and any kind of civilian clothing as a disguise. Stealth and darkness are his strongest weapons, which he honestly cannot refuse without losing the space of irregularity, which means: without that, so as not to stop being a partisan. The military concept of a regular Prussian army was by no means based on a lack of education or ignorance of the meaning of the guerrilla. This is evident in an interesting book by a typical Prussian general staff officer who knew the war with the Frantiers in 1870-71 and who published his opinion in 1877 under the title "Leon Gambetta and his armies." The author, Baron Colmar von der Goltz, died during the First World War as the commander of the Turkish army as Pasha Goltz. With all objectivity and with great accuracy, the young Prussian officer discovers the decisive mistake of the republican warfare and states: “Gambetta wanted to wage a big war, and he fought it, to his misfortune; for for the German armies in France of that time, a small war, guerrilla, would have been much more dangerous. ”23 The Prussian-German leadership of the ground forces, albeit late, but finally overtook the guerrilla war. On May 6, 1944, the High Command of the German Armed Forces published the already mentioned general directives on the fight against partisans. So the German army, before its end, still managed to get to know the partisan correctly. Meanwhile, the directives of May 1944 are recognized as excellent regulation and an enemy of Germany. The English brigadier Dixon, who published a comprehensive book on the partisan after the Second World War with Otto Heilbrunn, reprints the German directives in extenso as an example of the correct fight against the partisans, and the English General Sir Reginald FS Denning notes in his introduction to Dixon-Heilbrunn that the value of the German instructions for the fight against partisans in 1944 does not diminish from the fact

The two phenomena of the German end of the 1944-45 war need not be attributed to the German Wehrmacht; rather, they can be explained by a contradiction with him: the German Volkssturm and the so-called werewolf. Volkssturm was called up by decree of September 25, 1944, as a territorial militia for the defense of the country; people belonging to it, starting to act, became soldiers in the sense of the law on conscription and participants in the war in the sense of the Hague charter of land war. Their organization, armament, use, morale and losses are reported by the recently published work of Major General Hans Kissel, who was chief of the Deutscher Volkssturm headquarters since November 1944. Kissel reports that the Volkssturm in the West was recognized by the Allies as a belligerent detachment (military unit), while the Russians viewed it as a partisan organization and shot the prisoners. In contrast to this territorial militia, the werewolf was conceived as a youth guerrilla organization. The result is reported in a book by Dixon and Heilbrunn: "Some of the few aspiring werewolves were captured by the allies, and that was all." The werewolf was described as “an attempt to set free the war of the partisan children” (Kinderheckenschutzenkrieg) .24` In any case, we need not dwell on this in detail here.

After the First World War, the then victors liquidated the German General Staff and prohibited its restoration in any form in Article 160 of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919. The historical and international legal logic is that the victors in World War II, who in the meantime outlawed the Duellkrieg of classical European international law, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union, after their common victory over Germany, also outlawed the Prussian state and destroyed his. Law No. 46 of the Allied Control Council of 25 February 1947 decreed:

The Prussian state, which for a long time had been the bearer of militarism and reaction in Germany, de facto ceased to exist. Guided by the idea of preserving the peace and security of peoples and wishing to restore political life in Germany on a democratic basis, the Control Council prescribes the following:
Article 1. The Prussian state with its government and all its administrative organs is liquidated.

The partisan as the Prussian ideal of 1813 and a turn to theory

Not a Prussian soldier or a career officer of the Prussian General Staff striving for reforms, but the Prussian Prime Minister Bismarck was the one who, in 1866, against the Habsburg monarchy and Bonapartist France, “wanted to take up any weapon that was released to us (entfesselte) a national movement not only in Germany, but also in Hungary and Bohemia, ”so as not to be defeated. Bismarck was determined to set Acheron in motion. He willingly used the classic quotation Acheronta movere, but he attributed this, of course, more willingly to his internal political opponents. Both the Prussian king Wilhelm I and the chief of the Prussian general staff, Moltke, were far from the Acherontian plans; something like that must have seemed to them creepy and also non-Prussian. And for the weak attempts of the German government and the general staff to prepare a revolution during the First World War, the word acherontisch would be too strong. Of course, Lenin's trip from Switzerland to Russia in 1917 belongs to this context. But everything that the Germans could conceive and plan then, when organizing Lenin's journey, thanks to the historical consequences of this preparation for the revolution, so monstrously surpassed and turned upside down plans that our thesis about

the Prussian disagreement with partisanship is thus more likely to be confirmed than disproved. 25

Nevertheless, the Prussian state of soldiers (Soldatenstaat) once had an Acheron moment in its history. It was in the winter and spring of 1812-13, when the elite of the officers of the General Staff tried to free up and take over the forces.
national hostility to Napoleon. The German war against Napoleon was not a guerrilla war. It can hardly be called a people's war; the latter does it, as Ernst Forsthof accurately says, only “a legend with a political background.” 26 It was quickly possible to direct those spontaneous forces into a solid framework of state order and regular struggle against the French armies. Nonetheless, this brief, revolutionary moment remains enduring to guerrilla theory.

Here they will immediately recall the famous masterpiece of military science - the book On the War of the Prussian General von Clausewitz. They will remember it quite rightly. But Clausewitz was then a young friend of his teachers and mentors Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and his book was published only after his death, after 1832. But there is another manifesto of hostility to Napoleon, dating back directly to the spring of 1813; it belongs to the most amazing documents in the entire history of partisans: the Prussian Landsturm Edict of April 21, 1813. This is an edict signed by the King of Prussia, which was published in the Prussian code of laws in compliance with all the rules. There is no doubt that the Spanish Reglamento de Partidas y Cuadrillas of December 28, 1808 and the decree of April 17, 1809, known as the Corso Terrestre, served as a model for this edict. But these documents were not personally signed by the monarch.27 You are amazed when you see the name of the legitimate king under this kind of call for guerrilla war. These ten pages of the Prussian Code of Laws of 1813 (pp. 79-89) certainly belong to the most unusual pages of all the laws of the world published. Every citizen of the state, as it is stated in the royal Prussian edict of April 1813, is obliged to resist the invading enemy with all types of weapons. Axes, pitchforks, scythes, and shot rifles are highly recommended (at # 43). Every Prussian is obliged not to obey any order of the enemy, but is obliged to harm him by all available means. Also, if the enemy wants to restore public order, no one should obey him, since this makes it easier for the enemy to conduct military operations. It says unequivocally, that the "riot of unbridled rabble" is less harmful than the state when the enemy can freely dispose of all his troops. Repression and terror for the protection of the partisan are promised, they threaten the enemy. In short, there is a genus of Magna Carta partisanship. Three places - in the introduction and ## 8 and 52 - explicitly refer to Spain and guerrilla as "a model and an example." The fight is justified as a fight within the confines of self-defense that “sanctifies all means” (# 7), as well as the release of total disorder.

I have already said that it did not come to the point of a German partisan war against Napoleon. The edict of the Landsturm itself, already three months later, on July 17, 1813, was changed and cleared of all partisan danger, of all Acheront dynamics. Everything that followed took place in the battles of the regular armies, even if the dynamics of the national impulse penetrated the regular detachment. Napoleon could boast that during the many years of French occupation on German soil, not a single German civilian had fired a single shot into a French uniform.

So, what is the special significance of that short-lived Prussian order of 1813? In the fact that it is an official document of the legitimation of the partisan of national defense, namely, a special legitimation that emerged from the spirit and philosophy that reigned in the then Prussian capital Berlin. The Spanish guerrilla against Napoleon, the Tyrolean uprising of 1809 and the Russian partisan war of 1812 were spontaneous, autochthonous movements of a devout, Catholic or Orthodox people whose religious tradition was not affected by the philosophical spirit

revolutionary France and was in this respect underdeveloped. Especially the Spaniards, Napoleon called in an indignant letter to his governor-general of Hamburg Davout (December 2, 1811) a killing from the corner, a superstitious people who are deceived by 300,000 monks - this people cannot be compared with the diligent, hardworking and reasonable Germans. On the contrary, Berlin in 1808-1813 was created and minted by a spirit that was absolutely entrusted with the philosophy of the French Enlightenment, so believed that he could feel grown up on it, if not surpassed it.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte, the great philosopher; such highly educated and genius soldiers as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz; such a poet as the previously mentioned Heinrich von Kleist, who died in November 1811, - they characterize the enormous spiritual potential of the Prussian intelligentsia, then ready for action at a critical moment. The nationalism of this Berlin intelligentsia stratum was the lot of educated people, and not of a simple or completely illiterate people. In such an atmosphere, when the excited national feeling was combined with a philosophical education, the partisan was philosophically open and his theory became historically possible. That the doctrine of war also belongs to this alliance is shown by a letter written by Clausewitz as an "anonymous soldier" in 1809 from Königsberg Fichte as "the creator of the Machiavellian essay." In this letter, the Prussian officer, with all possible reverence, instructs the famous philosopher that the doctrine of the Machiavellian war is too dependent on antiquity and that today "they gain infinitely more by the revitalization of individual forces than by an artificial form." New weapons and masses, says Clausewitz in this letter, are fully consistent with this principle, and, in the end, decides the courage of a loner to engage in close combat, “especially in the most beautiful of all wars that the people are waging on their own land for freedom and independence ".

Young Clausewitz knew the partisan from the Prussian plans for the 1808/13 uprising. In the years 1810-1811, Clausewitz lectured at the Berlin Military School on the small war and was not only one of the most significant military experts in small war in the special sense of using light, mobile units. Guerrilla became for him, as well as for other reformers in his circle, “above all, in the highest sense, a political affair of a downright revolutionary character. Defending the arming of the people, uprising, revolutionary war, resistance and rebellion against the existing order, even if it is personified by a foreign occupation regime, is a new phenomenon for Prussia, something “dangerous” - something that seems to fall out of the sphere of the rule of law ”. With these words, Werner Hahlweg captures what is important to us. But then he adds: “True, the revolutionary war against Napoleon, as it appeared to the Prussian reformers, was not waged. It only went as far as a "semi-rebellious (halbinsurrektionellen) war," as Friedrich Engels put it. Nonetheless, the famous February 1812 memorandum remains important to the "inner impulses" (Rothfels) of the reformers; Clausewitz composed it with the help of Gneisenau and Boyen before moving on to the Russians. It is "a document of sober political analysis made in accordance with the standards of the General Staff," he refers to the experience Clausewitz composed it with the help of Gneisenau and Boyen before moving on to the Russians. It is "a document of sober political analysis made in accordance with the standards of the General Staff," he refers to the experience Clausewitz composed it with the help of Gneisenau and Boyen before moving on to the Russians. It is "a document of sober political analysis made in accordance with the standards of the General Staff," he refers to the experience

Spanish People's War and wants to calmly bring matters to the point of "responding to cruelty with cruelty, to violence with violence." The Prussian Landsturm Edict of April 1813 is already clearly recognized here.

It must have been hard for Clausewitz to be disappointed that everything he expected from the uprising “did not take place.” 29 The People's War and the partisans - “party members” as Clausewitz says - he understood as an essential part of the “forces exploding in war” and inserted them into the system his doctrine of war. Especially in the 6th book of his doctrine of war (the amount of means of defense) and in the famous chapter 6b of the eighth book (war is an instrument of politics), he also recognized a new "potency". In addition, one can find surprising, profound individual remarks in him, such as, for example, a passage about the civil war in the Vendée: that

sometimes a small number of individual partisans may even “claim to be called an army.” 30 And yet, in general, he remains a reformist-minded career officer of the regular army of his era, who could not himself, until the last succession, blossom those sprouts that become visible here. This, as we shall see, happened much later and required an active professional revolutionary. Clausewitz himself still thought too much in classical categories, when in the “strange triplicity of war” he appropriated to the people only the “blind instinct” of hatred and enmity, to the commander and his army “courage and talent” as a free action of the soul, and to the government - purely rational manipulation of war as a policy tool.

In that short-lived Prussian edict on the Landsturm of April 1813, the moment is concentrated in which the partisan first appeared in a new, decisive role, as a new, previously unrecognized figure of the world spirit. Not the will to revolt of a brave, warlike people, but education and the intelligentsia opened this door to the partisan and gave him legitimacy based on a philosophical basis. Here he became, if I will be allowed to say so, philosophically accredited and gained access to the court. This was not the case before. In the 17th century, he sank to the level of a character in a rogue novel; in the 18th century, during the time of Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great, he was a pandur and a hussar. But now, in Berlin in 1808-1813, it was discovered and appreciated not only in the military-technical, but also in the philosophical sense. For at least one moment, he gained his historical position and spiritual initiation. It was an event that he could not forget again. This is decisive for our theme. We are talking about the theory of the partisan. Well, the political theory of the partisan, exceeding specifically military classifications, became, in fact, possible only thanks to this accreditation in Berlin. The spark, which came to the north from Spain in 1808, found in Berlin a theoretical form that made it possible to preserve its combustion and transfer it further to other hands.

True, at first in Berlin, the traditional piety of the people was also not under threat, as was the political unity of the king and the people. It seemed to be intensified rather than jeopardized by the affirmation of the oath and the glorification of the partisan. Acheron, who was released, immediately returned to the channels of state order. After the wars for the liberation of Germany in 1813-1815. in Prussia, Hegel's philosophy dominated. She tried to create a mediator between revolution and tradition.31 She could be considered conservative, and indeed she was. But it also preserved the revolutionary spark and, thanks to its philosophy of history, provided the developing revolution with a dangerous ideological weapon, more dangerous than the philosophy of Rousseau in the hands of the Jacobins. This is a historical
the philosophical weapon fell into the hands of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. However, both German revolutionaries were more thinkers than activists of the revolutionary war. Only thanks to the Russian professional revolutionary - Lenin - Marxism as a doctrine became the world-historical power (Macht), which it represents today.

From Clausewitz to Lenin

Hans Schomerus, whom we have already quoted as a specialist in the field of partisanship, gave one section of his (which became available to me in the manuscript) reasoning the title: From Empecinado to Budyonny. This means: from a partisan of the Spanish guerrilla against Napoleon to the organizer of the Soviet cavalry, the leader of the cavalry of the Bolshevik war of 1920. An interesting military-scientific line of development shines through in this name. However, for us, having in mind the theory of the partisan, it is too strong

draws attention to military-technical issues of tactics and strategy of flexible (beweglichen) war. We must not lose sight of the development of the concept of the political, which takes a radical turn just here. The classical concept of the political, fixed in the 18/19 centuries, was based on the state of European international law and made the war of classical international law protected in the international legal sense, a pure war of states. Since the 20th century, this war of states with its protections has been eliminated and replaced by a revolutionary war of parties. For this reason, we have titled the following presentation From Clausewitz to Lenin. The truth here - in comparison with the military-special-scientific narrowing [of the topic] - is in a certain sense the opposite danger,

The partisan here is a reliable point of aiming for weapons, since he can save one from such general philosophical and historical genealogies and is able to lead back to the reality of revolutionary development. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels have already realized that revolutionary war today is not an old-style barricade war. This was especially emphasized again and again by Engels, the author of many military scientific works. But he considered it possible that bourgeois democracy, with the help of universal suffrage, would give the proletariat a majority in parliament and thus legally transform the bourgeois social system into a classless society. Consequently, a completely non-partisan revisionism could appeal to Marx and Engels.

On the contrary, Lenin was the one who realized the inevitability of violence and bloody revolutionary civil wars and wars of states and therefore approved the partisan war as a necessary component of the general revolutionary process. Lenin was the first who quite consciously understood the partisan as an important figure in the national and international civil war and tried to turn him into an effective tool of the central communist party leadership. As far as I can tell, this happened for the first time in the article The Partisan Battle, published on September 30 / October 13, 1906 in the Russian magazine Proletary. 32 This is a clear continuation of the knowledge about the enemy and hostility, which begins in 1902 in the essay “What is to be done?” first of all, with a turn against Struve's objectivism. From this “the professional revolutionary began consistently.” 33

Lenin's article on the partisan deals with the tactics of the socialist civil war and is directed against the opinion widespread at that time among the Social Democrats that the proletarian revolution will by itself achieve its goal as a mass movement in parliamentary countries, so that the methods of direct use of force are supposedly outdated. For Lenin, guerrilla warfare refers to the method of civil war and, like everything else, concerns a purely tactical or strategic issue of a specific situation. Guerrilla warfare is, as Lenin says, "an inevitable form of struggle" that is used without dogmatism or pre-determined principles, just as other, legal or illegal, peaceful or violent, regular or irregular means and methods should be used, judging by the situation. The goal is the communist revolution in all countries of the world; then, what serves this purpose is good and just. As a result, the problem of the partisan is solved very simply: partisans led by the communist center are fighters for peace and valiant heroes; the guerrillas who shy away from this leadership are anarchist rabble and enemies of humanity.

Lenin was a great connoisseur and admirer of Clausewitz. He intensively studied the book On the War during the First World War in 1915 and entered into his Notebook extracts from it in German, marginal notes in Russian, with underscores and exclamation marks. Thus, he created one of the most ambitious documents in world history and the history of the spirit. From a thorough examination of these

extracts, marginal notes, underlines and exclamation marks, a new theory of absolute war and absolute hostility can be developed that defines the era of revolutionary war and the methods of the modern cold war.34 What Lenin could learn from Clausewitz and what he thoroughly learned is not only the famous formula about war as a continuation of politics. This is further knowledge that the distinction between friend and enemy in the era of revolution is primary and paramount and determines both war and politics. For Lenin, only a revolutionary war is a real war, since it arises from absolute enmity. Everything else is a conditional game. Lenin himself especially emphasizes the difference between Krieg (war) and Spiel (play) in a marginal note to one place in Chapter 23 of Book 11 ("Schlussel des Landes"). A decisive step is taken in the logic of this distinction, which breaks the safeguards that the war of the states of continental European international law in the 18th century managed to make, which were so successfully restored by the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15 that they survived until the end of the First World War and which Clausewitz had never really thought about eliminating. Compared to a war of absolute enmity, the guarded war of classical European international law proceeding according to recognized rules is no more than a duel between cavaliers who have the right to seek satisfaction. To such an absolute enmity to the communist as Lenin, this kind of war should have seemed only a game in which, judging by the state of affairs, he participated in order to mislead the enemy, but which he essentially despised and found ridiculous. which managed to make the war of the states of continental European international law in the 18th century, which were so successfully restored by the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15 that they survived until the end of the First World War and which Clausewitz had never really thought about eliminating. Compared to a war of absolute enmity, the guarded war of classical European international law proceeding according to recognized rules is no more than a duel between cavaliers who have the right to seek satisfaction. To such an absolute enmity to the communist as Lenin, this kind of war should have seemed only a game in which, judging by the state of affairs, he participated in order to mislead the enemy, but which he essentially despised and found ridiculous. which managed to make the war of the states of continental European international law in the 18th century, which were so successfully restored by the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15 that they survived until the end of the First World War and which Clausewitz had never really thought about eliminating. Compared to a war of absolute enmity, the guarded war of classical European international law proceeding according to recognized rules is no more than a duel between cavaliers who have the right to seek satisfaction. To such an absolute enmity to the communist as Lenin, this kind of war should have seemed only a game in which, judging by the state of affairs, he participated in order to mislead the enemy, but which he essentially despised and found ridiculous. that they survived until the end of the First World War and that Clausewitz had never really thought about eliminating them. Compared to a war of absolute enmity, the guarded war of classical European international law proceeding according to recognized rules is no more than a duel between cavaliers who have the right to seek satisfaction. To such an absolute enmity to the communist as Lenin, this kind of war should have seemed only a game in which, judging by the state of affairs, he participated in order to mislead the enemy, but which he essentially despised and found ridiculous. that they survived until the end of the First World War and that Clausewitz had never really thought about eliminating them. Compared to a war of absolute enmity, the guarded war of classical European international law proceeding according to recognized rules is no more than a duel between cavaliers who have the right to seek satisfaction. To such a

The war of absolute enmity knows no protection. The consistent implementation of absolute enmity gives war its meaning and justice. So, the only question is: is there an absolute enemy and who is it in concreto? Lenin did not hesitate for a minute about the answer, and his advantage over all other socialists and Marxists was that he took absolute enmity seriously. His concrete absolute enemy was the class enemy, the bourgeois, the Western capitalist and his social order in every country where he ruled. Knowing the enemy was the secret of Lenin's monstrous striking power. His understanding of the guerrilla rested on the fact that the modern guerrilla had become a truly irregular phenomenon, and thus the strongest denial of the existing capitalist order, and on the fact that he was called to be a genuine perpetrator of enmity.

The irregularity of the guerrilla today does not only refer to the military "line" as it did in the 18th century when the guerrilla was only a "light, mobile unit," and it also no longer applies to the proudly paraded uniform of the regular unit. The irregularity of the class struggle calls into question not only the line, but the entire edifice of the political and social order. In the person of the Russian professional revolutionary Lenin, this new reality comprehended itself to the point of philosophical awareness. The alliance of philosophy with the partisan, which Lenin concluded, released unexpectedly new, explosive forces. This alliance caused, at the very least, the undermining of the entire Euro-centrist world, which Napoleon hoped to save and who hoped to restore the Congress of Vienna.

Preservation of interstate regular war and taming

interstate civil war became so self-evident in the European 18th century that even the clever people of the old regime (Ancien Regime) could not imagine the destruction of this kind of regularity, even after the experiences of the French Revolution of 1789 and 1793. To do this, they found only the language of universal horror and insufficient, in fact, children's comparisons. The great, courageous thinker of the old regime (Ancien Regime), Joseph de Maistre, foresaw what was being discussed. In a letter written in the summer of 1811, 36 he considered Russia ripe for revolution, but he hoped that it would be, as he says, a natural revolution, but not an Enlightenment-European, like the French one. What he feared most was the educated Pugachev. So he put it to figuratively that he is correct

I knew it as Dangerous itself, precisely the union of philosophy with the elemental forces of rebellion. Who was Pugachev? We are the leader of the peasant and Cossack uprising against Catherine 11, who was executed in Moscow in 1775 and who posed as the queen's deceased husband. An educated Pugachev would be the Russian who "would start the revolution in a European way." This would have resulted in a whole series of terrible wars, and if things had gone this far, "I have no words to tell you what to fear then."

The vision of a clever aristocrat is amazing, both in what he sees, precisely the possibility and danger of connecting the Western mind with the Russian revolt, and in what he does not see. With its time date and place - St. Petersburg in the summer of 1811 - it is located not far from the Prussian military reformers. But it does not notice anything about its own closeness to the reform-minded cadre officers of the Prussian General Staff, whose contacts with the royal court in St. Petersburg were nevertheless quite intense. It is unaware of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz. If we combine their names with the name of Pugachev, then the crux of the matter would be fatally missed. The profundity of a significant vision disappears, and only a sharp word in the style of Voltaire or, if you will, Rivalor remains. If we also think about the alliance of Hegel's philosophy of history with the liberated forces of the masses, as the Marxist professional revolutionary Lenin consciously realized, then the formulation of the genius de Maistre dissipates to a small colloquial effect of the front Ancien Regime. The language and the world of the concepts of guarded war and measured enmity could no longer correspond to the onset of absolute enmity.

From Lenin to Mao Tse-tung

During the Second World War, the Russian partisans, after expert assessments, diverted about twenty German divisions to themselves and thereby made a significant contribution to the outcome of the war. Official Soviet historiography - such as Boris Semyonovich Telpukhovsky's book about the Great Patriotic War of 1941/45 - describes a valiant partisan who destroys the rear of enemy armies. On the vast expanses of Russia and with infinitely long fronts stretching for thousands of kilometers, each division was indispensable for the German military command. Stalin's main point of view regarding the partisan was that the partisan must always fight behind enemy lines, according to the well-known maxim: there are partisans in the rear, brotherhood at the front.

Stalin succeeded in linking the strong potential of national and domestic resistance - the essentially defensive, telluric force of patriotic self-defense against an alien conqueror - with the aggressiveness of the international communist world revolution. The combination of these two heterogeneous quantities dominates today's guerrilla warfare across the planet. At the same time, the communist element has so far been largely a winner thanks to its dedication and its reliance on Moscow or Beijing. Stalin cruelly sacrificed Polish partisans who fought against the Germans during World War II. The partisan battles in Yugoslavia in 1941/45 were not only a general national defense against an alien conqueror, but were also very brutal internal battles between communist and monarchist partisans.

The greatest practitioner of the revolutionary war of our time has become at the same time its most famous theorist: Mao Tse-tung. Some of his writings are “today

compulsory reading material in Western military schools ”(Hans Henle). Since 1927, he has been collecting experiences of communist action and then used the Japanese invasion of 1932 in order to systematically develop all modern methods of simultaneously national and international civil war. The "Long March", from southern China to the Mongol border, which began in November 1934, 12,000 kilometers with huge losses, was a series of guerrilla achievements and guerrilla experiences that resulted in the Chinese Communist Party rallying into a peasant and soldier party, with the guerrilla as the center. A significant coincidence lies in the fact that Mao Zedong wrote his most important works in 1936-38, and so in the same years, when Spain in the national liberation war resisted the international communist outreach. In this Spanish civil war, the guerrilla played no significant role. On the contrary, Mao Zedong owes his victory over his national enemy, Kuo-min-tang and General Chiang Kai-shek, exclusively to the experience of the Chinese guerrilla war against the Japanese and Kuo-min-tang. The most important formulations of Mao Tse-tung for our topic are found in the 1938 work "The strategy of guerrilla warfare against the Japanese invasion." But it is necessary to involve other works of Mao in order to fully imagine the picture of the doctrine of war of this new Clausewitz.37 In fact, we are talking about a consistent and systematically conscious continuation and development of the concepts of the Prussian officer of the general staff. Only Clausewitz, contemporary of Napoleon 1, could not yet have foreseen the degree of totality that today is self-evident for a Chinese communist with regard to a revolutionary war. The characteristic image of Mao Tse-tung is evident from the following comparison: “In our war, the armed population and the small war of the partisans, on the one hand, and the Red Army, on the other, can be compared with both hands of one person; or, to put it more practically: the morality of the population is the morality of an armed nation. And the enemy is afraid of this. " the morality of the population is the morality of an armed nation. And the enemy is afraid of this. " the morality of the population is the morality of an armed nation. And the enemy is afraid of this. "

"Armed nation": this, as you know, was also the motto of the career officers of the Prussian General Staff who organized the war against Napoleon. Clausewitz belonged to them. We saw that at that time the strong national energies of a certain educated stratum of the population were taken up by the regular army. And the most radical military thinkers of the time distinguished between war and peace and viewed war as a state of emergency clearly demarcated from peace. And Clausewitz could not, proceeding from his existence as a career officer in the regular army, bring the logic of partisanship to the end as systematically as Lenin and Mao did on the basis of their existence as professional revolutionaries. But Mao adds a specific point regarding guerrilla warfare, thanks to which he comes closer to the inner essence of the matter than Lenin and thanks to which he acquires the possibility of extreme ideological perfection. In short: Mao's revolution is more tellurically based than Lenin's. The Bolshevik vanguard, which, under Lenin's leadership, seized power in Russia in October 1917, shows great differences with the Chinese communists, who, after more than twenty years of war in 1949, got their hands on China. These differences are manifested both in the internal group structure and in the attitude towards the country and people that they have captured. The ideological controversy of whether Mao teaches true Marxism or Leninism becomes almost as secondary in the face of the horrific reality defined by telluric partisanship as the question of whether whether the old Chinese philosophers were already expressing something akin to Maoism. We are talking about a specific "red elite", minted and created by guerrilla warfare. Ruth Fischer clarified the essential - she points out that the Russian Bolsheviks of 1917 were a national minority "led by a group of theoreticians, the majority of which consisted of emigrants"; 1949 Chinese Communists led by Mao and his friends in

for twenty years they fought on their own national soil against the national enemy, Kuo-min-tang, on the basis of a terrifying guerrilla war. It may be that by their origin they were the urban proletariat, just like the Russian Bolsheviks were from St. Petersburg and Moscow; but when they came to power, they brought with them the minted experiences of severe defeats and the organizational ability to “plant” their principles “in the peasant environment and develop them there further in a new, unforeseen way.” 38 Here we can see the deepest germ of “ideological” disagreements between the Soviet -Russian and Chinese communism. But here an internal contradiction is also revealed in the situation of Mao himself, combining in itself a deprived space, a globally universal, absolute world enemy, a Marxist class enemy, with a territorially capable of being limited, the real enemy of the Sino-Asian defense against capitalist colonialism. This is the contradiction of One World, the political unity of the earth and humanity, against the majority of large spaces, which are reasonably balanced within themselves and with each other. Mao expressed a pluralistic view of the new nomos of the Earth in the poem Kunlun, (German translation by Rolf Schneider):

If the sky were the dwelling place of the military, then I would draw my sword
And cut you into three parts:
One - as a gift to Europe,
one - for America,
But I would leave one part for China,
And peace would reign on Earth.

In the concrete situation of Mao, various types of enmity are encountered, which intensify to the level of absolute enmity. Racial hatred against the white, colonial exploiter; class enmity against the capitalist bourgeoisie; national enmity against the Japanese interventionist of the same race; the growing enmity against one's own, national brother in long, bitter civil wars - all this did not paralyze and did not question each other, as one might think, but was confirmed and intensified in a specific state of affairs. During the Second World War, Stalin managed to combine the telluric partisanship of the national native land with the class enmity of international communism. Mao was ahead of Stalin in this. Mao, in his theoretical consciousness, continued the formula about war as a continuation of politics, bypassing Lenin.

Thinking operation, basic in Mao, is just as simple as it is efficient. The meaning of war is enmity. Since war is a continuation of politics, politics always acquires, at least as an opportunity, an element of enmity; and since the world contains the possibility of enmity - which, unfortunately, is an experimentally confirmed fact - then it also contains a moment of potential enmity. The only question is whether enmity can be guarded and regulated, that is, whether it is a relative or absolute enmity. Only the belligerent itself can decide at its own peril and risk. For Mao, who thinks like a guerrilla, today's world is only a form of real enmity. It does not stop during the so-called cold war. The latter, therefore, is not half war and half peace, but it is a state-of-the-art participation of real enmity with other openly violent means. Only weak-willed people and dreamers can deceive themselves in this.

In practice, this raises the question of in what quantitative relation is the battle of a regular army in open war to other methods of class struggle that are not openly military. Mao answers this question with clear numbers: a revolutionary war is nine-tenths non-open, non-regular war, and one

tenth open war of the military. The German general, Helmut Staedke, on this basis derived the definition of the partisan: the partisan is a fighter of the nine-tenths of warfare, which provides only the last tenth of the regular armed forces. 39 Mao Tse-tung does not lose sight of the fact that this last tenth part is decisive for the end of the war. However, a European belonging to an old tradition needs to protect himself from using the generally accepted classical concepts of war and peace, which, if they talk about war and peace, are subordinated to the European protected war of the 19th century and, therefore, not absolute, but only relative and amenable guarding enmity.

The regular Red Army only appears when the situation is ripe for the communist regime. Only then is the country openly occupied by the military. This certainly does not apply to the conclusion of peace in the sense of classical international law. The practical significance of this kind of doctrine since 1945 has been very convincingly demonstrated to the whole world thanks to the partition of Germany. On May 8, 1945, the military's war against conquered Germany ended; Germany then unconditionally capitulated. Until now (1963) peace has not yet been concluded between the victorious allies with Germany; but to this day, the border runs between East and West exactly along the lines along which, 18 years ago, American and Soviet regular military units demarcated their occupation zones.

Both the ratio (expressed in numbers of 9: 1) of the cold war and open war of the military, and the deeper, world-political symptomatology of the partition of Germany since 1945 are just examples for us to clarify the political theory of Mao. Its core lies in guerrilla warfare, whose main feature today is real enmity. Lenin's Bolshevik theory recognized and recognized the partisan. Compared to the concrete telluric reality of the Chinese partisan, Lenin has something abstract and intellectual in defining the enemy. The ideological conflict between Moscow and Beijing, which has manifested itself more and more strongly since 1962, has its deepest source in this concretely different reality of true guerrilla warfare. Here, too, the theory of the partisan turns out to be the key to understanding political reality.

From Mao Tse-tung to Raoul Salan

French career officers brought the glory of Mao Tse-tung as the most modern teacher of warfare from Asia to Europe. In Indochina, the colonial war of the old style came into contact with the revolutionary war of our time. There they learned in their own skin the striking power of well-thought-out methods of destructive warfare, psychological mass terror and their connection with guerrilla warfare. Based on their experiences, they developed the doctrine of psychological, destructive and insurgency war, about which there is already an extensive literature.40

We wanted to see this as a typical product of the mindset of career officers, namely Colonels, Colonels. There is no need to argue about this secondment to the Colonel here, although it might be interesting to ask whether a figure like Clausewitz as a whole corresponds more to the spiritual type of a colonel than a general. For us, we are talking about the theory of the partisan and its consistent development, and the latter is embodied in the sensational case of recent years, rather in the general than in the colonel, namely in the fate of General Raoul Salan. He (more than the other generals Jouhaud, Challe or Zeller) is the most important figure for us in this context. In the seconded position of the general, an existential conflict that was decisive for understanding the problem of the partisan was revealed, which should occur when a regularly fighting soldier not only on occasion,

war must withstand a battle with a fundamentally revolutionary and irregularly fighting enemy.

Salan, already as a young officer, recognized the colonial war in Indochina. During World War 1940/44, he was assigned to the General Staff of the colonies and remained in this capacity in Africa. In 1948, he arrived in Indochina as commandant of the French military units; in 1951 he became high commissioner of the French Republic in North Vietnam; he directed the investigation of the Dien-Bien-Phu defeat in 1954. In November 1958, he was appointed the highest commandant of the French armed forces in Algeria. Until now, politically, he could be ranked among the left, and back in January 1957, a dark organization, which in German can probably be called "Fehme" (Fehme), made a dangerous attempt on his life. But the lessons of the war in Indochina and the experiences of the Algerian partisan war influenced the fact that he learned the inexorable logic of partisan war. The chief of the then Parisian government, Pflimlin, gave him all the powers. However, on May 15, 1958, he helped General de Gaulle come to power at a crucial moment. During a public event in Algeria, he shouted Vive de Gaulle! But he soon became bitterly disillusioned with his expectation that de Gaulle would unconditionally defend France's constitutionally guaranteed territorial sovereignty over Algeria. In 1960, an open feud began with de Gaulle. In January 1961, some of Salan's friends founded the OAS (Organization d`Armee Secrete), whose declared chief Salan became, and he rushed to Algeria on April 23 to take part in the officer's coup. When this coup ended in failure on April 25, 1961, the OAS tried to undertake systematic terrorist actions, as against the Algerian enemy, and against the civilian population in Algeria and the population in France itself; systematic in the sense of the methods of the so-called psychological warfare of modern mass terror. The terrorist enterprise suffered a decisive loss in April 1962 with the arrest of Salan by the French police. The hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court in Paris began on May 15 and ended on May 23, 1962. The charge concerned the attempted violent overthrow of the legal regime and the terrorist acts of the OAS, and only covered the period from April 1961 to April 1962. He was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment (detention criminelle a perpetuite), since the court found the defendant in extenuating circumstances. systematic in the sense of the methods of the so-called psychological warfare of modern mass terror. The terrorist enterprise suffered a decisive loss in April 1962 with the arrest of Salan by the French police. The hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court in Paris began on May 15 and ended on May 23, 1962. The charge concerned the attempted violent overthrow of the legal regime and the terrorist acts of the OAS, and only covered the period from April 1961 to April 1962. He was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment (detention criminelle a perpetuite), since the court found the defendant in extenuating circumstances. systematic in the sense of the methods of the so-called psychological warfare of modern mass terror. The terrorist enterprise suffered a decisive loss in April 1962 with the arrest of Salan by the French police. The hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court in Paris began on May 15 and ended on May 23, 1962. The charge concerned the attempted violent overthrow of the legal regime and the terrorist acts of the OAS, and only covered the period from April 1961 to April 1962. He was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment (detention criminelle a perpetuite), since the court found the defendant in extenuating circumstances. The hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court in Paris began on May 15 and ended on May 23, 1962. The charge concerned the attempted violent overthrow of the legal regime and the terrorist acts of the OAS, and only covered the period from April 1961 to April 1962. He was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment (detention criminelle a perpetuite), since the court found the defendant in extenuating circumstances. The hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court in Paris began on May 15 and ended on May 23, 1962. The charge concerned the attempted violent overthrow of the legal regime and the terrorist acts of the OAS, and only covered the period from April 1961 to April 1962. He was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment (detention criminelle a perpetuite), since the court found the defendant in extenuating circumstances.

I briefly reminded the German reader of some dates. The history of Salan and the OAS does not yet exist, and we should not interfere with our assessments and judgments in such a deep, internal conflict of the French nation. We can only establish here some lines from the material as far as it is published41 in order to clarify our important question. There are many parallels here with regard to partisanship. We will return to one of them later, for purely heuristic reasons and with all the necessary caution. The analogy between the Prussian officers of the general staff of 1808/13, impressed by the Spanish guerrilla, and the French general staff of the 1950/60s, who experienced modern guerrilla warfare in Indochina and Algeria, is stunning. The big differences are also obvious and do not require a long exposition. There is an affinity in the main situation and in many individual destinies. But this should not be abstractly exaggerated in the sense that it is possible to identify all theories and constructions of the defeated military in world history. That would be nonsense. And in the case of the Prussian general Ludendorff, the situation is different in many essential points than in the case of the left-republican Salan. For us, it is only important to clarify the theory of the partisan.

During the hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court, Salan remained silent. At the beginning of the hearing, he made a long explanation, the first words of which were: Je suis le chef de l`OAS. Ma respontabilite est donc entiere. In his explanation, he objected that the witnesses he had presented - including President de Gaulle - had not been questioned and that

the material of the trial was limited by the time from April 1961 (the officers' coup in Algeria) to April 1962 (the arrest of Salan), due to which his own motives were obscured and important historical processes were isolated, fenced off and reduced to the types and facts of the normal criminal code. He called the acts of violence of the OAS simply a response to the most hated of all acts of violence, which consists in the fact that people who do not want to lose their nation protect this nation. The explanation ended with the words: “I must give an account only to those who suffer and die because they believed in a broken word and in a devoted duty. Now I will be silent. "

Salan did maintain his silence throughout the entire hearing, in defiance of many, sharply insistent questions from the prosecutor, who considered this silence to be merely a tactic. The President of the Supreme Military Court, after briefly pointing out The "illogicality" of such a silence considered the behavior of the accused in the end, if not with respect, then at least tolerant and not as a contempt of court. At the end of the hearing, Salan replied to the chairman's question about whether he would like to add anything to his defense: “I will open my mouth only to shout out Vive la France !, and to the prosecution, I will simply answer: que Dieu me garde! ”42

The first part of this concluding remark by Salan is addressed to the President of the Supreme Military Court, referring to the situation of the execution of the death penalty. In this situation, at the time of the death penalty, Salan would have shouted: Vive la France! The second part is addressed to the representative of the public prosecution and sounds somewhat mysterious, like the words of an oracle. However, the case makes it clear that the prosecutor - in a way that is not ordinary for the prosecutor of the still anti-clerical state - suddenly became religious. He not only declared Salan's silence arrogance and lack of repentance, in order to plead before the court against admitting extenuating circumstances; he suddenly began to speak, as he categorically put it, as "Christian to Christian", un chretien qui s`àdresse a un chretien, and reproached the defendant for that, due to the lack of repentance, through his own fault, he lost the mercy of the merciful Christian God and incurred eternal damnation. To this Salan said: que Dieu me garde! One can see the abysses over which the wit and rhetoric of the political process are played. However, we are not talking about the problem of political justice.43 We are only interested in clarifying a set of issues that, thanks to such mottos as total war, psychological war, subversive war, insurrectionary war, invisible war, have become confused and change the problem of modern guerrilla warfare.

The 1946/56 war in Indochina was "a model of a widespread modern revolutionary war" (Th. Arnold, aa O., p. 186). Salan learned modern guerrilla warfare in the forests, jungles and rice paddies of Indochina. He had learned from his own experience that Indo-Chinese rice farmers could have routed a battalion of first-class French soldiers. He saw the disaster of the refugees and recognized the underground organization organized by Ho Chi Minh that blocked and outplayed legal French rule. With punctuality and precision
General Staff, he set about observing and researching a new, more or less terrorist warfare. In doing so, he immediately faced what he and his comrades called "psychological" warfare, which, along with military-technical action, is characteristic of modern warfare. Here Salan could immediately adopt Mao's system of thought; but it is known that he also delved into the literature of the Spanish guerrilla against Napoleon. In Algeria, he was at the center of a situation where 400,000 heavily armed soldiers fought against 20,000 Algerian guerrillas, with the result that France renounced its sovereignty over Algeria. The loss in human lives for the entire Algerian population was ten to twenty times greater than that of the French, but the material costs of the French were ten to twenty times higher than that of the Algerians. Shortly speaking,

existence as a Frenchman and a soldier in the face of an etrange paradoxe, in the logic of madness (Irrsinnslogik), which could exasperate and lead to an attempted counterattack of a courageous and intelligent person.44

Aspects and concepts of the last stage

We try to distinguish four different aspects in a similar situation typical of modern guerrilla warfare in order to acquire some clear concepts: the aspect of space, then the destruction of social structures, then the interweaving in world-political contexts, and, finally, the technical-industrial aspect. This sequence is relative and can be changed. It goes without saying that in concrete reality there are not four independent areas that can be isolated from each other, but only their intensive interactions, their mutual functional dependencies reveal the general picture, so that any analysis of one aspect at the same time always contains references and implications of three other aspects and finally they all pour into the force field of technical and industrial development.

Aspect of space

Quite independently of the good or evil will of people, of peaceful or militant needs and goals, each increase in human technology produces new spaces and boundless changes in the inherited structures of space. This is true not only for the external, conspicuous increases in space of astronautics, but also for our old earthly spaces of habitation, work, worship and space of freedom of action. Today, in the era of electric lighting, gas pipelines, telephone, radio and television, the thesis "the house is inviolable" evokes a completely different type of protection than in the days of King John (King John the Landless) and Magna Charta (Magna Charta) in 1215, when the owner of the castle could raise the drawbridge. On the technical increase in human efficiency, whole systems of norms are broken, such as, for example, 19th century maritime war law. From the ownerless seabed, the space that is located near the coast emerges, the so-called continental shelf, as a new space for human action. Bunkers for radioactive waste are emerging in the unowned depths of the Pacific Ocean. Industrial and technological progress, together with the structures of space, also changes the orders of space. For law is the unity of order and location, and the problem of the partisan is the problem of the relationship between regular and irregular struggle. Industrial and technological progress, together with the structures of space, also changes the orders of space. For law is the unity of order and location, and the problem of the partisan is the problem of the relationship between regular and irregular struggle. Industrial and technological progress, together with the structures of space, also changes the orders of space. For law is the unity of order and location, and the problem of the partisan is the problem of the relationship between regular and irregular struggle.

The modern soldier can be progressively optimistic or pessimistic about his personality. This is not so important for our problem. In military-technical terms, any general staff officer thinks directly, practically and meaningfully and rationally. In comparison with this, proceeding from the war, the aspect of space is close to him in theory. The structural difference between the so-called theater of war in land war and war at sea is an old theme. Airspace has been added as a new dimension since the First World War, which at the same time has changed the former Schauplatze of land and sea in their spatial structure.45 In guerrilla warfare, a complexly structured new space of action arises, since the guerrilla is not fighting in an open field. battles and not in the same plane of open war of the fronts. Rather, he forces his enemy to enter another space. So he adds to the surface of the regular, ordinary theater

warfare is another, darker dimension, a dimension of depth46 in which uniforms being worn on display become deadly. In this way he delivers in the terrestrial realm an unexpected, but therefore no less effective analogy with a submarine, which likewise added an unexpected dimension of depth to the surface of the sea on which an old-style naval war was fought. From underground, he interferes with the usual, regular play on the open stage. Based on its irregularity, it changes the dimensions of not only tactical, but also strategic operations of the regular armies. Relatively small groups of partisans can, through the use of soil conditions, bind large masses of regular troops. Earlier we mentioned “Paradox” on the example of Algeria. Clausewitz already clearly knew and accurately described this in the already quoted (above note 30) statement,

> The concrete clarity of the concept is that we adhere to the telluric-earthly character of the partisan and do not name (and do not even define) him as a corsair of the earth. The pirate's irregularity has nothing to do with any regularity. On the contrary, the corsair gets spoils of war at sea and is supplied with a "letter" from the government of the state; his type of irregularity has something to do with regularity, and so he could have been a legally recognized figure in European international law before the Paris Peace of 1856. In this respect, both, the corsair of the naval war and the guerrilla of the land war, can be compared. A strong similarity and even identity is manifested primarily in the fact that the thesis "They fight the partisans only in a guerrilla way" and the other thesis a corsaire corsaire et demi basically mean the same thing. However, today's partisan is something different, than a corsair of a land war. For this, the elementary opposition of land and sea remains too great. It may be that the inherited differences of war, enemy and trophies, which until now have founded the international legal opposition of land and sea, will one day simply melt in the crucible of industrial and technological progress. For now, partisan means still a piece of real soil; it is one of the last posts of the earth as a not yet completely destroyed world-historical element. For now, partisan means still a piece of real soil; it is one of the last posts of the earth as a not yet completely destroyed world-historical element. For now, partisan means still a piece of real soil; it is one of the last posts of the earth as a not yet completely destroyed world-historical element.

Already the Spanish guerrilla against Napoleon is fully revealed only in the important aspect of space, this opposition of land and sea. England supported the Spanish partisans. The naval power used the irregular land warrior for its large military endeavors to defeat the continental enemy. In the end, it was not England that forced Napoleon to lay down their arms, but the land powers of Spain, Russia, Prussia and Austria. An irregular, typically telluric form of guerrilla warfare entered the service of typically maritime world politics, which for its part ruthlessly disqualified and criminalized any irregularity at sea in the field of naval warfare. In contrast to land and sea, various types of irregularities are concretized, and only if we have in mind a specific feature, the aspects of space designated by the words land and sea in specific forms of their formation as concepts, only then are analogies allowed and fruitful. This is really primarily for the analogy, which is important for us here for the knowledge of the aspect of space. Namely: in a similar way, as the naval power of England, in its war against mainland France, took advantage of the indigenous Spanish partisan, who changed the scene of the land war thanks to irregular space; later, during the First World War, the land power of Germany used the submarine in its war with the naval power of England as such a weapon that added unexpected other space to the former space of war at sea. The then masters of the sea surface immediately tried to discriminate the new type of struggle as irregular, even criminal and pirate means of struggle. Today, in the era of nuclear-powered submarines

everyone sees that both - Napoleon's indignation at the Spanish Guerrillero and England's indignation at the German submarine - lay on the same plane, namely, in the plane of indignation of a low-value opinion in the face of uncalculated changes in space.

Destruction of social structures

A monstrous example of the destruction of social structures was experienced by the French in 1946-1956 in Indochina, when their colonial rule there ended in collapse. We have already mentioned the organization of the partisan struggle by Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Laos. Here the communists also put a non-political civilian population at their service. They even supervised the domestic servants of the French officers and employees and the auxiliary workers of the French rear service. They collected taxes from the civilian population and carried out all kinds of terrorist acts in order to induce the French to anti-terror against the local population, thereby further inciting their hatred of the French. In short, the modern form of revolutionary war is leading to many new, unconventional means and methods, whose description alone would blow the frame of our image. Society exists as res publica, as a public, and it is called into question if a non-public space is formed in it, which effectively disavows this public. Perhaps this instruction will be enough to realize that the partisan, whom

pushed aside the professional military consciousness of the 19th century, suddenly found itself in the center of a new type of warfare, whose meaning and goal was to destroy the existing social order.

In the changed practice of hostage-taking, this becomes tangibly visible. In the German-French war of 1870/71, German troops, in order to protect themselves from frantiers, took the nobility of the village as hostages: the burgomaster, priest, doctors and notaries. Respect for such respected people and for the nobility could be used in order to exert pressure on the entire population, since the social authority of such typically bourgeois strata of society was practically beyond doubt. It is this bourgeois class that becomes the real enemy in the revolutionary civil war of communism. Anyone who uses such respected people as hostages is working, judging by the situation, on the communist side. For a communist, this kind of hostage-taking can be so expedient that he, if necessary, provokes - either to destroy a certain bourgeois stratum of society, or to attract it to the communist side. In the already named book about the partisan, this new reality is well known. In a guerrilla war, it says, effective hostage-taking is possible only in relation to the guerrillas themselves or to their closest associates. Otherwise, only new partisans will be created. On the contrary, for the partisans, every soldier of the regular army, every uniform wearer, is a hostage. “Everyone is in uniform,” says Rolf Schroers. effective hostage-taking is possible only in relation to the partisans themselves or to their closest associates. Otherwise, only new partisans will be created. On the contrary, for the partisans, every soldier of the regular army, every uniform wearer, is a hostage. “Everyone is in uniform,” says Rolf Schroers. effective hostage-taking is possible only in relation to the partisans themselves or to their closest associates. Otherwise, only new partisans will be created. On the contrary, for the partisans, every soldier of the regular army, every uniform wearer, is a hostage. “Everyone is in uniform,” says Rolf Schroers.

- must feel threatened, and thus everything that the uniform represents as a motto must be threatened. ”47

It is only necessary to fully think through this logic of terror and anti-terror and then transfer it to any type of civil war in order to see the destruction of social structures, which is in operation today. A small number of terrorists are enough to put pressure on large masses of people. To the narrow space of open terror are added further spaces of insecurity, fear and general distrust, the “landscape of treason” that Margret Boveri presented in a series of four exciting books.48 All the peoples of the European continent - with a couple of small

exceptions - experienced it on their own skin during two world wars and two post-war eras as a new reality.

World Political Context

Likewise, our third aspect, interweaving in world-political fronts and contexts, has long captured the general consciousness. The autochthonous defenders of the native soil, who died pro aris et focis, national and patriotic heroes who went into the forest, everything that was the reaction of a spontaneous, telluric force against an alien invasion, meanwhile fell under the international and supranational central government, which helps and supports, but only in the interests of a completely different kind of world-aggressive goals, and which, according to the circumstances, defends or leaves to the mercy of fate. Then the partisan loses its essentially defensive character. He becomes a manipulated weapon of world revolutionary aggressiveness. He is simply sacrificed and deceived by all that

Somehow the guerrilla as an irregular fighter is always dependent on the help of a regular might. This aspect of the matter is always present and also recognized. The Spanish Guerrillero found its legitimacy in its defenses and in its accord with royalty and with the nation; he defended his native soil from a foreign conqueror. But Wellington also belongs to the Spanish guerrilla, and the fight against Napoleon was fought with the help of England. Full of rage, Napoleon often recalled that England was the real instigator and the one who benefited from the Spanish guerrilla war. Today, the connection is realized even more clearly, since the continuous strengthening of technical combat means makes the partisan dependent on the constant help of an ally who has technical and industrial resources,

If many interested third parties compete with each other, the guerrilla has free space for his own policies. This was Tito's position in the last years of the world war. In the partisan battles that were fought in Vietnam and Laos, the situation is complicated by the fact that the contradiction between Russian and Chinese politics has become urgent within communism itself. With Beijing's support, more guerrillas could be sent across Laos into North Vietnam; this would be a stronger help to Vietnamese communism than Moscow's support. The leader of the liberation war against France, Ho Chi Minh, was a supporter of Moscow. Stronger assistance will decide the outcome of the case, be it a choice between Moscow and Beijing or other alternatives in the current situation.

For such intense political ties, the above-cited book on the partisan by Rolf Schroers finds an apt formula; it speaks of an interested third party. This is an apt expression. For this interested third person is not some banal figure here, like the third laughing one from the saying. Rather, it relates essentially to the situation of the partisan and therefore also to the theory of the partisan. The powerful third supplies not only weapons and ammunition, money, material assistance and all kinds of medicines, he also creates the kind of political recognition that an irregularly fighting partisan needs in order not to sink, like a robber and like a pirate, into the Non-political, which means here: in criminal. With the expectation of the distant future, the irregular must gain legitimacy in the regular; and for this, the irregular has only two possibilities: recognition of the existing regular, or the implementation of a new regularity on their own. This is a brutal alternative.

To the extent that the partisan becomes motorized, he loses his soil and grows dependent on the technical-industrial means that he needs for his struggle. Thus, the power of the third party concerned also grows, so that it eventually reaches a planetary scale. All the aspects in which we have so far looked at today's guerrilla movement seem to dissolve into an all-encompassing technical aspect.

The technical aspect

And the partisan does not remain aloof from development, progress, from modern technology and its inherent science. The old partisan, in whose hands the Prussian Landsturm Edict of 1813 wanted to put a pitchfork for hay, seems ridiculous today. The modern guerrilla fights with machine guns, hand grenades, plastic bombs, and probably soon with tactical atomic weapons. It is motorized and connected to the information network, equipped with covert radio transmitters and radars. It supplied by aircraft with weapons and food. But it, as it is today, in 1962, in Vietnam, is suppressed by helicopters and blocked. Both he himself and his enemies do not lag behind the rapid development of modern technology and its characteristic form of science.

One British naval expert called piracy the "pre-scientific stage" of the war at sea. In the same spirit, he should have defined the partisan as a pre-scientific stage in the conduct of a war on land, and declared this to be the only scientific definition. But even this definition of it immediately becomes scientifically obsolete again for the difference between war at sea and war on land itself falls into the whirlwind of technical progress and today appears to technicians as something pre-scientific, that is, exhausted. Dead people jump fast, and if they are motorized they moving even faster. The partisan whose telluric character we adhere to, in any case it becomes a scandal for everyone pursuing rational goals and value-rational thinking person. The partisan provokes a downright technocratic affect. The paradox of its existence reveals the discrepancy: the industrial and technical imparting of weapons the modern regular army of the kind of perfection; and the pre-industrial agrarian primitiveness of successfully fighting partisans. This already caused fits of rage in Napoleon in connection with the Spanish Guerillero and should have intensified accordingly with the progressive development of industrial technology.

While the partisan was only a "light detachment", tactically especially a mobile hussar or rifleman, his theory was a matter of a military scientific specialty. Only the revolutionary war made him a key figure in world history. But what will come of it in the era of atomic destruction? In a technically organized world through and through, old, feudal-agrarian forms and ideas about struggle, war and hostility are disappearing. It is obvious. Do therefore struggle, war and enmity disappear altogether, and are they reduced to social conflicts? When the internal, in the optimistic opinion, immanent rationality and regularity of a technically organized world through and through has been fully realized, then the partisan, perhaps, is no longer a troublemaker. Then it simply disappears by itself in the uninterrupted performance of technical and functional processes, not otherwise, than the dog disappears from the freeway. For a technically minded fantasy, then it is hardly still a police-transport problem, and by the way it is neither a philosophical, nor a moral or legal problem.

This would be one, namely the techno-optimistic aspect of a purely technical consideration. He expects a New World with a New Man. As is known, early Christianity came out with similar expectations, and two millennia later, in the 19th century,

socialism emerged as New Christianity. Both phenomena lacked all the destructive efficiency of modern technical means. But from pure technology, as always with such purely technical reflections, does not flow from the theory of the partisan, but only an optimistic or pessimistic series of pluralist propositions.
value or lack of value. Value, as Ernst Forsthof aptly says, has “its own logic.” 49 It is precisely the logic of the absence of value and the destruction of the bearer of this absence of value.

As for the predictions of widespread technicist optimism, it does not go into the pocket for the word, that is, behind it, the obvious assumption of value and lack of value. He believes that the irrepressible, industrial and technical development of mankind will by itself transfer to a completely new level all problems, all previous questions and answers, all previous types and situations. At this level, old questions, types and situations will be almost as unimportant as questions, types and situations of the Stone Age after the transition to a higher culture. Then the guerrillas will die out, like the hunters of the Stone Age, if they fail to survive and assimilate. In any case, they became harmless and unimportant.

But how will the human type, which previously supplied the partisan, manage to adapt to the techno-industrial world around it, use new means and develop a new, adapted type of partisan, say, industrial partisans? Is there any guarantee that modern means of destruction will always fall into the right hands and that irregular fighting will be unimaginable? In contrast to this optimism of progress, the pessimism of progress and its technical fantasies have a greater field of possibilities than they usually think today. In the shadow of today's atomic balance of world powers, under a glass bell, so to speak, of their enormous means of destruction, a free space of limited and guarded war could stand out, with conventional weapons and even with means of destruction. the dosage of which the world powers could agree openly or secretly. It could end up in a war controlled by one of these world powers, and it would be something like dogfight.50 It would be a seemingly innocent game of precisely controlled irregularities and "perfect disorder", as perfect as they could would manipulate world powers.

Along with this, however, there is also a radically pessimistic tabula-rasa solution to technical fantasy. In an area treated with modern means of destruction, of course everything will be killed, friend and foe, regular soldier and irregular population. However, it is technically conceivable that some people will survive the night of bombs and missiles. In the face of this possibility, it would be practically and even rationally expedient to plan together the situation after the bombing and already today prepare people who will immediately occupy the bomb craters in the devastated zone and occupy the destroyed area. Then a new kind of partisan could add a new chapter to world history with a new kind of taking up space.

So our problem expands to planetary proportions. It even grows to be supra-planetary. Technological progress makes it possible to fly into outer space, and thus, along the way, immeasurable, new challenges for political conquest are opening up. For new spaces can and must be taken by people. The taking of land and sea of the old style, as the previous history of mankind knows them, will be followed by the taking of the space of the new style. However, taking is followed by division and use. In this respect, despite all other progress, everything remains the same. Technological progress will only bring about a new intensity of new taking, division and use, and will only reinforce old questions.

With today's contradictions between East and West, and especially in the gigantic competition for immeasurably large new spaces, we are primarily talking about political

power on our planet, no matter how small it may seem. Only the one who owns the seemingly so tiny Earth will take and use new spaces. As a result, these immeasurable areas are nothing more than potential spaces of struggle, namely the struggle for dominance on this Earth. Famous astronauts or cosmonauts, who until now have been appointed only as propaganda stars of the mass media, press, radio and television, will then have a chance to turn into space pirates and, perhaps, even into space partisans.

Legality and legitimacy

In the development of partisanship, we encountered the figure of General Salan as a representative, symptomatic phenomenon of the last stage. In this figure, the experiences and influences of the war of the regular armies, the colonial war, the civil war and the partisan struggle meet and intersect. Salan thought through all these experiments to the end, following the inevitable logic of the old thesis that the guerrilla can only be defeated in a guerrilla manner. He did this consistently, not only with the courage of a soldier, but also with the precision of a General Staff officer and the punctuality of a technocrat. The result was that he himself turned into a guerrilla and eventually declared civil war as his own supreme commander and his government.

What is the inner focus of such a destiny? Salan's main defender, Maitre Tixier-Vignancourt, in his big concluding speech to the court on May 23, 1962, found a wording that answered our question. He remarks about Salan's activities as chief of the OAS: I must state that the old militant communist, if he were at the head of the organization instead of the chief military chief, would have taken other actions than General Salan (S. 530 of the trial report). This guesses the decisive point: a professional revolutionary would do it differently. He would have taken a different position than Salan, not only in relation to the interested third party.

The development of the theory of the partisan from Clausewitz through Lenin to Mao moved forward through the dialectic of the regular and the irregular, career officer and professional revolutionary. Through the doctrine of psychological warfare, which the French officers - participants in the war in Indochina - adopted from Mao, development did not return in the ricorso genus to the beginning and to the origins. There is no return to the beginning here. The guerrilla can put on a uniform and develop into a good regular fighter, even a particularly brave regular fighter, perhaps, as the poacher is said to be a particularly skillful forest watchman. But all this is conceived in the abstract. The reworking of Mao's teachings by those French career officers actually contains something abstract and, as it was once said during the Salan trial, has something of an esprit geometrique.

The guerrilla is able to easily transform into a good uniform wearer; on the contrary, for a good career officer, a uniform is more than a suit. The regular can become an institutional profession, the irregular cannot. A career officer is capable of transforming into a great founder of the order, like Saint Ignatius of Loyola. Transformation into pre- or sub-traditional means something different. One can disappear in the dark, but turning the darkness into a war zone, on the basis of which the former arena of the empire collapses and a large stage of official publicity is taken out of the network - this cannot be organized with the technocratic intelligentsia. Acheron cannot be calculated in advance and does not follow every spell, even if it comes from such an intelligent head and even if it is in such a desperate situation.

It is not our task to calculate what the intelligent and experienced wartime coups in Algeria in April 1961 and the organizers of the OAS calculated, with reference to some very natural specific questions for them, especially regarding the actions of terrorist acts against the civilized European population or with respect to the above mentioned interested third. This last question is already quite meaningful as a question. We recalled that the partisan needs legitimation if he wants to stay in the political sphere and does not want to fall into the criminal sphere. The question is not limited to some that have become common today, cheap and frivolous antitheses of legality and legitimacy. For legality turns out to be precisely in this case the strongest legality - what it originally actually was for the republican,

progressive, uniquely modern, in one word: the highest form of legitimacy itself.

I would not like to repeat what I said more than thirty years ago on this still relevant topic. The reference to this belongs to the knowledge of the situation of Republican General Salan in 1958/61. The French Republic is a rule of law; it is its foundation, when it cannot be destroyed by opposing law and law and distinguishing law as a higher instance. Both the justice and the army are above the law. There is republican legality, and this is the only form of legitimacy in the republic. Everything else is sophistry hostile to the republic for a real republican. The public prosecutor at the Salan trial accordingly had a simple and clear position; he again and again referred to the "sovereignty of the law", which remains superior to any other conceivable authority or rule. Compared to this sovereignty of law, there is no sovereignty of law. It turns the irregularity of the guerrilla into a deadly illegality.

Salan, in spite of this, had no other argument than an indication that he himself, on May 15, 1958, helped General de Gaulle in achieving power [and in the struggle] against the then legal government, which he was then obliged to his conscience, his Pairs, his fatherland and before God and now, in 1962, he sees himself deceived in everything that was proclaimed and promised as sacred in May 1958 (report on the trial, p. 85). He referred to the nation as opposed to the state, to a higher kind of legitimacy as opposed to legality. And General de Gaulle used to often talk about traditional and national legitimacy and contrast them with republican legality. This changed with the onset of May 1958. And the fact that his own legality became certain only since the September 1958 referendum,

However, irregularity alone does not constitute anything. It just becomes illegal. However, today the crisis of the law and thus the crisis of legality is indisputable. The classical concept of law, the mere preservation of which is capable of maintaining republican legality, is called into question by the plan and the measure. In Germany, the reference to the law as opposed to the law and among the lawyers themselves has become a matter of course, which still hardly attracts attention. And non-lawyers today always speak just legitimately (not legally) if they want to say they are right. However, Salan's case shows that in the modern state, even questioned legality itself is stronger than any other kind of law. This is due to the decisionist power of the state and its transformation of law into law. We do not need to delve into this issue here.

the state will one day "wither away". So far, legality is an irresistible functional mode of every modern, state army. The legal government decides who is the enemy that the army must fight against. Anyone who undertakes to determine who the enemy is, claims his own, new legality, if he does not want to join the definition of the enemy by the previous legal rule.

The real enemy

A declaration of war is always a declaration of an enemy; it goes without saying; and when declaring a civil war, this is all the more implied. When Salan declared civil war, he was actually proclaiming two enemies: with regard to the Algerian front, the continuation of regular and irregular war; against the French government, an illegal and irregular civil war began. Nothing clarifies the hopelessness of Salan's situation as clearly as looking at this double declaration of the enemy. Every war on two fronts raises the question of who is the real enemy. Is this not a sign of an inner dichotomy - to have more than one single real enemy? The enemy is our own question as a gestalt. If one's own gestalt is unambiguously defined, where does the doubling of the enemy come from? The enemy is not something that for some reason must be eliminated and, because of its low value, destroyed. The enemy is in my own realm. For this reason, I must face him in the struggle in order to find my own measure, my own boundaries, my own image and appearance.

Salan considered the Algerian partisan to be an absolute enemy. Suddenly in his rear a much more nasty, more intense enemy arose - his own government, his own boss, his own brother. In his brothers of yesterday, he suddenly saw a new enemy. This is the crux of Salan's case. Yesterday's brother revealed himself as a more dangerous enemy. There must be confusion in the very concept of the enemy, which is closely related to the doctrine of war and which we will now deal with to clarify, at the end of our exposition.

The historian will find examples and parallels in world history for all historical situations. We have already outlined the parallels with the processes of 1812/13 in Prussian history. We also showed how in the ideas and plans of the Prussian army reform of 1808/13 the partisan found its philosophical legitimacy, and in the Prussian Landsturm Edict of April 1813 - its historical letter of credit. So now it should not seem strange, as it would be at first glance, if we take as an example the situation of the Prussian General York in the winter of 1812-1813 as an example. At first, of course, huge opposites are striking: Salan, a French of left-Republican origin and modern technocratic coinage, against a general of the imperial Prussian army in 1812, who definitely could not come to the idea of declaring civil war on his emperor and supreme commander. In the face of such differences of eras and types, it seems secondary and even accidental that York fought as an officer in the colonies of the East Indies. However, it is precisely the striking opposites that make it all the more clearly that the main question is the same. For in both cases it was about deciding who the real enemy was.

Decisionist precision reigns supreme in the functioning of every modern organization, especially in the functioning of every modern, regular state army. At the same time, the main question for the situation of today's general very accurately appears as an absolute Either-or. A harsh alternative to legality and legitimacy is only a consequence of the French Revolution and its collision with

restoration of the legitimate monarchy in 1815. In such a pre-revolutionary legitimate monarchy as the then royal Prussia, many feudal elements retained the link between command and subordination. Fidelity has not yet become something "irrational" and has not yet melted into simple, countable functionalism. Prussia was already a clearly defined state at that time; her army could not renounce the Friderician origin; Prussian army reformers wanted to modernize rather than return to any form of feudalism. Nevertheless, the situation and environment of the legitimate Prussian monarchy of that time may seem to today's observer and in a conflict case less acute and harsh, less decisionist-state. There is no need to argue about this now. The point is only that the impressions of the various garments of the epochs do not erase the main question, namely the question of the real enemy.

York in 1812 commanded the Prussian auxiliary corps, which, as an allied detachment to Napoleon, belonged to the army of the French General MacDonald. In December 1812, York went over to the side of the enemy, to the side of the Russians, and concluded the famous Taurogen Convention with the Russian general von Diebitsch. During the negotiations and at the conclusion of the convention, Lieutenant Colonel von Clausewitz took part as a mediator from the Russian side. The letter that York sent on January 3, 1813 to his king and supreme commander-in-chief became a famous historical document. This is true. The Prussian general writes with great respect that he expects the king to judge whether he, York, can fight "against a real enemy," or whether the king condemns the act of his general. He faithfully awaits an answer, ready, in case of censure,

The words about "the real enemy" are worthy of Clausewitz and get the point. The fact that the general is ready to “wait for the bullet on the battlefield” refers to the soldier who is responsible for his deed, not otherwise than General Salan was ready to shout out to Vive la France! in the Vincennes trenches before being shot. However, the fact that York, with all due respect to the king, reserves the right to decide who the "real enemy" is - gives his words a true, tragic and rebellious meaning. York was not a partisan and, perhaps, never would have become. But in the horizon of the meaning and concept of the real enemy, a step into partisanism would not be absurd or inconsistent.

Of course, this is only a heuristic fiction, permissible for a brief moment, when the Prussian officers elevated the partisan to an idea, that is, only at this turning point, which led to the edict of the Landsturm on April 13, 1813. A few months later, the idea that a Prussian general could become a partisan would even become grotesque and absurd as a heuristic fiction, and would remain so forever as long as the Prussian army existed. How was it possible that the partisan, who in the 17th century descended to Picaro (rogue) and in the 18th century belonged to a light, mobile detachment, on the eve of 1813, for a short moment, appeared as a heroic figure, so that in our time, more than a hundred years later, even become a key figure in international events? The answer to this question is clear from the fact that that the irregularity of the partisan remains dependent on the meaning and content of the specifically regular. After the disintegration and disintegration in 17th century Germany, a regularity of wars for dynastic reasons developed in the 18th century. This regularity gave war such strong defenses that the war could be viewed as a game in which a light, mobile unit participated irregularly and the enemy as simply a conventional enemy became a partner in the war game. The Spanish guerrilla began when Napoleon defeated the Spanish regular army in the fall of 1808. Here there was a difference with the Prussia of 1806-1807, which, after the defeat of its regular army, immediately concluded a humiliating peace. The Spanish partisan again restored the seriousness of the war, namely, in contrast to Napoleon, respectively on the side of the defense of the old European continental states, whose in the 18th century, the regularity of wars for dynastic reasons developed. This regularity gave war such strong defenses that the war could be viewed as a game in which a light, mobile unit participated irregularly and the enemy as simply a conventional enemy became a partner in the war game. The Spanish guerrilla began when Napoleon defeated the Spanish regular army in the fall of 1808. Here there was a difference with the Prussia of 1806-1807, which, after the defeat of its regular army, immediately concluded a humiliating peace. The Spanish partisan again restored the seriousness of the war, namely, in contrast to Napoleon, respectively on the side of the defense of the old European continental states, whose in the 18th century, the regularity of wars for dynastic reasons developed. This regularity gave war such strong defenses that the war could be viewed as a game in which a light, mobile unit participated irregularly and the enemy as simply a conventional enemy became a partner in the war game. The Spanish guerrilla began when Napoleon defeated the Spanish regular army in the fall of 1808. Here there was a difference with the Prussia of 1806-1807, which, after the defeat of its regular army, immediately concluded a humiliating peace. The Spanish partisan again restored the seriousness of the war, namely, in contrast to Napoleon, respectively on the side of the defense of the old European continental states, whose in which a light, mobile unit participated irregularly and the enemy, as just a conventional enemy, became a partner in the war game. The Spanish guerrilla began when Napoleon defeated the Spanish regular army in the fall of 1808. Here there was a difference with the Prussia of 1806-1807, which, after the defeat of its regular army, immediately concluded a humiliating peace. The Spanish partisan again restored the seriousness of the war, namely, in contrast to Napoleon, respectively on the side of the defense of the old European continental states, whose in which a light, mobile unit participated irregularly and the enemy, as just a conventional enemy, became a partner in the war game. The Spanish guerrilla began when Napoleon defeated the Spanish regular ar

the old regularity, which has become a convention and a game, has shown itself not at the height of the new, revolutionary charged, Napoleonic regularity. The enemy thus again became a real enemy, war - again a real war. The partisan defending the national soil from a foreign conqueror became a hero who really fought against a real enemy. It was a really important process that led Clausewitz to his theory and doctrine of war. When then a hundred such a professional revolutionary as Lenin inherited the defenses of war, the war became the absolute bearer of absolute enmity against the absolute enemy.

years later the theory of war
blindly destroyed
everything
war and partisans
became

From real enemy to absolute enemy

In the theory of war, it is always a question of distinguishing between hostility, which gives war its meaning and its character. Every attempt to preserve or limit war must be filled with the consciousness that - in relation to the concept of war - enmity is the primary concept, and that distinguishing between different types of war is preceded by a distinction between different types of enmity. Otherwise, all efforts to preserve or limit war are just a game that turns out to be untenable in the face of outbursts of real enmity. After the Napoleonic Wars, irregular warfare was driven out of the general consciousness of European theologians, philosophers and lawyers. Indeed, there were supporters of peace who saw in the abolition and elimination of the conventional war of the Hague Charter of Land War the end of the war in general; and there were lawyers who considered every doctrine of a just war to be something eo ipso just, because already Saint Thomas Aquinas taught about something similar. No one suspected what emancipation meant, the release of irregular warfare. No one thought about the consequences of a civilian victory over a soldier, when one day a citizen puts on a uniform while a partisan takes it off to continue fighting without a uniform.

Only this lack of concrete thinking ended the destructive work of professional revolutionaries. It was a great misfortune, because with those war protections, European mankind managed to achieve something rare: refusal to criminalize the enemy in war, thus relativizing enmity, denying absolute enmity. It is indeed something rare, even incredibly humane, to lead people to renounce discrimination and defamation of their enemies.

This is what appears to be questioned again by the partisan. His criteria include the extreme intensity of political engagement. When Che Guevara says: “The partisan is a Jesuit of war,” he means the unconditional political application. The biography of every famous partisan, starting with Empecinado, confirms this. In enmity, what was illegally done seeks its right. In it, it finds the meaning of the case and the meaning of law, when the shell of protection and obedience, where it still lived, breaks down, or tears the fabric of the norms of legality, from which it could still expect rights and legal protection. Then the conventional, traditional game stops. But this termination of legal protection is not necessarily partisan. Michael Kohlhaas, whom the sense of right made a robber and murderer, was not a partisan, because he did not become politically engaged and fought exclusively for his own violated private right, not against someone else's conqueror and not for a revolutionary cause. In such cases, the irregularity is non-political and becomes purely criminal, since it loses a positive connection with the existing regularity somewhere. This is how the partisan differs from the noble or ignoble leader of the robbers.

When analyzing the world-political context (above p.), We emphasized that the interested third takes on an essential function when he enters into a relationship with the regular, which is necessary for the irregularity of the partisan in order to remain in the political realm. The core, the essence of the Political is not just enmity, but the distinction between friend and foe. The Political presupposes both, friend and foe. A powerful third person interested in the guerrilla can think and act selfishly; with his interest politically, he is on the side of the partisan. This results in political friendship and is a kind of political recognition, even if it does not come to public and official recognition as a belligerent party or as a government. Empecinado was recognized by his people, the regular army and the great English power as a political value. He was not Michael Koolhaas, and he was not Schinderhannes (nickname for the bandit leader who died in 1808), whose third concerned was the cover-ups of the criminals. On the contrary, the political situation of Salan was tinged with despair and tragedy, for he became illegal inside politics, in his homeland, and outside, in world politics, not only did he not find any interested third, but, on the contrary, ran into a solid enemy front of anti-colonialism.

So, the enemy of the guerrilla is a real enemy, but not an absolute enemy. This follows from the political character of the partisan. Another boundary of enmity is evident from the telluric character of the partisan. He protects a piece of land with which he is autochthonous. His main position remains defensive despite the increased agility of his tactics. He behaves exactly like Saint John of Orleans before the church court. She was not a partisan and regularly fought against the British. When the ecclesiastical judge asked her a question — a theological trap question — whether she would argue that God hates the English, she replied: “As to whether God loves the English or hates them, I do not know; I only know that they must be expelled from France. " Such an answer would be given by every normal partisan - the defender of the national soil. With such a defensive character, the principled limitation of hostility is given. The real enemy is not declared to be an absolute enemy, and is not declared to be the last enemy of humanity in general.52

Lenin shifted the conceptual center of gravity from war to politics, that is, to distinguish between friend and foe. This was rational and after Clausewitz was a consistent continuation of the idea of war as a continuation of politics. Only Lenin, as a professional revolutionary, seized by the idea of a world civil war, went further and made an absolute enemy out of a real enemy. Clausewitz spoke of absolute war, but still assumed the regularity of existing statehood as a condition. In general, he still could not imagine the state as an instrument of the party and the party that orders the state. With the absolute position of the party and the partisan became absolute and rose to the level of absolute enmity. Today, it is not difficult to see the ideological skillful technique that caused this change in the concept of the enemy.

For technical-industrial development has strengthened the armament of people to pure means of destruction. This creates a defiant disproportionate defense and obedience: one half of humanity becomes a hostage for the other half of the overlords, armed with atomic means of destruction. Such absolute means of destruction require an absolute enemy if they are not to be absolutely inhuman. After all, it is not the means of destruction that destroy themselves, but people destroy other people with these means. The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes grasped the essence of the process already in the 17th century (de homine 1X, 3) and formulated it with all precision, although then (1659) the weapons were still relatively harmless. Hobbes says: man

it is also much more dangerous for other people who, as it seems to him, threaten him than any animal, as human weapons are more dangerous than the so-called natural tools of the beast, for example: teeth, paws, horns or poison. And the German philosopher Hegel adds: the weapon is the essence of the fighter himself.

In concrete terms, this means: a supra-conventional weapon presupposes a supra-conventional person. It not only presupposes it as a postulate of the distant future; it rather admits it as an already present reality. So, the last danger lies not in the availability of means of destruction and not in the pre-rational evil of man. It consists in the inevitability of moral compulsion and violence. People who use those means against other people are forced to morally destroy these other people, that is, their victims and their objects. They must declare the opposite side as a whole criminal and inhuman, total inferiority. Otherwise, they themselves are criminals and monsters, inhumans. The logic of value and inferiority unfolds its entire destructive sequence and forces more and more new and deeper discrimination,

In a world in which partners thus mutually break into the abyss of total depreciation, before they physically destroy each other, new types of absolute enmity must arise. The enmity will become so terrible that it will probably no longer be possible to talk about the enemy or enmity, and both of these things, even with the observance of all the rules, will first be prohibited and damned before the work of destruction can begin. The annihilation will then be completely abstract and completely absolute. It is no longer directed against the enemy at all, but only serves the so-called objective realization of the highest values, for which, as you know, no price is too high. Only the denial of real enmity opens a free path for the cause of the abolition of absolute enmity.

In 1914, the peoples and governments of Europe, without absolute enmity, unsteadily on their feet, with dizzy heads, entered the First World War. Real enmity arose only from the war itself, which began as a traditional war between the states of European international law and ended in a worldwide civil war of revolutionary class enmity. Who will prevent the emergence of new types of hostility in a similar but still infinitely intensified manner, whose implementation will cause unexpected forms of manifestation of a new partisan?

The theorist cannot do more than preserve concepts and call a spade a spade. The theory of the partisan is poured out into the concept of the political, into the question of the real enemy and the new nomos of the Earth.

Translated from German by Yu. Corinth

Karl Haushofer

CONTINENTAL BLOCK: BERLIN-MOSCOW-TOKYO

There is no doubt that the most ambitious and important event in modern world politics is the prospect of the formation of a powerful continental bloc that would unite Europe with the North and East of Asia.
But projects of this scale are not born only in the head of this or that statesman, be he as great as the famous Greek goddess of war who had the ability to reincarnate. Informed people know that such plans take a long time to prepare. And it is precisely because of this circumstance that I willingly accept the proposal of our geographical school, which chose me from among the representatives of the older generation in science in order to provide evidence of the formation of continental Eurasian politics - after all, for many years, starting with the first risky attempts to establish friendly, and subsequently union relations, I undertake systematic research on this issue, which allowed me to constantly follow (sometimes directly present during the formation of these political associations) for the forge of fate,

First of all, it is necessary to learn one of the principles of geopolitics, which was first formulated in the distant times of the birth of the Roman state and has not lost its relevance since then: "Fas est ab hoste doceri" ("Learning from the enemy is a sacred duty").
Soon after the birth of important political formations, a potential adversary develops an instinct of an imminent threat, the very symptomatic feeling that the remarkable Japanese sociologist G.E. Vishara ascribes to his entire people and which allows the Japanese to see the approach of any danger from afar. Such a national characteristic is undoubtedly very precious. Howbeit. It was the British and American leaders who were the first to see the barely appeared on the horizon the possibility of creating a Eurasian continental bloc, fraught with a threat to world Anglo-Saxon domination, while in the Second Reich we did not have any idea of what could be learned from the connection of Central Europe and the mighty potential of East Asia across the vast Eurasia. Lord Palmerston, one of the toughest and most successful imperialist politicians, was the first to tell the prime minister who removed him from office during the government crisis: “Our relations with France may now become somewhat strained, but we must maintain them at all costs, for in the background we are threatened by Russia that can connect Europe and East Asia, and we alone will not be able to resist. " This phrase was spoken in 1851 - in an era when victorious England was in all its splendor, when the United States, having survived a series of severe internal crises, first applied a harsh formula that we should forever inscribe on our tablets - the formula of "anaconda politics." A giant snake that strangles its victim, squeezing its rings around it until until all the bones are crushed and breathing stops - the image is not pleasant. Trying to imagine this threat hanging over the political spaces of the Old World, one can understand what the size and power of these spaces would have become if the “policy of anaconda” failed. In addition, even during the prosperity of the victorious world empire, there was a warning from another imperialist - Homer Lee, who wrote the famous book about the decline of the Anglo-Saxons. In this book, which belongs to the era of the apparent apogee of the world British Empire, one can even during the period of prosperity of the victorious world empire, there was a warning from another imperialist - Homer Lee, who wrote the famous book about the decline of the Anglo-Saxons. In this book, which belongs to the era of the apparent apogee of the world British Empire, one can even during the period of prosperity of the victorious world empire, there was a warning from another imperialist - Homer Lee, who wrote the famous book about the decline of the Anglo-Saxons. In this book, which belongs to the era of the apparent apogee of the world British Empire, one can

read that the fateful day, the sunset of the gods may come for the world English-speaking empire on the day when Germany, Russia and Japan will become each other's allies. As long as the global British empire has thrived, there is this grim fear of a single alliance, which makes you foresee that sooner or later the forces of encirclement - this brilliantly and skillfully designed art that was mastered in the Middle Ages in Venice - might collapse. In modern times, the most astute warnings came from Sir H. Macinder, who wrote an essay in 1904 on the geographical axis of history. Axis is the great empire of the steppes, the center of the Old World, whoever ruled it - the Persians, Mongols, Turks, white or red kings. In 1919, Mackinder makes a new warning and proposes to once and for all divide the Germans and Russians by resettling the inhabitants of East Prussia to the left bank of the Vistula. Further, in the last days before the start of the blitzkrieg against Poland, the New Statesman accused a narrow circle of geopoliticians, including us, of looking for the most effective ways to fight the British Empire and British imperialism by their own means. We would be happy if we could really use these means for our defense, especially when we find ourselves face to face with aggressive actions. Finally, one can recall my conversation with the elder Chamberlain. in the search for the most effective ways to fight the British Empire and British imperialism by their own means. We would be happy if we could really use these means for our defense, especially when we find ourselves face to face with aggressive actions. Finally, one can recall my conversation with the elder Chamberlain. in the search for the most effective ways to fight the British Empire and British imperialism by their own means. We would be happy if we could really use these means for our defense, especially when we find ourselves face to face with aggressive actions. Finally, one can recall my conversation with the elder Chamberlain.[97], who foresaw the danger that England might eventually throw Germany, Russia and Japan into each other's arms in their hopeless struggle to secure the necessary living conditions: that is why he proposed cooperation between England, Germany and Japan. The fear of German-Russian cooperation, even in 1919, when we were disarmed and made a completely harmless impression, was so strong that a proposal was born, at the cost of a grand resettlement of the inhabitants of East Prussia to the West, to limit the borders of Germany to the western bank of the Vistula - in fact, only for that so that Germany and Russia no longer have common borders. The Rapallo Treaty was a huge disappointment for Mackinder and his school. Thus, fear of possible potential consequences

Continental politics of the Old World for the world British Empire runs through its entire history. Perceptible from the beginning, this fear became clearer and clearer afterwards, as the rulers of the British Empire lost their former ability to see the situation as a whole and their once inherent art of looking facts in the face. And as you know, "fear and hatred are bad advisors." You can see a similar feeling in the United States. Thus, Brooke Adams, one of the most remarkable and perspicacious experts in the field of economic policy, pointed out, long before the acquisition of Qiao-Chao, the extent to which the increasing Anglicization of the world would be threatened. if a grandiose German-Russian-East Asian unification is achieved through the construction of an extensive railway transcontinental line with end points in Port Arthur and Qingdao - the only unification against which any attempts by the British, American or even a unified blockade will be powerless. So no one else. how our adversary gives us the confidence that a solid continental bloc will prevail over anaconda politics economically, militarily, maritimely and strategically — a confidence we happily noted in our second attempt to strangle the Old World.

Let's look at the prospect of the formation of the continental bloc through the eyes of the "winners" to whom such extensive plans were attributed already during the acquisition of Kiao-Chao. To our shame, we must admit that already at the turn of the century in Russia and Japan there were many more thinking heads who foresaw and explored the possibility of creating

[97] In 1899 Haushofer had a personal conversation with Joseph Chamberlain, the British minister of the colonies and the spokesman for the extreme right, imperialist tendencies in English society. It was about the possibilities of forming an intercontinental geopolitical union of the British Empire-USA-Japan-Germany.

continental block than in Central Europe. Thus, it can be recalled that during the preparation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, from which England benefited much more than Japan, the Far Eastern island empire had the feeling that it was being drawn into an enslaving treaty. This agreement worried Japan, since it would have to ensure equal participation in the agreement of Germany, which would be a second counterbalance to the power of the British fleet. The negotiations dragged on for two years, during which repeated attempts were made to fully include Germany in the game. It seemed to the Japanese that Japan alone would not be able to remain on a par with the British naval power of that time, and the signed treaty would be enslaving.

"If the German and Japanese fleets cooperated with the Russian land army, the ocean agreement would cease to be an onerous deal with respect to England, turning into an equal treaty," such was the position of the shrewd Japanese with whom I spoke on this topic, and in this position they clearly stood much earlier. The Japanese ambassador in London, Ayashi, who published his memoirs, and John Hamilton, who published his memoirs of the Russo-Japanese war, provided a tremendous chance to study the diplomatic history of this issue. And if the first volumes were still published without the intervention of "organized pressure", then the second volumes of both authors could not but be censored, and both diplomats were threatened with disgrace. We can say that the first volumes of Ayasha and Hamilton appeared in the eyes of world public opinion as zealous trotters, while the second volume turned out to be like an obedient gelding. In any case, the first volumes did away with all the secrets of politics, and therefore an informed person could read them between the lines. So, for example, when the Japanese marquis Ito, trying to put the Japanese-Russian-German alliance on his feet, went through St. Petersburg to Germany, in order to neutralize his continental plans, an unscrupulous action was taken to change the code of dispatches coming from Japan. The Japanese visitors were going to counter the cunning of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in Friedrichsruhe, the country estate of Bismarck, the statesman who was especially worshiped by the Marquis Ito. Already in 1901-1902 they had a clear idea of the possibility of creating a continental union, and this possibility was studied in depth in Japan. They spoke quite frankly about her in 1909 and 1910. At that time we had an excellent intermediary for establishing contact with the highest Japanese realms - with the Marquis Ito. with his smartest successor, Count Goto, with Katsura, who was then chairman of the council of ministers, with the most influential figures in the circle of elderly statesmen. The fact is that the personal physician of the Japanese imperial family, a brilliant connoisseur of the Far East, the Württemberg Elvin von Baelz played a huge role here. But when this man, who possessed the unique trust of the highest Japanese spheres, wanted to make a report on the mental and physical characteristics of the Japanese at a congress of German doctors, the chairman of the congress told him that such a topic was not of interest. No doubt, that England would have behaved very differently with this man who belonged to the intimate circle of Mikado advisors. But for us, such statements have always clearly shown that the German imperial house, unfortunately, has an irresistible aversion to cooperation with the Far East. The slogan was still the formula of Wilhelm II: "Europeans, put your good above all!" But the young race threatened the freedom and equality of rights of Europeans to a much lesser extent than the representatives of the white race who seemed closer to us.
Russia was an important link in this grandiose policy. There, the main advocate of the idea of the need for the formation of a continental block was Witte, a German by origin, the creator of the Trans-Siberian railway and one of the most important Russian financiers. During the war, he worked out the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany and in 1915 he died under strange circumstances. IN

Russia has always had a current that realized the benefits and opportunities that the German-Russian-Japanese cooperation contained; and when, after the war, one of our most prominent statesmen - Brockdorff-Rantzau, who had an iron character - wanted with my help to restore the thread of contacts, two Russian statesmen controlled this process and strove to favor its course. In truth, one should have agreed on anything, whatever, in order to achieve the goal of uniting the Japanese and Russians for the sake of the highest political interest, so that they could reasonably regulate the borders, thereby protecting their rear and getting the opportunity to deploy political activity in other directions. Each participant in this game had to endure all night long walks, after which the lawns were completely covered with cigarette butts and spilled tea, and in an atmosphere of extremely strange discussions, conducted with an ancient sophistication that added piquancy to each of these conversations. When, after two or three hours, it seemed that the whole question could be clarified, dialectics forced to start again from the very beginning, and again three hours of discussion and tired and irritated rivals.
We in the Second Reich were too loyal to British colonial policy to take advantage of tough and sober geopolitical
the possibilities of a continental union capable of bearing good fruit for a long time. The Second Reich rejected this prospect, although the use of these opportunities implied the likelihood of double pressure on the enemy. And it was in this refusal that there was a great danger.
Today we know: it is possible to build rather daring steel structures, but only if there is a solid and solid foundation, if the main load-bearing supports are made of truly strong and elastic steel, if the structure of the structure is so strong that both the stone and steel joint. But such a steel structure gains special strength and resistance to world storms when, as in our new bridges, solid stone fortifications of a spatial block extending from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Pacific Ocean are inserted into its very foundation.

Let us emphasize that we look at the possibility of Germany's participation in such a continental policy quite coolly. This opportunity was not realized by Prince Ito and Bismarck. Similar attempts were made, referring to Tirpitz, Admiral Kato. Chief of Staff of the Fleet in Tsushima, my modest efforts were directed in the same direction. For all of us. working on this great agreement to save the entire Old World, the precondition was German-Japanese unification.

The Japanese statesman Goto told me: “Remember the Russian triple team -“ troika ”. A special way of harnessing is used there: in the center is the most restive and strongest horse; and on the right and left, supporting the middle one, two more flexible ones run. With such a team, you can win a lot in speed and power. " Looking at the map of the Old World, we state that three border seas are similar to such a triple team: firstly, the Baltic Sea with the Baltic space, which has recently become quite politically close to us; secondly, much less developed by its coastal inhabitants than the Baltic - us. Sea of Japan: and thirdly, under Italian domination and recently closed from the south of the Adriatic with the adjacent Eastern Mediterranean[98]. All these frontier seas are located in the areas of Russia's most important exits to the free ocean, if one does not take into account the free Arctic Ocean, the use of which depends on the whims of its heating by the Atlantic waters of the Golf Stream.

[98] Haushofer is referring to the April 1939 annexation of Albania by Italy.

The Japanese, obeying their strong instinct and following the tactics of controlling the sea, basically closed the zone surrounding the Russian outlet to the free ocean in the Vladivostok area, doing much more logical than the Germans did with the cradle of their race in the Baltic space.
Back in 1935, we inflicted endless damage on ourselves in Sweden by convincing the Social Democratic government of Stockholm, and then Oslo, to give up confidence in the protection of the League of Nations and take independent measures to protect our vast territory: we declared that such measures had been found we would have the most complete understanding. But, as you know, they have been waiting for the promised three years. The proposed non-aggression pacts were never adopted, and the space of the Baltic Sea thus began to look much less gratifying for us than the space of the Sea of Japan.
- for the Japanese. This is primarily to blame for the lack of a clear instinct tough geopolitical realities, which characterize mainly the social democratic ideology of the northern governments.
True, in Sweden only a minority understood the dangers and the opportunities that the future promised. Realizing that it would not find the necessary understanding in the competent government circles of Sweden Norway, Germany decided to unambiguously follow the main lines of continental politics, disregarding the interests of those whose friendliness was expressed only in loud phrases. We ?? could, because of several geopolitical outsiders, jeopardize the troika, which alone could wrest the Old World from the embrace of the anaconda.
However, the attempts of Russian-Japanese unification, which is another necessary condition for carrying out a full-fledged continental policy, are not news either. Frankly, these attempts began already in 1901-1902. Then they were undertaken again after the Russo-Japanese War, in 1909 and 1910, when I was in Japan — at that time Ito became the herald of such a policy. Then the United States made an original proposal to eliminate the main difficulties between China, Japan and Russia by buying all the railways in Manchuria and handing them over to the American capitalists; so they, against their will, forced the Russians and the Japanese to get closer.

Then, Italy began to make its own efforts towards the formation of the continental block. It was there that Ricardi did it, who inspired Mussolini to create an institute for the Middle and Far East. Thanks to this institute, there was a desire to carefully harness the precious cultural elements of Japanese and Chinese origin into the political and cultural harness. Large sums were not donated for this, but the premises of one of the majestic palaces, filled with the brilliant culture of the Renaissance, were provided. Rome possesses a powerful force that could be trusted. The Institute for the Middle and Far East is run by Senator Gentile, Archduke Tucci, Duke of Avarna, son of a former ambassador to the imperial court in Vienna. They did an excellent job with their duties, since, apparently, did not remain completely immersed in the world of philology,

As for the latest initiatives, the well-known Count Mushakoi and Baron Oshima should also play a huge role in the preparation of the continental union. As we know, throughout the war in China, Japan fought with only her left hand, since her right hand with a reserve military force was always at the ready in Manchuria. Such forces were concentrated there, which we did not even imagine. The border issue is now partly settled, and in an extremely clever way. For example, a treaty was signed in relation to Mongolia, where for five months the Russians and the Japanese fought serious battles, which resulted in numerous deaths and injuries. Then at the same time from both warring parties, from Moscow and from Tokyo, received

proposals to end this struggle. Soon this was done, and the conclusion of peace was accompanied by a majestic picture of a general funeral ceremony for the souls of the dead soldiers in a purely Japanese manner on the former disputed territory. Despite the religious nature of this ceremony, as well as the fact that participation in it itself was quite difficult for ideological reasons, General Potapov was present at the ceremony. Ceremonies like this are of great psychological importance. At the head of the troops marching with banners unfolded, the old general approaches the altar of the dead. Every Japanese firmly believes that the souls of warriors are indeed in front of this altar to receive the emperor's message. The very impeccable behavior of the Soviet general and his officers in this rather lengthy ceremony honors their remarkable ability to culturally adapt. Since you cannot turn your back on the spirits, all the participants in the ceremony slowly approach the altar from a distance and step back. It would be blasphemy to turn your back on ancestral spirits who are seen as living. This ceremony, imbued with absolute religiosity, is very interesting and very convincing from the point of view of ethnopsychology; it made a deep impression on even the most sophisticated people from all over the world who were allowed to attend. After the ceremony, they could say to themselves: here all the people firmly believe in the transmigration of souls. He believes that during a short earthly existence it is possible, through commendable actions for the good of the Motherland, to win an exalted place in the otherworldly existence, otherwise dishonor awaits behind the grave. The feeling that the whole people, with the exception of a few skeptics-free-thinkers, is warmly inspired by this idea, gives this people strength, solidarity and readiness for exceptional sacrifice.

Finally, geopolitics, thanks to the unusually advantageous, from a political and spatial point of view, opportunities that it managed to realize (and still have to be realized), overcame the ideological obstacles in the matter of continental unification for the implementation of world politics - and a great contribution to this was made by the double the game of British politics that pushed this process. Apparently all the impotence of Lord Halifax trying to pursue a policy of European cooperation; a much stronger current, led by opponents of Chamberlain. prepared for war and hesitated only for appearance, until the rearmament process ended[99].

The opportunity for an objective and unbiased study of the geopolitical power of the Eurasian pact presented itself on December 7, when a conference began in Chita on the conclusion of a trade agreement between Japan and Russia. So, to the east of us stretches the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with political
spatial mass of 21 352 571 sq. km. (excluding recent annexations), from 13,000 km. coastlines and 182 million inhabitants. Next is Japan, with an area of about 2 million square meters. km. (excluding territories located outside its immediate borders, as well as the territories of its powerful allies) with a very long coastline and 140 million people.
Of course, of this number, only 73 million inhabitants of the empire are literally its political and military support, but the workforce of 140 million people is quite

[99] Here we are talking about two currents among representatives of British foreign policy and the years preceding the outbreak of World War II. One of them (the so-called "Cliveden"), headed by the Conservative Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, who became in my 1937, and his deputy Halifax, sought to "pacify" Germany, considered as a bulwark against Bolshevism, and proposed the conclusion of an agreement between England and Germany-France-Italy, which, in particular, was reflected in the signing on September 30, 1938 of the "Munich Pact" on the partition of Czechoslovakia. Another trend, led by the opposition leaders of the Conservative Party Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden (they entered the government after the outbreak of the war) and gained the upper hand, insisted on the need to fight Germany.

available. In the face of such a state of affairs in the East, although we are working to intensify our cultural and economic ties on the western flank of the bloc, nevertheless, from a political and spatial point of view, we do not act to the same extent as other partners. We have at our disposal a million sq. km. (as well as the right to another three million square kilometers in the colonies) and from 87 to 100 million people. An intermediate position due to the presence of both oceanic and continental conditions of existence is occupied by Italy, which has 250 thousand kilometers of coasts (which entails their vulnerability and the need to make major efforts to develop the fleet and aviation) and from 57 to 60 million human reserves. If we compare these figures with those on which the central powers were based during the World War, then, based on geopolitical data, we will see a noticeable difference between the state of affairs then and now. And if we manage to consolidate and support this brave and grandiose Eurasian continental policy until reaching its last great consequences, its enormous opportunities will emerge, in which, for example, the autonomy and independence of India will be simply one of the phenomena accompanying such a policy. The fact is that sometimes I have met among young and not so young people the opinion that India is trying to achieve only the status of dominion, remaining under the protection of British troops. All the efforts of those politicians and ordinary Indians with whom I have personally met prove the opposite: their ultimate and most firm goal is independence. They have always maintained the belief that we take ever increasing help seriously,

From the first minutes after the promulgation of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, we have seen an extraordinary upheaval in Indian public opinion. Prior to this, Anglo-Indian newspapers were filled with phraseology on the theme of strengthening democracy around the world; and it is for this that India had to exist. But as soon as the grandiose specter of European continental politics emerged, this opinion, like a sharp change in the weather, completely changed. The Indians now believe that the Soviet Union could certainly have caused the British significant trouble in India - for this it would be enough for it to intervene and move its armies through the passes.

The grandiose and so dazzling spectacle of the Eurasian continental policy in its entirety was prepared separately by many people. It was not an accidental throw into the unknown, but a conscious fulfillment of a great necessity.

(translation by A. Karagodin)

* the first part of an article written in 1940.

Fragments of the second part of the same article (generally devoted to narrower practical issues):

“Germany has been accused of pursuing a plan to incite colored peoples against their 'rightful' masters in India and Indochina, encouraging their desire for self-determination. But in fact, based on the robot of the Englishman Mackinder, we are promoting the idea all over the world that only a strong connection of states along the axis of Germany-Russia-Japan will allow us all to rise and become invulnerable to the methods of anaconda of the Anglo-Saxon world. When, 4 months after the start of the war, the famous English journalist put forward such a claim to me, I replied that if you are attacked in accordance with the tactics of the anaconda applied on a global scale, moreover, they are attacked by the powers that have been constantly repeating this practice anaconda, then you have every right in every way

to oppose this policy of the enemy, striving to grab more and more pieces of influence. Only the idea of Eurasia, being embodied politically in space, will give us the opportunity for a long-term expansion of our living space. ” “Eurasia cannot be stifled as long as its two largest peoples are Germans and Russians.
- strive in every possible way to avoid an internecine conflict similar to the Crimean War or 1914: this is an axiom of European politics. "

“The last hour of Anglo-Saxon politics will strike when the Germans, Russians and Japanese will unite. This is what Homer Lee said. "

GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS OF MERIDIANS AND PARALLELS

There is a geopolitical term: Great Spaces (Grossraum). It originated in the ancient world, predetermined by the specifics of the Mediterranean, southern deserts and mountain ranges. The term, as it were, repeated the development trends focused on geographic sectors both along the parallels and on the East-West axis. This applied to temperate, tropical and subtropical zones. The exceptions were states located along the bed of large rivers flowing along the North-South line. River geopolitical formations, due to the special location of their vital arteries, experienced the pressure of the so-called. "Torque" generated by expansion along the parallels. This constituted the actual geopolitical history of the "river states" until it was finally suppressed by the dynamics of the latitudinal expansion of the empires of Forward Asia and, to the east,

Starting from a certain point in history, successive waves of "latitudinal expansion" followed - Phoenicians, Hellenes, Romans, Arabs, steppe peoples, Franks, Iberians, etc. This gave rise to a global trend of geopolitical development, going from the Romanesque Mediterranean to the Caribbean Mediterranean. This
the tendency was exhausted after the Portuguese and Spaniards reached the borders of the first Great Space, striving for meridian development. This space was the Kingdom of China, which often changed its external form, but at the same time remained surprisingly constant in the cultural-racial sense. So, the East Asian - Chinese and Japanese - geopolitical structure, developing along the North-South line, was cut through by the Spanish colonial Empire, the first geopolitical “latitudinal kingdom”. However, the Spaniards did not retain their monopoly for long - about 70 years. Their footsteps were followed by competitors who inherited the “latitudinal strategy” and sought to rob their predecessors and inherit their conquests. The British were the strongest among them. They managed to build their First and Second Empires, which generally followed a "latitudinal" orientation.

In the northern half of the continent, the Empire was constantly expanding to the East, first of the white, and then of the red kings. Buffer zones lay between the northern latitudinal Empire and the south. And only in the 40s of the XX century, two geopolitical macro-formations oriented along the meridian - the East Asian bloc and the Pan American bloc - almost simultaneously invaded the geopolitical field of latitudinal dynamics, forming a “frame” around the traditional layout of planetary forces.
This latest geopolitical event has a truly gigantic significance, since it predetermines a complete change in the “force field” of the earth's surface. It is this that gives reality to the Euro-African project, the attempts of the Soviet Union to move from its “latitudinal strategy” to the “strategy of warm seas” and India's plans to dynamize its policy towards the Pacific islands. The re-emerging geopolitical field is strikingly different from the picture outlined in 1904 by Halford Mackinder, who defined the center of the Old World as the “geographical axis of history”, although in 1904 Mackinder's concepts were quite adequate to the real state of affairs.

It should be clarified that the Great Space of East Asia tends to be self-limited by its continental borders. The situation is different with the United States, which, having completed its plans for geopolitical pan-Americanism, considers its control over the entire American continent only the first step towards achieving world domination and is already intensifying its efforts in tropical Africa, Iran, India and

Australia. The United States is again orienting its geopolitical expansion along the West-East line, striving to make “latitudinal dynamics” the basis of its future world power. This will give them the opportunity in the near future to threaten their potential adversaries with the possibility of a Third World War. Thus, it is precisely the geopolitical expansion along the meridian that, upon completion, creates the basis for the most serious threat to the world, since it carries with it the possibility of the enslavement of the entire planet by the United States.
To defend its geopolitical independence, East Asia is already forced to strengthen its own cultural and political form and create buffer security zones on the periphery of its influence. In one generation, Europe will also need the same buffer zones, similar to those that the emperors Ito, Goto, and others sought to create against the expansion of the Russian tsars. The tendencies of latitudinal and longitudinal development in Africa are especially evident in Islamic geopolitical formations and in the process of liberating Asian countries from English rule. The southern trend of geopolitical expansion of East Asia along the natural route of sea and air communications falls precisely on the uninhabited regions of Australia, located between the thought sectors of concentration of the English-speaking population. In this case, there is a very real possibility for the colonies of Mackinder's “outer crescent” to “be washed into the sea”. Europe, thus, instantly loses its strong connection with Africa, and the key point of potential confrontation with the "masters of latitudes" is shifted to the southeast.

The Soviets, this country, which has always been the “geographical axis of history,” and the Axis countries that control the Inner Crescent, will only have to watch what is happening in the southeast. No matter how important the military-strategic space of the Black and Caspian Seas, abundantly mixed with soldiers' blood, is not important for the cultural life of Europe, for the future new redistribution of the geopolitical space it will be secondary. For the process of creation of new “meridian” Large Spaces begins, which will acquire a decisive strategic importance.

* * *

The planet's geopolitical future depends on whether the Anglo-American trend of expansion along the parallels can break through the resistance of the East Asian trend of expansion along the meridians. Whatever this confrontation ends, the United States believes that in any case it will be reliably protected by the remnants of the former British colonial empire, even if only tropical African colonies remain of it. And in any case, the United States can count on tropical America under its control. But will they consider insular India, the third largest mineral resource, and Iran and India, worthy of shedding blood for them and spending money on a military expedition? Will they consider it necessary to expend energy in order to to tear this piece away from the Asian Big Space? At the moment, this is the most important and painful question for the squandering money and other people's blood: after all, this is a very large production.

* * *

Between Nanjin and Zhongqin China today, as before, the most incredible, the wildest compromises are possible. Further dynamic development along the meridian of East Asia is becoming more and more possible, latent energies are maturing every day. These energies came into play and became evident in the right side of East Asia - in Japan, and especially in China. On the left, west side of this

They have not yet manifested in the Large Space. We can assume in this region a new war lasting from 10 to 50 years. In China, the civil war has been going on for 32 years. Japan has 12 years of ground fighting behind it, and Japan has fully proved how belligerently it is in relation to the Pacific region. The confrontation between geopolitical expansion along the meridian and expansion along the parallel requires both sides to be patient, since this problem will be resolved within a sufficiently long period of time and over vast territories. An example of this is the geopolitical processes that have been taking place in recent decades on both sides of the Pacific Ocean.

("Newspaper of Geopolitics", No. 8, 1943, Germany)

General Heinrich Jordis von Lohausen

VIENNA AND BELGRADE AS GEOPOLITICAL ANTIPODES

Southeast Europe of three types

If you look at the geographical map of Europe, then southeastern Europe emerges as an obvious unity. In the north and in the north-east it is covered by the Carpathians, in the north-west - by the Alps, in the south it is surrounded by six alternating seas. The only diagonally large river that flows is the Danube.
Vienna and Constantinople, in the same way located diagonally to each other, mark the entrance gates. In the center is Belgrade, the natural center of gravity (key point) of the entire area of southeastern Europe. This space splits into three distinct areas, one each west and east of the Iron Gate, and one Mediterranean area:

One area is formed by the Pannonian depression. In its middle lies the Hungarian lowland crossed by the Danube. This depression is an area remote from the sea, accompanied to the southwest, on the other side of the mountains, by the Dalmatian coast.
The Carpathians separate this depression from the second region, from the coastal landscapes of the lower Danube, from Wallachia, Moldavia (region in Romania), northern Bulgaria and from the Danube Delta. Like the East Elbe offshoot of the Sarmatian lowland, these four areas do not have a common name.
The Balkan mountains south of these four regions again separate them from the third region, from the south washed by the sea. Despite this natural unity, these southern four classical areas - Thrace, Macedonia, Hellas and Illyria - do not have a common name. Similarly, this common name is absent from the Illyrian mountains, stretching south from the Carpathians to the Alps. Ranges of mountains separate the coastal south from the Pannonian countryside, far from the sea.

Belgrade's key position in many respects

Within these three regions and the mountains separating them, Belgrade is located not only in their geometric center. It is also located close to their junction, then close to the Danube breakthrough, but at the same time at the Pannonian key point at the confluence of the five rivers Danube, Sava, Drava, Tisza and Mures.
The key point is not always the central point at the same time; see paris
- a geometrically precise central point located far from the capital Bourges -
see also Moscow, see Lisbon or London. All of them are located at natural key points in their spheres of influence, but not in the central points of territories in a geometric sense. In southeastern Europe, the central point and the natural key point coincidentally - in Belgrade - coincide. Here, too, all routes from the north branch off, be they the routes to Sofia and Constantinople or to Thessaloniki and Athens, to Bucharest and to the mouth of the Danube.

Space of Thirteen Nations

The fact that Belgrade, nevertheless, has never achieved an equal political significance, let alone the cultural significance of Vienna or Constantinople, and even Budapest, is thus not geographic reasons - they cannot have ethnographic reasons. Southeast Europe is not a space for big nations. Namely, unlike all other natural landscapes of the European peninsula, for example, from Spain, Italy or from the Frankish large space, unlike Britain or Scandinavia, southeastern Europe does not include all of them, respectively, only one, but a large people and along with it at least one or two smaller people. On the contrary, this southeast of Europe contains ten peoples at the same time, namely ten exclusively from this space of peoples,

Thanks to such fragmentation, a great power could not arise here inside. For this, the basis of all these ten peoples was too narrow. No one here has ever been in such a position to take possession of this vast expanse. None of them managed to achieve the significance of the great Western European peoples that the Germans, French, Spaniards or Italians possessed - neither politically nor culturally - as it was in the case of the Greeks and Byzantines. Perhaps the Hungarians from the middle of the Pannonian depression could subjugate most of its marginal areas for a long time, from time to time even spread their influence to the Dalmatian coast, but this state never remained long.

Passarovitsky (Pozharevatsky) world

A great power could develop here only from the outside like the Turks who came from Asia Minor or Austria, which grew out of Germany. Accordingly, since the 16th century, there have been two great powers in southeastern Europe; the German Empire and the Ottoman Empire located vastly beyond Vienna, deployed at the entrance to the large Danube basin and after leaving it with their armies beyond Belgrade. Hungary was between them as a buffer.

And although later the emblem of the sultan's power was nevertheless carried twice to the gates of Vienna, the emperor's standards on the contrary - contrary to many far-reaching plans of Prince Eugene of Savoy - never reached the territory after Nis (Nissa), it is only 200 kilometers on the other side of Belgrade. Still, the brilliant victories of the prince in 1718, according to the Peace of Passarovitsky, brought Austria three jumps in the direction of Istanbul: in the west, the entire northern edge of Bosnia, in the east, Little Wallachia, in the middle, along with Belgrade, another 160 kilometers of Serbian land towards Thessaloniki. Even if it was a little, but the claims of Austria were nevertheless revealed: in the acquired Bosnian region, the claim to the remainder of this land; in Lesser Wallachia, the claim to Greater Wallachia, therefore, to the lower reaches and to the mouth of the Danube; in Belgrade and its hinterland, a claim to the rest of Serbia and a breakthrough to the Aegean Sea; in all three - the claim to liberate the Christian Balkan peoples from the embrace of the Turks.

Three double-headed eagles and a crescent

At the same time, one could expect a long dispute between both two-headed eagles, German and Russian, for the inheritance of the third, also two-headed eagle of Byzantium. However, they were still in an alliance with Russia and this alliance continued for another 130 years. So, with the known

conditions, while the Turks were still an enemy, a division was proposed: the Black Sea, that is, first Bulgaria, - the Russians, the Aegean Sea and, above all Serbia - Austria. However, in all scenarios of the future, the Russians had the advantage. They, perhaps, did not need to be sectioned at all, because from the very beginning they had two trump cards: 1) the kindred language of the Serbs and Bulgarians; 2) the identity of faith and ritual - all the Balkans were orthodox Orthodox.
But the Turk was still an enemy. The petty zeal of the churches did not play a role yet. Even if the generosity of Turkish rule in matters of faith called for caution, even if the Evangelical Christians of Hungary preferred Turkish rule to Habsburg for the best of intentions, Russia had an opportunity to play the card of orthodoxy and, after it, the card of Pan-Slavism in the next 19th century. In the meantime, in the 18th century, the Serbian patriarch Ipeka and the Bulgarian metropolitan of Ohrid expressed to the Kaiser general their desire to become, like the German archbishops, worldly masters of their vast dioceses and, as such, to join the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, while the Kaiser had the prospect of accepting the Serbian archbishops and in Vienna as their vassals! The wind was then blowing after 1718 in the banners of Austria and it was south of the Danube at that time,

However, then - Prince Eugene of Savoy died in the meantime - everything went differently. Already 1738 brought a catastrophe with it, and 1739 ended it; the disaster was caused by nothing more than a terrible inability and mediocrity. Its reasons were - where else? - in Vienna and she also spread to the front. It has never been corrected and it appears retrospectively in all its meaning comparable, perhaps, only to Hradec Kralove (Czech city).

1739 and 1866

Dominion in Germany, domination in the Balkans and along the Danube was at stake here. Difference: German Austria and after Hradec Kralove remained German, on the contrary, lost in 1739 in the southeast never again became Austrian again. Further: in 1866, all of Germany, even all of Europe, knew what was being discussed, in 1739 in Vienna they barely shrugged their shoulders about the loss they had suffered. There will be day, there will be food, the morning is wiser than the evening. But the morning never came. What came was the death of the Kaiser, the complete rejection of the Pragmatic Sanction, its own war for the order of succession, the Silesian wars — Vienna now had other concerns.
And one more difference: in 1866, the fate of Prussia, predetermined for this, won, in 1739, on the contrary, Turkey, which is historically, in fact, already in decline, but not thanks to any remarkable command or weapons, no, in no way a brilliant victory on the one hand, not a heroic defeat on the other; there is no hero like Benedek and no opponent like Moltke. Nothing in this event had a faint tinge of grandeur. In addition, the decision of 1866 for one hundred and thirty years was inevitable, but the decision of 1739 was recklessly challenged against the Russians.

There is hardly a more prominent contrast to the discussed primacy of politics over war. Those responsible for the front found themselves on the Spielberg and on the fortification of Graz, while in Vienna they remained in their chairs. Through French mediation - read intervention - all the concessions sanctioned by Count Neippberg to the Grand Vizier were once again solemnly confirmed in again Turkish Belgrade. Russia did not suffer any damage, France became the patron saint of all Christians living in the Turkish sphere of government.

The value of the Serbs

However, the lost Belgrade remained a spearhead pointing both north and south. The Turks knew why it was here that they built their headquarters, and the Hungarians also knew why they had fought for this city several times before, and Prince Eugene of Savoy knew exactly why he had to take this city - at any cost. However, with the expectation of the distant future, it was not only about Belgrade, not only about its confrontation with Vienna, about its unique location between the Balkans and the Hungarian lowlands, with the expectation of the distant future it was also about the Serbs as a people. Anyone who wants to conquer the southeast of Europe must support them and should not have them as his opponents. He must involve them in his empire as friends.

Like the Germans in a common European framework, the Serbs are also a middle people in their area. They border on six of the above-named ten peoples, with all except Slovenes and Slovaks, and are separated from the Greeks only by the disputed Macedonia.

Hungary - a subversive sword in the middle of the Danube basin

Only one more people in this space borders on the same number of foreign peoples: the Magyars; and together with the Serbs, they border on all eleven other peoples of southeastern Europe. The Magyars occupy the middle of the lowland. Nowhere except in the north does their closed settlement area reach the spurs of the mountains surrounding the Pannonian depression. Their strength comes from the plain, that western branch of the northern Eurasian steppe, from where the Huns and Avars undertook their predatory raids.
Before the Turks, but after the Bulgarians, the Turks conquered the Turkic people, who had advanced to southeastern Europe and here, the only settled Turkic people in the Danube depression. The conquerors and conquerors of the weaker outlying peoples such as the Romanians, the inhabitants of Transylvania, Slovaks and Croats, they used their middle position1 until 1918. They gave a sense of the importance of their middle position before in personal union, when Austria after 1866, deprived of its German position, without Hungary was no longer a great power. In 1867, when they reached an agreement, they destroyed the necessary restructuring of the Danube monarchy. Thanks to their stubborn refusal of any self-determination to the Slavs in their submission,

Budapest was their geometric center and this key position, Vienna as such was located between Brussels and Belgrade, respectively, also between Frankfurt and Belgrade, but not between Passau and Belgrade. Free from its Western influence, it became burdensome to the east as the west, and thus, in contrast to Budapest, found itself at a disadvantage. From the position of then more than two-thirds of the Danube Basin of the Magyars who controlled (today it is hardly a fifth), Austria was more or less a marginal area, just a flaw in the great Hungarian landscape structure. Its gaps were gaping in the west and in the south, in front of Vienna and Belgrade, before the beginning and end of the Danube. The Germans and Serbs were guarding the entrance. If Serbia belonged to the Turks, they had the freedom to go north. If it was Austrian, the Austrians had access to the south.
Serbia retained the key to both this and that direction. Belgrade was more important than Budapest, the help of the Serbs was necessary for every organizer of the Danube space, an irrevocable counterbalance against the oppositional Magyar middle

land. In pre-Turkish times, despite repeated attempts, the Hungarians were never able to settle in Serbia - the people of horsemen against the people of the mountains. The invasion of the Turks threw both peoples back, the Serbs, however, incomparably tougher and for a longer time than the Hungarians. The Serbian dominant role was played, which cannot be said about the Magyars. Not least from here, precisely from their history, the current behavior of the Serbs is also explainable.

The tragedy of the Serbs

The penetration of the later recorded Slavs tribes to the entire Balkan Peninsula begins as a result of the migration of peoples, emancipated by the Huns, already under the Emperor Justinian. Its first waves move from the Germans, crossing the southeast of Europe to the south, mainly the Goths, but also the Alans and Gepids. Later they were Avars, in the north up to Bohemia, and here up to Illyria they partly spread, partly they went to other lands. Already in the 6th century, the Croats liberated - under the name Hervaren, possibly of German origin - such Slavs who had already reached the coast of Dalmatia from the hands of the Avar government. Just as voluntarily, like the Slavs, under the protection of the steppe people, who took the place of the Bulgarians in the lower reaches of the Danube and the Serbs, with their resettlement to the mountains of Illyria, find themselves under the rule of the East Roman imperial power (for a while, the Croats, but only those who settled on the coast).

Serbs only very rarely united by a tribal leader, as it was for a short time in the 9th century. They created their first real state at the end of the 11th century; it covered parts of Bosnia after two periods - first twenty years, then seventy years of Bulgarian domination. This happened in spite of repeated attacks by the now Magyars and in spite of strong Byzantine opposition. Ruler of Zeta receives the crown from the hands of the papal legate. The capital of the kingdom - far from Hungary, Bulgaria or Byzantium - is today the Albanian city of Skutari.

However, stable unity brings the Serbs only the twelfth century under the Nemanja dynasty, only without Bosnia, which in 1204, after a short freedom, was again under Hungarian rule. And its first king receives his royal dignity from the Roman curia, from Byzantium and, as a countermeasure, the recognition of the henceforth independent, Serbian Orthodox Church. Thus, an ecclesiastical decision was made, and on the one hand, the Balkans from the Black Sea to the Ionian Sea finally become Orthodox2, but on the other hand, the Croats also completely fall out of this Balkan context. Like Hungary and Poland, and their country is becoming the foreground, the zone of attack of the West, the glacis of the West. This separation from the Serbs, who speak the same language, is later deepened by the powerful invasion of the Turks.

But before the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century become the golden age of Serbian history. Under the house of Nemanja, Serbia becomes the dominant state in the Balkans. Byzantine sovereignty is shaken. The Nemandyids themselves seek to obtain the throne of the emperor. Macedonia, later Thessaly, also half of Albania, were consistently subdued, Bulgaria was forced to join the union. Skopje becomes a royal city. The Republic of Ragusa comes under Serbian protection.

The shift of the political center of gravity to Seres, in the half-Greek south, is accompanied by the flourishing of its own court, which grew up on Byzantine examples of church art and culture. The right is ordered. Laws are issued that provide every inhabitant of the empire, regardless of origin or faith, freedom, life and property, and these laws are also truly incorruptible. Stefan Dusan, the penultimate of the Nemanid family, already calls himself "the emperor of the Raska and the Romans", he is already proposing - even in good time - to Emperor Charles IV and Pope Innocent V1 a joint war with the Turks at the head, that is, he himself

proposes as supreme commander. The brilliance of his court becomes brighter than the brilliance of the Basileus court on the Bosphorus, but then, almost sixteen years after his death, a steep rise is followed by a rapid fall: a grandiose victory for the Turks. Already in 1371, the united troops at Matiza - this place is still called "the death of the Serbs" - suffered heavy damage, then June 15, 1389 in the decisive battle at Amselfeld again, but this time they suffered a crushing defeat and sacrificed all of the Serbian nobility.
At first the Turks were content with what they had achieved. Their army is in urgent need of reaching the Persian border. Serbs without a leader, obliged to continue to obey and pay tribute, no longer pose any danger. The fact that Hungary, which has now become a front-line state, supports the Serbs, Albanians and Vlachs who have fallen away from the Turks, cannot save their countries. Neither the Hungarian national hero Janos Hunyadi nor Skanderbeg, the hero of Albania, can do this. When it comes to the Battle of Amselfeld in 1448, the Turks are victorious. The fate of the Serbs is sealed. In 1453 Serbia was finally occupied. From that moment on, its history was completed for 400 years. Its development has been prevented, its future is to be under the Turks.

Bogomils

Bosnia suffered the same fate ten years later. Despite the crusades initiated by the Pope, the Bogomils fought against Hungary, Croatia, against the Serbs and against the Republic of Venice for their free statehood. It was with Stefan Trcko. He calls himself "King of Serbs and Bosnia", later "King of Bosnia and Dalmatia". During the simultaneous decline of Byzantine, Bulgarian and Serbian power, this power was the last in southeastern Europe to reach its heyday. It stretched along the coast to the city of Cattaro (now Kotor), but fell into disrepair with the death of Stefan Trcko. The enemies of the Bogomils once again conquered the country, but already in 1463 they were swept away by the Turks.

But the persecuted Bogomils - who were still spiritually related to the Sufis, as in the West with the Albigenses and in Bosnia with the Arian Visigoths - convert to Islam and avoid greater enmity towards themselves. Thus, a permanent ruling stratum remains here, when, for example, in Romania this stratum was replaced by Phanariots, which means the Byzantines, set by the Turks for the tasks of government.

Awakening and the wrong path

In Serbia, on the other hand, besides the Turks and local Orthodox priests, there were only peasants. The nobility was destroyed. However, it is among these Serbian peasants, like none of the other Balkan peoples, that the memory of the lost freedom has remained persistent and alive. In their far-flung mountain villages, for 400 years of captivity, they sang their proud past in songs and sagas and passed it on from father to son and from son to grandson. Finally, at the end of the 19th century, with the gradual gaining of state independence, from now on, the Serbian army and the rapidly emerging caste of politicians came under the influence of models alien to space, already in 1918, into a dead end of erroneous development calling itself "Yugoslavia", in a fragile prison of peoples in the long term, to build which again in 1945 was worth a huge loss of life.

Two capitals

Very late, shortly before World War I, after the first choice for the independent Serbian government of Nis, Belgrade eventually became the Serbian capital, a city that for a long time was hardly really Serbian. This city, called Singidunum, once served the Romans as a stronghold. This name remained later in Byzantium. In 583, it was conquered by the Avars, later it belonged to either Byzantium or Hungary. In 1456, Hunyadi liberated the army of the crusaders who were trapped in the city by the Turks. For the Serbs, Belgrade was then still a city on the outer border of their area of residence. However, Austria did not originate in Vienna either.

Both cities were eagerly awaiting the power, thanks to which they could become a springboard. For centuries Vienna was both a German border city and a Kaiser city. This is the reason for her increased danger and her claim to the possession of Hungary. On the contrary, the transfer of the capital of little Serbia to the Danube was an unequivocal challenge to Austria.
The seat of the capital may be an expression of retreat, as in 1917 the replacement of Petersburg by Moscow or in 1922 the replacement of Istanbul by Ankara, but in border capitals it is often an expression of the expected expansion
territory, as in the case of Vienna and later Belgrade, but also at the time of Berlin. Its original location in the far west of Prussia prevented its later advance to the Meuse and Moselle in the 17th century.
But if we ask, returning to Vienna and Belgrade, about their most conspicuous geopolitical differences, we will notice that Belgrade is located twice in the center of gravity of a large space, and Vienna is between two, in fact, between almost three large spaces. precisely between Frankish or Western European and southeastern Europe, at the same time - through Moravia - it also borders on northeastern Europe. Its distinguishing feature is that it connects, looking for connection, but not rest in its own weight, in its own center of gravity of a large landscape. For its immediate surroundings - Moravia and eastern Lower Austria - are again only a small intermediate landscape between those three large spaces and, therefore, the absence of their own weight.
In this respect, Vienna is at a disadvantage not only in comparison with the centers of those large landscapes, such as, for example, in comparison with Paris or Berlin or with Belgrade, but also in comparison with such centers as Prague or Munich. Before 1866, this was not realized. And if a large German space was being built around Vienna, it was not a division corresponding to the landscape, but an ethnic guarantee. However, this factor is absent in the case of Belgrade, absent in the Serbs. For them alone, the Pannonian space is too large, like the entire southeast of Europe. They constitute a minority in these spaces among many nations.
And nevertheless, their irreplaceable, geopolitical position with a small number made them - their country, theirs and Belgrade - the preferred lever of powers alien to this space, which France and Russia first of all, but, of course, England always used against Vienna, against Germany. Serbs turned out to be convenient for inciting World War 1.

Shattered ellipse

With the retreat of the Turks, the Germans and Serbs are natural partners in the Pannonian space, but Vienna and Belgrade are still the centers of the ellipse. To turn this ellipse into a political unity was the geopolitical demand. it

the demand came from Austria, Prince Eugene of Savoy seemed to have fulfilled it. But what happened as soon as he died?

Completely unprepared they declared war, which in fact was the war of the Russians. Prince Eugene of Savoy strongly advised his kaiser to leave Maria Theresa a strong army ready for battle at any time. But Charles V1 confidently - but, as we know in vain - invested all the money in the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713. The army, its equipment and weapons fell into decay.

40,000 men were stationed in Hungary, but three corps were sent in three different directions - to Bosnia, Serbia, Wallachia - against the enemy; did not unite with 20,000 rebellious Serbs and Albanians; the latter were defeated by the Turks. The Kaiser's detachments, mistakenly sent into battle, were eventually to return from all three fronts.

The next year brings an inglorious ending. The new commander-in-chief, who clearly demands too much from his defeat, immediately retreats beyond the Danube due to an insignificant loss, simply abandons the bravely defended Belgrade to the mercy of fate and sends Count Neipperg to the Grand Vizier's camp in order to make peace. Peace is bestowed upon him for the concessions of all the regions reached by Austria in the Passarovitz peace. With one stroke of the pen, Serbia was donated.

"The hope of the Serbs to lead a dignified life under the Austrian scepter no longer took place." This is stated in the V11 volume of world history published by Spamers in 1894 in Leipzig. The continuation reads: “If the Austrians began to dispute the belonging of Serbia, then Austria would become the dominant power in the north of the Balkans and German culture would open up an endless field of opportunities there. From now on, all these grandiose prospects have been lost. " Piedmont this side of the Danube

These prospects were nevertheless not completely lost, because fifty years later, in 1789 - during the French Revolution - Belgrade in a now militarily successful war was again taken under the command of Laudon, but in 1790, according to the peace treaty between Austria and Turkey in Systovo Leopold 11 restored the status quo ante bellum, this time as if under British and Prussian pressure. Since that time, no one has continued the work of Prince Eugene of Savoy. Once lost remained lost, remained so in 1878. Then, during the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, Moltke, the winner of Hradec Kralove, but now an ally, remarked that the victory would not be complete without taking all the other Serbian regions. He clearly understood that the Serbs were more important to Austria than any people of their monarchy except the Germans.

Satisfying this clear demand and preparing for its fulfillment - this path still remained, but it was not necessarily a military one. It is not just the sword that is conquered. The opportunity was created by the 17th and 18th centuries. Since then, as a result of the massive settlement of refugees in Banat and Sirmia, there has been a significant Serb minority on this side of the Danube.4 Unfortunately, this minority has never experienced a treatment commensurate with its importance. However, already Joseph I in 1706 and Charles VI in 1713 confirmed their old special rights dating back to 1690. Since Serbian self-government still always had a thorn in the eye in jealous Hungary, Charles VI soon canceled it again, as he depended on the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction by the Hungarian Reichstag.

The pragmatic sanction turned out to be a gigantic fallacious investment. However, the Serbs demanded their guaranteed rights. The Serbian National Congress protested and already in 1735 it came to a peasant uprising, which was suppressed in 1736. The Habsburgs made the wrong move again. It was about making the Serbs on this side of the Danube into a Serbian Piedmont.

Perhaps, such train of thought was at first alien to the 18th century, but in 1790, when Leopold II founded the Illyrian Chancellery at Court, they could no longer have a place.

The achievement of the Serbs on the military border, the unconditional reliability of these "border guards" and their descendants until 1914 justified the attempt to make them the vanguard of Serbian freedom. Why, in fact, did Prince Eugene of Savoy and Loudon go to the front? Why else did they create the prerequisites for their victory?

However, instead of causing inconvenience to the Turks or the Hungarians, they began to dig a hole for Russia in Vienna. Half measures cannot achieve anything, neither in relation to God, nor on earth.

Translated from German by Yu. Corinth

GULF WAR - WAR AGAINST EUROPE

Austrian general Jordis von Lohausen is the largest modern geopolitician, a direct successor of the geopolitical school of Karl Haushofer. The best known are his works "Courage to rule" and "Strategy of survival", where he sets out the foundations of his understanding of the history of Europe, its interests, and its future. Lohausen is a radical opponent of Atlanticist geopolitical concepts and has openly advocated the liberation of Europe from American occupation since the late 1960s. Lohausen is a supporter of the concept of "European Empire", first formulated by the Belgian Jean Thiriard.

It is enough to look at the map of the world to see the continents of our planet as three belts, covering it from north to south. The first, from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, forms the New World, America. The second, from the North Cape to the Cape of Good Hope, is the continental part of the Old World, Euro-Africa. The third belt runs from Kamchatka to Tasmania through China, Southeast Asia and Indonesia and forms the eastern part, Australia-Asia.

In the center of the center

Between Euro-Africa and Australia-Asia (closer to the latter) there is the Russian-Siberian layer in the north, and the Middle East in the south. It forms the center of the Old World, the center at the heart of which is the Persian Gulf region. This region is the Achilles heel of the Old World, where a lime leaf fell on Siegfried's shoulder. And the question is not only about oil. Nowhere else do the oceans penetrate so deeply into the Afro-Eurasian continent: the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, the Atlantic Ocean through the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Between two oceans, equally distant from Africa and Asia, at the mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates is the ancient city of Ur. This is the "center of the center" that we will talk about - in all respects the most vulnerable place of the Old World. All earthquakes on the planet are reflected here. Since the forcible opening of Japanese ports during the war of 1854, it has been the policy of the United States to establish footholds on the shores of the Old World, as well as to create potential "island springboards". Thus, the Americans settled in the Philippines in 1898 and in Japan in 1945. Only after that did they go to South Korea and Vietnam. This was preceded, respectively, by the landing in Normandy, the deployment of troops in Germany and the actual subordination of Western Europe. It is characteristic that these bridgeheads are located in areas with a high level of development and on the borders of the Atlantic or Pacific oceans, i.e. oceans, washing the double Afro-Eurasian continent, and not, say, on such a fragile southern facade as the Indian Ocean. United States policy is to establish footholds on the shores of the Old World, as well as to create potential "island springboards." Thus, the Americans settled in the Philippines in 1898 and in Japan in 1945. Only after that did they go to South Korea and Vietnam. This was preceded, respectively, by the landing in Normandy, the deployment of troops in Germany and the actual subordination of Western Europe. It is characteristic that these bridgeheads are located in areas with a high level of development and on the borders of the Atlantic or Pacific oceans, i.e. oceans, washing the double Afro-Eurasian continent, and not, say, on such a fragile southern facade as the Indian Ocean. United States policy is to establish footholds on the shores of the Old World, as well as to create potential "island springboards." Thus, the Americans settled in the Philippines in 1898 and in Japan in 1945. Only after that did they go to South Korea and Vietnam. This was preceded, respectively, by the landing in Normandy, the deployment of troops in Germany and the actual subordination of Western Europe. It is characteristic that these bridgeheads are located in areas with a high level of development and on the borders of the Atlantic or Pacific oceans, i.e. oceans, washing the double Afro-Eurasian continent, and not, say, on such a fragile southern facade as the Indian Ocean. Only after that did they go to South Korea and Vietnam. This was preceded, respectively, by the landing in Normandy, the deployment of troops in Germany and the actual subordination of Western Europe. It is characteristic that these bridgeheads are located in areas with a high level of development and on the borders of the Atlantic or Pacific oceans, i.e. oceans, washing the double Afro-Eurasian continent, and not, say, on such a fragile southern facade as the Indian Ocean. Only after that did they go to South Korea and Vietnam. This was preceded, respectively, by the landing in Normandy, the deployment of troops in Germany and the actual subordination of Western Europe. It is characteristic that these bridgeheads

The Persian Gulf region is located precisely in this vulnerable zone, at the intersection of large power lines connecting the Far East with Africa and Europe with India. Here, on the approaches to the gulf, the Islamic world is divided into Arab and Persian parts. Anyone who has settled in this area can create protection or threat in all directions on the flanks or rear of not only the Middle East, but also Europe, India and Africa. In addition, this arrangement suggests an attempt to create a third front against the Russian military power, still unconquered. The position in the Gulf also strengthens the rear of Turkey - an ally against Russia - and creates pressure on Egypt, Syria and Iran, as well as on Europe, all thanks mainly to oil. The latter, by the way, is also important for Japan.

War against Europe?

Was the Gulf War a War against Europe? The answer to this question was wonderfully given in the Catholic journal Trenta Journey by a professor of political science at the University of Milan. He states: "The United States has realized that if it does not want to survive the same decline as the Soviet Union, it must confront its tomorrow's adversaries, that is, Japan and a united Europe centered on German economic power. No one will allow themselves to be debunked for a great life. America cannot put up with Europe, which is currently, despite weak mobilization, ahead of it economically and technically. Realizing that one day they would no longer be able to influence Europe, the United States relied on the Middle East and control of the Saudi oil crane. on which Germany and Japan will depend for decades if they fail to use their Siberian reserves. Only then will the Middle East and the impact that can be exerted on it lose their significance "(its strategic position remains the main one). For the Americans, the final case came in 1991, with the political elimination of the Soviet Union, a circumstance that was set in motion by Reagan's decision to exhaust Moscow with an arms race; provoked, as written in the script, by Saddam Hussein; embodied, according to the same scenario, by George W. Bush. In fact, this plan dates back to Kissinger, and was developed under his auspices. In 1975, the plan was published in Commentary magazine, and later it appeared in the Harpers Store under the heading "Seize the Oil". if they fail to use the Siberian reserves. Only then will the Middle East and the impact that can be exerted on it lose their significance "(its strategic position remains the main one). For the Americans, the final case came in 1991, with the political elimination of the Soviet Union, a circumstance that was set in motion by Reagan's decision to exhaust Moscow with an arms race; provoked, as written in the script, by Saddam Hussein; embodied, according to the same scenario, by George W. Bush. In fact, this plan dates back to Kissinger, and was developed under his auspices. In 1975, the plan was published in Commentary magazine, and later it appeared in the Harpers Store under the heading "Seize the Oil". if they fail to use the Siberian reserves. Only then will the Middle East and the impact that can be exerted on it lose their significance "(its strategic position remains the main one). For the Americans, the final case came in 1991, with the political elimination of the Soviet Union, a circumstance that was set in motion by Reagan's decision to exhaust Moscow with an arms race; provoked, as written in the script, by Saddam Hussein; embodied, according to the same scenario, by George W. Bush. In fact, this plan dates back to Kissinger, and was developed under his auspices. In 1975, the plan was published in Commentary magazine, and later it appeared in the Harpers Store under the heading "Seize the Oil". will lose their significance "(his strategic position remains the main one). For the Americans, the final case came in 1991, with the political elimination of the Soviet Union, a circumstance that was set in motion by Reagan's decision to exhaust Moscow with an arms race; provoked, as written in the script, by Saddam Hussein; embodied, according to the same scenario, by George W. Bush. In fact, this plan dates back to Kissinger, and was developed under his auspices. In 1975, the plan was published in Commentary magazine, and later it appeared in the Harpers Store under the heading "Seize the Oil". will lose their significance "(his strategic position remains the main one). For the Americans, the final case came in 1991, with the political elimination of the Soviet Union, a circumstance that was set in motion by Reagan's decision to exhaust Moscow with an arms race; provoked, as written in the script, by Saddam Hussein; embodied, according to the same scenario, by George W. Bush. In fact, this plan dates ba

The real losers are allies

Only a superficial study of armed conflicts can lead to the opinion that the enemy is only the one with whom the war is being waged. Often, countries that have victoriously participated in a conflict may state that the foundations of their independence or prosperity have been undermined (often both at the same time). The way to transform your own allies into vassals through war waged together is as old as the world. Americans are imitators of their distant Roman teachers. This is how they showed themselves in two world wars, in which they participated with great benefit for themselves. In both cases, the pretext was the destruction of German power, while the goal extended much further. America's allies have always borne the cost of this alliance. The list that confirms this is long: from Poland to Taiwan and South Vietnam, together with the colonial European empires that existed after 1918, led by Great Britain. After the general victory, America became the heir to their power, or their profitable places.

Whoever has power over Arab-Persian oil also has power over Western Europe and Japan, which have become slaves not only to oil, but, consequently, to the power that controls it.

In American imperial politics, it would be an unforgivable negligence, upon returning from the Persian Gulf, not to pull harder on the reins of the increasingly rebellious and industrially dangerous Japan of the European Community. As usual, with little risk in intervening in the Islamic sphere of influence, Washington should have found amusing the astonishing diligence of its allies, especially the Germans, the loyal and the best students in the "Atlantic" class, who have kindly agreed to fund the war to weaken them.

The great illusion of the helpless

The Gulf War came in handy for America. After all, it is necessary that the billions invested in weapons over the decades finally become profitable, and the expected orders for the renovation of the military machine would quickly stimulate the economy in need of this. But especially so that small, obscure, without rank, defeated enemies of World War II or bloodless allies were not ready to overtake America in the economic sphere. But before dispelling their illusions, you can let them “play in the yard with the elders,” and the war will help put them in their place. A war not directed directly against them, but rather aimed at one of the sources of their prosperity.

Control over mineral deposits increases the superiority of a well-armed economic power over others, less powerful. It can also be considered that the obvious advantage and safety net for the United States is the finding on its own territory of the most important resources for its survival and military capabilities. If necessary, countries rich in minerals, but obstinate will be forced to repent, either - under the influence of propaganda carried out on a global scale and supported by terrorist groups (underground or foreign), or under the pressure of an economic boycott, as has been the case for many years with South Africa. The fight against apartheid - the ideological cover for this campaign - came in handy. The target in South Africa was the ore needed in the military industry, or rather, termination of its natural monopoly. The economy of Western Europe, which began to develop after 1945, can no longer flourish without some of the metals found only in South Africa, as well as without Arab oil. The fall of black power in South Africa will unchecked the aforementioned deposits in the hands of powerful American groups.

The result achieved in the Persian Gulf, namely the growing rupture of ties between Europe and the Cape of Good Hope, is the undoubted success of American policy, and whatever may be said, a defeat inflicted on the Europeans. This is the price to pay for giving up power for the sake of consumption. Now, more than ever, the necessary minerals can only be possessed by using the services of an intermediary, the American one, of course.

Missed opportunities

However, after the two world wars, geographic rather than historical factors contributed to the economic union under the European leadership (on the principle of self-determination of peoples, and not on the American principle of "nation-building"), Africa and Europe, which became a natural complement to each other. The establishment in the eastern part of the Old World of the "Asian sphere of shared prosperity" envisioned by the Japanese was also defeated more because of the latter's intolerance of neighboring peoples than because of the American victory in the Pacific. Because of the petty squabbles of their leaders, the Arab countries are unable to expand the circle of their joint
action. Confirmation of this is the Middle East, where, following the American invasion, one can expect the consolidation of borders or the repeated denial of the right to self-determination of peoples oppressed by religion, in the first row of which the Kurds appear. This is also the fault of the Europeans, both the French and the British, who renounced their domination over the Arab space, although after the First World War it was recognized for them. Thus, it was they who left behind the unfinished

business fraught with complications, as has happened more than once. Examples of this are the difficult birth of Yugoslavia and the departure of the British and French from Africa after 1945.
So the Europeans should only blame themselves for everything that happened.

translation by L. Gogoleva

Jean Parvulesco

GEOPOLITICS OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

"India has long aspired to total political hegemony in the South Asia. "

Jiang Zemin

Along with five nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan in Baluchinstan in response to five such tests carried out by India, South Asia suddenly burst into "big history": henceforth, the planetary political-historical existence of nations will be determined only by their ability to effectively metastrategic nuclear deterrence. Until recently, China was the only Asian nuclear power. And it is in comparison with China, and not with Pakistan, as it might seem at first glance, that India's metastrategic entry into the sphere of active continental geopolitics should be assessed. At present, the continental nuclear confrontation is taking place precisely between India and China, and Pakistan, despite all the claims and efforts, plays here an auxiliary role designed to strengthen China's anti-Indian camp.

Total geopolitics of the Great Eurasian Continent, revolutionary, avant-garde geopolitics, affirming the final imperial concept of integration within the framework of a common initial metahistorical destiny - Western Europe,
Eastern Europe, Russia, Great Siberia, India and Japan - clearly excludes China from the active definition of a great continental Eurasian union. In a sense, the progressive potential unification of the Great Continent is directed precisely against China, and India in this respect is clearly supported by the metastrategic continental potential of Russia and France. The process of great continental integration is a dialectical thing.

At the same time, the India-China nuclear confrontation in Southeast Asia requires Japan to make an immediate decision, an irreversible strategic choice that - as soon as it is implemented - will force it to join the great continental camp, whose regional pole in the Southeast is India. ... This decision must be made despite the understandable nuclear psychopathology of the Japanese. Everything goes to the fact that the Eurasian history of the near future will consist in the nuclear encirclement of China (including its strategic satellites) by an ensemble of great continental imperial powers that are part of the political line of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow-New Delhi-Tokyo axis.

The attitude to this demarche on the part of the United States is deliberately inscribed in the model of basic geopolitical correspondences, since the final and decisive battle - the beginning of which can already be considered established - between the Great Continent and
The United States, corresponds to the main line of force of the fundamental ontological antagonism between "continental" and "insular"
powers, and also there is no doubt that the appearance
a politically united Europe (no matter how hindered by the shadow, behind-the-scenes forces actively working against this project) will at some point create an insurmountable obstacle to the final implementation of the US "grand plan" to establish planetary hegemony. The forceful appearance of Greater Europe in the dialectical game of asserting imperial planetary power will again return the United States to its status

a minor power, and thus finally destroy the notorious "American myth."

For this reason, the United States will join efforts to neutralize Greater Europe with China's aspirations to resist its continental encirclement. It is obvious will lead to a large Beijing-Washington alliance, in which China will offer the United States a giant foothold in the East of Eurasia, and the United States will provide China with access to the market spaces controlled by this ocean power.

At the same time, the aggressive anti-continental permanent geopolitics of the United States is acquiring today within the great continental space a new huge reservoir of subversive and conspiracy powers concentrated in the sphere of pro-Atlanticist versions of fundamentalist Islam (especially the Wahhabi or Taliban type), which along the entire length of the southern coast of Eurasia will join the activity of geopolitical fortress of China, the negative radiation of which internally destabilizes and blocks the Far Eastern link of the great continental integration that Japan should become.

A recent book by high-ranking French official Alexander Delval, Islamism and the United States, Alliance Against Europe, says everything necessary about the problem of the offensive metastrategic use by the United States of certain fundamentalist (Wahhabi) Islam in its struggle against the Great Continental European renaissance, which is currently undergoing a stage decisive assertion and revolutionary imperial self-determination.

In the condition of such planetary convergences, the special mission of France (or, more precisely, the Great Continental Carolingian pole of the France-Germany axis approved by General De Gaulle) is to ideological polarization and to unite on the basis of awareness of the common destiny of the entire ensemble of elements of the Eurasian Great Continent in the face of the aggressive challenge of the United States and China, as well as in the face of the subversive mission that the United States is assigning to the Atlanticist varieties of Islam fighting the great continental project.

The planetary pole of the Eurasian Great Continent, whose ultimate and secret goal is to choose a spiritual perspective, is opposed by the materialistic block of the Washington-Beijing axis, which is under the explicit or still latent beginning of the mondialist group in the United States, which, under the guise of establishing planetary economic hegemony, seeks to put an end to the ontological civilization of Being - our civilization, up to a change in the very status of a person who in our world is based on the inertial continuation of traditional European, Hindu and Japanese concepts, faithful to the mystery of the "light of being."

It also follows from this that in response to the active political and economic penetration of the United States into Africa, Europe should immediately undertake an offensive counter-intervention in Latin America, which in the geopolitical sense is for the United States what Africa is for Europe - a double continent associated with mainland by a chain of direct geopolitical reverberations.

European elements of deep political-revolutionary implementation are currently visible in Argentina and Chile, starting from which a large-scale offensive revolutionary integration of the entire South American continent should be launched.

In a sense, the problem of the nearest planetary identification of world history boils down to France's readiness to fulfill its secret, deep, bottomless destiny, which requires from her a new (final) initiative on metahistorical great continental integration, and it is France that must ensure that this integration is crowned his last imperial triumph. For this reason, it is absolutely necessary that a new, unexpected will awaken in France, capable of openly establishing the deep foundations of the providential

destiny of France, to mobilize them in a revolutionary way, becoming the pole of a total offensive strategy - and this will be a new beginning of French history, the history of Europe and the Eurasian Great Continent as a whole. In other words, secret France, parallel France must - as if by magic - reveal itself from under that miserable, insignificant state where it has fallen today, expel from itself the salutary breath of a new ascent to being, so that “everything will again enter the zone of higher attention” ... This is what “ours” have been waiting for and preparing since time immemorial - the coming of Secret France to the final political and historical power.
Chinese President Jiang Zemin recently stated that "India has long aspired to total political hegemony in South Asia." Chinese President Jiang Zemin was not mistaken at all. Indeed, India has long aspired to total political hegemony in South Asia, but only not on its own behalf, but in favor of the imperial great continental unity, the flame of which is kept by Secret France.

It is known that Russia is rejecting a real political dialogue with France taken separately. It does the same with Germany. But at the same time, Russia is completely predisposed to develop and strengthen a decisive political dialogue with the Franco-German axis taken in its entirety. The same is the attitude of India towards Western Europe, since on a confidential level India has long been ready to unconditionally support Russia in its great continental dialogue with France and Germany.

The shift of the critical center of gravity of modern great continental geopolitics from West to East is a sign of the fundamental metastrategic evolution of the current situation, whose content may seem ambiguous at first glance.

Any shift of the center of gravity to the East implies, proclaims and establishes the beginning of a new historical cycle. Today's division of Russia as a result of a failed Marxist adventure will pass as soon as the current millennium ends, and we will see the great sign of the birth of New Russia, which will directly affect the successful implementation of the political-historical great continental project. It is Russia that will then become the geopolitical saving “bridge from Europe to India”.

The great continental engagement of the Carolingian Franco-German pole in favor of India and Japan is realized through Russia, through New Russia, whose total Eurasian development will reveal in all its fundamental meaning the heartland - “the highest and final core land” of the Great Continent.
At two opposite ends of the Eurasian Great Continent, India and France are attracted by two oceans - the Pacific in the East and the Atlantic in the West. Of particular importance in the case of France is the attraction to the South Atlantic - to South America and Antarctica. Because it is in Antarctica, as some of our people already know, that the supreme fate of the Eurasian Great Continent will be decided. This is the last secret of transcendental geopolitics, a secret that we now have to keep in mind.
The moment has come for France to cast aside the banality of its own insignificant modern history and open up to its last, secret, highest destiny.

World history is now approaching a decisive turning point, to the point of completion and a new beginning, the third millennium symbolizes a return to the origins. For the first time in ten thousand years, the peoples of the Eurasian Great Continent, from Europe to India, having seized the reins of the political and historical formation of the entire Eurasian ensemble in their own hands, will be able to restore that primordial unity of existence, high consciousness and common destiny that preceded their historical division ...

The great metahistorical cycle ends, closing in on itself, its end merging with its beginning. The end of one world heralds the beginning of another world.
Beyond external political circumstances, which in fact represent deceptive mirages of a complete and incurable catastrophe, the future reunification of the Eurasian Great Continent is transcendentally inscribed in the logic of historical formation, and no one and nothing can prevent this. Having gained control over the poles, over the Arctic and Antarctica, the Eurasian Great Continent will gain decisive and total planetary dominion, passing into the state of Imperium Ultimum, absolute power over the final history of this world. This will be an ontological domination over history and over that. which is transcendentally on the other side of history, being the “final goal”. And all this has already been laid in the form of an embryo in a new convergence of active planetary geopolitics, the development of which we must control and direct. There is nothing but will. There is nothing but purpose. Everything becomes more risky day by day. In June 1998, Bill Clinton spent “nine days in China,” thereby irrevocably and frankly laying the strategic basis for the final US-China offensive on the great continental Eurasian front, on its decisive geopolitical positions.

This also includes the announced joint US-China naval maneuvers - a sign of the decision on political and strategic positions, which are covered by the appearance of economic projects, and elements of democratic doctrine related to the observance (or non-observance) of "human rights" are easily sacrificed. All of this was finally approved at the time of Clinton's June visit to Beijing.

It is now clear that the blatant anti-continental conspiracy between China and the United States forces us to reveal a deep determination to rebuff this in the metastrategic key of the great continental line on the part of the protagonists of the Eurasian project - first of all, on the part of France and India. The determination of France, representing the extreme West of Eurasia, and India, representing its extreme East, should influence Russia in the issue of its radical and irreversible choice of the future path.
So, the geopolitical lines of force of future planetary outbreaks of the third millennium are marked. The rest depends on our will to survive, on the completeness of our awareness and mastery of the abyss of our own destiny.

Emrik Shoprad

BIG GAME

The end of the ideological confrontation within the bipolar system has led many analysts to the conclusion that the era of universal peace under the sign of "liberalism" and "democracy" has begun. But this approach, for some reason, does not take into account the following fact: most of these conflicts are based not on ideological, but on national contradictions, that geopolitics is the decisive factor in them. The world after the end of the Cold War is not only shaken by small regional conflicts based on the assertion of their national and cultural identities by different peoples, but - and most importantly - all such conflicts fit perfectly into the global confrontation between the great powers. This struggle is clearly manifested in the refusal of such great powers as Russia and China to recognize the dictate of American imperialism.

In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Washington and its allies are playing a game against Russia, which is cut geographically. Everywhere in Eastern Europe, where NATO is moving, and in a giant battle for spheres of influence. which unfolds in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Ukraine, Washington with its satellites - Germany, Turkey, Pakistan - seeks to undermine Russian influence. The wars in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan are elements of a new Great Game that is unfolding between Russia and the American empire. Uzbekistan is a kind of terminal - in the very heart of Central Asia - where the path, free for the United States, from the Indian Ocean into the interior of the continent ends. At the same time, Turkmenistan is increasingly moving away from Moscow towards Turkey and the United States.

In Europe, the new Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, is increasingly drawing closer to Russia, Greece, Romania and Cyprus, forming a sketch of an Orthodox bloc opposed to an unformalized alliance between the United States and Germany in this zone. This Atlanticist alliance includes the Turkish wing, including Bosnia. The Kosovo conflict, unfolding at the very center of what constitutes the identity pole for the historical identity of the Serbs, and fanned by the Albanians under the clear tutelage of the CIA, is another manifestation of the Great Game.

In the Near and Middle East, the strategy of American imperialism and its staunch ally Israel has led to the emergence of an alliance that until recently seemed impossible - to the rapprochement of Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran, although between these three geographically close states there are many serious
regional contradictions.

Recovering from the first shock of the collapse of communist regimes on its traditional periphery, Russia is slowly raising its head. The gradual normalization of Russian-Ukrainian relations and Moscow's initiatives on the Iraqi issue clearly testify to this. Recall that Boris Yeltsin mentioned the possibility of the outbreak of a third world war precisely in connection with the Iraqi conflict ...

The other great power is less and less willing to accept the dictates of American imperialism. This is China. We have finally emerged from the era of the Russian-Chinese conflict, which during the period of bipolarity was explained by the desire for ideological

leadership in the socialist camp. The Moscow-Beijing axis is now opposed to the Washington-Tokyo axis. The new China seeks to acquire the same positions in Asia that it held before the arrival of Europeans in the 19th century. China's naval claims have already been unequivocally manifested in the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, which brings us close to the beginning of the Sino-Indian conflict. A new factor - in order to strengthen its position against Japan, Beijing is trying to get closer to Hanoi.

The Great Game on a global scale is gradually increasingly leading to opposition between the pro-American imperialism of the "liberal democracies" and the "club of the damned": China, Iran, North Korea (which actively cooperates in the field of rocketry with Tehran), Cuba and Iraq ...

World conflicts arise only when there is a competition of interests on a global scale. The media commentaries give us the false idea that regional conflicts are private anomalies independent of the global context and stem from the provincial ignorance of the local population. In fact, geopolitics should be likened to the movement of tectonic plates. Giant platforms slide and collide with each other. At some points, the impacts are so strong that they generate earthquakes. But the very fact of an earthquake is not independent - invisible underground large-scale processes find their expression in it ...

(translated from French by A.D.)

Alexander Dugin

The Rest Against The West

1. Two types of mondialism

In the modern understanding of the strategic position of the West on the part of unconditional adherents of Western civilization, there are two main lines that see differently the state of affairs in the modern world and propose two opposite projects. It is important to note that both lines are united in that the interests of the West, understood as the highest and unconditional civilizational value, are at the forefront here. You can conditionally call these two intellectual camps among Westerners "left mondialism" and "right mondialism".

The term "mondialism" means, in the broadest sense, the concept of the integration of the planet under the leadership of the West, the creation in the distant future of a single World State with a single World Government. However, there are two opposite views on the achievement of this goal: conditionally "left" and "right".

Left mondialism proceeds from the premise that the conditions for planetary integration are already in place, and that the common denominator for such integration is the widespread tendencies towards the triumph of liberal democratic tendencies in the most diverse societies, the establishment of market regimes everywhere and the spread of the ideology of "human rights." "Left mondialism" tends to neglect the "remnants" of traditional societies, such as religion, ethnicity and race, social hierarchies, ethical norms, etc., believing that they themselves will soon fade away in a homogeneous technotronic-informational planetary a society without borders and nations.

The brightest exponent of such "left mondialism" (or otherwise "optimistic mondialism") is the American Francis Fukuyama, who entitled his programmatic work "The End of History". He argues that there are only a few years left before the emergence of a homogeneous planetary liberal-democratic society, modeled on the model of Western civilization and governed by the Western "elite". Fukuyama unambiguously identified the collapse of the Soviet system with the onset of the "End of History", understood as a total affirmation of the liberal-capitalist order with its logic, its controllability, its system. Fukuyama expressed a concentrated position that is generally characteristic of American Democrats. In Europe, similar projects were developed by Jacques Attali, adviser to former French President Francois Mitterrand (see "Elements" N2), while viewing the "end of history" in a mystical, Judeo-messianic perspective (which is formally absent in Fukuyama). (A propos, Attali recently published a new work, "He Will Come," in which current socio-political cataclysms are interpreted from the perspective of kabbalistic eschatology; here the meaning of the Moidialist understanding of the "end of history" is manifested even more frankly and clearly than before.)

The second line of mondialism, the so-called. "Right mondialism", on the other hand, views the current situation rather pessimistically, believing that the primacy of the West and planetary integration under its leadership of all the peoples of the world encounters a multitude of

the most serious obstacles, which do not even think to disappear, as the mondialists would like. "Right mondialists" point to the fact that the collapse of the main enemy of the West - the Soviet bloc - led not to genuine liberalization and democratization of the former Soviet world, but to the emergence of various religious and national entities in its place, which had no desire to abandon their political and cultural identity. Thus, the prerequisites for the "end of history" are not yet ripe, and before such an end really comes, the world will have to go through a difficult stage of civilizational conflicts based on newly formed spatial, political and cultural units. In this perspective, the "right-wing mondialists" believe that at this stage it is necessary to strengthen the Western world,

The most famous representative of this "right" line of mondialism is Samuel Huntington, whose statement of the programmatic article was given above. Huntington is the spokesman for conservative circles in the United States, and especially the Republican Party. His polemic with Fukuyama reflects much more global realities than the differences in the views of two specific analysts. This is a clash of two basic tendencies of mondialism, and therefore, both authors express positions that are vitally reflected in the destinies of all peoples of the earth, since in any case, the degree of influence of the West on the civilizational processes of the modern world is enormous. And the future of mankind will largely depend on whose line the West accepts for leadership - Fukuyama or Huntington.

Conventionally, on the basis of the main theoretical texts of Fukuyama and Huntington, two Mondialist projects ("left" and "right") can be designated as "The End of History" and "The War of Civilizations" (Clash of Civilizations).

2. Antimondialism and two projects

Mondialists consider the current state of affairs, naturally, based on their interests and weighing the pros and cons from their positions. For consistent and conscientious opponents of the West and its model, for all anti-mondialist forces, no matter what they start from - Orthodoxy, Islam, Confucianism, socialism, nationalism, tradition, etc. - it is quite logical to consider the current picture of the world in a reverse perspective, taking with a minus what the mondialists take with a plus, and vice versa. Consequently, all tendencies noted by mondialists as positive should be considered negative, and vice versa.

As an absolutely negative value, a perfect dystopia, one should take Fukuyama and his "ideal", which represents the worst thing that can happen for anti-mondialists. Thus, the thesis of the liberal End of History should be viewed as a radically hostile concept, as the principle of a "common enemy" in the face of which all anti-mondialist forces and tendencies must unite, regardless of their internal differences. The figure of Fukuyama and his theses must be taken from a radically Manichean perspective as Absolute Evil, as the teaching of the "children of darkness". The left mondialists themselves are also quite clearly aware of the fact that the coming of the end of history requires an abolition, i.e. destruction of what constituted the essence of history - religions, nations, races, traditions, cultures.

traditional values are incompatible. In this sense, the West becomes synonymous with pure Evil for anti-mondialists, which brings us back to the literal meaning of the ritual of Orthodox baptism, when the person baptized three times "denies Satan", turning his face to the West, to the symbolic "place of hell", opposite to the East, the symbolic "place of heaven."

Thus, leftist mondialism is a totally negative concept; its whole value lies only in the fact that it is so negative that it represents a very convenient model for the consolidation of all forces organically incompatible with the theory of the world liberal-democratic regime, total cosmopolitanism, One World. According to Fukuyama, as a litmus test, strategic allies and strategic opponents should be determined: if Fukuyama is approved, we are dealing with the absolute enemies of the traditional society, with the "children of darkness." Everything is obvious here. But with "right-wing mondialism", with the theory of "war of civilizations," with Huntington's concept, the situation is more complicated.

Huntington, in fact, is not an opponent of Fukuyama, his ideological opponent. He, like Fukuyama, agrees to recognize Western civilization as the highest value and is concerned about its domination over the world. But unlike Fukuyama's optimism, Huntington focuses not on describing the mondialist liberal utopia, but on highlighting those factors that currently hinder and will hinder its implementation in the future. In other words, if Fukuyama is inclined to ignore the residual aspects of the traditional way of life of peoples and states, believing that they are leveled out by themselves in the global market mondialist structure, then Huntington, on the contrary, carefully analyzes anti-mondialist, i.e. anti-Western tendencies and predicts that they are still destined to play an important role in the battle with the West.

In this sense, Huntington is more realistic and objective than Fukuyama. But this does not change anything in the system of priorities that he himself and the circles behind him are guided by.

For anti-mondialists, Huntington's analysis is very important because it identifies several specific factors that impede the realization of "The End of History." Consequently, it is precisely these factors that should be especially carefully studied and used by those forces that seek to thwart the Mondialist plans. But at the same time it is important to clearly realize that the "concessions" to traditional society that Huntington makes in his pessimistic (for mondialists) forecast, he himself considers as temporary obstacles. insurmountable at the moment, but doomed to defeat in the face of the universal and integration mission of the West. Therefore, true anti-mondialism must put forward its own third project, which would be the complete opposite of Fukuyama, but at the same time would radicalize anti-mondialist elements. which are allowed in the project "wars of civilizations" of Huntington. This requires some changes in the analysis of the situation that Huntington offers from his side.

3. Third project

First, it should be noted right away that the civilizations identified by Huntington are not equivalent systems that relate to each other in a similar way. Among them there are several civilizations that clearly have universalist claims and

historical teleology is understood in a very special way, that is, the meaning and purpose of human history. Other civilizations, despite their development, antiquity and spiritual usefulness, still have a local character, are not eschatologically sharpened and do not claim a universal mission on a planetary scale. This consideration introduces the first major division in the civilizational circles listed by Huntington.

Thus, Western, Islamic and Slavic-Orthodox civilizations clearly have their own universalist idea, believing that only they own the last word in the history of mankind. Whereas the Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Latin American and potential African civilizations do not endow themselves with any global theological mission, or, if there are some attempts, we are talking about rather artificial and marginal theories. Thus, potential wars between civilizations initially acquire completely different semantic meanings.

The conflict between civilizations with claims to universality is one case that theoretically implies globality at its core.

The conflict between civilizations without messianic tendencies has a completely different meaning, limited to regional aspects.

Finally, we can consider the third case, when it comes to a potential clash of messianic and non-messianic civilizations. This clearly has a new, third meaning.

In other words, we can say that three messianically oriented civilizations are likely to dynamically provoke conflicts on the planetary scale, i.e. to act not just as ordinary civilizational subjects, but as carriers of the integral planetary ideology. Consequently, these civilizations - Western, Islamic and Orthodox - should be considered from the very beginning as the main participants in the ideological war regarding the meaning of history, into which they will try to involve other local civilizations.

There is another distinction to be made here. Among the three messianic civilizations, one is in an exceptional, privileged position. This is Western civilization. It is to her that the leading place in control over planetary reality belongs and all existing international institutions are subordinate to her. Thus, if the messianism of the Orthodox and Islamic worlds are potential tendencies, then the Western world, in fact, is on the verge of fully realizing its universalist claims, i.e. he almost succeeded in establishing his understanding of history and its end.

There is one more important circumstance that corresponds to this "chosenness" and "privilege" of the West. If all other civilizations, both messianic and non-messianic, are generally traditional, continuing, albeit in a modern form, the lines of development that precede the New Time, then the West bases its power precisely on the denial of Tradition, on the refutation of all aspects of traditional society, which it recognizes as "backward", "archaic", "undeveloped", "conservative", etc.

Hence follows the last consideration: the Western messianic anti-traditional universalist civilization alone opposes both the alternative messianic civilizations, Islam and Orthodoxy, and all other non-messianic traditional civilizations. Consequently, the main and fundamental line of the "war of civilizations" is unambiguously the line "the West against the rest", the West against the Rest. And from the position of opponents of mondialism, the opposite formulation “the Rest against the West”, “everyone else is against the West” naturally suggests itself.

If the war of civilizations is destined to take place, then its main and central front will be the struggle against the West and its civilizations of all other countries. Moreover, in this struggle, the role of the Islamic and Orthodox worlds is obviously central and active. perhaps even aggressive and offensive, while other civilizations are assigned the role of passive and defensive, at the level of the national liberation struggle against Western influence.

All these considerations show that the third project, the anti-mondialist project, should take the following form.

In the planetary struggle of civilizations, the correct desired configuration would be the general unification of all countries and peoples in a geopolitical crusade against the West. This campaign should be based on an Orthodox-Islamic alliance, since it is for Islamic and Slavic-Orthodox civilizations that the Western version of messianism is a pronounced Manichean opposite of their own eschatological and teleological aspirations. If we take a closer look at the intellectual climate of the Islamic and Orthodox worlds, we will see that such a messianic consciousness continues to live among representatives of both civilizations, despite all the historical vicissitudes that have fallen to their lot: anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism are the common place of modern Islam and modern Orthodoxy.

The Slavic-Orthodox world, together with the Islamic world, represent the vanguard of the opposition of "the rest" (the Rest) to the West. The effectiveness of the anti-Western strategy on a planetary scale depends on the activity of such an alliance. It is important to emphasize that, of course, Orthodox and Islamic eschatologism represent different tendencies that cannot be reduced to a single doctrine, but in comparison with the anti-traditional line of the West, there are more similarities than differences between Islam and Orthodoxy. And already at a completely pragmatic level, it is obvious that a serious eschatological dispute between Islam and Orthodoxy can take place only if the third is excluded, i.e. only after brackeing Western civilization (and before that it is still so far away that even thinking about it is utopian) On the other hand, all the current frictions between Islam and the Slavic-Orthodox civilization are undoubtedly beneficial exclusively to the West, since as a result of tension, the West diverts the forces of its most important and dangerous historical and geopolitical opponents. The Orthodox-Islamic conflict is extremely beneficial to the West, and for this reason it is easy to understand that it is equally disadvantageous to Islam and Orthodoxy. Therefore, the anti-mondialist strategy should take as a starting point an unconditional and as strong and lasting as possible Orthodox-Islamic union. and for this reason alone, it is easy to understand that it is equally disadvantageous to Islam and Orthodoxy. Therefore, the anti-mondialist strategy should take as a starting point an unconditional and as strong and lasting as possible Orthodox-Islamic union. and for this reason alone, it is easy to understand that it is equally disadvantageous to Islam and Orthodoxy. Therefore, the anti-mondialist strategy should take as a starting point an unconditional and as strong and lasting as possible Orthodox-Islamic union.

Further, the anti-Western line should be actively pursued by the Orthodox-Islamic vanguard in other, less dynamic civilizations. In this sense, the Confucian-Islamic ties indicated by Huntington should only be welcomed. Moreover, any geopolitical and strategic cooperation between Russia and Islamic countries with

other civilizations is of tremendous importance in the overall anti-mondialist strategy. At the same time, tactically, one should reasonably distribute roles and concentrate Russia's efforts where Islam encounters certain problems, and vice versa.

So, for example, in India, Latin America and non-Islamic Africa, it is most reasonable to intensify the anti-Western line through Russia, while China, Japan and Islamic Africa will prefer to make contacts with Islamic countries. If, at the same time, the spiritual elite of the Orthodox and Islamic civilizations realizes in general terms the imperative of civilizational strategic cooperation in the face of a total enemy, then in the future it will be possible to speak of a fine coordination of all such efforts on a planetary scale. And the main goal of such coordination will be to transfer civilizational tensions into the channel of a single universal confrontation along the line of the Rest against the West. A common enemy minimizes contradictions within the various components of the "rest of the world."

And finally, the last crucial point of the anti-Western strategy is the vulnerability of Huntington's thesis about the unity of Western civilization, which includes Western Europe and the United States. If the United States is really and absolutely synonymous with the West, both in the geopolitical and in the historical, cultural sense - this country was initially based on the denial of traditions, on the artificial implementation of abstract humanistic-utopian liberal principles, then other European countries, in addition to the obvious Western component, have and another potential traditional dimension. This is especially true for the countries of Central Europe and Spain, but certain aspects were preserved even in liberal and anti-traditional France. Some anti-American and traditionalist European intellectuals talk about the difference and even the opposite of the concepts of "West" and "Europe." "Europe", in their opinion, is something traditional associated with religiosity, ethics, ethnic and national norms, while "the West" is a pure denial of the entire Tradition and an artificial civilization born during the period of the deepest European crisis, during the "Decline of Europe" not as a continuation of European history, but as its denial, its degeneration. Consequently, it is potentially possible to include anti-American and traditionalist movements in Europe itself in the anti-mondialist planetary front, which would make it possible to split the unstable unity of the West even more. in their opinion, this is something traditional, associated with religiosity, ethics, ethnic and national norms, while the "West" is a pure denial of the whole Tradition and an artificial civilization that was born during the period of the deepest European crisis, during the "Decline of Europe" not as a continuation of the European history, but as its negation, its degeneration. Consequently, it is potentially possible to include anti-American and traditionalist movements in Europe itself in the anti-mondialist planetary front, which would make it possible to split the unstable unity of the West even more. in their opinion, this is something traditional, associated with religiosity, ethics, ethnic and national norms, while the "West" is a pure denial of the whole Tradition and an artificial civilization that was born during the period of the deepest European crisis, during the "Decline of Europe" not as a continuation of the European history, but as its negation, its degeneration. Consequently, it is potentially possible to include anti-American and traditionalist movements in Europe itself in the anti-mondialist planetary front, which would make it possible to split the unstable unity of the West even more. during the "Decline of Europe" not as a continuation of European history, but as its negation, its degeneration. Consequently, it is potentially possible to include anti-American and traditionalist movements in Europe itself in the anti-mondialist planetary front, which would make it possible to split the unstable unity of the West even more. during the "Decline of Europe" not as a continuation of European history, but as its negation, its degeneration. Consequently, it is potentially possible to include anti-American and traditionalist movements in Europe itself in the anti-mondialist planetary front, which would make it possible to split the unstable unity of the West even more.

At least theoretically, it makes sense to include Europe, opposed to the United States, in the common front of planetary anti-mondialism, and this in practice means the need for geopolitical pressure on Europe from Russia and the Islamic world and the development of various geopolitical projects with a general tendency to cause maximum harm to the undivided dominance of the United States in the world ... And in this case, the key country is undoubtedly Germany. The ideal case would be the organization of Franco-German cooperation and the parallel transformation of Europe into an independent geopolitical sector independent of the United States as a space of an independent civilization different from the West. Such a European (Romano-Germanic) civilization in the future could play an independent role in the eschatological denouement of history,

4. Specific recommendations (Anti-Huntington)

Based on the main goal - the fight against the West and mondialism - and based on the theses of Huntington, it is not difficult to formulate a number of recommendations that will be the exact opposite of what Huntington himself advises the rulers of the West. The points:

- It is necessary to undermine American-European relations in every possible way, to encourage disharmony and conflicts in this area; it is necessary to emphasize in every possible way what separates the Old World and the New, and in every possible way to obscure what unites them. In this sense, it is useful to refer to the European geopolitical tradition of the so-called. "Continentalism" (Haushofer, Nikisch, Schmitt, Kurt von Beckmann, Leo Frobenius, etc.), where the anti-Western line was developed in detail. In a more actualized form, it is easy to find similar themes in contemporary European "New Right" (and some "New Left");

- It is important to hinder as much as possible the process of integration into the Western civilization of those countries Latin America, Eastern Europe and the East, which are striving for this. To this end, it makes sense to develop geopolitical projects in which these countries could receive certain benefits from cooperation with representatives of non-Western civilizations;

- Do everything possible to exacerbate and spoil relations with the United States Russia and Japan, resorting to any political and economic methods. The cooling of the US-Russian and US-Japanese relations will objectively force the very pro-American government in these countries to follow the national course;

- Try to translate local conflicts between civilizations into a single general planetary confrontation with the West, in whatever harsh form it may be expressed.

- In every way to encourage the military power of Orthodox, Islamic and Confucian states in order to destabilize the Western economy, forced to compete with several potential adversaries at once. It makes sense for Russia to sell weapons, including nuclear weapons, to Islamic countries - especially Iran and Iraq, as well as Libya. Nuclear atheism of the West must be opposed by nuclear Orthodoxy and nuclear Islam;

- In every possible way to encourage pacifist movements in the United States, using important factor of neo-religiosity and neo-mysticism. It makes sense to maintain and build up Russia's strategic armament in the Far East and, if possible, involve Japan in this (in exchange for high technology and financial support). Japan should be seen as Russia's main strategic ally in the Pacific against the United States in the very near future. It also makes sense to support China's political expansion southward;

- Eliminate and smooth over difficulties in contacts between Orthodox Christians. Islamic, Confucian and other countries belonging to non-Western civilizations, try to make compromises in order to prevent the ignition of internal conflicts within a potential anti-mondialist bloc;

- Identify and, if possible, suppress and persecute groups that are conductors of Western influence, especially in those countries whose geopolitical

the status is undefined. In addition, we should, whenever possible, oppress and marginalize those social strata that objectively impede the creation of a planetary anti-Western bloc and provoke conflicts among non-Western civilizations. This is especially true of anti-Russian and anti-Orthodox tendencies in Islam and anti-Islamic tendencies among Russians and Orthodox Christians.

- Sabotage, corrupt and discredit the activities of international institutions, implementing the interests of Western civilization, provoking or inspiring the withdrawal from them of the largest possible number of countries, and in the long term their dissolution or, at least, their transformation from universal to regional and local.

Unfortunately, at present, almost exclusively Huntington's theses are being implemented, and the opposite, anti-mondialist strategy has not even been formulated until now, let alone its implementation. The Yugoslav conflict (see "Elements" No. 2) is a mondialist provocation of the West to work out a clash between its civilizational opponents. A similar scenario is planned to be implemented on the territory of the former USSR, where the Islamic factor is consistently opposed to the Orthodox-Slavic, and the West-Slavic (pro-European) to Great Russian. In the interests of Islam too. both Orthodoxy and ethnic groups gravitating towards Europe, it would, on the contrary, be the conclusion of a strategic alliance and the closest interaction in the common Eurasian continental block.

Center for Special Metastrategic Research

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION (PART VIII)

THE APOCALYPSE OF ELEMENTS

(From geopolitics to philosophy of history reflections on the theory of elements by Karl Schmitt)

1.1 Civilization elements only two

The connection of the civilizational structure with the domination of one or another element of Land and Sea is the axis of the concept of Karl Schmitt and its most powerful and impressive side. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that we are talking not just about the abstract application of the sacred theory of 4 elements to cultural and historical analysis, but about the isolation of the fundamental historical (and not only natural) dualism of the two elements of Land and Sea, Earth and Water, and this dualism becomes really a historical factor only when it is recognized and intellectually experienced by human society. To clarify what, in fact, we mean, let us point out the absence of mention of the fire element and its philosophical, cultural and civilizational analysis by Schmitt (this will be discussed below). And regarding the air element associated with the era of aeronautics, Schmitt argues that it did not generate its own "nomos", its own civilizational type, being a technical continuation of the historical trajectory approved by the civilization of the Sea. Aerocracy and even more topical ethericcracy, i.e. the aeronautical and space stages of the development of technology did not provoke such global changes in the course of human history, which brought with them the discovery of the World Ocean and its challenge.

Schmitt's ingenious intuition quite rightly told him that space carries neither a real challenge nor a historical response, and space exploration under the conditions of "ethericcracy" only demonstrates the agony of an enslaving but not liberating technocratic civilization. At first glance, it seems that such an approach to the historical dialectic of the elements in Schmitt, if we take into account his implicitly anti-thalassocratic sympathies, should become the basis of a purely conservative doctrine with a pronounced ecological background. It is tempting to interpret the closing words of his article on "Planetary Tension Between East and West" in this way:

"New spaces, from where a new challenge will emerge, should be on our earth, and not outside it in outer space."

This is what Schmitt's followers do most often, taking into account his conservative views in politics. But, in our opinion, it would be too simple. If the new challenge is nothing more than a return to a land-based orientation after the revolutionary era of domination of "liberated technology" and oceanic civilization, even out of fear of a technological or ecological catastrophe, then the spiritual tension of the historical dialectic loses its dramatic dimension, it becomes almost a natural cyclism , is identified with that static-polar tension, on the overcoming of which, according to Schmitt himself, the entire purely human spiritual history is based. The land-sea civilizational dualism must be resolved somehow differently.

Schmitt is inclined to consider the transition to aerocracy and further, to ethericcracy, only as a natural development of the strategy of the Sea, and not as signs of new revolutionary eras. Thus, we can say that the element of Water in its universalistic expansion, carried out precisely at the expense of Land and the spaces traditionally subordinate to it, puts at its service two other elements air and ether (vacuum), which, from a physical point of view, are not nothing else but more and more discharged states of matter. In other words, the water element of the sea manifests itself through the subordinate elements of air and ether, continuing its civilizational tendency to "liquefy"; at the same time, we recall that it was this tendency that gave rise to the historical dialectic of "marine existence" and the associated liberation of technology and the stages of the industrial revolution.

How can one explain, in this case, the successes in the aeronautical and space spheres of such a land superpower as the USSR of the latest planetary expression of the geopolitical Behemoth, the forces of the continental masses and the land Nomos? In the same way as Schmitt himself brilliantly explained the historical function of Marxism in Russia: it was the conceptual arming of the doctrine of the second industrial revolution of the alternative elite, who managed to turn an archaic land country into a gigantic industrial and technical bastion, capable of successfully resisting multifaceted pressure for 70 years. oceanic civilization. The Eastern Bloc's use of aerocracy and ethericcracy was an extension of the Marxist strategy of the Industrial Revolution to resist the bourgeois civilization of the West.

So, one member of the historical dualism More included other elements in the process of its planetary affirmation. If at the time of Schmitt's writing of the article "Planetary Tension" in 1959 this process was in its infancy, then by the 80s it had become transparent and obvious to everyone. The sea has mastered Air and Space.

Here we come to the most important point in recent history, which is a touchstone for the overwhelming majority of ideologies and socio-political doctrines that were considered quite acceptable until very recently.

We mean the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and perestroika.

1.2 Specificity of the universal flood

This event is key to test the adequacy of Karl Schmitt's views. Reasoning in his terms, you can describe this event as follows.

The end of the Eastern bloc, which embodied in our century the planetary tendency of Land against the Sea, marks the end of the historical stage in which it was possible to effectively use the conceptual structure summarizing the second stage of the industrial revolution for global competition with the civilization of the Sea, with the West and the world that identified its own destiny with unlimited development of liberated technology. In other words, it was the end of the adequacy of Marxism. The forces of Sushi lost the defensive conceptuality that was effective until the conditions of the response that Marx gave to the challenge of European history that was contemporary to him changed completely and irrevocably.

One of the explanations for the collapse of the Soviet bloc is its lag in the field of technological competition, and the main point in this lag was the inability to adequately respond to the American SDI program. In other words, Mora won a technological duel against Sushi in the sphere of high tech ethericcracy associated with strategic inventions in the space field.

What does this mean from the point of view of the dialectic of history?

First: the Sea, which gave rise to the impulse of a technical breakthrough and further technical civilization, nevertheless defeated Land, although it borrowed in a timely manner and effectively the latest (for its time) conceptual technology from the Sea itself. This process strictly coincided with the end of the second stage of the industrial revolution. On a theoretical level, this began to become clear from the beginning of the 70s in parallel with the rapid degeneration of communism and socialism in Europe. In practice, the end was put in restructuring. The third stage of the industrial revolution needed at least a new Marx and a new Marxism. It could have been European fascism, but this attempt turned out to be abortive both on a theoretical level and on a physical plane, Germany was defeated by a more civilizationally consistent land power (USSR), supported in this case by the Sea (as has happened many times in history from Napoleon to the First and Second World Wars). There was no new Marx, apparently, there could not and should not have been.

Second: The collapse of the Eastern Bloc means a real globalization of the Sea, which from the role of judge and controller is moving to the role of an autocrator (autocrat). This is mondialism, the civilizational integration of the planet under the auspices of the West. In the religious language for this event, there is only one name for the Flood, the end of the Earth's nomos, and the universal domination of the Sea's nomos. Let us also recall the apocalyptic beast coming out of the Sea.[100] This entails the final transition from the era of confrontation between the two elements to the era of the conquest of one element by the other, hostile to it. We can say that this is the beginning of the "universal world". Leviathan defeats Behemoth, Whale Bear. Moby Dick's triumph over the Russian Bear.

Third: the Sea is now subject to the rest of the elements of the conquered Land (the defeated enemy, Hostis), Air and Ether (natural allies, in solidarity with the water dialectics, Amicus) serve as ideovariations of the Sea, the helper of the elements of the planetary Ship, the World Island (World Island, and in terms of Speakman, not Mackinder). This is the era of One World, post-industrial society, the era of global informatization and automation. In the language of Marx's most avant-garde intuitions, this is called "real domination of capital"[101]. The time of the disappearance of ideologies, the time of postmodernism and the "end of history".

The challenge of the opened Ocean, accepted by the Anglo-Saxons, who gave the answer, which was embodied in a techno-industrial breakthrough, was molded into the modern Western

[100] It is interesting to explore the geopolitical meaning of the symbolism of a "false prophet" or "another beast." About him in the "Apocalypse" says the following: "And I saw another beast coming out of the earth" (Apocalypse 13, 11). Those. this "other beast" belongs to Suchet. But it also emphasizes that "he acts before him with all the power of the first beast" (Apt. 13, 12). In other words, we are talking about the "spirit of the Land", which went over to the side of the elements of the Sea, to the side of Leviathan. Just as the "beast coming out of the sea" itself is a representative of Satan, the dragon, his substitute (that is, Atlantism is a historical expression of world evil), so "another beast" or "false prophet" is, in turn, already a representative of the "beast from sea ", ie its substitute.

[101] See Jean-Marc Vivenza, From the Formal Dominance of Capital to Its Real Dominance, The Elements, No. 7.

civilization, subjugated the whole world and took on its final form in the global autocracy of America, the very continent from the discovery of which Columbus began the "modern world." This challenge completed its historical manifestation in the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, in the restructuring and disintegration of the USSR. The liberated technique (entfesselte Technik) has overcome all external barriers. The Power of the Sea is now absolute. It is embodied in the hegemony of the technocratic West, the strategic primacy of the United States, the domination of fluid capital, and the complete blurring of traditional value structures. Property, inheritance, marriage, dwelling have all lost the meaning that they had in the era of land existence, in the era of the nomos of the Earth.

1.3 An overlooked element

Although Schmitt speaks of the disposability of truly historical events, preferring to avoid any form of determinism and systematization, nevertheless, being a Christian, he could hardly deny that history has an End and, therefore, some teleology. His rejection of the teleology of Hegel or Marx does not mean rejection of teleology in general. As an absolutely honest thinker (and in this sense he is similar to Heidegger), he does not want to limit either himself or others the free intuition of truth, believing that this is the highest human dignity and intellectual freedom, which are projected, in the end, into The Policy (das Politische) and in the Decision (die Entscheidung). All Schmitt's arguments implicitly contain eschatologism, normal for a Christian: he emphasizes the uniqueness of the New Time, which lies in its globalism, and in its attitude to "

Obviously, Schmitt realized the parallelism between the biblical story about the creation of Land as a result of the withdrawal of the Waters and the actual situation, which is something of a reverse offensive of sea existence on land, i.e. symbolic flooding of the Earth with Water. At the same time, it is important that the thalassocratic tendency, permanent in history, is only currently entering its oceanic phase, acquiring the maximum possible scale. The radiation of oceanic thalassocracy into the stratosphere and space only illustrates the limit of its victory.

But a logical retrospective question arises: why exactly the nomos of the Earth, Land became the matrix of human existence in the millennium of Tradition? And further, why did such a stable land structure of the traditional nomos (not overturned either by potamic (river), or limited thalassocratic or nomadic retreats) finally fell victim to the chaotic elements of the Ocean?

The Book of Genesis, asserting the existence of Waters before Sushi, hints at a certain primacy of Chaos in comparison with order, and Indo-European mythology confirms this in many plots. In a sense, it can be assumed (as is the case in the Hermetic tradition) that the Earth is condensed Water, and in terms of geography, that Land is the bottom of the Ocean, freed from Water. But this territory conquered from chaos, nomos, Land, Continent, Mackinder's Heartland, Mitgard of the ancient Germans, the fortress of Order, the historical Polis is not the cause of the traditional nomos, but the result of some transcendental influence, the trace of the Supernatural recorded in nature, the imprint of what is possible would be called the source of History. The Russian word for solid earth, das feste Land, die Erde, will allow us to get closer to this mysterious power. This word is Land. It etymologically contains an indication of the quality of dryness, which is absent in other languages. And this quality, in turn,

evokes an association with warmth, heat and Fire, that last forgotten element, the fifth element, which is familiar to ancient classifications, but for some reason is absent in Schmitt's civilizational and historical analysis.

And right there we remember Heraclitus, who, in spite of Thales of Miletus and other philosophers-thalassocratus, approved the revolutionary theory of the origin of the Universe from Fire. Fire is undoubtedly a transcendental element in relation to the elements of the earthly environment. If the Earth, Water and Air are internal in relation to our planet and its inhabitants, and even the cosmic vacuum surrounding the stratosphere can be considered as an inner quintessence (ether) in relation to the environment, then Fire, Heat, Light come to us from outside, from a shining sacrificial star, the Great Sun. Common elements are the elements of people. Fire is the element of the Gods, the substance of the spiritual Heaven. And the polarity of Fire in relation to all other elements does not fit into that static, purely natural, scheme that Schmitt rightly isolated, speaking of the natural tension between the Land and the Sea, and which he quite rightly separated from the tension inherent in the dialectic of human history. In fact, the tension provoked by Fire is the essence of dialectics, and if one can agree with Thales about the origin of Nature, then only Heraclitus is right about the origin of History. The gift of the titan Prometheus to people, the divine Fire brought to earth, is the main mysterious subject of historical dialectics, the agent invisible of alchemists, the philosophical child of the same Heraclitus, unfolding through the centuries and cycles the content of his solar spirit, celestial gnosis. only Heraclitus is right about the origin of History. The gift of the titan Prometheus to people, the divine Fire brought to earth, is the main mysterious subject of historical dialectics, the agent invisible of alchemists, the philosophical child of the same Heraclitus, unfolding through the centuries and cycles the content of his solar spirit, celestial gnosis. only Heraclitus is right about the origin of History. The gift of the titan Prometheus to people, the divine Fire brought to earth, is the main mysterious subject of historical dialectics, the agent invisible of alchemists, the philosophical child of the same Heraclitus, unfolding through the centuries and cycles the content of his solar spirit, celestial gnosis.

The Transcendental Fire scatters the primordial Waters to create the Land. The Transcendental Fire is revered as the main Principle by the people of the Earth, they place it in the center of their Home (sacred hearth), in the center of their Temple (sacred altar), in the center of their body (reverence for the heart), in the center of their world (the sun, which gives orientation of space and dimension time). The terrestrial nomos of the Earth is a consequence of the subtle influence of Fire. Mankind responded to the challenge of the Transcendent with a land order, and thus entered History, rose above nature and became itself. Home is the answer to the Sun. Land and its civilization is a product of intellectually meaningful Fire.

As long as the connection between Fire and Earth was realized, the oceanic challenge did not exist. Thalassocracy was counterbalanced by tellurocracy, and the Roman Vesta triumphantly crushed the foam-born Carthage, whenever it encroached on the universalization of its cultural and civilizational message. When the sacred fire died out in the homes of people, in the hearts of people, in their temples, the apocalyptic roar of Liviathan was heard. And the Land, which had lost its meaning, its center, its power, was henceforth doomed to lose the eschatological duel to the Sea.

The restructuring and slaughter of the Behemoth became inevitable already at the moment when the Tradition became conservative, when the answer given to the challenge of the transcendental Fire finally obscured the question when the nomos of the Earth stopped checking its norms with the nomos of Heaven. Ultimately, all of human history is nothing more than an interlude between the First Flare of the magic star and the universal flood.

1.4 Icon and Land

Schmitt's remarks on iconography and his generalizations about the connection between the Image and the West are very interesting. This is directly related to the element of Fire, since the visual ability is an element of the light dimension of reality, which, in turn, is one of the aspects of Fire (along with heat). If we accept the genetic connection between Land and the Sun, revealed by us, then the connection between the Icon, the sacred visual image, and the nomos of the Earth will become clear. Naturally, spatial immobility, fixity, orderliness of the environment naturally gravitate towards expression in the image of a symbol, hieroglyph, picture. The fire, as it were, snatches from the fluid reality a certain fragment that is transformed into an Image, into an Icon, into something permanent. This, as it were, repeats the mystery of the origin of the original Land from the mass of water chaos. Nomos of the earth through the Icon constantly reminds of its source. In this sense, the worship of icons and, in general, the use of painting, is indeed a clear sign of traditional, earthly, continental existence.

This consideration helps to develop the comments that Schmitt made about Spain's historic mission. Catholic Spain, having planted the face of the Blessed Virgin on all the conquered lands, carried out an incredibly important mission of neutralizing the Ocean (and calling it) by means of Fire. In some ways, this planetary operation was analogous to the historical function of Marxism in Russia: in both cases, the challenge of the Sea was accepted in order, if possible, to neutralize its harmful consequences for the Earth's nomos and to try to turn the poison into medicine. The loss by Spain of the sea battle with the English pirates was fraught with terrible planetary consequences: on the transatlantic island, the Anglo-Saxons sowed the seeds of that apocalyptic civilization, which was destined to embody Leviathan in all its eschatological, final power. From the foam emerged the Continent Ship, superior in all respects to its European prototype. It was written to this monster to extinguish the sacred fire, smash the Image, establish its own "new world order" on the planet. Naturally, the dominant worldview of the newborn monster was the ideas of extreme Protestant sects, Baptists, Puritans, Mormons, etc., differing in the extreme degree of iconoclasticism, church modernism and light of no hatred. The doomed Latin American guerrilla, based on a mixture of Marxism (sic!) And Catholic liberation theology (sic !!), is all that remains today of the ambitious planetary demarche of the Spanish conquistadors to disrupt the ecumenical flood.

But here one theoretical difficulty arises, which Schmitt has not fully analyzed. The fact is that he mentions the habit of identifying the visual Image and the veneration of icons with the West, and its negation, iconoclasticism, with the East. Schmitt himself gives several examples that refute the unambiguous correctness of such an identification. Let's deal with this in a little more detail. Moreover, this closely touches on the most important problem for us, the historical meaning of Russia and its mission.

1.5 Absolute Amicus et Hostis portraits in time and space

Here we are dealing with a problem, the metaphysical meaning of which was understood in our other book ("Mysteries of Eurasia", chapter "Subconsciousness of Eurasia"). We are talking about the identification of their Tradition with the West, typical for European thinkers. At the same time, it is often not just about the West, but about the Northwest. Moreover, sometimes even three geographical concepts West, North-West and North merge. This is opposed by the South, Southeast and East, most often, also merging into one civilizational picture, represented by the Semitic cultural landscape of the Middle East,

most familiar to Europe historically. At the same time, this view is sometimes deduced from the Roman, and sometimes from the Christian heritage.

But this is, in fact, an optical illusion that Europeans owe to geography. Only the deepest minds and, first of all, Rene Guénon were able to move away from this confusion and look at things from a different, more adequate position. So, Rene Guenon quite rightly pointed out that, from the point of view of real (and sacred) geography, the continent-Eurasia is a huge mass of land, where Europe is only a western cape, a peninsula directed to the Atlantic. Indo-European peoples live all over the continent from Hindustan through Iran and Russia to Europe itself. Aryan India preserves the memory of the most ancient myths and intellectual views of the white race, and Orthodox Christianity spreads far beyond the Urals up to the Pacific Ocean, occupying spaces larger than Europe. However, historical narrowness and inculcated clichés do not allow Europeans to treat the Orthodox culture of Russia as a completely authentic Christian tradition, moreover, entrusted to the white Indo-European people. It is very significant in our context that it is in Orthodox Russia that the Greek name "icon" has survived as applied to the sacred image, and moreover, it is the Orthodox, Russian icon that today fully supports the truly Christian tradition, which has practically died out in the West.

René Guénon, reviewing the book "The Origin of Humanity" by German professor Hermann Wirth[102], pointed out that it is necessary to distinguish between such concepts as the North Atlantic (north-western), Hyperborean (northern) and Atlantic (western) regions.

In fact, the worship of Fire and the land nomos of the Earth, carefully studied by Schmitt, is a distinctive quality of the Indo-European white peoples as a whole, who descended into Eurasia from the North, settled throughout its space from West to East and from East to West. Where there are Indo-Europeans, there is an Icon, sacred painting, worship of Fire and Light, solar myths, traditional hierarchy and the memory of Hyperborea. India abounds in sacred images. In Iran, even after Islamization, and Islam strictly forbids images of people and animals, miniatures and real paintings flourished. In the Russian Orthodox Church, not only icons, but also icon painters were revered, and the Orthodox hesychasm, the doctrine of the Uncreated Light, was the central life line of the Russian Church.

Dislike for the image, iconoclasm, is also characteristic not so much of the East as of the South. This is quite normal geographic symmetry, if we take into account the Hyperborean origins of the Indo-Europeans. If the race of the North worships fire and an image, then the opposing race of the South should worship the antithesis of Fire (for example, Water) and the antithesis of an icon (for example, sound). It is curious that Guénon himself correlates this cultural dualism with sedentaryism and nomadism: sedentaryism is associated with the figure of the biblical Cain, visually and time, while nomadism with Abel, verbalism and space[103]. This fits perfectly into the duality of the elements, which Schmitt parsed. The marine existence (albeit strictly separated from nomadism) is such an extreme development of nomadism, which passes into a new quality at the moment when the path from

[102] See j-l "Dear Angel" N 1, Moscow, 1991.
[103] See René Guénon "The Kingdom of Quantity and Signs of the Times", Moscow, 1994.

land nomadism through navigation on the mainland seas and up to a decisive exit into the open Ocean.

One more detail is also extremely curious: Guénon claims that the Semitic tradition is by no means an Eastern tradition, but an Atlantic, Western and at the same time nomadic tradition. Hence, according to him, and a positive attitude towards the cattle-breeder Abel in the biblical story. Moreover, Guenon points to the fact that the great architect was invited from among foreigners to build the Temple of Solomon, and proves that it was a representative of the Indo-European tradition, since it was characterized by the cultivation of sacred architecture, i.e. the construction of that House, which, according to Schmitt, underlies the nomos of the Earth, and the Semitic nomads themselves had a different social and sacred structure.

And finally, in relation to the East, Guenon argued that this side of the world is more than anyone else associated with Tradition, with the constancy of sacred archetypes, with fidelity to the origins. In the book "East and West" he elaborated on the argumentation in support of this thesis. We can say that Guénon unambiguously connects the East with the North, considering it the historical successor of the original Nordic Tradition. By the way, regarding the identity of the concept of the Light of the North and the Light of the East, brilliant passages can be found in the works of Henri Corbin, the best modern specialist in Iranian tradition and translator of the great Sohrawardi.

So, let's summarize our comments. The North is identified with the Indo-European tradition, sedentaryism, worship of Fire and the Image. In addition, the North is also sacredly connected with the East. It is these two orientations that should be taken as initial in the question of the history of the development of the Earth's nomos and its central lines of force. The defense of icon veneration in history, therefore, is by no means a western, but a northern or eastern tendency. This line is typical for all of Eurasia from India to Ireland. It coincides with the historical trajectory of the Light of the North, Nordlicht, and with the peoples and cultures that act as bearers of this Light. These are Doric Sparta, imperial Rome, Zoroastrian Iran, Vedic India, Byzantium, Orthodox Russia, Catholic Ireland and Spain. This is the camp of the nomos of the Earth.

At the opposite pole of history, accordingly, there are the South together with the West (!), Nomadic sevens, iconoclasts, the embryos of thalassocracy, commercial civilization and "technological breakthrough". Guénon would call this camp "the preconditions for an anti-traditional civilization" and "the builders of the Great Parody." It is also worth recalling the idea of the eschatological dissolution of the Egg of the World, "dissolution", set forth by Guénon in "The Kingdom of Quantity", which exactly and chronologically and typologically coincides with the triumph of the Sea analyzed by Schmitt. Guénon, like Schmitt, connects this dissolution with technological progress, liberal ideology and Western civilization of the New Time. The Anglo-Saxon world as a whole evoked in him a feeling of deep hostility and wariness.

And finally, the role of the Semitic factor, Western and nomadic, according to Guénon; southern, if we evaluate the distribution of the Semites from the standpoint of Eurasia; associated with trade and free exchange, characteristic of all thalassocracies (Carthage v. Rome); who stood at the origins of capitalism (criticized by both Marx and Sombart); iconoclastic and hostile to everything Indo-European in religious matters (Judaism and Islam); in solidarity with the Protestant movement in its Calvinist version (the spread of Calvinism in Holland, England, and later in America the oceanic powers for the most part); finally, especially active in the destruction of traditional

for Europe, the nomos of the Earth (about which Schmitt himself has repeatedly written) puts the last point in the chain of correspondences.

North + East, Icon, Indo-Europeans, Fire, Home, Settlement, Tradition and Land. These are the powers of the Earth's nomos. Supporters of culture and order, who responded to the challenge of the transcendental Fire with a fan of Aryan traditions up to Christianity.

South + West, Iconoclasm, Semitic peoples, Water, Ship, nomadism, modernism and the Sea. These are the forces of denial of the Earth, carriers of dissolution, apocalyptic energies of rational chaos, the nomos of the Sea. They responded to the Ocean challenge by taking its side against the Earth and against the most ancient, almost forgotten fiery Promethean question, which predates the earth's nomos and all of human history.

1.6 Nomos of Fire

The end of the Eastern Bloc signifies the complete victory of the Nomos of the Sea. All attempts to resist its logic and its structure with the help of its own technical means turned out to be untenable. The battle on ships was lost by Spain; economic-industrial, strategic and doctrinal resistance to the nomos of the Sea of National Socialist Germany (1933 1945), inspired in part by Haushofer's Eurasian project, was suppressed by the power and cunning of the West, which used the USSR for this purpose; technological rivalry, taking into account the lessons of Marxism, which lasted the longest, was lost in the 60s and 80s by the Warsaw Pact countries in parallel with the end of the second stage of the industrial revolution and the transition to a post-industrial society. The cycle of human history, having passed through the static polarities of nature, has come to an end,

We can state the absolute loss of Land, Behemoth, Eurasia, Earth's nomos. Of course, the very nomos of the Earth was only a trace of the solution by humanity to the open problem of Being put before it, but not by its essence. The external form of the Answer, but not the fiery element that gave rise to the Hyperborean Answer. The Earth can no longer respond to the challenge of the Nomos of the Sea, which has become global and unique. She is flooded with Waters, her Order is dissolved through the cracks in the World Egg. The end of the industrial revolution dispelled the illusion that entfesselte Technik could be competed at its own level. The etherocratic stage of absolute thalassocracy, a glance thrown at the Earth from space, makes all creatures swarming on it, fundamentally the same, their value is strictly pragmatic and equal to their usefulness. Life is calculated in the financial equivalent of the really dominant Capital. Genetic engineering is breeding chickens and human clones, just as the steam engine or the loom was invented yesterday. Technology has invaded humanity, reaching its center. In 1959, Schmitt might still have a spark of hope that something could suddenly change. By the end of the century, there is no such hope.

The Triumph of Water apocalyptically absorbed all the elements and all historical forms that he could not only destroy, but transmute in his civilizational geopolitical parodic alchemy. Gold (money), a universal solvent and the technical ingenuity of the forces of the Sea have turned humanity into a controlled biomass. But there is something left that is not subject to this global process.

The fire.

It is he who, cleared of his natural, cultural and socio-political layers acquired during his travel through history, is now in a privileged position in comparison with the compromise state in which he was, remaining only the nomos of the Earth, the land order. The structure of its initial challenge is only now being clarified, since only now is it manifested in its entire historical volume to which this challenge was thrown. The question is neither more nor less than a Human. To what extent was it historical? What is natural? To what extent did he succumb to the elements that make up his natural fabric (up to general rationality)? To what extent was he able to remain faithful to the unobvious transcendental dimension? How much fire did it end up with? Or is it all just Water?

GLOSSARY

(basic concepts and terms of geopolitics)

Anacondas strategy the geopolitical line of Atlanticism, aimed at tearing away from Eurasia as much of the coastal territories as possible in order to contain its geopolitical expansion.

Atlantism (related terms ***Water, Sea, Thalassocracy, Sea Power)*** complex geopolitical concept; combines in itself: historically the Western sector of human civilization, strategically the union of Western countries dominated by the liberal-democratic ideology, the military-strategic NATO member states, social focus on ***"Trading system"*** and Opposite ***"Market values" (***model USA). to Eurasianism.

Aerocracy Greek "Power through air ". The strength component of the strategy, based on the development of airspace and its use for ***geopolitical expansion.*** The development of aviation, in contrast to the development of navigation, did not generate its own nomos, becoming only the development of the thalassocratic principle.

hippopotamus other Heb. "Beast", "land monster" (in the Bible). Schmitt's term. Same as ***continent, continentalism, Eurasianism.***

Berlin natural strategic capital of Central Europe.

Bipolar world (bipolarism or bipolarity) a natural geopolitical structure that reflects the main geopolitical dualism on a planetary scale ***thalassocracy*** vs ***tellurocracy.***

Block the unification of several states, significantly changing their strategic and geopolitical quality, bringing them to a higher level of planetary activity. According to law ***"Spatial progression"*** the formation of blocks is an inevitable process.

Rich North the same as Atlanticism, the West and the liberal-democratic world.

Large Space (Grossraum) Schmitt's term. Consolidation of several powers into a single strategic entity. The emergence of Large Spaces is due to the theory ***"Spatial progression".***

Outer crescent (or ***island crescent)*** Mackinder's term denoting the totality of territories included in the zone ***thalassocratic*** influence. Parts of continents and islands gravitating towards ***"Marine existence".*** Also a zone entirely controlled by strategic ***atlantism.***

Inland sea (mare internum lat.) a term denoting a body of water enclosed within a land tellurocratic volume, and therefore is not a strategic or cultural boundary.

Inner ocean term meaning the same as ***"Inland sea",*** only on a planetary scale. Also ***Middle Ocean.***

Inner crescent (or ***continental crescent*** or ***rimland)*** Mackinder's term denoting the coastal territories of Eurasia located between ***"Outer crescent"*** and ***"Axial area".***

Inner axis the quality of the geopolitical connection between the center and the periphery within a single strategic (or political) space. See also geopolitical ray and geopolitical segment.

Water (or Sea) a special term for "thalassocracy". Especially developed by Schmitt (das Meer) and Mahan (Sea, Sea Power).

East the same as the Second World.

Enemy (hostis lat.) Schmitt's term. A purely political concept that denotes the totality of external state, social, ethnic or religious entities that stand in positions opposite to those of the strategic capital. It has no moral burden and can be dynamically transferred to various formations. Movable category. See a friend.

Second world the name of the socialist camp during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, it means Eurasia.

The geographical axis of history (or ***axial range*** or ***heartland)*** Mackinder's term denoting the inland Eurasian territories around which the spatial dynamics of historical development takes place. Coincides with the territory of Russia.

Geopolitics is a science, the main provisions of which are set out in this book.

Geopolitical dualism the basic principle of geopolitics, which asserts the opposition of thalassocracy and tellurocracy as the engine of the historical process.

Geopolitical ray vector of power (economic, strategic, cultural, economic, administrative, etc.) impact of the geopolitical pole on peripheral regions. The real political picture of the world in a static state operates with geopolitical segments. In geopolitics, it is customary to speak of rays as an open dynamic process of a constantly lasting impulse.

Geopolitical stretch a set of relations between a strategic capital (or geopolitical pole) with peripheral regions, considered at a specific historical moment without taking into account the general dynamics of political processes. See also geopolitical ray.

Geostrategy military aspects of geopolitical analysis.

Geoeconomics an offshoot of Atlantist geopolitics. Considers space in utilitarian-eco nomic sense. One of priority disciplines "Thalassocratic" analysis.

State-Nation secular state with bright pronounced centralism. Political formation in which state forms lead to birth

ethnos and its culture. It differs from ethnic formation (community, people) and from the Empire.

The border in geopolitics, there are two types of borders: border-line and border-strip. A line boundary represents a maritime boundary. The border is a land lane. The task of a geopolitical bloc, claiming to act on a planetary scale, is to make border lines maximum for itself and minimum for an adversary, and vice versa.

Demopolitics Kjellen's term. Influence of demographic parameters on the structure of the state. Not widely used.

Discontinuous belt Cohen's term. Broken coastal zones with an indefinite, variable orientation, which can turn towards both the tellurocratic continent and the thalassocratic sea.

Friend (amicus lat.) Schmitt's term. A purely political concept. denoting a set of external state, social, ethnic or religious entities, standing in positions that coincide with the positions of the strategic capital. Has no moral burden and can be dynamically transferred to different
education. Movable category. See enemy.

Eurasianism complex geopolitical concept; combines in itself: historically eastern sector of human civilization, strategically relevant or
a potential bloc of states and nations that refuse to recognize the imperative of liberal-democratic ideology, a strategically relevant or potential association in a military alliance of the eastern, ***"Tellurocratic"*** countries, socially oriented towards ***"Ideocracy"*** welfare state, non-capitalist
economic system.

Eurasia the same as ***continent, heartland, land, earth, tellurocracy.*** In a more limited sense, it means geopolitical Russia.

One World (One World) see mondialism.

Living space Haushofer's term. The minimum territorial volume that allows the people to achieve the realization of their historical and political aspirations.

West synonym ***thalassocracy, atlantism.***

Land (or ***Land)*** in geopolitics, a special term for "tellurocracy". The theory of "Earth", das Land, was developed especially in detail by Karl Schmitt.

Ideocracy gr. "The power of ideas, ideals." The term of the Russian Eurasians (N. Trubetskoy, P. Savitsky). Contrasted with the "power of matter", "market system", ***"Trading system".*** Under ideocracy, the hierarchy in society and the stimulation of labor proceed from non-economic principles.

Empire a superstate formation that unites several peoples and countries under the auspices of a universal idea of a religious, ethical or ideological nature.

Integration in geopolitics, it means various forms of combining several spatial sectors. Integration can be carried out both on the basis of military expansion and peacefully. There are several ways of geopolitical integration: economic, cultural, linguistic, strategic, political, religious, etc. All of them can lead to the same end result of an increase in the strategic and spatial volume of the block.

The colony territory controlled by a force, separated by a body of water. It is viewed as a temporary and external base, alienated from the general geopolitical space of the metropolis. Opposite***provinces.***

End of Story Fukuyama's term. Mondialist thesis about the total victory of thalassocracy and the liberal-democratic model on the whole planet. Cm.***mondialism, One World.***

Continent Eurasia, Land, tellurocratic principle.

Continentalism synonym ***Eurasianism*** in a narrowly strategic aspect. Concept close to concept***Dry land, Earth.*** The Continentalist school of geopolitics is the only one in Russia, prevailing in Germany, present in France and impossible for the Anglo-Saxon countries. Opposite***atlantism.***

Kratopolitics Kjellen's term. Consideration of the state from the point of view of its power potential. Not widely used.

Leviathan Old Hebrew "Sea monster" (in the Bible). Schmitt's term. Same as ***atlantism, Sea*** etc.

Liberalism a worldview that combines the left (minimalist humanism, individualism, ethnic and cultural egalitarianism) components in the field of politics and the right (market, privatization, private property, capitalism) in the field of economics. The ruling ideology of the Atlanticist camp. The political expression of liberalism is***liberal democracy.***

Meridian expansion (expansion along the North-South axis) expansion of the sphere of influence (military, strategic, cultural or economic) along the meridian, also ***longitudinal expansion);*** the main condition for the territorial and strategic stability of the state.

Meridian integration (integration along the North-South axis) linking separate spatial sectors into a single whole along the meridian (also longitudinal ***integration).*** Positive in case of confident control over the northern and central regions. Negative if located in the north or in the center of geopolitical formations, whose loyalty***strategic capital*** questionable or weak.

Location Savitsky's term. The same as a quality space or just ***space (***in a geopolitical sense).

Minimal geopolitics an applied discipline that borrows some terms and methods from genuine geopolitics, but leaves aside the basic geopolitical dualism.

World Island Mackinder's term. Mackinder called them ***Eurasia*** and the geographical axis of history. In Speakman, this concept radically changed its meaning and began to denote the totality ***thalassocratic*** zones (***zones of the outer crescent).*** Due to this discrepancy, it is better not to use the term broadly in order to avoid ambiguity.

Multipolar world at the present stage, a purely theoretical concept that presupposes the coexistence of several ***Large Spaces.*** Possible only after overcoming ***unipolar world.***

Mondialism from fr. monde "peace" (meaning "world", not "peace"). A special ideology that presupposes the merger of all states and peoples into a single planetary entity with the establishment of a World Government, the destruction of racial, religious, ethnic, national and cultural boundaries. There is "right" mondialism and "left". The right one represents globalization ***Atlanticism.*** The left considers it necessary to include in the United State and ***Eurasian*** sector (on one or another basis).

Sea the same as ***thalassocracy,***

Water. Moscow natural strategic capital ***Eurasia.*** The foundation axes any ***continental integration.*** Cm. ***Eurasia***

Neoatlantism a modern version of Atlanticism that rejects mondialism (even right sense) as a premature and impracticable project in the given conditions. Considers that instead of ***One World*** will happen ***clash of civilizations.***

New order a large-scale geopolitical reorganization project.

New world order the same as mondialism and projects for the creation of a World Government.

Nomos term by Karl Schmitt. The basic principle of organizing any space (geographic, social, political, economic, cultural, etc.). Synonymous with the concept of "order", "law", "way". Nomos Sushi = ***tellurocracy.***
Nomos of Water (or Sea) = ***thalassocracy.***

Society the result of the collapse of communal formations. Unlike a community, it is fundamentally divisible into atomic members (individuals).

Community the natural form of existence of people connected by organic ties. Opposes ***society,*** in which, instead of organic ties, the norms of a formalized contract between individuals dominate. Society is governed by Tradition.

the fire an element symbolizing a pure spirit. Transcendental principle.

Unipolar world the geopolitical model that emerged after the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War. The only dominant pole is Atlanticism and the United States.

Axis geopolitical union of two or more ***geopolitical capitals.***

Partisan Schmitt's term, the symbolic figure of the defender of the "nomos" Sushi in a situation of triumph of the opposing geopolitical force.

Passionarity Gumilyov's term. Internal energy of an ethnos, the driving force of cultural, political and geopolitical creation.

Periphery spaces and lands that do not have an independent geopolitical orientation, remote from ***strategic capital,*** on whose behalf the main geopolitical decisions are made.

Political geography Ratzel's term denoting what after Kjellen came to be called "geopolitics" proper.

Possibilism from fr. possible, "possible". Vidal de la Blache's term. Designed to nuance geographic determinism, partly characteristic of geopolitics. Theory Possibilism claims that ***space*** does not predetermines history, but only predispose to one or another of its course.

Applied Geopolitics the term Lacoste. Using geopolitical toolkit applied to micro-issues of regional guiding principles. Also level excluding ***minimal geopolitics.***

Provinces peripheral territories that are part of the main geopolitical formation and are considered as an integral part of the organic whole. Opposite ***colonies.***

Space the basic concept of geopolitics. It is not a quantitative but a qualitative category. The structure of space predetermines the structure of history (first of all, political history). This is the main thesis of geopolitics as a science.

Spatial progression law formulated by Jean Thiriard. It sounds like "from states - cities through states-territories to states of continents ". Geographic the dynamics of the political stories relentlessly leads to an increase scale minimum social formations. Cm. also ***"Vital space".***

Spatial meaning Ratzel's term. The system of historical predeterminations embedded in the qualitative space. Cm. ***space.***

Regionalism focus on autonomy ***peripheral spaces.*** It has several forms of economic, cultural, political and strategic.

Sacred geography the totality of the ancients' ideas about the qualitative space. Modern geopolitics is guided by a typologically similar understanding ***space,*** only expresses it in a rational natural science form.

Sanitary cordon artificial geopolitical formations serving to destabilize two large neighboring states that can form a serious bloc, which, in turn, will be dangerous for a third party. A classic move in the strategy of the Atlanticists in their opposition to the continental integration of Eurasia.

North in sacred geography (and in Doibler's) a symbol of spirit and ideal order. In modern geopolitics, it is synonymous with the concept***rich north,*** which is something exactly the opposite, i.e. Atlanticism and Liberalism.

Sociopolitics Kjellen's term. Study of the social aspects of the state.

Middle Ocean (Midland Ocean) Speakman's term. Atlantic Ocean, if we consider North America and Europe as a single geopolitical space.

Central Europe space intermediate between Russia and the Atlantic the coast of Europe. Traditionally viewed as a zone of German predominantly influence.

Clash of civilizations Huntington's term. Theory permanence and irreplaceability of geopolitical conflicts at the civilizational level.

Strategic capital (geopolitical pole or ***source of geopolitical ray)*** center of geopolitical ***integration*** and an active figure in the large-scale geopolitical process. Links between strategic capitals form geopolitical***axis.***

Land cm. ***Land***

Tellurocracy Greek "Power through the land" or "land power". Characteristics of powers with a clear land geopolitical orientation. See Eurasia, Heartland, ideocracy.

Thalassocracy - Greek "Power through the sea" or "sea power". Characteristics of states and nations dominated by navigation.

Tokyo natural strategic capital of the Pacific.

Trading system a type of society in which the hierarchy and stimulation of labor are based on economic principles. Market, liberal-democratic system.
Opposite ***ideocracy.***

Third World a common name for underdeveloped countries that belong primarily to the regions of the geopolitical South.

Turan the northeastern regions of the Eurasian continent, the steppe expanses of Eurasia.

Latitudinal integration (integration along parallels) is the most vulnerable and difficult moment of linking the geopolitical spaces controlled by the center. Should be carried out by the most peaceful and diplomatic means. It is based on the gradual joining of heterogeneous regions to the central part through the spatial hierarchy of the sectors most loyal to the center.

Latitudinal expansion (expansion along parallels) an aggressive geopolitical trend that invariably generates conflict situations, an offensive geopolitical strategy. Almost always fraught with military conflicts.
is carried out only after the completion of the meridian expansion.

Ecopolitics Kjellen's term. Consideration of the state as an economic force. Not widely used.

Etherocracy Greek “Power by means of supra-atmospheric layers”. Dominance of space weapons. Development of thalassocratic and aerocratic tendencies.

South in sacred geography, regions of disorder, confusion and degeneration. In modern geopolitics, the Third World is an underdeveloped country where liberal-democratic principles have not been established.

Heartland English "Core earth"; cm. ***the geographical axis of history.*** Mackinder's term.

Hinterland German "Back ground". Areas extending inland from the coastlines. A term specific to ***thalassocratic*** analysis of space.

Jus Publicum Europeum lat. "General European Law". Historical set of legal codes that governed interstate relations in Europe.

Jus Publicum Euroasiaticum lat. "General Eurasian Law". A draft international law that could regulate relations between Eurasian countries and peoples based on the recognition of the priority of continental ***tellurocratic*** values.

Lenaland English “Land adjacent to the Lena river basin”. Mackinder's term. Indicates all North Eurasian territories lying east of the Yenisei River up to the Pacific coast. In his later works, Mackinder paid special attention to this area, believing that these lands did not belong to ***tellurocratic,*** but ***thalassocratic*** zones of influence.

Linkage Kissinger's term. ***Atlantist*** strategy by connection ***discount belt*** Eurasia into a continuous territory controlled by the West.

Mitteleuropa German the same as ***Middle Europe. One world*** mondialist

concept of the One World. See also End of History.

Pax americana lat. "American World". Same as ***atlantism. Pax***

Euroasiatica lat. "The world in a Eurasian way". Same as ***Eurasianism.***

Pax persica lat. "World in Persian". A project for the geopolitical reorganization of the Central Asian space under the auspices of Iran in alliance with Russia.

Rimland English "Coastal lands"; cm. ***"Inner crescent".*** Mackinder's term.

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