Nicolai Hartmann

POSSIBILITY AND ACTUALITY

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BOOKS

Nicolai Hartmann

Possibility and Actuality

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Nicolai Hartmann

Possibility and Actuality

Foreword

This is the second volume of my work on ontology. Of my four investigations, it ties in most closely with *Toward the Foundation of Ontology* [*Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*], which was published two years ago; it relates to the latter as the core of a science does to the preliminaries. It stands midway between these preliminary investigations and the already highly specialized analysis of the categorial construction of the real world.

It remains to be proven that the theory of modality occupies this key position within the complex problematic of "that which is as it is" [*das "Seiende als Seiendes"*]. For this fact is, by no means, self-evident. But the proof is nearly identical to the course taken by the investigation, itself. Let it only be said beforehand: the crucial question of what "reality" is – i.e. what the "way of being" of reality is in the perpetual flow of the world that surrounds our lives, that brings us forth and passes us by – this question is, if answerable at all, only to be dealt with in one way, which is revealed by modal analysis. Modal analysis penetrates the structure of possibility and actuality, necessity and contingency. It gains, from the peculiar relation that the modes have with one another in the course of world events, the ontological internal aspect of real being as such, which makes its positive identification at least indirectly possible.

Thus, this book is not about "Possibility and Actuality" alone. It is about much more than can be expressed in the mere title of a book. Possibility and actuality are only central to our new investigation insofar as through their relation one may seek to shed light on nearly all of the many greater and more important things, which must here find their expression.

What the difficulty is with the more exact determination – or even with the mere description – of the pure ways of being should have sufficiently arisen from the "foundation." The analysis of being-there and being-so was, therefore, only a preparatory move; it allowed the difference between the ways of being (reality and ideality) and the moments of being (being-there and being-so) to emerge concretely, but it could not elucidate the particular nature of the ways of being, themselves. It was shown in all clarity that, in general, neither being nor the particular ways of being in one ontological sphere can be defined. The only viable way to determine the ways of being is to understand them from their categorial construction, i.e. to let their own structures illuminate them from within.

This is no small task. Since the structures of "that which is" can be understood as categories, the theory of categories can, therefore, be said to have already begun. In fact, no clear-cut line can be drawn between this theory

and ontology. All of ontology, when it investigates the particular, becomes a theory of categories; and likewise for all epistemology and all metaphysics. In this respect, these fields of philosophy stand close together and show historically related developmental trajectories. The world one seeks to know is imbued with content, which, in turn, is rooted in the particularity of the principle prevailing in it. Whether one is dealing with this world itself or merely with its recognizable aspects, the investigation will always be concerned with the predicaments that are involved in understanding the particular principle in it.

The levels of modality are the most general and most fundamental categories of "that which is," as well as of the knowledge of "that which is." In this respect, their investigation rightly precedes the content-related categories. The latter are "constitutive" principles. From Kant, one is familiar with the distinction between constitutive and regulative principles; one might accordingly expect a certain equation of the modal with the regulative. With that equation, however, the problem of modality would be misunderstood from the outset. The Kantian opposition is purely epistemological; it separates the content-related aspect of knowledge from the methodological, and therefore does not touch at all on the problem of being. There is method only in the progress of knowledge as such. "That which is as it is" has no methods. It has, alongside its constitutive principles of construction, and ahead of them, its aspects of being (being-there and being-so), its ways of being (reality and ideality), and its modes of being (possibility, actuality, and necessity). They all stand in very determinate, although differently dimensioned opposition to the constitutive categories. But none of these kinds of opposition coincide with the Kantian one.

Since the aspects of being have now preliminarily been examined, but the ways of being can only gradually be clarified, there now appears in the place of the Kantian opposition the ontologically fundamental opposition of the constitutive and the modal. What "modal" means cannot, of course, be readily indicated in any other way than the way offered by the difference in levels of the modes of being themselves. This is not something unfamiliar to practical thought, but its more precise meaning can only be revealed by the investigation itself. This investigation leads immediately to greater technical difficulties, and is, moreover, from the outset burdened with the task of making possible the most important decisions of ontology. In order to forge ahead it must first of all uncover and clarify the proper field of activity. If one could be spared this work in ontology, and if one could also methodically separate the interlocking requirements, then one would surely have an easier time of it. But, as the matter stands, no separation and no simplification is possible. The course of the investigation is clearly predetermined by the given surfaces for attack presented by its objects; it cannot be arbitrarily or otherwise changed.

It is an investigation that is not undertaken lightly or for its own sake. No direct and actual concerns of daily life, and no speculative interests within the area of philosophical concerns adhere to the object of modal analysis. Only deeper behind these spheres of interest does its realm begin. And yet, the foundational questions of metaphysics are indirectly brought to light by the clarification of the modal problem. Among them are questions concerning sufficient reason, continuous determination, the *contingentia mundi*, the essence of becoming, the "Ought," the actualization of the nonactual, and the making-possible of the impossible. The ancient masters of *prima philosophia* truly sensed this, and in their own way they strove to resolve the modal problem, as did all of the philosophers before Aristotle, and after him the most important of the Scholastics, as well as the ontologically-oriented thinkers of modern times: Leibniz, Wolff, and Hegel. It may, indeed, be said that further theses in the construction of their theoretical systems emerged according to the extent to which these philosophers understood the relation of possibility and actuality, knowing how to recognize its consequences. To track the development of modal concepts through the centuries up to the present day is a fascinating and yet seldom mastered task of historical research: from the ancient opposition of *dynamis* and *energeia*, on through its subtle changes in the medieval opposition of potency and actuality, up to the modern themes of *possibile et impossibile, necessarium et contingens, determinatum et indeterminatum*. With such a pursuit, I believe one would find that the fundamental decisions of metaphysics have always fallen within the field of modality.

Only present-day investigations in ontology try to avoid modal analysis. In fact, with the nadir of ontology, beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, the consciousness of the necessity of modal analysis has not reemerged at all in these investigations. Such a consciousness must be reawakened. Otherwise, one cannot break free from all the deeply rooted conceptual confusion and sloppy thinking that have rendered an actual grasp of "that which is as it is" virtually impossible. One must have comprehended what real possibility is in order to be able to distinguish it from essential possibility and logical possibility. It is of no use to ignore such things because they seem formal and meaningless; one cannot overlook the consequences, and one cannot see in advance how disastrous it is if one loses one's orientation right at this initial crossroads.

Ontology cannot be carried out in this way. In order to go about it seriously, one must draw on the foundations peculiar to "that which is" itself, and must therefore be unconcerned as to whether in this way one disregards a currently prevailing concern. The basic problems of philosophy have always had an esoteric character. One cannot turn them around at will, back onto the beaten tracks of temporally conditioned interests. They prescribe a peculiar path to the seeker,

a path that is not for everyone. If the path has been recognized, then one merely has to decide to pursue it or to renounce any further foray. Renunciation of the path signifies the abandonment of philosophy. But the pursuit of the path is the undertaking of a task whose end cannot be foreseen.

Modal analysis is, if correctly considered, a complete science. It has, up until now, been carried out only sporadically – just as logic, before its first summation by Aristotle, was once a merely sporadically practiced science. It may be of no less philosophical importance than logic. But this only becomes apparent if it is approached systematically. For the time being, it suffices to recognize that modal analysis is a field replete with surprises and revelations – indeed, not only in an ontological respect. It ushers in no dogmatism of being, no primacy of any passively substantial powers that set limits to human activity. It is the task of freeing us from the bonds of misunderstanding that it serves, the direct continuation of that for which Kant and Fichte strove – the preparation of the path for a well-grounded philosophy of humankind and creative action. These are, admittedly, not things that are obvious at first glance; they require the troublesome process of steadily pushing forward. But it seems to me that only modal analysis can establish such a foundation. For it alone is in a position to shed light upon the equally dreaded and avoided murky problems of determination. At no point since antiquity, however, have the traditional concepts of ancient metaphysics been more ill-fated than they have been in these problems.

Faced with such tasks, perhaps I could have limited my investigation to the modes of the real. They constitute a subject matter that opens up a wider perspective. But there is such an abundance of errors concerning the modes of ideal being, of logic, and of knowledge itself that it was not possible to leave these out of the picture. These errors constantly encroach on how the real is understood, having almost completely distorted it over time. In any case, the modal analysis of ideal being belongs ontologically to this theme; the modal analysis of judgment and of knowledge, on the other hand, could have been conveniently omitted, if it were possible to encounter preconceptions anywhere other than within their own field of objects. But in the last two centuries, modal concepts have historically developed predominantly in the fields of logic and epistemology. Thus, I am left with no other choice than to include in this investigation the modal relations of ideal being, in addition to the modal relations of logic and of knowledge. I have summarized these three groups of problems, which in this way are withdrawn from the modal analysis of the real, in Part III under the common title “The Modality of the Unreal,” the negativity of the title leaving sufficient leeway for their heterogeneity.

Whoever regards this as not a matter of tangible results alone, but a matter of acquired insight and independent judgment, will appreciate this completion

of the overall picture. In fact, it is difficult to find one's way through the most general ontological questions, if one does not have a truly comprehensive view of the domain in which possibility and actuality manifoldly and varyingly confront us. Whoever wants to forego this or is able to independently orient himself to the complex problematic of the spheres, can keep in mind the core alone (Part II, "The Modality of Real Being"). He obtains, at least, a self-contained picture of things that are ontologically of greater importance and, in general, philosophically fundamental. Whether he can then dispense with the comprehensive view and further justification, he must work out with his own philosophical conscience.

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Nicolai Hartmann

Introduction

1 Historical and Terminological Considerations

In the late Middle Ages, one understood by "mode" the particularity of a substance. In subsisting things, attributes were distinguished as constant and necessary, while modes were seen as changing and contingent determinations. The former were understood as essential parts and the latter as mere states of a substance. This meaning of "mode" was maintained in the philosophical systems of modern times based on a metaphysics of substance. In its time, this meaning prevailed with these dominant systems, falling along with them when critical thinking put an end to theories of substance. This meaning has nothing to do with the contemporary meaning of modality and may here be left to rest.

In contrast to this, later on in logic – probably not before the late eighteenth century – another meaning of the word "mode" developed. It pertained to a fourth dimension of the classification of judgment, in addition to quantity, quality, and relation. It emerges from the distinction between whether the judgment reveals a being-possible[1], a being as such, or a being-necessary. These three cases form the three "logical modes." The "modality of judgment" resides in their opposition.

One could be content with this, as long as the logically oriented theory of knowledge was the dominant, fundamental discipline in philosophy. Just as the ancient problem of being began to erupt once again – the first signs of which were already present in Hegelian logic – one also rediscovered in the content of judgment, a meaning of being, and that the modes of being must, consequently, underlie the modes of judgment. Thus, one now translated the modality of judgment back into a mode of being. In doing so, however, one simultaneously came up against the ancient problematic of possibility and actuality, which had accompanied ontological thought from its beginnings, or rather, had fundamentally governed it.

Hence, "modality of being" is a newly coined expression, although the subject matter itself is old. Its new guise did not suffice, because it was borrowed from the world of thought. The ancient content of the matter was no more sufficient for a new, broadened presentation of the problem than the knowledge of recent times has proven to be. First and foremost, the logical concept of actuality

1 [Translator's note]: In an effort to distinguish between "Sein" and "Seiende," "Sein" will be translated as "being." Depending on the context, "Seiende" will be translated primarily as "that which is," "what is," "that is", "particular being" or "a being."

collapsed when confronted by the hardness of the real. But the possibility of being also led back to an importance of the real situation, the airy structure of merely uncontradictory conceivabilites exhibiting only a distant resemblance to it. It was here that the ancient pair of categories, "potency and actuality," offered to fill those logical modes with the content of being. But it neither coincided with the underlying modal opposition of possibility and actuality nor provided space for the third, now advancing, ontological mode, necessity.

In these interferences of heterogeneous meanings and the sequences of problems behind them, which are still recognizable and no less heterogeneous, the field of research into the modality of being matured into a certain ripeness for decision, without yet having gained firmness in its foundations. By no means does the deficiency expressed here adhere solely to the state of the problem of modality. It adheres rather to the situation in all of ontology, and ultimately goes back to the obscurities in the concept of being, in the traditional theory of *essentia*, in the understanding of being-there and being-so, as well as in the givenness of real and ideal being. A new beginning could only be made, if clarity were brought to these points.[2]

Once this occurs, the way has at least been cleared. It has been shown that two different pairs of oppositions are found in the traditional opposition of *essentia* and *existentia*: the opposition of ideality and reality, on the one hand, and the opposition of being-there and being-so, on the other. The ways of being always adhere to the aspect of being-there. They are the particularizations or ways of being-there. But, now a third opposition appears along with the opposition of ways of being and the opposition of the aspects of being: the opposition of the modes of being. For within each way of being-there, there is in turn the difference between being-possible, being-actual, and being-necessary, as well as that between the corresponding negative modes, being-impossible, being-nonactual, and being-contingent. Depending on their spheres of being and their ways of being, these modes of being turn out very differently and show different lawfulness in their mutual relation.

The investigation of this relation is complex and must be conducted separately for each sphere of being. This holds true not only for the primary and independent spheres, but just as much so for the secondary spheres, i.e. for that of logic and that of knowledge. If in the history of philosophy, the problem

2 To create such clarity was the task of the first volume, *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie* (4th ed. 1965), whose four parts correspond to the points indicated.

of the modes of being had taken a linear course of development, then arguably such a complication could have been avoided. But after the investigation of this problem has taken a detour via logic and epistemology, and its control over the spheres of being is still incomplete, the necessity of unfurling the problem of modes in its whole breadth is revealed.

The necessity of such an intricate analysis already attests to the fact that even today it is difficult to separate an aspect of being, way of being, and mode of being. Nothing is more common in our day than the conflation of being-there and reality, reality and actuality. What is required for the purpose of ontology is not, however, confined to mere clarifications and differentiations. Rather, it is necessary to work out the positive relation holding sway between them. Only in this way can the investigation of the problem of "that which is as it is" [*das "Seiende als Seiendes"*] be properly served.

2 Aristotle and the Theory of Potency and Actuality

One can easily be deceived about the importance of such investigations. In stark contrast to ancient philosophy, the last century has judged there to hardly be any task here, much less has an attempt been made to deal with it. The beginnings lie at the pinnacle of Greek philosophy. They are instructive in more than one respect.

It is astonishing that in his theory of "that which is as it is" Aristotle made little use of the "ten categories" he had so carefully established and developed. Οὐσία [*ousia*, substance, being] surely stands at the center of the discussion, not as a principle that one applies, but rather as a complex tangle of the problem's threads to be unraveled. In order to untangle it, he introduces four other principles that have nothing to do with his categories. They turn out to be two pairs of oppositions: form and matter, potency and actuality. The first two are obviously of a constitutive nature, while the latter claim to be levels of modality.

The important thing in this case is that the analysis is carried out with nearly all of the weight of the ontological problem resting on the oppositional interplay of potency and actuality. Form and matter are static principles and becoming is not to be grasped in them; but it is in becoming that all of the real is comprehended. Aristotle regards form as an active, moving principle; but with this conception, he already oversteps the meaning of the being of form, and pushes "form" under an aspect of "*energeia*" that has its opposite not in matter but in "*dynamis*." It is no accident that the theory of Book Z in the *Metaphysics*, which seeks to construct the concrete real (σύνολον) [*synolon*, compound whole] from the interaction of form and matter, cannot be carried out without

the theory of *dynamis* [potentiality] and *energeia* [activity] from Book Θ, although it is by no means laid out in it. This relation was soon noticed by interpreters, but was not evaluated. The only substantive consequence to be taken from this amounts to the fact that already in Aristotelian metaphysics the modal principles prove themselves to be the truly fundamental ones. Potency and actuality have long been able to hold their own in the history of metaphysics, even after the dualism of form and matter has been ruptured. The latter had already occurred in Duns Scotus' principle of individuation; on the other hand, "potencies" were still the "capacities" of the soul in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "energies" – the activities of German Idealism.

Thus, the way of being of the real world was modally constructed from the outset. But of course, the principles of this construction were neither purely modal nor sufficient for the comprehension of becoming. This is shown most clearly in the double meaning of "*energeia*." On the one hand, it should be the moving principle of a thing, but on the other hand it should be the perfect thing, itself. In the former sense, the *eidos* [form, essence] is "pure *energeia*;" in the latter, it is the concrete individual case. Hand in hand with it goes the conception of the real process as actualization of an *eidos*. Given that this *eidos* is the energetic movement in the process, *energeia* itself thereby develops into an active principle of purpose that guides actualization, just as the predetermined purpose in consciousness guides action. And at the same time, *dynamis* develops into a state of being-planned-out [*Anlagezustand*], which is teleologically directed towards actualization.

It becomes evident that in this way the teleological structure of determination in the real processes is decided; and this alone would be sufficient to make such modal concepts untenable. But ontologically, another deficiency remains in them: they are not purely modal concepts at all. Potency, understood as plan, is not possibility, but the "determination to become something," and the immanent tendency to become this something. *Energeia*, however, is not actuality, but the fulfillment of this something; namely, in the double sense of the purpose, which was initially predetermined, but then also actualized. Within a limited process of becoming, it behaves as the beginning and end of becoming; namely, corresponding to the double meaning of *energeia*, so that this, as the driving force already presupposed in potency, is not present as actualized form until the final stage.

In this way the constitutive side of both principles clearly emerges. But even more important is the fact that the character of principles is lost. If the δυνάμει ὄν [*dynamei*, potentiality] and the ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν [*energeia*] are different stages of the process by means of which a particular being [*Seiendes*] proceeds, then their essence is rather that of states that detach from each other. And they

consequently enter a relation of mutual exclusion, which is not compatible with the character of modes of being. The potential particular being cannot simultaneously be actual, and the actual particular being cannot simultaneously be potential. Every particular being can only have either the one or the other state of being, but not both at the same time. *Dynamis* and *energeia* stand disjunctively to each other. They exclude each other. If one of the two must pertain to every particular being, then their relation is such that the whole world of the real stands divided into potential particular being and actual particular being.

3 The Division of the Real. The Ghostly Existence of Possibility

This is now a result that evokes a wealth of aporias. If *dynamis* and *energeia* were purely constitutively comprehended, i.e. if they meant nothing but phases of a thing's development, then this division of the real world could continue if need be. As a matter of fact, however, the modal opposition of possible and actual is, at least, still intended, which essentially changes the situation. For now "that which is" in the state of *dynamis* stands as a merely improper being, or a half-being, as it were. Thus, for example, the being of a seed is, in its way, not a fully-fledged being, but a hypothetical being of the plant, namely its mere being-planned-out. But since the life of a plant species consists in the steady oppositional interplay of the seed and the fully grown plant – both falling under the same *eidos* – this life of the species thus breaks down into two kinds of being, which never correspond, but continually alternate: a being-possible and a being-actual of the plant. All living things display these two kinds of being. And since Aristotle transfers these notions of the living to the whole of nature (to everything that has an internal principle of becoming, a φύσις [*physis*, nature]), the division between half-being and whole-being, in fact, cuts through the whole realm of the real.

This is a dualism of kinds of being that far outweighs a dualism of constitutive principles of being. "Form and matter" are still only elements in the construction of the world. They do not appear in isolation. *Dynamis* and *energeia*, on the other hand, stand alongside each other as separate states of the real. Of course, the true importance of being remains a matter of the actualized, and Aristotle's theory of the priority of *energeia* corresponds to this fact. But aside from the total state of the actualized, the world at any given moment is still full of the nonactualized; and insofar as this, in itself, has a modal meaning of the "possible" – insofar as it is something that can become actual or not become actual (since not everything that is potential has to become

actual) – there must be within the real world, alongside the actual, a large mass of the "merely possible," concerning which the decision as to its whereabouts must be delayed.

Thus, in the Aristotelian world the possible leads a kind of ghostly existence. Here, the freely wandering "possibilities" are something absolutely real. They mingle together as half-beings amidst the whole-being, pushing into its ranks, and are links in its connections and dependencies. This difficulty will not be remedied by proposing the priority of *energeia*, since *dynamis* will not thereby be dissolved into *energeia*, and will only be made dependent on it. If Aristotle had left the seed its own character of actuality, because it is just as much a real thing as a fully developed plant, then the case would be quite different and the dualism would fall away. But he does not do this, since he considers as actual only the actualization of *eidos*. The seed, however, does not have its own *eidos*, but only the *eidos* of the plant, and this *eidos* is not actualized in it.

Is this real world, in which we live, actually such that in it, half-being stands next to particular being as a being-between, so to speak, of being and nonbeing? Is it true that the planned-out systems through which organisms reproduce do not have their own actuality, but only a suspended being-possible in indeterminateness? And even if this should be so, is this being-possible then transmitted to the great mass of inorganic, particular being, which likewise arises and vanishes? Should one perhaps understand determinate stages of movement or change (φορά and ἀλλοίωσις) [*phora* and *alloiosis*] as their "plan-phases," according to a kind of seed? Must one not seek everywhere the final stages according to which those phases must be "planned?" This produces a completely skewed picture of the majority of physical processes. Here, all the more, the stages of the process have entirely the same kind of being, with no difference in their rank or constancy or volatility. They are all equally "actual" – having the same being-actual as the flow of the process as a whole – and for that very reason they are all equally "possible." For if they were not possible, they could not be actual either.

If one looks closer, then one finds in the Aristotelian determinations a picture of the world that has no place for true becoming. This is astonishing enough, since, then again, one cannot fail to recognize that for Aristotle it is a matter of the determination of becoming. One must keep in mind, however, that in the dualism of *dynamis* and *energeia*, there is only one mode for the beginning stage of the process and one for the final stage – both of which are understood as static conditions – but no mode for the process itself, the moving forward, the flow. The state of *dynamis* lies "before" the process, and the state of *energeia* "after" the process. The process as such comes away empty-handed.

Since the process is the basic categorial form of the real – not therefore a transition from being to being, but the manner in which things, living organisms, humankind, etc. behave in being-there – the Aristotelian conception represents a misunderstanding of real being. The weight here rests completely on the statically understood principles of form that are "actualized" in the process; but the process only plays the role of a transition.[3]

Clearly, this conception of process cannot be maintained. It has already been breached by Aristotle, himself. But the coined determinations have outlived his system. They have, up to the present day, governed the problem of modality in the realm of ontological thought, and have hindered the emergence of a purer conception of possibility and actuality.

4 The Future and the "Multitude of Possibilities"

The effect that the modal principles of Aristotle had in antiquity and in the Middle Ages will not be pursued here.[4] In the following centuries, potency and actuality did not remain true to the original meaning of *dynamis* and *energeia*, although the teleological-constitutive element in them was maintained. And this was too deeply rooted in the metaphysical conceptions of the Western world for a fundamental revision of modal concepts to occur.

For the problem of being, virtually everything depends on how the concept of possibility is understood. As long as being-possible was understood as the state of being of "potency," one had to maintain the division of the real, and consequently at the same time also the conception of a half-being, indeterminate or undecided, that exists alongside the actual. The more this conception established itself, the more it freed itself from its ideological foundation and from an orientation toward the organic. One transferred it from the actual plan-systems (whose prototype is the seed) to the general construction of the

3 This attests to the extreme difficulty that Aristotle has with the formulation of κὶνησις: *Physics γ*, 201 a 10: ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια ᾗ τοιοῦτον κίνησίς ἐστιν. This definition amounts to a contradiction, for according to the presuppositions, a δυνάμει ὄν "as such" cannot have the kind of being of ἐντελέχεια [*entelecheia*]. The fundamental determinations are, therefore, breached. Compare this to, 201 b 27 f.: κίνησις [*kinesis*] arises neither in δύναμις [*dynamis*] nor in ἐνέργεια [*energeia*], it requires an ἐνέργεια ἀτελής [*energeia ateles*], which *ex. def.* is a "wooden iron" [i.e. a contradiction]. This is an important consequence, for κίνησις is not "movement" alone, but every kind of progress; i.e. it is "process" in general.?

4 It is a complicated subject, which has recently been comprehensively discussed by August Faust, in *Der Möglichkeitsgedanke*, 2 Vol., Heidelberg 1931/32.

real world. And now it seemed, as had certainly not been intended by Aristotle, that there must be many more possible things than actual things in the world, since every present stage leaves open a multiplicity of "possibilities" for the future, only one of which ever becomes actual. Hence, that which has become actual always had to represent a choice from a much wider region of the possible.

Only through this widening of perspective does the concept of "possibilities," spreading themselves out freely in the field of the real, gain a universal meaning. Every stage of the process is now an incalculably multifold possible; namely, the further it relates to the future, the more of an actual, incalculably multifold possible it is. Then again, as for the actual, it shrinks in its total state, becoming much slighter and poorer. The ghostly world of the "merely possible" besieges it on all sides and overruns its content. This is the aspect that one sees in the future when going about everyday human life: there are "one's possibilities," that lie within one, and from which one thinks one can choose this possibility or another. Indeed, speculative thought confers this aspect to the Deity who, at the beginning of time, chooses one world to create from among all "possible worlds."

This wide realm of the possible is, by no means, meant as merely the "conceivable." It is not that thoughtless "everything possible" that can also mean "everything imaginable." Nor is it meant as the existence of this possible in an airy realm of essences without reality – as in the Leibnizian notion of "possible worlds" before the world's creation. Rather, it is meant as something that belongs in the midst of real things, events, situations, living organisms, etc. but which is not yet actual – and from which the greater part never becomes actual. It envisions the anticipatory consciousness as a being-planned-out in the present, but without an actual plan that would be there as an entity, and of course also without any guarantee that the "planned-out" in it will ever become actual.

If one thinks of a being-planned-out, as not exhibited in any entity and itself fleetingly becoming something different from moment to moment, then no account of what a being-planned-out is supposed to be has been given. But if one considers that not even the power to guide the process is meant here, then all being-planned-out of such a kind becomes illusory. What remains is not much more than the simple dependence of the later on the earlier. Such a dependence is a slap in the face of the presuppositions already made, because it means anything but a standing open of many "possibilities."

And it now, in fact, becomes quite questionable what it actually has to do with the "being-possible" in these "possibilities." One is apparently not given any account of why most of them are quite impossible and only the perfunctory ones appear in any real givenness, binding thoughts as "possibilities." Looked

at more closely, such superficial thinking occurs most frequently in abstraction and is not the ordinary way of thinking in practical life. We generally have only vague knowledge of the wide-reaching conditionality of true being-possible in the real connections of the moment. Truly, we know that not everything we envision as "possible" is possible in reality. And, indeed, we are careful to be aware of this, even when envisioning those "possibilities" – without the one abolishing the other, and without having to gain from this even the slightest hint as to which of the envisioned possibilities could claim to be an actual real possibility. We have no complete knowledge of the situation, but the experienced person may very well know, in general, that he does not have this knowledge.

Even the simplest reflection reveals that here a distinction must be made between envisioned possibility and real possibility. The former rightly claims the wide range for a multitude of "possibilities," but does not withstand the traditional claim to reality. On the other hand, the latter proves itself to be strictly related to a series of real conditions, and thereby develops into an expression of a real relation. Both kinds of being-possible have consequently shed the traditional character of being a "state of that-which-is."

Of course, it cannot be so quickly decided whether or not the ghostly being-there of the "merely possible" in the real sphere dissolves into empty appearance. After all, another realm of the possible has been revealed, in which it could very well belong. Whether or not this is the case, depends on a series of other matters.

5 An Overview of the Aporias in the Ancient Concept of Possibility

The aporias that are conjured up by the traditional concept of possibility constitute a long series of controversies, at least some of which have been fought through over time. Most of them are so closely linked to the teleological metaphysics of the Middle Ages (and even still, to the systems of recent times) that they hardly concern us anymore. The only important ones are those that lie in the essence of the thing, i.e. in the conception of the modes as "states" of being. They can be extracted from the above discussion and enumerated in the following manner.

1. The possible as true *dynamis* "toward something" or being-planned-out "in something" assumes a preexistence of the "something," in which it is planned out. Since this preexistence is not real being, it must have either

another way of being or no being whatsoever. In the latter case, it is illusory. In the former case, it oversteps the sphere of being (the sphere of the real), whose modes are involved. In both cases, however, there cannot be within the real world a particular being "apart from" an actual particular being.

2. The possible as half-being within the real has the unfortunate tendency to waver intangibly between being and nonbeing. It is therefore liable to the ancient Eleatic aporia, which concerned becoming, as long as it was understood as the transition from nonbeing to being and vice versa (arising and vanishing – from nothingness and into nothingness). Ontologically, this yielded no unequivocal meaning, because transition itself, becoming, is the real's continuous form of being.
3. If the possible, however, is a merely ideal being (essence, *eidos*, form transcending temporality), then in its sphere – in the realm of essence – it is entirely actual, but in the real sphere it is consequently neither actual nor possible; for many real conditions would belong to its real being-possible, all of which would have to be actually present. Thus, it is not possible in either sphere.
4. If one understands it, however, from the given concrete real situation in the determinate present as the future, then one encounters that plurality of simultaneously open "possibilities," from which only one ever reaches actualization. It remains incomprehensible what differentiates the others from this one, proving them "impossible" in due course.
5. In this respect, the general conception of the possible remains an indeterminate or undecided thing, waiting for its whereabouts to be decided. But aside from the nonsense that the real world is burdened in this way by an overabundance of the undecided and the indeterminate – which does not at all correspond to the findings – there still remains the particular aporia: from where should the decisive factor come?

There are more severe difficulties that cannot be overcome without making blatantly metaphysical presuppositions. Ontology must refrain from making such presuppositions, however. Indeed the suspicion is close at hand that these difficulties, for their part, are already the consequences of metaphysical presuppositions and therefore represent artificial, self-made aporias. This suspicion becomes even stronger when one sees how they take effect in the concept of actuality. Namely, if an actual thing is merely that which may be considered as actualization of a predetermined *eidos*, then most things, events, situations – indeed, most of what is fleeting, ephemeral, a mere transitional – have sunk into the nonactual. With such a concept of actuality, at best one can comprehend the

typically recurring shapes of living things, but not the great mass of things that continually turn out differently in the ceaseless intersecting of events.

There is an age-old experience of philosophical thought: whatever is naively placed in the concept of possibility emerges quite dramatically in the concept of actuality, and whatever is left out of the concept of possibility avenges itself on one's understanding of actual life. It is therefore no accident that the attempt has been made, time and time again, to somehow grasp the internal relatedness of the two modes. Thus, at the crux of the matter lies the question: how does the possible become actual? Or, how does half-being become whole-being? How does the ideal become real? How does the future become the present, the indeterminate become the determinate, the undecided become the decided?

During the Middle Ages, there were many attempts to answer these questions. Most of them returned to the Aristotelian priority of *energeia*. But one thereby had either to make *dynamis* into a kind of latent state of *energeia* or to seek the impetus for actualization in a force outside of the world – a creative reason, a will, a predetermination. In both cases, there are prohibitive metaphysical assumptions. Later, in Wolffian ontology, we still find this problem in its ancient insolubility as the problem of a *complementum possibilitatis*. But this new concept is merely a newly cloaked perplexity.

Such a fundamental problem is clearly not to be overcome by these means. Rather, there is a need to revise the beginnings from which it originates. But, for this purpose, we must turn back to a time before Aristotle.

6 The Megarian Concept of Possibility and its Fate in the History of Philosophy

There are two questions on which everything else depends. The first question concerns the new coinage of the concept of possibility: is there not a simple meaning of being-able-to-be that would have nothing to do with being planned-out and aiming at, which in far greater generality would hold true for all real relations, and which would therefore be demonstrable in the same way for all becoming and having become?

But the second question is this: is the modal structure of the real exhausted by the oppositional interplay of the two modes? Is there not still another modality of being involved here – a modality of being, through which all halfness, indeterminateness, and indecision would be allowed to reach wholeness, and all searching for the impetus of actualization would become superfluous?

This second question leads to the introduction of necessity. It has taken a detour via logic. It is to be dealt with straight away. Although hardly any

breakthrough has been reached concerning the first question even in our time, it has had an ancient and venerable prelude. It must be discussed first. –

The main difficulty here clearly involves possibility's becoming-independent. It is in it, as a state of particular being apart from a state of actuality, that the sources of error must lie, and along with this, the source of all inconsistencies. For that reason, it is a question of whether being-possible may be regarded as a "state" apart from other states of "that which is," and indeed whether the modes of being are correctly understood as states of "that which is" – thus, of the real, first and foremost. They could also be structural elements of the ways of being; then they would not appear separated, but would be connected in each and every particular being, constituting the ways of being through the kind of connection they have. Their relation would then not be mutually exclusive, like that of the ways of being (ideality and reality), but would rather be a relation of mutual supplementation, like that of the "aspects of being" (being-there and being-so).

This last relation is very likely to solve the whole aporia with one fell swoop. But if one searches for it in the history of philosophy, one finds only faint traces. Independent, Aristotelian possibility prevails almost without exception. And where the thought of another relation emerges, it takes effect unreliably and is hardly noticed.

But the astonishing thing is that such a notion was already there at the beginning of ontological thought. Indeed, the Aristotelian theory of *dynamis* and *energeia* was already in opposition to it, having developed directly through polemics against it. And it is no less astonishing that it was completely misjudged in its time, probably even by its own originators and advocates. Although it was clearly formulated, neither its essence nor its consequences were understood. Under such circumstances, it is very understandable that it was thereafter completely supplanted by the immense authority of Aristotle.

It was the Megarian school that, in pursuance of Eleatic doctrine, established the principle that "only the actual is possible."[5] This holds true particularly for the aspect of the future: it is a contradiction that from a determinate state of things in the present, many different kinds of things may be possible; if these many kinds of things thereafter prove themselves to be impossible, then they cannot have been possible from the outset. Only the one thing that subsequently becomes actual was possible. The possible is therefore only that which is either actual or will be actual.

5 This Megarian thesis will be further dealt with below in another connection (Chap. 22). The authoritative position is Aristotle, *Metaphysics Θ* 1046 b 29 f.

Diodorus Cronus, who gave the principle this form, has placed himself in the wrong as regards his contemporaries as well as posterity; namely, through the demanding kind of sophistical play of concepts, as he advocated it, and through the conclusion that he drew from it. He wanted to prove, in accordance with Zeno's way of thinking, the impossibility of becoming and the immobility of all being. Neither he, himself, nor any of his contemporaries recognized this proof as fallacious; from the principle that only the actual is possible, something of this kind cannot at all follow – because it concerns possible events, just as much as possible things or substances. An error in the Megarian theory lay here from the very beginning. It is inconsequential today, because, in any case, a static view of the world no longer convinces anyone. But in its time, this error fatefully led to the misunderstanding of an insight that was ahead of its time.

This insight – the school named it the κυριεύων λόγος (the master argument) – was nothing less than the abolition of the popular idea of possibility and the introduction of possibility as a strict, ontological concept. Here, being-possible is not grasped as a "state" of "that which is" apart from that of being-actual, but rather as a modal aspect contained and presupposed in being-actual. Here, there is no independent possibility, no "merely possible," no divided real world, no half-being next to being, no indeterminate, and no incalculable manifold of suspended possibilities. The possible is only ever that which becomes actual; everything else is absolutely impossible. This signifies the principle: the possible is only that which is actual.

Neither the scope of this principle nor its actual meaning and grounding can be presupposed here. This requires further sounding out and must be reserved for a later investigation. For the principle is paradoxical – it is a slap in the face of the familiar concepts. If it is true, then it must be truly revolutionary. But then it might also be worthy of a quite different sort of proof than that offered by Diodorus Cronus. For the time being, it comes down to the fact that since antiquity there has been another concept of possibility aside from the Aristotelian concept of *dynamis*, a concept of possibility that avoids these aporias.

Only one of these aporias shall be noted here. This concept of possibility had been objected against earlier, the allegation being raised that it lets possibility and actuality coincide, and thereby abolishes the difference between the modes. It is thought that if the possible and the actual coincide, then the being-possible of a thing must be the same as its being-actual. A quite primitive conceptual error has crept in here, however. If I say, "only the living dies," then everyone understands that living and dying are not thereby posited as identical, but rather that they only coincide at their periphery. Since things are not "dying," death has, in effect, only life in it. This is not a contradiction, although life has in it the opposite of itself.

Thus, the possible may also very well have being-actual in it (and vice versa), without the one conflicting with the other; but also, without possibility and actuality becoming identical.

7 The Modality of Judgment and the Third Mode

From its beginnings, ontology has been closely tied to logic. Indeed, it has been hardly to be distinguished from it. Aristotle most certainly did not produce this connection, rather he sought a distinction to level against it; this benefitted his *Analytics*, but only partially came through in his *Metaphysics*.

While later logic slowly detached itself from the problem of being, the difference between the modes of judgment and the modes of being also announced itself. The *possibile logicum* as *modus compositions* in the intellect is opposed to the *possibile reale*, which is grounded in a *potentia in re*.[6] And since the conception of the other modes depends on how one conceives of possibility, the delimitation is transferred to these modes. The concepts of the logical modes were thereby promptly stabilized, while the ontological modes were kept in suspense by their internal aporias and did not come to a rest.

The logical sphere has the peculiarity that everything in it appears removed from becoming and elevated into a sort of timelessness. The relation of the modal levels is thereby simplified in the logical sphere, and thus it comes about that firstly in logic, a clarified overall picture and an unequivocal concept of "modality" is developed. The modes here are not gradations of being, but gradations of the validity of judgment; at least, this is the historically predominant, basic meaning of their difference, and everything here amounts to it. It is maintained, by and large, even if it has not always hit the mark in the determination of its concepts.

Moreover, it is in the logical field that the ranking of necessity in the hierarchy of modes is first carried out. This results from the stringency with which the conclusion follows from the premises in logical forms of inference. It is this fact that caused the reaction of the modality of judgment to the modal analysis of being in the first place. –

Traditional logic sets up modality as a fourth dimension of the classification of judgment, alongside quantity, quality, and relation of judgment. Understood

6 Thus, Duns Scotus (*Sent*. I. D. 2 *quaest*. 7). Apart from that, the conceptions of the *possibile logicum* in Scholasticism very well agree, while the conceptions of the *possibile reale* diverge markedly from one another.

in this manner, it had even gained a certain popularity. One distinguishes the "problematic" judgment from the "assertoric," on the one hand, and the "assertoric" from the "apodictic," on the other. The "S is P" is plainly expressed in assertoric judgment without any gradation of certainty; in problematic judgment, it is expressed as uncertain; and in apodictic judgment, it is set down as certain. The uncertainty expresses a being-possible, and the certainty expresses a being-necessary; between the two, the expression "plainly" ["*schlechthin*"], stands as that of being-actual.

Insofar as an essential part of the original meaning of modality is retained in this differentiation, the content of judgment remains untouched by it, and only the kind of validity is gradated. But the names of the modes imply something more; they point beyond the naked kind of validity. This is most clearly seen in the term "apodictic." Its original meaning is not expressed as "unshakeable," but as "proven." Apodeixis is even called "proof." If one takes this in a strict sense, then the validity of the apodictic thereby obtains a relativized meaning: the proven, precisely because it is proven, is conditioned by the premises of the syllogism; whether these themselves are also proven, the syllogism gives us no assurance. But if they are proven, then they depend on further premises. This regression continues *ad infinitum*. Nowhere does it find a starting point that could itself have the character of the logically apodictic. And this means: apodicticity is relative from the ground up; it has an "if – then" form, and is not strict necessity. Furthermore, it is not the pure validity-mode of "S is P", but is just as much a structural mode of its connections with other judgments. Actual necessity – namely, logical necessity – therefore does not belong to the judgment that is "apodictically" expressed, but only belongs to the "if – then" itself, which is the form of its conditionality. Logically speaking, however, this form is a form of the relation of judgment, the "hypothetical."

This in no way means a devaluation of logical necessity, and most certainly not a devaluation of logical modality. On the contrary, in this simple consideration a first indication is given that the modes of judgment, like the modes of being, are basically something other than they have traditionally been considered to be.

8 The Modality of Validity and its Background

It is not much different with the original meaning of the "problematic." "Problem" does not mean uncertainty. Rather it means questionability and being worthy of questioning. All questions now rest on something known and somehow valid, through which, above all, a knowledge of the unknown is made possible.

The question anticipates the judgment, but only for valid judgments. It is the logical form of that which has not yet been comprehended by judgment in the connection of judgments. It has therefore the same relativity to prejudgment as the conclusion.

The consequence is: the problematic adheres just as little to a single judgment as to the apodictic. It has the form of relation, of connection, of conditionality. In this respect, there is found in it a mode of validity that is not pure, but that is connected to an aspect of structure and to the dependency of judgment.

However, even if one disregards this impact of the content-related and constitutive, a certain nonactuality still remains in the conception of the modality of judgment – namely, insofar as it concerns the ways of validity and not the ways of being. Validity as such is not to be detached from "what it is for." One may understand it subjectively as validity for the perceiver, for a time, for a state of knowledge, for a society, or objectively as validity for a range of cases. In both instances, validity means only the being-recognized, and the being-true, respectively, but not the mode of judgment itself.

In order to avoid this, one can develop a particular concept of specific "logical validity," as has been attempted in many cases. But one only masters the difficulty if one actually fulfills this concept of validity through something demonstrable, i.e. if one grounds the concept on a logical, fundamental phenomenon. This in turn can be achieved in no other way than by exposing the meaning of being in judgment, as it is evident in the "is" of the copula.

This being – logical predicative being – is a very subordinate and dependent way of being; it is a being only in the occurring statement, thus only borne by thought, which can claim no independent place aside the primary ways of being (reality and ideality). But it in no way arises in the subjectivity of the act of judgment; on the contrary, it elevates the content of judgment to a very definite objectivity, and by virtue of this objectivity, the meaning of a judgment exists independent of the judging subject. This relation is well known in logic, although its proponents have seldom been in a position to sufficiently comprehend it. They have almost always misjudged the character of being in the copula – either overlooking it, or taking it too lightly.

The connection of the logical to the ontological, however, belongs to this character of being. These are relations of being "evaluated" in judgments. And this predicative being is now what varies in the modal levels of judgment. Only this variation, and not the variation of validity, directly expresses judgment. The naked "being" in the copula of assertoric judgment confronts a being-possible and a being-necessary, a "being-able-to-be" and a "having-to-be." These ontological differences are purely modal; they constitute the

particular nature of "problematic" and "apodictic" judgment. This is what these names are unable to express. They are, purely logically, no closer to being understood. Indeed, purely logically, they are not unequivocally satisfiable. Their proper meaning is an ontological one, and it is to this meaning that the modality of judgment refers.

This is the reason why one cannot remain with the modes of judgment in order to understand the modes of being. One may very well be led from the former to the latter as the underlying modes; but if one is to push through to the modes of being, then one must comprehend these modes as they are in themselves and as always being in a certain opposition to logical modality. The fact that for such a long time logic was clung to by epistemology, and by ontology as well, has been a source of considerable error for both sciences.

9 The Modality of Knowledge and the Degrees of Certainty

Epistemology must have savored the consequences of this confusion to the very end. For there are modes of judgment, just as there are modes of knowledge, and they must be distinguished from the latter just as precisely as knowledge is distinguished from judgment. It is a different matter whether I recognize something as possible or as actual or as necessary. Of course, attained knowledge takes the form of judgment, but it is not judgment. In any case, one would not have been permitted to take its modes from the modes of judgment. It was the intellectualism of a one-sided, logically oriented theory of knowledge that was to blame for such a form of extraction.

Kant, who borrowed his whole table of categories from the table of judgments, also adopted the modes of judgment with the analytic of principles. Thus, came into being his "postulates of empirical thought," which are a gradation of certainty. In their succession, they imitate the logical levels of validity. They have thereby continued to be a model right up to the present. But their meaning, as the name "postulate" already implies, is purely methodological. The primary meaning of the modality of knowledge has thus been increasingly lost. But even the logical meaning has not been rigorously retained. Within certain limits, degrees of validity must be transferable into degrees of certainty. But the postulates only indirectly present degrees of certainty. They are primarily something else.

Kant indicates their difference quite clearly as a difference of relation. For he defines them through their "connection" or "coming to agreement." This depends on whether the content of knowledge agrees with the aprioristic in

knowledge, or with the aposterioristic, or with both. In the first case, it is recognized as possible, in the second case as actual, and in the third case as necessary.

One cannot dispute that it may very well be in this that differences of certainty are rooted. The deep-rootedness itself, however, is not a degree of certainty; it is obviously something quite different. For if it is agreement – regardless of with what – then it is relatedness, and is an aspect of structure, a determinateness, and therefore something constitutive. But it should not be this directly, because the constitutive is the general categorial opposition to the modal.

And even if there were pure levels of certainty, would the gradation of certainty then hold true for the levels of the modality of knowledge? Is then the knowledge that something "can be" – i.e. knowledge of possibility – a less certain knowledge than the knowledge that something "is?" Or should it perhaps be a matter of a "merely possible knowledge?" Obviously not! This knowledge is just as certain (or uncertain), and in it another knowledge is merely recognized, namely, the knowledge that something "can be." This is, of course, less than understanding that it "is." But it is not a difference in certainty; it is a modal difference in the content of knowledge, and must be understood as such.

The content of knowledge, however, together with its modality, can once again be graded according to degrees of certainty. One may be sure or unsure of the being-able-to-be, just as much as of the having-to-be. The levels of certainty of understanding are something different from the modes of knowledge; indeed, the latter remain indifferent toward them. Being-possible and being-necessary can be graded according to their certainty not only into three levels, but unlimitedly and diversely. However, these levels are not identical to their mutual opposition. Neither are they identical to the opposition to understanding of being-actual.

If one recognizes the consequence of this, then one sees not only that the postulates yield no degrees of certainty, and that the degrees of certainty are not modes of knowledge, but also that the actual and true modes of knowledge are referred back to the modes of being. What this comes down to is precisely the difference between knowledge of being-able-to-be, of being, and of having-to-be. But this is something quite different from what is said by the Kantian definitions. This kind of difference is not relational, nor is it a difference of certainty. It is only able to be understood in terms of the differences of being – therefore, epistemologically speaking, in terms of the object of knowledge.

As long as the modes of being have not been worked out, the associated ways of knowledge are not able to be grasped. This is why no strict modal concepts have been worked out even in the field of knowledge.

10 The Metaphysical Notion of Necessity

The Aristotelian disposition allowed only a duality of levels of being. Aside from the aporias of *dynamis*, this is its main deficiency. It is responsible for this, partly due to the teleology of *eidos*, in which a disguised kind of necessity is already presupposed, and partly due to the habit in antiquity of philosophizing through oppositions. Potency and actuality formed a self-contained oppositional relation, which did not appear to require elaboration, as long as the power of determination of *eidos* was not doubted. From the point of view of *dynamis*, what can there be, still further beyond *energeia*? *Energeia* is already the fulfillment or completion (ἐντελέχεια) of everything that can possibly appear in a planned-out state.

One could very well have consistently applied necessity to their conceptual relation.[7] But it seemed superfluous to place it next to those two, because their opposition did not require a third – indeed, it did not even allow for one. Only the (aforementioned) aporias of *dynamis* could have revealed another one here. But they were not developed. And thus the question remained open as to how the indeterminateness of being-possible is in fact brought to determination, and how its indecision is in fact brought to decision. It is this, the second of those remaining questions, that the traditional concept of possibility left unresolved. The answer to it lies in rupturing the ancient scheme of opposition, and in introducing the mode of necessity.

As long as the actuality-potency theory flourished, attempts to properly rank this third mode encountered insurmountable difficulties. Neither logic nor epistemology had carried enough weight to allow the character of a mode of being to be clearly recognized in *necessitas*; neither the mode of validity nor the mode of certainty seemed to require a corresponding mode of being. Indeed, even after necessity had long since been grasped in its own ontic nature, one was reluctant to place it in a series with potency and actuality. And it must be added that, in its own way, this reluctance was justified, since necessity did not truly belong beside these two. It belongs with both the pure possibility of being and the actuality of being, but these are not potency and actuality. However, the power of the ever more urgent problem of necessity did not extend so far that it could have led to a basic clearing away of ancient modal concepts.

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7 One may compare this to the definition of ἀναγκαῖον [*anagkaion*] by Aristotle, *Metaphysics Δ* 1015 a 34 f.: τὸ ην ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν. Corresponding exactly to this is the Scholastic definition: *quod non potest non esse*.

Meanwhile, the concept of necessity had maintained a special kind of existence in metaphysical thought ever since antiquity. Wherever a unitary principle of the origin of the world dominates metaphysical thought, the concept of necessity appears alongside the problem of δυνατόν [*dynaton*, capacity, capability], almost untouched by it and temporally preceding it. The concept of necessity is then the expression of the continuous dependency of all things on principle, regardless of whether this principle is an "indeterminate" (ἄπειρον) or a very determinate principle of order, of harmony, or of reason (λόγος). In this form it can be traced back, without much explanation, to the χρεών [*chreon*, fate, necessity] of Anaximander. Heraclitus and Parmenides, as differently as they viewed the cosmos, were both familiar with such a principle: the whole of cohesive necessity.

Fixed form acquired necessity in the teachings of the Stoics. Here, everything depends on a divine *logos* in the world, from which events and destinies are predetermined. For that reason, ἀνάγκη [*anagke*, necessity] appears as πρόνοια and εἱμαρμένη (providence and fate). This is not a pure modal concept of necessity, but is rather a constitutive appendage of such a thing. And, within very modest limits, it is perfectly sufficient to disprove the multiplicity of possibilities and thereby at the same time the always disjunctively appearing *dynamis*. The *logos* dwells in all of "that which is;" it is the internal destiny of all things. And there is no power in the world that can stand up against it.

Neo-Platonism connected this theory with the idea of emanation. This gave it a form that presented the Christian philosophy of the Patristics and Scholastics with a welcome tool for implementing their concept of God.

It is, however, characteristic of this theory that its concept of necessity remained very close to the Aristotelian concept of *dynamis*. The Stoic *logos* is represented as the "seed" in all individual beings; thus, in them, it plays the role of a "plan." Only insofar as the harmony of the whole world spreads over the individual being is this plan, with its destiny, included in the larger connection. The ἀνάγκη is therefore only perceptible insofar as it constitutes this being-included and is external necessity.

This is, of course, an essential difference from Aristotle. The theory of *eidos* gave each thing its own internal principle, which "can" in each case either be actualized or not be actualized. In this respect, the plan stands here without necessity, i.e. without decision to become-actual. In the worldview of the Stoics, on the other hand, and especially in Neo-Platonism, the unity of determining providence covers it. It completes the indeterminate, and decides the undecided. If it is translated without reduction into Christian concepts, and is referred to the relation of God and man, then it immediately becomes Augustinian predestination.

11 Natural Law and the Necessity of Being

Clearly, the metaphysical notion of necessity undertakes too much. It wants to show immediately that everything that "is" in the world is necessary; furthermore, it presupposes that the teleological form of determination is continuous and fully sovereign. The latter has proven itself to be untenable ever since the very beginning of modern natural science; it is, moreover, a thesis that reaches far beyond the modal problem. On the other hand, even if the former is true, it cannot be proven in this manner.

First of all, only necessity was to be placed next to possibility and actuality as a mode of being. And this is precisely what this metaphysics of providence was unable to do. For the relation of potency and actuality remained unexplained in it. Thus, necessity could only move to its natural position after the traditional metaphysics of nature and its teleological concept of necessity had fallen.

It is, accordingly, a crucial boundary that causes the strict concept of law to emerge. It is the meaning of natural law to have strict universal and indestructible validity in all particular cases that, according to their nature, fall within its domain. This means that in the particular case itself, certain features cannot fail to appear. Here, necessity consequently means not that something predetermined (an *eidos*) must come to actualization, but that an indissoluble connection exists between the features of a thing (of an event, of a process, of a situation) or even between whole groups of features, which may be very different in content; so that if the one appears, the others cannot fail to appear.

This understanding of necessity is not entirely new. Aristotle's formula "τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν" fits it quite well. But it is still something different, if understood in this manner, the necessity is now moved to its natural position: as the counterpart to possibility. It is thereby interposed into the old, familiar oppositional interplay of potency and actuality. And since it does not fit into this, the opposition is ruptured – as are the concepts of potency and actuality along with it.

It had always been understood that an impetus, a moment of decision, is necessary for a potential to become actual. It had merely not been sought in a modal component. It could be sought in the higher power of world reason, but the clarification of internal relations would thereby be renounced. It could also be sought in "chance" (*contingentia*); but then a second principle would be placed alongside the principle of form, which was intended to be the directing aspect of actualization. With contingency as a principle, *eidos* was invalidated. In the concept of *eidos*, a kind of necessity was already present, even if it was only a partial-necessity, hidden behind the image of a purposeful, moving

power. Such hiddenness allows one to understand how this inner partiality could remain latent over the course of so many centuries.

The concept of law is at first a concept of form, and has historically developed from the latter. But it differentiates itself so substantially from the Aristotelian-Scholastic concept of form that it initially appears to us to be its opposite. Law is not moving form, not final principle; it is, in the first place, not the form of a thing, but the form of a process. And precisely because it is not a moving form, it can be the form of movement itself. These all are things widely discussed, which do not need to be established here. But as a direct consequence of these new determinations, another aspect of the modal problem becomes important: law distinguishes itself from substantial form by the ripening for decision of the aspect of necessity. Only here is necessity detached and freed from all speculative burdens – from teleological and theological schemata alike – developing into neutral necessity, in which the essential thing is not the particular form of not-being-able-to-be-otherwise, but the not-being-able-to-be-otherwise itself. Only in this way is the basic modal shape of necessity first attained. It clearly announces itself in what is now an unmistakable opposition to possibility. A merely possible thing is that which can be otherwise; but a necessary thing is that which cannot be otherwise.

This formulation clearly avoids all predecision not only about the nature of determination, but also about the scope of the necessary in the realm of particular being. Here, it is not presupposed, as it is in theories of providence, that everything that exists is necessary. Strictly speaking, it does not even presuppose that there is anything necessary at all. It only comes to light that, wherever it may be found, being-necessary is something different from being-possible and being-actual; it is, a new mode of being alongside them – deliberately distinguished from all sheer validity and from degrees of certainty; for something may very well "be" necessary that is not considered to be necessary. And vice versa.

This turn of events signifies nothing less than the onset of the historical ripening of the whole problem of modality. As long as one saw actuality as the counterpart of possibility, one could in no way purely grasp its categorial character. For that reason, it appeared to be potency. If, as previously suggested, one takes it to be the counterpart to necessity, then the character of potency and all of its irresolvable difficulties fall away at once. The aspect of pushing ahead to actualization crosses over into necessity and is separated from *dynamis*; what remains is pure being-possible.

At the same time, the modal meaning of actuality becomes clear. The equivocation in the concept of *energeia* is dissolved. Actuality is no longer completion, nor is it the being-actualized of a predetermined *eidos*. Thus, it does not

emerge twice – once at the beginning and once at the end of the process. It now simply means the being-there of each particular being in its place in the spatial-temporal world – unaffected by the difference between being completed and being uncompleted, and indifferent to whether it is a continuous event, a fleeting stage of a process, or a relatively stable thing. The character of actuality, the activity of "setting to work" ["*Ins-Werk-Setzen*"] (ἐνεργεῖν), which was taken from the analogy of human "acting" ["*Wirken*"], has merged into necessity. What remains is pure being-actual as such.

Thus, it at least holds the intention of transformation, beginning with the concept of law. Transformation is historical and is not brought about all at once. For the thinkers of modern times, the concept of actuality, with its many names and transformations, has long led a merely apparent existence. This is well known from the Hegelian philosophy of history, which only acknowledged as historically "actual" the actualization of the "Idea" (a substantial, active, spiritual principle), whereby the greater part of humanity, events, and private destinies is left "nonactual," falling back into the rubble of history. The metaphysical violence of the teleological concept of actuality is perhaps nowhere more shockingly evident than in this late exaggeration. The ontological categorial problem of modality has moved beyond it.

12 The Superordination of Necessity and the Principle of Sufficient Reason

It is on the basis of being positioned in opposition to possibility that the mode of necessity is included. This oppositional positioning is something internal and natural – visible in the categorial relation of the modes themselves. It immediately becomes evident, if possibility is negated. Negated possibility is "impossibility." But impossibility, for its part, falls under the genus of necessity; it is necessity of nonbeing. On the other hand, if the necessity of being is negated, then possibility is obtained: whatever is not necessary is "able" to be, but is also "able" not to be. This dual being-able is possibility.

In this intermodal relation, necessity and possibility enter into a direct, oppositional connection. Actuality remains neutral toward both, as a "plain being" in which neither being-possible nor being-necessary is directly visible. In this neutrality, the actual of experience customarily arises and serves as a foundation for the appearance of the contingent in it.

If one closely considers this internal relation, then one finds that the notion of law does not do it justice. Natural lawfulness involves a similarity of circumstances, of sequences of events; it is a type of process. But this is not the actual

meaning of real necessity. Real necessity is, in itself, quite indifferent toward the similarity or dissimilarity of cases. For real necessity it is not essential that the individual case fall under a schema or that it somehow be dependent on a universal principle. It does presuppose a dependency, but of a quite different sort: the dependency of preexisting real circumstances, of factors or conditions, which are just as real, temporally connected, and transitory as the dependent. In short, real necessity does not connect a supra-temporal principle with the temporal event; rather, within the event, it connects one stage with another – the real with the real, the temporal with the temporal. The fact that this connectedness in the sequences of natural processes shows similarity (lawfulness) is indeed characteristic of the real, but it is not the actual essence of being-necessary. A world without similarity or lawfulness would also be conceivable; in it, one event could still necessarily and continuously follow another. The ensuing consequences would merely not have any pattern.[8]

Up until the present day, this important point has been dominated by obscurity. This is related to the science of law's tendency to regard the foundation for all "that is" as being in laws alone: the factuality of the particular is based on law – not very differently from how it was formerly supposed to be based on the principle of form – and to understand it as originating from law means to understand it as necessary. In this sense, knowledge of necessity is considered to be the highest mode of knowledge. But at the same time, necessity of being subordinates possibility and actuality. It displaces these modes from their dominant position, taking up the position of highest ontological mode for itself.

This may or may not be justified, but in either case it remains questionable. The mode of being comes too close to the mode of knowledge, and the modal character is generally displaced onto the structural character of the form of law. From both conceptions, it follows that the "highest" mode of being is now understood as the most powerful and most dominant.

Thus, the content-related and constitutive again displaces the pure ways of being. The sustaining element of the relation arises behind necessity. The necessary appears as the involved; one arrives at determinism with the involvement taking the form of determination and being conceived of as fully sovereign. Even this would be a tolerable consequence, if it meant merely the superordination of pure necessity, without its being pushed under a definitive form of (final or

8 The theory of categories will have to show, in another context, that the same holds true of necessity as of causality. The so-called natural laws are linked to them as presupposition, but the causal nexus as such is not linked to the natural laws.

causal) determination. But it becomes very significant, if all determination is understood as such by law.

It is a merit of modern philosophical thought that Leibniz – and after him, in broader application, Wolff – knew how to place the problem of necessity on a wider foundation, positioning it in opposition to the science of law. This took place through the exposition of the "principle of sufficient reason," which, since then, has carried through into all fields in which there is a contrariety of the modes – in logic and epistemology, as well as in metaphysics.

The *principium rationis sufficientis* is far from being a genuine modal principle. It plays out the modal problem, all the more, as a problem of determination. But it avoids fixation on a definite type of determination; above all, it detaches itself completely from the principle of law and shifts the whole emphasis to the linking of "that which is" (or of that which corresponds to it in the secondary spheres of thought and insight). The "sufficient" reason is found entirely in one plane with its necessary consequences. The thought has its ground in thinking, the understood in understanding, and "that which is" in that which is [*das Seiende in Seiendem*].

Perhaps even more importantly: despite all predominance of the constitutive-determinative in the principle of sufficient reason, care has been taken here to assure that the aspect of necessity is appropriately understood. This clearly follows from the formula: ". . . *ratio sufficiens, cur potius sit quam non sit*" ["sufficient reason, why it is, rather than is not"]. It has been objected that this "*potius*" [rather] is a weak and only "half-formulated" expression that does not accurately reflect the stringency with which "consequence" follows from reason. This is not to be disputed. One thing that it does reproduce very accurately is the opposition to possibility – that the "being possible" of something simply indicates that it can be, while it also just as well can not be. Since antiquity it has been understood as manifesting precisely this kind of indecision. But if the sufficient reason is the reason "why it is, rather than is not," then it thereby constitutes the aspect of decision sought since antiquity. In this respect, the essence of being-necessary is very precisely determined here from its opposition to being-possible.

If one understands all being (being-actual) in opposition to a somehow existing alternative of "being-able-to-be-and-not-be," then it is also understandable why Leibniz and Wolff held the principle of sufficient reason to be universally valid for all of "that which is." Being-actual is a "being-so-and-not-otherwise." It excluded from it the being-able-to-not-be of that which it is. Determinatively expressed, this means: it has its reason as to why it "is" rather than "is not." Modally expressed: it cannot "not be;" it is necessary.

13 Aporias of Modal Analysis. Methodological Considerations

It has been shown that we have not yet found a concept of the possibility of being or of the necessity of being clear enough to serve as a foundation for the investigation. It will take no one by surprise that under such circumstances still very little can be demonstrated about such a concept of the actuality of being in the material handed down through history. Being-actual is even less graspable, even though it appears to be the most self-evident and best known.

The modal categories have the tremendous disadvantage of being difficult to recognize. This is due to their position on this side of all differentiation with regard to content. All understanding adheres to distinguishable determinations, and therefore to that which is constitutive and which concerns the being-so of "that which is." All categories above modality are constitutive categories; all examples that allow something to be grasped are differentiated with regard to content; and the determinations that we gain from them are those of being-so, not of being-there and its modes. Only determinations are able to be comprehended in terms of content.

Thus, the differences of modality are nowhere able to be directly grasped. Although they underlie everything and are presupposed everywhere, they are only comprehensible "with" a determinate content or "in" it. This indirectness makes consideration of them dependent, and refers them to the methodological law of the downwardly directed perspective of strata. This law implies that the categories of the lower strata can be made visible from the higher strata of being (because they are generally contained in them), but not vice versa. And thus, the true aporia only begins once the retrospective task of making the universal visible from the particular is carried out. It is only then that one may take up the task of comprehending the mode-of-being as such.

Intuition itself, and especially the conceptual understanding of the modes, can only succeed in connection with the consideration of content. As soon as one loses sight of the constitutive, nothing more is visible. The intuition of modality is the kind of intuition that stands in the way of its own condition. In order to proceed, it must clear its own condition out of the way. In this manner, it is not only an indirect, but also an in-itself broken intuition, i.e. an intuition that partially abolishes itself. It can only comprehend its object by eliminating itself. And since its connectedness of content appears in all that is comprehended, in taking effect it must always withdraw once again from what is comprehended.

This is the methodological difficulty of modal analysis, and ultimately it is an insurmountable one. It is this that makes modal concepts so irritatingly iridescent, and yet so apparently vacuous and abstract. One does not see how

they are loaded with dynamite, the decisive moment for being and nonbeing contained within them.

The iridescence can, of course, be overcome within certain limits, if viewed concentrically from different sides at the same time. The acquired aspects of the mode then interfere with each other in such a way that the unreal is reciprocally dissolved. But the abstractness, the emptiness of content, is not taken away. It is necessary, because it means that all of the constitutive content is disregarded. It is for this reason that the modal concepts remain dependent.

To put it more precisely, ontological modes as such cannot generally be defined. It is not any different with them than it is with the ways of being: one may compare, delimit, or determine differences between them, but in doing so one does not directly confront the central question. Admittedly, the situation with the modes is more favorable, because their diversity is greater. This is especially true, if one includes the negative modes, because their differentiation allowing the content of examples to be attacked from more directions. But they cannot be truly defined – unless one does so nominally.

If an indirect procedure is employed, however, there still remains a way for modes to be mutually determined, the one from the other. One thereby comes to their internal coherence, their reciprocal relation of implication, of indifference, of antagonism. With regard to the constitutive categories, this is the only means of definition that perhaps does justice to their content. With regard to the modal categories, which have no content of their own, they remain necessarily empty, unless one gives them a terrain, through the connection to an unlimited field of possible content. But then one must, as has been shown, subtract whatever is related to content in comprehension itself from whatever is comprehended. And it then becomes a question of how much still remains.

On the other hand, in this field, the slightest comprehension is of such fundamental importance that the broadest perspective is immediately opened up. In incalculably diverse content-defined and categorial relations, the understanding of the modes illuminates and clarifies what would otherwise remain unsolvable and impenetrable in them. Ontologically, this takes effect first and foremost in the opposition of spheres of being, i.e. in making the ways of being graspable. The most obscure problem in ontology is here brought to light; the essence of real being and ideal being, which in itself is in no way graspable, becomes approximately determinable from the relation of the modes to one another.

The root of this situation is to be sought in the basic categorial opposition of the constitutive and the modal themselves; it essentially coincides with the basic categorial opposition of determinateness of being and way of being. Its most general expression is the relation of being-so and being-there (which was investigated in the “foundation”), since the way of being is the way of being-there.

This opposition has its ontic place among the remaining oppositions of being; and in this respect, the whole of modal lawfulness already ranks below the categorial stratum of oppositions of being. Although just as fundamental as the latter, it stands in opposition to it. For the remaining oppositions of being are purely constitutive and presuppose intermodal relations. The groups of categories of modality and of oppositions of being are consequently not separated from each other by an actual difference of elevation, in terms of stratification, but stand next to each other, and may be regarded as belonging to one stratum. More precisely, they could not be assigned a relation of rank that would place them any closer to each other.

This peculiar position is deeply characteristic of the modal categories. They form a kind of borderland out of a narrower and more essential ontology along with a narrower theory of categories. They are indeed categories, but categories of pure ways of being. In this respect, they form the core of ontology, insofar as nearly all that we know of "that which is as it is" is generally acquired along the detour through modal analysis. But, at the same time, they serve as the foundation for all categorial determinateness. It is in them, as the most incomprehensible objects of both subject areas, that the unity of both fields becomes directly comprehensible.

14 The Four Lessons of Modal Analysis

The situation is therefore such that neither logic, nor epistemology, nor metaphysics has brought forth pure modal concepts. They must be acquired anew in all fields. And wherever they differ, the investigation must be divided up accordingly.

At this juncture, the ontological importance lies on the real sphere alone. The investigation into the real modes must therefore stand at the center. It is also the investigation most widely carried out; in its domain, the most is to be learned and the furthest reaching conclusions are to be drawn. In this case, it is natural to proceed from traditional modal concepts, which are determined in part by logic and in part by the ancient theory of *potentia*. Only in opposition to these concepts can a sufficient system of real modes be worked out.

This offers us a circuitous path leading though a more or less neutral realm of modal concepts, in which the differences of the spheres have disappeared, or at least appear blurred. The preliminary investigation, which deals with this undifferentiated state of the modes, is not merely methodologically offered, but also technically required. One must begin by clarifying the different meanings of modal concepts passed down through history – the discussion above being

far from sufficient – and then there is also a certain basic lawfulness of the modes, that stands on this side of their differentiation according to sphere and must be worked out before any particularization.

The most important part of this preliminary investigation is the theory of the "basic modal law," which holds true for all ways of being and the theory of the dimensional arrangement of the modes. Only on the grounds of insights that arise here can it be shown what this law actually has to do with the mutual relations of one and the same sphere, as well as with their principles of lawfulness, the "intermodal laws." All further and more differentiated investigation depends on these laws. For if the modes are not directly definable in any sphere, then any more accurate comprehension of their essence must emerge from intermodal relations. And accordingly, in each sphere, the particular lawfulness of these relations can only first arise in opposition to the reciprocal position of the neutral modes.

On the other hand, the ambiguities that exist with respect to the ideal, logical, and gnoseological spheres can only be removed if the structure of the real modes is clarified. For that reason, the actual modal analysis of this sphere only begins after the central "Part Two." Although by no means uniform in itself, its collective relatedness to the real sphere allows it to be summarized in Part "Three."

The final part of the investigation will deal with the relation of the modes of different spheres to each other. And only in Part "Four" will we see the consequences of systematically working through the whole field of concern for modal analysis. The epistemological insights fall away, particularly those that benefit philosophical knowledge. As all knowledge is extensively conditioned and supported by the relation between categories of knowledge and categories of being, the same holds true to a large extent for the relation between the epistemological modes and ontological modes. For that reason, the investigation conducted here serves as a prototype for the whole theory of categories, the general as well as the specialized categories of individual fields of knowledge. In it, the central position of modal analysis is first shown – not only for ontology, but also for philosophical fields of each and every kind.

Part One: **The Problem of the Levels of Modality**

I Aporias and Equivocations of Modal Concepts

1 Meanings of "Contingency"

a) A Provisional Hierarchy of the Six Modes

Historically, six basic modes have been recognized, three positive and three negative: possibility, actuality and necessity, on the one hand, and impossibility, nonactuality and contingency, on the other. Moreover, they have been granted access to a hierarchy of these modes depending on the sphere, this means a ranked order according to the gradation of validity, certainty, or being itself.

This hierarchy is different from the order found in the strata of being and their categories. It is also different from the order of meaningfulness or value. It is purely a modal order and does not coincide with any other gradation. In it, the negative modes are located at the very bottom, so that the negation of the lowest positive mode takes the lowest position among them, while the negation of higher positive modes takes a correspondingly higher position. Thus, the oppositional interplay of the positive and negative modes obtains a symmetrical character.

The introduction has shown the grounds on which necessity, although only recently included, claims the highest position among the positive modes. But since antiquity, possibility has taken the lowest position among them. The whole order of precedence is thereby determined with a certain clarity. Of course, the meaning of higher and lower being itself does not remain completely unambiguous. But, it is readily intelligible, and this suffices as a starting point. Being impossible is obviously extreme or negative nonbeing. In terms of being, it is less than being-nonactual, because being-nonactual leaves the door open to being-possible. Being-nonactual, in turn, is less than being-contingent, since the contingent is actual anyway, and only necessity is negated.

It is likewise with the positive modes. Being-actual is more than merely being-possible. Being-necessary is more than merely being-actual. The merely possible can still be nonactual – which even seems to imply possibility – and the merely actual can be contingent (not necessary). The inability to determine whether it is necessary or contingent seems to be the meaning of naked being-actual.

If one puts these ascending strata together in a table (with the arrow indicating the direction of ascent from lower to higher modality), then the hierarchy appears as follows:

necessity	↑	not being able to be otherwise
actuality		being so and not otherwise
possibility		being able to be so or not so
contingency		not being necessary (also being able to be otherwise)
nonactuality		not being so
impossibility		not being able to be so.

In any event, we can proceed, using this table as a provisional schema. It shows at least a uniform principle. It is close enough to the naïve conception to render explanation dispensable. Moreover, it coincides well with the levels of validity of judgment.

On closer inspection, the hierarchy's heterogeneity is revealed. Only within the positive modes is it completely clear. Here, the higher mode experiences a clearly perceptible, increased determinateness in its kind of being. The fact that necessity is more than actuality and that actuality is more than possibility, constitutes a uniform sense of direction. For here, the lower mode is contained in the higher: whatever is actual must at least be possible and whatever is necessary must at least be actual. Thus, it at least corresponds to traditional modal concepts. Whether it also conforms to traditional ontological concepts remains to be seen.

This plays out differently for the negative modes. Surely, impossibility has a minimal amount of being, extreme nonbeing, but contingency is only a nonbeing of being-necessary. Can it then be said that there is less determinateness of the kind of being, itself, in being-nonactual than in being-contingent, and even less in being-impossible than in being-nonactual?

Clearly, this will not do. In this case the most negative mode is the most determinate, and the mode of medium negativity is less determinate, while the comparatively most positive mode is the most indeterminate. Impossibility is obviously a mode of necessity; it is negative necessity. Thus, in extreme negativity, it gains the same degree of determinateness in its kind of being (determinateness of negative being) as the highest positive mode. On the other hand, not only is contingency no type of necessity, but it is the opposite of being-necessary altogether – hence, the indeterminateness in its relative positivity. Meanwhile, standing midway between the two, nonactuality behaves indifferently toward being-necessary and being-contingent. It can be based on impossibility, but it does not need to be; and in the end being-nonactual is something contingent.

Accordingly, it seems that for the negative modes the determinateness of the kind of being is indirectly proportional to the mode's elevation. The character of being, itself, wanes as the determinateness of its own essence grows. It is, nevertheless, not a matter of constructing a line that uniformly decreases in other respects as well. This immediately becomes evident when the standard of interpenetration is applied. Among the positive modes, we find that the lower is always found in the higher. This does not apply to the negative modes: nonactuality is obviously not found in contingency, and impossibility is not found in nonactuality. One may very well have expected the relationship to be the other way around: the less determinate mode being contained in the more determinate, thus the higher in the lower according to the hierarchical order. But this does not occur either.

Admittedly, nonactuality is found in impossibility; an actual thing cannot be impossible. This follows from the relation of the positive modes: actuality presupposes possibility. One would also expect that contingency must be found in nonactuality. But this is by no means the case. The nonactual can also be impossible, in which case it is necessarily nonactual and by no means contingent. The nonactual is absolutely indifferent to whether it is impossible or merely contingently nonactual.

b) The Questionable Position of Contingency

There can be no doubt that contingency tears a hole in the clear-cut arrangement of the modes. With it, the curve of ascent becomes unsteady.

This impression becomes even stronger, if it is clearly understood that no unequivocal relation exists between possibility and contingency – precisely at the point where the negative modes connect to the positive mode. Here, a negative mode presupposes the positive modes: contingent being presupposes the possibility of being; contingent nonbeing presupposes the possibility of nonbeing. But, the possibility of the one, like the possibility of the other, does not presuppose its own contingency. From it, the one may be necessary just as well as the other. Otherwise, the necessary simply could not be possible, which would bring us to a flat-out contradiction.

In this respect, contingency behaves just like a positive mode. But if this is the case, then it belongs in a different position in the hierarchy. That is, it must not belong at the lowest position among the positive modes – since it already presupposes possibility. It should be between actuality and possibility, instead. The indifference that being-actual displays toward necessity and contingency is

quite consistent with this. Actuality would, consequently, also have to stand between the latter two modes.

Meanwhile, the negative character of contingency is not abolished. It is and remains the negation of necessity. And so, this very same ambiguity remains in its position despite all rearrangement. Indeed, it should have already become quite apparent that the ambiguity inheres in its own inner essence. This ambiguity traces back to a dual sense within itself, a kind of split in its modal character. Certainly such inconsistency of a mode in itself cannot be remedied by merely regrouping the modes.

Now there is more than one such ambiguity in contingency. Being-contingent is a more controversial mode altogether. No sweeping decision can be made for all spheres as to whether this mode ought to stand among the other modes.

We are familiar with how "chance" ["*Zufall*"], ordinarily accepted as harmless, manages to disappear once in-depth knowledge of the situation is acquired, how it gives way to a network of many interrelating events, in which the "contingent" [*das "Zufällige"*] then proves to be necessary. We experience this disappearance in all areas of our knowledge pertaining both to the world and to life. Even where we cannot actually bring into view the extent to which our finite knowledge penetrates, one is given the distinct impression that these interrelations fully permeate, leaving no room for contingency, indeed that only knowledge's limitedness creates the illusion of contingency for us, time and time again.

This illusion cannot be dispelled. It is seen in the individual case, where a determining trajectory becomes visible, but it cannot be generally remedied. Theory can deny chance, but only as a mode of being. As a mode of experience and givenness, it remains in force. In opposition to the facts of givenness, such negation of chance fulfills determinism. Its thesis is: nothing actual is contingent; or, everything actual is necessary. It thereby abolishes the indifference of actuality to necessity and contingency. If this thesis is transposed from the modal to the constitutive, then it reads: everything that is, has its sufficient reason. Thus, we arrive at the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason.

This principle will be discussed later. We only have readily available the striking fact that contingency is a mode whose source can be generally disputed. In this respect it stands alone among the other modes. None of them can be called into question in a similar manner. Not even the skeptic disputes that there is actuality; he doubts only its being-in-itself – i.e. the way of being of the sphere in which it acts – and that is something quite different. This also allows possibility to be recognized, since it is presupposed as being-actual. Nonactuality indicates mere nonbeing and in this respect nothing at all can be disputed about it. But we experience impossibility and necessity in their

harsh rigidity in all areas of life, events, thought, and even fantasy. One may very well question whether everything actual is necessary, and whether everything nonactual is impossible, but not whether there are necessary things and impossible things, themselves.

Contingency is the only exception to this. It is not even a simply negative mode, but rather semi-positive. The contingent should indicate something actual, in which only being-necessary is negated. Taken in itself, this is an uncontradictory kind of being; but it cannot be clearly classified among the other modes, nor does it reconcile the phenomena of all spheres and the strata of interwoven connections.

c) Equivocations of Contingency

The difficulties clustered around this point are considerably increased by the variety of meanings "contingent" ["*zufällig*"] assumes in linguistic usage. Indeed, the manner in which one speaks of "chance" ["*Zufall*"] in ordinary life, shares very little with the modal problem. Nevertheless, everyday meanings steadily mix in unnoticed, entering philosophical deliberation and leading to confusion. Thus, the equivocations of the contingent must be exposed once and for all.

1. If I happen to bump into someone and apologize, then one says it occurred "accidentally" ["*zufällig*"], and here "accidentally" means undesignedly, inadvertently, unintentionally, and thus blamelessly. I deem the accident something that I did not intend and that it was not in my power to avoid.
2. If I meet Mr. X on the street, not having sought out this encounter in the least, I thus experience it as "accidental" ["*zufällig*"], by which I do not merely mean that it is unintentional, but that it is unexpected and unforeseen. This meaning comes closest to what we mean by "accident" ["*Zufall*"]. For the meeting was something that befell me. It is similar to anything else that meets me unexpectedly, that happens to me, that surprises me, that touches or concerns me.

   In unforeseen things, as in accidental things, existing connections are not denied. They are merely overlooked. No notice is taken of them, even if they are accessible to intuitive understanding. In both cases, the background of events is not taken as essential. In this way, contingency is a function of the conditioned isolation of events carried out through interpretation.
3. Something different is meant, however, if I toss a coin and then directly challenge the fact that it only accidentally landed on "heads or tails." For in this case, the "outcome" is supposed to decide any undecided matter.

Here, by the contingency of the outcome, what I mean is not only the unintentional or the unforeseen, but also the independence that the results have from me, and the manner in which the outcome is not partial to my own interests. It is impartial inasmuch as I do not have in view the conditions surrounding the outcome and do not have control over them.

The new meaning of the contingent is then the inscrutable and incalculable, which is accepted as mere fact, as the "outcome" itself. Here, the background of the event is not taken as inessential; it is directly invoked as a decisive authority. But it is left untouched in obscurity. In ordinary life this is the typical attitude consciousness assumes toward the future. It is not intentional, not a game played with chance, not a challenge posed to chance, but an unavoidable attitude. Furthermore, the same perspective is taken on the "outcome" as on the decision of the still undecided. In this sense the "outcome" is the proper *contingentia* (the "as it comes to a stop"), or with a different nuance, the *convenientia* (the "as it is encountered"). This meaning of contingency is therefore a pure mode of perception, being perfectly justified as such.

4. Furthermore, if I say: in this particular triangle, it is necessary that the sum of the angles is equal to 180°, but it is contingent that a particular angle is equal to 64° – I mean something quite different by "contingency" than in the cases above. I mean neither an unforeseen nor an inscrutable thing, and certainly not something unintentional. Rather, I mean something that is not essential for the triangle as such, and that is in fact independent from it, insofar as I comprehend it. What is meant here is thus a contingency of being: there could be a triangle that did not have an angle of 64°, but there could not be a triangle, whose angles did not equal the sum of 180°. That this determinate triangle has an angle of 64° is therefore "contingent" in relation to the essence of the triangle, i.e. it is inessential, accidental.

   "Accidental" is meant to indicate the particularity's way of being in a certain case, held in opposition to the universality and necessity that essential features have in all cases. Thus, this is not a question of a conceptual mode. Only one factor reminds us of it: here, it remains an open question whether or not the special determinateness of the individual case is somehow necessary in its own way and in its own sphere (namely, in the real sphere). For it is contingent, in the sense of being accidental, only in relation to the essence of the triangle, i.e. only in relation to ideal being.
5. Finally, in the case of a real triangle (or perhaps a given property of this form), if I declare the measured angle of 64° within this figure to be "contingent" in the context of the real relations at hand, then once again I am referring to a quite different meaning of "contingency." I am referring to it

with the same meaning that the word bears in the experiment with the coin, when I considered its landing "heads up" to be not only unpredictable and unalterable, but in itself contingent. I am referring to contingency then in the sense of an ontically uncaused outcome, a real groundless existence or not-being-necessary.

So, I considered the outcome as detached from all conditionality, i.e. as something that under exactly the same circumstances could very well have occurred differently, because it is not at all dependent on the circumstances. By the "same circumstances" I mean not only the circumstances known to me or which are generally recognizable, but also the unrecognizable circumstances (if there are such circumstances), right up to the most imponderable trifles. I ascertain the individual event from the collocation of circumstances, and understand it as something independent from them.

This does not at all mean that the outcome is merely not essentially necessary (merely contingent in relation to the essence, therefore merely accidental), rather it means that the outcome is not necessary in reality. This in turn means that nothing has determined it, that it is *as* it is, entirely due to its own self. This is the real contingency, in which the principle of sufficient reason is superseded and declared void. It is in this manner that the real connection of events, and of the world, is breached.

d) The Only Ontically Relevant Meaning. Consequences

Concerning these five meanings of the "contingent," only the last one is deeply questionable. Only it can be disputed. For only it disputes something that would otherwise be brought into force as irrefutable: only it stands in conflict with the being-present of connection in events, of lawfulness and of dependency in the state of the real world. The other four meanings, on the other hand, are of a much more innocent nature; they only disregard the existence of necessity in real connections, without actually disputing them.

It is on real contingency alone that the metaphysical problem of *contingentia* and *necessitas* depends, as does the problem of sufficient reason along with them. The real contingent is entirely conceivable in itself, without internal contradiction. Whether it is also devoid of external contradiction (compared with the otherwise known) is a quite different matter. And it is on this that the most difficult decisions depend. For it involves the further ontological problem of real chance, whether this is also found to be itself conceivable in the real world, and whether there are not real phenomena that oppose it. That which has actuality in the real world is not nearly everything that is conceivable.

This problem admittedly extends into the realm of the other spheres. Even in ideal being, there could be an isolated appearance conditioned by nothing; just as it could indirectly appear in the logical and epistemological spheres. This will require special investigation. But with no familiar concept of chance corresponding to these meanings that are obvious in-themselves, no issue of greater importance depends on them.

For that reason, only real contingency is the sort of mode that requires important categorial decisions. Aside from this, only the meanings (discussed below under 3 and 4) of incalculability and essential contingency (the accidental) bear some ontological importance – although they do not involve actual aporias. The first is a mere mode of knowledge, its appearance depending on the particular conditions of comprehending connections and dependencies. The second is a complex mode, which only implies that the real exists indeterminately in its particularity of ideal being. In both cases, it is already a question of the relation between the kinds of being in different spheres. If categorially analyzed, this relation must lead to second-order intermodal relations. But such relations will be the object of a much later investigation. They will be discussed once the basic relations within the individual spheres are clarified.

2 The Meanings of Necessity

a) The Relation of Necessity to its Counter-Modes

One cannot discuss the equivocations of contingency without coming up against the equivocations of necessity. Since these two modes stand in contradictory opposition, one would expect every meaning of contingency to correspond to a meaning of necessity. That this is only partially true – namely, in the last three meanings of contingency – is partly due to the negativity of contingency, but also partly due to the particularity of linguistic usage.

The first two meanings of contingency do not negate various kinds of necessity, rather they negate one and the same kind, that is, only necessity for consciousness or observation. Thus, no other meaning of being-necessary can correspond to them. Linguistic usage, on the other hand, is not nearly determined by the formal relation of opposition as much as it is by the modes' positive, characteristic importance. It does not adhere to the purely negative. It does not take "chance" to be the negation of necessity – which it is by law – but rather to be something positive, regardless of how indeterminate it may be. Naïve consciousness understands it as a kind of *deus ex machina*, which decides

what will be and what will not be. It ascribes malice or goodness to it, depending on whether undesirable or desirable things occur. But it at least experiences it as the actual "just popping in," with no concern as to how especially problematic such "popping in" is.

This is not the case for necessity. Wherever necessity is recognized, it always achieves a relation of strict connection with consciousness. This relation places certain constraints on linguistic usage from the outset.

Moreover, necessity stands in two further relations of opposition: to impossibility on the one hand, and to possibility, on the other. Impossibility is itself a kind of necessity, namely negative necessity. Whereas possibility is something quite different, the opposition to it is not qualitative, but rather purely modal. The possible is that which can turn out differently; but the necessary is that which cannot turn out any differently than how it does in fact turn out.

If one holds tightly to these moments of opposition, then it is already clear that there must be different sides to the concept of necessity, involving a series of different meanings depending on whether they dominate or recede. In fact, the position they occupy in the type of necessity of different spheres is greatly divergent.

b) Equivocations in Linguistic Usage

Here, all stricter meanings of necessity take precedence over certain equivocations in colloquial language. The latter are not indifferent, making themselves felt in philosophical terminology in a variety of ways. They must be eliminated through special consideration.

1. One of these meanings is the necessary as "required" or as "needed" for a certain purpose. Thus, we speak of the means necessary for a venture, the knowledge necessary for a particular kind of activity. Indeed, even without a truly purposeful relation, in the natural sciences one speaks of the necessary conditions for an appearance, a cause, or an effect to occur. This linguistic usage refers to an improper being-necessary. It looks at a total relation in terms of the result and refers to nothing other than the dependency of the result on the condition, even if this is only a partial condition. In fact, the condition is not necessary here at all. At least, this is not what was said nor what was intended. The condition can be missing – but then the given result fails to occur. In this relation the real is only an "if – then," according to which the condition can be excluded from the result (be it real or conceived). But in this respect, the necessity entailed is a mere mode of knowledge.

2. In contrast, the popular meaning of necessity refers to an actual being-necessary, with the necessary being understood as the inevitable, as destiny, or as fate. This supplies the foundation for the conception of a predetermined as that which must be fulfilled, with people working for or against it. Conceived of in this manner, it always obscurely and indeterminately expects that something "should" happen or "should not" happen, understanding the actual occurrence or nonoccurrence accordingly. It says of the one that "it was to be so" and of the other that "it was not to be so," aware of both *ex eventu*. This concept of necessity is teleologically based. Its structural scheme is the final determination, namely, that of world events in general. Within certain limits it is very compatible with the theory of *potentia*, having even historically accompanied this theory in many philosophical systems.
3. The necessary is to be distinguished from this as the utterly unavoidable and inevitable, without strictly speaking being predetermined. In this sense one does not say of the necessary that "it was to be so," but simply that "it was bound to happen." And by this one means: the circumstances having been such and such, it could not have happened any differently. It was perhaps not inevitable in itself, but only for us. If one had fully discerned the circumstances and, on top of that, had also had at hand the means to prevent it, one surely would have been able to prevent it – to have redirected the process. Understood in this manner, the concept of the unavoidable takes the schema of causal determination as its foundation. The causal process is basically very flexible, bound by no goals. Whoever has the power to intervene in it, can direct it. Its necessity is only the necessity of the consequence.

c) Philosophically Essential Meanings of Being-Necessary

The last of these popular meanings of necessity already approaches the strict meaning of real necessity. In it, a series of metaphysical assumptions is already demolished. If one now entirely leaves the latter aside, keeping in perspective the difference between the spheres of givenness, for the time being, then the following four meanings stand out as philosophically essential and indisputable.

1. To begin with, "logical" necessity is the best known of those somewhat inappropriate names of "necessity of thought." Of course, it is recognizable in pure thought, and governs it insofar as it is "logical thought;" its primary

meaning, however, does not inhere in thought, but rather in the coherence of its content. We know it as inference, evidence, derivation; it signifies the conditioned, but in its conditionality it also implies the indisputable and incontrovertible validity of one thing on the grounds of another (of a judgment on the grounds of another judgment). The conditionality in this necessity is unabolishable; it has the "if – then" form of relation. But this itself is thoroughly unconditioned. It continuously governs the relation between the premises and conclusion, but without surpassing this type of dependency. Essentially the original premises on which it is based cannot be logically necessary. The regress of all logical chains of necessity inevitably leads to something logically contingent. Whether this thing is also contingent in its being is not thereby predetermined.

2. "Essential necessity" is closely related to logical necessity. It governs the whole field of ideal being. Logical formal structure is only a sector of this field (only the most general schema of connection), or more precisely, only such a schema's form of appearance in the sphere of thought. For the logical is subject to the laws of ideal being, and only for this reason can its power of validity surpass the realm of thought, extending to objects.

   Essential necessity is what belongs to a thing due to its ideal structure, not separable from it under any circumstances, not in any particular or "contingently" real cases. This necessity is the strict opposite of the "accidental" (as that which is contingent in relation to essence [*Wesen*]). Working from this opposition, it is clearly to be understood as the necessity of the "essential" [*das "Essentielle"*]. It is rooted in ideal being, but is not restricted to it. It extends deep into the real, reaching out to special cases of all kinds, but only insofar as the real is subjected to the structure of ideal being.[1]

   What held true for logical necessity also holds true for this necessity: it is a necessity of relatedness and dependency. It has the structure of "ascription" (ὑπάρχειν), and thus of relation. It only can govern the connections as such – only as far as the connections reach – but not their first foundations. Principles, axioms, and basic laws remain ideal-contingent. And along with them, the whole necessary connection of ideal being also remains ideal-contingent. Essential necessity is always under the presupposition of bearing an essentiality or essentially connecting that which falls under it as a particular or general case, thus not presupposing the existence of the essentiality itself.

1 For reflection on how this is not the case without limits, see, *Grundlegung*, chap. 47–50.

3. Just as logical necessity is dependent on essential necessity – having a limited counterpart so to speak in the realm of judgments and inferences – so too is "epistemic necessity" dependent on logical necessity. It does not consist in a necessity of insight, but in an insight into necessity. It means that one not only recognizes what something is or that it is, but also why it is so, and why it is in general. Therefore, aside from the knowledge of a thing, the knowledge of the reason for the thing also belongs to epistemic necessity. This is why it is more than knowledge of actuality (factual knowledge). It is just as relational as logical necessity, and is reliant on basic approaches, which cannot be recognized as necessary – even when these are not logical first principles (since knowledge can also emanate from real facts).

   But it is vital to epistemic necessity that it need not follow the necessity of being in any way, be it essential or real necessity. Not everything necessary in itself is viewed by humans as having necessity. We do not see necessity in most of what we take as fact. Indeed, we do not even do so when we have reason to believe that it is necessary. This attests to epistemic necessity being something different from the necessity of being, and even from logical necessity. It is, accordingly, to be treated as a special modal category.
4. Compared with the kinds of necessity enumerated, "real necessity" stands out as something special. Most of the time it was rashly equated with causal connection. For the extent of its reach, the necessity of causal consequence is naturally a form of real necessity; but it is not the only form. There are still more real connections other than causal ones, just as there is a real other than the physical real. Even organic and mental processes have their determination, and this does not merge into causality; just as it does not for personal, spiritual, and historical processes. They are all real processes, occurring at the same time as physical processes and having their own kind of consistency. There is even dependency in them, making it such that they cannot occur any differently than they actually do occur.

   Real necessity lies in this "not-being-able-to-be-otherwise." The constitutive-structural side in it is therefore not a determinate type of nexus, but rather being-determinate in general or the general ontological law of real determination. Whether this is a continuous law, and whether all that is real is necessary and must be as it is, does not come into question for the time being. These are questions of the real's intermodal relations and will be dealt with when they themselves are investigated.

   But, perhaps the mere concept of real necessity leads to a delimitation of its essence. For even this necessity has the form of relation; even the real is only necessary "on the grounds of something." Since the series of reasons can neither infinitely regress, nor turn back in on itself, there must be initial

reasons that are real and contingent. It makes little difference whether these are to be sought in what is temporally first, in eternal principles, or in the whole of real connection; the first, the principle, or the whole are removed from the relation, in which only real necessity can exist.

d) Summarization and Supplementation

The first three meanings of necessity taken from linguistic usage are not considered here for categorial investigation. The first of them plays a certain role in the epistemological context, and must consequently find its place among the modes of knowledge. The other two stem from a kind of popular metaphysics and refer to the sphere of the real, being precursors, as it were, to the concept of real necessity.

The four philosophical meanings of necessity, on the other hand, are all objectively justifiable. They belong to different spheres, and each is indispensable in its own sphere. Of course, only real necessity and essential necessity are ontologically fundamental. For only they are primary modes of being. Logical and epistemological necessity are secondary, always related to the other two modes, but for this reason they are absolutely different types of modes than the other two.

According to sphere and modal type, each of the four displays a different meaning of necessity, but they share the following: 1. They are based on the sphere's relational structure; they only emerge in existing connections (modally being the other side of these connections); they can never inhere in isolated content, but only exist in the relation of the one to the other. 2. They bear their own essential limit in themselves, i.e. they remain correlated with their modal opposite, a type of contingency – differentiated according to sphere.

What has been said above may be supplemented on one point. In impossibility the four types of necessity recur in a negative sense. Impossibility is negative necessity. There is logical and gnoseological impossibility (the latter being the insight into being-impossible), just as there is essential and real impossibility. Here, as before, the latter two are the fundamental types and the former two are secondary types.

In all four cases, impossibility is no less relationally founded. Something is only impossible as long as something else is supplied that does not allow for its being-there or being-so. For this reason the essential boundary lying in them simultaneously arises for the type of impossibility. Dependent on nothing further, an isolated thing or a first thing can be no more impossible than necessary. Insofar as it does not exist, it is negatively contingent.

3 Meanings of Possibility

a) Disjunctive and Indifferent Possibility

Since the meanings of impossibility and necessity go hand in hand, there must also be corresponding meanings of possibility. This holds true at least for the four meanings last mentioned, these being the only ones that have a categorial nature. But the situation is complicated by the fact that the secondary meaning of indeterminateness is closely associated with possibility – as opposed to necessity. The introduction showed how this indeterminateness brings to mind some kind of remaining open or being undecided.

Thus, a new feature enters into the differentiation of meanings. One must wonder whether this is an essential feature; and if it is, then in which spheres it has validity. Thus, before starting into the difference of spheres, two kinds of being-possible are to be distinguished. For this reason, the associated popular meanings can be disregarded, since these lead back to them.

1. The one kind of being-possible is "being merely possible." Whatever is "merely" possible is, in any case, not actual, let alone necessary. It therefore carries into the world a being-there aside from the actual – a nonactual, potential, and seemingly very enigmatic being-there. We already encountered it in the initial steps we took to consider modality, seeing how it plays the broadest role in the history of metaphysics.

   As for this possibility, Aristotle's principle holds true that it is always simultaneously both the possibility of being and the possibility of nonbeing. It is therefore dual possibility, or "disjunctive possibility" to be exact, a mode in which the otherwise never united, contradictory counterparts of **A** and not-**A** coexist. Of course, this does not mean that the possibility of their coexistence exists, but only that the coexistence of both "possibilities" exists. Only the being-actual-together of **A** and not-**A** is impossible; their being-possible-together is not only very possible, but – according to this concept of possibility – also necessary: whenever **A** is possible, not-**A** "must" always be possible as well.

   But the peculiarity of this "disjunctive" possibility is that it abolishes itself in the transition to being-actual. Being-actual can only be in one of two cases (for they are mutually exclusive). This may be called the law of disjunctive possibility. It can be simply expressed as follows: as soon as **A** becomes actual, the possibility of not-**A** disappears; and as soon as not-**A** becomes actual, the possibility of **A** disappears. In both cases the coexistence

of the two possibilities disappear, as does disjunctivity and "pure being-possible" along with it.

2. In contrast to this we have "indifferent possibility" or "plain possibility." It is no "pure being possible." It is compatible with both being-actual as well as being-necessary, its "indifference" consisting in this. In fact, for its part, it is the very possibility that must always be fulfilled in being-actual and being-necessary, since whatever is not possible cannot be actual.

   But it is not dual possibility: if **A** is possible, then this mode of possibility does not require that not-**A** also simultaneously be possible. Admittedly, not-**A** does not therefore need to be equally impossible, but the being-possible of **A** is not to be seen in terms of whether not-**A** is possible or impossible. This one-limbed possibility of **A** is thoroughly indifferent toward it. It thus stands in contrast to "disjunctive" possibility, which is the simultaneous possibility of not-**A**, described as "indifferent possibility," i.e. as the possibility which is altogether indifferent to the other (contradictory) case.

   This has a very important consequence. Disjunctive possibility meant a "state of being" apart from actuality; it cannot enter into the being-actual of a thing as a condition, but rather remains excluded from it, since the possibility of not-**A** posited in it contradicts the being-actual of **A**. Indifferent possibility is not at all the same as this. Since it is not simultaneously the possibility of not-**A**, it is also indifferent toward **A**'s actuality and nonactuality. Thus, this kind of being-possible does not exclude being-actual from it and is compatible with it, as well as with being-nonactual. As a condition, it can enter into the being-actual; it is no separate state of being that exists apart from actuality.

   Indifferent possibility is not abolished in actuality, it is maintained in it. A sphere in which this type of possibility exists, is therefore generally distinguished by the fact that in it the modes are not states and do not mutually exclude each other. Rather, they are able to connect to and supplement each other according to the kinds of aspects of being that they have.

b) Logical, Ideal, and Gnoseological Possibility

It is now to be expected that the spheres and their ways of being – the primary just as well as the secondary – are essentially characterized by the kind of being-possible prevailing in them. Without a more exact analysis, it appears that we cannot tackle each sphere in order to clearly determine its type of possibility. The following must therefore be taken with a certain provisionality. Only guidelines can be laid out.

1. First of all, there is "logical possibility" as well as the "possibility of thought" (conceivability) based on it. It is widely known to bear the simple meaning of lacking contradiction. If the latter is modally expressed, then it directly represents the being-able-to-coexist of all of a conceived content's aspects (or "characteristics"), or in the simplest case, a predicate P with the preexisting characteristics of subject S. In principle, the size of the coexisting spheres remains indifferent. It can be restricted to one concept, or it can be widened to encompass the entirety of all concepts, and thus non-contradiction can accordingly imply quite a lot or very little. From the perspective of an individual concept, it is, in the former case, only the "internal" non-contradiction, and in the latter case, the "external," i.e. its compatibility with a whole conceptual system. Nevertheless, the principle of being-possible as such is the same.

   Yet, it is not so easy to determine more specifically what type of being-possible this is. If one proceeds from the problematic judgment, "S can be P," then in it the counterpart obviously remains open, "S can also be not-P." Here, possibility is disjunctive; and thus at least logical possibility is understood. But if one proceeds from the idea that non-contradiction in **A** does not in any way imply non-contradiction in not-**A**, then one fully and unequivocally stands by an indifferent possibility, which similarly claims to be "logical" possibility.

   Hence, logical possibility awaits a clarification that only modal analysis can provide.
2. Underlying logical possibility is "essential possibility." It means being-able-to-be or being-able-to-not-be, in the sense of ideal being. We say that an angle of 90° is possible in a triangle, but not more than one. It is also possible that there is no angle of 90° in a given triangle, but not two such angles. The one like the other lies within the essence of the triangle: the latter contradicts its essential characteristics; the former exists with them without contradiction. Essential possibility does not predetermine whether an angle of 90° is possible in the particular case of, a given real triangle. But even if it is not really possible, it still remains possible in relation to the triangle's essence. For the essence is not what is particular about the case. The particularity of the real is "inessential."

   Here, the relational structure of being-possible is non-contradiction, and thus it is also graded according to how wide or narrow the essential connections are. But if a sphere of being that does not succumb to arbitrarily drawn human boundaries is at issue, then essential possibility is always fundamentally displayed in the whole sphere's total non-contradiction.

The same must hold true for its modal type as for logical possibility – with which it has always been confused: its non-contradiction does not reveal whether it is disjunctive or indifferent possibility. This depends on other conditions, which can only be investigated in places where they become perceptible.

3. "Epistemic possibility," on the other hand, is not based simply on the non-contradiction, although it is related to it by the logical impact of knowledge. It does not mean "possibility of knowledge" – as this would be the basic question of epistemology (calling to mind Kant's "conditions for the possibility of experience") – but rather the "knowledge of possibility," namely, of something that is an object for knowledge. One may very well recognize that object **A** has certain qualities, without recognizing how it is possible. To determine the latter one must comprehend the connections in which **A**'s conditions lie. If one understands the conditions as given, then based on them one understands how **A** is possible.

   If one grasps the whole chain of conditions, then one has an overview of **A**'s total possibility; if one grasps only one link in this chain, then one has only discerned a partial possibility. In the former case, it is recognized that **A** is possible, without anything further; whereas in the latter, **A** is recognized to be possible only under certain conditions (in the event that certain further conditions appear and complete the chain). It is easy to see that only the first case produces true and proper knowledge of possibility.

   Finite human knowledge, however, and particularly the know-how of practical life, is almost exclusively concerned with comprehending partial possibility. This means: our knowledge of being-possible shifts into a merely partial overview of conditions; which again results in displaying the form of "disjunctive" possibility. If I survey only a part of the conditions under which **A** is possible, then I do not know whether the other conditions are also present and thus do not know whether **A** or not-**A** will ultimately appear. Hence, a partial aspect of the conditions necessarily produces *in mente* a dual, disjunctive, being-possible.

   It basically remains this way, even after **A** appears and is recognized as actual. For by no means does one recognize why not-**A** could not appear. That is why this mode of partial possibility has the greatest leeway in everyday life and in knowledge, even though it means an incomplete and nonactual possibility. It serves as the grounds for all calculation of the multiplicity of "possibilities," all consideration of chance or eventuality. If all conditions were evident, then **A**'s counterpart would have fallen away, with only **A** remaining possible. Then only one chance would exist in epistemic possibility and it would be indifferent possibility.

c) The Particular Nature of Real Possibility

"Real possibility" stands in contrast to logical and essential possibility, on the one hand, and to epistemic possibility, on the other. It is not non-contradiction. Indeed, it is much more than that. By no means do we find that simply on the grounds of being harmonious in itself and without contradiction, any such thing is possible in real connection. The perfect, geometric, spherical shape of a body is surely free of contradiction in itself; but in a real celestial body it is absolutely not possible, as long as a far reaching series of real conditions is not met (including, among others: the elimination of all equilibration of mass and other influencing factors, e.g. rotation, the gravitational effect of other masses, the internal inhomogeneity of specific gravity, etc.).

In a strict sense, the real possible is only that which has had all of its conditions fulfilled, right up to the very last one. As long as a single condition goes unfulfilled, the thing in question is not possible, on the contrary, it is impossible. Accordingly the fulfillment of the conditions means nothing less than its real being-present, thus, its real-being-actual.

This is based on a relational structure that, just like the relational structure of real necessity, inheres in the continuous relations of dependency in an existing determination of the real. It does not need to arise in a determinate kind of nexus (such as a causal nexus), but must be continuous. In a world with no continuous dependency of events, forms, and states, the meaning of real possibility would be abolished; in such a world absolutely everything would be equally possible and equally impossible, respectively. There would remain only essential possibility, and from it, all real becoming is only "possible" in the negative, meaningless sense of its essentiality not being impeded.

From this it follows that real possibility in the strict sense is never disjunctive and never mere partial possibility. In accordance with its essence, it is indifferent possibility and total possibility. The latter provides a direct insight into its relational structure; it is only present if the chain of conditions is totally fulfilled. It is indifferent for the same reason, since it cannot simultaneously be the possibility of **A** and not-**A**. But first and foremost, it cannot "disappear" in the becoming-actual of **A**. **A**'s being-actual presupposes that the chain of conditions is fulfilled. For this to occur, **A** must at least be really possible.

And furthermore it follows that the constantly disjunctive partial possibility, which we always rely on in life when looking toward the future and considering chance, is not properly real possibility. It is only epistemic possibility and what corresponds to this in the real is always only a partial relation of actually existing dependency. It is itself only a partial insight into the given, real situation, partial knowledge of the chain of conditions whose totality constitutes real

possibility. If we could fully survey this chain, then we would recognize that not many "eventualities" are possible, but rather only one. And this is always the one, which becomes actual in the subsequent course of events.

d) The Real Aspect of Partial Possibility

This is, by no means, to say that one could not meaningfully speak of "real partial possibility." This term is certainly disjunctive and means something along the lines of the absence of contradiction.

Except that the "meaningfulness" of such possibility is not strictly ontic-categorial. Certainly, the authority of such discussion does not stem merely from the finitude of our insight, and in this respect it cannot simply be attributed to epistemic possibility. It is based not only on the partially unrecognized existence of conditions, but also on the fact that an objective, temporal succession is demonstrated by the appearance of conditions. The conditions that temporally endure belong to the total possibility of whatever lies in the future; in any case, from the standpoint of the present they are still not there. And if one cannot be sure that they will occur – that they must necessarily occur – then alongside the possibility of **A**, the possibility of not-**A** remains open. Yet, if the negative not-**A** allows for a very different, positive fulfillment, then this means a standing open of "many possibilities."

The expression just used is inexact; it should be called "a multiplicity of the possible," specifically because in this multiplicity the being-possible itself is the same; only the content varies. But this may here be left to rest. The important thing is simply that there is a "real aspect of partial possibility," and that it is absolutely not a purely subjective aspect. **A**'s chain of conditions is not only partially recognized here, it is also only partially present. For that reason, possibility now becomes disjunctive. The relation given in it is a real relation; and it is easy to see that all possibility of the future in the given present bears some characteristics of this relation.

At this point there is one thing that must not be forgotten: this real relation is strictly speaking not real possibility. For the time being, a future **A** is not yet possible; and the same holds true for the disjunctive counterpart (the positive fulfillment of not-**A**). Indeed, as the future **A,** it is still not currently possible, and it can only become possible if the remaining conditions appear. But these are missing for the time being, and whether they will appear cannot be gleamed from the incomplete chain of given conditions. One should only declare **A** to be really possible when one is certain that the still outstanding conditions will actually appear. But by claiming such certainty, one breaches the partial relation

that exists between the given conditions and the resulting **A**; one thereby refers already to a much wider real connection, and presupposes that in it the factors, which will bring forth **A**'s missing conditions, must already be contained in the present. But with this one once again approaches the aspect of total possibility, while simultaneously abandoning disjunctivity. This is because, out of a totality of conditions only one thing – and no more than that – is ever possible.

But this is not what we mean in ordinary life, when we speak of "future possibilities." In considering the events to come, we may very well know that in reality only one possibility exists, the others not being real possibilities. We may also be convinced that only the possible future is simultaneously necessary; indeed, experience may very well have familiarized us with how clearly we can see after the fact why it could not have been otherwise. All of this does not prevent us from seeing the future as divided into a plurality of possibilities.

From this, it clearly follows that real possibility is not properly involved here. Nevertheless, for this reason the "real aspect of partial possibility" does not arise completely from epistemic possibility. Although it is one aspect and as such is a matter of knowledge, a real relation underlies it, justifying it. This real relation is neither one of real possibility, nor an ontically complete real relation; rather, it is a fragment of the latter, a mere, partial relation. The fragment is in effect determined by the limits of givenness and over-view.

It is a recurrent and well-known fact of epistemology that the limits of a real aspect do not themselves need to be real limits. By no means do they abolish the reality of whatever is comprehended in the aspect. All respective (movable) cognitive limits are of this kind, and they are not any less genuine (immovable) limits of cognizability. They are all merely gnoseological limits, not ontological limits. But they do not abolish the ontological character of cognizability within these limits.

e) The Relationality of Possibility and its Essential Boundary

Among the enumerated types of possibility, real and essential possibility are obviously the basic ontological ones. Apart from them, only epistemic possibility exhibits a characteristic structure. On the other hand, disjunctive and indifferent possibility form an opposition that overlaps with the majority of those types; both seem therefore to be individually graded once again in them.

The relational structure is common to all of the enumerated types. Just like necessity, possibility is always rooted in a context of dependency; although it remains to be determined whether they are the same in this respect. The common property of both modes is that they never float about freely and always

exist by being "based on something." This constitutes their internal relational structure. This remains the same in all spheres and particularizations of the modal type.

But in one respect, the types of possibility are essentially different from the types of necessity. The latter bear their limits within themselves due to their relationality. The types of possibility, on the other hand, display no internal limits that would arise from the relation to preexisting conditions.

Let us consider: necessity has as its boundary the counter-mode of contingency; where the relation between condition and conditioned ceases, the first links are contingent – as long as there is nothing on account of which they could be necessary. Possibility has the counter-mode of impossibility. One might now ask: where are the first links in the chain of conditions and would they be something impossible? Obviously this will not do. This cannot be the case for the essential sphere's connections, or for the real sphere's connections, let alone for the secondary spheres' connections. Along with the possibility of the first links, the possibility of all the following links would collapse. This works out differently for necessity: with the necessity of the first links, the necessity of the following links does not collapse. This necessity is only relatively based on the earlier links. If the first links are contingent – and with them, the whole of the real connection – then they can still exist within the whole of necessity.

It is, more precisely, the case that: insofar as they are "contingent," the first links in all chains of conditions are utterly irrational; but they are not something impossible *a limine* [at the beginning]. Possibility is obviously something that depends on conditions only within a clearly delineated sphere – namely, on the conditions that it is bound to by the existing, determining connection – but not beyond the sphere in question. Outside of the sphere, or at its limits, everything that is not in itself impossible is equally possible. Accordingly, the contingent, as it must somehow be possible, can only be possible "in-itself," and not based on something else. Every first thing, however, is contingent. And who would want to say that something contingent is basically impossible? This would mean that the whole would also be impossible. But the whole is not only possible; it is actual.

That such a concept of possibility is empty of content does not nullify it ontologically, but only shows that it sketches out something unrecognizable. And this does not change its indispensability. For possibility, the limit that necessarily leads regressively to its self-annihilation only means the annihilation of its relationality. What remains is not being-impossible, but only a being-possible that does not exist "based on" something. Here, possibility merges into another modal type: a non-relational mode.

4 Meanings of Actuality

a) The Fluctuations of Meaning in Linguistic Usage

Out of all of the modes aside from contingency, actuality – as well as its corresponding negation, nonactuality – shows the most extreme fluctuation of meaning in linguistic usage. This is very understandable. Unlike necessity and possibility, it is not bound to a tangible relation of dependency, thus being the least definable mode. But at the same time, it is the most fundamental, most apparently obvious, and most habitually accepted mode.

1. When speaking of what is "actual" in a human being, as opposed to the mask or pose assumed, we mean what is true or genuine in this person. This concerns the opposition between being and appearance, having little to do with modality. Appearance is in fact actual in its own way; otherwise, it is not actual appearance.
2. The equation of actuality and reality lies close at hand, this being encountered just about everywhere in life and even in philosophy – or whatever deems itself such. It is misleading in two ways. First of all, the real has other modes in it as well: real possibility and real necessity, and likewise real nonactuality and real impossibility. Secondly, there is also an essential or ideal actuality, and no less, a logical and epistemological actuality. Thus, in this linguistic usage, the sphere is simply confused with the mode.
3. The meaning of actuality again seems to be displaced in the equation of actuality with "existence." In the strict sense, existence is exclusively real actuality. It consequently excludes the other spheres. But in practice for the most part it is not understood this way, only being understood in terms of its direct givenness in experience. In this sense, it involves only a mode of knowledge.
4. This is also where the confusion of actuality and being-there belongs. Such confusion is very understandable, and only able to be fully invalidated through the most acute analysis, since being-actual is in fact the essence of being-there. But the mode is still confused with the "moment of being." Being-so also claims actuality; and a thing's being-there must be a possible, although it also can be a necessary or contingent. Thus, despite all accusations of apparent pedantry, ontology must make a distinction here.
5. In philosophy, one often encounters the conception of the actual as the "effectual" [*das Wirkliche als das "Wirksame"*]. This turns it into something quite different, making a determinateness of being (a feature of being-so)

out of a mode. But this equation is also ontologically skewed in other ways. Is an individual being only actual when it actually takes effect? Will it be nonactual, if it does not actually take effect? Or does this refer perhaps only to the ability to take effect? Then actuality would be reduced to possibility. But it should form the modal complement to possibility. If efficacy is taken merely as the outer "sign" of actuality, then it remains a skewed sign. It is certainly vexing to see how the sense we have of "actuality" participates in such meanings.

6. The ancient traditional concept of actuality describes being's fullness of content or concrete determinateness as being-actual. According to this concept, the mode of being is graded in relation to the level of each being's determinacy: the organism holds a "more actual" status than an inanimate thing, the mental essence holds a "more actual" status than an organism, etc.; this concept of actuality approaches the Scholastic concept of reality, according to which God is the *ens realissimum* [the most real being], because God is the epitome of all positive predicates. If one does not distinguish "real" from "actual," then this meaning of *realitas* skips over "actuality."

   This presents the same confusion about ontological determinateness as we saw with "efficacy." Meanwhile, this is precisely the characteristic feature of the stratified relation of the real – the fullness of determination increases with the stratum's height while the mode of being remains the same throughout. Understood in a strictly modal manner, actuality has no gradation. It is one and the same in all strata. For it concerns only the kind of being itself, and not the content (the being-so) that "is" in this kind of being. The same holds true for the other modes. The modes form a hierarchy of their own kind in all spheres of the *concretum*, and consequently they are not subject to the gradation of strata.
7. In addition to this concept of actuality, the Middle Ages also passed down a second concept, that of *actualitas* (*actus*). It is the counterpart of *potentia*, going back to the Aristotelian concept of ἐνέργεια, and ἐντελέχεια, respectively. It means exclusively contemplative actualization (εἶδος, *essentia*). Its internal difficulties have already been discussed above (Introduction, sections 2–5). It does not concern the meaning of an ontological mode, because it presupposes a teleological schema in the relation between *dynamis* and *energeia* and moreover does not apply to all that is, let alone to the entire real. It basically excludes all incompleteness from itself. Whereas, the actual world characteristically includes the complete just as much as it does the incomplete.
8. In more recent times, we find a very widespread equation of actuality with "perceptibility," or of the actual with that which is given by the senses.

Kant encouraged this in his second "postulate of empirical thought," which Neo-Kantianism has held onto (for example, Rickert). This comes dangerously close to positivism. This makes actuality into a mere epistemic mode and its kind of givenness takes the place of its kind of being. One is lead astray by taking sensory evidence as evidence of real actuality. First of all, it is not evidence of all actuality, but only of determinately natured actuality. Secondly, it is merely the evidence for that to which it attests, and not its actuality itself.

b) Logical, Gnoseological, and Essential Actuality

Ontology must turn away from these blurred and dissonant meanings of actuality. The things in them pertaining to the true problem-matter belong in contexts other than those of modal analysis. What remains are the four meanings, in which the meaning of being-actual is divided according to spheres. The first two of these meanings will now be summarized.

1. "Logical actuality" is known from the way in which assertoric judgment attains validity. It is being-actual's form of predication, the bare "it is so" – indifferent toward being-necessary or being-contingent, without reflection on being-possible. Removed from connections and conditions, it appears as something being-posited irrespective of them.
2. The situation regarding "epistemic actuality" corresponds to this. Assertoric judgment is only its expression and is not identical to it. It does not mean the actuality of the known (which would be a particular form of real actuality), but knowledge of something's being-actual. It differs from epistemic necessity and epistemic possibility, because the object is comprehended not on the grounds of something else, not from its relation or conditionality, but as detached from these and from itself, in a mode characteristic of knowledge, the mode of direct givenness. Here, the actual does not appear as that which is, nor as the valid, but as the lived, the experienced, the observed, the stated; immediate in a manner similar to the identifiable, the specifiable, but not the demonstrable. It is absolutely not the understood or comprehended, and within itself is not even the comprehensible. Comprehension and understanding can only come from conditionalities, reasons, presuppositions; this is a matter of knowledge of possibility and knowledge of necessity. Mere being-given behaves indifferently toward these things. This is the reason why in everyday life epistemic actuality is easily mistaken for contingency.

But if it is givenness, then this means that it is in no way restricted to sensory evidence. Here, the given entity is life and experience in every form. This domain includes living through events and situations, which is only ever partially based on perception; likewise, the experience which we endow with a strangely human character and no less the inner self-experience which is occasionally just as surprising as other experiences. In all of these, perception is only one source among others.

3. From a different perspective, "essential actuality" is related to logical actuality. It means plain existence in the ideal sphere of being. One is familiar with this, for example, in "mathematical existence." This does not merge with validity, but implies a being, a "there is." It is attached to the aspect of being, of "ideal being-there." But essential actuality is to be more widely understood; it equally concerns "ideal being-so." For the same existence holds true for all essential features that are visible and able to be factored out. Except that here it does not depend on the seeing and stating itself – which would be mere epistemic actuality – rather it depends on the known, the object.

   Essential actuality is a difficult mode to comprehend, because connections dominate in the ideal sphere of being. Pure, ideal existence is only to be comprehended by disregarding these connections. This is not to say that there is an ideal existence without being-possible and being-necessary. That is not what is at issue here. All such questions already concern the intermodal relations of the ideal sphere. But even if essential actuality should always be indissolubly connected to essential possibility and essential necessity (for the former, there is no doubt that this is the case), it still remains something different than these modes. For purely as such, it is a plain being, while those modes are a relational being. Non-detachability would therefore not reside in the nature of the mode as such, but in the relational structure of content in the ontological ideal sphere.

c) The Special Position of Real Actuality

"Real actuality" becomes comprehensible only in opposition to the mode of validity, to factual knowledge, and to ideal existence. Actuality, in a narrower, proper sense, is only real actuality. This makes it very understandable that time and time again actuality is taken for plain reality – understandable, but by no means true.

Real actuality is beyond all ways of givenness and kinds of validity. It is as indifferent as only a true character of being can be toward all becoming known

and all judgment. But it also remains equally beyond essential actuality; what there "is" ideally, there still is not yet in reality. For the real, essential actuality means only a possible, and by no means a real possible, since a long series of real conditions would still belong to a real possible. The real actual contains in itself the individuality of the particular case. It encompasses everything that necessarily is "contingent" in relation to its essence. Whatever may in itself be contingent cannot be decided from the way of being alone.

Real actuality is in itself indifferent toward necessity and contingency. Whether this is in fact the case in the real realm, and whether the individual actual can exist in it without necessity is another question. But it should be emphasized that if the individual actual cannot exist without necessity, then it would not reside within necessity as a universal mode of being, but rather in real connection as a continuous, relational formation. Real actuality as such is not a structural aspect of the real. It is nothing but the naked "being-so-and-not-otherwise," lacking the reasons for why it is not otherwise. It does not exclude reasons, but does not consist in being based on them either.

This becomes very clear if one looks at the real actual as a whole, and therefore at the world as it "is." For beyond it, there are neither reasons nor conditions. Whether a particular actual thing can exist within the world in such a state of detachment is another problem altogether. Should this problem be negated, however, the totality of the real actual would still remain as something that cannot be necessary, because it has no reasons or conditions outside of itself on which it could be based. To the contrary, real necessity finds a limit in the wholeness and in the first links of its chains of conditions, respectively. The same holds true, as has been shown, for the relational structure of being-possible.

Real actuality is the least determinable and least describable mode. This is because of its detachment from and indifference toward the relational modes. For its kind of being can never be comprehended in itself; only its relatedness is able to be comprehended. On the other hand, it is the mode that is experienced in the most extreme ways of givenness. Here, belong the ways of givenness that originate from emotionally transcendent acts, from the hardship experienced in events, destinies, occurrences, and the weight of day-to-day life with its fullness and gravity. Human existence in its dynamism and drama is a unique and thorough testimony to the real actual. For all evidence of reality is first and foremost evidence of actuality. Only secondarily, in reflection, is it also evidence of real possibility and real necessity.

It is here that the reason lies as to why, in everyday life, "experience," broadly understood, prevails to such a large extent over all universal knowledge, all anticipation and apriority. It alone offers the tangibility of being placed

directly before something and being incorporated – of being concerned, being gripped by something, or being impressed.

These are, of course, only ways of givenness of the actual, and not the actual itself. But its modal character is indeed reflected in them. Pure being-actual as such is not able to be characterized, even though it is so prevalent and self-evident to us, the most familiar of what is familiar. The expression, "existence" – which of course does not coincide with actuality[2] – brings something out into view. It implies emergence, appearance, or occurrence (in effect the being-revealed from the twilight of indeterminateness, so to speak), and it is in this that something's becoming-actual in the flow of real events consists. For all of the real actual has its time, its coming and going; the great stream of becoming lets it leap into being and then sink back again.

From another perspective, "being-there" implies something similar, although being-there does not by any means coincide with actuality. It is rather an aspect of being. In this way it seems to claim its place through something like a making-itself-wider in narrow real relations, a being-present and not-being-brought-away, a hulking and unconciliatory kind of thing. It is thus something that – being transmitted through space – evokes the impenetrability of matter. These are, to be sure, only images, and need not be taken literally; but within the essence of the real actual there is assuredly something of each of them.

d) Actuality and Nonactuality

Among the last four enumerated meanings of actuality, clearly real actuality is the one that is ontologically fundamental. It will be shown that real actuality forms the basic mode among the other modes and their variations. Thus, it is that on which the whole of modal analysis centers, even when it seems to be pushed into the background by an abundance of special problems. But detachment and lack of relation are common to the four types of actuality, since they separate themselves according to sphere. For that reason, actuality is the most irrational mode in all spheres.

It is unnecessary to further explain why the same also applies to nonactuality. This mode exhibits the same differentiation in spheres; there is logical and

2 Philosophical language understands "existence" more in terms of an aspect of being (real being-there) than a mode of being (real actuality). Moreover, existence applies only to the nature of substance, and not to the real event.

essential nonactuality, epistemic and real nonactuality. Each has a meaning strictly corresponding to its positive correlate. But purely as such, nonactuality plays no independent role; indeed it can hardly even be assigned a role in the real sphere. Only in connection with the actual, that is "on the grounds" of this connection, does it acquire a certain meaning. It is a mode of empty space in the spheres. But empty spaces "are" only something through their positive delineation. The mode is thereby accorded its secondary being. For it gains this meaning from the counter-mode, from actuality. Only in withdrawing itself from actuality, is it something assignable. Naked nonbeing is not a kind of being.

In this sense, nonactuality does not exhibit quite the same detachment as actuality, since it is not to the same extent an absolute or fundamental mode. Or rather, it is basically such a mode, but only in a concurrent way. It is detached from the connections of conditions in the same way as actuality, and is indifferent toward the relational modes, but is not able to be detached from the actual. This is, nevertheless, another kind of connectedness, which renders the principal difference between negative possibility and negative necessity all the more clearly recognizable.

Apart from that, the qualitative element of negation in it belongs to another group of problems. It will be dealt with in the discussion of the categories of quality.

II The Basic Modal Law

5 Toward the Differentiation of the Modes

a) The Appearance of Contingency in Being-Actual

The equivocations of modal concepts revealed a series of popular meanings put forward everywhere in lieu of the modes' proper categorial meaning. These popular meanings have obstructed the comprehension of the modes in the formation of philosophical concepts. Dismantling them presents greater difficulty than one would expect. It is insufficient to merely expose their inconsistencies, because they have taken root in the philosophical train of thought itself. Thus, we will have to deal with them over and over again.

More importantly, it would not even suffice to completely overcome them in one's own thinking. For even the group of stricter philosophical terms leaves much to be desired in terms of transparency. Rather, the settling of the outer, more than the semantically adhering aporias, enables new and more deeply reaching aporias concerning the matter to emerge.

In particular, contingency and actuality are still open to ambiguity. There is a kind of similarity between them and it is not completely external. The two belong close together. Only the actual can be contingent; the nonactual can, of course, be contingent as well, but it has no role to play independent from the actual. The actual is misunderstood in this manner, because it appears to be pushed aside by its detachment in the proximity of the contingent.

Yet it is precisely this that is unclear. For there is still question as to whether there is a contingent amidst world connection. But there is no question as to whether there are actuals. If, according to what was discussed above, the actual in itself were indifferent toward necessity and contingency, then this would not imply being pushed into "the realm of chance" or presuming contingency's factual occurrence in the world.

The difficulties arising at this point are immense, only to be multiplied by the conceptual incomprehensibility of being-actual. Nothing is changed here by the fact that actuality is clearly given in experience, since no conceptual determination is to be gained from such a source. This incomprehensibility is also related to contingency. Moreover, having an experiential character, the actual's ways of givenness themselves bear the stamp of the contingent. This is only epistemic contingency, but it still remains deeply disconcerting. It is not a knowledge of contingency (like the other epistemic modes) – were it such, it would provide the insight that virtually no dependency is present. Instead it

is mere epistemic contingency, namely due to the lack of an understanding of its conditionality.

But knowledge transmits its own experienced contingency to its object. It "encounters" the object in an apparent absence of connection, and the object "comes to it." And since the object is understood as actual, the actual appears contingent. We cannot eliminate this ever-recurring process. We can only seek to figure it out, understanding it as the source of ontological error. In this manner we can at least paralyze its disconcerting effect.

b) The Reflection of the Modes of Being in the Secondary Modes

In everyday life, just as in scholarship, there is a tendency to shift all ontological modality to the spheres that are most accessible to us, although they are secondary – the sphere of logic and the sphere of knowledge. This forces the primary modes, the modes proper to the ontological spheres, out of the philosophical field of view. For once they are remodeled in a manner analogous to the epistemological modes, they disappear behind the substitutes that have arisen.

This cannot be completely avoided. Everything is given in ways of knowledge. But if the understanding of the ontological modes is not successfully freed from the influence of the modes of knowledge and judgment, then one inevitably overlooks the ontological aspect of the modal problem. The modal problem fundamentally depends on this ontological aspect alone. The modalities of judgment and knowledge do not bear nearly as great importance. That is why contraposing these spheres offers such uniquely clarifying significance.

The analysis of equivocations has already taught us something decisive about this issue. It showed that conversely, the modes of secondary spheres are dependent on those of ontological spheres, being related to them – particularly to the real modes – and thus directly exhibiting a certain counter formation. This is evident as soon as one has understood that the modes of judgment are neither absorbed into levels of validity, nor are the modes of knowledge absorbed into levels of certainty. Rather they signify the "predication" of being-able-to-be, of plain being, and of having-to-be, but these mean the "knowledge" of the very same three levels of being, i.e. both the knowledge as well as the predication of real, in addition to that of ideal being-able-to-be, plain being, and having-to-be. The modes of being are faithfully reflected in the modes of judgment and of knowledge. On the one hand, they are clearly withdrawn from them, but on the other they very well may be extracted from them. Of course the last claim is

only roughly true, as was shown by the semantic analysis. It was most clearly perceptible in the dichotomy of disjunctive and indifferent possibility. But this leads back to the other modes.

This is a valuable methodological clue, but at the same time it presents a new aporia and not simply a methodological one, at that. The logical and gnoseological modes point beyond themselves to the modes of being, while at the same time concealing them behind the seemingly ontological form, in which they themselves appear. The difference between assertoric and problematic judgment is only comprehensible in the predicative ontological character of the copula: "S is P" and "P can be S." Epistemic actuality and epistemic possibility are distinguished by the insight that something "is" the case, and by the insight that something "can be" the case. Thereafter, one is tricked into thinking that the modes of being must be directly comprehensible in the logical and gnoseological modes. In classical ontology one is misled by this when dealing with *de possibili et impossibili* for instance. This is very clear in Wolff, who always argues on the grounds of conceivability and recognizability. One loses track of the main subject in the process.

The most important thing is that the "S can be P" posited in judgment is not identical to the ontically real (or even the ontically ideal) being-able-to-be-P of S. It is also crucial to recognize that a series of conditions is required for this to occur in full totality, a totality which is not taken into consideration in problematic judgment, let alone posited with it. Judgment can only calculate with partial possibility, but ontically taken this is not at all possibility. The same holds true for the different kinds of knowledge of possibility. This knowledge makes decisions by merely partial possibility. This is why nothing can be inferred with certainty from the possibility merely recognized or posited in judgment.

Obviously, nothing can be subsumed under such possibility, because it is disjunctive and not indifferent. The consequence could only be as follows: insofar as conditions are known, the particular case of S having the character of P bears no contradiction. Ontically such a consequence is just as good as worthless, since a single further condition – and the absence of a single further condition, respectively – can render impossible S's being-P in the particular case. Indeed, it can turn into a direct contradiction. And with this the same relation is transmitted to essential possibility. For only that which is not in contradiction to any of its essential characteristics is essentially possible for S. If judgment in itself has no guarantee that it will encompass all the essential characteristics of S, then it is ideally-ontologically worthless and does not allows for any subsumption of specific cases.

Wherever such judgment of possibility is established by a science of ideal being, it is connected to the content oriented investigation into S's essence. It only comes to be understood once it has incorporated the totality of essential characteristics. The same is true of mathematics. It can accomplish this task – at least in simpler situations – because its objects possess only a limited totality of characteristics. In the universal intuition of essences [*allgemeine Wesensschau*], however, as it accounts for the aprioristic impact of the science of experience, this is not possible. Here, the discrepancy between the possibility of judgment and possibility of knowledge on the one hand and essential possibility on the other is just as great as the discrepancy between essential possibility and real possibility.

c) The Dimensions of Opposition of Modal Diversity

On the other hand, the differentiation according to spheres has brought into view a multiplicity of the modes, leading one to expect an extraordinary complexity of their mutual relations – of intermodal relations – and of their laws. If all six modes (as enumerated in Ch. 1a) recur in each of the four spheres, namely in essential variation, then we have to deal with at least 24 modes, their mutual relations being present within each sphere as well as from sphere to sphere in the investigation.

In this multiplicity one must begin by classifying it into a structure. The semantic analysis has already supplied the starting points for such a classification.

Each positive mode is opposed to its negation; i.e. the negative modes are arranged in opposition to the positive modes. Yet, at the same time, the difference in ontological importance provides a gradation of the modes, a higher and a lower order entirely due to the modes' ontological status. This hierarchy of positive modes appears to recur with the negative modes.

The opposition of the spheres proceeds further, again being twofold: on one hand, it depends on the opposition of the proper ontological modes (or primary modes, i.e. the modes of the ontological spheres) and secondary modes (such as those of judgment and of knowledge); on the other hand, it depends on the opposition of real modes and ideal modes. The latter recurs in a modified form in the opposition of gnoseological and logical modes. For the logical modes are primarily determined by the essential modes, as logical lawfulness represents a modified sector of more or less applied ideal lawfulness. The epistemological modes, however, are primarily determined by the real modes, at least they appear to be, when one looks at the vast majority of experiences

in their basic forms without one-sidedly orienting oneself toward scientifically exact knowledge. It is knowledge that, in its dual sources or ways of givenness, is turned, on the one hand, toward real actuality (in comprehension *a posteriori*), and, on the other hand, toward real possibility and real necessity (in comprehension *a priori*). Pure, ideal knowledge, in contrast, only depends on a single source, the aprioristic.

A difference of determination does not coincide with any of these four kinds of oppositions. The difference becomes conspicuous when the types of possibility, the positive as well as the negative, are placed alongside those of necessity. Thus, a fifth opposition is added, the opposition of determinate and indeterminate modal character.

However, the dimensions of the modal oppositions are not depleted by this. There is yet a sixth dimension, which has already emerged in the above analysis, but still does not come any closer to determination. This is the opposition of the fundamental and relational modes. It obviously takes up an entirely different position than the other oppositions; and one may expect very different consequences to be drawn from it.

This produces a six-fold oppositional dimensionality, in which the dimensions mutually overlap:

1. Positive and Negative Modes
2. Higher and Lower Modes
3. Ontological Modes and Secondary Modes
4. Ideal Modes and Real Modes (recurring in the secondary modes)
5. Determinate and Indeterminate Modes
6. Fundamental and Relational Modes

Of these oppositions, each bears its own particular weight. The whole of the further investigation is arranged according to what concerns the spheres (represented here in the 3rd and 4th oppositions). The 1st opposition is, in itself, transparent; the 6th will be investigated shortly, with the "basic modal law" being rooted in it. But the relation of the 2nd and 5th oppositions of modal analysis will be shown to emphasize a further particular issue, it being here that the ontological importance of special intermodal relations (differentiated according to the spheres) is concentrated. The focal point of the investigation is thereby shifted to the problem of arranging or hierarchizing the modes. And as this is only to be decided from the relations that hold sway between the modes, all further analysis depends on demonstrating the intermodal laws.

6 The Opposition of the Fundamental and Relational Modes

a) Conditionality and Unconditionality of the Kind of Being

The last opposition enumerated requires special clarification. It is predominantly this opposition that cuts decisively across the hierarchy of the modes provided above. If actuality is placed between possibility and necessity – with the reasoning that it is "more" than being-possible and "less" than being-necessary – then its common position of opposition toward both clearly cannot be comprehended. This position of mutual opposition, however, is deeply characteristic, not only of actuality itself, but also of both its counterparts. The analysis of meanings already showed that necessity and possibility clearly have the character of relational connectedness in all spheres, while actuality is clearly detached from all relational connections in all spheres.

The same holds true *mutatis mutandis* for the negative modes. With them, contingency must initially be left out of the picture; as negation of necessity it is also negation of relationality in general. Thus, it can only appear in the actual. But here, the relations are quite particular and must be carefully investigated. On the other hand, nonactuality and impossibility clearly exhibit the opposition of a fundamental mode and a relational mode; as then impossibility represents nonbeing's necessity.

One now visualizes the relation concretely. If **A** is necessary, then it is necessary "on the grounds of something," or "through something." If **A** is possible, then it is possible "by virtue of certain conditions," and thus "by means of something." Nothing is necessary or possible purely in itself or purely "by means of nothing else." Necessity and possibility are not modes that rest in themselves, but rather they are "based" modes, that is, they are always based on something else. They only arise and can only arise in the structure of being, in which everything is connected by relations of dependency. They signify an indirect, supported kind of being, never identical to the supporting being, and yet standing and falling along with it.

The same applies to impossibility. If **A** is impossible, then it is impossible "by means of something" that does not allow **A** to become actual. Something can only be impossible where there already exists something that is opposed to its possibility. Impossibility can only arise within a particular structure of being.

The "relationality" of impossibility, possibility and necessity consists in this correlation. It is characteristic of these modes in all spheres, and thus concerns the essence of the modes themselves, not their particular position or variation.

And in them it forms a shared opposition to the absolutism of the "fundamental" modes, which have no such correlation.

The fundamental modes are actuality and nonactuality. If **A** is actual, then this in no way stipulates whether it is actual on the grounds of something or on the grounds of nothing; and the same applies to whether or not the conditions for **A** must be fulfilled. The objection will, of course, quickly be brought forward that there is no such isolated actuality in the world, and that conditions must in fact always be fulfilled. This should not be disputed, but here it is not what is under discussion. If this is the case in this world, the only world we know, then they do not stem from the essence of actuality, but from the essence of the world as it is at any given time. Of course, what is actual must at least be possible and in this real world possibility depends on a chain of conditions. But in principle one can conceive of a real world, in which things would proceed differently, in which all that is would stand on its own, without conditions or reasons.

The particular nature of the existing real world cannot be modally expressed in any manner other than through the principal formulation of the intermodal relation consisting in it, between possibility and actuality, on the one hand, and between necessity and actuality, on the other. This will be dealt with in the discussion of the real sphere's intermodal laws. But relationality does not reside within the essence of the actual as such.

The pure being-actual of something is not relative to the being-actual of something else. It has modal "absolutism." This means that actuality is not a relational, but a "fundamental" mode of being. And one may add: this makes it also a "pure" mode of being. Relatedness in itself is not a matter of modality, but a matter of the constitution, the structure, the character of the content. Therefore, the relational modes are not pure modes, but stand at the border between ontological kind and ontological determination, between modal and constitutive categories. Only actuality, and along with it nonactuality, is pure modality. This is in turn the reason why its essence is less tangible to such a great extent. For only the constituent related to the content can ever be directly comprehended, not the kind of being in itself.

It is easy to see that for nonactuality it is the same as for actuality. Nonactuality is only qualitatively distinguished from actuality, being the very same mode turned into the negative. If something is nonactual, then this does not stipulate whether or not it is nonactual "on the grounds" of something, i.e. whether something existed before it that did not let it become actual. It does not need to be impossible; it may also be "contingently" nonactual. Whether there is such "contingent" nonactuality in the real world is another matter to be decided elsewhere. But, its being conditioned does not stem from the

modal character of the nonactual in itself. Nonactuality is an absolute mode (despite its lack of independence from actuality). For it, there could very well be a real world in which being-nonactual would be just as contingent as being-actual.

b) The Aporia of Conditionality in Essential Necessity

With regard to ideal being, the differentiation of relational and fundamental modes pushes against a certain resistance by traditional conceptions. If essential actuality is already difficult to clearly distinguish from essential possibility – in ideal being, everything "possible" is also ideally actual – then it now seems completely unfeasible to relationally understand essential possibility and essential necessity. If the former indicates the absence of contradiction of a form in itself, then this form is not related to another one, let alone made dependent upon it. Furthermore, essential necessity could seem to be a being-necessary of essentiality in itself and in relation to itself. Being-necessary in relation to a particular "essence" is meant to indicate precisely such an internal relation. And for that reason, it is called "internal necessity," in opposition to "external necessity," as it reveals the real.

If one has successfully reached this point, then one may go a step further and say that, real necessity is not true necessity at all; namely, because it is merely "external" necessity. This is just a merely "accidental," and in this respect, "contingent" necessity. This view is widespread. It implicitly underlies the phenomenological method of argumentation, which unhesitatingly declares all real being-there as such to be "contingent." This is related to the method of bracketing. The bracketed is understood as contingent, because it is extrinsic in relation to the essence.

Here, several errors have been intertwined with each other, and they must initially be kept apart. Above all this problem is due to the inability of the "intuition of essences" (as well as of ancient theories of essence) to draw a strict distinction between the ways of being and their essentially very different modes. A concept of necessity convenient for this practice is indiscriminately taken as the grounds, defining necessity as essentiality, namely, as that which belongs to the *eidos* of a thing. As a result one no longer has the freedom to consider any other concept of necessity aside from this. Once this position has been taken on the matter, one is no longer able to recognize that it does not yield the essence of necessity, but only the essence of essence, and thus a tautological definition. In truth, such "necessity" does not have a

modal character at all, but a character unworthy of the sphere and name of an ontological mode.

If this is rectified, then the meaning of essential necessity can be determined with all strictness in two ways. The first is that there is in fact another, equally true necessity alongside essential necessity; one that goes much farther than it, concerning real being-there itself, and sparing none of the cases' quite individual particularity. It is this that is real necessity. It is based not in essence, but in real connection. It is entirely contingent in relation to essence, but in no way contingent in relation to the real. It leads to a linkage of the real with a "first contingent," but this is not its peculiarity; essential necessity does this within its sphere as well (see Ch. 2 c. above). In this respect, there is no difference between the two. Insofar as real necessity is contingent, essential necessity must also be contingent within its sphere. That an essentiality is thus provided in this manner and that when traced back to its final reasons the determinate results from it with essential necessity, is seen to be just as contingent as the determining chain of the real's composition. Both have behind them the contingency of their first foundations, as well as the contingency of the whole of the sphere.

But in addition to this, there is a second way. Essential necessity in itself is no less relational than real necessity. Essential necessity is not the essence itself, but rather something else due to the essence; or, because of determinate essential characteristics, other essential characteristics are necessary. It does not make any sense to say that the essence of a triangle is necessary; but it does indeed make sense to say: it necessarily belongs to the essence of a triangle that the sum of its angles = 180°. Essential necessity has the indissoluble form of "belonging to" or "being ascribed to" (ὑπάρχειν). But one thing can only "belong to" something else, and not to itself. What essential necessity ontologically implies is this: if a shape has the characteristics **a b c**, then the characteristic **d** still belongs to it indissolubly. This characteristic is connected with the others, and belongs to them. This state of belonging in the essential sphere is the same as the inability-to-be-absent in the real sphere. Essential necessity is, therefore, relational in the same sense as real necessity.

c) The Same Aporia in Essential Possibility

The difficulty with essential possibility is similarly disentangled. It has the form of non-contradiction. This presupposes that wherever essential possibility appears, certain aspects are already present, which the essential characteristics

in question can either correspond to or contradict. In a planar triangle, two angles of 90° are not possible, but one such angle is possible. Certain essential characteristics are present within the essence of the triangle (e.g. the law of angular sum) and these contradict the one, but not the other. Essential possibility depends on the relation of essential characteristics pertaining to content. It is therefore relational in the same sense as real possibility is in its sphere. And the same is also true of essential impossibility.

Even here it cannot be claimed to be a "purely internal" possibility (and impossibility), while real possibility is deemed an "external" possibility that exists due to conditions outside of the thing in question. The external and internal are completely relative. One may very well say that an ideal entity would be a "thing possible in itself;" but it is such only as long as each of its attributes can coexist with the others. This becomes quite important when the counterexample of the "square circle" is called upon. The salient point is that ideal entities are not simple in themselves, and that in their complexity there is room for the unanimity or antagonism of attributes. As a matter of fact, it is the case for the "in itself possible" that only one attribute, or one group of attributes, is possible or impossible in relation to the remaining attributes, but never each for itself or in itself. Thus, the relationality that forms the basic structure of all being-possible is re-established. The remaining aspects are those that stand opposed to the one in question. They are external moments in exactly the same sense as real conditions are external to the real conditioned.

Ultimately, it is not the case even in the essential sphere that it depends only on the "internal possibility" of an entity itself. Rather, it is always at the same time an issue of compossibility with other entities in the sphere, insofar as these have already formed a connection in which all belong, placed alongside each other. Whatever is to be possible for the triangle must also agree with the basic relations of lines and angles, that is, right up to the axioms. Otherwise, it is not geometrically possible.

This merges a whole field of entities together with its essential connections in an indissoluble unity. And this unity now proves itself to be primary, standing before all isolation of individually existing entities. Indeed, already implicitly found in an entity's "inner" non-contradiction was the whole breadth of external absence of contradiction, reaching to the limits of existing essential connections.

Internal non-contradiction is only detached from external non-contradiction *in abstracto*. In truth, it is rooted in it, just as the individual entity is rooted in the structure of ideal entities as a whole. Considered categorially, this is the same rootedness in the whole of continuous connections that the real individual entity has in its sphere at all times.

7 The Development of the Basic Modal Law

a) The Relativity of Relational Modes to Fundamental Modes

Relationality is not relativity. It is not in opposition to absoluteness. Even relations can be absolute. And in this sense, the relational modes do not lack absoluteness. To claim that relational modes have relativity, however, is something separate, which demands proof.

Whatever is "relational" consists in relation, and has the structure of relation. Thus, it does not need to be relative. But whatever is "relative" stands in relation to something else, thus being dependent on it or "relative to it." It does not, in itself, need to be structured by the relation, i.e. to be relational.

In a relational structure, the components are necessarily relative to each other; but the structure as a whole does not need to be relative to its parts in the same sense. On the other hand, a relative structure, i.e. a structure which is itself a component of a relation, does not need to have a relational structure itself. Although the relationality of a structure may very well involve relativity. And then relativity, in categorial opposition to absolutism, enters into it indirectly.

For example, this is always fundamentally the case at the limits of entire relational structures. All connection and all connectedness trace back to some last link that cannot be understood from the state of connectedness itself. The entirety of the relational structure is then relative to this last link.

This relativity is readily visible in the relational modes. Considered constitutively, it first comes to light only in the final links of ontological connections – in first conditions, principles, and so on – but modally, it is always directly comprehensible in each particular possible thing and necessary thing. This relation is expressed as the "basic modal law:"

All relational modes are relative to the absolute modes. It is for this reason alone that the latter are called "fundamental" modes.

Or, if the particular modes are incorporated into the basic law: impossibility, possibility, and necessity are relative to actuality and nonactuality. For this reason actuality and nonactuality are the fundamental modes.

This basic modal law holds true in all spheres of possible modal gradation; it even holds true for the blurred and inconsistent popular meanings of modal concepts. That is to say, its validity is to be understood in such a way that everywhere the relational modes of a sphere are correlated with actuality and nonactuality in the same sphere.

The correlative relation itself, however, consists of a fundamental mode being presupposed or contained in a relational mode. But this dual form alone does not say much. For this is a very specific way of being presupposed or contained and by no means is it to be mistaken as having a categorial implication. Rather, it appears for its part in two different senses – in a dual direction, more or less – so that each individual relational mode is relative to the fundamental mode in a twofold manner.

To demonstrate this twofold relativity and to prove the basic modal law – since it remains unproven for the moment – is one and the same task. It will have to consist of a separate proof for each kind of relative existence, or as we may say in anticipation, in a proof of "internal" and "external" relativity. The former will be dealt with first.

b) The Proof of "Internal" Relativity

There is in possibility, impossibility, and necessity a pure, internal relation, through which they are aligned with being-actual or with being-nonactual; a relation maintained within its simple modal meaning and thus not only involved through its relationality. It can be demonstrated in the following manner.

The impossibility of **A** indicates that **A** is not able "to be;" its possibility indicates that **A** is able "to be;" its necessity indicates that **A** has "to be." Therefore, the not-being-able, the being-able, and the having-to are related to a "to be" that is modally foundational and of primary importance for them. Without such a "to be," all being-able and having-to is meaningless. It is a being-able and having-to of nothing, and therefore does not exist at all. But which mode does this "to be" have?

There is only one answer to this question: for its part, it does not have relational modality – otherwise, there would be an infinite regress of the correlative relationship – on the contrary, it must have "absolute" modality, a "plain being" that is not further reducible. But this means: it has the mode of actuality. And in the negative case (e.g. in the possibility of nonbeing), it has the mode of nonactuality.

One may easily convince oneself of this. The impossibility of **A** means: **A** cannot be "actual;" the possibility of **A** means: **A** can be "actual;" and the necessity of **A** means: **A** must be "actual." In all three cases, it is the being-actual of **A** that is impossible, possible, or necessary. We are only deceived about this state of affairs by the habitual usage of simplified everyday parlance, which does not name the fundamental mode. In this manner it comes to appear as if actuality were on the same level as possibility and necessity. In truth,

possibility and necessity are merely modal aspects of relativity in being-actual. For this reason, they are entirely meaningless without the fundamental mode as their mutual point of reference.

This is clearly a relativity that cannot be reversed. One may surely speak of the actuality of a thing's being-necessary or being-possible, but only in the same sense as one may speak of a necessity or possibility of a thing's being-necessary (and respectively, being-possible). However, one is then referring to a complex secondary mode, which does not after all herald any new kind of being, but only an echelon of the very same fundamental modes. And such an echelon does not even lie within the essence of that necessity and possibility, rather it lies only in the particular content **A**, with necessity and possibility being the modality of this content. On the other hand, it is essential for all possibility and necessity to be founded on the "absolute mode."

This becomes quite clear, if we further follow the regress led by the echelon of relational modes. In a "possibility of possibility," the second possibility remains related to the absolute mode – whether it remains so directly or through further graduated links – and somewhere in the background the possibility of something's being-actual must exist. Otherwise, the whole series would collapse back in on itself. The same holds true for every possibility of necessity and for every necessity of possibility, and as always one may further combine this with the influence of impossibility.

In every echelon, the basic modal relation continues to exist: the relational modes – directly or indirectly – remain modal components of being-actual; they remain its particularizations and variations, in accordance with the kind of conditional relations that prevail in the sphere in question. On the other hand, the fundamental modes as such are not modes of another modality, but are what they are simply and without making reference back to anything else: plain being and nonbeing, actuality and nonactuality.

c) Implementation and Apparent Difficulties

This "internal relativity" of the relational modes to the fundamental modes is common to all spheres. It is most clearly visible in the real sphere. Here, it nearly goes without saying and one only needs to become aware of it in order to find it confirmed everywhere. "An event is possible" means nothing other than "it can actually occur;" "a consequence is necessary" means nothing other than "it must actually occur." In both cases, it is the real being-actual (and respectively, the actual occurrence) that "can" be or "must" be. And it plays out in exactly the same way for impossibility regarding the "inability to be actual."

The same can be shown for the modes of knowledge. Knowledge of **A**'s possibility involves the insight that **A** can "be actual." Knowledge of **A**'s necessity involves the insight that **A** must "be actual." Knowledge of **A**'s impossibility involves the insight that **A** cannot "be actual." Everywhere being-actual is found to be the underlying thing whose being-possible and being-necessary is comprehended.

The case is quite similar for the logical modes. The judgment, "S can be P," declares that the being-P of S can be actual. The same schema is present in "S must be P," and "S cannot be P." S's "actually-being-P" is always what is being declared as something that must be, can be, or cannot be. Thus, as expressed by the copula, the same relativity to the absolute mode recurs in predicative being as holds sway in being real and in being known.

With the essential modes, it is more difficult to see this relation; but only because actuality is more withdrawn in the ideal sphere, vanishing behind the domination of relations, associations, and conditionalities. If it is "possible" for a triangle to have a right angle, but "impossible" for it to have two right angles, then the essential actuality of this may very well be demonstrated, namely, in a form relative to the other attributes of the triangle, determining that "there is" and "there is not." This is seen most clearly in essential impossibility: there can be no triangle with two right angles; or, there cannot be two right angles in a triangle. In the case of essential possibility, this means: there can, indeed, be one right angle in a triangle. In such formulations, one must not be confused by either the unusual phrasing (due to pleonastic practice) or the form of judgment expressed. It does not concern the logical mode of judgment, but rather the essential mode of the geometrical facts. And in this mode, one distinctly perceives the relatedness to the "occurrence," to the "existence" – in short, to the mathematical existence that is concealed behind the "there is."

That the same holds true for essential possibility is seen in how the example varies in a corresponding manner. That two angles are necessarily acute in every triangle obviously means that "there are" necessarily two acute angles in every triangle. This is the necessity of "there are," i.e. that of essential possibility.

d) Nonactuality as a Fundamental Mode

So far, it should be clear that actuality constitutes the fundamental mode of the relational modes in all spheres, and that, consequently, actuality is "what" is in fact necessary, possible, or impossible. But, aside from this, nonactuality also claims a similar role. There is also necessity, possibility, and impossibility of being-nonactual.

These modes form no new modal levels to be added to those of being-actual, but rather they coincide with them. Impossibility is negative necessity, nonactuality is negative actuality; consequently, both negativities are neutralized according to the law of *duplex negatio*. The necessity of being-nonactual is the impossibility of being-actual; the impossibility of being-nonactual is the necessity of being-actual. This dual law is well known in logic. But it is far from a merely logical law. It is a continuous law common to all spheres, governing the equivalence of modes. It is known – omitting the practical designation of absolute modes that only operates tautologically – generally under the shortened formula: the necessity of not-**A** is the impossibility of **A**, and the impossibility of not-**A** is the necessity of **A**. The facility with which the negation changes place (without changing the common mode) leads one to forget that it is not concerned with a merely qualitative law, but rather a modal one. Behind the simplified expressions "**A**" and "not-**A**," hide the fundamental modes of actuality and nonactuality.

Things work out a little differently for possibility, insofar as it is the possibility of being-nonactual. Wherever disjunctive possibility is concerned, it is always simultaneously the possibility of **A** and not-**A**, meaning that it is simultaneously the possibility of being-actual and being-nonactual. As disjunctive possibility, it is always simultaneously correlated with both fundamental modes.

However, if it is a matter of the indifferent possibility maintained in being-actual, then the dual possibility collapses, with only one limb remaining. Then the possibility of **A** is different from that of not-**A**, and moreover indifferent toward its existence. But this means that the whole mode splits into a possibility of being-actual and a possibility, which is indifferent toward it, of being-nonactual. This is the case wherever total possibility is involved, because only partial possibility can be disjunctive.

In a purely modal way, then, the possibility of being-nonactual is not reducible to the possibility of being-actual. But it is certainly reducible in terms of content. For in the overall picture of the actual (one in every sphere), the nonactuality of **A** is always the actuality of **B**; and, correspondingly, the possibility of not-**A** is at the same time the possibility of **B**. Whereby the relation concerning the content of **A** and **B** falls under the categorial basic relation of quality, thus having nothing to do with the modal character.

e) The Proof of "External" Relativity

The basic modal law signifies a dual relativity of the relational modes to the fundamental modes. The first of these relativities, the "internal" one, lies within the

categorial meaning of the modes themselves. The second lies within their relatedness to another being in the same sphere. This is "external" relativity. External relativity is also relative to the fundamental modes, insofar as the other being, which the relation traces back to, exhibits the mode of actuality (or nonactuality, respectively).

The extent to which possibility is always, necessarily being-possible "on the grounds" of something has been shown above, as has the extent to which necessity and impossibility exist always necessarily "on the grounds" of something. The three relational modes have their conditionality "outside of themselves," and thus they have an "external" relativity. They are only possible in an existing connection of whatever is (regardless of the sphere), and thus are only to be found where some kind of *modus dependendi* holds sway.

This is to say that they have a constitutive flipside, and that they are not completely absorbed into a pure kind of being. The ontological connection between constitutive and modal categories inheres in them. And this point of connection leads to a series of difficulties, which must be resolved in the problem of determination. But the modal dimension to the issue does not concern the modes as such, rather it concerns the intermodal laws, since they are peculiar to the individual spheres. For the time being, we only have to deal with the issue of the being-conditioned itself in the structure of the modes. The question of their mutual implication must wait to be answered. It is not able to be generally asked or generally answered.

In general, one may only ask: which mode contains that which provides the "grounds on which" something is possible or impossible? Or: which mode contains the conditions from which an **A** or not-**A** (thus something actual or nonactual) is necessarily possible or impossible?

One may answer these questions: only the fundamental modes are such as to be both required and sufficient to account for the kind of being that these conditions have. If we now push aside the negative fundamental mode, then this principle yields the following result.

The conditions for something actual's being-necessary and being-possible must themselves be "actual." It is not sufficient for them to be merely possible, and it is asking too much for them to be also necessary. Nothing is possible on the grounds of the merely possible; and nothing is necessary on the grounds of the merely possible. Only on the grounds of actual conditions can something be possible or necessary. Otherwise, it would not be the possibility and necessity of an actual – as "internal" relativity requires – but only of a possible (which e.g. logically gets clearly expressed in a hypothetical relation). Consequently, there would in fact be no actually existing possibility or necessity, but only possible possibility and possible necessity.

On the other hand, it must also hold true that: nothing becomes necessary only through the necessity of its grounds, and nothing becomes possible only through the necessity of its conditions. Rather, in both cases it suffices for the grounds and conditions to be "actual." No argumentation is required here for being-possible; it is evident that its conditions do not need to be necessary. For being-necessary, however, the principle is tainted with ambiguity.

If being-necessary is required to be completely absolute, then the principle cannot be correct. The grounds of being-necessary must themselves be necessary, and so must their grounds, and so on *ad infinitum*. Only in this manner would there be necessary necessity. That is what is meant by absolute necessity.

But even this absolute necessity does not exist in any sphere. It can exist nowhere, because necessity is a relational mode, and because according to its own essence in each sphere absolute necessity allows the regress of conditions to reach back to the sphere's limits, and thus back to a first condition, which cannot be necessary, because there is nothing more behind it "on the grounds" of which it could be necessary. All necessity returns to the contingent. And the contingent can have no positive mode other than actuality. Thus, all necessity is merely actual and not necessary necessity. Indeed, seen as the whole of the chain of being, it is merely contingent necessity. Or perhaps: it is never absolute, but merely "relative" necessity.

However, it is relative to nothing other than the actuality of its conditions. Of course, its conditions can, themselves, be necessary in turn. But neither does this regress continue unrestrained *ad infinitum,* nor does the necessity of the conditions of the necessity of the conditioned add anything to it. All necessity is and remains conditioned wherever being-conditioned meets with purely "actual" conditions. How proximally or distally these appear in the chain of conditions is, thus, in principle an indifferent matter. But this is what the principle indicates: nothing becomes necessary only through the necessity of its grounds; it is sufficient for the grounds to be "actual."

What holds true for possibility and necessity must also hold true for impossibility. Nothing is impossible on the grounds of the merely possible, but neither is anything impossible only on the grounds of the necessary. It is required and sufficient for impossibility that its grounds be "actual." It follows from what has been said above, that impossibility is a kind of necessity. Surely impossibility "can" also be necessary impossibility, but not *ad infinitum*, and not in the final analysis; and it does not at all need to be this in order to exist. For in all spheres there is no more absolute impossibility than there is absolute necessity. With regard to the whole of the sphere, it always remains merely relative impossibility and this means contingent impossibility.

But by no means does this make it "merely possible" impossibility – which would not be impossibility at all. It must actually exist. Thus, its grounds must be "actual grounds."

f) The Position of Negative Conditions

Meanwhile, the principle expressed by the "external relativity" of the relational modes formally extends even further. For the conditions and grounds of these modes, it is required and sufficient that their own kind of being be that of the fundamental modes. Up until now only the actuality of the latter has been taken into account; therefore, the task of analyzing nonactuality as a conditional mode still remains.

In fact, the overall relations are such that simple substitution could sufficiently serve as proof – if a certain ambiguity did not cling to the negative mode's kind of being. Hence, the matter must be laid out more precisely.

Nonactuality is negative actuality. It shares the "absolutism" of its kind of being with the positive mode, being plain nonbeing in the same sense as actuality is plain being; whereby "plain" signifies indifference toward existing relational attachment. It is indifferent to possibility and impossibility alike. Which means that it is just as capable of contingency as of actuality. The whole difference between them is qualitative, and not an original modal difference.

From this, it follows, that among the conditions "on the grounds" of which something is possible, impossible, or necessary, negative actual conditions can always also be present. Or to put it another way: something's being-nonactual can also serve as the grounds for the possibility, impossibility, or necessity of a thing. It only needs to be added: under different, positively actual conditions. Then, as in logic, the principle "*ex mere negativis nihil sequitur*" holds true, just as does the principle generally and ontologically that: no relational mode, whether positive or negative, results from purely negative conditions alone, consequently neither does something's impossibility nor something's possibility or even its necessity. A series of purely negative conditions – taken directly as an absolute ontological mode – is empty nothingness. On the contrary, they are not conditions based on which something could be or not be, in some resulting manner.

Things are quite different when a negative condition stands among the positive conditions. Then it falls under the law *omnis negatio est determinatio*,

which is, of course, not purely modal, although it is still a basic law.[1] It then comes into connection with the actual, being granted the importance of a completely positive condition by it. Between actuality and nonactuality, insofar as they are modes of conditions, there is only the difference that actuality autonomously appears, independent of whether any negative conditions are involved, while nonactuality remains dependent on the positive links in the chain of conditions.

Apart from that, they are entirely equivalent and the qualitative difference between them with respect to the conditional being is only a secondary one. In fact, it is the case anyhow that something is never possible or necessary by virtue of one single condition, but rather always due to a whole chain of conditions. In such a chain of conditions, the negative components weigh just as much as the positive and are determining components to the same extent. Among all the conditions of impossibility, these tend to be the decisive ones.

Ultimately, this whole discussion is given a more universal foundation, if we call upon the universal categorial relation of being and nonbeing – and respectively, the qualitative relation of the positive and negative. In a closed connection of being, the being of the one is invariably simultaneously the nonbeing of the other, and the nonbeing of the one is simultaneously the being of the other. Pure nonbeing is nothing at all. But determinate nonbeing is also determinate being. This is a law of categorial quality. It ought to be discussed in a different context. But if it is introduced here and applied to the fundamental modes – whose opposition, in any case, has the general form of the oppositional interplay of being and nonbeing – then by virtue of being an actuality with determinate content, all actuality of **A** is simultaneously the nonactuality of **B**; and all nonactuality of **A,** by virtue of being a nonactuality with determinate content, is simultaneously the actuality of **B**.

With this the last remnant of difficulty attached to nonactuality as a fundamental mode dissolves into an empty appearance. Together nonactuality and actuality form a single, homogeneous ontological foundation for the relational modes, in which their qualitative opposition disappears.

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1 More precisely, it reverses a principle of quality: *omnis determinatio est negatio*. Its *conversio simplex* would, therefore, be erroneous, if taken as absolute. But it becomes cogent as soon as it is collocated with positive determinations.

8 Supplement to the Basic Modal Law

a) The Third Kind of Relativity in the Relational Modes

The basic modal law has still not been exhausted by "internal" and "external" relativity. In addition to these two, there is yet a third kind. This is the relativity of the relational modes to the fundamental modes. And it is to be fundamental in the same manner as the two other kinds of relativity. It is just not as momentous as the others. It is something blatant, something that no one would question. Thus, it is only to be briefly mentioned here. It does not require a proof per se. Mere clarification is sufficient.

It is related to the echelon of modes shown to be incapable of continuing on *ad infinitum*. If the conditions by virtue of which **A** is possible or necessary are merely possible conditions, then what results is a merely "possible" possibility or necessity of **A**. If they are necessary conditions, i.e. necessary on the grounds of additional conditions, then **A**'s possibility or necessity is a necessary one. As it turns out, too little is required for the former and too much, for the latter. It would suffice if the conditions were "actual." What results is then an "actual" possibility or necessity of **A**.

But from this one should recognize another kind of consequence, a consequence different from the one that arose from "external" relativity. It is apparent that necessity and possibility, if they are to have full modal value, must be "actual necessity" and "actual possibility;" and naturally for the very same reasons, impossibility with full modal value must be "actual impossibility." As merely possible kinds of being, they can never be complete (*ad infinitum*). The consequence is that the relational modes presuppose the mode of actuality in a third way: they themselves, with their whole relational structure included, must have actuality.

This is a relation that cannot be reversed. As they have already demonstrated, the echelon of modes can very well be presented differently; there is also sheer possible possibility and necessity; although there is also necessary possibility and necessity, this relation is external to them, not belonging to their essence. On the other hand, it is essential that they are "actual" possibility and necessity – if they are to have full modal value. And this has a very real meaning: the relation of conditions they consist in must be an actually existing relation. It may not be a nonactual relation. This holds true for all spheres and accordingly the being-actual of conditional relations in each sphere is to be strictly understood as the characteristic mode of actuality for that sphere.

If one wishes to be very precise, then it is here to be added that the echelon of relational modes may very well exhibit more links among themselves, without becoming meaningless as a result. At some point they must come across a link that has the mode of actuality; otherwise they break down. A possibility of possibility has a conditioned modal value, even if it is "actual" possibility by being the second possibility or a link further along in the chain. The same is true for a possibility of necessity, or also of impossibility. For the necessity of necessity, it is different only insofar as necessity is, in any case, actual necessity and only insofar as it remains, on the grounds of the *regressus*, correlated with a first link that can only be "actual."

In one aspect, however, this "third" relativity is essentially different from the first and second. In their own way, the relational modes are only relative to the positive fundamental mode, but not to the negative one. One cannot say that the whole relation between conditions and conditioned, as it stands in the relational modes, must have either actuality or nonactuality. Indeed this alternative is formally permissible, but only the one component produces a mode, while the other produces none. Nonactual possibility is not at all possibility, regardless of the sphere in which it operates; and nonactual necessity is not at all necessity. A nonactual conditional relation does not even have any existence; it is neither a positive nor a negative relation.

The consequence is: the third relativity of the relational modes is a merely one-sided relativity, as opposed to internal and external relativity. It is only relative to actuality, and not to nonactuality. This consequence is of interest, at least in a modal respect, as it allows the secondary character of the negative fundamental mode, as opposed to the positive fundamental mode, to be comprehended in an extraordinarily flexible manner.

b) The Historical. The Threefold Modal Law of Aristotle

The basic modal law has been confirmed on all fronts, and thus one may expect to find it repeatedly emerging in all particularizations of the modal problem. Yes, to be sure, striking evidence is gained for this law once the principle within it has been comprehended. It is not superfluous to note this. For this is methodically the typical state of affairs in most of the specialized modal laws – even for the particular laws that only hold sway in one sphere: laws that are by no means all known or recognized; but once one has comprehended what they involve, they acquire evidence from the connection of relations.

Following this, it would be surprising if the basic modal law had been evaded in ancient ontological thought. By no means is this the case. Admittedly,

one must look beyond the formulation's particularities, if one wants to recognize traces of the law in distant history. For the concept's speculative impact naturally obscures the insight's solid ontological core.

It was shown above how the beginnings of the theory of modality lie in the Aristotelian theory of *dynamis* and *energeia*. This theory is a modal teleology, and for that reason, its categorial content is not readily discernible. Moreover, it is restricted to two modes that only partially coincide with possibility and actuality. Nevertheless, its highest principle is closely related to the basic modal law. It is the Aristotelian modal law of the "priority" of *energeia* over *dynamis*. If one lets into the concepts of *dynamis* and *energeia,* this constructive, teleological, secondary meaning – which does not constitute their whole content – then they approximate the pure modes of possibility and actuality. In which case the law states: all possibility is already correlated with actuality; the latter is presupposed, it is the basic mode.[2]

Meanwhile, the analogy to the basic modal law goes even further. Aristotle develops his principle of priority from three directions. *Energeia* has its position of priority, 1. according to *eidos*; 2. according to being (οὐσία); and 3. according to temporal becoming. Concerning these three meanings of priority, the second may be discarded, because on it depends the teleological meaning in the relation of *dynamis* and *energeia*, the priority of purpose and its containment in the "plan." The first and third meanings of priority correspond surprisingly well to "internal" and "external" relativity to actuality. But nothing analogous to the third relativity is to be found in Aristotle's theory.

According to its *eidos* – or as Aristotle formerly put it "according to λόγος" (i.e. according to its essential determination) – *energeia* is primary, because potency is not plain potency, but determinate potency "of something" whose actual becoming is under concern. This something, constituting the direction of *dynamis* and its content, is a thing "that exists according to *energeia*" ["*der Energeia nach Seiendes*"], and is by no means a mere potential. All potency is potency of an actual. If the teleology of potency is allowed into this argument, and if doing so brings it into relation with its pure modal content, then this indicates that the possibility is not possibility of a possible, but rather of an actual. This means nothing other than that possibility is "internally relative" to actuality.

But, according to its becoming – or as Aristotle says "according to time" – *energeia* is prior in the sense that the adult man is prior to the semen that comes from him, although the adult man is the actualization of what the semen only is

2 See, Aristotle, *Metaphysics, Θ* from 1049 b 4

potentially. If this relation is transferred over to the continuous process of becoming, in which potency and actuality steadily alternate, then we come to Aristotle's principle: "one *energeia* always anticipates the others."[3] And *dynamis* is everywhere that *energeia* appears, being only a transition, placed between *energeia* and *energeia*.

If this principle is reduced to its purely modal meaning, then it implies that all possibility is only possibility "on the grounds" of an actual. No possibility comes from something merely possible. What stands behind possibility, its presupposition of being, is always the actual that anticipates it. Taken as an unequivocal concept, this once again means that all possibility is "externally relative" to actuality.

Admittedly, in Aristotle this insight is limited by his conception of the process as the actualization of something that has been laid out. That is, the same *eidos* is already determined in the plan and in the developed form. This conception axiomatically excludes the idea that the possibility of something determinate can be situated in very different conditions, which do not identify the internal form (of *eidos*) with the result. Indeed, even Aristotle himself did not hold to this limit; it is breached, for example, in the potentiality of matter (especially the "first"). And furthermore, it is also a limitation in terms of its content, standing and falling with the teleological schema of the process.

It is far more important that the "external relativity," itself, is what remains recognizable in this restriction. This is very acutely expressed in this connection, when Aristotle emphasizes that it is always "another" *energeia* that anticipates the "one." The "one" is already the *energeia* to which the interspersed possibility is internally relative (whose potency it is); while the "other" is that on the grounds of which it comes about according to temporal becoming, i.e. to which it is externally relative.

c) The Historical Perspective

Thus, without much analysis one can recognize the essential features of the basic modal law in the Aristotelian law of priority. One must not make this a question of interpretation. This is not a matter of whether Aristotle intended such a universal and formal law; it is only concerned with how his much more specialized understanding of the problem nevertheless led him to an ontological relation of a much larger scope. This is one of those numerous,

3 Ἀεί προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας. *Metaphysics, Θ* 1050 b 5

groundbreaking discoveries in the history of philosophy whose full meaning failed to be recognized by its own discoverers. Hence, it is all the more important, to lead it out of a ripe stage into its full meaning and scope. And if one considers that this prioritized thesis of Book Θ is the ontologically central thesis of Aristotelian metaphysics, that with it stands or falls not only the *eidos* theory of Book Z but also the theory of unmoved mover in Book Λ, then one must say that Aristotle only knew how to give a position to a partially visible basic modal law, which corresponds quite well to its purely ontological importance.

The meaning of the law is only blurred by modal teleology's one-sidedness. It is only recognized for possibility and not for the other relational modes; furthermore, the possibility from which it is recognized is not in its original and universal form, but only in the particularization of *dynamis*, in which an impetus toward actuality certainly does not mean mere "internal" relativity. The Aristotelian thesis claims too much. It suits its "external" relativity with great precision, but understands its content too narrowly. Nevertheless, one must say that here, within the boundaries drawn by Aristotelian concepts, the twofold relativity for possibility becoming actuality is fundamentally understood.

Despite much distortion and misrecognition, this law has borne the greatest importance for the following destiny of ontology. The principle prioritizing actuality over potency was maintained in the ontological theories of the Middle Ages, as it was where one no longer rightly understood its underlying meaning. For Aristotle had connected it inseparably with the principle of the "unmoved mover." This principle decidedly cuts across Christian metaphysical thought. But along with this principle, the theory of the priority of *energeia* was also maintained; and only its modal meaning, still recognizable in Book Θ, faded more and more from speculative theories. Teleology became more and more the heart of the matter.

Only after teleological thought was shaken up, only after the image of purposive nature fell, could the original meaning of Aristotelian thought break through once again. This breakthrough, however, occurred along the circuitous path leading through epistemological modality.

III General Arrangement of the Modes

9 The Position of Contingency Under the Basic Modal Law

a) The Abolishment of External Relativity in Contingency

The case of contingency has already been shown to be special in such a way, being a remarkable mixture of positive and negative modality, that it cannot be decisively ranked among the other modes. It is also the only mode whose existence in the one or the other sphere is controversial. But now something else must be added to all of this: the question of the extent to which we are dealing with a relational mode when concerned with contingency and the extent to which we are not.

By no means is this a simple question. Contingency is the counterpart of necessity, its negative counter-mode. Accordingly, it is to be expected that its modal type must be relational; for necessity is relational. This is also the case for possibility's negative counter-mode; impossibility is just as relational as possibility itself. On the other hand, one easily sees that contingency bears a different kind of negativity than impossibility. In the latter, only determinate relations are abolished (those on the grounds of which **A** would be possible). Conditionality and relationality are not simply touched upon, but rather are directly required: **A**'s being impossible only exists "on the grounds" of determinate conditions that exclude the being of **A**. The negativity in contingency is entirely different. It concerns the connections themselves and as such, the grounds on which a mode can be generally relational. It basically negates all relations, isolates **A** from all conditions, and thus stands as the absolute relationless mode.

It thereby moves over to the side of the absolute modes, actuality and nonactuality. And this is no external relation, it corresponds to the fact that these two modes alone can be contingent. Indeed, it considerably surpasses both of them in its detachment. Actuality and nonactuality do not abolish the relations of that which is; they are only indifferent toward them. But contingency is not indifferent toward them; it directly abolishes the relations, negating and annihilating them.

This is seen most clearly when thinking about contingency as generalized in the real world. It then abolishes all determination and dependency in the world. It atomizes the world, shattering it into disparate events that stand there unconnected. Indeed, it even dissolves the unity of an individual event, insofar as it abolishes the connectedness of its temporal stages. It posits all

being as unrelated. Therefore, it not only annihilates its contradictory opposite, necessity, but also the other relational modes, possibility and impossibility.

Thus, wherever it reigns – i.e. in whichever sphere or whichever special sector of a sphere – contingency abolishes the "external relativity" of the relational modes. Thus, its position under the basic modal law becomes an impossible one. Or else it abolishes the law. For the law requires external relativity just as much as it does internal relativity.

b) The Aporia in the Relation of Possibility and Contingency

Contingency's position under the basic modal law leads to a kind of antinomy between it and this law. At first glance, one might think that the antinomy would be disadvantageous for the law. So it seems, as long as one only has in mind the relation of contingency and necessity. But, as has just now been shown, this is not the whole relation. The two other relational modes are equally affected along with it. This is what was always disregarded by the older ontology whenever it analyzed intermodal relations (e.g. Wolff in his theory of *contingentia*). This was, namely, because such an ontology failed to recognize that *necessitas* and *possibilitas* belong together due to their common relationality.

The situation presents itself quite differently, if one ceases to regard things in this manner. In which case, it is not so much the basic modal law that is jeopardized by the negativity in contingency as is the existence of the relational modes in general. Certainly, necessity does not then carry as much weight for the latter as possibility does. Indeed, one may very well think of deleting necessity from a whole sphere of that which is (or from a particular sector in it); this is, at least, not contradictory. But one cannot think of deleting possibility from any sector of being, because in every sphere the being-possible is the presupposition of being-actual, and with the latter we touch on the foundational mode of the whole way of being.

Thus, the aporia is displaced in the relation of possibility and contingency. Wherever chance prevails in a realm of being not only is nothing necessary, but strictly speaking, nothing is impossible and nothing is possible. With this, it at once becomes disconcertingly apparent that the last two abolishments contradict each other: where "nothing is impossible," it is certainly not the case that "nothing is possible," but on the contrary that "everything is possible;" and where "nothing is possible," it is certainly not the case that "nothing is impossible," but on the contrary that "everything is possible." This contradiction is obviously not removed if the external relativity of possibility and impossibility

are justified, both modes, thus, presupposing something actual "on the grounds" of which they exist.

Or, should one perhaps turn the tables and declare the contradiction to be an appearance by abolishing the meaning of being-possible and being-impossible "on the grounds of" something? One may perhaps think of this as being accomplished in the following way. The reign of chance abolishes the presupposition and grounds that allow for there to be possibility and impossibility in a relational sense: the dependency within the sphere (or the special sector of the sphere). Under such circumstances, the meaning of the principle "nothing is possible" is altered. It then does not mean that the grounds that abolish possibility appear, but that all grounds and conditions generally capable of constituting or abolishing the being-possible of something are absent. In which case, the principle simultaneously involves another sense of being-possible, namely, one without grounds or conditions. But then, in this sense, the principle means that, "everything is possible." And this does not contradict the principle that "nothing is impossible," but coincides with it.

The consequence is that then both principles become meaningless, as does the thus-transformed concept of possibility, itself. If I say, "the *mundus fabulosus* (perhaps a realm of utter bliss) is possible if only nothing positive impedes its development," then this does not in fact say anything about its actual being-possible or being-impossible. The positive conditions are what constitute its being-possible, and pure negative possibility is separate from these conditions. It is an error to attribute **A**'s being-possible to the mere absence of the factors that would contradict **A**. Then one could say just as well that if a sphere contains nothing, then in it everything is possible. Such a negativistic non-contradiction is not sufficient for logical possibility, let alone the possibility of being. Playing with pure negativity in this manner is empty, indeterminate speculation; and since the latter "permits everything," a true being-possible is not restored.

c) The Alternative between Contingency and Relational Modality

Thus the conflict between the basic modal law and contingency inexorably leads to a decision in the subject area of possibility, and this decision falls within the spheres that exhibit a connection in their content that favors the basic modal law.

If contingency were an absolute mode in the same sense as actuality and nonactuality, then the conflict would be decided much differently. But contingency is no such absolute mode. It is not indifferent toward the relations of

being. In fact it is essentially concerned with them, since it abolishes them. This is expressed most appropriately by the formulation: contingency is the negative relational mode. This does not mean that it is merely a negative mode of a relational type, but that it is generally negative with regard to the relationality of being, and is thus the negating mode of the relations themselves.

This is the reason why it cannot coexist with the relational modes in one sphere – at least not insofar as the sphere is a sphere of being and as it is itself an ontological mode. Contingency of being either abolishes the relational modes, or they abolish it. Only at the limits of the sphere in which they rule do they allow for contingency. But even there, they, themselves, cease to exist. And this cessation is identical to the introduction of contingency.

Therefore, an alternative relation exists between contingency and the relational modes. This is deeply characteristic of all specialized intermodal relations. This alternative plays a decisive role in a long series of questions and wherever it appears, it makes the problem of being metaphysical, because beyond the connections of being even comprehensibility ceases. Here, is rooted the most controversial of all pure problems of being, the problem of determination. The modal alternative brings it to a head, raising it to the point at which nothing remains but the radical crisis of continuous connection and total incoherence.

But this question's decision no longer lies in the general discussion of the modes, nor can it be decided for all spheres in the same way. In each sphere it depends on the particular kind of constitutive lawfulness that holds sway. And, as long as this lawfulness is reflected in the mutual relation of the modes, it must also be able to be obtained from the special analysis of the intermodal lawfulness of each individual sphere.

d) The Maintenance of Internal Relativity in Contingency

Meanwhile, the position of contingency under the basic modal law has still not been exhausted. This law expresses a dual relativity to the fundamental modes, internal and external. This relation developed just now only concerns external relativity. It is abolished in contingency. Contingency is not an outwardly relative mode.

But how do things stand with internal relativity? Here, the matter is obviously quite different. Internal relativity to the fundamental modes is quite compatible with the abolishment of constitutive relations of being – indeed, with total atomization of the world. That which has no conditionality "behind

it" may very well have conditionality "in it." As long as contingency is based on nothing else, it can and must be contingency "of something." And this something, whose contingency it is, must exist in the sense of a determinate kind of being. But this means that contingency is not an externally relative mode, being instead a mode "relative in itself." It has the internal relativity of the relational modes, belonging to them in this sense.

If one works from these grounds, then it is easy to see that, in a similar manner, this internal relativity is a relativity to the fundamental modes, to actuality and nonactuality. Contingency is just plain being and nonbeing, something's determinate being-there and not-being-there, the occurrence or nonoccurrence, the existence or nonexistence. And this indicates: the contingent is nothing other than something's being-actual or being-nonactual – thus, the very same as what can be necessary, possible, or impossible.

Of course, another modality can indirectly exist contingently, which then produces the echelon of modes. There is also contingent possibility, impossibility, and necessity. It has already been shown how these three modes inevitably become contingent at the limits of a sphere, which constitute the scope of its relationality. But basically this does not tell us anything new. For this contingency of the relational modes consists in the contingency of their conditions. And from these conditions directly follows the principle that they must have plain actuality – and in negative cases, nonactuality. Thus, in graduated modality there remains the basic relation stipulating that contingency has no external relativity, having only internal relativity to actuality and nonactuality.

The position of contingency among the other modes remains divided and iridescent, so to speak. In it, the basic modal law is only half-fulfilled. It does not merge into a pure modal character, being neither a relational nor an absolute mode; or rather, it is both, but only in part. It abolishes the relations of being, placing itself directly in opposition to them. Indeed, it forms quite an alternative relation to the relational modes, although this does not include the absolute modes, since it presupposes these modes with its internal relativity to them.

This dazzling status cannot be explained away from its essence. It must be taken up and considered as an unsolved aporia. It forms an additional piece involved in that pushing ahead to metaphysical boundary questions, this piece remaining peculiar to it all the way down the line of modal problems. But the consequence for the reciprocal position of the modes is that it tears a hole in every kind of decisive arrangement that can be implemented in consideration of the dimensions of the diversity of the modes specified above.

10 Contingency and the Self-Abolition of Necessity

a) The Ontological Principle of Contingency

It is now clear that the relation of alternatives between contingency and the relational modes – which in this universality already pushes us toward a kind of decision – once again comes to a head in the close relation of contingency and necessity. The problem of determination has been wrongly restricted to this point, but as the most positive of the relational modes, necessity is still the mode most concerned with the opposition to contingency. This is formally expressed in the fact that only necessity directly contradicts contingency. And related to this is the fact that only in necessity does there arise the limiting concept of a contingency that is necessary by virtue of itself. This does not arise in possibility, and at least not directly in impossibility.

It has been shown how in all spheres this limiting concept is essentially and internally a concept of necessity, one required by its own relationality. It has further been shown that contingency is just the abolition of relationality as such. From this, it follows: necessity has in it the peculiarity of abolishing its own ontic presupposition and thus itself – not within the limits of the sphere over which it holds sway, but rather at the limits themselves. For it is within the essence of its external relativity to always point beyond itself to others and to be unable to stop this regress until reaching the limits of existing ontological connections. The first link of the chain is always merely actual, without being necessary. And this means that it is contingent. The reason for this is that external relativity is torn away at the sphere's limits.

Accordingly, a completely clear-cut relation exists between necessity and contingency – both of which are still strictly general, when understood on this side of the distinction between spheres. It can be expressed as an ontological principle of contingency: there is no necessity without contingency, but arguably there can be contingency without necessity. Or in relation to the spheres of possible connections: everything in a sphere can be contingent, but everything in a sphere cannot be necessary.

In the latter form, the second half of the principle may appear ambiguous. It does not mean that within a sphere everything could not be relationally connected and correspondingly necessary; it only means that at the limits of the sphere, the dependency in detachment overturns the necessity in contingency. But the boundary links count as part of the sphere and consequently contingency also counts as part of the sphere.

The first half of the principle seems to be unequivocal. Indeed, the difficulty here lies in something else. That is to say, if everything in a sphere is contingent, then the sphere is atomized, dissolved, and no longer to be described as a sphere. It lacks cohesion. Nevertheless, this affects only the character of the sphere as such, not the contingency. The latter exists even if the cohesion of the sphere has been dissolved. Such a case is in fact fictitious, since none of the spheres we know are created in this manner. Connection is everywhere, and there is also necessity everywhere. But this is due to the type of sphere, not the relation of necessity and contingency.

b) Absolutely Necessary and Absolutely Contingent Being

The ontological principle of contingency – ontological, because it excludes the popular meanings of the contingent and only concerns the contingent according to being – has revealed a disparity in the importance of the two modes: necessity bears in itself the principle of its own self-abolition, and thereby involves contingency as its limitation. Contingency, on the other hand, knows no self-abolition or limitation, and on its own it involves no necessity. Self-abolition is the consequence of external relativity to actuality. Contingency, however, has only internal and not external relativity.

This state of affairs appears discernible, once one has basically comprehended it, but in metaphysics it has almost always gone unrecognized. And this misjudgment has led to the most flagrant errors. The best example of this is the huge misconception of "absolute necessary being."

God is thereby referred to as the first cause [*der erste Grund*] of all existing necessity in the world. Two lines of thought argue that this first cause has absolute necessary being. The first is contained in most cosmological proofs of God. It concludes that: a cause, on which the necessity of something is based, must itself be necessary; whatever is therefore the first cause of all causes and also simultaneously the cause of all necessity in the world, must have absolute necessity; otherwise, all necessity would collapse into it and would be contingent necessity. The second consideration runs something like this: if every necessary consequence comes from a cause, then the cause, for its own part, is necessary for the consequence; the further back the series of causes goes, the more unconditioned its necessity must become; the cause of all causes must consequently be an absolutely necessary cause.

Both lines of thought are incorrect. The first concludes *a contingentia mundi* – "because, otherwise, the world, including all necessity, would still be basically contingent." This dread of chance is understandable, though one

cannot be argued out of it. Moreover, there is a simple misunderstanding of the cause of being. The cause of something does not at all mean the cause's being necessary, but only a necessary conclusion drawn from it. In the relation of the cause and consequence, only the consequence is generally necessary (on the grounds of the cause), but never the cause itself. Yet, as demonstrated above, the being-actual of the cause is sufficient for the necessary-being of the consequence. Therefore, a first cause of all necessary consequences in the world definitely does not need to be a necessary cause, let alone one that is "absolutely necessary." It is sufficient for it to be actual.

However, the second line of thought – which is predominantly latent, only betraying itself upon occasion – confuses the indispensability of the cause for the consequence with the necessity of the cause itself. That indispensability is, at best, the epistemological grounds for the consideration, but in any event it is not the ontological grounds of the matter. Or else, it is teleologically understood as the required existence of the means for an end; but then the indispensability of the cause is a purely speculative construction.

All sorts of conceptual confusions cluster together in such arguments. It is quite understandable how one comes to regard all necessity, arising from a first cause – as from a source of being-necessary – as being ascribed to itself. Historically, a very naïve conception has repeatedly pushed to the forefront, regarding necessity as a kind of substance, peculiar to its source in a seemingly infinite quantity and, therefore, able to flow boundlessly out of it – in the same way as Aristotle described eternal movement flowing from the first mover. Most world-substance theories display this conceptual schema. Here, the narrower systems of emanation form only a special case.

Indeed, the same mistake has even leapt into exacting thought. The reason for calling logical laws or the axioms of geometry "necessary" is that on the grounds of their existence, the conclusions derived from them are necessary. The allure of conferring necessity in this manner is linked to all first principles grasped through inference; they, themselves, are regarded as necessary, because on them is based the necessity of the particular and the concrete.

But quite the opposite is the case. Neither axioms, nor laws, nor any principles are necessary. At most, they are comprehended as the "necessary presuppositions" of particular things given otherwise. But this is only epistemic necessity in the method of inference, not the ontological necessity of what has been developed. It is, therefore, at best – if the conclusion is valid – only necessity of the insight that the inferred "actually" exists. And even this hardly applies anywhere. There is a very justifiable controversy concerning the existence of necessity, and in all relevant areas. Principles are, of course,

foundational for necessity, that is, for necessity appearing in *concretum*. Yet, they themselves are absolutely contingent.

Applied to the "absolutely necessary being," this now means nothing less than that it is, in truth, the "absolutely contingent being." Otherwise it would have to form the limit of the world's relationality, a being necessary by virtue of itself. And this is precisely what is meant by the term *causa sui*. But, in truth, a being necessary by virtue of itself represents a being that is not necessary. For necessity here simply has "external relativity" to itself. However, nothing is external to it "on the grounds" of which it could be necessary. Nevertheless, one may say that it has its own grounds in itself, it is the *causa sui*; thus, no sort of higher modality is attained. For even this, which has its cause in itself and, thus, does not have it outside of itself, is consequently not something necessary, but contingent.

As absolutely necessary being, God, is the absolutely contingent being.

c) Contingency as Irregular Mode and Limiting Mode

To deal with the issue of generally arranging the modes, it is crucial to discern this relation. Since all necessity traces back to contingent initial links, one could be inclined to infer a modal superiority of contingency, or to give contingency a central position among the modes of being. This would be just as wrong as wanting to misunderstand the role of contingency in the concept of God, in its axioms and principles.

Just as this example shows, this mode's true essence is only that of a marginal or boundary mode. As such, it is to be recognized unconditionally, and even the antinomic character of its position cannot deceive us about this. Whether it can claim a place beyond and yet still within the spheres of being must remain questionable as long as we are not provided with a decision on this issue by the intermodal relations of the spheres, themselves.

For the time being, it can only be understood as the consequence of what has been stated: contingency as limiting mode does not belong among those modes that prevail throughout the ontological spheres in continuous relatedness to one another. If these modes are called the regular modes, then contingency is to be described as an "irregular mode." An ontological sphere's modal structure may very well be understood without drawing in contingency. But this means that contingency can simply be left out of the modal system. One must keep a place open for it at the limits of the sphere. For, here, it takes the place of necessity. In this way, one keeps the place of necessity open for it in the system of modes.

Thus, its peculiar relation to the other modes becomes clear. It does not take an independent place among them, but assumes the place of another mode instead. Even necessity only conditionally occupies its place; and that is not modally conditionally, but constitutively conditionally – conditioned through the sphere's scope of relations and connections. Wherever this connection ceases, it automatically turns into its opposite: contingency. Thus, at the same time, it disappears from intermodal relations. Contingency replaces it, and takes on its rights.

Leibniz had this relation in mind when he placed a principle of *convenientia* at the beginning of all things – alongside the eternal truths – seeing in it the universal reason [*der universale Grund*] for the existence of the world. In this principle, which was supposed to make the cause of the world [*Grund der Welt*] "sufficient," the "principle of sufficient reason" abolished itself. It was a groundless principle.

11 The Formal System of Modes

a) Modal Indifference and Modal Heterogeneity

Even without the peculiar position of contingency, the opposition of the fundamental and relational modes is a chapter afflicted with riddles. It does not touch upon the difference between "higher and lower" modes. The gradation of the modes passes homogeneously through it, although the ontological meaning of the modes is heterogeneous. Consequently, it is still important to assure this opposition by other means.

A different phenomenon offers us a foothold for doing so. It can be called "modal indifference." It already plays a role in the problem of intermodal relations, although it is initially only a general role, i.e. regardless of the peculiar circumstances in the individual spheres.

By modal indifference one should understand the peculiar position a mode has in relation to two other modes standing in contradictory opposition, insofar as these two relate to it in the same manner, or can coincide with it respectively. It is not just any pair of modes that can coincide or coexist with each other in one and the same respect, e.g. actuality cannot do so with impossibility. Likewise, the modes do not all just happen to be able to exist without each other, e.g. actuality cannot exist without possibility. Whatever is actual cannot be impossible, it must at least be possible. Thus, actuality is not indifferent from either direction. For that reason, the existing modal indifferences constitute a

particular categorial phenomenon that is only characteristic of determinate modes among one another.

There are three indifferences in the formal relation of the modes on this side of their differentiation according to spheres:

1. Actuality is indifferent toward necessity and contingency;
2. Possibility is indifferent toward actuality and nonactuality;
3. Nonactuality is indifferent toward possibility and impossibility.

When expressed concretely these indifferences immediately become evident: 1. Whatever is actual can be necessary or contingent; both are compatible with naked being-actual; 2. Whatever is possible can be actual or nonactual. Of course, this does not apply to disjunctive possibility (which abolishes itself in being-actual), but rather to indifferent possibility; and for the sake of this compatibility, the latter is "indifferent possibility," since the actual must at least be possible; and for this reason it is to be expected that only indifferent possibility will be found in the ontological spheres; 3. Whatever is nonactual may very well be possible, but it may also be impossible; both cases are compatible with formal being-nonactual.

Only two kinds of such modal indifferences hold true. First: the duality of contradictory modes, toward which a third mode is indifferent, always consists of a higher and a lower mode. Calculated from the position of the third mode, both modes cannot be higher, nor can both be lower. At least such is the case if one holds to the traditional hierarchy of modes given above, which corresponds to the formal or general relation of modes on this side of their differentiation according to sphere. If possibility is indifferent toward actuality and nonactuality, then, relative to possibility, actuality is a higher mode and nonactuality a lower one; possibility itself stands in the middle, and the alternative that it leaves open plays between a higher and a lower mode.

And second: if the opposition of fundamental and relational modes is understood as "modal heterogeneity," then the principle holds true that all modal indifference is at play between heterogeneous modes. Or even: if a line of separation is drawn between the two types of modes, so that the two absolute modes come to stand on the one side with the four relational modes on the other, then without exception all modal indifference would play "across the line," to and fro.[1] An absolute mode can only be indifferent toward two relational modes, and a relational mode can only be indifferent toward two absolute modes. The former is

1 See the schema given below in Ch. 11 d, Fig. 5.

the case for actuality (indifferent toward necessity and contingency) and for nonactuality (indifferent toward possibility and impossibility), while the latter is the case for possibility (indifferent toward actuality and nonactuality).

Here, there clearly is a quite simple lawfulness. This playing-across-the-line is the law of modal indifference. It demonstrates that the opposition of relational and absolute modes is fundamental and actually implies a categorical heterogeneity. Within the homogeneous modes there is no indifference on either side of the line. One may thus suppose that the whole phenomenon of modal indifference is conditioned by the existence of modal heterogeneity. And this places the opposition of fundamental and relational in a new light: it becomes the underlying fundamental moment of modal diversity, with the qualitative opposition of the modes, as well as their hierarchy, retrogressing toward it.

b) The Dimensional Arrangement of the Regular Modes

The last consideration clearly shows the old arrangement of the modes to be insufficient. In that arrangement, the height of the mode and the boundary drawn between positive and negative modes were well expressed, a one-dimensional arrangement being sufficient for this. But it certainly is not sufficient to delimit the relational modes from the absolute. Since here a boundary line is required by the indifferences, as they all "cross the line," their relation is not expressible in a linear arrangement.

It becomes expressible, as soon as a second dimension is introduced that specifically represents the heterogeneity of the modes as distinguished from their levels of elevation. If, from the outset, one were to leave contingency out of play as an irregular mode – as above, it cannot be unambiguously incorporated – then the arrangement of Fig. 1 is obtained. In this figure, the horizontal line stands for the boundary between the positive and the negative modes, while the vertical line stands for the boundary between the absolute and the relational modes. It is the vertical line that cuts "across" the modal



Fig. 1

indifferences. The hatched line indicates the transition from the highest mode down to the lowest; the serpentine curve it assumes corresponds to the heterogeneity of the modes, interconnecting them with one another.

On the other hand, if in lieu of the second opposition (absolute – relational), the opposition of the modes determinateness and indeterminateness[2] is taken as fundamental and mapped onto the horizontal line, then the arrangement turns out quite differently (Fig. 2). For impossibility bears higher determinateness than nonactuality, which bears in turn higher determinateness than possibility. If now the determinateness of modal type – as opposed to modal "height" – increases from left to right, then on the left possibility remains standing completely alone as the most indeterminate mode (without a negative counterpart); opposite to it on the right stands the complementary pair of the most determinate modes, necessity and impossibility, which also exhibit the greatest range of modal height. The two absolute modes, on the other hand, occupy the middle of the diagram, forming an opposition with an average range of modal height.



Fig. 2

Since both arrangements are concerned with the relation of the same five regular modes, they must be connected to each other de jure. In which case, the schema becomes three-dimensional. The abscissa of Fig. 2 must, therefore, be placed perpendicular to that of Fig. 1, creating a dimension of depth. On the one hand, possibility would then stand opposite the absolute modes along with necessity and impossibility, but on the other hand, it would be positioned as the most indeterminate mode within the vertical layer of absolute modes and the complementary pair of necessity and impossibility. Purely schematically, this poses no difficulties, and it is clear according to the matter. On the other hand, it becomes a richly complex matter for contemplation.

In both schemas the transitional curve from the most positive to the most negative mode passes through the three remaining modes. It begins with the highest level of determinateness, crossing over to the lowest level of determinateness (possibility), and then back again to the highest (impossibility). Each time it moves back or forth it passes an absolute mode. Thus, in Fig. 2 it roughly

2 It is the fifth opposition enumerated above. See Chapter 5 c.

forms a parabola (seen in the hatched line) by touching twice on transitional links of average determinateness (actuality and nonactuality). On the other hand, the wavy line in Fig. 1 arises through the fact that the transitional links stand on the left (as absolute modes), while the final links and the middle link stand on the right (as relational modes). Hence, the transition denoting modal heterogeneity must cross the boundary line four times.

If the two curves are correlated with each other three-dimensionally, then the uniformly complex curve of total modal gradation is obtained in their three intersecting kinds of oppositions.

c) The Insertion of the Irregular Mode

But this arrangement has one deficiency. It accommodates only two of the three modal indifferences, that of possibility toward actuality and nonactuality, and that of nonactuality toward possibility and impossibility; but not that of actuality toward necessity and contingency. As contingency is not included in the arrangement.

If one wants to express the third indifference, then one must re-insert contingency. And this is not easy, since its position is not clear in any of the three dimensions, thus being unable to be represented by explicit classification in Fig. 1 or in Fig. 2. On the other hand, the fact cannot be helped that it is an "irregular" mode – only a limiting mode of the spheres – and, thus, only takes the place of necessity at the limits of a sphere. With necessity's place being usurped, the whole arrangement is changed. In order to cope with this, one must allocate a place to it that suits its peculiarly iridescent, hybrid nature. This hybrid nature is threefold.

1. Contingency is neither a purely positive nor a purely negative mode. It is surely the negation of necessity, but the non-necessary is not a nonbeing, such as the nonactual and impossible. Thus, it cannot be placed next to these two without causing confusion. Contingency holds the middle position between modal positivity and negativity. Indeed, it is simultaneously a positive and negative mode. In both schemata, this can only be expressed by placing it right on the boundary between the positive and negative modes (the horizontal line).
2. Contingency is neither a purely relational nor a purely absolute mode. As has been shown, it is both while also being neither. It is the abolition of relationality, insofar as it itself is relationless, but it is still negatively correlated with the relations of being. Thus, as a negative mode it is relational,

but as a positive mode it is absolute. This is reflected in the principles demonstrated above: it has internal relativity to the fundamental modes, but not external relativity. If one wants to express this in the schema of Fig. 1, then one can simply place contingency in the middle of the vertical boundary line between the absolute and relational modes. And if it already stands on the horizontal boundary line anyway, then it must now be relocated to where both boundary lines intersect. The consequence is that the transitional curve, running down from necessity to impossibility, now also passes contingency, and in doing so it passes the intersection of the boundary lines. After this the curve in Fig. 3 remains essentially the same as the wavy line in Fig. 1; only its middle portion appears more determined – because, it passes a point in which both modal oppositions are neutralized.



Fig. 3

3. With regard to determinateness, the hybrid position of contingency is revealed by the fact that its relation to possibility is not clearly assignable. Viewed in contrast to the other modes, possibility is the most indeterminate mode. It alone assumes (as disjunctive) an alternative form. In this respect, it is even more indeterminate than contingency, which is at least always clearly either an actual thing (in the sense of internal relativity) or a nonactual thing. On the other hand, contingency is the detachment from all relation, whereas possibility is rooted in the correlation with its conditions. This means: as a relational mode, contingency is less determinate than possibility, yet as an absolute mode, it is more determinate. Or rather: as a negative mode, it is less determinate than possibility, but as a positive mode, it is more determinate. For as a positive mode, it is absolute, but as a negative mode, it is relational. If one wants to express this schematically, then one must supplement Fig. 2 so that contingency is placed on the horizontal boundary line between the positive and negative modes – i.e. in the gradation of determinateness. It is placed in the same position as possibility. Admittedly, this fails to express the essential difference: it does not take this position with the same decidedness as possibility.



Fig. 4

But, here, the transitional curve remains essentially the same (Fig. 4) as it was in Fig. 2. Three modal pairs stand vertically opposite each other. Among them, only the middle pair forms a truly contradictory opposition: actuality and nonactuality. Necessity and impossibility form only the opposition of positive and negative necessity, while possibility and contingency do not form a modal opposition at all. The possible may very well be contingent, and the contingent must be possible.

If the arrangement of Fig. 3 is now inserted into that of Fig. 4, making the whole arrangement three-dimensional, then a total transitional curve is obtained from necessity down to impossibility, passing through four intermediate stages while observing three kinds of oppositions. In doing so, contingency is given one-dimensionally as an extreme, and two-dimensionally as a component of a boundary between oppositions. But its position does not become completely clear in any of the three dimensions, least of all in terms of determinateness (horizontal line in Fig. 4), since here it is aligned with possibility.

For the curve, this implies a kind of indeterminateness. Or, mathematically speaking, in all three dimensions a certain sector of the curve becomes discontinuous. Hence, we may infer that contingency can play a quite different role in individual spheres. For it is positioned in a volatile sector. This outlines a remaining problem, which does not advance into the formal (general) consideration of intermodal relations, although it may very well find further clarification in the specialized analysis of individual spheres.

d) The Position of Indifferences in the Formal System of Modes

Even more importantly, however, in the schema of Fig. 3 modal indifferences are able to be sufficiently expressed to some extent. In the schema of Fig. 1, they only represent the indifference of possibility and of nonactuality. After introducing contingency into the arrangement of modes, the third indifference, that of actuality (toward necessity and contingency), appears in the schema.

Of course, there still remains one difficulty with this: contingency stands right in the middle "of the line" (of the vertical line, expressing the heterogeneity of the modes), thus having a semi-relational and semi-absolute modal character. But, as has been shown, the indifferences only exist between heterogeneous modes; they "cross over the line." Since actuality is now indifferent toward necessity and contingency, its indifference would accordingly only "cross the line" in one component of the alternative, but would only lead up to the line in the other component (that of contingency).

This difficulty is eliminated if the hybrid nature of contingency is taken into account. It has been shown that as an absolute mode contingency is positive and as a relational mode it is negative, since relations are negated in it. But that aspect in contingency toward which actuality is indifferent is clearly the negative aspect, the not-being-necessary. And this constitutes the relational side of its unsteady modal character.[3] Therefore, with regard to the indifference of actuality, one may treat contingency as a negative and simultaneously relational mode. It then leaves its position at the intersection of the boundary lines (Fig. 3), moving below the horizontal line to the negative modes and shifting to the right of the vertical line, at the same time, so as to join the relational modes (Fig. 5). Then the law stipulating that modal indifference exists only between heterogeneous modes, i.e. "crosses the line," is fulfilled in actuality, since necessity and contingency then both stand beyond the boundary line.



Fig. 5

In the new schema, the three indifferences are summarized, being expressed through the arrows and the corresponding brackets. The brackets represent the alternative existing between the counterparts of indifference; the arrows

3 The "discontinuity" of the curve in the area of contingency would be represented in Fig. 3 and 5 as a fluctuation of C's position around the intersection of the boundary lines, running diagonally from upper left to lower right, i.e. from positive absolute modal character to negative relational. In Fig. 5, the lower extreme position of C within this realm of discontinuity is selected.

illustrate "crossing over the line." Contingency is placed in parentheses, so as to indicate its irregular position. Its relocation in the negative relational sector is justified by the curve's discontinuity in its domain. The latter itself is not expressed in the schema. This arrangement accordingly does not conflict with that of Fig. 3. Only the uniformity of the transitional curve (the symmetrical wavy line) is disturbed. But this uniformity is made fictitious by contingency's wavering position.

Apart from this, another (qualitative) law of modal indifference can be read from the schema by such transposition: every time that a mode stands indifferent toward a positive heterogeneous mode and toward a negative heterogeneous one. This is clearly expressed in the fact that the brackets all "cross over the line," namely over the horizontal boundary line, therefore, always including a positive and a negative mode within their scope.

Part Two: **The Modality of Real Being**

I The Real Modes and Their Intermodal Laws

12 Ontological Modes and Secondary Modes

a) The Role of Intermodal Relations

Concerning the modal oppositions enumerated above (Chap. 5 c.), two have not yet come into their own: the opposition of ontological modes and secondary modes, as well as the opposition of real modes and ideal modes. Admittedly, the latter only plays a direct role within the ontological modes, but it recurs indirectly among the secondary modes insofar as the logical modes are closely related to the ideal modes, while the epistemological modes are, first and foremost, the modes of real knowledge, and they are, consequently, related to the real modes.

With these oppositions, one comes to the modal problem of the spheres, its tetrad roughly corresponding to the overlap of the two pairs of opposites. This problem now comes into the foreground, because in it the investigation is divided into a series of parallel tasks. Each sphere requires its own modal analysis. This could be avoided as long as they continued to be considered in a strictly formal manner, although, even then, the differences of spheres establish themselves at every turn. Various statements and insights bear little resemblance to such sorts of being, but there does remain a certain analogy, as well as an unmistakable relatedness. Not only do they signify something else, but they "are" something else.

As soon as one takes a close look at the relations between the modes – the intermodal relations – carrying out the investigation in a uniform manner for all spheres becomes impossible. Right in the initial steps of the investigation, it becomes clear that these relations are not the same in the spheres. Certainly, one could try to consider the modes separately, without including the intermodal relations. But this proves to be completely impossible. It is the same here as it is nearly everywhere else in categorial analysis: the categories, themselves, are far more difficult to comprehend than their relations to each other; a detour must unavoidably be taken through the latter in order to comprehend the categories as such. The phenomenon of their coherence is their accessible side, and only from it do the individual members in the group of categories become graspable.

It may be added that, in the case of the modal categories, they are generally difficult to directly comprehend, because in order to comprehend them one must disregard their content, i.e. everything directly assignable. Thus, for them, every detour is welcome. This particularly holds true for the fundamental modes,

whose detachment excludes a detour through their constitutive framework, consequently also excluding any detour through non-modal kinds of relations. But everything ultimately comes down to the fundamental modes, because the other modes are internally and externally relative to them.

Thus, the intermodal relations are not identical in the spheres, and this results in a certain diversity among the modes themselves. If, at this point, one considers what difficulties are encountered by the determination of the spheres, themselves, and their ways of being, then the importance of this diversity is thrown into a different light. Whatever ideal being "is," and whatever real being "is" cannot in any way be directly indicated; but, if the modes of both spheres of being are different, then the character of ideality and reality can be indirectly learned from their difference. Furthermore, if, for their part, the modes along with their diversity are only comprehensible by means of a detour through intermodal relations, then this moves the intermodal relations to the starting point of an investigation whose consequences must ultimately benefit a determination of the ideal's ways of being as well as those of the real.

This view is so eminently ontological and so obviously concerned with the central problem of ontology, that through it one immediately understands why the theory of modality constitutes the core of ontology.

Intermodal relations themselves are concerned with three kinds of relations. They are rooted in the peculiar nature of the individual modes, either to implicate another mode or exclude it or behave indifferently toward it. These three kinds of relations underlie all further particularization in the relation of the modes. They may unilaterally or reciprocally exist between any two modes. Their variation in the relation of the modes allows a considerable diversity to enter the overall picture of their system.

The three indifferences that can still be laid out in the general consideration (on this side of the division) are already examples of intermodal relations. The same is true of the relation between fundamental and relational modes, as is expressed by the basic modal law. Only here is there a major difference. It will be shown that the indifferences certainly do not prove true in all spheres and that they actually adhere more to the formal relation of the modes than to the modal construction of the ways of being. The basic modal law is quite different; there is no deviation from it or exception to it, no matter how differently the remaining intermodal relations may be formed. This permeation through all spheres and ways of being is clear evidence that it concerns an actual, fundamental law of being.

Relations of the sort mentioned above – those that exist exclusively between the modes of one and the same sphere – shall hereafter be called "first-order intermodal relations," or "simple intermodal relations." Thus, the laws expressing

them may be classified as "first-order intermodal laws." In each sphere they form a structure of "simple" laws that is cohesive in itself, having individual components that cannot be isolated and only exist with one another. According to the nature of this structure in each sphere, the modes, themselves, also show a different face from sphere to sphere.

All relations of another form are dependent on the first-order intermodal laws. For there are still other relations beyond the "simple" ones: those existing between the modes of one sphere and the modes of another sphere. These relations shall hereafter be called "second-order intermodal relations" or "complex intermodal relations." The associated laws, as far as they can be clearly comprehended, are called the "second-order intermodal laws" and they form the basic framework of connection between the spheres; in them the heterogeneous realms of "the given" join together in unity. The number and variety of the complex intermodal relations is certainly far greater than that of the simple intermodal relations; it is an extensive task to bring them into a comprehensive analysis, requiring a special series of investigations (in Part IV of the modal analysis).

In the present stage of the relevant issues, this task cannot be carried through to its end – i.e. to a self-contained structure of laws. Nevertheless, the clarification of numerous traditional misunderstandings, as well as the fruitful treatment of the issues central to epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics, depends directly on it. Within certain limits, one may say that today the destiny of systematic philosophy depends on the extent to which this is accomplished.

The complex intermodal relations are of secondary importance, however, for the identification and determination of the modes themselves, as well as for the clarification of the ways of being. Thus, in this investigation, they may be deferred until the modality of the individual spheres, on the grounds of first-order intermodal relations, is thoroughly discussed.

b) The Varying Preferential Position of the Modal Types

The phenomenon of the preferential position of the relational or absolute modes supplies tangible proof as to how deeply the difference between spheres, particularly the opposition of primary modes (modes of being) and secondary modes that belongs to it, is involved in intermodal relations. This preferential position varies in the spheres, namely, due to the different character of the spheres themselves. The preferential position of one mode does not immediately signify a superordination over the other modes, nor does it signify greater determinateness. Rather, it only signifies that the mode under discussion dominates in the sphere, and that the sphere's true ontological importance is based on it.

This is made recognizable by the fact that the structures of the sphere appear predominantly in this mode.

The preferential position of necessity is best known in the logical sphere. The world of the logical – as secondary as it may always be in the world overall – is a domain of connections. Consequence, dependency, inclusion, and being-included are its preferred phenomena. Isolated concepts or judgments are not found in it; only abstraction – the misuse in logic textbooks of "examples" that are torn out of all connection – lifts them into apparent independence. Anywhere that there is a true body of thought, the logical structure exists in a complex, all-connecting structure. The modal form of conclusions, which is always necessity, corresponds to it. Aside from this, possibility still plays a certain role in the form of the absence of contradiction [*Widerspruchslosigkeit*]. But even this form proves to be concerned with the quite indeterminate mode of "disjunctive" possibility, which forms the *negativum*[1] in impossibility more than it constitutes the presence of conditions.

Actuality and nonactuality emerge everywhere in logical premises as affirmative and negative assertoric judgments. But logic does not directly have anything to do with these judgments. The validity of the premises stands outside of its area of competence. These kinds of conclusions grant only the necessity of the conclusion "on the grounds" of the premises, not the validity of the premises themselves. The logical structure presupposes assertoric validity, but does not have anything further to do with it. It comes to a standstill when faced with consequences and non-consequences. It is the lawfulness of consequences. For that reason, here necessity dominates.

Only in the logical is there such a pronounced preference for one mode. The ideal ontological sphere behaves in a much more neutral manner. It does not display necessity alone, but rather all of the types of relational modes. It is a pure, structural sphere and, thus, relation is its underlying element. Essential necessity is the being-associated with the structure of an "essence;" essential impossibility is the being-excluded from it; essential possibility is the being-compatible with it. In fact, possibility plays an even greater role here than necessity. That is, because here just about everything depends on the non-contradiction of all essences – not only in themselves, but also in their coexistence with the whole sphere.

The sphere of knowledge, on the other hand, appears to be divided in this respect. The absolute modes hold sway in the realm of perception, as well as in

1 [Translator's note]: The term "*nihil negativum*" is used by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to describe an empty object of which there can be no concept, i.e. a self-contradictory object of which a concept is impossible, such as a closed figure composed of two straight lines.

all acts of direct reception related to it (even in emotional acts); the form of consciousness corresponding to them is factual certainty. The less reflective the consciousness of the object is, the more purely this modal preference appears, and the less one asks about possibility and necessity. Comprehending cognition radically differentiates itself from this. One only ever comprehends something "from" another thing, or on the grounds of another thing. Comprehension is only possible in connection, and through connection. Hence, the relational modes move into the foreground. One has comprehended a thing only when one has comprehended it apart from its factuality [*Tatsächlichkeit*], as well as its possibility and necessity, and apart from its absence and impossibility, respectively. Epistemic necessity and epistemic possibility are pronounced modes of comprehending cognition.

If everything in the world of epistemological objects (hence, of that which is in both spheres) were contingent, then comprehending cognition would be impossible and comprehending thought would only be a conceptual game without epistemic value. Only the comprehension of facts would remain as the domain of cognition. On the other hand, here, we have the reason for the marked predominance of logical thought in the sphere of comprehension. The logical is the pure structural lawfulness of those connections in which the relational modes are given leeway.

The real sphere is quite different. It shows a clear prevalence of the absolute modes. Here, everything comes down to being and nonbeing, actuality and nonactuality. Even possibility and necessity show, here, a certain accentuation of the fundamental mode that stands behind them (in the sense of the "third relativity"): they exist only as long as they themselves "actually" ["*wirklich*"] are what they are. And this means not only that they are true possibility and necessity, but that their conditions must also have real actuality. Being-actual constitutes the underlying ontological importance of the real. Related to this is the fact that in the real sphere, the negative modes play only a subordinate – and more or less concurrent – role. Similarly related to this is the fact that in this sphere alone the problem of the contingent plays an important role, reaching into the metaphysical. For the real as such is never essentially necessary. Its real necessity is conditioned by actuality.

c) Intermodal Inconsistencies of the Traditional Hierarchy

The preferential position of a modal type or of an individual mode in one sphere does not coincide with its modal superordination. Yet, this does not mean that it exerts influence on the hierarchy. Thus, it is to be expected that the arrangement

of the modes, as it is correspondingly taken as the grounds for the traditional table and adhered to in the dimensional schemata (Chap. 11), experiences a rearrangement in the spheres. The inevitability of this rearrangement announces itself in certain inconsistencies of the former arrangement, emerging wherever it is not a matter of logical modality alone, but rather of epistemological and ontological modality.

A classic example of this is provided by the Kantian "postulates of empirical thought," which certainly concern only the three positive modes, and yet the logical hierarchy is maintained in them. Kant defines them in this way: 1. "Whatever is in agreement with the formal conditions of experience (according to intuition and comprehension) is possible;" 2. "Whatever is related to the material conditions of experience (of sensation) is actual;" 3. "That whose connection with the actual is determined according to universal conditions of experience is (exists as) necessary."

These determinations have been widely accepted outside of Kantian philosophy. They are the expression of certain tacit presuppositions, which are made almost everywhere that an element of modal consideration emerges in a positive-scientific or philosophical connection. It is, therefore, important to be clear about them as theses with content.[2]

They have the form of definitions. This already contradicts the titular concept of "postulate." They are intended as methodological principles, guidelines for empirical thought, and therefore they may only say what possibly, actually, and necessarily "holds true" in a determinate condition of experience, and not what "is" possible, actual, and necessary. If this sense were strictly retained by them, then it would leave to them only the metagrounds thrown from the realm of the modal into the realm of the constitutive. These metagrounds are readily conspicuous. In all three definitions, the "conditions of experience" constitute the point of reference for congruence. According to the Kantian disposition, these conditions are "formal" moments of content on the one hand and "material" ones on the other, thus having nothing to do with modality.

But the claim of the postulates goes further. They say not only what "holds true" as possible, actual, and necessary, but what in all determinateness "is" possible, "is" actual, and "is" necessary. Thus, they raise a claim that cannot

2 Their double-edgedness, in an epistemological respect, has already been referred to in paragraph 9 of the introduction. But it is their claim to ontological validity, which is now at issue.

be justified by the mere relation to epistemological conditions. The possibility of the "object" is made dependent on the form of "knowledge;" as is the actuality of the "object," on the material of "knowledge;" and the necessity of the "object," on the agreement of both aspects of "knowledge." Such a rendering dependent is only permissible under the presupposition of an idealistic standpoint. Even the lightest criticism of this standpoint renders it illusory. This is why it is highly questionable whether aspects of knowledge can compensate for the modality of being. Every unbiased examination shows that ontological modes are something essentially different from epistemological modes.

Ontologically speaking, the phenomenon of the difference between spheres, which should rightly be presupposed in every sustainable epistemological conception, is completely disregarded. If "being-possible" and "being-actual" were nothing more than the consciousness of possibility and the consciousness of actuality, then there would be no other modes than the modes of consciousness. This conflicts with the distinctions drawn by the naïve outlook and scientific view, alike. Both know quite well that in the real world much "is" possible and "is" actual, which, by no means, "is recognized" as possible or actual, and which, indeed, may not even once "be recognized" as such. There is simply no room for this in the Kantian definitions.

Furthermore, the assignment of modal differences to the opposition of form and matter remains questionable. It has a conditional justification for the modes of knowledge, because the relational aspects of knowledge are found in its form, but the material differences have an absolute way of givenness. For the modes of being, however, this cannot be true, because aspects of form in all that is have the same actuality, possibility, or necessity as the substrates in which they consist.

d) The Aporetic in Kantian Modal Concepts

The aporias tied to the inconsistencies mentioned above can be summarized in the following four points.

1. If actuality depends on the matter of knowledge alone and possibility depends on the form of knowledge alone, then clearly many things must be able to be actual that are not possible. There is no guarantee given in knowledge or anywhere else that if something only accords with the matter, then it also accords with the form. And even if it were given, then the first two

postulates would not express it. Thus, according to them, something that was in fact permissible would be utterly impossible.

2. Whatever stood in no connection with perception, could not be actual even if it agreed with all forms, the universal as well as the particular (such as the natural laws), even if it were required of them. If they have lost connection to perception, then material bodies in space or an entire system of such bodies must be nonactual; and this would be even more true for every kind of spiritual being. Here, it is denied from the outset that something not perceptible or deducible from the perceptible could be actual.
3. If necessity ought to exist in connection with the actual, according to universal conditions of experience, then that which does not trace back to a connection with the perceived cannot be necessary. Thus, relations of pure mathematics could not be any more necessary than an *a priori* understanding of the facts. This cannot even be brought into accord with Kant's own views concerning synthetic *a priori* judgment. Here, necessity is understood only as the necessity of "empirical thought;" it is not the mode of all knowledge, let alone the modal character of being.
4. If actuality fulfills only half of the conditions of necessity (the connection with perception), then obviously the actual as such is contingent. This does approach a roughly indeterministic world view, but it is not the Kantian one, which is completely ruled by lawfulness. There is no sense in even looking for laws in a world in which the actual is not only not recognized as necessary, but "is" also not necessary. Lawfulness presupposes some form of the actual's necessity.

Whatever these aporias express is not the obliquity of Kantian modal concepts alone, and not merely the one-sidedness of epistemological dualism, but the fundamental transgression of ways of being as such. This criticism concerns *mutatis mutandis* every approach seeking to implement the same three steps of the hierarchy in an ontological sphere. It is intrinsically wrong to trace back the being-possible of something to its mere contingency under certain principles of experience, just as it is wrong to relate being-actual to givenness. And it is doubly wrong to consider being-necessary as a synthesis of both kinds of relatedness.

For neither is necessity a sum of possibility and actuality, nor does it presuppose the conditions under which they are recognizable. It is a mode entirely different from them, and its relation to them is in fact quite different from one of summation. This becomes evident as soon as one proceeds from the relationality that it shares with possibility.

13 The Real Modes and Modal Consciousness

a) The Ontological Breakdown of the Traditional Hierarchy

The traditional hierarchy has proven itself to be insufficient for the ontological spheres. It is easy to see that there must be an error in its principles. But it is difficult to say where the error lies.

This difficulty is not lessened by there being something obviously right in the ancient hierarchy, which is not touched on by this criticism: the fact that our knowledge about actuality, on the one hand, and about possibility and necessity, on the other, is heterogeneous. Thus, consciousness of actuality remains related to the givenness of perception. Through what do we ultimately know of the existence of things, if not perception? In this respect, Kant's second postulate is justified. Little is changed in this, if one recognizes that a whole series of transcendent acts stands behind perception.

On the other hand, the question remains: why should being-actual be generally limited to the given? Indeed, it is most clearly recognized purely *a priori* that there can be actual things in the expanse of the real world, of which we can have attained knowledge through no kind of givenness – neither through perception, nor through a different kind of primary transcendent act. Neither being recognized nor recognizability is situated in the modal character of "being-actual." It is the pure comprehension of the modal character alone, that is now crucial and not givenness or recognizability.

It is the same for possibility and necessity as for actuality. That something comes to agreement with the formal conditions of experience is sufficient to constitute consciousness of possibility, but not the thing's being-possible. In real connection, the thing may very well be impossible, namely, if the series of its real conditions is incomplete. But these real conditions can be situated completely outside the realm of those "formal conditions of experience."

And likewise: if the connection of a thing with the perceived is determined according to general laws of experience, then this is sufficient for a certain consciousness of necessity, but not for the real being-necessary of the thing itself. The real being-necessary depends on real grounds, and these determine it independently of whether or not, by laws of experience, they stand in connection with the perceived. Something can "be" necessary even when it is not recognized as necessary; indeed, even if it is not recognized at all.

In these considerations, as simple as they may be, the question of the modal levels clearly turns from an epistemological into an ontological one. The traditional hierarchy is not even contested in its sphere. Only the relations of

being of the real sphere withdraw from it. Nothing seemed more obvious to ancient rationalism than to identify levels of knowledge with levels of being; idealism cannot completely avoid this, and the majority of newer trends – right up to positivism stifled by formalism – have replicated it. They did not know any better. The ontological content of the modal problem first broke through the inevitable calcification of this oversimplified way of thinking. Relations of being defer neither to the demands of reason nor to the lawfulness of consciousness.

b) Proof of the Heterogeneity of the Modes of Consciousness and Being

Thus, the real modes begin to detach themselves from modal consciousness. And as this detachment begins a wide field of ontological insights opens up, which are only now to be garnered. This cannot happen all at once; the breakthrough is identical to the entire scope of the now forthcoming modal analysis of the real.

That something for knowledge can be considered "actual" – and thus perhaps as given fact – without being recognized as "necessary" is in no way disputable. But from this, it absolutely does not follow that it can also "be actual" without "being necessary." Necessity of being can go unrecognized where the actuality of being is recognized. It can be rooted in unrecognized ontological connections. And in the majority of cases, it will be so rooted.

Likewise, a very common occurrence takes shape in everyday life, just as in science, in which something is recognized as "actual" without us being able to see how it is "possible." We are familiar with this occurrence in all appearances that are somehow complicated or simply novel. But, naturally, this does not signify that the thing "is actual" without "being possible." The possibility of being may be unrecognized even when the actuality of being is completely certain for consciousness. It can be rooted in unrecognized and perhaps even in unrecognizable conditions of being. The thing then appears "enigmatic" or "miraculous" to us, just as it appears "contingent" in the former case (with unrecognized necessity).

Here, we find rigorous proof of the heterogeneity between modality of being in general (real modality in particular) and the modality of each kind of consciousness (epistemic modality in particular). The levels of the one do not coincide with those of the other, indeed they do not even correspond to each other, i.e. neither in the individual mode nor in the intermodal relations. Therefore, the modality of being must be investigated independently from the modality of knowledge.

This relation clearly reflects the well-known relation of *ratio cognoscendi* and *ratio essendi*. One can never be certain about excluding the latter from

the former, but the latter does not need to be analogous to the former. Whatever is the cause in one can be the consequence in the other, and vice versa. It is exactly the same for the modes. Possibility is the condition of actuality for being, yet it can lack actuality for knowledge, since it can go unrecognized. Nothing is changed by the formal knowledge that something recognized as actual must also somehow be possible.

Thus, it is to be expected that for the ontological spheres, a different modal result is produced than in the epistemological sphere, reflecting the changed meanings and mutual dependencies of the modes. For the modes of being do not generally signify any modal consciousness, and the modes of consciousness do not generally signify any modes of being.

c) The Modal Oppositions and Modal Hierarchy of the Real

All classification is based on opposition. Among the dimensions of modal opposition, there remains that of the positive and negative modes untouched by the opposition of spheres. Therefore, nothing is to be modeled on it in the transition to the real modes. Only contingency is indeterminate in this respect. It can, for the time being, be left out of the picture, because as a limiting mode it only concerns the whole of the sphere, not the particular real within it.

It is different for the opposition of the fundamental and relational modes. If one proceeds from actuality as the positive fundamental mode – it having been shown to be the dominant mode in the real sphere anyway – then its oppositional analysis presents a negative picture in relation to the other two positive modes. Actuality does not stand in an oppositional relation to either necessity or possibility. Only its absolutism stands in opposition to the mutual relationality of those two modes. But this is only an opposition of modal type, and not of the individual modes, themselves. The only strict opposition to being-actual lies in being-nonactual, and is, thus, within the same modal type. Taken formally, the nonactual now does not mean a necessary nonactual or a contingent nonactual; it can mean each of these, without even shifting its modal meaning, but it does not need to do so. It is indifferent to impossibility and possibility.

But it is not the case that because of this the actual is indifferent to them. The impossible, at least, cannot be actual. Whatever is actual must at least be possible. The relation of indifference cannot be carried over unchanged from negative to positive mode. It turns into something else. But the new relation is a positive one of a quite different kind: a relation of dependency, or of implication. Such a relation exists only for one counterpart, not for both; in the case mentioned it exists for possibility.

If one holds tightly to this for comparison while approaching the intermodal position of possibility, then its close connection to necessity becomes readily visible. In which case the common position of both relations to the absolute mode (actuality) becomes discernible.

Possibility is in a structurally oppositional relation to necessity. The dimensions enumerated above do not commit us to this opposition; it does not emerge in any of them, and does not come into its own in any of the traditional conceptions. It is a particularly complex structure and can be expressed most simply as a double law: the lack of necessity directly implies a kind of possibility, and the lack of possibility directly implies a kind of necessity. That is to say: the not-being-necessary (of **A**) is negative possibility (possibility of not-**A**, therefore the negative limb of disjunctive possibility); and the not-being-possible (of **A**) is negative necessity (necessity of not-**A**).

Both principles, in this form, are well known to logic. This becomes evident, if one takes as one's starting point the strict connectedness of necessity and the classes of universality of judgment. If "all S are P" is true, then each individual S and P is necessary; but if "all S are P" is not true; then this necessity falls away, and so too "can" an individual S be not-P. Not-being-necessary is negative being-possible. And likewise, if it is true that "some S are P," then surely an individual S "can" be P; but if it is not true, then "no S is P" is true, and no individual S can be P. The negation of possibility is negative necessity.

d) The Division of Real Possibility

In the logical sphere, this relation manifests itself quite harmlessly. For here, there is disjunctive possibility: possibility of being always includes possibility of nonbeing, and vice versa. There is, here, only the double-possibility of P and not-P. If non-necessity is, thus, directly the possibility of nonbeing, then it is also indirectly the possibility of being. But this changes in ontically real terrain.

In the real sphere, there is no disjunctive possibility. Otherwise, what is actual could not be possible: even in an **A's** being-actual, the possibility of not-**A** no longer exists, as the latter would contradict the former. Real possibility is at least indifferent possibility; i.e. it must at least allow that **A** be simultaneously actual. Otherwise it cannot maintain itself in **A's** being-actual; and it must do so, if the actual is not to be "impossible" (see Chap. 3, a and c).

Thus, in the sphere of real being, the possibility of **A** and the possibility of not-**A** are not one and the same. There are two different possibilities, a positive and a negative mode, which cannot coexist in relation to the same circumstances of **A**. They are mutually exclusive, just as actuality and nonactuality

are. This finds its confirmation in the content related character of real possibility. It has been shown to consist in the series of real conditions; once all of the conditions are fulfilled right up to the very last, they make the circumstances of **A** possible. As long as a single condition goes unfulfilled, **A** is not possible. But if they are all brought together, then not-**A** is not possible.

Under such circumstances, the basic modal law separating the relational modes from the absolute acquires a special meaning. It proves to be impossible to place actuality between possibility and necessity in the hierarchy of modes. Likewise, it is impossible to place nonactuality between negative possibility and impossibility. The special position of the fundamental modes must be dealt with seriously, not only by opposing the dimensional modes to the relational ones as is done above, but by radically restructuring the modes according to their modal stature. Actuality must be placed either below possibility or above necessity, and nonactuality must be placed either above negative possibility or below impossibility. The two fundamental modes then come to stand either close beside each other (on the horizontal boundary line) or so far away from each other that within their span they encompass the whole series of relational modes. It remains to be shown which of the two positions is appropriate.

The laws of indifference being violated by this does not invalidate any of these laws. The indifferences are only formal relations; their validity depends on the traditional hierarchy of modes. But it now stands in question whether the peculiar nature of the real sphere does not disrupt this hierarchy and the meanings of modes adopted from it, in addition to essentially changing its intermodal laws.

The state of affairs is generally such that one only enters into the categorial analysis of the modes by means of a more precise investigation into the intermodal relations of a determinate sphere. Everything that one takes over in terms of conventional determinations for this investigation – and everything counts that (on this side of the division according to spheres) would generally constitute the formal character of the modes – must, for the time being, be held under the suspicion of being a prejudgment. It must, in each sphere, be subjected to re-examination.

14 An Overview of the Intermodal Laws of the Real

a) The Equivalences of the Relational Modes

A new series of consequences can be drawn from what has been said, bringing us directly into a discussion of the intermodal relations of the real. The first

series of these consequences is connected to the oppositional relation between possibility and necessity, as was developed just now (Chap. 13 c).

It is not a direct opposition. Only through their negative counterparts do these modes enter into opposition with each other. The contradictory counterpart of possibility falls under the genus of necessity (impossibility is negative necessity); and the contradictory counterpart of necessity falls under the genus of possibility (not being necessary is negative possibility).

If one turns this relation of opposition into a positive one, then it may be expressed in the form of laws of equivalence. A negative mode is equivalent to a positive mode, as long as the aspect of negation springs over to the absolute mode, the relational mode being relative to it (in the sense of internal relativity). That is to say, possibility, as well as necessity, can be just as relative to the actual (**A**) as to the nonactual (not-**A**). Thus, the two first equivalences assume the following form:

1. The negation of the possibility of **A** is the necessity of not-**A**.
2. The negation of the necessity of **A** is the possibility of not-**A**.

Behind the oppositional relation looms a very positive relation, a very close and original relatedness of both positive relational modes to each other, emerging along the detour through their negative counterparts; since the necessity of not-**A** is the impossibility of **A**, and the possibility of not-**A** is the negative component of divided possibility, which from now on is an independent negative mode.

However, if the opposition of its negative side is understood then the relation intensifies. Proceeding from the negation of both modes of internal relativity to a nonactual (not-**A**), the equivalences produce the positive modes of **A**:

3. The negation of the possibility of not-**A** is the necessity of **A**.
4. The negation of the necessity of not-**A** is the possibility of **A**.

Due to their eminently positive results, these principles are of greater importance than the first two. The first of them (3) is even well known in logic, due to the apagogic conclusion that is based on it. But it is not the conclusion alone that is in question here. Rather, with these laws of equivalence, a first step is taken toward the determination of the intermodal relations of the real. They are still close to the formal laws, being reminiscent of them in their form. But their scope is already wider.

It may be noted that the striking formal symmetry in the laws of equivalence is based on the division of possibility. Hence these laws can be valid only for

N of A (I of not-A)
P of A
P of not-A
N of not-A (I of A)

Fig. 6

spheres in which possibility is not disjunctive (not needing to be only the real sphere). Through this division we obtain four relational modes instead of three. That is, two positive and two negative (Fig. 6). There are two necessities and two possibilities, one being positive and one negative for each pair.

The two necessities are synonymous with each impossibility (of the contradictory counterpart). Each of the four equivalency principles now emerges from the negation of one of these modes: the negation of each possibility proves equivalent to a necessity, and the negation of each necessity proves equivalent to a possibility. All four equivalences cross over the boundary line between positive and negative modes. This symmetrical relation is obviously based on the fact that two of the four modes contradict each other, so that they fall not only under the principle of contradiction, but also under the principle of excluded middle. Each has one possibility and one necessity separated by the line, so that one of each pair must necessarily exist. The one pair is **P** of **A** and **N** of not-**A**, while the other is **P** of not-**A** and **N** of **A**. The four equivalences are nothing but the explication of this uniform relation. Their uniformity is no accident. The ontological weight of the matter, however, does not fall on it, but, rather on consequences of a very different kind.

b) The Position of the Fundamental Modes in the Real Sphere

The circle of modal equivalences being closed with these four laws shows better than anything else the homogeneity of the relational modes. Actuality and its counterpart, nonactuality, stand outside of this circle. They have their own lawfulness, a direct and simple lawfulness that never spreads out into the relational modes, but rather remains entirely within the fundamental modes (to the left of the line in Fig. 1). The negation of actuality is only ever nonactuality, and the negation of nonactuality is only ever actuality. Only through their being contained in the relational modes – in the sense of their "internal relativity" to the fundamental modes – do they spread into further oppositions and equivalences.

It makes no difference to the external position of the absolute modes that the relational modes are relative to them and that every **A** and not-**A**, whose

possibility and necessity the equivalences concern, are, thus, abbreviated symbols for an actual thing and a nonactual thing. This relativity implies only the presupposition of the absolute modes in the relational modes, not an opposition that could be drawn according to an equivalence. It does not demolish the boundary line of heterogeneity. Rather, it is directed towards it. For only the relational modes are relative to actuality and nonactuality.[3]

This state of affairs sheds new light on the obliquity of the usual classification of actuality as between possibility and necessity, and of nonactuality as between possibility and impossibility. Both modes are not ontologically middle levels. For the real sphere, it does not matter if actuality is regarded as "more" than possibility but "less" than necessity; for this sphere, it has neither sufficient homogeneity with, nor sufficient opposition toward, either. It falls under another genus of being. As has already been shown, it is to be inserted either above or below possibility and necessity. And since it clearly cannot be placed below possibility – since possibility is presupposed in it – there remains only one alternative: in the real sphere, actuality comes to stand above necessity. One would expect at least this.

And the same is to be expected in the case of nonactuality. It also will not be allowed to stand between (negative) possibility and impossibility, but only above or below them both. And since it cannot stand above possibility (even negative possibility) – as it is obviously more negative than it – only one alternative remains: in the real sphere, nonactuality must come to stand below impossibility. It then stands as the lowest ontological mode, the most purely negative and at the same time the most determinate in its negativity.



Fig. 7

3 Of course, in the sense of an echelon of modes, there is **Actuality** of **A** and **Actuality** of not-**A**, as well as **NA** of **A** and **NA** of not-**A**; and of these, there are two that are crosswise equivalent to each other. But since this only involves two basic modes, nothing but the law of *duplex negatio* results. Equivalences of this kind are meaningless, and must be left by the wayside.

Meanwhile, it must be clearly stated at this point that both principles – and both transpositions, that of actuality and that of nonactuality, respectively – are by no means proven by the preceding considerations and that they still await their proof. Furthermore, they are much too important for us to be content with a formal calculation of their "arrangement." What the arrangement depicted in Fig. 7 expresses purely externally is nothing less than the foundation of real ontology. It is the starting point for a response to the great question of what reality actually is.

Whoever compares the schema of Fig. 7 with the schemata used above (Fig. 1, 3 and 5) can perhaps already visualize this. Possibility is dissolved into two modes, one positive and one negative (**P+** and **P-**). The wavy transitional line has disappeared from the two-dimensional arrangement; in its place, a much simpler transitional line has appeared, crossing over the vertical boundary line only twice. On its way upwards from nonactuality to actuality it passes through the whole series of contiguous relational modes. For the indifferences, there is no room in this arrangement; none of them could be clearly accommodated. This means ontologically that a whole series of very peculiar intermodal relations appear. But these relations are still to be worked out and to be proven. On them alone depends the soundness of the new arrangement and the foundation of real ontology.

c) The First Principle of Real Intermodal Relations

The intermodal relations of the real, whose overview – not proof – is now at issue, may be summarized in three principles. Their ontological content is, of course, only covertly expressed in these principles. It requires an explanation by corollaries. It widely deviates from all conventional conceptions, appearing highly paradoxical in many places. But the weight of the matter rests directly on the paradoxical corollaries. Since the proof of these corollaries is complicated, for the time being it is best to enumerate them as unproven, reserving their proof for a separate investigation.

There have been shown to be three kinds of relation that are possible between different modes of one and the same thing: exclusion, implication, and indifference. One mode can negate another (to exclude it from itself), it can require it (to presuppose or entail it), and it can be compatible with it without requiring it. Exclusion is obviously mutual, while implication and indifference can appear unilaterally. A mode X can presuppose a mode Y, without mode Y having presupposed it; Y must then be indifferent to X, i.e. allow its

opposite. This is at least how it is in the formal relation of the modes. In the real relation much is changed.

The first principle concerns the indifference of modes. In the formal relation of the modes there were three indifferences, which adhered to actuality, possibility, and nonactuality. All three were dual relations (alternatives). In the real sphere all three are abolished; there is no real modal indifference. There is only exclusion and implication. This may be uniformly expressed as follows:

> Principle I: Concerning the modes of the real, one mode is never indifferent toward another.

Before being properly demonstrated, this principle is only roughly explained in the following way. Actuality must be indifferent toward necessity and contingency. But since contingency has no position among the regular modes of the real (see Fig. 7), only the other components of the alternative remain; thus, the alternative itself falls away, and along with it so too does the indifference whose essential form it is.

Possibility must be indifferent toward actuality and nonactuality. But as a divided positive mode, it is only possibility of being, and not of nonbeing. Since nonactuality presupposes the possibility of nonbeing, the possibility of being can only be connected to actuality, not nonactuality. Thus, the alternative falls away, as does the indifference of possibility along with it. (The same is true, of divided negative possibility, *mutatis mutandis*; it cannot be connected to actuality, because this mode presupposes the possibility of being).

Finally, nonactuality must be indifferent toward both possibility and impossibility; whereby the former is the positive possibility of being, since only this mode has a contradictory relation to impossibility. But, now, nonactuality presupposes the possibility of nonbeing; and as the latter, according to the division, cannot coexist with the possibility of being, thus nonactuality cannot coexist with the latter either. Thus, one component of the alternative falls away, as does the alternative itself along with it. Hence, the indifference of nonactuality falls away as well.

d) The Second Principle and its Corollaries

The second principle concerns the exclusion of modes. It may be taken as evident that the positive modes are all compatible with each other, as is the case with the negative modes. One and the same thing can simultaneously be possible, actual, and necessary; likewise, its nonactuality and impossibility can be

connected with the possibility of its nonbeing. Mutual exclusion, therefore, only takes place between positive and negative modes; or figuratively speaking, it always crosses over the horizontal boundary line.

But that is why in a formal relation not every positive mode excludes every negative mode, and not every negative mode excludes every positive mode. The only modes that mutually exclude each other are: 1. necessity and nonactuality; 2. necessity and impossibility; 3. actuality and nonactuality; 4. actuality and impossibility; 5. possibility and impossibility; and also, according to the division of possibility: 6. negative possibility and necessity. These six mutual incompatibilities can be called the "evident laws of exclusion," because they provide insight into the formal essence of the modes – independent of the particularities of the sphere.

But it is similarly insightful that according to the formal essence of the modes, undivided possibility is compatible with actuality and with nonactuality; this must yield the result that according to the division of possibility there is not a mutual exclusion between: 1. positive possibility and nonactuality; and 2. negative possibility and actuality.

This very closely corresponds to the indifference of possibility toward actuality and nonactuality (second law of indifference, see Chap. 11 a). Wherever indifference holds sway, the relation of exclusion is eliminated. But now the indifferences are abolished in the real sphere (the first principle states: no mode of the real is indifferent toward another mode); the indifferences are replaced by exclusion or implication. And since the latter does not come into question here, only exclusion remains. Consequently, two new, absolutely paradoxical laws enter into the real sphere in addition to the six evident laws of exclusion: modes that exclude each other are: 1. possibility of nonbeing and actuality, as well as 2. possibility of being and nonactuality.

If we now cast a glance at the schema of Fig. 7, then we see that only one relation remains in which exclusion could be disputed: that of positive and negative possibility. But even this relation means the division of possibility, also meaning that these two could not coexist in one and the same thing. This is paradoxical enough and still to be proven. But for the time being, we must let it stand. The overall result has an eloquent simplicity, and may be summarized by one principle.

> Principle II: All positive real modes exclude all negative ones and – since their exclusion can only be mutual – all negative real modes exclude all positive ones.

If one considers this to be the general principle on which the particular laws of exclusion all rest, then the specified paradoxical laws of exclusion represent its

corollaries. But the true importance of the principle is based on the latter. That is why it is worthwhile to grasp them in an explicit form. According to the mutuality in the relation of exclusion, each of the two laws is divided into two components, so that all together we obtain four "paradoxical laws of exclusion." They are placed next to each other here in a dual formulation, detached from, and yet united with, each other:

1. The being of whatever is nonactual is not possible (nonactuality excludes positive possibility).
2. The nonbeing of whatever is actual is not possible (actuality excludes negative possibility).
3. That whose being is possible cannot be nonactual (positive possibility excludes nonactuality).
4. That whose nonbeing is possible cannot be actual (negative possibility excludes actuality).

If one looks at the content of the last two principles (particularly principle 3), then that revolution in basic modal concepts announces itself signaling the transition of thought from its own modal construction to that of the real world. These things clash with all of the usual methods of thinking that one is accustomed to testing out. The very ground of logic seems to waver.

e) The Third Principle

It is with the implications that the real modes first show their true face. The implications are by far the most important intermodal laws. For they alone constitute the positive relation of the modes, insofar as it is a "determinate" relation. The indifferences are indeterminate, and the exclusions are only negative relations.

According to principle II, the six real modes break down into two groups that altogether mutually exclude each other. The horizontal line (in Fig. 7) forms the boundary line, which separates the negative modes from the positive modes. No implication crosses over this boundary line in either direction. Only exclusion crosses this line. Thus, only the two groups remain, each self-contained and yet open as the scope of possible implication.

Within these boundaries, four laws of implication have always been valid. They are recognized in very diverse formulations – some more logical, some more ontological – or they may even be found to be merely implicitly presupposed. They can be expressed in their detached form as follows: 1. whatever

is necessary is also actual; 2. whatever is actual is also possible; 3. whatever is impossible is also nonactual; 4. the nonbeing of whatever is nonactual is also possible.

Laws 1 and 2 then produce the corollary: 5. whatever is necessary must also be possible; and likewise, 3 and 4 produce the corollary: 6. the nonbeing of whatever is impossible must be possible.

In their self-contained form, these six "evident laws of implication" can be summarized by four principles: 1. necessity implies actuality and positive possibility; 2. actuality implies positive possibility; 3. impossibility implies nonactuality and negative possibility; 4. nonactuality implies negative possibility.

The evidence for these laws is purely formal and self-evident. But by no means does this make them meaningless. They maintain themselves in the real sphere and remain there, but they are not the only laws. Within them lies, in the first place, the reason why necessity has always been superordinated over actuality: necessity proves itself here to be the more determinate mode, implying the other two positive modes, while actuality only implies one and possibility, none. And it is similar for the negative modes: impossibility is the most determinate negative mode, implying the other two negative modes, while nonactuality implies only one, and the possibility of nonbeing implies none.

This is how it appears before the real character of the sphere has been taken into consideration. It is important to make clear what this means. It means that in this formal (or neutral) conception of the modes, the laws of implication are not reversible: actuality does not imply necessity, and possibility implies neither actuality nor necessity; likewise, nonactuality does not imply impossibility, and negative possibility implies neither nonactuality nor impossibility. The "higher" positive modes imply the lower ones, but the lower positive modes do not imply the higher (or those that are considered to be higher in formal relation); and the "lower" negative modes (or whatever is formally regarded as such) imply the higher modes, but the higher negative modes do not imply the lower.

But, in the real sphere, this is precisely what fundamentally changes. One considers the following. There are only three kinds of intermodal relations: indifference, exclusion, and implication. Which of these three is to be the relation of actuality to necessity, of positive possibility to actuality and necessity? And likewise, which is the relation of nonactuality to impossibility, and of negative possibility to nonactuality and impossibility? Exclusion does not come into question, since it only crosses the boundary line (the horizontal line), and therefore is found only between positive and negative modes; but the relations in question here all occur within one group of modes (the positive or the negative). In formal relation the indifference was supplied for these counterparts of evident

implications: since possibility (still undivided) was indifferent toward actuality and nonactuality; and then, of course, positive possibility can also be indifferent toward necessity, and negative possibility can be indifferent toward impossibility. Likewise, actuality was indifferent toward necessity, and nonactuality was indifferent toward impossibility.

But now, according to principle I, the indifferences in the real sphere have all fallen away; no real mode is indifferent toward another real mode. The relations in question can thus consist in neither exclusion nor indifference, only able to be relations of implication. This abolishes the one-sidedness of implications. The laws of implication develop into laws of mutual implication. But in this way, they encompass all relations that exist within each group of real modes. For that reason, they may be summarized by a principle of surprising simplicity:

> Principle III: All positive real modes imply one another and all negative real modes imply one another.

Thus, the formal laws of implication remain. Their inverted forms are simply added to them as new laws. Not only do the higher positive modes imply the lower, but the lower also imply the higher; and not only do the lower negative modes imply the higher, but so too do the higher imply the lower.

If principles II and III are summarized, then the overall picture of intermodal relations in the real sphere becomes even more uniform. The boundary line separating the group of positive modes from the group of negative modes, now wholly becomes the central phenomenon: all relations that cross over the line consist in exclusion; all that hold sway within a group, above or below the line, consist in implication. A third kind of relation is not to be found, since all possible relations of the six modes have been exhausted with those mentioned. This coincides with what principle I expresses: the indifferences are abolished.

Since all categorial coherence (the internal connection of a single stratum's categories) has the form of implication, it may also be said of the modes of the real that: each of its two groups is completely coherent in itself, but both groups are completely inconsistent with each other. It is a peculiar radicalism of being and nonbeing that therein expresses itself. This radicalism is the first ontological light to be shed on the essence of reality.

f) Corollaries of the Third Principle

Nevertheless, the oversimplified formula of principle III only dimly foreshadowed its ontological importance. It must be explained by the individual laws of implication in order for us to see what it contains.

It encompasses twelve laws of implication altogether: the six evident implications listed above, which clarify the formal relation of the modes, and their inverted forms, the six "paradoxical implications," unique to the real sphere. It is obvious that only the latter are of ontological importance, since the peculiar construction of real ways of being is tied only to them. Consequently, the true meaning of principle III lies in them alone.

The symmetrical construction in the series of these six paradoxical laws of implication is best expressed by proceeding from possibility in both modal groups, placing the terminologically self-contained formulation beside the concrete, active formulation for each law.

a) The Paradoxical Implications of the Positive Real Modes:

1. Whatever is really possible is also really actual (positive real possibility implies real actuality);
2. Whatever is really actual is also really necessary (real actuality implies real necessity);
3. Whatever is really possible is also really necessary (positive real possibility implies real necessity).

b) The Paradoxical Implications of the Negative Real Modes:

4. That whose nonbeing is really possible is also really nonactual (negative real possibility implies real nonactuality);
5. Whatever is really nonactual is also really impossible (real nonactuality implies real impossibility);
6. That whose nonbeing is really possible is also really impossible (negative real possibility implies real impossibility).

Within these two groups of laws, the relation is such that both times the third law is produced as the conclusion resulting from the first two (the third law from the first and second, the sixth law from fourth and fifth). Incidentally, the laws of the first group are far more important, because they belong to the positive modes. Among them – the third is only a corollary – the ontological importance rests on the first two laws, since in these laws the paradoxical character is most strongly solidified and seems more or less intrusive. These two laws generally play the decisive role in the further modal analysis of real being; their range extends far beyond the realm of the modal problem, into the structural relations of the real sphere. Since the first law determines the role of possibility and the second law that of necessity in the construction of the real world,

they should hereafter bear the distinct designations: “real law of possibility” and “real law of necessity.”

The justification for these ambitious sounding titles can only be given with the proof of the six laws, themselves. For the time being, all of these laws are merely “postulated;” they are not yet explicated in their ontological content, let alone proven. It will be shown that the most important intermodal relation – concerning the essence of real actuality – is not expressed in them, at all. All of this still needs to be provided and cannot be anticipated.

The proof itself cannot directly extend to the principles, since in their generality these are too abstract to be summarily proven. It must begin in the corollaries, and only from them rise up to the principles. Since the evident laws require no proof, it will be exclusively concerned with the ten intermodal laws: the four paradoxical laws of exclusion, and the six paradoxical laws of implication. In these two groups of laws, the summation of real modal lawfulness is completely contained.

II Formal Proof of the Intermodal Laws of the Real

15 The Law of Division of Real Possibility

a) The Relation Between the Formal and the Material Proof

One can only prove intermodal laws by learning to discern their content. They are not derivative laws able to be proven from other, more universal laws. What this involves is not truly a proof, but rather reference and demonstration – as is always the case in categorial analysis. The paradoxical laws would of course require a viable, elaborate proof. What lies within the bounds of the possible is something quite modest, but by no means simple: to learn to work through the paradox – until one encounters the evident.

There are two ways of doing this: among the laws one can select the evident ones and take them as a starting point, allowing oneself to be led from them with the help of intermodal coherence to the remaining laws; and one can show from the *concretum* that the sphere of being, whose laws they are – in our case, therefore, the real sphere – in fact contains them and is to be understood from them. The first way is an aprioristic method, amounting in the end to a strict, yet merely "formal proof." The second way is that of an analytical penetration of experience from its base; it grows into a "material proof," which is loosely connected, but widely rooted in facts. Only the formal proof has the character of pure modal argumentation. The material proof remains on the constitutive side of the "external relativity" peculiar to the relational modes.

One must make it clear from the outset that the underlying, fundamental conclusions must lie within the material proof, because it follows a circuitous path through the constitutive side of real relations. Within the essence of the ways of being and kinds of being there simply lies the fact that this constitutive side can only be "concurrently" grasped as something bearing content, even if one must always simultaneously disregard the latter in order to comprehend the modal. Thus, the circuitous path is the better way.

But one must not, consequently, consider the formal proof to be superfluous. It merely has a different function. It is the direct survey of the modal relations of the real, the ontological orientation, so to speak, toward an unfamiliar, rarely entered ground, which the traditional approach has only ever viewed from a distance, through the lens of the logical – and, in part, also the

gnoseological – modes. It, thus, forms a purely stated method that gropes for *a priori*, insightful connections from point to point, and in this way its function cannot be comprehended through the very different gait of material proceedings.

It is precisely because the true "strength of evidence" rests on the latter that we must now begin with the formal proof. The orientation must precede the seizure of new ground through philosophical knowledge.

b) The Meaning of the Law of Division and its Insightfulness

The formal proof can have its starting point only in a principle that is neither openly nor covertly contained in the formal evident intermodal laws, but rather in one that is insightful in another way. We have acquired such a principle within the division of real possibility into two different modes.

The two modes are possibility of being (**P+**) and possibility of nonbeing (**P-**). In the schema (Fig. 7), the one stands above the line that separates the positive and negative groups of real modes, and the other stands below it. According to the basic modal law, this "being and nonbeing" is concerned with actuality and nonactuality. The division, therefore, indicates: possibility of being-actual (**P+**) is not simultaneously possibility of being-nonactual (**P-**); and vice versa, the latter is not simultaneously the former. Both mutually exclude each other. In detached form this means:

1. The nonbeing of whatever is really possible is really not possible;
2. That whose nonbeing is really possible is really not possible.

This dual principle is an ontological law, which shall hereafter be called "the law of division of possibility." It is not true for just any possibility in any old sphere, but only for the real possibility of being. At the moment, the question as to whether it has any further validity must remain unanswered. It is already substantially restricted in this respect, as may be recognized at first glance. If it can be made reasonable, then it becomes the natural starting point for all formal argumentation in the area of real modes; for the *ratio cognoscendi* it forms the boundary that separates the intermodal relations of the real from those of the other spheres.

But the law of division – in connection with what was said earlier (Chapter 13 d) – becomes reasonable in the following manner. Real actuality presupposes real possibility, and real nonactuality presupposes real possibility of nonbeing (these are two of the evident laws of implication; see Chapter 14 e, Principles 2 and 4). If one mode is presupposed in another, then this now

means that it is accepted or contained in it. But in the being-actual of something, only the possibility of its being (being-actual) can be contained, not the possibility of its nonbeing (being-nonactual); likewise, in the being-nonactual of something, only the possibility of its nonbeing (being-nonactual) can be contained, not the possibility of its being (being-actual). Thus, in both cases the disjunctive dual possibility cannot be contained.

One considers at this point: if the possibility of nonbeing were contained in actuality, then that which is already actual would still have to be capable of not being, i.e. to be at the same time nonactual. And if the possibility of being were contained in nonactuality, then that which is nonactual would still have to be capable of being, i.e. to be able to be at the same time actual. Both cases are, at best, meaningful if possibility is loosely and indeterminately understood as a "being generally possible," as it is understood in everyday life as a being-conceivable; whatever is not actual at present may very well be able "to be, in general," i.e. it can become or could have been actual; and whatever is actual at present may very well be able "to not be, in general," i.e. to become or to have been nonactual. In this way, nothing is abandoned. But such a vague "being able to" is not involved in real possibility. Real being is determinate being here-and-now; its transitoriness, its temporally changing being and nonbeing, is already implicated; this does not contradict the clear being in the here-and-now, nor does it contradict the being-excluded of the not-being-able-to-be in the same here-and-now. Real possibility is exclusively being possible here-and-now, it is determinate being-possible. Whatever is formally "possible, in general," is certainly not really possible in unequivocal temporal determinateness (nor in spatial determinateness, for physical being).

This is what is expressed in the modal determinations: the possibility of nonbeing is excluded in the being-actual of the real (namely, in its temporary, transitory being-actual, as long as this lasts); whatever is actual in full real determinateness cannot be nonactual at the same time, in the same determinateness. And likewise: the possibility of being is excluded in the being-nonactual of a real thing (namely, in its temporary being-nonactual); whatever is nonactual in the full determinateness of an existing real connection cannot be actual at the same time, in the same determinateness. Otherwise, a real contradiction would have to arise in both modes.

c) The Corollaries of the Law of Division

One can argue from actuality, just as from possibility. Real actuality is not a "being-actual, in general" under just any conceivable circumstances, but rather

it is the determinate being-actual of something (**A**) in a determinate connection of the real – i.e. at a determinate time (and also in determinate space, for physical being). Whatever is actual at another time (at another place) and in another real connection is not at all the same in terms of its content; its actuality is not that of **A**, but rather the actuality of **B**. The connections, including the spatial-temporal determination, all belong to the real determinateness of **A**. If a part of them is abolished or is replaced by another, then we no longer have **A**, but rather **B**. And of course, **B** may very well be nonactual, while **A** is actual. But **B** cannot be actually identical to **A**.

If **A** is now really actual in such a fullness of determination, then this directly means not only that it "is" not nonactual, but that in this very same fullness of determination it no longer has the "possibility" to be nonactual either, i.e. that its nonbeing is impossible. Here, the issue is not whether it could sooner or later be nonactual – i.e. in an altered fullness of determination, thus no longer as **A**, but as **B**. Assuredly this point is not disputed. But nothing is changed in the now-being-impossible of **A's** nonbeing.

The case is no different for being-nonactual. Real nonactuality does not mean a "being-nonactual, in general," anytime and anywhere, but rather the determinate being-nonactual of something (**A**) in a determinate connection of the real, at a determinate time (and in the case of physical being, also in a determinate space). Whatever is nonactual at another time (in another place), in another real connection is no longer the same **A** in regard to content, and its nonactuality is not that of **A**, but that of **B**. The connections all belong to the real determinateness of an **A**. If an **A** is nonactual in this fullness of determination, then it directly follows not only that it is not actual, but also that it is not possible – that is to say, in this fullness of determination it is not possible. That it may very well be possible sooner or later in another fullness of determination (thus, no longer as **A**, but as **B**) is not in question here. This is not disputed by the law of division either. But nothing is changed by the fact that **A**'s being here and now is not possible.

According to these considerations, the law of division of possibility may be considered to be proven for the real sphere. Of course, this proof is valid only in the sense that it illuminates the relevant real modes. And this illumination does not conclude with what has been said. It has only just begun. It is, therefore, to be expected that the proof will be further reinforced by progressive modal analysis.

But, at the same time, this argumentation reveals a new side to the content of the law of division; it decisively determines the modal construction of the two fundamental modes, real actuality and real nonactuality. This may be summarized by two principles:

1. So as to include the possibility of being in real being-actual, the possibility of nonbeing is excluded from it;
2. So as to include the possibility of nonbeing in real being-nonactual, the possibility of being is excluded from it.

This dual law is of the greatest consequence for the overall character of the real sphere and for the ontological meaning of real being in general. It is the key to the entire sphere's intermodal laws; but these are nothing other than the pure modal exposition of real being as such. The mere analysis of the meaning of this law is already capable of supporting the proof of the two basic principles stated above and particularly that of the paradoxical laws of implication. One cannot explain their complex content without encountering this law.

The consequences will be considered in due course. Anticipation can only obscure the situation. What is needed here is clean and orderly analysis.

d) Actuality and Temporality. The Hardness of the Real

On the other hand, before going any further, another side of the law of division must be emphasized, which is more readily met with understanding than anything dependent on it. For it adequately expresses a well known peculiarity of the real.

What, then, does it truly mean for no possibility of nonbeing to exist in actuality? It means that once something has become actual, it can in no way be made nonactual (retrogradely). And what does it mean for no possibility of being to exist in nonactuality? It means that once something, in its time, has become nonactual, it can in no way be made actual (that is to say, not as the same thing that it would have been, in its time). Understood in this manner, the law of division of possibility proves itself to be the law of the "hardness of the real" – a law that awards reality as way of being to the radicalism of absolute decidedness, namely, in the positive as well as negative sense.

It, therefore, expresses nothing less than the proverbial "implacability" of that which has once become and the "irretrievability" of that which has never become. It is not as though whatever has never become could not even become at a later moment, and it is not as though whatever has become at one point could not pass by and disappear. Only whatever it would have been in its time cannot be brought about, as the past is not to be undone, and as the future would not be the same. In the practice of everyday life, this in fact constitutes the hardness of real events: once something has occurred, no power on earth can

render it as not having occurred, and once something has been omitted, no power on earth can insert it into the gap of events where it would have belonged.

Time passes over that which has become, letting it disappear into new becoming. Becoming, however, is not the softening of being, but only its categorial form, the general form of real being. The stream of temporal coming and going dissolves that which has become, only as the present – at a later time it is past – abolishing it, but not as that which has become in its time and in its unique real connection of being. The present sinks into the past, being then no longer present, but the past clings to it and does not release it. The past abolishes it, thus making it unabolishable.

It is an ontologically false concept of time that understands the past (and the future) as nonbeing, the present alone as being, but time itself as eternal dissolution of the actual. It may appear in this way to human consciousness – despite being only partially true – but it proceeds differently in real events. All of the real actual passes away; but this is only the temporality of its form of being and of events (of becoming, of flowing). Its vanishing in the flow of time is not a becoming-nonactual in the span of its duration. Temporality generally does not touch on the stance that is immovable in its place in time and likewise immovable in its time-bound real connections. Temporality leaves to it the actuality in "its time," and leaves actuality to it in the passing-away itself and in the being-past. For "its time" also passes away with it. This is the underlying meaning of temporal being, and the condition of sinking into the past. How could it be otherwise? In general, only what is held onto in the full content of its real actuality at its place in time can sink into the past. Otherwise, it would not relentlessly need to sink with "its time."

This is the concrete meaning of the law of division. It is in fact a law of the absolute hardness and of the brittleness, so to speak, of all of the real actual: a law of the steadfastness of the transient and ephemeral, of the retention of the inevitable, of the inability to shift that which is incessantly moving away, or – if the term is chosen with the necessary caution – the supratemporality of the temporal, as such. And this term refers to everything that is not subjective in thought, that is not in the memory of the Epigoni[1] but rather stands on this side of all willing and consciousness, in the stream of real events explained through their temporality.

This is not made apparent by time itself, which is a structural category of the real. But it is visible through the modal categories of the real. All categorial

1 [Translator's note]: In Greek mythology, the Epigoni were sons of the Seven against Thebes, who avenged the deaths of their fathers by capturing Thebes ten years later.

analysis of time is futile without categorial analysis of real modes leading the way. It is on the meaning of being-possible and being-actual that the understanding of being-temporal depends, and not vice versa. This expresses the law of division of real possibility: whatever is actual can no longer not be, and whatever is nonactual can no longer be. If one were to read a kind of Eleaticism into this, then the law would be completely misunderstood. This has nothing to do with the quiescence of becoming – nor generally with the error of antiquity, in which being and becoming were viewed as opposites. Becoming is rather the continuous form of real being; a different form gives it nothing, and even duration is only slowed becoming. If the law is expressed in a manner that explicitly emphasizes temporality, then it simply indicates this: whatever has become actual at its time, be it even the most fleeting transition, remains for all eternity an actual thing at this, its, time – even if it is no longer actual at a later time; and likewise, whatever has become nonactual at a determinate time remains for all eternity nonactual at this determinate time, even if it should become actual at a later time. In truth, it is not then the same in regard to content, being a different thing in different real connections.

This is the ontological meaning of the past "eternally standing still." But the instructive principle underlying this does not so much concern temporality as the ontic essence of real being in general and as such. This promptly yields the first steps in the modal analysis of the real, beginning to illuminate the otherwise impenetrable mystery of its way of being.

16 Formal Proof of Principles II and III

a) The Derivation of the Paradoxical Laws of Exclusion

It is in the essence of a proof to follow the *ratio cognoscendi*. It is not compelled to begin with the fundamentals and progress to the dependents. It may choose its starting point wherever it finds it. Among the intermodal laws of the real, the positive laws are undoubtedly the fundamental ones. These are the ones that were enumerated as paradoxical laws of implication under the third principle; and, under this principle, particularly the first and the second (Chap. 14 f). In anticipation of this, they were already described as the "real law of possibility" and the "real law of necessity" with regard to their central position and their unique ontological importance. They state: whatever is really possible is also really actual; and whatever is really actual is also really necessary.

Everything now depends on the proof of these two laws. From them, the remaining intermodal relations are all discernible, the implications as well as the exclusions. Even the abolition of indifferences indirectly depends on them. All of these relations are rooted in these two laws, according to *ratio essendi*. If they were proven, then the proof of the remaining laws could simply follow *ratio essendi* (according to dependency of being).

But, for the time being, they are not proven. And furthermore, gaining insight into them is the most difficult task standing before us. Thus, we must reverse our course and begin with the more easily proven laws. It is the route of the *ratio cognoscendi*, "from that which is prior for us to that which is prior in itself," from the dependent to the fundamental.

For the time being, only the law of division of real possibility is given, but in its exposition the hidden fullness of its content has already come to light. It is the only law that can be directly understood from the meaning of real possibility and real actuality. It has also shown itself to already have the form of an intermodal law, that is a simultaneously positive and negative law – namely, having the form of a dual implication and exclusion (see the formulation of Chap. 15 c). For the requirements of a further derivation, this result can be reformulated with an unchanged content in the following way:

a) If in the real being-actual of **A**, the possibility of **A** is included, then the possibility of not-**A** is excluded;
b) If in the real being-nonactual of **A**, the possibility of not-**A** is included, then the possibility of **A** is excluded.

Assuming this formulation, the paradoxical corollaries of principle II can now prove what was implied, that all positive real modes exclude from themselves all negative real modes, and vice versa. The proof of this principle itself depends only on the four paradoxical corollaries; since in any case the remaining laws of exclusion are evident.

If one now looks at this reformulation of the law of division, then it is immediately apparent that half of it contains the first paradoxical law of exclusion (b), while the other half contains the second paradoxical law of exclusion (a). If in the real being-nonactual of **A**, the possibility of not-**A** is excluded, and likewise if in the real being-actual of **A**, the possibility of not-**A** is excluded, then this means nothing other than:

1. The being of whatever is really nonactual, is really not possible; and
2. The nonbeing of whatever is really actual, is really not possible.

But, these are already the first two corollaries of principle II (see Chap. 14 d). Thus, the principle itself is halfway proven. But if one now considers what is actually stated by these two principles, then one finds that they are reversible, and that their reversal produces the third and fourth corollaries.

In formally logical terms, the matter is thus: both principles that have been proven (I and II) are negative universal judgments. They have the form, "no S is P." Judgments of this form are purely – i.e. without change in quantity – convertible (allowing the *conversio simplex*): from "no S is P" it follows that "no P is S." If all nonactuality of **A** thus excludes the possibility of **A**, then all possibility of **A** must also exclude the nonactuality of **A**. And, likewise: if all actuality of **A** excludes the possibility of not-**A**, then all possibility of not-**A** must also exclude the actuality of **A**.

These two conversions are not only formally consistent, but also correct in terms of their content. That is to say, if in the real there could be a possibility of **A** in which – as in disjunctive possibility – the case would remain open that **A** could be nonactual, then this case would form such a nonactuality of **A,** in which the positive possibility of **A** would be included. But the law of division (in its second half, b) indicates that this possibility is excluded from all nonactuality of **A**. At least, when it is concerned with real nonactuality. Consequently, in all possibility of **A**, the nonactuality of **A** must be excluded.

The same is true of the second conversion. If in the real there were a possibility of not-**A**, in which the case that **A** is actual remained open, then this case remaining open would mean an actuality of **A**, in which the possibility of not-**A** would be included. But the law of division (in its first half, a) indicates that this possibility is excluded from all actuality of **A**. At least, when it is concerned with real actuality. Consequently, in all possibility of not-**A**, the actuality of **A** must be excluded.

Whatever arises in this manner is nothing other than the group of the remaining two laws of exclusion: the third and fourth corollary of principle II. In their detached form, they indicate:

3. that whose being is really possible cannot be really nonactual; and
4. that whose nonbeing is really possible cannot be really actual.

Along with these four laws, principle II of the real intermodal relations is altogether formally proven. For the remaining laws of exclusion are self-evident. Only the four paradoxical relations of exclusion required proof. Thus, every positive real mode excludes every negative real mode, and every negative real mode excludes every positive real mode. An exception is made for none.

b) Formal Proof of the Positive Laws of Implication

But, in addition to this, still more is accomplished. For on the grounds of the principles acquired, the paradoxical laws of implication are also proven, particularly the "real law of possibility" and the "real law of necessity" (Chap. 14 f). This proof is much simpler than one would be led to assume given the laws' weighty content. For the laws of implication are *implicite*, already contained in the laws of exclusion. One only needs to read the latter affirmatively, for them to arise of their own accord.

The third of the paradoxical laws of exclusion implies that real possibility excludes real nonactuality. Since nonactuality and actuality are now contradictory to each other, and thus fall under the principle of excluded middle, something whose nonactuality is excluded must necessarily be actual. If read affirmatively, then the principle: "whatever is really possible cannot be really nonactual," directly means what the real law of possibility implies; it is:

> The 1st paradoxical law of implication: whatever is really possible is also really actual (real possibility "implies" real actuality).

Furthermore: the second paradoxical law of exclusion implies that real actuality excludes the real possibility of nonbeing. Since the possibility of nonbeing (**P** of not-**A**) and the necessity of being (**N** of **A**) contradict each other, thus falling under the principle of excluded middle, that whose nonbeing is excluded must not only be actual, but also necessary. Impossibility of nonbeing is just necessity of being (see Chap. 14 a, the third law of equivalence). If read affirmatively, then the principle: "the nonbeing of whatever is really actual, is really not possible" directly means what the real law of necessity expresses, which is:

> The 2nd paradoxical law of implication: whatever is really actual is also really necessary (real actuality "implies" real necessity).

If these two "real laws" are now brought even closer together, then they give rise in a syllogistic manner to the third paradoxical law of implication. The second law forms the major premise, the first law forms the minor premise, being-actual is the middle term, and the conclusion expresses the connectedness of possibility with necessity. In an ontological sphere where actuality includes necessity and possibility includes actuality, it is clear that possibility must also include necessity. If the world of the real is created in such a manner that an actual **A** in it is also necessary, and a possible **A** in it is also actual, then it is thereby

created in such a manner that a possible **A** in it is also necessary. This, in due form, is:

> The 3rd paradoxical law of implication: whatever is really possible is also really necessary (real possibility "implies" real necessity).

If these three laws are held together with the three positive evident laws of implication (Chap. 14 e), then the first half of principle III is proven: "all positive real modes mutually imply one another."

c) So as to Ward off a Dangerous Misunderstanding

The advancement of a formal proof is nothing other than the explication and thorough investigation of intermodal relations from a starting point that is in itself insightful (the law of division). Thus, it is on the one hand less, but on the other hand more than a pure proof; it is simultaneously the content-oriented clarification of the state of affairs in the modal construction of reality. This cannot be repeated at every point in the argument, but it must remain present throughout the entire course of the train of thought. As a consequence it becomes at the same time necessary to protect the results – and these are the laws themselves – from the misunderstandings that tend to creep into a formal treatise. For the formulations in which such results are articulated can only affirmatively express what they mean; they cannot at the same time anticipate and ward off what is not intended by them but can be drawn from them by metaphysically biased thought.

The first three paradoxical laws of implication, and along with them the whole of principle II, are directly vulnerable to this type of dangerous misunderstanding. This is the place to encounter this misunderstanding in order to prevent our ensuing thoughts from going astray at the very threshold of greater connections.

There is, according to these laws, no actual thing in the real that is not also necessary, and no possible thing that is not also actual and necessary; just as much as there is, according to the corresponding evident laws, no actual thing that is not also possible, and no necessary thing that is not also actual and possible.

If this result is not understood very precisely in its literal sense – i.e. in the sense of what was in fact proven – and if the meanings are only slightly shifted (which, for those unfamiliar to modal analysis, invariably happens at the outset), then it must begin to appear as though the three positive real modes are put on the same level as one another. This would mean that the difference

between the three modes would have been abolished. But if their difference is abolished, then all three of them are one and the same mode. In which case, one can no longer speak of intermodal relations. The whole framework of the modal construction of reality would thereby collapse. The laws would be meaningless, empty tautologies. All "relations" presuppose that the elements between which they exist are different from one another. If the elements become identical, then relations are abolished. If the implications of real modes are thus understood as identities, then they are reduced to an empty play of concepts and are ontologically annihilated.

Properly, such a misunderstanding should be ridiculous and unworthy of mention from the outset. But historical experience teaches us that wherever and whenever philosophy has ventured even one step further in the field of a true modal analysis, this misunderstanding has immediately turned up with inevitable regularity, cutting off further ramifications of the most fruitful basic approaches *a limine*. Therefore, it is not only necessary to set this misunderstanding straight, once and for all – which, of course, is easily done – but also to lay bare its roots, thereby giving ontological thought an instrument for self-control.

Let us clarify the facts of the matter beforehand. Implication is not identity, and the laws of implication are not equations. That the actuality of **A** implies the being-possible of **A** does not mean that its being-possible coincides with this, but that it presupposes it. That the three positive modes in the real imply one another does not mean that they spill over into one another, but that they cannot exist in a real **A** without one another – that the one always either presupposes another or is entailed in it. That an actual **A** is at the same time necessary does not mean that its being-actual consists in its being-necessary, but only that the actual **A** is necessary as well. That a really possible **A** is simultaneously actual does not mean that its possibility itself constitutes its actuality, but only that the possible **A** is actual as well. The being-actual of **A** is and remains something quite different from its being-possible, and the being-necessary of **A** is and remains something quite different from both its being-actual and its being-possible. But, for this reason, it may very well be within the real character of such an **A** that its possibility cannot exist without its actuality, and that its actuality cannot exist without its necessity.

There are also many such relations outside of modality, and they are well known. Thus, the material being of a real thing cannot exist without spatiality, and this (as spatiality) cannot exist without materiality (mass, weight, etc.); they imply each other, but material being itself is and remains something quite different from spatial being, which obviously arises from it, so that there is also outside of the real sphere an ideal spatiality (a geometric one), existing without mass and weight. A similar example is provided by the relation of reality, in

general, and temporality: all of the real is temporal (having arisen, being transient, resulting from a process), and everything temporal is real; yet temporality and reality are and remain something quite different from each other, unable to be characterized simply in terms of each other.

It is easy to discern such implications in the field of content related (constitutive) determination. For in this field, no one will confuse them with identities. The difference in their content is tangible. However, the modal level is not concerned with content, but rather with a kind of being, and this is why differentiation fails so easily. For that reason, rigorous ontological reflection is required in order to keep a firm hold on the difference of the modes, given the indissolubility of their connectedness to the same form of content.

For, as a matter of fact, the implications of the real modes share precisely the same relation. By no means can one say that possibility implies actuality in every sense and in every sphere, or that actuality implies necessity in every sense and sphere. At any rate, they do not in the logical sphere, or in the epistemological sphere. But the way of being requires this, because the particular nature of the connection ruling in the real is such a way of being; for that reason, this way of being of the real can be characterized through the relation of the real modes. But that is why it is completely mistaken to regard the laws of implication of the real modes as coinciding with the modal character of the real itself. Rather, they remain entirely what they are, fundamentally different modes. The nature of reality is such that they cannot exist in it without each other. It will be shown in a later investigation that the modal structure of the real involves a very peculiar construction of the modes, in which possibility and necessity function as internal conditions of being-actual. On the other hand, if their difference is blurred in the initial steps of the investigation, and we are unable to keep in view the closeness of their connectedness, then from the outset the path is cut off to any further exploration of the real world in the construction of its way of being.[2]

2 Persuasive evidence for this relation is provided by the method of many sciences, proceeding from facts, but then asking how the facts are possible or why they are necessary. Similarly, Kant's method in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is thus: the fact of synthetic *a priori* judgment is presented first, and only after this is its possibility questioned. This clearly presupposes that one and the same thing is simultaneously possible and actual (or even necessary), but that its being-possible (and respectively, being-necessary) is in no way the same as its being-actual. Otherwise, it would not at all be comprehensible how its possibility could be questioned, if one already knew about its actuality. That one can very determinately comprehend the being-actual of a thing without comprehending how it is possible (or even necessary), constitutes strict proof of the complete differentiation of modes superimposed in one and the same real.

The positive meaning of the laws of implication is such a far cry from identity that it is on the contrary a highly synthetic meaning, not fully able to be read out of the essence of the modes themselves. For this reason, these laws are paradoxical. Here, the "material" discussion will have to show another side of the relation, which only comes to light if we proceed from the "external relativity" of the relational modes. It then turns out that being-actual, in the sense of real actuality, is sustained by an overlapping relation of positive relational modes, with these modes remaining absolutely distinguished from each other and from actuality itself, each mode having its particular function in the construction of reality. Here, necessity and possibility appear as conditions sustaining actuality. But since they do not emerge separately in the real sphere (because the nature of the real requires it), they imply each other, disappearing behind their product, real actuality. Their modal opposition is maintained, however. The categorial analysis of the real modes essentially consists in retrieving them from their gradual disappearance for naïve consciousness and in rendering visible their difference – from each other, as from actuality.

Proving this is a task to be taken up later, which will require further exploration. At this point, foresight should merely prevent misunderstanding. For, indeed, this "disappearance" of the relational modes behind real actuality seduces the naïve consciousness, again and again, into letting the modal differences, themselves, disappear.

But, aside from this alluring tendency, there is another purely external motive for misunderstanding. It is, for philosophically unschooled thought, perhaps the more forceful of the two, although it consists merely in language usage's habitual lack of clarity. For ontological purposes, it is absolutely necessary to strictly distinguish between "possibility" and "the possible," between "actuality" and "the actual," and so on for the remaining modes. "The actual" (=**A**) is the thing bearing determinate content (such as the event, the real situation); "the actuality" of the thing, on the other hand, is the underlying mode-of-being itself, its being-actual as such. It shares this being-actual with all other actual things. According to the laws of implication, one and the same "actual" (**A**) is at the same time a "possible" and a "necessary;" but its "actuality" is not its "possibility," nor is it its "necessity." The latter would be completely meaningless while the former rightly exists.

Here, we find reason for confusion. A confusion that can be remedied only by the most scrupulous use of language. "Possibility" is never the same as "actuality" or "necessity," not even if a "possible" (**A**) is at the same time an "actual" and a "necessary." The same **A** is then the bearer of different modes at the same time – whatever does not contradict itself in **A**. It is, therefore, correct and

corresponds to the meaning of the laws if one says: "a really possible **A** is also really actual," or "a really actual **A** is also really necessary;" but it would be completely nonsensical and contradictory to the laws if one wanted to say that the "real actuality" of an **A** is already its "real necessity," or that the "real possibility" of an **A** is already its "real actuality." This would mean the identity of positive real modes and, thus, in truth, their abolition. Such unnoticed – and actually quite heedless – identification of the modes is not what it seems to be, and is no innocent oversight that will iron itself out on its own. It is a serious and veritably disastrous mistake. For this mistake encourages a misunderstanding that easily befalls uncritical modal consciousness anyway. If one does not address it right at its points of origin, then as thought proceeds it spreads without resistance, undermining the construction of ontology.

d) Formal Proof of the Negative Laws of Implication

For the time being, the second half of principle II remains to be proven. It concerns the three paradoxical laws of implication of the negative real modes. They are the true mirror images of those of the positive modes; indeed, they can be derived from them according to their proof. But the proof can be just as strictly carried out for the negative laws as for the positive laws, directly on the grounds of the laws of exclusion, i.e. in a manner exactly analogous to the argumentation through which those laws were proven.

The fourth paradoxical law of exclusion (Chap. 14 d) says that real possibility of nonbeing excludes real actuality. Since actuality and nonactuality contradict each other, thus falling subject to the principle of excluded middle, that which has its actuality "excluded" must necessarily be nonactual. If read affirmatively, then the principle: "that whose nonbeing is really possible cannot be really actual" directly indicates:

> The 4th paradoxical law of implication: that whose nonbeing is really possible is also really nonactual (negative real possibility "implies" real nonactuality).

Furthermore: the first paradoxical law of exclusion implies that real nonactuality excludes the real possibility of being. Since possibility of being and necessity of nonbeing now contradict each other, thus, falling subject to the principle of excluded middle, that whose possibility (of being) is excluded must be impossible. Negation of possibility of being is necessity of nonbeing; the latter, however, is the impossibility of being (see the first principle of equivalence, Chap. 14 a).

Thus, the principle, "whatever is really nonactual, its being is really not possible," if it is read affirmatively, directly indicates:

> The 5th paradoxical law of implication: whatever is really nonactual is also really impossible (real nonactuality "implies" real impossibility).

If one now brings together these two principles, the fourth and the fifth paradoxical laws of implication, then the remaining sixth law of implication arises in a syllogistic manner. The fifth law forms the major premise, the fourth law forms the minor premise, being-nonactual is the middle term, and the conclusion expresses the connectedness of negative possibility with impossibility. In a sphere of being where nonactuality includes impossibility, and possibility of nonbeing includes nonactuality, clearly the possibility of nonbeing must also include impossibility. If, therefore, the world of the real is created in such a manner that in it a possible not-**A** is also an actual not-**A**, and an actual not-**A** is also a necessary not-**A**, then it is created in such a manner that a possible not-**A** is also a necessary not-**A**. In such a real world a possible not-**A** means, at the same time, an impossible **A**. But this, in due form, is:

> The 6th paradoxical law of implication: that, whose nonbeing is really possible, is really impossible (negative real possibility "implies" real impossibility).

If these three paradoxical laws are brought together with the three negative evident laws of implication (Chap. 14 e), then with this move the second half of principle III is proven: "all negative real modes mutually imply one another." This, therefore, indicates: in the real there is no nonactual that is not impossible, and no negatively possible that is not also nonactual and impossible; just as there is no nonactual that is not also negatively possible, and no impossible that is not also nonactual and negatively possible.

Apart from that, the same is true here as was noted in the first half of the principle: the general implication of the negative real modes does not mean an identification or abolition of their differences. Whatever is negatively possible is, indeed, nonactual, and whatever is nonactual is impossible; but, negative possibility is still not nonactuality, and nonactuality is still impossibility. The laws of implication have a synthetic meaning in the negative laws. It depends on the real character of the modes, and not on their formal-general essence; as then the "law of division of possibility" is a real law, with the whole formal proof tracing back to it.

In addition to this, it will be shown that among the negative real modes the two relational modes have a peculiarly overlapping relation, by virtue of which

they apparently disappear behind the absolute mode. But this is a task to be taken up later.

17 Formal Proof of Principle I

a) Abolition of the Second and Third Indifference

Our line of argument proceeded from the law of division, leading then to the paradoxical laws of exclusion, and from these on further to the paradoxical laws of implication. Thus, it traversed the entire field of the first and second real intermodal principles in terms of its content. The first principle (Chap. 14 c) still remains to be addressed. This is a purely negative principle; it implies the abolition of all modal indifference in the real sphere: "No mode of the real is indifferent toward an other."

The prospects of substantiating such a negative principle are more favorable than they are for positive principles. The course that the proof takes could, therefore, have been laid out at the outset, if it did not bear another kind of difficulty: it indirectly concerns the elimination of contingency from the realm of the real sphere. Until the paradoxical laws of implication were formally clarified, we lacked the means for dealing with this adequately. That is why the first principle had to be deferred.

The three formal indifferences, as enumerated in Chap. 11 and pictured in the schema of Fig. 5 (Chap. 11 d), are: 1. the indifference of actuality toward necessity and contingency; 2. the indifference of possibility toward actuality and nonactuality; and 3. the indifference of nonactuality toward possibility and impossibility.

These indifferences have now been abolished for the real sphere through principle I. The principle, therefore, breaks down into the three laws of abolished indifference:

1. Real actuality is not indifferent toward necessity and contingency;
2. Real possibility is not indifferent toward actuality and nonactuality;
3. Real nonactuality is not indifferent toward possibility and impossibility.

One could simply regard these principles as proving that the laws of exclusion and implication of the real all govern only possible intermodal relations and leave virtually no room for indifferences. But they can also be independently proven.

The second of these laws directly follows from the law of division of real possibility. The latter abolishes dual possibility, dividing it into a positive and a negative possibility, which now exist as different modes, which exclude each other, as such. Neither of these two modes is indifferent toward actuality or nonactuality. This emerges from the corollaries of the law of division: the possibility of nonbeing is excluded in real being-actual; and the possibility of being is excluded in real being-nonactual (Chap. 15 c).

The laws of exclusion are reversible. In the possibility of nonbeing, being-actual is excluded, and in the possibility of being, being-nonactual is excluded. Since the state of being excluded is itself a negation of possibility, the two principles can be expressed as follows:

a) In negative possibility, real being-actual is not possible;
b) In positive possibility, real being-nonactual is not possible.

In both modes of possibility, there is only one possible state of affairs; in **P-** only not-**A** is possible, and in **P+** only **A** is possible. Whatever is negatively possible in the real "can" only be nonactual; also being able to be actual does not remain open to it. And whatever is positively possible in the real can only be actual; also being able to be nonactual it does not remain open to it. Negative and positive real possibility are, therefore, not indifferent; both demonstrate quite clear exclusion toward one side, and clear implication toward the other.

Furthermore: the third law of abolished indifference has been proven along with the second. Real nonactuality cannot be indifferent toward possibility and impossibility, because (according to the law of division) it excludes the possibility of being, and only includes the possibility of nonbeing. But now the third indifference directly involves possibility as a positive mode, since the modes always have as their alternatives one positive and one negative mode, toward which a third would be indifferent (see Fig. 5: the brackets all cross over the horizontal boundary line). Consequently, that limb of disjunctive possibility toward which nonactuality would have to remain indifferent is directly and unequivocally excluded from it.

Whatever is really nonactual is not really possible; rather, it is entirely impossible. Nothing here is changed by the fact that it is simultaneously not-being-possible. For negative possibility is included in impossibility, in any case. Here, no alternative exists but unequivocal negative being-necessary, and at the same negative being-possible. – Thus, without further ado, the indifference of nonactuality falls away along with disjunctive possibility.

b) The Special Position of the First Indifference in the Real Sphere. Real Possibility and Real Contingency

Only the first law of abolished indifference involves special circumstances. Here, it does not concern the counterparts, necessity and negative possibility – which would produce a strict parallel to the last case (of the third indifference) – rather it concerns the alternative of necessity and contingency. The formal indifference of actuality thus consists of the fact that an actual thing does not need to be necessary, but can also be contingent.

However, this does not at all concern the contingency of the law of division; this is why the laws of exclusion do not extend to it. This is in accordance with how it is simultaneously positioned both at the border between absolute and relational modes, and at the border between positive and negative modes; with this we see that its position fluctuates within certain limits, changing back and forth from positive-absolute to negative-relational modality, and thus oscillating around the intersection of the two boundary lines in the schema (see Chap. 11 c and d; Fig. 3 and 5). Its characterization as an "irregular mode" consists in this, as does the unsteadiness of the transitional curve in the realm of contingency.

In contingency we find the peculiar case of a mode that, being the adversarial counterpart of necessity, has a parallel – and, more or less, a duplicate – in another mode, that is, in negative possibility. Both possibility of nonbeing and contingency contradict necessity. Both are thus not only excluded from necessity, but also contained within its negation. Each of these two modes, along with necessity, is subjected to the principle of excluded middle: whatever is not necessary is contingent, and vice versa; but also, the nonbeing of whatever is not necessary is possible, and vice versa.

With this, one may be led to believe that contingency is generally nothing other than the possibility of nonbeing. But this is by no means the case. For the contingent can be fully actual, whereas the negatively possible is entirely nonactual – at least in the real sphere (according to the fourth law of exclusion, Chap. 14 d). In terms of its position in the modal table, contingency is a variable mode. It is the mere negation of being-necessary, but apart from this, it is not negative and, therefore, cannot coincide with a purely negative mode (**P-**).

Real actuality, consequently, cannot have the same relation to contingency as to negative real possibility, and certainly not the same as to positive possibility. The former is excluded from all positive real modes, and the latter is excluded from all negative real modes. But real actuality could formally have the same relation to contingency as to "disjunctive possibility", namely, if this

mode were not abolished in the real sphere. For disjunctive possibility stands at the border between the positive and negative modes. It is no less determinate than contingency, involving only a different type of determinateness.

From another perspective, the relation appears quite similar. Contingency is, in its own way, also indifferent, namely, toward actuality and nonactuality: not-being-necessary can just as well be of a being as of a nonbeing. In this respect it resembles undivided possibility. But this indifference of contingency does not, by any means, coincide with that of possibility. "Chance," as the saying goes, "decides" on the actual and nonactual, provided that no necessity holds sway. But disjunctive "merely being possible" does not decide on the actual and nonactual; it remains open to both, unless it is decided by "chance" or necessity.

Thus, the two indifferences are not at all the same. But nothing keeps them from existing together with each other. Indeed, if one looks more closely, it generally appears that they only can exist with each other. For on the one hand, wherever chance holds sway, the positively possible is not necessary, and thus its nonbeing is also possible. Only amidst such indeterminateness can chance decide something. And on the other hand, wherever possibility is indifferent toward actuality and nonactuality, no necessity holds sway; and then whatever is actual is so by chance. Thus, wherever possibility does not have such indifference, but is only found as divided positive possibility, on the one hand, and as negative possibility, on the other, the actual cannot be contingent, since it is necessary.

c) Abolition of the First Indifference and the Limitation of this Abolition

There are three conclusions to be drawn from this.

1. The abolition of the indifference of possibility in the real sphere by the law of division means that the indifference of actuality in the real sphere is also simultaneously abolished. The first law of abolished indifference is thereby proven: real actuality is not indifferent toward necessity and contingency.
2. Wherever the indifference of possibility is abolished, as well as the indifference of actuality along with it, chance is also eliminated. There is no contingent within the real sphere. This principle implies the same thing as the second paradoxical law of implication, the "real law of necessity:" whatever is really actual is also really necessary (Chap. 14 f). The abolition of the indifference of actuality can be directly inferred from this principle, which

is proven elsewhere; except that in this manner what actually happens with contingency does not become clear. For this, it is necessary to embark on the circuitous path leading through the relation of possibility and contingency. Contingency is abolished through its own indifference, along with the other indifferences. For it cannot be separated from this, its indifference, as the other modes can be separated from theirs. It cannot be divided like possibility, and its indeterminateness cannot be abolished. But the real sphere is the territory of complete determinateness. That is why there is no room for contingency in it.

3. This abolition of indifference in the modal character of real actuality, as well as the elimination of the contingent, reaches only as far as the law of division of possibility does. Wherever this law loses ground, chance gains ground. The law of division now only holds true "within" the real sphere; it does not hold true for its first conditions and principles, nor does it hold true for it as a whole. It holds true only where actual real conditions exist, "on the grounds" of which something can be possible; but such conditions do not exist for the first links of the chain of conditions, nor do they exist for the totality of the sphere. At the limits of the sphere, not only is the law of division abolished, but so too is the actual meaning of real being-possible. For, according to the basic modal law, being-possible cannot be separated from its "external relativity" to the actuality of preexisting conditions, "on the grounds" of which something can be possible in the first place.

Hence, contingency dissolves the being-necessary of the actual at these very same limits of the real sphere. Here, the "real law of necessity" is repealed – along with the remaining paradoxical laws of implication and exclusion, as well as the law of division of real possibility – and the indifferences come into force. Thus, real actuality becomes indifferent once again, leaving room for contingency.

d) The Disappearance of "Indifferent Possibility"

The last of these consequences, viewed in terms of its content, reaches far beyond the scope of formal argumentation. It will only be able to show its true face in the material discussion of the intermodal laws. Even if the consequences have not yet come into full view, it should be formally evident that the three indifferences express something essential for the boundary relation of the sphere. In this respect they are far from null and void, only being excluded from the character of real being within its boundaries.

This becomes all the more striking, if one considers that the formal indifference of actuality toward contingency and necessity recurs in the negative modes, i.e. also exists in nonactuality. For one of the alternatives, impossibility, is negative necessity; but the other is the same contingency as that which stands in opposition to the positive relation of necessity. If we allow for the indifference of possibility, then nonactuality also becomes indifferent – not only toward possibility and impossibility, but also toward contingency (of nonbeing) and impossibility. Therefore, even here the parallelism of two non-identical relations of indifference sets in; and then even here it is easy to see how in spite of their nonidentity the second cannot exist without the first, and it does not exist anyway as far as the law of division extends, i.e. not within the limits of the real sphere.

Consequently, the modal construction of real being depends entirely on the division of real possibility and the abolition of indifferent possibility.

This result presents us with yet a further point of interest that concerns the character of being of reality itself. It was already shown at the beginning, with the "equivocations of possibility," why real possibility is not disjunctive possibility, but – as it seemed at this point – would have to be at least "indifferent possibility." For it may not exclude being-actual, and must, therefore, be maintained in the being-actual of a thing. The real actual must at least be possible (see Chap. 3a and c). But it was thereby presupposed that something could also be really possible without being actual. From the consequences of the law of division this has proven itself to be untenable; there may be something of this sort in another sphere, or even at the limits of the real sphere, but not "within it." Thus, the law of division expressed the "real law of possibility:" whatever is really possible is also really actual. But, with this, the character of indifference of possibility falls away, although it should be maintained in opposition to disjunctivity and should take its place. It is now proven that the two modes of divided possibility cannot mean "indifferent possibility." This seems to contradict what was said earlier.

The contradiction is only an apparent one. Here, everything depends on whether the abolition of indifference is correctly understood. Indifference is not abolished "back" into the indeterminateness of disjunctive possibility, rather it is elevated to the full determinateness of "only positive" and "only negative" possibility. Or, as the laws of exclusion stipulate: positive possibility is radically cut off from the negative real modes, and the negative real modes are radically cut off from the positive real modes. The former can no longer exist without actuality and necessity, while the latter can no longer exist without nonactuality and impossibility.

It was clearly not enough to dissolve disjunctive possibility by dividing it into two "indifferent possibilities." It was precisely in this manner that the

indifference was not maintained. It is a halfness that detaches positive possibility from negative possibility in order to be able to introduce it into actuality, and that likewise detaches negative possibility from positive possibility in order to be able to introduce it into nonactuality. Both still remain indeterminate as long as they exist for themselves and are not firmly linked with the more determinate modes, positive possibility with actuality, and negative possibility with nonactuality. But if they are firmly linked in this way – each with the appropriate absolute mode – then they are no longer "indifferent" but rather fully determinate and solidified, so to speak, "decided" possibility.

Pure, "indifferent" possibility is obviously not maintained in any sphere; it is unstable. All possibility is either divided or undivided. Undivided possibility is too indeterminate for indifferent possibility, while divided possibility is too determinate. In the real sphere, indifferent possibility is surpassed by divided possibility, whose two limbs not only have become unambiguous, but also are firmly coupled with the more determinate modes in their group. It disappears in the determinateness of these limbs.

e) The Division of the Modal Table and the "Decidedness" of the Real

The flip-side of this situation is the merging of both groups of real modes, as well as of principles II and III that express it: all members of the positive group imply one another and exclude the negative group; while all members of the negative group imply one another and exclude the positive group. This is why the indifferences are abolished, because they are all forms of indeterminateness.

From this point of view, the law of division can once more be seen in another light. It means not only the division of possibility, which it expresses, but also the division of the whole modal table, the crevice, so to speak, that runs through the middle. For the table's coherence lay precisely in the one limb of possibility. And even this limb – the simultaneously positive and negative being-possible that stands at the boundary – is abolished in the law of division. The ancient Parmenidean principle is thereby fulfilled – but in a much more radical way than the ancients understood it: "But therein is the turning point: it is, or it is not," or also "being is, nonbeing is not."[3]

In antiquity, this principle (along with its variations) was wielded against becoming, because the latter was understood as a mixture of being and

3 Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Fragment 8, Line 15 f.: ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷδ' ἔστιν ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, likewise Fragment 6, Lines 1 and 2.

nonbeing. This has already been proven to be an error, since the opposition of being and becoming was then a skewed one from the outset; becoming is rather a particular kind of being, namely that of the real, and it excludes nonbeing from itself just as much as static (perhaps ideal) being.

For the modal lawfulness of the real – and this directly means becoming – the Eleatic principle takes on a very precise and fundamental meaning: it summarizes the abolition of that mode in which being and nonbeing were brought together, in which the "turning point" between being and nonbeing, therefore, gave way to indecision. For indecision means disjunctive, and even indifferent possibility. That there is not such indecision in the real implies the abolition of the one as well as the other in the law of division. This law is the true turning point between being and nonbeing. It is the law of decidedness of the real.

This is negatively and unequivocally expressed in the paradoxical laws of exclusion, and is positively and unequivocally expressed in the paradoxical laws of implication. In the real there is no "merely possible," either positive or negative; there is no half-being and no half-nonbeing, no indifference, no indecision. But whatever is mere being-possible is also actual and necessary; and whatever is mere not-being-possible is also nonactual and impossible. Possibility is and remains a different modal character in the same being than its actuality and necessity; but it is not detached from them, and only appears connected.

This is the new and explicit meaning of the Parmenidean principle. It is no longer related to becoming, but to the way of being of becoming, i.e. to real being as such. Reality is the absolute decidedness of being and nonbeing. Becoming itself, the real process, in which everything arises and passes away, is altogether the "becoming of what is," not merely a coming into being – as if all real importance lay on the results of the process and not on this becoming itself, and as if there were results residing in the stream of becoming (an atomism of childlike, materialistic thought) – no more than it is a coming into nonbeing. The decidedness of the real is rather the determinateness and unequivocality of an inexorable world event. The world of the real is the sphere of ontic radicalism.

This is nothing other than the formula of the law of division translated into the living, human sense of reality. Taken on its own, the expression "decidedness of the real" could be misinterpreted; whereas it is hardly to be misunderstood when held in contrast to the indeterminateness in indifferent possibility. From here, the paradoxical intermodal laws can be put into a simpler form. For this purpose, it is sufficient to understand the two "real laws" – that of possibility and of necessity – in which all paradox crowds together anyway, in the sense of determinateness. These laws then indicate:

> Whatever "can" be has already come to a decision to be. It can no longer not be. So it "must" be. And for that reason, it "is."

Likewise, the corresponding negative laws imply:

> Whatever "cannot" be has already come to a decision to not be. It can no longer be. So it "must" not be. And for that reason, it "is not."

These few principles summarize the ontological content of those intermodal laws that endow the ways of being of the real with their peculiar character. One can hear from them better than from the rigorously composed laws, themselves, how very much they all depend on the division of possibility, and how they likewise clearly express the essential characteristic of decidedness in the ways of being of the real. This shows very strikingly how the derivation of the laws from the law of division, which made use of formal proof, is not extrinsic to these laws, but means the legitimate exposure of their actual roots. For this is the very peculiarity to be found in the decidedness of the real, that it begins wholly in possibility, and from it conveys the whole structure of real modes.

III Material Proof of the Intermodal Laws of the Real

18 The Foundation of the Material Proof

a) Formal and Material Discussion

The criterion of a true proof is that it is more than a proof. If it leaves untouched the meaning of the principle that it proves, then it is only an external verification, a merely methodological affair. It is only rooted in the essence of the matter, if it is inseparable from the meaning of the principle. Then the proof is also the natural exposition of the matter, its progression of thought traversing the matter's internal structure.

The formal proof of the intermodal laws of the real has, within the limits of its means, stood the test of a true proof. The full meaning of the laws has gradually been revealed through its progress. Indeed, it has already shown something far beyond them: it has pulled away a shroud from the essence of real being. In the sharp and clear-cut sculpture of the laws, this essence, which otherwise remains unrecognizable in deep obscurity and is given only to the unaccountable sense of reality, appears as a very peculiarly formed and structured character of being. What only announces itself at the outset but does not let itself be substantiated – that the intermodal laws of a sphere constitute the structure of its ways of being, and that these laws must, therefore, be tangible in them – has been confirmed within certain limits, although it is easy to see that with what has been said, only a beginning has been forged.

The formal discussion of the laws has prepared the way for another, more profound discussion, by teaching us first of all to discern the relation of possibility and actuality in the real sphere, as well as discern the relation of the remaining modes. Its work, therefore, had to remain only partially carried out, because it dwelled entirely in modal considerations, leaving out the much wider surface of attack of that-which-is for knowledge, which lies in the constitutive and content-related. The advantage of unequivocality and strictness of procedure comes with the disadvantage of abstractness, the one only partially balanced out by the other. The first half of the task could of course, only be performed in this way. But now it demands all the more to be completed.

There is no reason to leave the constitutive out of play in the construction of the real, as long as it is directly concerned with modal relations. Mode of being and determinateness of being belong together, and they do not appear without

each other. Thus, it cannot help but have its own modal relations reflected in the constitutive basic peculiarities of the real. And even if modal analysis deals only with the latter, it must still be free to track them down in the guidelines of the former – as they are far more easily accessible. This relation takes advantage of the "material" discussion of the real modes by giving them, once again in an analytical respect, a proof of a different and clearer kind from the concreteness of structural real relations.

This proof also depends on the acquisition of a starting point that will enable insight into the modal construction of real being. This starting point is to be sought wherever paradox remains unremedied in the formal discussion. For an unclarified remnant still remains, and the focal point of the task standing before us must be located wherever it takes root. With this unmistakable clue, we reach the area at issue in real possibility, this also being where the formal discussion's starting point was located. Everything now depends on concretely understanding real possibility. This is what is accomplished by taking a detour through the constitutive.

b) The Twofold Conflict in the Popular Concept of Possibility

Up until this point in our examination, we have accepted the paradox of the intermodal laws, themselves, without actually clarifying it. Now is the time to turn to doing so. This can only occur by bringing to light its inherent aporias.

What does it ultimately mean when the real law of possibility says: whatever is really possible is also really actual? And what is the meaning of the other principle, its true reflection in a negative sense: that whose nonbeing is really possible is also really nonactual? The question can become even more pointed if the two principles are contraposed: whatever is not real cannot be real; and whatever is real cannot also not be real. Here, the aporia is so tangible that the impression of inconsistency cannot be dispelled. The process of real events obviously seems to conflict with it, and the real consists in this process. One discovers again and again in ordinary life: whatever "is" not will "become" with time; i.e. it will become actual. It must, therefore, have been possible all along! How can the law declare that it was not possible? And by the same token, whatever "is" will pass away with time; i.e. it will become nonactual. Thus, its nonbeing must have been possible! But the law says that its nonbeing was not possible.

This objection may be very naïve, but it is important for this very reason. For it expresses an absolutely unsolved aporia. If, for example, human beings could bring nothing into being that "is not," and could not cause the nonbeing of

anything that "is," then they would be paralyzed in their activity, and all action would be a thing of impossibility. The ontic meaning of actualization still seems to rest directly on the fact that much is possible that is not actual. And since actualization is a real process, real possibility must be directly involved in such being-possible. But it is a very different real possibility from that which is delineated above. It amounts to the fact that in every particular existence of the actual, much must be possible that in itself is by no means actual. In this sense, one says: all present being bears within itself many kinds of "possibilities" of future being, of which only one is ever actualized over the course of time; since not all that exists together in "possibility" can simultaneously become actual. Innumerable seeds of possible development – and this means of different being-possibles – lie dormant in each human being. Only the actual journey through life, the influences, the destinies, and the decisions determine what is actualized.

This consideration constitutes the popular concept of possibility, which is the prevailing one everywhere in ordinary life, and which, in its own way, is quite correct. That is to say, correct in what it ultimately means. But it does not signify true, real possibility, and it does not ask what being-possible actually means in determinate, given, real circumstances. Here, one could even call upon what has been said above about the false concept of time and the hardness of the real (Chap. 15 d) in order to criticize this concept of possibility. However, it is instructive at this point to look more closely into the latter. There is also another path that the material discussion may take to convince itself that the simple wisdom of everyday life remains on the level of mere phenomenon and does not break through into the relation of being. Namely, by examining the inconsistency that lies within this concept of possibility itself.

It is now once again to be asked, as it was a short while ago, but this time the other way around: what does one actually mean when one says "whatever is not can still be," or "whatever is not actual is still very possible?" Does one then seriously mean that this possible "could" at the same time already be actual? Or even that it "could" under random future circumstances become actual? Indeed, one knows very well that this is not so. One knows that this possible cannot become actual without quite a number of presuppositions for this becoming-actual having been actualized. One knows that a whole chain of conditions must be fulfilled before it can become actual. And if one wants to put an end to the matter and actualize it by one's own means, then one knows only too well that one must first supply the missing conditions.

But in practical terms, what does this knowledge then mean when expressed ontologically? It means this: in truth, one knows very well that neither at the present can that "possible" be, nor in the future can it become actual under

any arbitrary set of circumstances. But if one knows that at the present it cannot be, then one also knows that at the present it is not possible. But it had just been described as a "possible." One knows, therefore, that even what is described as possible is "impossible."

Of course, only at the present is it impossible. It remains a being-able-to-become-actual. But in regard to this matter, one knows that still remaining conditions must be fulfilled before the thing can become actual; whoever strives for it as a goal knows that he must provide the remaining conditions. It cannot become actual before all the conditions are fulfilled. Even the inexperienced person does not deceive himself about this in ordinary life. He can be deceived in his knowledge of individual conditions, but not fundamentally deceived in the knowledge that "all" conditions must be generally fulfilled if the thing one strives for is to "be able" to become actual. Indeed, in practice, even after all efforts have failed, someone is not easily deceived into believing that merely because he did not succeed in fulfilling all the required conditions, the thing striven-for is, therefore, not able to become actual. But this clearly reveals the insight that even in the future a "possible" cannot become actual unless all the conditions of its possibility (i.e. of its being-able-to-become-actual) have been fulfilled. Only then "can" it become actual. One knows that until then it is "impossible."

Thus, the internal conflict in the popular concept of possibility is twofold. While one may think that there may be much "possible" that is not actual, one knows at the same time that this "possible" is, for the time being (namely, in the given situation of the thing), possible neither at present nor in the future; more precisely, that it is absolutely impossible at present, and on the grounds of its present givenness, is not even possible in the future.

No account is given of this knowledge. Such knowledge would otherwise tell us unequivocally that at any time in the course of real events – in the present as in the future – only that which is possible reaches actuality.

c) The Insufficiency of Partial Possibility and the Totality of Conditions

In the unfurling of this twofold conflict, the aporetic of real possibility lies clearly before us. If one were referring only to a formal being-possible-in-general, then the conflict would be even more apparent. For real possibility is simply not formal possibility. But one is referring entirely to real possibility. For with regard to the future, "everything possible" is, by no means, declared to be possible, but according to the circumstances, only the determinate – namely, that which is determinate in regard to its content – and otherwise is declared as not possible.

One thereby always holds onto certain already-present conditions, which remain open to the possibility of a thing in a decisive way, while already excluding the possibility of other things. Whereby the remaining-open is understood in such a manner that one cannot tell yet whether the further conditions required will come forward or not.

By no means is the conflict, as such, taken away. Even everyday consciousness of possibility contains it. But now the reason why consciousness contains it may be shown.

Namely, partial possibility is clearly whatever one has in view when speaking of a "multiplicity of possibilities" or even merely of the "being-possible of the nonactual." Partial possibility consists in the incomplete series of conditions in which it remains uncertain whether it will be completed or not. What this means is: some conditions – namely, those that one has in mind or considers to be particularly important – are fulfilled, and from them the thing is "possible." In which case, the phrase "from them" is understood in the following way: the thing is possible insofar as these conditions are fulfilled. Whether it is also possible insofar as other conditions are fulfilled is not thereby affirmed, but it is not denied either; it is simply not discussed. One does not know about every required condition. At most, one can know that one does not know about all conditions. But even insofar as one knows about them, one still acts in everyday life as if everything, for the time being, depended only on those conditions that have been directly given.

One does not need to go to too much trouble to find examples here. If a man is saving money to purchase a car and says to himself, "it is possible that I will have my car in a year," then perhaps what he means is this: "I have scraped together a certain amount; if all goes well, then within a year I will have saved up enough for the purchase price." He banks on partial possibility. He cannot foresee whether "all will go well," nor does he claim that it will. He does not delude himself about the conditions that are still unfulfilled – perhaps from month to month he will encounter a long chain of difficulties in enforcing his plan to save money – the already fulfilled conditions are enough to show him the totality of conditions to be foreseen. He anticipates total possibility on the grounds of partial possibility. And for him, this anticipation means the chance of his success.

Or perhaps: if Columbus says to himself that it is "possible" to sail westward around the Earth to India, then he means: the main condition is fulfilled, because the Earth is a sphere. He does not know whether other conditions are also fulfilled, whether the ocean actually extends continuously from Spain to India, whether or not an unknown continent cuts through it from north to south, and a great deal more. These are all obviously to be taken into

consideration; but since he cannot make out the facts before being taught by experience, he needs to challenge experience by taking action. He relies on chance, on the grounds of his certainty that a main condition is fulfilled. He knows that the true possibility or impossibility of this will only be decided once he attempts it. The relation thus becomes clear. In general, human beings rely on only partial possibility. In everyday life, the totality of conditions is never given. But in any given situation there are many partial possibilities. In each cross-section of total real events, an incomplete series of conditions for various kinds of future events is given. The human consciousness of possibility adheres to this series, as to that which alone is tangible. But these partial possibilities still make nothing (i.e. none of these various kinds of future events) "really possible." The rest of the conditions are still missing. As long as they are not actual, the "possible" is not a real possible. One recognizes this through the fact that as long as this is the case, nonbeing remains possible as well. Partial possibility is disjunctive possibility. And even if one wanted to understand it as one-sided positive possibility (by disregarding its negative component), it would still remain indifferent possibility through its incompleteness. It would remain indifferent toward whether or not the "possible" becomes actual.

With this, we approach the point at which the material proof of the intermodal laws has to begin. The formal proof proceeded from a re-coinage of the concept of possibility, as was required by the character of being of the real: in the place of disjunctive possibility appeared divided possibility, which is unequivocally positive or negative. The beginning of the material proof is strictly analogous to the abolition of partial possibility; "total possibility" appears in its place.

This abolition does not mean that there is no partial possibility in the real, but that partial possibility is not real possibility. And even this is not to be understood as though the conditions that constitute partial possibility were not real. They themselves are, of course, just as real as the conditions of total possibility, but on the grounds of them, alone, the thing for which they are the conditions is not yet really possible. Rather, the thing is really impossible as long as the series of conditions is not totally completed.

d) The Law of Totality of Real Possibility

Once this relation – which in itself is quite simple and has only become so difficult to access due to the inertia of skewed concepts – has actually been made clear, even without further survey, one can recognize by its nature that in it resides a fundamental law of real being. This law – in contrast to the other laws of possibility – may be described as the "law of totality of real possibility." From

the negative side, it can also be considered to be the "law of insufficiency of partial possibility." In line with this double character, it requires a double formulation, which may be expressed in this way:

> Only that whose conditions are all actual, up to the last one, is really possible. Whatever is only partially possible is really impossible – even if only one condition is missing.

This, of course, holds true only for positive possibility. For negative possibility, a parallel law must somehow hold true. Yet one would go completely astray here if one wanted to simply turn this law into a negative one, as with the formal modes. Here, the ability of negative modal analysis to mirror positive modal analysis fails completely.

The nonbeing of **A** is, by no means, only really possible if all conditions of **A**, up to the very last, are really nonactual. It may very well be the case that many of them are actual, but not "all." Thus, for negative possibility no negative totality of conditions in the real is required. For negative possibility it is sufficient that a single condition of **A** is missing. Or more precisely: for the nonbeing of **A**, it makes no difference whether many or few conditions of its being are missing, whether all or only one – be it even the most inconsequential condition. Even the absence of the slightest factor from the totality makes possible the nonbeing of **A**.

This is something that is well known in practice. Whoever wants to thwart something determinate that is in the works has an easier time of it than the opponent who wants to actualize that thing. He knows that he does not need to annihilate all factors, but rather only one. Every factor of the thing that counts toward its real conditions, even the most inconsequential, is crucial in the totality of conditions.

Partial possibility is therefore not insufficient as negative real possibility. The law of totality is only a law of positive, not negative, real possibility. Thus, it directly corresponds to the structure of uniform real connection: because this connection is always and in every part complete, and thus is always and in every part only slightly positively possible, but negatively possible to a considerable degree; only the very determinate in it "can" "be" here and now, but infinitely much in it "can" "not be" here and now. This peculiarity of the real may be called the "narrowness of possibility of being," its flip side being the "wideness of possibility of nonbeing." Thus, in contrast to the law of totality of positive real possibility, the oppositional law of negative real possibility must run as follows:

That for which at least one of the conditions is nonactual is negatively really possible. Only that for which the chain of conditions is really complete is totally possible – its nonbeing is really impossible.

Here, we find something new and especially instructive with regard to the formal discussion: negative real possibility demonstrates its internal construction to be absolutely unlike that of positive real possibility. Formally, they appear the same, but understood in material terms, they are completely different. Indeed, they are two sides of one and the same real relation, sharing the same dependency of the conditioned on its conditions. But the whole weight of this relation falls on the positive mode; the negative mode is only its annex and expresses only the lack of self-contained conditional relations. The "wideness" of the possibility of nonbeing illuminates this very clearly. It is the pure freedom of negativity, the unbounded scope of the unreal, so to speak, that remains from the "narrowness" of the positive real possible. Not much belongs to unreal being. It does not need anything positive to be fulfilled. It is barred only from the narrow field of the real possible – and this means that which has behind it a totality of real actual conditions.

e) The Law of Totality and the Law of Division

This dissimilarity between positive and negative real possibility – the weighty fullness of content and determinateness of the one, and the emptiness and lack of essence of the other – sheds new light on the total character of real being. For if from now on the other real modes are understood in terms of their content and their intermodal laws are materially substantiated, then it cannot fail to appear that the positive modes carry all the weight in the realm of the real, while the negative modes disappear into a kind of modal nothingness. This will, in fact, be verified further along in the course of the discussion. And it has already been externally revealed that this time the proof of the intermodal laws dwells entirely in the positive modes.

The two main laws of the real modal table, the "real law of possibility" and the "real law of necessity," can be directly proven from the "law of totality of real possibility," without taking a detour through the negative modes and the laws of exclusion. The remaining laws of implication then follow from them. But then the laws of exclusion, as well as the abolition of indifferences, appear to be merely negative annexes to the two real laws.

Incidentally, the same is true of the law of division. From the material point of view, it gains not only a new meaning, but also a new independent proof. The simple (first) formula of this law reads: the nonbeing of whatever is really possible is really not possible; and that whose nonbeing is really possible is really not possible (Chap. 15 b). This dual formulation can be deduced directly from the law of totality and its negative counterpart.

That is to say, if in the real the negatively possible is only that whose conditions are not all gathered together, and the positively possible is only that whose conditions are all gathered together, then obviously in the real the positively possible is never simultaneously negatively possible, and vice versa. The material precondition for possible being excludes the precondition for possible nonbeing. It can only be that either all of the conditions of **A** are gathered together or all of the conditions of **A** are not gathered together, but not both at the same time. Consequently, the positive and negative possibility of **A** cannot coexist. This is, in fact, a proof of the law of division, and indeed, one that is far more concrete than the formal proof.

19 The Identity of Real Conditions

a) "External Relativity" as Real Dependency

Along with the new proof, a new meaning of the law opens up. In the law of division, "disjunctive possibility" (along with "indifferent possibility") was abolished. In the law of totality, "partial possibility" is abolished, i.e. it is demonstrated that partial possibility is not the real possibility of a thing. If disjunctive possibility is now abolished with partial possibility, but partial possibility is not abolished with disjunctive possibility, then it is clear that the law of totality of real possibility goes deeper to the root of the whole relation than the law of division.

The root is found in the material meaning of real possibility. This meaning has proven itself to be very determinate and tangible in the totality of real conditions. Totality is what the possibility of nonbeing excludes from the possibility of being. Likewise, the lack of totality – be it even in only the smallest partial condition – is what the possibility of being excludes from the possibility of nonbeing. The division of real possibility has therefore, in fact, acquired another meaning. Positive possibility is not merely split off from negative possibility, because it is possibility of the being-actual of a thing and, therefore, must be "maintained" in real actuality, as it can be maintained in it, but cannot include the possibility of nonbeing. It is split off, because it cannot exist "on the grounds" of the same real actual thing "on the grounds" of which negative possibility exists, namely, on the grounds of a chain of conditions that is not totally complete. The argument here does not depend on the consequence, as it did in the formal discussion, but rather on the grounds.

And likewise for negative real possibility: it is split off, because it cannot exist "on the grounds" of the same real actual thing, "on the grounds" which allow positive possibility to exist, namely, on the grounds of a total chain of conditions. Through this connection, the law of division of possibility is not anchored in the formal essence of real actuality, but rather in the material essence inherent in real possibility. The essence of real possibility has opened up. The expression of which is the law of totality.

The insufficiency of disjunctive possibility, and even that of indifferent possibility, has its grounds in the insufficiency of partial possibility. The clarity and decidedness of divided possibility – along with the hardness and ontic radicalism of the real – is rooted in the being-required of a totality of conditions for real possibility.

Apart from its content, a further rootedness is to be noted in this result. This reaches back – across the modal relations of the real – to the "basic modal law" (Chap. 7 e). This law implies that the relational modes are relative in a twofold manner to the absolute modes. Of these two relativities, the "internal" one already served as the natural starting point for deliberation in the formal proof. But "external relativity" remained out of play. It rightly comes to the fore in the material discussion.

"External relativity" means this: possibility and necessity exist "on the grounds" of something that, for its part, is "actual" (in partial factors of a real connection, the nonactual is also involved, but it always depends on the absolute mode). On the grounds of something "merely possible" nothing is possible or even necessary; but on the grounds of something necessary nothing is any more possible or necessary than it is on the grounds of something actual. Necessity and possibility are, therefore, conditioned by an already preexisting actual thing. But this is the relation that one presupposes if one is convinced that real possibility goes back to a totality of conditions that must be fulfilled in it. For even this is characteristic of such a series of conditions for being-possible, that bit by bit it must become really actual.

Whatever the law of "external relativity" implied is now fulfilled in the intermodal relations of the real. That actual thing "on the grounds" of which something ought to be really possible has dissolved in the completed series of its conditions. It is clear that this series of conditions generally constitutes the foundation on which the intermodal laws of the real are based, since now more than ever necessity presupposes the conditions on which it depends, the series of conditions already being complete in real possibility. The "real dependence" that consists in the relation of condition to conditioned is identical to the "external relativity" of real being-possible and real being-necessary. Both are modes of

being-dependent, and it is in this dependence that their relational structure subsists.

The material discussion has, therefore, been based on the "external relativity" of necessity and possibility, from the outset. And with these first steps, it has already been shown that this relativity is more productive than the "internal" one.

b) The Coupling of Real Possibility and Real Necessity through the Identity of their Chains of Conditions

The crux of the matter is now the proof of the three positive paradoxical laws of implication (see Chap. 14 f) from the law of totality of real possibility. It is for this purpose that the proof has begun with the relation of positive possibility and necessity – i.e. with the third law listed.

According to the basic modal law, possibility and necessity share the characteristic that they are correlated to something on which they depend. In the real sphere, this must be a real actual thing. Furthermore, it has been shown that this real actual thing, as long as the possibility of a real **A** depends on it, must already exist in a completed chain of conditions. One may now, therefore, consider: this chain of conditions can only be "one" chain, inasmuch as it, itself, piece by piece, is really actual and constitutes the real connection on the grounds of which **A** is possible. There is no room in the same real connection for a second chain to exist alongside it. If the necessity of **A** now presupposes its possibility (see the fifth evident law of implication, Chap. 14 e) and exists on the grounds of a chain of real conditions, then this cannot be a second chain of conditions alongside the first. The first is already the totality of conditions and constitutes the real connection on the grounds of which **A** can exist. However far it may reach in world connection, there can be no real conditions of **A** outside of it, otherwise it would be incomplete. Consequently, in the chain of conditions of real necessity of **A**, no further conditions can be added that were not already contained in it. Real necessity must be based on the same real chain of conditions as real possibility.

This relation has a very important consequence: if the chain of real conditions of a thing is complete, then its real necessity is given at the same time as its real possibility. The result, therefore, is none other than the material meaning of the third paradoxical law of implication: "whatever is really possible is also really necessary." It can be expressed more concretely: along with the real conditions of possibility, the real conditions of necessity are already

fulfilled. Or as simply the "formula of identity:" the conditions of the real possibility of something are simultaneously the conditions of its real necessity.

Thus, within the limits of the real sphere, something is only possible if it is also necessary. This is still a paradoxical principle. But a line of reasoning was rarely ever permitted to so strikingly succeed in making evident a paradoxical principle – this principle not losing its strangeness even once it is comprehended and recognized. The salient point is the "identity of conditions." For every real **A,** there is only "one" real connection in which it exists and only one chain of conditions on which it depends. But, as for this chain, the matter stands as follows: as long as not all conditions are linked together up to the very last, **A** is not really possible, but rather impossible. On the other hand, if they are all linked together, then **A** is not only really possible, but not-**A** is also really impossible. This implies the negative counterpart of the law of totality (Chap. 18 d). But now the impossibility of not-**A** is equivalent to the necessity of **A** (Chap. 14 a). Therefore: if all real conditions are linked together up to the very last, then **A** is not only really possible, but also really necessary. In which case it not only "can" appear, but "must." It can no longer fail to appear.

Since this consideration involves a decisive step in the material discussion, its factors should be assembled once more in a different order. Possibility and necessity are modes of dependency, and thus, of real dependency in the real sphere. This implies their "external relativity." If one and the same **A** is simultaneously possible and necessary (and it cannot be necessary without being possible), then two kinds of dependency exist in it. Admittedly, one and the same **A** can also be at the same time dependent on two different series of conditions; but, of course, this is only if these series are incomplete. If one of them is already the complete series of conditions for **A**, then the other must be contained in it. If, therefore, **A** is only really possible when all conditions are gathered together, then the conditions of its necessity must already be contained in this totality, since any further conditions in addition to this totality cannot exist alongside it in the same real connection.

This is what the "identity of chains of conditions" indicates. There is for every **A** in real connection only one single complete chain of conditions, and this is at the same time that of its real possibility and real necessity. If there were two such chains, then the real connection would be doubled, which is simply absurd. That is why the principle holds true in the real sphere that: as long as **A** is not necessary, because the series of its conditions is incomplete, it is not possible either; but if **A** is possible, because the series is complete, then it is also necessary.

The coupling of real possibility and real necessity is the direct consequence of the totality and identity of their chains of conditions.

c) Discussion of an Example. Consequences

One is not so unfamiliar with these things in the practical matters of everyday life as one might imagine. Think of a boulder in the mountains lying heavily on the slope. A mild tremor sets it rolling down into the valley. The stone "cannot" start rolling before a moving force upsets its present state of balance, although all other conditions for its rolling down into the valley have long since been present – which are, in fact, far more fundamental, basic conditions, such as the height at which it is positioned in relation to the bottom of the valley (the descent), the earth's gravity, the steepness of the slope, etc. As insignificant as the first impulse upsetting its balance may be, it is still the last missing condition for its rolling, which brings about the completion of the totality of conditions. As long as this last condition is missing, its rolling is absolutely "impossible." It first becomes "possible" the moment that this last condition appears. It completes the mass of conditions. But at this very moment, the rolling down of the stone also becomes "necessary." For when the missing condition appears, completing the mass of conditions, its rolling can no longer fail to occur. It proceeds, unable to be stopped, going on to cause whatever it may. The same totality of conditions that initially makes the rolling down really possible has also already made it really necessary.

It is the particular nature of the real to have nothing in it that is "merely possible." Wherever and however something becomes really possible, it has also already become really necessary. Whatever "can" be in the connection of the real "must" be in it as well. And since the structure of real connection has the form of a temporal process in which the apparently permanent is only a relatively constant stage, the principle's more adequate form is, therefore: whatever "can" occur in the connection of real events "must" also occur in it, and cannot fail to occur.

The flow of real events is complex. At each moment it contains the totality of conditions for whatever occurs. Or expressed conversely: at each moment of the entirety of events there occurs only that whose real conditions are completely gathered together at that time. For only this "can" occur at that time. Something else cannot happen. And for that reason, this event "must" occur at that time, and cannot fail to occur. For the process does not stand any stiller than time itself. It continues inexorably, and if no event can occur other than that for which the mass of conditions in the process itself has been fulfilled at that time, then this event "must" occur.

In a real process, there consequently exists at all times the identity between the conditions of possibility and the conditions of necessity for one and the same partial event. Both are constituted by the very same temporarily

interwoven structure and connections; they form a single, uniform, unique real situation. In every segment of the overall sequence of real events, such an unequivocal, determinate real situation is given. From it at any given time, a single determinate further event is "possible," but no other events. For that reason, the "one" event that is possible from "one" real situation is also always necessary from it.

This "identity of conditions" – real conditions of possibility and real conditions of necessity – is far from implying an identity of real possibility and real necessity, themselves. In naïve thinking there is always the tendency to confuse it with such an identity. The confusion is the very same dangerous misunderstanding that was already warded off above (Chap. 16 c). But on the basis of the material discussion, it can be warded off to an even greater extent. There is a difference between something "being able to" occur and "having to" occur. The two could be classified quite separately, and do not need to be linked to each other. Only the totality of the series of conditions that is required equally for each of them links their being-able-to-be and having-to-be. There can only be "one" such totality in the unity of a real connection at any given time. By virtue of this totality the "really possible thing" is at the same time a "really necessary thing;" but this does not cause its "real possibility" to be its "real necessity." The vulgar use of language may confuse a "possible thing" with "possibility," a "necessary thing" with "necessity" – but philosophy must know how to keep them apart.

The identity of real conditions is not rooted in the particular nature of the modes, but in the particular nature of the real. It is the real connection in the particular situation in the overall sequence of events, which only ever has room for "one" chain of conditions. The law expressing the being-necessary of the real possible is not in itself an evident principle. It is and remains a synthetic principle, and indeed, a paradoxical one. And light is only shed on this through the particular nature of the real. That possibility implies necessity is not a universal modal law; it does not hold true in all spheres. It is only a real law. It does not follow from the formal (general) essence of the modes, but only from the particular form that their "external relativity" assumes in the real sphere.

This state of affairs continually makes itself felt in the consciousness of possibility. Consciousness experiences it as paradoxical, and struggles against it. Consciousness cannot free itself from the idea that even if the stone does not "have to" ["*muß*"] roll, it still "can" roll. The most important thing is forgotten: the stone cannot roll as long as its balance is not upset, but as soon as this happens it has to roll; in short, it cannot as long as it does not "have to," and it "has to" as soon as it "can." One has in mind partial possibility, but considers it to be real possibility, not noticing that it is merely indifferent possibility, which does

not even approximate the true being-possible of an event in the connection of the real.

This discrepancy is unavoidable. For consciousness has its objects constituted by modes and intermodal laws that are different from real processes. It has its simplified modes of consciousness, which are not commensurate to the "hardness of the real." Consciousness of possibility is in fact softened, indeterminate possibility; it is usually not only indifferent, but even disjunctive possibility. It is far from implying a consciousness of necessity. But the question of why this is the case falls within the domain of the modality of knowledge, and must be reserved for a later investigation.

20 The Real Law of Necessity

a) Relation of Real Actuality to the Chain of Conditions

From here, one can show by a simple inference that in the real, the being-actual of a thing also implies its necessity (the second paradoxical law of implication, Chap. 14 f).

It is a universal and evident modal law that actuality implies possibility (the second evident law, Chap. 14 e). If now real possibility for its part implies real necessity as has been shown, then it follows that: real actuality also implies real necessity.

Or in detached form (and with a more regular position of premises): if in the real sphere everything that is possible is also necessary, but generally everything actual must at least be possible, then the principle also holds true that in the real sphere everything that is actual is at the same time necessary.[1]

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1 Since in this field one continually encounters complaints about such a line of thought – which for the most part provide no substantiation, and yet are confusing all the same, because they appeal to the vulgar consciousness of possibility – consequently, the objection may be presented here which Johannes Hessen (*Das Kausalprinzip*, Augsburg, 1928, p. 259) leveled against the conclusion just reached above, as well as a certain, earlier version of my argument that reaches the same conclusion. The objection has the virtue of at least clearly expressing its presuppositions. Hessen thinks that although the conclusion itself is unobjectionable, the major premise is false: "Something resides in the stage of the real possible as long as, and only as long as, the conditions for its entry into actuality are present, but these conditions are still incomplete. If all of the conditions are present, then it has thereby moved from the stage of the real possible into that of the necessary: for then its entry into actuality must take place. Consequently, it is incorrect to say: something is, in the strict sense, really possible when all

This principle is now the "real law of necessity," whose meaning is of immeasurable significance for the problem of determination. If one wants to understand it not only formally, but materially – from the structure of real relations – then the above syllogism does not serve as a mere schema for this, but rather clearly indicates where its root is to be sought. Namely, the syllogism makes real possibility into a *terminus medius*. Thus, it is in it that the conclusion is to be sought.

Which moment of real possibility now comes into question for this mediating role? Obviously, only the one based on a chain of conditions, all of which, up to the very last, must be really actual. But regarding these conditions, the principle holds true that they are at the same time conditions of necessity. If something determinate (**A**) could be really actual without being really possible, then it would, of course, not need to have anything to do with this whole chain of conditions; it would be able to stand detached in the absoluteness of its own mode of being. In which case, it would not need to be necessary, either. But it most assuredly cannot be really actual without being really possible; were something not really possible, it would be "impossible," and the impossible is precisely that which cannot be actual.

From this it now follows: whatever is really actual has "behind it" the whole chain of conditions that constitute its real possibility; that is, up to the very last, for as long as a single one is missing it is not really possible, but rather is impossible. If, however, none of the conditions are missing any longer, all of them

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conditions are present. The error is not eliminated if I add: it is then not only really possible, but also necessary. Because, then both are excluded." – so contends Hessen. One immediately sees that he takes the concept of partial possibility as the grounds, imagining this to be already sufficient for real possibility. It is not clear to me how this is supposed to fall into harmony with the fact that the absence of even a single condition renders the thing impossible; something, of which such a well-read author can hardly be ignorant. Thus, I must assume that he has let himself be deceived by the traditional modal concepts that he has adopted without examination. But this is only the least of his mistakes. According to Hessen, the modes in general do not characterize a certain kind of being, but are rather "stages" – obviously appearing in the developmental process of the thing. For that reason, he thinks that necessity and possibility would have to exclude each other: if all conditions are present, then the thing can no longer be possible, but can only be necessary. But he does not consider that something no longer possible is thereby impossible (according to the third principle of exclusion). In which case one would have to say that only an impossible thing can be necessary, which is obviously self-contradictory. – This is what happens if the modes of being are considered as "stages" of a process. Incidentally in both cases the error lies in complete ignorance of intermodal relations; and moreover it is not the knowledge of the paradoxical relations that is missing – this would be forgivable – but rather that of the evident relations.

having been gathered together, then **A** is not only possible, but also necessary. It can no longer fail to occur. The same chain of conditions that makes **A** possible also makes it necessary. Or, as can be seen from the results: insofar as the real actual **A** has the conditions of its possibility completely "behind it," so too does it have the conditions of its necessity completely "behind it." It is for this reason that the real actual is at the same time really necessary.

The conditions are identical – because they only come into question in their totality, but the real connection only ever has room for "one" totality, not two. Behind every real actual thing there is only one single complete chain of conditions, just as there is also in any case only one single situation in real events from which its actuality arises, i.e. with the occurrence of which it becomes actual.

For this reason, it cannot be actual without being necessary. For it cannot be actual without being possible. Real possibility links the real actual to the totality of conditions, and this totality of conditions, in turn, links it to real necessity. It is caught up in a dual linkage, but both linkages bind it to one and the same totality of real circumstances.

This is the reason why the one linkage cannot exist without the other.

b) The Superordination of Real Actuality over Real Necessity

What this argument depends on should hereafter be clear. It does not depend on the relation of actuality and necessity alone (as expressed by the law of real necessity), but rather on the whole relation of the three positive real modes. And it is precisely the position of possibility in this context that is decisive.

Real actuality is also revealed from a new point of view. It does not have the mode of real necessity as a higher mode "above it," but rather as a lower mode "below it," no different from how it also has real possibility "below it." Both relational modes constitute preconditions for real actuality. It is no longer as it was in the formal-general relation of the modes (on this side of all difference of the spheres), where actuality was positioned between possibility and necessity in terms of elevation; in the construction of real ways of being, actuality is above both of them. Compared to it, necessity has no greater determinateness here. Necessity is only one half of a uniform relation of conditions, with real actuality resting upon it. The other half of this relation falls to possibility. Real actuality has the whole relation as its precondition, thus having real possibility and real necessity as preconditions in the same way. In the relational order of modal height, it has both of them "below it." It is the "highest" real mode.

In this spatial image, "having . . . below it" implies something similar to what was implied by "having . . . behind it" in another (similarly spatial)

image. It is possibility and necessity that have the relational structure. Together, they constitute the relation of the real actual to the totality of its real conditions, its "depending on" this totality, its real dependency. But once the conditions have preceded it, the conditioned follows. The being-actual of a thing is the conditioned in this relation. For that reason, it is the higher mode in it – not only in comparison to possibility, but also necessity – the fulfillment, so to speak, of that which has only the roots of its being in these two modes. In this sense, it has real necessity, as well as real possibility, "below it" as its preconditions – that is, by having "behind it" the single, uniform, and complete chain of conditions for which these two modes constitute the linkage.

This is, thus, the point at which the rearrangement of the positive modes is justified, as it was earlier anticipated on the grounds of formal considerations (Chap. 14 b, Fig. 7). The leading position of the absolute mode does not, as it might have seemed, have merely the meaning of an emphasis on, or regard for, a fuller content of being; rather, it means a plain, but very determinate and realistic [*reell*], relation of conditions, which, in fact, can only first be uncovered by a material discussion of the modes – just as the tight coupling of possibility and necessity in the connection of the real was only first able to be grasped through the totality and identity of their conditions.

With this we arrive at a point where the superordination of real actuality could cause difficulty. That is, if real actuality is brought together with the "internal relativity" of necessity to actuality, then it may seem as if it presupposes a superordination of necessity, namely, in the sense of a dependency. All positive necessity is necessity of the being-actual of something, and therefore has this being-actual as an internal presupposition.

It is easy to see that there is a misunderstanding present here. "Internal relativity" does not mean a real dependency of being-necessary on being-actual; the latter is not something that must already be present in real connection if a thing is to be necessary. Internal relativity means only that being-necessary has a direction, and that this direction leads to the being-actual of the thing; indeed, being-necessary consists in this very leading. If it is now shown in the relation of real dependency that this being-necessary consists of a firm connectedness between the becoming-complete of a chain of real conditions and the occurrence of the thing, then in this relation we do not find the converse, but rather clearly the same relation as in the "internal relativity" of necessity. It obviously amounts to the same thing whether I now say that necessity leads to actuality or that it is the relation of conditions on which actuality is based (as a matter of fact, it is half of this relation). They are just two aspects of the same relation. They complement each other without conflict. What remains of the apparent difficulty is nothing but the inexactness of linguistic expression.

c) Real Connection as the Binding of the Modes to One Another

Even more clearly than the coupling of possibility and necessity, the "real law of necessity" demonstrates the true meaning of implication. The modes, themselves, do not coincide, and their particularity or difference is not infringed upon; what coincides is only their occurrence in one and the same real.

Being-actual as such is and remains not only something quite different from being-necessary; it is right in the real sphere that it first reveals its complete being-otherwise. For, here, one can grasp this being-otherwise in the structure of the real, in the relation of dependency. Being-necessary is one side of the real's dependency on its conditions (the other side is being-possible); however, being-actual is, on the grounds of this dependency, its existing being itself. Actuality is as different from necessity in the coupling of the real modes as the *relatum* is from the *relatio* in every relation, and as the dependent is from the form of depending in every dependency. It is only the structure of the real connection, the unity of real events, the uniqueness of every real situation that links the actuality of a thing to its being-necessary. The necessity of the real actual is not an obvious intermodal relation. The law that it expresses is and remains a paradoxical principle; it cannot be evident in the formal essence of the modes as such, but only in the categorial construction of the real. It is only a "real law" of the modes, and is not a universal modal law that extends to all spheres.

It all depends on the character of the real. An actual "**A**," purely as such, without any real character of its being-actual, does not generally need to be "conditioned." It could stand as "unconditioned," and would then be contingent. There would be no contradiction in this; after all, actuality is no relational mode. Such an **A** would always have to be possible in some sense, even if it were a completely negative one, or in the sense of the absence of contradiction. But this implies no necessity; only real possibility does. Wherever there is no real process and no real connection, there is room for the contingent – at the limits of the real sphere, in it as a whole, as well as in the absolutely first links of the chains of conditions. This plays out differently within its limits in all of the particular real. Wherever there is a real event and real connection, wherever a determinate real situation is present in any section of a total process, not just anything can become actual (i.e. be really possible), but only something "determinate," and a different event cannot become actual (and is really impossible), since all becoming-actual is linked to the totality of real conditions; and this means: there, only what is necessary can become actual. For, if this totality is not present (even if only one condition is missing), then it is impossible for the thing in question to become actual; but if it is present, then it is also necessary and not "merely" possible.

If the real actual were not linked in this way to the real connection in which it appears, then it would not first need to be really possible; in which case a much looser and more negative form of being-possible would suffice. This being the case, it would not need to be necessary either – since the stone could begin rolling without "having to" begin rolling. One may reflect on what this means: it could begin rolling without any real conditions, that is, without a mountain, without a slope, without gravity, without an impetus. Clearly, this is nonsense. It is nonsensical, however, not on the grounds of the formally understood modes, but only on the grounds of the peculiar coupling of the real modes. The real law of necessity is a law of the real process and of the real situation.

d) Resistance of the Consciousness of Actuality to the Real Law of Necessity

This state of affairs is clearly reflected in human consciousness of actuality. Consciousness generally does not look at the totality of the real situation. It does not grasp it. Whenever it sees real dependency, it is limited to one portion of the conditions. Therefore, the real actuality of **A** appears to it as immediately and empirically given. It tacitly presupposes that **A** must also somehow be possible. It does not understand this being-possible from the totality of conditions, but only from one subjectively conditioned selection of factors. It, thus, grasps only a partial possibility, and this has the form of disjunctive possibility – of indeterminateness, and of undecidedness. For that reason, it is not simultaneously a consciousness of necessity. For only total possibility, based on the completed chain of conditions, implies necessity.

If the real law of necessity were an evident law, and if it were recognizable in the formal essence of the modes themselves without a more deeply reaching knowledge of real connection, then consciousness would behave quite differently in everyday life. Just as it presupposes the possibility of a real actual **A**, it would implicitly and tacitly presuppose its necessity; it would be convinced of it, even without being able to discern it, i.e. without being able to grasp the totality of conditions on which it depends. But now the real law of necessity is only indirectly made recognizable through an understanding, at least in principle, of real connection. Such an understanding is basically foreign to the naïve consciousness of reality. Thus, it is a consciousness of actuality, with the accompanying consciousness of possibility as its starting point, but without consciousness of necessity.

Modally, this now means that the real actual **A** may be considered as a contingent **A**. One cannot free oneself of the idea that the stone could still "in fact"

roll, even if it does not "have to" roll; it could just accidentally break loose and roll away. This consciousness of actuality ignores the importance of the partial conditions making up and completing the mass of conditions; indeed, it scorns them. It is not familiar with them, turning away from them in favor of the everyday demands of its understanding. It struggles against the necessity of the real actual, and, by no means, only where it is practically or ideologically interested – as in the case of its own real initiatives (its moral freedom) – but invariably and inevitably.

Thus, the real law of necessity must seem paradoxical and suspicious to it, provoking its resistance, even against the emergence of better insight. It opposes its real feeling; and does this not without grounds, if the grounds are already in it, in consciousness, and not in its object. Consciousness of reality has other modes, and stands under other intermodal laws than the real it seeks to comprehend. Its objects do not conform to its ways of representation. In real relation, actuality implies necessity; but the consciousness of actuality does not imply the consciousness of necessity. The paradox stems from the inadequacy of consciousness of the modes.

This resistance of naïve consciousness makes itself felt deeply within philosophical thought. Even modal analysis has to deal with it at every turn, and must continually overcome it. For even philosophical consciousness has trouble revising its categories and learning to work with the revised ones.

Investigation and comprehension alone do not suffice. The comprehended must be transmitted to the whole field of real knowledge and kept alive in the continual effort of progressive comprehension. For this involves a turning point in the whole aspect of the world.

These unapparent intermodal laws, which seem so abstract and so far from all matters of everyday life, still have the power to provide us with a perspective on the construction of the world, which lofty speculative principles are not in a position to give and which might not be accepted without their development. Whether it is worth the trouble to relearn these laws may be judged at the end of the discussion.

21 The Real Law of Possibility

a) The Ontological Meaning of the Law. Casting Out the Ghosts

Perhaps even more paradoxical than the real law of necessity is the "real law of possibility" (the first paradoxical law of implication, Chap. 14 f). It says that in

the real, everything that is possible is also actual. This represents a slap in the face to naïve sentiments, far more than the being-necessary of all actual things. How closely the real law of possibility is connected to the real law of necessity makes itself clear to no one in ordinary life, and has eluded philosophical thought at nearly all points in time – even when the continuous, accompanying necessity of all real events has by no means escaped it. Thus, the thinking of traditional metaphysics was inconsistent despite all outward appearances of logical incisiveness.

Within certain limits, common understanding thereby resigns itself to the fact that everything "must" be as it is, and that everything that happens "must" happen in the way that it happens. It does not take this very seriously, allowing for exceptions, but it does silently rely on this with regard to the whole of life, doing so with insufficient and one-sided images; it is inclined to believe equally in destiny and predestination, although these concepts are not entirely foreign to it.

On the other hand, it finds entirely foreign the concept that only that which "is" can be, or that everything that "can" be is also actual; likewise, the concept that nothing "can" happen that does not happen, or that everything that "can" happen actually happens. It is deeply rooted in the human sense of reality to presuppose that an unimaginable number and variety of things that "can" be "are" not, and "can" happen that have not happened. The realm of the possible – namely, not as the realm of the merely conceivable, but as the realm of that which is generally possible in life itself and in the real world – appears immeasurably greater to it than that of the actual. It considers the realm of actuality as narrow, finite, tightly bound to the hard facts and their consequences, while the realm of the possible is regarded as infinite, boundless. From moment to moment, life seems to lead to an incalculable fullness of "possibilities," and it seems to be only in the narrowness of the actual that only one possibility can ever be realized, all the others sinking into nothingness.

But how, then, does someone actually know that such an incalculable number of things that do not become actual are possible? Given that the really possible is only that for the sake of which the totality of conditions are linked together in the particular real situation, although one almost never grasps this totality in ordinary life, and from subsequent experience always sees only the possibility of the "one" thing that reaches actuality – what right does one have to say that so many other things were at the same time really possible? Surely, the fact that in one's thoughts – or perhaps better put, in the event of one's imagination getting ahead of itself – there is a wide realm of the "merely possible," which is not actual and never becomes actual, provides no reason for accepting it as existing in the real world. It is understandable that a person

would naively make this assumption. But, on the contrary, it is not understandable at all for one to seek to hold onto it in philosophical reflection for no reason other than its being a familiar habit of thought. With this, one sets down a division that runs through the real world. According to this division, all the actual is besieged by a vast entourage of the "merely possible," as if by a swarm of ghosts; if one were to take this consequence into consideration, then one would surely be wary of making such utterly ungrounded assumptions (see Introduction, 3).

On the other hand, the "real law of possibility" now says: there is in the real no "wideness" of the possible, no parallel multitude of shifting "possibilities," at least, not in the sense of real possibility; nor is there a "merely possible" standing beside the actual, no freely wandering, hovering, ghostly possibility, no division of the real into two kinds of being, no second realm beside the actual. Rather: the narrowness of the actual is also the narrowness of the possible; in the structure of real events, nothing is possible that is not actual; nor does anything in it "become" possible that does not thereby become actual; indeed, there was never anything that was possible without being actual, and nothing will ever become possible without becoming actual. In short, at any given time only that which "is" real at that time "can" be real; and, at all times, only what actually occurs "can" occur.

The "real law of possibility" is the short formulation for a complicated process of revolution in philosophical thought. This process may be described as casting out the ghostly from the human conception of the world. It cannot take place without resistance; it is not a question of insight alone. For so it is with man: he loves his ghosts.

b) The Mediated Reconnection of Real Actuality to the Conditions of Real Possibility

Despite all paradoxes, this law is not difficult to prove from the material meaning of real possibility. The proof can also be given here in the form of a syllogism. The universal and evident modal law serves as the major premise: necessity implies actuality (Chap. 14 e, the first evident law of implication). The minor premise is formed by the principle already materially proven above: real possibility implies real necessity (Chap. 19 b, the third paradoxical law of implication). If both of these premises are valid, then it follows: real possibility also implies real actuality.

Or in detached form: if in each sphere that which is necessary must also be actual, but in the real sphere that which is possible is also necessary, then in the real sphere everything that is possible must also be actual. This is the "real law

of possibility" in its positive form. The more abrupt, negative form says: there is in the real process at any given time nothing possible other than whatever is also at that very same time actual.

This syllogism, like the one encountered earlier (Chap. 20), is no merely external schema. It may rather be understood as the material exposition of the uniform basic relation on which the whole coherence of the laws of implication in the real sphere is based. This is seen most clearly from its *terminus medius*. Real necessity functions here as such. It appears to be the link that provides the connection between real possibility, as the lowest positive mode, and real actuality as the highest. But we have seen that real necessity is based on the same real chain of conditions as that on which real possibility is based (Chap. 19 b). It has been shown that if the chain of an A's real conditions is completely linked together, then **A** is not only really possible, but also really necessary. It is the "identity of conditions" that fetters possibility and necessity to each other in the field of the real. But this identity is rooted in the law of totality of real possibility (Chap. 18 d).

Thus, the crux of the matter lies in the essence of real possibility. The law of totality implies that partial possibility is not real possibility at all. But disjunctive possibility is merely partial possibility. If, under determinate, given conditions in the real, different things were possible, and therefore not only **A**, but also manifold positive cases of not-**A**, then this could only involve partial possibility. But the law of totality says: the "really" possible is only that whose conditions all, up to the very last ones, are really actual: whatever is only partially possible – even if only one of its conditions is missing – is "in fact" really impossible. The multiplicity of "possibilities" is thereby excluded. Only **A** is possible. And everything that is not-**A**, no matter what it may want to subsist in, is impossible. Every real constituted with a different content (every not-**A**) would require a chain of conditions that is at least partially different.

But on the other hand, the "identity of real conditions" implies that based on its grounds, **A** is not only possible, but also necessary. If all conditions, up to the very last, are linked together, then **A** cannot fail to occur. It "must" be actual. This is the "real law of necessity." Necessity as a relational mode is now subjected to "internal relativity," and is the necessity of the being-actual of something. This means that: the **A** whose conditions, up to the very last, are linked together is necessarily "actual."

Here, it becomes evident that the major premise of the syllogism is no mere schema, but is instead the expression of a real relation of necessity and actuality, rooted in the same totality of conditions. **A** is, on the grounds of the real conditions of its possibility, not only at the same time necessary, but also at the same time actual. The "identity of conditions" thus proves itself to reach even

further than was previously thought; it spans over yet a third component. This can be summarized in connection with the formulations given earlier (Chap. 19 b): the conditions of the real possibility of **A** are not only at the same time the conditions of the real necessity of **A**, but also at the same time the conditions of the real actuality of **A**.

One must not in this case take umbrage at the absolute mode's dependency on the chain of conditions. This does not contradict its absoluteness. For it is not generally within the modal essence of actuality to be correlated (externally relative) to conditions; but the structural particularity of the real is what initially causes it to be correlated. Through it, everything real is deeply rooted in a real situation. Or expressed modally: through the real possibility and real necessity standing "behind it," real actuality is correlated to the one complete chain of real conditions that is common to both. Thus, the conditions are indirectly also those of real actuality. The dependency that all of the real actual has on the chain of conditions – the real dependency holding sway in all becoming – is identical to the fact that actuality is the "highest" real mode, i.e. it has not only possibility, but also necessity as its preconditions.

It is, therefore, with the completion of a single chain of conditions in a given stage of real events that **A** initially becomes really possible, but at the same time also already really necessary, and thereby really actual. From this it follows that within the limits of the real sphere the law holds true: **A** only becomes possible when it also becomes actual. The real making possible of a thing is simultaneously its real actualization. The totality of conditions that makes it really possible makes it also, by necessity, really actual.

c) Real Possibility and Consciousness of Possibility

The role of necessity as a mediating authority (formally as *terminus medius*) clearly reemerges in the last formulation. Real necessity "links" real actuality to real possibility. Since the conditions of genuine real possibility are at the same time sufficient grounds for real necessity, for that reason – and that reason alone – they are also sufficient grounds for real actuality. For that reason – and that reason alone – within the limits of the real world, nothing is possible that is not actual. For that reason alone, there is in the real no "wideness" of the possible held in opposition to the "narrowness" of the actual, no multiplicity of free-floating "possibilities." Or perhaps: for that reason, here the narrowness of the actual is at the same time the narrowness of the possible.

But one thing must be kept in mind: the paradox in the "real law of possibility" is thereby made clear and basically remedied, but not eliminated. It is not

abolished for the everyday consciousness of reality, since this consciousness is subject to other modal laws. Its consciousness of possibility is tied to partial possibility, and therefore it is detached from consciousness of actuality from the outset. One inevitably thinks, again and again: whatever is not "can" still be; whatever does not happen "can" still happen.

We cannot eliminate this subjective inevitability from the world. We can only discern it. Much "can," of course, happen in the real world that does not happen at the present time and under the given circumstances, but only at a different time and under different circumstances; namely, always then and there, where the conditions have been fulfilled for a specific, different event. But then and there, this different event actually happens. Nowhere in real events does something become possible that does not, at the same time, become actual in them. And it must be added: there has never been something possible in real events that was not actual; and nothing will ever become possible in real events that will not thereby become actual.

It is not superfluous to emphasize the temporal difference in wording, here. For the naïve consciousness of possibility has a penchant for appealing directly to it. It always believes that whatever is not actual now is, right now, still "possible," because it "can" still become actual in the future. It escapes such a naïve consciousness that even this "now-being-possible" of a future thing is a now-being-impossible, that something that does not now reach actuality can, at best, only become possible in the future, but only once the chain of its real conditions becomes complete and no sooner, at which point it must at the same time become actual. The real law of possibility is unaffected by temporal differences. It holds true for every point in time, regardless of whether it is at present or not at present. At every point in time, there "can" only be whatever "is" at that point in time; and there "can" happen only whatever actually happens.

d) The "Narrowness of the Possible" as a Sign of the Higher Ways of Being

Just as with the other implications, one must be on one's guard against the converse extreme with the real law of possibility. This law does not imply the "identity" of possibility and actuality. The two remain as different from each other in the real sphere as they are in the logical sphere. Only the peculiar structure of real connection links being-actual to being-possible. It is not an analytical principle that this linkage expresses, but rather, a highly synthetic and paradoxical principle. It is also not a universal modal law, but only a real law – providing insight into neither the essence of possibility nor that of actuality, but only into what stands behind both of them: the relation to real conditions.

Everything depends here on real character as such, on real process, on the real situation. If the possible did not have the same total chain of conditions "behind it" in the real that the actual does through necessity's mediation, then much that is not really actual could very well be really possible. The "narrowness of the possible" is a phenomenon that pertains specifically to the real: the other spheres do not share it. Only in the real sphere is the possible restricted to the actual. There is no such restriction wherever possibility signifies no chain of conditions, but only the absence of contradiction, as in the logical sphere. There, the field of the possible is unlimited, or to put it more precisely, it is limited only by the contradictions to be found in the content of factors.

But in philosophy one has become accustomed, under the influence of older metaphysical systems, to understand possibility almost exclusively as the absence of contradiction. If finite understanding hardly ever penetrates real possibility, it is very understandable that on the philosophical side, one is still inclined today to pit a fullness of "possibilities" against the narrowness of the actual. Rationalism and idealism have encouraged this to the greatest extent through their devaluation of the real actual. The realm of essences appeared as a higher sort of being; this was understood as the realm of possibility. Compared to the determinateness and narrowness of the actual world, it appeared as the infinite fullness of that which "can" be. And since it is a realm of the universal, the universal thus appeared as the complete, while in the hardness of its reality the particular was seen as the incomplete.

This is the case if one only looks at the "scale" that considers the indeterminateness of the universal as wideness and transcendence, and if one does not ask that its emptiness be filled up. This very quickly reverses itself as soon as one seeks to capture with the tenuous net of essences whatever fills up the meshes. Then the impression becomes quite convincing that those universal essences (*essentiae*), taken separately, constitute a realm of incomplete being. The transcendent "wideness of the possible" in this realm is nothing but the flip side to this incompleteness. The real in its individuality, particularity, temporality, and transience, is, in a higher and fuller sense, precisely this being. In it there is complete determinateness, everywhere and at every time. This is why the "wideness of the possible" disappears in it. The narrowness of the possible, reduced to the limits of the actual, takes its place. Even Leibniz's "possible worlds" are incomplete, existing only in the emptiness of universality, being by no means really possible worlds; they lack the fullness of real conditions. And thus they are essentially possible, i.e. without contradiction in themselves, but nevertheless really absolutely impossible worlds.

The narrowness of the possible is not an essential law; it is only a real law. But this law is the seal of the higher ways of being, namely, of the only complete

ways of being. It expresses the material relation peculiar to the internal structure that emerged in the formal discussion as the "hardness of the real." The latter followed from the law of division of real possibility and the abolition of disjunctive possibility. But the actual meaning of the law of division first came to light in the totality of real conditions (Chap. 18e).

If these factors are compared, then new light is shed on that absolute decidedness of being and nonbeing characteristic of the real (Chap. 17 e). It consists of the fact that there is no "merely possible" in the real. A "merely possible" is indeterminate, incomplete, and in that respect, undecided being. But the real is, in every respect and at every temporal cross-section, complete being. A further essential feature of the real ways of being is thereby obtained. What initially could only be announced is verified: modal analysis is the way to uncover the mystery of the ways of being.

22 The Megarian Notion of Possibility

a) Aristotle's Account and Polemic

The real law of possibility is, indeed, paradoxical, but only for naïve consciousness' accustomed way of thinking. It is quite accessible in the connection of real events, this being the only context in which it clearly holds true. A consequent type of ontological thinking, once it has grasped what real possibility actually is, is unavoidably thrust into existence independent of any aspects of personal viewpoint. The history of philosophy bears eloquent testimony to this.

Before Aristotle coined his concept of δύναμις, which has been teleologically warped and become quite removed from a pure concept of possibility (it is rather a mere "plan"-concept), there was the purely ontological conceptual pair of δυνατόν and ἀδύνατον, which had acquired a certain ripeness for decision in the late offshoots of Eleatic philosophy. We know this pre-Aristotelian development in the conception of possibility almost solely through its consequences, particularly by the form it assumed in the Megarian school.[2] This conception was

2 This conception of possibility is usually attributed to Diodorus Cronus. However, it did not take effect until late in the time of Aristotle. But Aristotle himself polemicizes against this theory at length, ascribing it to "the Megarics" in general. It was therefore already a commonly held idea in the Megaric school before Diodorus's time. See E. Zeller, *Über den* κυριεύων [*Kyrieuon*] *des Megarikers Diodorus, Sitzungsber. d. Akad. d. Wissensch. zu Berlin* [Minutes of the Academy of Science at Berlin] 1882, p. 151 f.

already mentioned above in the historical overview (Introduction, 3); but only now is it possible to evaluate it in terms of its content. For there is at issue in it nothing less than the real law of possibility.

Aristotle's account of it was as follows: "there are some, such as the Megarics, who claim that something is only possible if it is actual; but that if it is not actual, then it is not possible either . . ."[3] According to its literal meaning, if one puts aside all further interpretation, then in due form the claim reported here is the real law of possibility. We lack the documentation necessary to determine whether something like a series of conditions was what the Megarian thinkers had in mind, or whether they had merely formally encountered the indeterminateness of dual possibility – surely it must have been one of the two. In view of the later argumentation of Diodorus Cronus, one would be more likely to exclude the latter; in view of the earlier polemic of Aristotle, one would be more likely to exclude the former. Whatever the case may be, there can be no doubt that the real ontological concept of possibility is present here in utmost determinateness, as it was developed in the first paradoxical law of implication.

This is clearly evident from Aristotle's account. Aristotle explains the matter, using the example of the master builder: if he does not actually build at the moment, then he "cannot" build; he "can" build only as an actual builder, i.e. as long as he actually builds. This example is chosen so that the paradox will abruptly come to the fore. Aristotle also intends to have an easy time with the refutation: "Indeed, it is clear that he could not be a master builder if he were not building; for being a master builder means being able to build." And it must be likewise for every τέχνη (skill [*Fertigkeit*]): as soon as one stops practicing it, one must already have lost it. Indeed, it would not be any different for the perceptibility of sense-objects, such as cold, warmth, sweetness: nothing can be perceptible, if it is not actually perceived. Likewise, for the perceptibility of the perceptible: the seeing and hearing person must "often

3 Aristotle, *Metaphysics Θ*, 1046 b, 29 f.: εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ φασὶν οἷον οἱ Μεγαοικοὶ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι . . . Here, Aristotle uses his terms δύνασθαι [*dynasthai*] and ἐνεργεῖν [*energeia*] to describe how the meaning of the principle already appears to be distorted. In Megarian terminology, the opposition of δυνατόν [*dynaton*] and ἀληθές [*alethes*] might have been involved, as can be seen from later testimonies. Here, ἀληθές [alethes] still bears the original, objective meaning of "unconcealed," – said about the object, not about knowledge – and therefore it may be understood in this context as "factual" or "actual."

throughout the day" be blind and deaf, namely, at any moment when he does not see or hear something.

With these pointed criticisms, Aristotle intends to be able to refute the real law of possibility. In fact, they appear as the height of absurdity, if we take his concept of *dynamis* as their grounds. This concept, insofar as it can be valid as a modal concept, is built upon partial possibility – since it means more the plan for something than the possibility of something – it therefore accepts at face value the open alternative of being and nonbeing (actuality and nonactuality). Accordingly, only that which is lacking actualization is "possible;" if it appears, then the possibility of nonbeing falls away, but so too does the possibility of being along with it; potency disappears in actuality (ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια).

Under this presupposition, it is understandable that Aristotle casually equates "being a master builder" with "being able to build," and likewise generally equates proficiency with being able to perform, as well as the (mental faculties [*seelische Vermögen*] of) sight and hearing with being able to see and being able to hear.

b) The Real Ontological Meaning of the Megarian Thesis

But the assumption is false. There are, of course, abilities and skills that do not stand and fall with their current functioning (ἐνεργεῖν). But these are not bearers of ontologically complete real possibility, but of merely partial possibility. They always still require completion, and always require a factor that lies outside of them, namely, in the total situation present at the time. Indeed, many such "other" factors are usually required for them to "be able" to function.

The master builder surely remains a master builder, even when he does not build. This only means that once he has gained the "ability," he retains it as such, and not that he "could," in reality, already be building. Despite all his mastery, he cannot build as long as the other real conditions for this are not actually present – that is, are not completely gathered together – beginning with the plot of land, the building material, the manpower, the building contract and so forth, right up to the particular plan for the house (the εἶδος ἐν ψυχῇ) and his own initiative (e.g. his resolve to take a certain risk). But if these conditions are all gathered together, up to the very last, then the building is already actually underway. He "can" therefore, in a real ontological sense, only in fact build when he actually builds, irrespective of his existing status as a master builder. He cannot build under just any circumstances, but only under certain ones.

For that reason – and not based on his mood – he does not continually build as long as he is a master builder, only doing so at times.[4]

It is likewise for being perceptible and being able to perceive. If one describes warmth, cold, or sweetness as "perceptible," then one does not mean by this that they can be perceived under all circumstances, but only under certain circumstances, particularly when the thing doing the perceiving (the hand, the tongue) touches them. Perceptibility is generally not yet the real being-able-to-be-perceived. And for the perceiving thing it works in the same way, except in reverse: the seeing and hearing person need not be considered to be often blind or deaf "throughout the day" because he does not constantly see or hear; he remains very much in possession of his faculties of sight and hearing. But a faculty is only a potency, and a potency is not yet the real possibility of seeing and hearing. No one can see, if light does not fall on spatial things within the span of his visual field, even if his vision is intact; and no one can hear, if no sound enters his ear, even if his hearing is intact. The faculty taken entirely on its own is only partial possibility. It does not become full real possibility until the chain of internal and external conditions becomes complete. But then sight and hearing also become actual (this is also acknowledged in the Aristotelian conception). But this means nothing other than: the seeing person "can" only see when he actually sees, and the hearing person "can" only hear when he actually hears.

This conclusion is so simple and undeniable that historically what it means has failed to be fully understood; in the rivalry between philosophical schools, it has had to yield to the powerful authority of Aristotle, who in this instance missed the essence of the matter. This means at the same time that the purely ontological approach of the Pre-Socratics, their last ripe fruit being the clearly formulated real law of possibility in the Megaric conception, had to yield to metaphysically speculative interests, and was buried, as it were, by the impact of their ardent assaults.

Not only the clarification of the real modes, but also the ontological conception of reality has quite simply been buried along with it for a long time. It still lived on in secret, but was and remained displaced from the scene of all stronger philosophical interests – not only in antiquity and the Middle Ages, but right up to our time. When expressed today the Megarian thesis seems just as foreign

4 It seems appropriate to change the example for present day society. According to Aristotle's conception, the unemployed person is "able" to work, even if he "has no work." The tragedy of his "not being able to" shows very radically the failings of such a meaningless concept of "being able."

to us as it was to Aristotelianism as a whole in the Western world. The old prejudice has not yet fallen away.

And it must be added: even the historical writing of philosophy, busily searching for original thought, has up to now heedlessly passed over this profound piece of ancient thought. The literature knows about the fact of the matter, without knowing its meaning or its importance. It mentions the remarkable principle as one would a curiosity. It is quite foreign to ontological thought. It is unacquainted with the problem involved here, and for that reason it is not capable of recognizing it. Even the perfectly clear and fully developed formulation, preserved for us by Aristotle, was hardly able to inspire philosophical historiography to speculate about the ontological meaning of the Megarian thesis.[5]

c) Right and Wrong on Both Sides of the Argument over the "Possible"

Meanwhile, it may not have historically gone unrecognized that even the Megarian school itself encouraged misunderstanding, its later representatives being particularly at fault. From the outset, the problem of possibility was involved in an entirely different sort of metaphysics that characterized the school's main teachings. This is the metaphysics of the Parmenidean concept of being, which banishes movement and becoming from the real world.

Historically speaking, this metaphysics had already been outlived and overtaken by the new presentation of the problem, as reformulated by Euclid of Megara and supplemented by an *eidos* theory on a Socratic foundation. The possibility of the nonactual was then disputed not simply for its own sake, but in order to refute the possibility of becoming and of movement. This binding together of two absolutely heterogeneous things has been to the detriment of the ontological problem's development. With it, the Megarian school put itself in the wrong. It could not free itself – although, in truth, Heraclitus already had done so – from the old concept of becoming as an arising from nothingness

5 Even August Faust's great and otherwise instructive work, *Der Möglichkeitsgedanke*, I. 1931, p. 29 f. passes over the Megarian doctrine unsuspectingly, without making a serious attempt to actually interpret it. Even Chrysippus's profound dispute with this doctrine, which the author impressively reports (p. 270 f.), does not bewilder him with its partiality. His historical conception of the problem of possibility in antiquity remains in this way hopelessly one-sided. It is precisely the ontologically more important side that is missing – which, of course, is also the more difficult one.

and a vanishing into nothingness. Thus, being and nonbeing appeared "mixed" in becoming, and this contradicted the concept of being that had been taken as a foundation.

If the opposition of possible and actual were involved in this inherently skewed problematic of being, then the possible would have to appear as a kind of nonbeing, with the actual alone appearing as being. But coming into being presents itself in this way as a transition from being-possible to being-actual. If one were now to oppose this coming into being, one would have to prove that this transition is appearance, and would, therefore, also have to seek proof that there could not be a "merely possible" that was not already actual.

Against this rigid metaphysics of being, Aristotle's polemic was proven correct. The new theory of *dynamis* and *energeia* was an attempt to understand anew coming into being, standing in conscious opposition to the Eleatic elimination of becoming. Thus, it should come as no surprise that it was chosen over the Megarian concept of possibility. The historical injustice perpetrated here took place on a deeper level of the problem; it could not be recognized on the level at which the matter was discussed. For even Aristotle's concept of becoming was one-sided; it was sufficient for the organic maturation and growth directed by a planned out system, but not for the natural process (κίνησις) in a more general sense. The natural process does not run from being-possible to being-actual, but from the being-actual of one thing to the being-actual of another – a notion that had already been developed at that time to a large extent by atomism, although it was not yet understood as a modal concept.

There was right and wrong on both sides of the dispute about possibility and actuality, which began at that time – and was never fought out to its end. Both sides grounded the debate on a false concept of becoming. The Megarics wrongly believed that by denying it they had already refuted the becoming of the real. But Aristotle was mistaken when he thought that he had comprehended the becoming of the real with the justification of a concept of becoming that he understood as a transition from *dynamis* to *energeia*. In order to justify an outlived metaphysics of being, the Megarics misused an ontological insight that would have been worthy of a far better use. Aristotle, however, did not see that the mistake lay in the application. He fought directly against their newly acquired insight.

In fact, becoming is the real's continuous form of being. It does not require the "merely possible" for its mobility. Being-possible is not a state or stage of a process. Every stage of a process is actual, regardless of whether it is an early or late stage. Its being-possible, however, means something quite different to it than its being-actual; it is a rootedness in conditions, which, for their part,

must already be actual. The being-possible in a real process is only a mode of real dependency. For that reason, it is not a state or stage, and in general does not appear isolated and by itself in real relation, appearing only as a modal aspect subordinated to an actual thing.

d) Diodorus Cronus and his κυριεύων λόγος

The Megarics damaged their cause not only through their metaphysics of being, but also through their style of argumentation. This is particularly true of the school's later representatives, Eubulides and Diodorus Cronus. Both were masters of eristics, drawing the school's body of thought into the realm of sophistries. Diodorus believed that through his dialectics he could give an effective new form to the Megarian idea of possibility; he pretentiously named it the κυριεύων λόγος [*kyrieyon logos*] (the master argument). He actually made a breakthrough insofar as the new modal idea began to create quite a stir. As to the matter itself he had been anything but useful.

The thesis that he pointedly and accurately declared was: "nothing is possible that is not either actual or going to be actual."[6] Thus, from the outset, Diodorus took into account future being. He thereby cut short the obvious objection that what might not "be" could still "become." It cannot be denied that this is a good start; one expects him to carry out a course of reasoning that is just as orderly. On the contrary, Diodorus's actual argument falls quite short; it is curious, and in fact, sophistical. It proceeds from the principles: "that which is past is necessarily actual," and "the impossible cannot develop from the possible."[7] These conclusions were basically reached in the following manner. Whatever is past is irreversible; its being-otherwise is "impossible." But now – before it has become actual, thus at a moment when it is still a future thing – one says that its being-otherwise is indeed "possible." If one accepts this, then one concedes that from a possible thing, an impossible thing may develop over time – which

6 Passed down through the *Dissertationes Epicteti* of Arrian, II. 19, 1. *Ibid*. for the following quotations. What is here translated as "actual" reads in the text as ἀγηθές. Concerning this term see the proceeding footnote number 25.

7 In the text, the second principle reads (in the place cited): δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον μή ἀκολουθεῖν. If what was meant by this were only that from the possibility of something there could not follow the impossibility of just anything, then the principle would be quite insignificant, and it would also fit poorly into his argument. It must very well have meant that from the possibility of **A**, the impossibility of **A** cannot "follow." In which case, it may be translated more simply, as above.

contradicts the second principle. Its being-otherwise cannot have been possible any earlier. On the contrary, at any given time whatever was always possible is all that is possible; and this is always only that which becomes actual at some time. The possible is, therefore, only whatever is also actual, regardless of whether it is now present or not present, past or future.

Not everything in this argument, amounts to sophistry. The irreversibility of the past is accurately asserted, and is, in fact, very closely related to the real law of possibility (see Chap. 15 d). But it is more likely to be its consequence than its ground. The sophistry begins with the second principle, subsisting in the double meaning of δυνατόν. Namely, if δυνατόν means Aristotelian (disjunctive) possibility, then the principle is false; since not-**A** is then also possible, and if not-**A** becomes actual, then this possible not-**A** becomes impossible. If, however, unequivocal total possibility is meant, then the principle is indeed tenable, but still unproven; since it basically implies what the argument should prove.

The argument is circular reasoning in disguise. In the dispute that it caused, this could not stay hidden. The consequence was, however, that one very soon believed that by invalidating the proof, one had also refuted the thesis it was supposed to prove. In doing so, one had forgotten the simple logical rule that the truth-value of a thesis does not depend on proof, that there are many skewed and false proofs for absolutely true propositions. But the coupling of the bad argument with a good cause was so firm and remained for such a long time that hereafter, in such arguments, the interest in the cause was combined with the taste for eristic art.

Nevertheless, the idea that only the actual is really possible has historically never completely disappeared. Chrysippus fought against it with arguments that still reveal his intellectual prowess. Cicero popularized it in his work on destiny. At the height of Scholasticism it reemerged – as it seems – completely independently. Abelard applied it to the creative action of divinity (God "can" only create what he actually creates); Averroes used it to represent a theory of development according to which everything that is possible also becomes actual. We find this idea in almost the same form, only with reference to historical becoming, in Herder's philosophy of history. In a more universal form and in a stricter modal version, Hobbes represents it in his theory *de corpore*; here, the emphasis is not on the widening of the actual, but on the restriction of the possible.

Also in the nineteenth century, some of the lesser-known thinkers, such as Johann Jacob Wagner and Christian Friedrich Krause, put forward something similar. Traces of it can also be found in A. Trendelenburg and F.A. Lange. Of course, hardly any of these thinkers penetrate to the modal core of the matter (Wagner perhaps being the exception). Ontological thought at that time had almost become impossible. The direction of thought was epistemological, or

even psychological. Whoever sees the connection between possibility and actuality is similarly inclined to let the former completely disappear from the real world, reserving it for the realm of thought. This is no longer a territory in which fundamental modal thought can prevail.

23 Material Proof for the Remaining Intermodal Laws

a) The Negative Laws of Implication

The material discussion has up to this point dealt with only the three positive paradoxical laws of implication. The bulk of the work has been done by the weightiness of these laws. But the corresponding proof of the remaining paradoxical intermodal laws still remains. These laws may all be easily derived from the three laws already proven – the two real laws (of necessity and of possibility) constitute the actual positive and essential laws in the total relation of the real modes, to which all the remaining laws only appear as accessories – but such a mere derivation would revert to the formal discussion, surrendering the advantage offered by the material discussion, which is its ability to also provide structural illumination at the same time. As has already been shown, it is, moreover, a peculiarity of the material discussion that it does not need to be derived from the proven laws. Rather, it is grounded on a demonstrable, content-constituting relation, being then in a position to prove each intermodal law directly as regards its content.

Thus, the further course of the proof may be indicated at least in outline. The presumed basic relation is expressed in real possibility's law of totality (Chap. 18 d). Just as the laws of implication of the positive real modes arose from it, the negative laws now arise as well (paradoxical laws of implication: 4–6, Chap. 14 f).

An **A** whose nonbeing is really possible has no complete chain of conditions behind it. It is missing at least one link in this chain. But as long as even a single link is missing, **A** is really impossible; it only becomes really possible when none are missing any longer. **A** therefore cannot be "actual" as long as its nonbeing is possible. Its being-actual is "impossible." – This is the content of both laws: "that whose nonbeing is really possible is also really nonactual;" and: "that whose nonbeing is really possible is also really impossible" (the fourth and sixth paradoxical laws of implication).

Furthermore, if **A** is really nonactual, then its chain of conditions cannot be completely linked together; otherwise it would already be necessary, along with

its possibility, and would consequently be actual. At least one link must be missing from the chain. But if even one link is missing, then **A** is really impossible. – Therein lies the proof of the fifth paradoxical law of implication: "whatever is really nonactual is also really impossible."

If the six paradoxical laws of implication are now gathered together and supplemented by the six evident laws (Chap. 14 e), then the whole of principle III is readily produced: "all positive real modes imply one another, and all negative real modes imply one another."

b) The Paradoxical Laws of Exclusion

It is even simpler for principle II: "all positive real modes exclude from themselves all negative real modes, and all negative real modes exclude from themselves all positive real modes" (Chap. 14 d).

The proof of this principle can be consistently maintained in the material discussion; there is no need, as with the formal proof, to prove each of its corollaries – i.e. the four paradoxical laws of exclusion – separately. One can instead demonstrate the coherent basic relation, from which they are all directly readable. This basic relation is, just as in principle III, the law of totality of real possibility. It has been shown above (Chap. 18 e) how the law of totality forms the background for real possibility's law of division, how from it a striking and astonishingly unequivocal proof of the latter arises. But now the division of possibility is, in fact, the *punctum saliens* of the laws of exclusion. Indeed, it is itself a relation of exclusion, namely, the exclusion of the other underlying relations. Its law is that in the real sphere the possibility of being excludes the possibility of nonbeing, and vice versa.

With the complete meaning of the law of totality having gradually opened up in the preceding investigations, we may now take it as our ground and argue in the following manner. **A** is really possible only if all of its real conditions are actually linked together; but then **A** is simultaneously also really necessary and really actual. The conditions for its possibility are identical to those for its necessity, while also being indirectly conditions of its actuality at the same time.

On the other hand: the nonbeing of **A** is really only possible if not all of its real conditions are linked together as actual conditions; but at the same time **A** is also already really impossible and nonactual. The condition for the possibility of its nonbeing is, therefore, identical to the condition for the impossibility and nonactuality of its being. Since the being-together of all of **A**'s real conditions and the not-being-together of all of **A**'s real conditions are mutually exclusive

(as the components of a contradictory opposition), everything that is conditioned by its being-together must also exclude everything that is conditioned by its not-being-together, and vice versa.

With this summary formulation of exclusion, principle II is already proven. For if, as has been shown, the three positive modes are conditioned by the being-together, and the three negative modes are conditioned by the not-being-together (of that chain of real factors), then all negative real modes are thereby excluded from the positive real modes, and all positive real modes are excluded from the negative real modes. Which is precisely the content of the principle. –

If one wants to separately lift out each of the four paradoxical laws of exclusion from this summary result, then this will only require the same basic relations to be explained in the particular partial relations. But this can result in nothing other than the negative sides of the relations of implication. For the sake of a random test, which a precise reexamination will not want to fail, the explication may at least briefly be suggested.

1. The real conditions of whatever is really nonactual are not all linked together; but they must all be linked together for its real possibility. Whatever is really nonactual is, therefore, also not really possible (first law of exclusion: **NA** excludes **P+**).
2. The real conditions of whatever is really actual are completely linked together. For the real possibility of its nonbeing, however, they must not be completely linked together. Thus, the nonbeing of whatever is really actual is not really possible (second law of exclusion: **A** excludes **P–**).
3. The real conditions of whatever is really possible must already be completely linked together. For its being-nonactual, however, they must not be completely linked together. Thus, whatever is really possible cannot be really nonactual (third law of exclusion: **P+** excludes **NA**).
4. That whose nonbeing is really possible does not have the complete chain of its real conditions "behind it." For its being-actual, however, the chain must be complete. Thus that whose nonbeing is really possible can not be really actual (fourth law of exclusion: **P–** excludes **A**).

c) The Abolition of Indifferences

What principle I finally arrives at is, thus, purely negative and implies only the abolition of the three indifferences given in the formal relation of the modes; as for the modes of the real, none is indifferent toward any of the others (Chap. 14 c).

The other side of this principle is that among the modes of the real there are only two kinds of relations, exclusion and implication. This is now proven with the material proof of principles II and III from the unity of only one basic relation. The possible relations between all real modes are thereby exhausted in the laws of exclusion and implication. There remains simply no room for intermodal indifference. But this may be shown separately for each of the indifferences.

For the indifference of possibility, the material proof has already been directly produced by the law of totality; this indifference is abolished along with partial possibility (see Chap. 18 d).

For the two other indifferences (Chap. 11 a and d), however, the material proof is instructive in a special way. Actuality must be indifferent toward necessity and contingency. But now within real connection no actual thing is "possible" that does not have the totality of its real conditions "behind it." If it does have them behind it, then it is also really necessary. Therefore, it cannot be contingent, and is consequently not indifferent toward necessity and contingency.

Since now only the actual – indeed, also the nonactual, but only in connection with the actual – can be contingent, the abolition of this indifference means the elimination of the contingent from real connection. This is synonymous with the real law of necessity. At the limits of real connection, however, this changes. Here, there is no chain of real conditions that could have the actual "behind it." The abolished indifference is thereby reinstated, and "chance" is separated from necessity. At the same time, however, the meaning of possibility also changes; possibility again becomes indifferent – toward actuality and nonactuality – and thus at the limits of the real principles II and III fall as well, i.e. the whole series of paradoxical intermodal laws.

The nonactual finally involves an indifference toward possibility (of being) and toward impossibility. But now under all circumstances – inside of real connection as well as outside – only the nonactual is that which has no completed totality of real conditions "behind it." If it now stands within a real connection (if it is something nonactual "in it"), then in this real connection it is also really impossible, since it would have to have a completed chain of conditions "behind it" for its real possibility. It is, therefore, not really possible, nor is it indifferent toward possibility and impossibility.

If, however, it stands outside of real connection or at its limits, respectively, then this alters the state of affairs. Here, there is no room for chains of conditions, and therefore, no division between possibility of being and of nonbeing either. But then the nonactual, insofar as it "is" not, must at the same time still "be able" to be; and this being-able-to-be is then a being-able-to-be-contingent. Being-nonactual, therefore, retains its indifference in the boundary relation of the real.

IV The Ontological Law of Determination

24 The Real Law of Actuality

a) Modality and Determination

There can be no doubt that the intermodal lawfulness of the real has led to a universal principle of determination. Such a principle is clearly reflected in the real law of necessity and also indirectly reflected in the real law of possibility, as well as in their negative counterparts (the fourth and fifth paradoxical laws of implication). Indeed, it announces itself already in the abolition of partial possibility, no less than it does in the law of division. One cannot deal with this lawfulness without encountering the law of determination peeking out from behind it at every turn.

Up until this point in the investigation, everything concerning the problem of determination has been deliberately eliminated, even when it directly intruded. This was in the interest of executing a pure modal analysis, which should call upon the constitutive categories of being only insofar as they contribute to comprehending intermodal relations. The problem of determination is not a modal problem, and the category of determination – just like its categorial counterpart, dependency – is not a modal category. It was also not presupposed in the material discussion. But the material discussion of the intermodal laws has, on its part, led to this category, namely, through the fact that real possibility refers to the relation of dependency on which it is based. It should be well understood: this concerns only real possibility, and not real necessity; real necessity would have to be able to be illusory. Only after it has been determined that the conditions of its possibility are at the same time those of its necessity is the now disclosed relation of dependency transmitted to necessity. And from this the other face of dependency is finally revealed, that of real determination.

In modal analysis, one cannot sufficiently guard against the tendency to introduce the problem of determination too early. This is a very metaphysically loaded issue. Wherever it is needlessly put into play, it tarnishes the purity of the investigation, provokes ideological side-taking, and falsifies the results. Such obfuscation and falsification in the issue of the real modes has been widespread since the time of Aristotle. And the issue of determination itself has suffered from this. It could not be clarified, because the field from which it could

have been illuminated – the field of real modality – is itself overburdened and overwhelmed by it.[1]

Accordingly, it is first of all necessary to carry out the modal analysis of the real purely in itself, right up to the end. Once it has led to determinate results, the consequences it bears for the problem of determination can be recognized without detriment to it or to the problem itself. But one thereby enters into an investigation of a quite different kind. Leaving modal analysis, one enters into the categorial analysis of determination as such. This is and remains a foreign element in the modal problem; it can only be an intermezzo in the course of modal analysis.

Nevertheless, its inclusion here is unavoidable. The reason is not only that it imposes itself of its own accord. It is rather that the problem of determination can be dealt with in an ontologically rigorous manner and brought to a resolution only on the grounds of modal analysis. Compared with the weightiness of arguments concerning being, which present themselves here and only here, deliberations that otherwise mediate for and against so-called determinism merely grope around in the dark.

This is a point at which modal analysis proves itself to be crucial for resolving a metaphysical and fundamental problem, because a remarkably high standard of philosophical value arises from it. This value is, by no means, immediately visible in and of itself. It only becomes measurable in the significance of the consequences. The problem of determination is put to the test as an example of the fundamental position that the modal categories claim.

b) The Internal Inconsistency of Consciousness of Actuality

Everyone concedes that everything that is actual must also be possible. One also concedes it for the real, although one knows that here being-possible requires a long chain of conditions that must all be fulfilled in real terms; this is conceded, even though experience teaches us that we seldom are properly informed about these conditions and perhaps never know them in their totality. One does not take exception to the fact that we only know about actuality, without knowing about possibility. One accepts the presence of the chain of conditions, even

1 There is astonishing evidence for this. The best modal investigations, which at least tended toward the ontological, such as those of Leibniz and Wolff, were broken off halfway through. They inevitably switch over to the constitutive problem of determination (in the theory of the principle of sufficient reason); namely, because they had been directed by it from the outset.

without recognizing it, and indeed one relies on its totality (since the presence of the chain depends on it), knowing very well that one cannot comprehend such a totality.

This is generally the case for the consciousness of real possibility. But things play out quite differently for the consciousness of real necessity. One does not easily concede that everything that is actual is also necessary. Perhaps it is most easily accepted for the realm of ideal being, once access to this realm has been found, although what it would mean here is not made clear. At any rate, it is not recognized for real being, i.e. for the world in which we live. Here, as in the case of possibility, one is not satisfied, with the natural observation that a necessity about which one is ignorant could exist just as easily as a possibility about which one is ignorant. One takes exception to knowing about the being-actual without knowing about the being-necessary, although subsequent experience constantly teaches us that what appeared contingent was, in truth, anything but contingent.

Consciousness of actuality, therefore, is inconsistent. It knows not only about the always-present chain of conditions already completed in all actual things, even if it knows them inadequately; but with some consideration, it also does not deny that the completion of this chain of conditions makes the possible simultaneously necessary. Nevertheless, it does not accept the necessity of the very same actual things whose possibility it recognizes and whose completed chain of conditions it consequently presupposes. This is because partial possibility is imputed to them in practical terms, time and time again. But this possibility is disjunctive, and implies no necessity. Thus, consciousness of actuality continuously relies on the "merely possible" that is not actual, and for that very reason it also relies on the "merely actual" that is not necessary.

c) The Real Law of Possibility and the Real Law of Necessity

On the other hand, the real law of possibility says: in the real there is no "merely possible," but rather the possible here is only that which is also actual; and the real law of necessity says: in the real there is no "merely actual," but rather whatever is actual here is also necessary (Chap. 14 f). Both laws rely on the same abolition of partial possibility, and on the same totality of real conditions; for this totality, wherever it is present, means that everything that becomes possible also becomes actual, i.e. becomes actual with necessity (Chap. 19 b, 20 a, 21 b).

There is in the real no free-floating, detached possibility that is not the possibility of an actual thing; just as in the real there is no free-floating,

detached necessity that is not the necessity of an actual thing. In the real, possibility and necessity are just as inseparably attached to each other as they are to actuality. Only conjointly do they bring about results: from the totality of one and the same chain of real conditions. They are not identical, although their conditions are. For that reason, they cannot appear without each other.

The two real laws are not only rooted in one and the same fundamental relation, they also express one and the same real relation. This conclusion cannot be drawn from a purely modal consideration. But it emerges irrefutably as soon as the relation of the chain of conditions itself to its result is targeted behind the diversity of interpenetrating modes.

The "real law of possibility" may thus be expressed as follows: from a complete collocation of real circumstances, only one single, real thing, determinate from all angles, can result; and this real thing cannot turn out any differently than how it actually turns out. Or generally: in the connection of the real, nothing can be other than it is, and nothing can happen other than what happens. Something other than whatever is may very well become, but nothing other than whatever "becomes" can become. At another time, some other thing is really possible, but from a different collocation of real circumstances; and even this other thing cannot turn out any differently than the way that it turns out.

One now becomes wary of how, for all intents and purposes, this formulation means the same thing as the "real law of necessity." It reveals the same relation, only from a different angle. That something cannot be any different than it is means that it is "necessary" for it to be as it is. But that the formulation adheres to the being-so of the real, and not to the being-there (like the purely modal formulations) makes absolutely no difference to the matter. The distinction between being-so and being-there has proven itself to be highly relative and inessential for the basic ontological problem.[2]

d) The Absorption of Both Laws into the Real Law of Actuality

The real law of possibility and the real law of necessity join together in a single ontological law that can be called the "real law of actuality." This law expresses

2 Compare to this: *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, Chap. 18 and 19; particularly what is said about the "continuously shifting identity of being-there and being-so in the context of being as a whole."

a complex relation that may be understood from more than one angle. In connection with modal analysis, it is easiest to formulate the following:

> Possibility and necessity are dependent in the real sphere. Here, there is neither a "merely possible" nor a "merely necessary," but only the actual. The being-actual of this actual, however, consists of its simultaneously being-possible and being-necessary

Real actuality is, therefore, the full permeation of real possibility and real necessity. It is nothing other than their overlapping relation. It is the peculiarity of real being that in it the being-actual and being-necessary of a thing not only are never separated, and never exist without each other, but also are never found outside of the actual – namely, the same actual whose being-possible and being-necessary they are. And it is just as much a peculiarity of real being that in it the actual is not only never found to be without total possibility and necessity, but also never without the complete, mutual permeation of both. To which it must again be added: within the limits of the real – for at its limits, as well as in the real world as a whole, this changes.

The "real law of actuality" consequently expresses the totality of all intermodal laws of the real. And with this it presents the ontological determination of the ways of being of the real, insofar as these laws can conceive them. The real – understood within its limits and from the structure of its connections – is the sphere of the complete permeation of possibility and necessity. Their overlapping relation is the ontological character of real actuality.

The best evidence for this is the disappearance of possibility and necessity in real actuality – a disappearance that does not mean their abolition, but only their withdrawal or concealment from consciousness of reality. That is to say, both possibility and necessity only emerge independently where they emerge in isolation, i.e. where they do not overlap with each other. In the real, this separation does not occur, although it clearly does in knowledge, and generally in the consciousness of the real, in everyday life just as well as in the sciences. That there is a consciousness of possibility without a consciousness of necessity is a well-known fact; all human contemplation of the future has this form. Partial possibility is involved in it, and that is why necessity remains behind possibility in this consciousness of possibility. One then says: the stone "can" roll, even if it does not "have to" roll. Possibility is preponderant, disturbing the balance of the relational modes. But by this one does not mean real possibility. And, thus, both real possibility and real necessity remain concealed. Consciousness of reality is incomplete.

It is a lesser known fact that there is also a consciousness of necessity without a consciousness of possibility. However, one does not have to look far for it.

In the sciences, knowledge of law serves as a cornerstone for all understanding. Lawfulness always expresses a kind of necessity. It can usually be comprehended in the form of "if – then." The sense of this form is the inevitability of the consequence if its condition is fulfilled. But whether there is a case in which it is fulfilled, and whether in general, among given real relations, such a case is possible is not included in the knowledge of law as such. Here, therefore, possibility remains behind necessity in the epistemological situation. Necessity is preponderant, and the balance of possibility and necessity is disrupted. For that very reason, such necessity is not real necessity; it is not based on the totality of real conditions. Consciousness of reality is incomplete, even as an exact consciousness of law. Even in consciousness, the real law of actuality is not in force. In consciousness, the relational modes do not overlap with each other. For that reason, they emerge separately in knowledge. They do not disappear in their result. They are not the real modes. And that is exactly why, in consciousness of actuality, true real possibility and real necessity are hidden by their result.

This relation becomes quite clear in the fact that in everyday life our consciousness of actuality stands entirely independent of all consciousness of possibility and necessity, being even detached from it to some extent. The givenness of facts (real actual things) is direct; it does not take a detour via the real conditions of facts, i.e. not via the modal components of actuality, possibility and necessity. It leaps over the latter, standing right at the result. To it corresponds the proper source of knowledge, from which the aposterioristic is drawn, this being the experience generated in the individual case, against which possibility and necessity of the same thing can be recognized only with the help of another aprioristic kind of knowledge.

For consciousness, therefore, the real actual appears largely detached from the series of its conditions; real possibility and real necessity are not given along with it in its givenness. But that such a detached appearance is possible, has its ontological ground in the fact that in real actuality, itself, possibility and necessity have "disappeared." This kind of being-disappeared does not mean being-annihilated – since with its annihilation, actuality would also fall away – but rather only a "being abolished" in the result, and therefore, in fact, its being contained and "being maintained" in the result.

In the connection of events, the real actual always has its complete chain of conditions "behind it." And this means that it has its real possibility and real necessity – as its modal components – "behind it." In it, these two modal components are brought into balance, both being made indifferent and being mutually paralyzed. Therefore, they do not emerge from it.

For this reason, the real actual can appear to be actual without the possibility and necessity presupposed and maintained in it having appeared. It can be

given without their being given along with it. And since it is generally given in such a detached manner, it appears to empirical consciousness as contingent.

e) The Modal Construction of the Real Process

The real law of actuality, therefore, conflicts with the unreflective consciousness of actuality. This unreflective consciousness knows nothing of it, and its ignorance is based on the relation of "being made indifferent," which is expressed by the law; since the "disappearance" of the relational modes behind the absolute mode rests on this relation. This "being made indifferent," itself, is the veiling of the chain of conditions for consciousness.

Thus, the real law of actuality is simultaneously its own veiling for consciousness. Consciousness knows only the continually stable cohesion of the real amidst all the volatility of the stream, the balanced composure of self-sustaining equilibrium, finding it even in the ephemeral stage of a process; and it experiences it as the absolute hardness and decidedness of the real. This composure has nothing to do with standing still; the real actual consists altogether in process. Its way of being is the calm decidedness of events, themselves, which is total and complete at each point in time. The indeterminateness of the "merely possible," its fluctuating and wavering, lies deep beneath real becoming; the restless surging of unfulfilled necessity (as we recognize it in the Ought-to-Be) is far above it. What the real actual has "behind it" is always clear determinate possibility, and at the same time, fulfilled necessity. Just as there is no indeterminateness marching in lockstep with real events, there is no "Ought" arising from them either. Both of these only begin at the highest levels of the real (in spiritual being) where powers from outside the real come into play in the real process, but this belongs to a very specific group of problems and no longer concerns the general essence of real actuality.

Like the first two real laws, the real law of actuality is not in itself evident, and can only indirectly be brought to light. In itself, it is and remains paradoxical. Its formulation is a highly synthetic principle that can be recognized only in the essence of the real, and not in the general essence of the modes. Just as, in themselves, the possible is not actual and the actual is not necessary, so too is the mutual permeation and overlapping of possibility and necessity not in itself actuality. Possibility, like necessity, results only from the identity of real conditions. It was, therefore, important to make clear that there are also places where they do not coincide and do not interpenetrate (as is the case in consciousness of reality). That is to say, the actual in itself does not need to be conditioned. But, certainly, this is the case for the real actual in its

ontological sphere and in its way of being. In a self-contained sphere, in which everything is becoming throughout – in which, moreover, at every moment a determinate collocation of circumstances, on which further events depend, is gathered together – in such a sphere, the actual is conditioned at all times. For the actual must at least be "possible." And it is only possible in such a sphere, if in the particular collocation of circumstances the conditions of its possibility are completely linked together. But if these conditions are linked together, then it is also necessary.

The real actual is, therefore, only conditioned as long as it is preconditioned by its real possibility. This real possibility depends on the chain of conditions. And because the chain of conditions is identical for possibility and necessity, it is also at the same time conditioned insofar as its real necessity is a precondition for it. Thus, the actuality of a real thing is conditioned not by itself, but by its connectedness to the relational modes. And since according to the basic modal law (Chap. 7) the relationality of these modes consists in a double relativity to actuality as the fundamental mode, within its sphere, the real actual is always bound to another real actual as its condition.

The mode of this bond is the shared relationality of possibility and necessity. The complete permeation of real possibility and real necessity in the real actual is nothing other than the connectedness of actual to actual that is peculiar to the whole real sphere. The "external relativity" of possibility and necessity links the actual backwards to another actual – to that, "on the grounds" of which, it is at the same time possible and necessary – and the "internal relativity" links it forwards – to that whose actuality, through its existence as a condition, becomes at the same time really possible and really necessary.

In this modal construction of the real process, everything that becomes actual is made possible, bit by bit, by the preceding actual, and can become from it nothing other than what it becomes. Step by step, the real linkage of the actual proceeds, by way of total possibility and necessity. And, step by step, these two modes become indifferent in their total permeation, and have no independence. They invariably disappear into the newly appearing actual.

25 Real Actuality and Real Determination

a) Skewed and One-Sided Concepts of Determination

With this discussion, the real ontological problem of determination has become ripe for decision. Indeed, in it the first decisions have already been made;

and – this is the underlying value in it – without considering or even making any reference to the metaphysical-ideological ramifications. The ontological, universal law of real determination is nothing other than the constitutive flip side of that modal law in which the interwoven, intermodal relations of the real all converge: the real law of actuality.

The content of this law of determination is clearly determined and delimited by the specified relation. To ascertain this relation is of the greatest importance. The old controversial question of determinism and indeterminism – the problem of freedom being unavoidably annexed to it – has brought along with it the fact that according to speculative prejudices something quite different is understood as the determinacy of the real – indeed, this is inevitably the case – due to the inertia of traditional habits of thought. In most cases, far too much has been considered to be subsumed under it, and much that is too specific. Thus arises the error that afterwards the specific is again generalized. Moreover, meanings are found that are too general by nature, watering down the problem.

Concerning this, the following points should first of all be noted.

1. It is not a matter of the popularized determinism found in "providence" and predetermination (predestination) that lets real events be directed from the outside, namely, by a power standing outside or above them that bears no similarity to the powers holding sway within them. Toward such determinism, the law of determination of the real is utterly indifferent.
2. It is also not a matter of another form of determination of the world "from an absolute principle of the world" ["*aus einem Weltgrunde*"], however this may be conceived (whether rational or irrational, god-like or brutal). A principle of the world stands outside of the world. The law of determination of the real, on the other hand, concerns only the connectedness of the world in itself. It basically leaves open the question of an absolute principle of the world.
3. It is generally not a matter of determination from "one" source, or from the unity of a "first cause" (unity of determination), regardless of whether the cause lies inside or outside the world; therefore, it is also not a matter of a "mathematical consequence" from the unity of a "substance," even if this substance is equated with the world as a whole. Real determination is completely indifferent toward the unity or multiplicity of its sources. It does not touch on the question of its source in the least. This transcends the competency of the law. Every source of determination is, rather, a limit of determination. But at its limit all determination merges into the absence of determination.

4. It is not a matter of final determinism – regardless of whether it would be from one final aim or from a multiplicity of particular aims. The determination of the real in certain strata of being (the highest) may, in fact, take on the form of purposeful activity; in any case, its manifestation in this form stems only from the particular nature of the ontological stratum (e.g. of spiritual being), and not from its own essence. For that reason, it does not bear this form throughout the entire world. Determination as such is not purposeful activity. This is only a special form in it. If we push aside its other mistakes, teleological thinking in metaphysics is at least a misunderstanding of the actual ontological problem of determination.
5. It is also not a matter of causal determinism, regardless of whether this would be from one or many causes. Causality is the type of determination involved in physical-material being; indeed, it is involved in the lowest stratum of the real, and is therefore an elementary form of determination that recurs in the higher strata, but not without modification, and not without transformation by higher types of determination. If reality were only "thingliness," then the autocracy of causality in the real would surely be conceivable; but reality is the common way of being that belongs to organic, mental, and spiritual being; its determination cannot, therefore, arise solely in that of physical processes. The higher strata of the real have their own higher forms of determination. The law of determination is a universal law, and the causal law is a special case that falls under it. The causal law is not proven by it either, nor can it be proven from it alone. A metaphysical causal determinism is just as much a misunderstanding of the ontological problem of determination as a metaphysical final determinism.

b) More Precise Demarcation of the Ontological Problem of Determination

After having warded off the most blatant misunderstandings, it is now possible to more precisely delimit the problem. To do so, the following factors are decisive.

1. It is not a matter of a unitary determinism of the whole world (of which the two forms cited just now are only a special case, with still other forms being conceivable). All real determination must not be assumed to have one and the same type of form. Every stratum of the real, on the contrary, may easily be assumed to have its own particular type of determination. The law of determination does not, however, concern the diversity of these types.

It is indifferent toward them. It expresses only the universal principle that in general all of the real is determined, regardless of stratum. It is consequently indifferent, even toward the unity and multiplicity of the types of nexus. The multiplicity of types comes not from it, but from the categorical stratification of the real.

2. It is not generally a matter of actual determinism either. Whether a universal law of determination that prescribes no determinate type of dependency can grow into a determinism is still very much in question. But the deciding of the question does not at all depend on the universal law as such, but on the particular relation of the types of determination and, in the final analysis, on the particular relation of the ontological strata whose relative independence sets a limit to all dependency. Thus, for the time being, the law of determination has no bearing at all on the problem of freedom.
3. On the other hand, the principle of real determination must not be taken too far. Not every determination is a real determination. Thus, for example, every kind of determination proceeds from principles – being a principle means to determine a *concretum* – but such determination is not meant here. Real determination plays out in another dimension, it moves wholly at the level of the *concretum*. It connects homogeneous components such as the real with the real, and not the real with its principles (or laws). In all strata, it has the form of a nexus.
4. It is also not a matter of logical determination, or of something comparable to it; therefore, it is also not a matter of mere essential determination, connecting entities in the ideal sphere of being. There is the one as well as the other – just as there is real determination. But they belong to different spheres, and are of different structural types. They depend on the intermodal relations of their spheres, which are different from those of the real modes.
5. Therefore, in the law of real determination, it is not a matter of the "principle of sufficient reason," either. This principle is not proper to the real sphere alone, but rather is common to all spheres. It is a general law, but also a flimsier and more impoverished law than the law of real determination. Only a law of determination according to scope would coincide with it. Such a law would be read from the relation of the modes of all spheres and not from the relation of the real modes alone. But whether the modes of other spheres demonstrate analogous intermodal relations is, at present, still in question. In contrast, the particular principle of "real ground" aligns quite nicely with the law of real determination. But real ground is no less different from essential ground, from logical ground, and from

epistemological ground than real determination is from the corresponding types of determination.[3]

c) The Sufficiency of Real Ground as Completeness of Conditions

The following will tie in with the last of these points. Ground and determination are not one and the same. They are complementary aspects of one and the same relation. "Determination" is the relation of ground and consequence, namely, the relation that is characterized by reason; the relation of "dependency" is characterized by consequence. In this relation, the "ground" itself is the determining thing, while the "consequence" is the determined (dependent) thing.

Thus, for the real sphere the "law" of real determination is synonymous with the "principle" of real ground; it merely tackles the relation from a different angle – from that of its other aspects. This is made clearly visible if one expresses both laws plainly as judgments while observing the restrictions listed above. In which case they read as follows: all of the real is determined by the real; and: all of the real has its ground in the real. The two principles are one and the same law. To have a ground is the same as to be determined. To be a ground is the same as to be determining.

Leibniz, who first stated this law, gave it the more precise designation "*principium rationis sufficientis*," "principle of sufficient reason." The "sufficiency" in this formulation is, no doubt, pleonastic; because a true reason is, of course, a sufficient one. An insufficient reason would not bring about the consequence. But it is certainly also apparent from Leibniz's formulation that the "sufficiency" is essential to the reason. It is directly in it that the power of determination lies. And what becomes far more interesting at this point is that in it there also clearly emerges the connection that real ground has with the real law of actuality and with the whole modal lawfulness of the real.

The "real law of actuality" says that within the real sphere, possibility and necessity "coincide" in all actual things. They are present in the real actuality of a thing as modal moments that have been "rendered indifferent" and therefore

3 In his work on the *Fourfold Principle of Sufficient Reason*, Schopenhauer saw very accurately this difference in spheres. The only issue being that the way he describes "reason of becoming" is surely too narrow for real reason. Real determination does not only concern becoming, especially in the higher strata of the real. Schopenhauer had in mind only the "cause" as real reason. This was his error. Causality is only the lowest type of real determination. The higher strata of the real have other types, with other forms of real reason corresponding to them.

disappear behind it. Being-actual has them "behind it," since it has the total chain of real conditions "behind it." Once complete, this chain makes it really possible, and at the same time also already really necessary. The "identity" of the conditions of its necessity with those of its possibility constitutes the peculiarity found in it that at any given time the real actual "cannot" be other than it "is" – that it may very well "become" other than it "is," but it cannot "become" other than what it "becomes."

Christian Wolff affirmed the formula for real ground: "*ratio sufficiens, cur potius sit quam non sit*." Leibniz had also occasionally used the comparative *potius*. But this comparative remains ontologically objectionable. It is not a matter of "being rather than not-being," but of "being, and not not-being." If this remnant of indeterminateness is replaced by the decidedness characteristic of the real, then being the ground for a real thing means indirectly "being sufficient" for another real thing, and that the latter "is," rather than "is not;" or in terms of its being-so, it means "being sufficient" for it to be so, as it is and not otherwise. But this is the same as what produced the real law of actuality: the chain of conditions of a real thing accounts for the fact that it cannot be other than it is.

One readily sees that the "sufficiency" of the real ground is the same as the completeness or "totality" of the real conditions. The real actual is therefore really necessary, because it must, in every sense, be really possible; it is continuously determined, because the chain of conditions, if it is to be "sufficient" for its possibility – i.e. if it is completely linked together – is also "sufficient" for its necessity. Thus, the chain of conditions is at the same time its "sufficient real ground," which allows neither its nonbeing nor its being-otherwise.

This formulation now expresses with full clarity the "law of real determination" – and respectively, the "law of real ground." But the remarkable thing is that it expresses the same thing as does the "real law of actuality." It is no accident that the modal wording and the constitutive wording running parallel to it express one and the same real relation of complete dependency. Both laws convey the same continuous real connection: at every stage of the real process, only "one" determinate real is possible "on the grounds" of the present real situation in that process, namely, that which in it becomes actual. The range of the "many possibilities" is, therefore, abolished. It is, in truth, only ever the possible that is also necessary; and this is always that which is actual.

The difference between the two laws is only a categorial one. The real law of actuality is the modal side of the same continuous relation of dependency whose constitutive side is the law of real determination. And since everything structural-constitutive now has its ontological mode, and all modality is only a constitutively formed and coined ontological mode, the identity of the real law of actuality itself in both laws is absolutely justified, although its categorial form is different.

d) Toward the Overlapping Relation of the Two Laws

For the factor of sufficiency, which is at the crux of this relation, the connection of condition and ground plays a decisive role. Indeed, the relation of the two laws can be made clear directly through it.

That is to say, a condition as such is by no means a sufficient ground, but a totality of conditions can be. The individual condition is merely a partial aspect of the sufficient reason, as even modally it means only a partial possibility, which is not real possibility. The individual condition is also a determinant, a real factor in the becoming-actual of a thing, but not independently, and only in association with all partial conditions. A determinate content-related factor of the conditioned surely depends on it, but only as long as the conditioned comes about through the whole of the completed chain of conditions. The individual condition, therefore, only determines in the totality of conditions. And this means that it only determines in association with a sufficient ground.

This can also be expressed as follows: the sufficient ground as the totality of conditions is, for its part, the condition of their being conditions. A condition is something only as long as there is something that it conditions; but this something does not come about without the totality of conditions. Thus, condition and ground in the relation of real determination stand in mutual dependency and do not occur without each other. What connects them is precisely that which makes the condition into a determinant (into a factor, and therefore, more than ever before, into a condition) and which also makes the ground into a sufficient ground: the completeness of the factors in the particular real situation. The power of determination of real ground, however, lies in its sufficiency, and the power of determination of the condition lies in its being included in the totality of conditions. That this is the case implies the material relation that underlies the real law of actuality: as long as even one link is missing from the chain of conditions, **A** is not yet really possible; but if the chain is complete, then **A** is already really necessary, and is therefore really actual. Necessity lies in the sufficiency of the totality.

If the modal formulation is connected with the constitutive formulation, then the law says: the chain of conditions through which something becomes really possible is at the same time the "sufficient ground" for its real actuality. Thus, in the real nothing is possible that does not have its sufficient ground in real connection itself. This is the principle of real ground. And since the conditions – corresponding to the "external relativity" of the relational modes – must, on their part, have real actuality, the principle can be fully presented as follows: there is, in the real, nothing possible that does not have its sufficient ground in another real actual thing. Or as expressed by the law of

determination: all of the real is completely determined by the real. Whatever is not completely determined by the real is not really possible; it is, therefore, really impossible, and necessarily remains unreal.

The last addendum is not superfluous, although it says the same thing. In a real process, there are at all times countless individual factors which, if they were brought into another association of real circumstances, would make possible a real that is different from the real which becomes actual under the given circumstances. In this sense, a variety of partial possibilities always exists. However, if no power in the world can make real circumstances other than what they are, once they have come into being, then all these partial possibilities hang in the air. The "if" and the "however" separate them from reality. The totality of conditions in which the individual condition initially becomes a determining one is missing.

Following the law of determination back to the real law of actuality has led beyond the latter and back to the "totality of conditions." This implies that the real conditions of possibility are, at the same time, real conditions of necessity. If this is understood as the grounds of the whole consideration, then the law of real determination can be put into an even simpler form: for every existing real thing, the totality of its conditions is its sufficient real ground.

In this formulation, the modal factors are entirely detached from the constitutive ones. In precisely this way, of course, the formulation conceals the synthetic and paradoxical aspects of the law that vividly emerge in the real law of actuality. This is not to its advantage. One must only recall that the indispensability of the conditions lies only in the fact that they are conditions of "possibility." As conditions of necessity – and respectively, as factors of ground – they would be anything but indispensible. For it is quite conceivable that an actual would not be necessary, and respectively, would have no sufficient ground. But it is inconceivable that an actual would not be possible. Real possibility exists only "based on the ground" provided by a chain of real conditions, which is complete right up to the very last. And only because this chain makes the possible at the same time necessary does the real have sufficient ground, from which it is completely determined and cannot be other than it is.

In the same way, this connection can be made clear without the use of modal concepts, if the "external relativity" of possibility is taken along with it and transposed with it into the constitutive. In which case, the law of real determination can be formulated as follows: every real thing is unequivocally determined by those other real things that "condition" it; as the conditioned result of these conditions, it cannot be other than it is. Here, the possibility in conditionality is translated into the necessity in determination; but the external relativity of both to actuality is dissolved into one such relativity to the particular real situation.

e) The Law of Determination's Ability to be Proven from the Real's Intermodal Lawfulness

The line of thought just employed shows that the way in which the law of determination leads back to the real law of actuality also means a proof of the former from the intermodal lawfulness of the real. In order to avoid misunderstandings, the course taken by this proof may be once more summarized here in its shortest form.

Whatever is really actual must at least be really possible. It is really possible only on the grounds of the completed chain of its real conditions. On the grounds of this chain, however, it is also already really necessary, and therefore cannot be other than it is. It is unequivocally determined by it. The chain of conditions is its sufficient ground.

This proof may be considered strong or weak – its verification can be sought in quite different contexts – but in any case, it is the only possible proof that can be produced for the law of real determination. It is based entirely on the intermodal relations of the real, and especially on the three positive paradoxical laws of implication. And since these all trace back to the "law of totality of real possibility" – as well as to its complementary principle, the "identity of real conditions" – the whole weight of the proof rests on these two items (see Chap. 18 d and 19 b).

That metaphysics, despite its keen interest in the problem of determination, has not given in to this proof – it may be that the ancient Megarics would have had it – lies only in the fact that an actual modal analysis of the real has been missing. In modal analysis lies the key to the problem of determination and of sufficient ground.[4]

In fact, there is still only Christian Wolff's attempt to prove the *principium rationis sufficientis* from the principle of contradiction. The misguided nature of this initial attempt – involving the grotesque arrogance of rationalism and the presumption that a real law can be proven from a logical, formal one – was already exposed in the time of Crusius[5] and others, making it unworthy of any further mention.

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4 One can find initial steps taken toward developing a modal proof in Alexius Meinong's *Zum Erweise des allgemeinen Kausalgesetzes*, Vienna 1918 (*Sitzungsber. d. Akad. d. Wissensch. in Wien*). The investigation is conducted with great acuity, although it is not set up in the right manner. 1. It does not distinguish between logical modes and real modes, thus bringing in an amphibolous concept of possibility; and 2. It attempts to prove too much, namely, not the universal law of determination, but the causal law (which modally is not possible). Therefore, in truth, it proves nothing at all.

5 [Translator's note]: Christian August Crusius (1715–75), German philosopher and theologian.

But what was concealed behind the mistaken argument, and what Wolff's contemporaries and successors failed to see, was indeed something far more serious. In Wolffian ontology it is not where one would look for it, i.e. not in the section concerning the *ratio sufficiens*, but rather in the chapters *de determinatio et indeterminato* and *de necessario et contengente*. That is to say, Wolff's actual course of deliberation is grounded on a syllogism whose middle term is *determinatio*. But the double meaning of determinateness (in itself) and determinateness (by something else) is embedded directly in this concept. Since "all that is" is determinate, and all determination is determined by something, "all that is" must have its determinant behind it, and must therefore have its sufficient ground. This is a blatant *quaternio terminorum*, and the result is obtained by fraud.

But this is a fallacy that belongs more to the surface. The true motive behind the error is not to be grasped in this way. That is, Wolff proceeded from modal concepts – in accordance with Leibniz' procedure – putting him clearly on the right path. His concept of determination led him directly to *necessitas*, and this was by no means limited to essential necessity. It directly included the series of real circumstances in themselves. In any case, he did not work through the real relation that makes the ground for a thing sufficient. On the one hand, his concept of real necessity flowed much too quickly into causality, and the series of real circumstances suddenly assumed the form of a causal chain. On the other hand, his concept of *necessitas* remained entrenched in the traditional half measure: it was not correlated with a coequal concept of real possibility. Wolff understood the *possibile* logically as well as ontologically only in the sense of disjunctive possibility and partial possibility.

Thus, a peculiar system of half-understood, half-misunderstood modal lawfulness of the real took shape in his ontology. He was familiar with the real law of necessity, and stated it unequivocally,[6] but he did not know the real law of possibility; and he did not realize that the former could not exist on its own, at all. He let all of the actual be necessary, but at the same time he let whatever is not actual be possible (i.e. really possible). Thus, the absurdity came forth that one and the same actual thing does not exclude the possibility of its being-otherwise but nevertheless ought to include the necessity of its being-so-and-not-otherwise.

A dim consciousness of this inconsistency can still be felt in the indeterminateness of the comparative formulation "*cur potius sit quam non sit*." A real

6 Christian Wolff, *Philosophia prima*. p. 288. "Quodlibet, dum est, necessario est."

ground correlated to mere partial possibility was, in fact, only sufficient for a "being likely," and not for a strict having-to-be.

26 Universal Real Determination and Particular Types of Real Nexuses

a) Real Strata and Types of Real Determination

The problem of determination is, of course, not exhausted with the law of real determination. Nothing is thereby determined about the other spheres, nor is the particular form of determination within the real touched on. In the former respect, the intermodal laws of the other spheres have to be decided; in the latter, however, the modal analysis is generally incompetent, and only the particular theory of the individual ontological strata's categories can decide. Each stratum has its particular category of determination, i.e. the particular form of continuous connectedness and dependency holding sway in it, and this is only to be gained analytically in each stratum from the particular nature of real forms and real processes. But this is a quite different task from the proof of the universal law of real determination.

This law says only that, in general, all of the real is determined by the real. Thus, if the real world is stratified, then this means only that in each stratum of the real world some continuous determination exists, and thus, that in each stratum every particular event and every entity is determined by real relations, regardless of whether these belong to the same or to different strata. It follows neither that each stratum has its own particular type of determination, nor that all strata have the same type of determination.

The law of real determination is indifferent toward the unity or diversity of the form of determination. It is simply a fundamental category – or elementary category – of the real. That in fact the individual strata of being are determinatively differentiated and relatively independent does not follow from it, but rather from the categorial lawfulness of stratification.[7] But even from this lawfulness, the particular nature of the types of determination is not to be inferred;

7 This lawfulness is dealt with in detail in the next volume. It belongs to the general theory of categories. See, "Kategoriale Gesetze" (*Philosophischer Anzeiger* I. 2, Bonn, 1926), p. 233 f., as well as *Aufbau der realen Welt* (Berlin 1940), Chap. 42–61.

only the particular categorial nature of the strata, themselves, is to be inferred. For in point of fact, the nature of each stratum is autonomous.

This is the reason why one must be so on guard against rashly bringing together the law of real determination and the law of causality. Causality is the best-known form of real determination, and this is because it is the lowest and simplest: the form of continuous connectedness in the lowest real stratum, the stratum of the physical-material. If the law of determination is equated with the law of causality, then the latter is transferred to all of the higher strata of the real – to organic, mental, personal-spiritual, social, and historical being – and the tendency to understand these ontological fields mechanistically creeps in. They are, therefore, violated from the outset.

In truth, each of these ontological strata has its own special law of determination. For the most part, we do not know the higher types of determination, or we have only blurred perceptions of them. Only in the field of spirit – especially in practical action – are we familiar with a second type of determination, namely, final determination. And even with this type of determination, there still remains the very same danger of overstepping the bounds. One may, for example, be inclined to understand organic life teleologically, or perhaps even to understand the historical process in this way. Numerous theories have taken this path, and still take it even today. They are stillborn theories, confirmed neither by facts nor by categorial analysis. The nexus of historical events is obviously a very complicated one, with the purposeful activity of human beings constituting only one aspect of it. And the organic nexus is obviously a different one, even though its results resemble those of the final nexus, being difficult to distinguish from them. Here, all investigations are still only in their beginnings.

In any case, it is a mistake here, as well as in the field of a higher ontological stratum, for one to believe that there is an exclusive choice between causality and finality – as if there were only these two. Such a belief is based merely on the fact that these two are the only well-known types of real nexus. On the contrary, one would have to expect *a priori*, even if not many facts speak in its favor, that each ontological stratum has its particular category of determination, as indeed each has as its own particular categories of form and law.

b) The Mutual Relation of Different Types of Determination

Determinate rules apply to the superimposition of different types of determination in the stratified real world. These are important for understanding certain consequences, and so they must be added here, although they are not yet able to

be provided with the necessary substantiation at this point. The substantiation lies in the categorial laws.

1. In all strata of the real, determination has the form of "nexus," i.e. an intertwining of the real with the real, which traverses the ontological stratum, leaving nothing in it untouched. This basic form is guaranteed by the universal law of real determination. For the product of its rootedness in the intermodal laws is that the "external relativity" of the relational modes is relative to the real actual, not to something heterogeneous or external to the real (not to mere essences and principles). In the real, the actual is possible and necessary only on the grounds of the actual; or: all of the real is determined by the real, for it is conditioned by the real. Continuous determination of the real by the real, however, necessarily leads to a further real; i.e. it has the form of nexus, whether we look at it backwards or forwards. What limits are set to the nexus is a question of its particular form. Not every kind of nexus is fundamentally infinite (and therefore antinomic in its initial components) like the causal nexus.
2. There is no stratification of "that which is" that is not connected to the dependency of all strata. Categorial dependency holds sway only upwards from lower to higher stratum, and not vice versa. This means, for the stratification of the types of determination, that they do not exist indifferently next to each other; rather, the higher types are conditioned by the lower, which are contained in them as subordinate aspects, respectively. But this does not affect the particular nature or independence of the higher type. It is its *novum*, its transformation of the lower. The exact structure of determination that originates in this way is, of course, difficult to specify, since knowledge cannot directly access the middle ranks in the types of stratification.
3. The individual strata are determinatively decided. Each stratum is also saturated by the real nexus that governs it. It is determined by it throughout. But if the higher types of real nexus contain the lower as their aspects, and thus are conditioned by them from the inside out, then this determinative decidedness of ontological strata within the whole of the real world means only a decidedness running "upwards," and not "downwards;" thus, only toward the higher stratum, and not lower. The higher stratum is always based on the lower, but the lower is not based on the higher. In the higher real nexus, many of the lower strata are, therefore, always involved, indeed, the whole series of lower strata is. It itself is structurally open to the lower strata, although it preserves its autonomy in relation to them.

4. Furthermore, this means that the whole of the real world, despite being divided into a multiplicity of strata – each having its own particular forms of real nexus – nevertheless does not determinatively fall apart, but remains a cohesive whole. This determinative wholeness of the world corresponds exactly to what the universal law of real determination requires. It represents the continuous connectedness of all real things with each other in the multiplicity of forms of determination.

c) The Passage Generally Taken by the Real Nexus through its Particularizations

To these general points of view, which all concern stratification, pertain two particular factors that only concern the interlocking of different types of determination.

1. Each individual ontological stratum is saturated by its particular real nexus (and the lower type of nexus that is presupposed in it), but it does not thereby exclude an increase in determination – if there is such a thing. It is, therefore, closed to the higher stratum and its nexus in the sense that it does not require it and rightly exists completely without it, but it does not therefore exclude its involvement in its realm. Thus, the organic process encroaches downward into the existence of inorganic nature (e.g. the growth of plants in the formation of land and climate); spiritual being in the form of purposeful willing and acting extends downward to the naturally purposeless (e.g. anywhere that human beings utilize given natural forces for their own purposes). The spirit can do this everywhere that the requisite real conditions are given independently of it, and if one adds to these the conditions coming from it, itself (insight, setting a purpose, choosing a means, etc.), then the chain of conditions becomes complete, and whatever is made possible by it simultaneously becomes necessary.

   The universal law of determination, therefore, runs completely through not only a stratum of being, but also the superimposition of the strata; and not only upwards within the limits of categorial dependency, but also unrestrictedly downwards under given conditions. The involvement of the higher nexus in the lower is not thwarted by the categorial dependency of the higher on the lower, but is only limited by it.
2. Despite being divided into strata, each having its own nexus, the real world is nevertheless determinatively homogeneous. This means: it is not only the unity of a thoroughly determined whole, but also qualitatively a cohesion of

continuous chains in every direction, spanning over the distance between strata. For the real possibility of an actual thing that belongs to a determinate stratum, it makes no difference over which and how many strata the chain of conditions on which it is based extends. With any given distribution of the components, there is always the same completeness of the chain that makes the really possible also really necessary. Or, expressed constitutively, there is always the same conditionality on all sides, spanning the entire breadth of an existing real situation, which at the same times constitutes the sufficient reason of that which becomes.

Regardless of the regional particularization of the nexus, the real connection is still basically a unique, always complete connection of determination in which everything that coexists and clashes then comes together as only it "can" come together. All particularizations of the real nexus remain within this basic form. The *nexus realis* is generally pervasive. And this is exactly what the law of real determination says.

d) Real Determination and Real Freedom

The problem of freedom is metaphysically so closely related to the problem of determination that it cannot be arbitrarily separated from the latter. Nothing is changed here by the fact that its content – it concerns human beings, will, decision, and responsibility – belongs to a quite different connection of problems. Ethics, if it wants to justify freedom of the will, cannot do anything other than fall back on the foundations of universal real determination. Ethics has done this mostly in the way that it seeks to break through the latter, and it always thereby gets itself into the greatest predicament, because it proceeds from the assumption that only in an indeterministic real world can a free will exist.

It is, therefore, necessary at this point to show how the relation of continuous real determination and freedom appears ontologically. It can at least be made clear on the grounds of what has been said that the fear of "determinism" is unfounded, and that only a critically clarified concept of freedom is required to unite the autonomy of human decisions of the will with the universal law of real determination. Everything here depends on freedom being understood not in the sense of indeterminateness (negative freedom), but in the sense of self-determination of the human will – as "freedom in a positive sense," according to Kant – since "free will" is then not the indeterminate or undecided, but the independent, self-deciding will.

If freedom is self-determination, then it does not, from the outset, stand in opposition to determination, but is itself a kind of determination. It thereby

moves into the series of forms of real determination that cascade upwards [*überhöhende Formen*]. If there is now a stratification of forms of determination in the unity of the real world, then they must be in a continuous transformative relation, whereby the higher form is always conditioned by the lower, but is not determinate in its particular nature. The lower is always only a partial condition of its structure and of its holding sway in the higher stratum, but is not its sufficient ground. This is not contradictory to the law of real determination, and not to the real law of actuality either. These are only real laws; they concern only the relation of the real to the real, and not the relation of categorially different forms of determination.

The higher nexus is, in many of its structural elements, dependent on the lower, but is autonomous in its particular nature (its categorial *novum*). The chain of conditions of a real thing in the higher stratum contains an ample number of components from the lower strata; but they are only partial aspects of it, and therefore do not make its real possibility complete; they make it, in fact, neither necessary nor actual. The chain becomes complete only through the addition of real components of its own stratum. But these are under a categorially different kind of determination. Structurally, they belong to the higher real nexus itself, and are not found outside of it.

Thus, organic determination (perhaps in the transmission of certain kinds of qualities) comes about only through organic, real components, and psychical determination (perhaps in mental changes of mood) only through specifically psychical ways of reacting, even though organic factors may be very much involved in the latter, and causal factors may be very much involved in the former. It is the same with the determination of the human will. A long series of lower real factors is always involved in it, whether of a physical, organic, or psychical kind, and they determine it, each one according to the way of determination of its own stratum. But the will still plays its own part in its own determination; the chain of conditions is not complete without the will's self-determination. The chain only becomes complete through the will itself as determinant. With the decision by the will, the consequence that results as necessary from it is also decided – its ground becoming sufficient through the will.

But the will, itself, only becomes determinate – which means actual – in its decision and through it. Indeed, only in its decision does it become the will. For the indeterminate will is not yet a will, and is therefore not a free will either. Thus, its determination is necessary, but not causally necessary, and not organically or psychologically necessary, but rather necessary only through the self-determination of its particular and much higher real stratum.

The real law of actuality thus suffices for the will. It does not require a different necessity in different strata. But this means: the will is autonomous, on

the grounds of its categorial particular nature. It is, therefore, free with regard to its lower determinants, even though it is conditioned by them.

e) Determination and Determinism

Thus, its freedom is at least represented in relation to the real determination of the lower strata, and above all, in relation to causal determination; but not any less in relation to biological, psychological, or historical-social determination. What has not yet been decided, however, is the question of the self-determination of the will itself. For this always occurs under the influence of values; however, values are not products of the will, but rather, universal essences. Even with regard to them, the will must have the freedom to decide for or against them. This side of the question of freedom, however, no longer involves the problem of real determination. For that against which this freedom holds its own is no longer real. –

Therefore, even though it is a universal and continuous law, the law of real determination does not signify an actual determinism. At least, not if by determinism we understand a world order that leaves no room for autonomous determination. It would, of course, signify determinism, if, for the whole of the real world, only one single type of determination were to come into question, and if the world were not stratified and the individual strata did not have their actual forms of nexus. All of the real is dependent, even the highest strata, if the causal nexus alone rules everything, or even if the final nexus alone rules everything. In which case, a stratum of a differently natured determination is not possible. There can only be freedom in a real essence if multiple determinations are superimposed. At each height of the strata, the higher is then free from the lower. But where only a single nexus rules, there is no higher and no lower determination, and for that reason no freedom.

True "determinism" is only the determinism of unity. It measures all of the real by the same yardstick. But the law of real determination does not assert such unity. It leaves room for the diversity of stratified types of determination, and thus, also for the autonomous determination of the will and the person. Indeed, from stratum to stratum, it leaves room for freedom. This is obviously the opposite of determinism. One could just as rightly call it indeterminism – if both "isms" were not in fact inappropriate. In truth, the total relation that comes about under the law of real determination is such as to be beyond determinism and indeterminism. It constitutes a third and far more complex type of determinative construction of the real world.

27 The Real Mode of Contingency

a) The External Boundary of Real Determination

Freedom is the internal boundary of real determination and of the necessity of the real actual. It does not limit the validity of the law of determination, although it does limit the content of its meaning. It is not, therefore, a barrier to the law as such; it merely expresses the way in which the law intersects and intertwines with otherwise ontological lawfulness.

There is also, however, an external boundary of real determination. And this is, in fact, a barrier to the law of determination; for it directly limits its validity. To develop a conception of what lies beyond this boundary is utterly impossible. This external boundary is not the expression of the law's intersection with other lawfulness, but lies within the essence of the law of determination itself, and is, therefore, not to be separated from it. This external boundary is chance.

It is a treacherous weakness of indeterministic theories of freedom that they all – openly or covertly – understand freedom as contingency (indeterminateness): the fabric of real determination, which in general is surely accepted, is seen as sporadically interrupted; "freedom" should then appear in the gaps of the real nexus that arise in this manner. Freedom is thus thought to be a beginning of the self-determination of the will.

There are two inconsistencies in this. First of all, a gap in which determination reappears is no gap at all. Second, this self-determination, which must be of a higher kind, would only be possible on the grounds of a lower kind, even though on its own this kind would not make it complete. In truth, with a gap in real determination, something quite different from freedom is posited, namely, indeterminateness, or modally expressed: contingency. But contingency bears little similarity to freedom. The contingent can also be dependent, and the free can also not be contingent. Contingency is not even the scope of possible freedom, since there would have to be indecision in such contingency. Chance, however, is already decision. In this respect, it is far more like necessity, and cannot be distinguished from it in everyday life – not, at least, as long as the chain of conditions concealed behind the actual fails to be grasped. The result is that the decidedness is the same, whether it is that of contingency or necessity.

In a "gap" of determination, as long as it leaves room for freedom, chance may not hold sway, either. What would be in it might be neither necessary nor contingent; which is impossible according to the principle of excluded middle. All of "that which is" is clearly either necessary or contingent.

Moreover, in the "gap" there might be only that which is in the mode of incomplete possibility – which is simultaneously disjunctive and yet open to all the alternatives of being and nonbeing. But this is precisely what is not possible in the real.

This, of course, does not quite mean indeterminism. For it does not mean that in the gap nothing is really actual. It means that the gap is really fulfilled, but nevertheless fulfilled on the grounds of an incomplete chain of conditions. What escapes this conception is that incomplete chains of conditions yield no real possibility, at all, and thus no real actuality, either. Its undertakings fail due to this absurdity.

b) The Antinomy in the Essence of Real Contingency

Only in two respects does chance resemble freedom: it is the boundary of determination, as being "on the grounds" of another being (therefore, of nexus); and it is not indecision, not an open alternative (like partial possibility), but rather decision. Freedom is also decision, and exists not because of the real nexus, but despite it, although it appears in the middle of it. This is why chance and freedom are wrongly brought together, again and again. Even Kant did not quite know how to avoid this, as he understood his causal antinomy "cosmologically," and referred to the "first arising" of the world process. That is to say, the "first cause" would surely be contingent, but would still not, as Kant assumed, be "free."

On the other hand, it is to be maintained in all strictness: the real contingent is a real actual that is not really necessary, and is, therefore, not based on the sufficient ground of a total chain of conditions. Thus, it cannot be really possible either, in the sense of being conditioned by such a chain. And since, as a real actual, it must also be somehow really possible, it signifies the contradiction that it is at the same time both really possible and not really possible, fully determined and undetermined, conditioned and unconditioned. The contradiction can also be defined in another way: something is a possible thing and at the same time made possible by nothing; it is determined, while, at the same time, being determined "by nothing." Thus is revealed the peculiarity that it is not, in this conflicting determinateness of being, some sort of conceived thing, a form of fantasy, but something that is undeniably required by the law of real determination itself. This law implies that all determination has the character of a series and forms a continuous nexus. It, therefore, involves a *regressus*, which goes on and on, and thereby leads back to the "first links," but abolishes itself in them.

"First link" means that there are no further links standing behind it on whose "grounds" something could be really necessary or merely really possible. And since the whole of the series, and along with it the nexus itself as a real one, always depends on the first link, the contingency of the whole series is at the same time tied to the contingency of the first link.

In this sense, the whole of the real sphere as such is and remains contingent. And everything in it, be it a single link or a connectedness, shares in this total contingency. For that reason, the whole ruling necessity of the real nexus is, ultimately, contingent necessity. And for that reason, the real mode of contingency is a paradoxical mode. It is not paradoxical in the same sense as the intermodal laws of the real; these oppose merely the usual and apparently self-evident ways of intuition; they are not in themselves contradictory, and contain no antinomies. The real mode of contingency, on the other hand, as the "external boundary" of all relationality and determination, is paradoxical in the sense of internal contradiction. Therein, it shares the peculiar nature of the boundary concepts of all cosmological series – as developed by Kant – leading undeniably to an antinomy.

With regard to the whole of determinative world connection, everything consequently comes down to the previously developed ontological principle of contingency: there is no necessity without contingency, although there may very well be contingency without necessity (Chap. 10 a and b). All necessity is groundless in the first links of its conditionality, and is therefore contingent as a whole. Its first link, on which, it is based as its sufficient ground, is not something "absolutely necessary," but rather something "absolutely contingent." It is of no use to seek the sufficient reason for the world in God. If God himself is to be the first reason, then he must thereby become something contingent.

In the formal-dialectical play of these flexible boundary concepts, of course, we may make of them whatever we want; thus, we can construct at will a "higher" synthesis of necessity and contingency. And then each speculatively desired reversal of their relation may be "proven" with the most astounding logical acuity. Meanwhile, the worthlessness of such construction and proof clearly announces itself, insofar as syntheses of this kind from undeniable real relations, are by no means to be filled with content. It simply lies in the essence of the law of determination itself – namely, just as it arose from its modal backgrounds, which all converged in the real law of actuality – that it involves its own abolition at the limits of the real world it governs. It is a law that prescribes its own limitation.

Whether the real world generally has limits to its temporal expanse and to its total processes, and whether the just now developed boundary relation

consequently comes into force somewhere can, of course, be decided neither on modal grounds nor on some other tangible grounds. It is the real antinomic character of all basic questions of such a kind to lead into the darkness of intractable unknowability. With regard to the unknowable, the only legitimate recourse remaining for knowledge is to clarify and delimit the content of irrationality. For that reason, ontology must come to a halt at this point and content itself with the unequivocal clarification of boundary relations as such.

c) Recurrence of Indifferences and the Abolition of the Paradoxical Intermodal Laws

With some caution, one can surely go still another step further. And for this, modal analysis has provided the foothold. The real ontological, positive meaning of the contingent is that it "displaces" necessity and sufficient reason at the limits of the real sphere. This results from the position of contingency in the modal table of the real, and from the role of an "irregular mode" assigned to it in the modal construction of the real ways of being.

In this way, at least part of the internal contradiction in it is dissolved. Nevertheless, it is ontologically only partially appropriate for the real contingent to be seen as an impossible real possible, or as a determined undetermined; it is much more appropriate for it to be understood from the other direction, as a real actual, in which the real law of actuality, along with the real law of necessity and real law of possibility, is abolished. In it as a real actual, necessity and possibility do not coincide; they diverge widely from each other. Wherever the actual has no chain of conditions "behind it," it is possible without being necessary. In that case, real possibility is not total possibility, but disjunctive possibility. It is a possibility in which everything desired is possible, as long as it does not conflict with itself. And whatever then makes a determinate, possible thing actual, whatever decides being and nonbeing, is real chance.

But this means that, at the limits of the sphere, the whole peculiarity of the intermodal laws of the real is abolished. And with it, the law of division of possibility falls first of all. Disjunctive possibility takes its place. But then the three principles become untenable: as the paradoxical laws of exclusion and implication fall, the three indifferences begin again.

Not only is possibility then indifferent toward actuality and nonactuality, but nonactuality is also indifferent toward possibility and impossibility, and – what is most important here – actuality is indifferent toward necessity and contingency. In the last indifference, there is now in fact leeway for the real contingent. It is the leeway that is missing from the real sphere; the narrowness of

the real possible expresses precisely the absence of this leeway. Here, therefore, real actuality does not exclude the possibility of nonbeing, and real nonactuality does not exclude the possibility of being. And vice versa. The possibility of nonbeing implies neither nonactuality nor impossibility, and nonactuality does not imply impossibility. The possibility of being, however, implies neither actuality nor necessity, and therefore actuality does not imply necessity, either.

With the recurrence of the indifferences, not only is the door opened to real chance, but so too is the whole modal table altered. The division that separates this table into two groups that exclude each other coincides with the law of division. Once again, possibility sinks down into the indeterminateness of a dual mode. As such, it is virtually meaningless. Chance is at home in this indeterminateness. Necessity and possibility have both yielded to it. All decision stands with it alone. Only actuality and nonactuality still stand in their same places. They prove themselves even here to be the "absolute" modes, unaffected by the volatility of relational modes.

One can, therefore, understand the reduction of the modal table at the limits of the real sphere in such a way that in it only actuality and nonactuality remain. Necessity and impossibility are displaced, and possibility has become meaningless. Relationality has disappeared with the chain of conditions; there is no modality of relation here that could emerge in actuality and render itself indifferent. However, this means that contingency is not one mode among others, but only the vague expression of the disappearance of the relational modes and the detachment of the absolute modes. In this respect, one must say that, with its emergence, the absoluteness of the fundamental modes seems to be most sharply pronounced in character.

Thus, at the limits of the real sphere, modal lawfulness – and with it the ways of being – is radically divided into a lawfulness that holds true within the whole and a lawfulness that holds true of the whole. Wherever modal indifference is eliminated, chance is eliminated as well; and wherever it recurs, the real law of actuality, along with the law of determination, is eliminated, i.e. it is there that the realm of chance is to be found.

V The Modal Construction of Becoming

28 Partial Possibility and Time Relation

a) The Real Modes and Becoming

Above, it has been repeatedly taken into account that the introduction of the strictly understood real modes puts one in a certain opposition to conventional ways of thinking. But it is a matter not only of opposition to the quite naïve aspect of materiality, which regards the course of events as something accidental, but also of opposition to the aspect of becoming itself, which has already left static ways of thinking behind it. This aspect depends on the temporality of the real; it signifies how all forms are pulled apart in the successive stages of a process, so that none of them are ever gathered together as a whole at any one time. This is true of human life, as well as of the progression of a heavenly body in cosmic space. In this case, nothing is changed by the difference in ontological stratum.

The state of being pulled apart consists in the fact that the past stages are "no longer" and the future stages are "not yet," but the present stage as the only "that which is" is separated from them, although the process is continuously connected to it on both sides. At each moment, the past is moving farther away, and the future is moving closer. The now-point moves to the future; the future moves into the now and is present just for a moment, before sinking into the past. In this respect the position of the present toward the future is very different from that of the present toward the past; the present always foreshadows the future as something still indeterminate, while having the past behind it as something unchangeably determinate. This difference is ineradicable, rooted in the irreversibility of the course of time.

If at this point one turns to the opposition of the possible and the actual, then the result is: the chains of conditions, on which the occurrence of the stages depends, are always closed only up to the now-point at that time; for the future, they are still open, i.e. incomplete. Corresponding to this is the fact that everything past and present has its full determinateness, but the future does not; or expressed in modal terms, the fact that everything past and present has reached actuality, but that the future is still nonactual. In further stages of the process it continuously becomes actual, just as the present became actual at its time, and just as all earlier stages became actual at their time.

But how are we to understand the openness of the future in its "indeterminateness"? The future can only become actual if the chain of its real conditions

becomes complete; for only then does it become really possible. This means that, for the time being, it is still really impossible, and that as the process moves forward, the impossible continuously becomes actual.

This is, of course, opposed by that aspect of becoming which says that only the possible becomes actual, not the impossible. The circumstances for this aspect of becoming are quite different: at every moment in the process, a "multitude of possibilities" is present, which together constitute the open horizon of the future; it can come about "in such-and-such a manner," or it can come about differently; it all depends on which partial conditions in the further course of the process join those already present. On this "multitude of possibilities" is based that characteristic indeterminateness, that "multiradiality," so to speak, of the future – even of the very next moments – which seems to be laid out in all actual, respective ongoing events.[1]

Unmistakably involved in this multiradial foreshadowing of the future is the concept of disjunctive possibility, along with the partial possibility that is always characteristically connected with it. And it cannot be denied that this concept of possibility very neatly fits the aspect of the future that we always keep in mind when we anticipate events in everyday life. Thus, the future represents itself in whatever stands before us now: as a multiplicity of eventualities, chances, and perspectives. Indeed, we know in advance that only one of them can become actual. But since we do not know which one it is before it becomes actual, there exists for us the multiplicity of parallel "possibilities" – arising from one and the same given real situation, in which the chain of real conditions is complete for none of them.

b) Aporias of Partial Possibility in the Real Process

We must now ask quite seriously: what kinds of "possibilities" are involved here? Proper real possibility is out of the question, since it is not plural, and since it does not result from an incomplete chain of conditions. But it is not a matter of a mere pretension of finite understanding either. To finite understanding, the relation is a "real" one. A certain number of real conditions are actually

1 One may compare this to Wilhelm Sesemann's excellent analysis of this aspect in *Die logischen Gesetze und das Sein*, Kaunas 1932, pp. 160 f., 166 f., 180 f., 186 f. and many further places. Sesemann considers this modal aspect of becoming to be the actual, real ontological one. On this point, I cannot agree with him, since it seems to me that the actual modal analysis of the real would then be missing. But he has clearly grasped the problem.

present, and from these, it is not the case that just any random thing is possible; on the contrary, only some things are ever possible, while others are not – it depends on what is or is not allowed by the conditions already present. Whatever they have already excluded is no longer possible, even in a disjunctive sense.

The complex of conditions present is, even in all its incompleteness, an absolutely real one. It constitutes only partial possibility and not real possibility, but this partial possibility consists in real relation. And since the complex is the same for all simultaneous eventualities, we may add: in real relation it constitutes the shared partial possibility of all relevant eventualities. And the multitude of "possibilities" that proceed from such an incomplete complex of conditions is nothing other than the ambiguity of the indeterminateness in it, or the multitude of directions in which it can be completed.

So far, no contradiction is present in the law of totality of real possibility. The aporia lies only in the question: what kind of possibility – in contrast to real possibility – is it, then, that emerges in this way in real relation, itself? Since it is not real possibility, but is nevertheless based on an absolutely real chain of conditions (albeit an incomplete one), it does not properly belong to any sphere and can not be understood as logical or ideal or perhaps even epistemic possibility. It obviously belongs somehow to the real relation of the stages of the process, and it cannot be excluded from becoming; indeed, it signifies something very specific for this real relation, namely, that out of the determinate, developed conditions, only one limited embodiment of eventualities remains open, and not an unlimited embodiment of eventualities. The already present conditions, which indeed cannot be abolished, restrict it. And this restriction is an absolutely real one. If a stone rolls down a slope and in its rolling has taken a particular path, then it "can" no longer go back and roll along another one; it "can" only roll further downwards "this way, or that." What is involved here is the modal meaning of this being-able or not-being-able. In order to successfully understand this meaning, the ontological character of disjunctive possibility appearing in the real process, must become clear.

And alongside this first aporia appears a second. Assuming that a real character of this possibility can be specified, the ghostly possibility hovering next to the actual would still halt its entry into the real world. For, in each stage of events, there would, thus, be posited a whole "horizon of different possible things," from which the real actual could elevate itself as a preferred case only in the course of the process. Thus, the real sphere would be non-uniform once again. It would have to consist of two kinds of being, possible and actual – in which case the weight of the real would, of course, continue to rest on the latter alone, but this being-actual would proliferate from a surging swarm of "possibilities," emerging and then sinking back again into nothingness. And

for the fluctuating actual, this swarm would somehow have to prepare the way for its becoming.

c) The Temporally Narrowing Circle of the Possible

The solution to these aporias suggests itself in the thought that a new "dynamic" aspect of real laws arises here in contrast to the "static" aspect, the former having to supersede the latter. The decisive step must then lie in the introduction of temporality; the real process would require a different real possibility from that which is based on the law of division and the law of totality.

On the other hand, it is easily shown that this real possibility is one of real events, and, therefore, of temporal processes. But the claim of the dynamic aspect would not thereby be abolished. One must give more attention to this aspect itself in order to logically examine it. For this aspect is not exhausted with what has been said above.

For the relation between the condition and the conditioned, temporality means that the conditions of the present lie in the past, and that the conditions of the future lie in the present (and past). Generally, in every process the conditions are temporally prior to the conditioned. Since real possibility is now based on conditions, the being-possible of an event must precede its being-actual. Thus, whatever has become actual in every "now," contains certain conditions of the future; this future is "merely possible" on the grounds of such conditions. For the conditions are not complete; the possibility is mere partial possibility and is, therefore, dissolved in the multitude of different "possibilities" that form a horizon of the possible at that time.

Now, however, time advances, as does the process along with it. The present recedes into the past, the future moves into the present. This means that from the "merely possible" an actual thing develops. And since being-actual no longer allows any more indeterminateness, this moving into the present also signifies a decision about which of the "many possibilities" will become actual. With this decision, the remaining "possibilities" sink back into nothingness; they become impossibilities, and are thereby eliminated.

This process takes place not just once, and not abruptly, but continuously. Over the course of the process, "possibilities" are, thus, steadily eliminated. The "circle of the possible" becomes ever tighter – in accordance with the conditions that newly appear from moment to moment; the chain of conditions is filled out, and at last becomes complete, and then it is only the one "possible" thing that becomes actual. This is the stage in which partial possibility merges into complete real possibility. And as the process continues, the just-now-become-actual

becomes, in turn, a partial condition of further "possibilities." The process does not stand still. It goes beyond whatever has now become, letting it sink into the past, and from every "now" there opens up a new "circle of the possible," which then undergoes the same process of selection.

What results from this aspect? An important conclusion can be drawn only if it can be shown that the decision about the "destiny" of the many respective "possibilities" – therefore the deciding authority that lifts one of them into actuality, while eliminating the others – is not included among the conditions that lead out the real process, but is an independent (free) power alongside them. The feared determinism is then dissolved. In which case, the open "horizon of possibilities" means a realm of freedom. To put it briefly, what one actually wanted to prove with this aspect all along is then fulfilled: no necessity rules in the world-process, and there is room for human freedom.

It has already been shown above (Chap. 26 c–e) that this concern about the importance of ethics and spiritual autonomy is superfluous; that freedom is looked after in a completely different and much more perfect way; and that it requires no indeterminism or violation of the intermodal laws, whatsoever. But, completely disregarding these things, it is now only right to clarify how it stands with that authority of "decision" in the simple progress of the real process.

29 Undecidedness and the Puzzle of Decision

a) New Aporias and Theoretical Perplexity

And here begins the great theoretical speculation. For what the proponents of the "horizon of possibilities" actually have in mind – an authority deciding according to a kind of human will – should not be directly introduced here, unless the foul play of anthropomorphic modal concepts is to remain obfuscated. The proponents of these theories must, therefore, seek other corroboration.

But the corroboration is difficult to obtain. The nearest is presented by Aristotle's concept of potency. Potency is the being planned out of something whose actualization still depends on a moving principle; depending on whether this principle comes into play or not, the planned-out thing is, or is not, actualized. But this presupposes the final structure of the process, and this structure cannot be generally claimed for all real processes. And it is of even greater consequence that any transitional stage of a process may in no way be understood as a layout plan for future stages. At best, this would go on if the plan were allowed to be

something determinate, so that over the course of the process either something determinate or nothing at all would emerge from it. But this is not the case in the majority of natural processes, and it is not what is meant by the "multitude of possibilities," either. A "potency" in the sense of such multiplicity would gain a completely non-Aristotelian character. It would have to be, at the same time, the plan for a vast number of things and in it the actual meaning of being planned out would, therefore, be directly abolished. For even being planned out has meaning only in a firm determinateness of direction, and not in boundless indeterminateness. The concept of potency was conceived in opposition to indeterminateness.

Admittedly, the "horizon of possibilities" ought to be a limited one. But this, by no means, suffices, if a certain indeterminateness essentially remains here – corresponding to the incompleteness of the chain of conditions. One only needs to choose more widely separated stages of the process in order to see that the limitation always becomes looser, eventually merging into an incalculable multi-dividedness. What, for example, does it mean if one says of a newly built house that it could collapse? This is perhaps to say in a meaningful way: at some time or other it can be cracked by the ground trembling or sinking in that area, which would then lead to further consequences; there are hundreds of ways in which this kind of thing can happen, causing similar consequences. But does this mean that whatever happens to the house is thereby planned out? Obviously not. The multi-dividedness of the eventualities directly excludes the character of potency.

Such a concept of potency becomes totally vague. It becomes blurred by indeterminateness, thus approaching the meaning of the merely "general." Logically, the general even behaves toward the cases like a "merely possible" does toward the actual. It has indeterminateness and disjunctivity in common with partial possibility. Even the real sphere has the general as a structural element, both in forms and in processes. When looked at more closely, it is nothing other than the homogeneity or typicality in the processes and structures of the real world. In this respect, the real general now seems to be related to that "plurality of possibilities," since its "cases," in disjunctive parallelism and indecision, are "under" it and spanned by it.

If one attempts, however, to introduce the general here, in order to determine the character of partial possibility, then it proves itself incapable of serving this purpose. Not only is decision to be sought even less in it than in potency – only the special case brings decision, but the special case remains undetermined by the general – the general does not occur independently in the real, at all. It exists only in real cases themselves, and is nothing but their homogeneity in a determinate respect (like their essential inhomogeneity continuously is, in a

different respect). We know it perhaps as the lawfulness of sequences; but this lawfulness exists only in real sequences, themselves, not next to or outside of them, and not somehow temporally before them, either. It is only found detached from such sequences in the abstraction of thought.

Science lifts it out for the purposes of gaining insight (acquiring a more comprehensive perspective); but even science does not intend for laws to be something apart from the sequence of natural processes. Science is not identical to its objects. Its lifting out of the common in a multitude of cases is justified as long as it does not view what is lifted out as having a separate existence. But if one now wants to understand the conditional grounds of a "multitude of possibilities" in the real stages of a process as a general thing, then one directly commits the error of taking the general as a real reason for its own existence; since one is saying that it exists "before" the cases, i.e. before actually becoming one of them. This is impossible.

In truth, one has done something completely different. One has claimed the logically justified independence of the general, and has transferred it, sight unseen, to real relation. This sliding into the logical, and indirectly into the realm of essences, is treacherous. One sees in it that the real is no longer seriously in question. The possibility that represents a generality of cases is, at best, essential possibility. But such a possibility is not even partial possibility of the real; it is not based on real conditions, and exists not only without them as a totality, but also without a single one of them. And such a possibility least of all explains why just "one" case among this generality becomes actual. For it lies within another ontological sphere that in no way can answer for reality. From the standpoint of ideal being, all of the real is contingent.

It is an old mistake to think that the ideal and essential realm is a realm of the possible. The most famous thinkers of modern times have lapsed into this error, Leibniz with his "possible worlds," Kant with his "possible thalers." As long as this aberrant line of thought prevails, one cannot hope for a clarification of the ways of being: in this case real possibility is not distinguished from essential possibility, and real necessity becomes a superfluous concept, thus the real is contingent. The most abrupt conclusions of this kind have been drawn in recent times by the phenomenologists; the relation of real case and essence is represented as follows: the case is contingent, the essence necessary. For that reason, the case is bracketed, along with the whole real world. With such contrivances, one permanently abandons ontological territory. One exchanges the being for the phenomenon; but in the phenomenon, the ways of being and modes of being are intermingled. One intends to grasp the essence, and one lets go of the real. One has stamped it onto the inessential world.

b) Theoretical Experimentation with Chance. New Inconsistencies.

Theoretical guesswork leads no further. It seems that an actual "decisive authority" cannot be specified. On the other hand, the fact remains that in every ongoing real process, decisions occur from moment to moment, so that it is always the case that from many possible things – provided that they exist – only one becomes actual.

If one could make time, itself, responsible for this selection, then it would certainly provide a kind of explanation. But this is exactly what is least acceptable. Time, itself, is uniform, empty, a merely dimensional thing, and in addition it is an inexorable flow, as well as the schema of an order in flow, but it is not "that" which flows and underlies the order. Time, itself, determines nothing, it brings nothing, and it consumes nothing. It does not "exhibit" [*zeitigen*] anything. But, certainly, events are exhibited in it. They lead out of each other in time, crowding together in it, and crowding each other out of it. Determination and decision lie with them. Time is just the neutral real form of flow. It decides nothing.

Thus, nothing but chance seems to remain as a deciding authority. But this is the total ontological failure of the whole inquiry. For the introduction of chance is tantamount to the statement that there is no deciding authority. This is no explanation, but rather the renunciation of all explanation. Moreover, with "contingent decision," one gets into a completely different set of difficulties.

No difficulty is posed by chance beginning where the relation of conditions ends, if its beginning itself remains incomprehensible. In terms of partial possibility, however, the relation of conditions does not end. Partial possibility is based on a certain complex of real conditions, but an incomplete one; only through this does it have the character of a real relation, and only through this is the "multitude of possibilities," which it opens up, a limited one. But how does it stand in relation to the modality of these conditions? Should what they are perhaps also be contingent? This negates that aspect at its most determinate: they hold true of it as very clearly rooted in the past stages of the process, because they could not turn out any differently than they did. For them, therefore, real necessity is presupposed in their particular being-so.

But they were also not always there, and they only appeared over the course of the process. They have, therefore, in their own time inserted themselves as determining factors into the complex of conditions that is continuously filling up, and have, each in its own way, thereby restricted the "circle of possibilities." Does full real determination now hold true for all "previous" factors – i.e. for those that had entered until a determinate "now" – as it is then possible to

negate the same real determination for the factors appearing "later," which in the uniform continuation of the process are equated with them and determine in the same way the coming events? It is obviously of no use to play a double game here. This means: dividing the process into two kinds of sequences, one of which must extend up to the "now," while the other must extend from the "now" into the future, the former thus appearing as a determined sequence of stages, and the latter as an undetermined one. This amounts to utter absurdity, because the boundary between past and future shifts in the progression of the "now." According to this, one and the same partial event must be contingent at first, but necessary thereafter. Such a consideration obviously confuses the future with the contingent, and the past with the necessary. It can no longer see the unity of the process, because it has torn it into the temporal duality of the "now."

In exactly this way, one misses the actual dynamic of becoming. One wants to make becoming particularly beautiful with this dynamic, as one places oneself in the middle of the process. At the same time, one undertakes the investigation from a viewpoint in the "now." But it is of no use, since the inquiry treats the "now" as a fixed ground, as though it stood still. And so, through the double aspect of fore- and hindsight, one separates the temporal order of events into those two heterogeneous halves, with everything appearing determined in one, and undetermined in the other. Only a fundamentally static aspect of becoming can lead to such consequences. But obviously the basic error lies in precisely this quiescence of becoming, which has all of those absurd consequences. It is thought, with its abstraction, but at the same time also its perspective of time, with its all too naïve claims of concreteness, that puts into effect the quiescence – and as it were, the denaturation – of becoming. Of course, this thought does not thereby abolish the real flow of becoming. It has no power over it. Wherever and however abstraction puts itself in opposition to this flow of becoming, it puts itself in the wrong. It grasps at the mystery of becoming that has already passed it by.

c) The Anthropomorphic Concept of Time and Becoming

Here, the underlying abstract conception of time arises from the ignorance of human beings as regards the future, in contrast to their very determinate knowledge as regards the past. It is thus a rightly naïve conception. To the self in its practical deliberation, time seems divided into two aspects. The self does not notice, in its connectedness to the "now," the flow in which it itself stands together with its deliberation; for it, the static equilibrium of thought simulates

the standing still of the "now." The consequence is a whole series of errors. There are two of these that, above all, deserve consideration at this point.

The first error is the conception of the future as a "realm of possibilities." This realm temporally contrasts with that of the present and the past, as it would contrast with a realm of actuality. This establishes a temporal difference between the possible and the actual, so that the one real world seems divided into two ontological realms of different modality. Of course, with this one conjures up free-floating possibility once again. Even supposing that one could justify this, a greater difficulty still remains. With such division, one reintroduces the idea that the future always somehow may be represented in the present, namely, as the possible. And this coexistence of the possible with the actual is understood as a kind of connectedness of the future with the present, as a future-loadedness, so to speak, of the present.

No one would dispute that there is such a future-loadedness. It is only a question of how it is to be understood. For it does not require such artificial conceptual preparations – the possible does not need to be separated from the actual in the temporal perspective, and even less does the possible need to subsequently mingle with the actual. The simple temporal course of becoming is sufficient for it, as long as the chains of conditions are steadily filled out in it, whereby another thing becomes really possible at every point in time. The temporal succession in the emergence of the chains of conditions itself connects whatever follows firmly enough to whatever proceeded. For the real dependency of the conditioned in the continuous series depends on every condition. The mystery of future-loadedness is simply solved by the law of real determination.

But this involves a second error: the false ascription of modal differences to temporality itself. This ascription is just as treacherous as the false ascription of modal differences to the opposition of ways of being (ideal – real). As the possible was misunderstood there as the general – and indeed as the general made independent in the sense of ideal being – so too is the possible misunderstood here as the future, i.e. as something separated from the actual according to temporal order. The one conception like the other arises from the need to comprehend the possible as indeterminate; the one like the other is an evident metaground. Both abandon the territory of modality. Moreover, the shift in the time relation disparages the conception of time. For, at its time, the future is in truth no less actual in real terms than the present is at its time. It is, indeed, not actual "now," and that is why it is the future, but it is also not possible "now." At its time, it is just as possible in real terms as the present is at its. The abstract concept of time adhering to the "now" labors in vain to give to it a less weighty and a more indeterminate or softened way of being. The weightiness of the future's inexorable approach, which human beings experience as

the fullness of their destiny, directly consists in the fact that the future has the same hardness of the real as the present. A "merely possible thing," once it had moved closer, would puzzle no one, for then it would no longer present itself as a "merely general thing."

What is made so tempting by the conception of the future as a "merely possible thing," is, therefore, the supposed undecidedness in it. But the problem is not solved in this way. On the contrary, any possibility of demonstrating an authority of decision has been cut off. Moreover, the undecidedness, itself, is already highly questionable. Since partial possibility is presupposed, thus supposing a relation of conditions and dependency in any case, there is no reason why it should hold true for some but not all real factors. This puts into question the whole opposition of undecidedness and decidedness. It is, in the final analysis, an anthropomorphic opposition. Or, so it appears from the perspective of human beings regarding the present, when it comes to their decisions in acting and willing with regard to the future. They believe themselves to be faced with the indeterminateness of "many possibilities," seeing therein the scope of their activity. In truth, their freedom is something quite different; it is the freedom to interject their own initiative as a real factor in the already existing complex of factors. The opportunity to do so remains open to them as long as the event that they want to influence is still a future one; and, therefore, only the future stands open to their initiative. However, this does not lie in the indeterminateness of the future, but in the indifference of the causal nexus toward supervening factors of higher determination; this nexus is not bound to a goal, it incorporates every unfamiliar determinant that knows how to interject itself, letting them have an effect on the total determination. But the determinateness of the future is complete, even without the interference of human initiative – because of the real situation that has actually come into being at that time – it is only a different determinateness from that which comes into being "with it."

One sees that the obliquity of the consequences extends right up to the dangerous area of the problem of freedom. And it is undeniable that the concern about freedom has lured speculation onto the wrong track of an anthropomorphic concept of time and a similarly anthropomorphic concept of modal categories. For being-possible in the sense of undecidedness is now foreign to the real. In truth, the modal construction of becoming is missing here, just as is the real structure of the will's freedom. The theory here has allowed itself to be lured onto a track that is dangerously wrong-headed. Only a return to strict modal analysis can lead it back onto a level path.

As to the further errors attached to the first two, let us here only touch on the idea that no actual determination and no necessity connect the future with the present. Thus, according to the point of view that sees the future as "the merely

possible," the progressive decision among the "possibilities," which makes one of them actual, must be a matter of chance. The determinative connection in the course of becoming, which is presupposed for the past and present, is thereby abolished for the future. Since every real event moves toward the future and away from the past, it must be a contingent event when it is approaching, but a necessary event afterwards, once it has passed by. This is an obvious contradiction. In fact, with it one no longer has in mind real becoming, but only a modal difference in the "consciousness" of becoming. The anthropomorphic duality of the temporal aspect has made the unity of the real process incomprehensible.

30 Real Conditions and Real Decision

a) The Only Tangible Real Authority of Decision

One must therefore proceed differently, and must seek to place a positive factor against all these negative ones. And even if the sought "authority of decision" cannot be immediately shown, then at least a start can be made by clarifying in which general direction we are to seek it.

For up until now it has been clearly sought in a fundamentally wrong direction. No wonder it has not been found! In contrast to the possible as potency, as generality, as the future, and indeed, as the indeterminate and undecided, it has not been found. But perhaps it is conversely to be found in the individual uniqueness of the real situation in the process itself? Perhaps even in the present, or in the past? Could the whole overemphasis on the future, which has become as popular in our day as it has become vague, be an ontological mistake, and perhaps even an anthropomorphism? Indeed, it still remains quite questionable whether there actually exists in the present that indeterminateness which was accepted, sight unseen, on the grounds of a traditional concept of possibility. But then undecidedness also becomes questionable. This means: it could be proven that "decision" is situated precisely where it had at least been suspected to be, because one correspondingly turned a blind eye to the presuppositions one made about it.

According to this, an apparently negative result might be the only positive result of the discussion of that conception: that the indeterminateness assumed in the process is questionable. Indeed, this does not overturn the fact that an incomplete chain of conditions leaves open many different kinds of things as possible. But since in the further course of events many kinds of things are

narrowed and at some stage always dwindle down to one thing, it must be asked whether the narrowing and dwindling do not themselves have certain conditions in the present, to which the one thing owes its coming about. Should this be the case, then the decision about which of the "many possibilities" approaches full real possibility – and thereby actuality – must still have its ground in the same chain of conditions despite all of its assumed incompleteness, which ought to delimit the "horizon of possibilities."

In fact, what then remains for a residuum of decision other than the chain of conditions itself? If one does not want to rely on chance and to forgo any understanding of the matter, then one must look around for a tangible real authority. In itself, such a real authority could, of course, lie in a divine will; or if this old idea is secularized: in the ruling of a cosmic purpose, in the moving substances of forms, in the structural systems present. However, disclosures of such a kind come too late for this stage of the investigation. It is no longer a matter of testing and defending assumptions, as once was the case in speculative metaphysics, but of providing a plain categorial analysis of the given. There is, of course, determination of aims in the real world, and likewise their purposeful realization, but both are demonstrable only within the narrow field of human willing and acting. There are also planned out systems, but only in certain forms of organic processes. The one, like the other, is demonstrated only in a strictly limited field of being, and is not transferable to the wide diversity of becoming in the world; it is, therefore, unable to be generally true of the character of the real process.

The real process must *in genere* be grasped in such a way that it has the scope for these peculiarities, but in its basic character it claims a much simpler form of determination. Only such a form of determination is capable of such far-reaching transformation as is required by the particularization of the higher ontological strata.

b) The Progressive Completion of the Chain of Conditions and Continuous "Decision"

The stages of a real process appear in the order of their "succession" ["*Nacheinander*"], and, according to the law of time, the direction of their sequence is irreversible. If we introduce into this schema the modal concept of a pluralistic theory of possibility, then the order of succession implies that from many possible things, at any select point in time, only one becomes actual. If according to the basic modal law (Chap. 7 e) everything that is "possible" is only possible on the grounds of "actual" conditions and not merely possible ones, then, from

stage to stage in the process, the conditions of the respective "horizon of possibility" must already have actuality. That is to say, they must, for their part, have become actual at that time on the grounds of such factors as have become actual in the preceding temporal stages. This relation is continuously maintained in the succession of stages of the process, and is never reversed. Otherwise, the later stages would have to have become "actual" before the earlier stages, or the "many kinds of possible things" that constitute the horizon of the future would have to be possible on the grounds of the "merely possible." The former goes against the law of time, while the latter goes against the basic modal law. In the one case the process would be abolished, while the being-possible of the "possibilities" would be abolished in the other.

Thus, there indisputably exists a dependency of the stages of the process, running with the direction of time, from earlier to later. In this way, it directly presupposes the accepted pluralistic concept of possibility. For, amidst all of the indeterminateness of the future, it still claims the full determinateness of the present. And even that indeterminateness it considers to be a limited one, therefore, one by which the actual factors at that time have been restricted, and therefore determinate. There consequently exists a dependency of the present on the past, and of the future on the present, in the sense that the limitation of the "circle of possibilities" by the preceding events is fully and completely determinate.

But now this limitation itself is a progressive one, becoming ever narrower. The question is therefore: on what is the progression of the limitation itself based? The theory says: on the progressive completion of the chain of conditions; the more conditions that are linked together at a given time as "having become actual," the narrower the "circle of possibilities" becomes. Thus, there are new conditions continuously appearing; and since these must be "actual" conditions, and by no means merely possible, it can now further be asked: from where do all of these "actual things" come, which fill out the chain of conditions and restrict the circle of the possible?

This question, however, is synonymous with the question of the sought authority of decision. For decision in the process does not come about suddenly, but gradually: it is identical to the progressive restriction of the "possibilities." Or, more precisely, it is not at all a matter of a single decision, with which everything would then be settled until the becoming-actual of "one" possibility; rather, it is a matter of a series of decisions continuously being added. In them, determination progresses until it amounts to the singular determination of a single, full, real possibility. The becoming complete of the conditions is then the final decision in favor of "one" possibility and the elimination of all the others. The whole process is thus the progressive, real

making-possible of this "one possibility," and it is thereby at the same time its real actualization.

c) "Decision" as Being Contained in the Respective Complex of Real Conditions

In these considerations, the darkness now begins to lift. If they have now succeeded in indicating from where the always newly appearing conditions come that restrict the "circle of the possible," then the question about the decisive authority has been answered. Its modal construction must become clear in the determinative construction of becoming.

For that purpose, one only needs to consider the basic homogeneity of the stages of the process. It obviously does not work here to let two kinds of law rule, one for the past stages (and the present stages), and the other for the future stages. Every future stage still moves inexorably toward the present and away from the past. All consideration of a stationary "now" fails to allow for such steady progression. One must, therefore, abandon it; its attempt to view temporality and becoming concretely has proven itself to be an abstraction, a misunderstanding of that which it wanted to grasp, namely, the dynamic of becoming. Instead of considering the temporal process from such a viewpoint, one must proceed from the equalization of the stages of the process.

One now reflects: the consideration proceeded from what was given at that time, i.e. a complex of real conditions that had already become actual in an arbitrarily selected "present" stage of the process; these conditions ought to have had their preconditions in the past, i.e. in an earlier stage of the process. Thus, in a strict, real ontological sense their actuality should have become really possible on the grounds of earlier actual things. Then the same must also hold true for the next stage of the process, which shows an increase in conditions: along with the added conditions, it must be based on the actuality of the present stage. Therefore, the additional factors of this later stage must have become really possible "on the grounds" of the factors of the earlier stage, just as its factors became really possible "on the grounds" of those of the stage preceding it.

In other words, if a part of the real factors of the coming stages is generally always situated temporally ahead of, and contained in, the present at any given time, then how does this involve excluding another part of them as coordinated real factors? These other factors are indeed "present," but have not "become actual," and, for their part, only become really possible and thus "actual" on the grounds of actual things. These other actual things, on the grounds of which they become actual, must temporally precede them, according to the

law of time. Since neither potency, nor plan, nor purpose, nor even the groundlessness of chance comes into question for them, there obviously remains no other possibility. It can, therefore, be said of every point in the present, however arbitrarily it may be chosen: every real condition that later appears, restricting the circle of the possible and thus contributing to "decision," must – because it must be an "actual" condition – necessarily in the same way be really made possible by preceding real conditions (thus, the present real conditions), as these themselves are really made possible by those lying in the past.

Consequently, the decision as to which of the "many possibilities" standing open at that time shall rise into actuality can lie only in that which has already "become actual," in the present and the past and, therefore, where the already given and present conditions lie that delimit the "circle of possibilities." But this means: it must already somehow be contained in the given complex of real conditions at a given time. And this results in the consequence: if this complex of conditions outside of the delimitation of "possibilities" also produces the decision as to which of them can alone become actual, then in truth, from the outset it leaves open no "circle of possibilities," at all; the "multitude of possibilities" sinks down into itself, and there remains only the one possibility. But this is the possibility of that which becomes actual in the course of the process.

The modal construction of becoming thereby gains a completely different aspect. The aspect of the pluralistic theory of possibility is eliminated. Disjunctive possibility disappears; the real law of possibility proves itself in the real process, and with it, the whole intermodal lawfulness of the real. Partial possibility is reduced to a subordinate factor within the relations of conditions whose totality constitutes, in each stage of the process, the real possibility of the following stages.

31 Determinative and Modal Construction of Becoming

a) The Connectedness of the Processes and the Total Process

What is the reason that this state of affairs in the modal construction of the real process, although often seen and fundamentally expressed, is also frequently obscured? Great philosophical minds have been deceived in this respect. In part, the reason may lie in the lack of proper modal analysis. For the real world, and especially for becoming, it had generally never before been allowed to be carried out; and it also had to be unpromising to tackle it with conventional modal concepts. But this is not the only reason.

There is yet another, very human, underlying source of deception, which directly and inevitably obscures the relation of real process and real possibility. This is the tendency to isolate the individual process through the way in which it is perceived. It is not the abstraction of thought alone that does this; unreflective intuition also does this in everyday life. Both look at individual processes as if they were reading them each for itself, uninfluenced and without relatedness to each other. Or they at least grasp only an isolated relatedness, not the continuous relatedness that connects all individual processes.

It is easy to see how this is decisively involved here. Indeterminateness is the essential characteristic of the "horizon of possibilities;" this indeterminateness ought to exist on the grounds of the respective incompleteness of the chain of conditions. Only in this way could the further "destiny" of the individual "possibility" stand there undecided. But how can it stand undecided if the individual process, whose "present" stage has been considered, is only one of many running parallel, and the many processes very essentially influence each other? In that case, the "present" stage is no longer a strictly limited complex of given factors, a vast number of determining factors being then involved. The complex of conditions proves itself to be far richer, and the determinateness of the conditions following from the present proves itself to be far greater. If one chooses a sufficiently wide range of ongoing events at a determinate point in time, then the determinateness in it becomes absolutely complete. And then from this widely laid out diversity of present conditions there are no longer "many possibilities" standing open, but rather only one.

This is what cannot be seen when the process is isolated. One stage of a process artificially excluded from the breadth of real connection can, of course, only show a small portion of the actual diversity of simultaneous factors. And from such a portion, indeterminateness, multi-dividedness of the possible, and undecidedness must remain. But this is exactly what has now become highly questionable, whether in the real connection of world events there are ever such isolated individual processes, and whether there are corresponding, isolated, detached complexes of conditions. The insight compellingly springs to mind that all isolation of such a kind is subjective only existing in abstraction, and respectively, in the intuitive way of perception; but in the real world all individual processes take place in a way that is inseparably integrated into the unity of one total process that constitutes the world event, and consequently every cross-section demonstrates the connectedness of all simultaneous events in the unity of a total situation.

From the total situation understood in this manner – as it becomes a different one at each moment, but is always there as complete and whole – one discovers that the respective "multitude of possibilities," along with their narrower

or wider "horizon," becomes illusory. Indeed, it becomes very questionable whether a future thing can be "merely possible" from the present, and whether it must not always be just as necessary as it is possible. This also corresponds to the strictly comprehended modal categories of the real. It was the content of that paradoxical law of implication that everything which becomes really possible becomes thereby at the same time really necessary. This law was directly and materially proven from the "identity of the chains of conditions" (see Chap. 19 b). This law now verifies itself in the determinative construction of becoming. It thereby proves itself to be what it claimed to be from the beginning: a modal law of becoming.

And what is perhaps even more important: it also corresponds to the whole of human experience – not, of course, to the quickly finished processes, according to the more vaguely generalized analogy, but certainly to the slowly progressing and carefully testing processes of science. Indeed, even science is not capable of demonstrating all the dependency in the process and proving all the really possible to be the only possible, i.e. the necessary. It teaches us, however, that everywhere that the structure of real factors is exposed, necessity is also exposed along with it, but never indeterminateness or undecidedness, not to mention the contingency of decision. This is a matter of experience, which points out to us in all clarity that no "multitude of possibilities" at all might have existed, and that consequently in the becoming-actual of one of them, a decisive authority alongside the present conditions was no longer required.

The "decision" – if one still wants to call it that – was in fact there in all of the earlier stages, as one already contained in "one" total process. In the place of "many possibilities," generally only one was really possible. And this one was at the same time really necessary. A different one could not happen.

Thus, the principle is further confirmed: the totality of conditions is at the same time sufficient reason. The sufficiency of the reason, however, is nothing other than fully valid decidedness.

b) The "Multiplicity of Possibilities" and Real Possibility

The last principle has, of course, been in somewhat of a hurry to let the "horizon of possibilities" disappear. In opposition to this the fact remains unresolved that in the process, the chain of real conditions is only gradually filled out, and that in a determinate stage, this filling out is, thus, still incomplete, because the conditions that appear later are still missing. This fact exists independently of the breadth of content in which the bundle of related processes is considered;

even the greatest breadth is not able to compensate for those conditions that have not yet come about. Thus, it seems as if, despite all cross-connectedness of real events, in a given stage a certain indeterminateness of the future would always have to exist, and thus also a certain plurality of "possibilities."

Or should one perhaps say that the incomplete chains of conditions would only exist subjectively in incomplete knowledge? Is it perhaps only the isolation of the individual processes in our way of perceiving things that conceals from us the completeness of conditions in the given stage of the present, even where we basically recognize the interlocking of the processes? The multiplicity of possibilities would thereby not only be entirely deferred on the part of consciousness; but it would then also not allow anything to correspond to it in real relations which would give rise to the consciousness of its perception.

This will not do, because the still-outstanding conditions that would make the chain complete are still not actual in the earlier stages. The fact that even for them the preconditions are already contained in the breadth of the total process changes nothing, since these preconditions are not identical to them. If they were identical to them, then the total result would already have to have become actual ("have occurred"). This would abolish the succession of stages of the process. But that is not what is in question. It is much rather a question of the being-possible of the later stages, resulting from the earlier stages.

If we consider, for example, the case of a rotten tree falling, then the rottenness, along with various other factors, is present long before the tree falls, but the blast of wind that provokes the falling of the tree is not. For this, a widely branched network of causes of a meteorological kind may already exist at the time, on the grounds of which it absolutely cannot fail to happen; nevertheless, the blast of wind, itself, is a last condition for the falling that has not yet become actual, for that network of causes is not identical to it. Before it arises, the tree cannot fall. As a result of that network of causes – together with the preexisting conditions in the tree itself – the falling of the tree is already necessary (the only possibility), but is not yet actual; as a result of the uncompleted chain of conditions, however, it is not necessary and the falling or not falling of the tree is only "possible."

If one now says that such a "double possibility" is ontologically unsubstantial when the last condition can no longer fail to appear, then in practice this is correct, but it misunderstands the question involved here. For now one acts as if this last condition were identical to the causal network that is already present and on the grounds of which it cannot fail to occur. Such identification, however, is completely unfounded, for it equates a present thing with a future thing, and therefore lets the stages of the process coincide. Which goes against the law of time. And moreover, it is wrong in terms of the causal relation, since

the effect is never contained in the cause, but is always produced from it as a new event. Causality is not evolution (not the mere unwinding of a wound up and already present thing); rather, it is a productive bringing forth of the unprecedented.

Therefore, there remains a determinate meaning of incompleteness, which rightly exists in real relation. And with it, being dependent on a "decision" retains its meaning: for even if the decisive factor is already necessary from the widened total situation, it is still not yet actual, and thus is still outstanding. The necessity of its occurrence does not negate the fact that something is still missing for its occurrence. And as long as this something is missing, falling or not falling is equally "possible." However, this "being-possible" must no longer be understood as real indeterminateness in world connection, but rather as a plain being-possible that is relative to that missing something. In this sense, "possible" means that which has not yet been eliminated by the conditions that have become actual up to that time.

So, it may be said, after all, that this "being-possible" – irrespective of its disjunctivity – expresses a determinate relation that changes over the course of the process but is always unequivocal in real connection itself. The mistake made by the traditional conception is simply that it is held to be the basic relation. It is no such thing. It is only an adherent partial relation in an underlying, continuous relation of dependency. And if one views it properly, then it claims no independence whatsoever: it, itself, expresses only a partial dependency, i.e. only a part of the existing total dependency.

The character of process of the real brings with it the fact that the conditions under which something becomes possible are only gradually and successively found together. The incomplete complexes of conditions are, therefore, really actual at all times, being by no means illusory, but they are not the whole. And likewise, the relation of dependency between them and the future is one in the whole of existing real dependency. This is the real [*Reelle*] in the popular conception of partial possibility, together with its disjunctivity. On the other hand, this conception immediately becomes unreal [*unreell*] if it is pulled out of the larger aspect of real connection – as happens most of the time, since such simplification is preferred. For that reason, emphasis is at first mistakenly placed on the indeterminateness, the undecidedness, the standing open of the many things that "can" further occur; and thus one ignores the broad foundation of determining factors that is always contained in their widely recognized simultaneity, and that is, only for this reason, not counted toward the chain of conditions, since it does not lie in their line of connection.

It turns out that only the affirmative aspect of that conception of partial possibility is "real" ["*reell*"] (concerns something in real relation); the negative

aspect of it is unreal [*unreel*] (illusory). The affirmative aspect is the limitedness of the possible through the present conditions, as well as the progressive delimitation of the extent to which the chain of conditions is filled out. This delimitation is simultaneously an increase in determinateness. The negative aspect is being-indeterminate, as such, and undecidedness; it is illusory either way, because it is based on disregarding the further conditions of the real actual.

c) Completeness and Incompleteness of Conditions

It has been shown that the conception of partial possibility is not incorrect in every respect. Thus, the contradictory conception falls away from it, along with those aporias concerning its way of being, as well as those concerning the ghost of the "merely possible" (Chap. 28 b), and with this they ought to be settled. As something independent, partial possibility would just be something impossible. Then it would be a "merely possible thing," in which case no way of being could be found for it. It stands quite differently as a part of a greater real connection of conditions and as a conditioned in the course of the process. There it is nothing but a partial relation that is not to be found in isolation for itself. But since the total relation, which it is a part of, is a real relation, it is concerned with no other way of being than reality. But from this fact, one may not draw the conclusion that it is already "real possibility." This term has a quite different meaning.

One must not place any further weight on this. All confusion in modal concepts arises from singling out and isolating this subordinate partial relation. Because of its becoming independent, the basic relation has been forgotten. Here, lies the source of many deep-rooted errors in the understanding of process, of becoming, and of temporality. The basic relation is that other one described by the three real laws: only the actual is possible, only the necessary is actual, only that which is simultaneously possible and necessary is actual. These laws are the modal expression of continuous determination. And if the basic form of real being is that of temporally flowing becoming, then the determination also temporally progresses, meaning that the chains of conditions always temporally lie ahead, gradually filling out and only directly adjoining the conditioned in their very last links.

What happens now to the "horizon of possibilities" in this expanded aspect of becoming, if every newly appearing condition ought to further restrict it? First of all, it is not abolished, but seems to be ruled by another principle: this same horizon becomes all the narrower, the deeper one goes within a present stage of

the process to understand the extent (and breadth, respectively) of the total process. If one understands it narrowly as belonging only to a partial process, and as taking place on its own, then indeterminateness rules, and the "horizon of possibilities" widens; but if one understands the process to have a universal scope as a world process, then there always remains only one of those "many possibilities," which is then the only existing real possibility. This is something that restricts "comprehension," but not the real process; indeed, in the process itself only one real possibility is ever present.

Does this mean that the schema of progressive restriction only exists for the artificial isolation of the individual process? In a strictly ontological sense, this must be affirmed. And this agrees with the earlier assessment that this schema only corresponds to a partial aspect of the real relation of dependency. In truth, the "many kinds of possible things" are by no means really possible; the partial complexes of conditions do not yet make them possible. Rather, something here only "becomes" possible, and indeed, always only one thing does.

But even if this one thing only "becomes" possible, then it "is" still not yet possible. And consequently, incompleteness in a determinate sense is ontologically vindicated. Although the solution was already seen above, this dilemma requires a still even more basic reconciliation. The law of real possibility does not imply that an event **X** would already be really possible in a temporally earlier stage **A**; rather, it implies that at the time that **A** is, **X** is still impossible, because the real conditions of **X** in **A** have not yet been completely linked together. On the other hand, the complexity of all simultaneous processes in the unity of one world event directly implies that the further conditions of **X** are already contained in stage **A**; and it is based on this fact that from stage **A**, only one thing is possible, namely **X**, and not many kinds of things.

This is now the explicit form of the aporia in the determinative construction of becoming. It exhibits the schema of an obvious contradiction. In one and the same stage **A** of a process, the conditions of **X** in one respect are completely linked together, but in another respect they are not completely linked together. It seems that only one of the two situations can be true.

d) The Chain of Conditions and the Respective Complex of Conditions

Meanwhile, this aporia is not as difficult to solve as it seems. The contradiction is not an actual one. For completeness in one respect is not the same as it is in another. The "chain of conditions," which slowly accumulates and does not

become complete until the last stage, is not identical to the "complex of conditions" that in stage **A** already forms a self-contained totality, provided that stage **A** is understood in sufficiently broad terms. Therefore, at any rate, the totality of conditions that is already present in **A** is not identical to that which only comes about in **X,** itself.

Does this immensely complicate the situation? Are there now two different systems of conditions that meet and then cross over each other? By no means is this the case. It involves the same dependency in the real process and the same ontic connection of conditions; but because the temporal process has "breadth," it allows for two aspects, succession and simultaneity. The one is illustrated by the image of the "chain of conditions," in which the "breadth" of the process remains unnoticed, because the image is a linear one; the other underlies the idea of the "complex of conditions," in which the "breadth" of the process is only considered in the momentary cross-section, while the linear structure of progression and accumulation comes up short.

This one-sidedness of the image or way of conception may not be completely removed; but surely one can become aware of it, and can thereby approach the ontic total relation. Granted, if it is a matter of a "chain of conditions" from **a** to **n**, then in stage **A**, perhaps, only the series **a** to **k** is present (has become actual), but **l** to **n** is not yet present. Then in the latter's place in the same stage **A** (broadly understood), a diversity of such factors is contained, on the grounds of which these missing conditions (**l**, **m**, and **n**) must appear (become actual) in the subsequent stages of the process. This is the case in the above example of the falling of a tree: the blast of wind is not yet there, but on the grounds of the weather situation that has already developed, it can no longer fail to occur. Thus, in stage **A** the preconditions of the still missing conditions are present. And in this respect, the "complex of conditions" with regard to **X** (the falling of the tree) is already complete in **A**. The "chain of conditions," however, is incomplete. And the one does not conflict with the other. They are flip sides to one and the same determinative situation in the given momentary stage of the total process.

This simple consideration shows that, in fact, no contradiction is present here. The necessity of the future **X**, as it already exists in **A**, is a mediated one, namely, mediated by links of conditions that, for their part, are only preconditions of the still nonactual links (**l**, **m**, and **n**), but are, therefore, still very much sufficient to allow these to inescapably "become actual" at their time. Thus, the linearly viewed chain of conditions (**a** to **n**) is not linked together, but rather only a part of it (**a** to **k**); whereas the authoritative preconditions are already linked together for the remaining conditions. We are now faced with the question of how this being-together is to also in no way mean that the

event **X** is already possible in stage **A**, but only that it is possible from **A** at its time – and indeed is alone possible.

e) Real Possibility, Process and Causality

There still remains an absolutely real sense of partial possibility that by no means exists only for this consideration. It implies that in stage **A**, a part of the necessary conditions of **X** has not yet appeared (become really actual). Nothing here is changed by the fact that even this part, on the grounds of factors present in **A**, can no longer fail to appear. For this not-being-able-to-fail-to-appear adheres to the particular constitutive structure of the real process: a continuous dependency progressing with the course of time, a dependency of the later on the earlier, which we call "causality." Thus, it is mistaken to understand the incompleteness of the "chain of conditions" in stage **A** as indeterminateness, or to deduce a "multitude of possibilities" from it. For it is opposed by the "completeness" of the "complexes of conditions" that are deeply rooted in the breadth of the total process, from which **X** before its occurrence is already just as possible as necessary. But this means the same as what was implied by the lack of independence of partial possibility: there is partial possibility in the real process only as subordinated partial relation. It never emerges from the total relation of the complete complexes of conditions, and therefore signifies no real, disjunctive being-possible at all, but only this, that certain conditions of **X** in **A** have not yet become actual. It, therefore, does not mean that others could also appear in place of these conditions. As soon as one isolates it, one makes an anthropomorphic real mode out of it, and thereby falsifies the modal construction of becoming.

Obviously, in reflecting on this one can introduce causality and the higher types of real determination (see Chap. 26 a and b) just as easily as the types of organic, mental, or consciously purposeful determination. This changes nothing here. None of them coincide with the universal law of real determination. And this law itself could only be deduced from the intermodal lawfulness of the real; it is indifferent toward the particular forms of nexus, as they correspond to the strata of the real. Causality is, in this respect, only prototypical, insofar as it is the lowest and most general form of determination of the real, which recurs as modified in the higher forms.

The seemingly tangled state of affairs in the real process now proves itself to be relatively uncomplicated. It only appeared to be tangled as long as it was incorrectly pushed underneath modal categories borrowed from consciousness. If, at this point, one anticipates some of what can be completely explained only by

a specialized categorial analysis of the natural process, then light can still be shed on the total relation from another angle.

If time as a real category means all of the real's being pulled apart in a sequence of separate stages, then becoming – and the real process, respectively – is the successive series of stages itself, their merging into one another in a determinate sequence and order, and also, of course, in a certain connectedness that takes effect as dependency, although they do not merge in continuous determination. That there is also continuous determination is not due to the process as such, but to causality, as well as to the other forms of the real nexus. The process as such could proceed with continual "contingencies;" it would therefore not need to be interrupted or discontinuous. Indeed, it is in this manner that naïve consciousness conceives of the real process. But then the aspect of partial possibility holds true. In which case, there must in each stage be the "multitude of possibilities" that progressively narrows and dwindles down to one possibility in the end. Without causality or another real nexus, therefore, an element of indeterminateness would remain between the stages of the process; and then the aporia of "decision" that was developed above would remain an unsolved mystery.

Continuous determination only puts a stop to indeterminateness for the simpler forms of the process, such as causality. It implies that everything appearing in a later stage is the consequence of something contained in an earlier stage. Which may only be true if the stages of the total process are understood as a cross-section of the totality of simultaneously running processes.

But with this, a further categorial basic moment is already included, that of interaction. This implies nothing less than the continuous, determinative cross-connectedness of all simultaneous events. Only together with such cross-connectedness does causality constitute that comprehensive linkage of everything appearing in the process that we know as temporally continuous dependency.

One recognizes that: the moment of causality corresponds to the "chain of conditions" that is successively being filled out, but the moment of interaction corresponds to the simultaneous "complex of conditions." The former is a longitudinal connection, but the latter is a holistic connection. For that reason, the chain of conditions may be incomplete where the simultaneous complex of conditions is complete. Expressed in modal terms, however, the double connectedness is precisely that which did not need to be due to the character of the process as such: the fact that from an arbitrary stage of the process, many kinds of different things are not "possible" in subsequent stages; only one is ever possible, namely, the one that afterwards becomes actual.

32 The Positive Relation of the Modes in Real Events

a) The Higher Forms of Determination

For the sake of simplicity, the last considerations have generally placed causality in the position of determination. There was good reason for this, insofar as causality is the simplest and most elementary form of real determination. But it is not the only form of real determination. And for that reason, the picture must be completed. For the real world, whose intermodal relations are involved, is stratified, and the higher strata's relations of determination are different in many respects from those of the lower.

It does not suffice to note that the causal nexus is also contained in the higher forms of determination; it is only a subordinate factor there, and it alone does not determine the height of these ontological strata of the determinative construction of becoming. But the latter in its totality is the real structure of conditions and conditioned, in which the real modes and their intermodal relations exist. It, thus, essentially depends on whether the general modal construction of becoming applies to the very specialized and complicated determinative construction of the higher forms of the process.

In fact, this may now be shown, and should at least basically be shown, for two higher forms of determination: for the development of a planned-out system, as it is characteristic of certain organic processes, and for the purposeful action of humankind. In both, it can be shown that they 1. presuppose the causal nexus; and 2. only allow the unity of a single real possible thing. It is obvious that one must anticipate many special cases here that can only be explained much later on in the investigation. But this cannot be avoided.

Here, the question of what a planned-out system is can be left to rest. The function of such a system in a developing organism is well known. It consists of a kind of guiding of the process up to a mature stage, which is a whole as system of form and as system of function. The planned-out system, itself, is a preexisting and absolutely real structure. Hence, its effects on the process are direct, causal effects throughout. But by no means does it contain all real conditions for the materialization of the mature organism. Rather, in each stage, the process of becoming remains dependent on certain external factors (such as the presence of warmth, humidity, nutrients, a certain amount of light, and so forth). This means that in every stage, aside from a bundle of factors that include the plan-bearing germ, there exists the same relation throughout as in other real processes. Narrowly understood, the stages of the process always leave open a plurality of possibilities (e.g. even the possibility of the individual's perishing),

but broadly understood, they contain at every moment a totality of complexes of conditions, which as such leave only one possibility.

The same is the case many ontological levels higher in the active realization of purposes grounded on human anticipation. The realization itself is not only a real process, but also a causal process. The "means" are consequently chosen by active consciousness, whether they "cause" the desired result (the purpose) or not. What greatly differentiates this from other causal processes is just that here a purpose and a selection of means guided by this purpose have led the way. And even here, factors can emerge at every stage of the process that move events in a different direction from what had been anticipated – factors that were not foreseen, and that were not taken into account. If the guiding consciousness evades these "obstacles," then a new selection of means is accordingly introduced. Thus, narrowly understood, much is "possible" in every stage, but broadly understood, only one thing is possible. At least, this is how it appears when one looks at the real process and at the factual process of actualization, which according to its modal construction merges completely into real making-possible. Only in the choosing of the end itself, as well as in the selection of the means, is there another order; but both of these are a matter of consciousness, and precede the process of realization. The preeminence that conscious, willing, and acting essence has over blind events is just its power to set a purpose and to find the means; whereby the latter are tied to the limits of the given.

b) The Present as Loaded with the Future

The conception of a "multitude of possibilities" is essentially based on the need to regard the ongoing present as being as closely connected to the future as possible, and to understand it as a fateful becoming pregnant of the "now" with still unborn events. Although the image is an anthropomorphic one, the conception underlying this need has something irrefutable about it. One can describe what it means as the future-loadedness of the present.

If one looks at it more closely, however, one sees that this need is only poorly satisfied by the aspect of a horizon of open "possibilities." The decision about the coming events is directly removed from the present, and is ultimately left to the future itself, i.e. to "chance." Thus, the future-loadedness is only partially, weakly, and anthropomorphically seen. Upon further inspection, it becomes wholly indeterminate, and not only incomprehensible, but also illusory.

Seen in reverse, this aspect leads very quickly to the absurd. The continuous "elimination of possibilities," the steady narrowing of their horizon, obviously

presupposes that in the other direction one would encounter an ever-widening horizon; it presupposes a horizon that is originally completely unlimited and actually infinite. But what ought one to think about such a horizon? In it, simply everything must be equally possible. And with this, all difference between the possible and the impossible would fall away. In truth, therefore, nothing would be allowed to be actually possible. Not only does such a possibility of everything lose any resemblance to true real possibility, but also to partial possibility from which its schema is taken. It is a being-possible not "on the grounds" of something, but "on the grounds" of nothing. Here, all "being based on conditions" ceases. Such a concept of absolutely empty possibility, therefore, already opposes the basic modal law, insofar as this law requires that everything possible be conditioned by the actual. It could, if need be, signify the mere absence of contradiction (even if only the "internal" kind), which does not come into question, however, since it is still not a being-possible in the field of the real. This absurd perspective is consequently a purely negative and correspondingly meaningless one. If it were clearly formulated, it would mean: at the beginning there is nothingness, from which everything is equally possible.

And perhaps it may be said that this same perspective, when seen in reverse, is, if not just as utopian, then just as catastrophic. That is to say, if the "horizon of the possible" becomes ever narrower over the course of the process until only one possibility remains, then it is not evident how a new horizon of "possibilities" can reopen. But this is, indeed, what is intended by the continuation of further processes. Of course, one takes care here simply to assume that the restriction of possibilities is always paralleled by an "opening up of new possibilities," and, therefore, a widening of the horizon; and, indeed, this would have to be connected to every newly-appearing (i.e. limiting) condition. But this is simply taken from the popular aspect of becoming, from which one has proceeded; one knows from the outset that becoming does not stand still. But one has not the least idea about how it should occur. That is to say, if nothing new presents itself, then all becoming would have to come to a standstill, if the given possibilities are all eliminated, except for one; then nothing further could be "possible."

Of course, one then takes refuge in the "breadth" of becoming, which must still contain many further bundled processes. But one does not notice that it would have to come out exactly according to the presupposition made with these other processes. Indeed, one does not notice that by including the "breadth," one already presupposes the present situation in the sense of an absolutely complete complex of conditions, and that from the outset the latter abolished the "multitude of possibilities," respectively reducing them to a mere partial relation, which does not appear in isolation.

What is askew in this perspective, viewed forwards as well as backwards, is obviously the faulty conception one brought along from the determination that prevails in the real process. This conception does not take the form of an intertwining of factors beginning in complete indeterminateness and ending with final definition. It does not begin with the emptiness of "infinite possibilities," which would then be filled up, little by little, as the individual items of decision gradually meet (all of them being equally "contingent"); nor does it flow out of one single, complete filling up of the emptiness, which then, in fact, would allow no further appearance of determining factors. Rather, it consists, figuratively speaking, of a stream of absolutely unchanging breadth – or at least basically unchanging – in which at all times the total determination of the later stage is contained in the earlier.

This comes about simply through the connectedness of the individual process to the total process. Whatever there is in the breadth of content of a simultaneous total stage (in a simultaneous cross-section through the whole of world events) that collaborates in the bringing-forth of a particular partial event, it also takes effect at the same time in countless other directions in the development of other partial processes. And the further stages of these partial processes form precisely such simultaneous cross-sections, in the progress of the continuing total process, and for their partial aspects, the same then holds true.

Here lies the reason why the determinative shape of the real process is not to be grasped through the schema of the steadily narrowing "horizon of possibility," and certainly not through the schema of partial possibility. The partial aspect in the single event is not transmitted to the whole of becoming. And this means: it cannot be understood as the principle in world events.

c) Real Making-Possible and Real Actualization

If one now introduces the determinations encountered above, then one can understand this relation in modal terms. One thus arrives at the positive relation of the modes in the real process.

In every stage of a partial process, there are certain conditions of what "becomes actual" in it, but is not yet actual; a widespread network of factors is, however, already actual, on the grounds of which these conditions must also become actual. This network is always present in the breadth of the total process, but only preconditions constitute this network, and only through the mediation of intermediate links can they unite further stages of the process into a cumulative effect. Those still-outstanding conditions are not yet actual, because for the time being, they are not yet "really possible." Even for their possibility,

conditions are still lacking. Only the continuing process, little by little, makes them possible – always on the grounds of already present factors, and always so that these factors only gradually take effect – just as the process only little by little makes further events possible, although it is also indirectly based on them. In this way the real process is generally the progressive real making-possible of that which successively becomes really actual in it. And just as it is progressive making-possible, so too is it progressive actualization. But the making-possible has this form to the extent that in each stage, the still incomplete chain of conditions contains new links from always-complete complexes of conditions of the total process. Making-possible consists of this progressive process of completion. Therefore, in no stage is a multitude of eventualities really possible, but only that to which the already present real making-possible leads; and this is that for which the preconditions are given in the broadly understood complexes of conditions of the total process.

The positive relation of the modes in the real process has now become tangible in this relation of real making-possible and real actualization. These two moments of the real process are nothing other than the real possibility and real actuality that are transmitted in the dynamic of the temporal order. And one easily sees how in them the "real law of possibility" recurs unchanged. Just as it universally holds true: whatever is really possible is also really actual; so it now also holds true for the process: whatever becomes really possible also becomes really actual. Real making-possible is not thereby rendered identical to real actualization: but nonetheless, the two are indissolubly correlated, as the latter is based on the former, and as without the former, the latter in turn would not at all be what it is. For real making-possible amounts to a totality of conditions – i.e. to real possibility – and if this has been achieved, then so has real actualization along with it.

It may further be noted that if this simultaneous becoming-actual of the becoming-possible is a necessary becoming, then real necessity is thereby introduced into the overlapping relation. This means that the whole series of paradoxical intermodal laws recurs in the modal construction of becoming. Or, to put it more concretely: the real making-possible in the process goes hand in hand with the just as progressive becoming-necessary of that which becomes possible. From stage to stage, that which was made possible in the preceding stages can no longer fail to appear. And this progressive overlapping relation of real possibility and real necessity in the process, always anticipating the subsequent stages, constitutes the steady course of real actualization. This is the dynamic aspect of what was expressed by the real law of actuality: that real actuality consists in the overlapping relation of real possibility and real necessity.

But now real actualization – understood as the progressive becoming-actual of always another and another – is nothing other than becoming itself. Thus, the intermodal lawfulness that goes along with the real law of actuality, and that now proves itself to be a lawfulness of actualization, constitutes the actual modal construction of becoming. With it, the circle of modal analysis of the real is closed. For becoming is the general basic form of that which constitutes the state of the real world.

d) The Special Role of the Relational Modes in Becoming

Thus, we also overcome the aforementioned aporia that lies in the partial anticipation of actuality by possibility and necessity. This can be more clearly grasped in the case of necessity. Given that in stage **A**, the conditions for **X** are still missing, **X** is not yet necessary; but since the preconditions for them are contained in **A**, **X** is indeed necessary. Indirect or anticipatory necessity, therefore, already exists where direct necessity does not yet. The latter cannot exist at all, because **X** does not become actual until a later time. And the same holds true for possibility. At the present time, **X** is not yet possible, but the further conditions for **X** to become possible at a later time are already linked together in stage **A**. Possibility and necessity are relational modes; they anticipate – pulled apart in the temporally successive filling-out of the chain of conditions – they connect the later with the earlier. Current events, through their being-possible and being-necessary, are linked with past events, and future events are linked with current events. This relationality of real possibility and real necessity, spanning and connecting temporal stages, is the actual basic essence of the process – a determinative, cohesive whole.

From this position, one may once again encounter that radical misunderstanding which assumes that if possibility, necessity, and actuality coincided in every respect, then they have to be identical. The relation appears to be completely reversed in the ongoing process: the connectedness of temporally separated stages is something quite different from these stages themselves; it could also be missing, in which case the stages would be unconnected and no process would be formed. That **X** is actual in due course is and remains something quite different from its being conditioned by preceding events. If its being-actual were not connected with its successive real making-possible and with its simultaneous, progressive becoming-necessary, then it would be isolated and contingent, and it would not be correlated to the temporally preceding actual. The modal construction of real actuality on the balance between real possibility and real necessity – based on the identity of their already real actual conditions – is

consequently the actual ontic framework of the real process. Without this modal construction, becoming would be no becoming, but rather an atomistic juxtaposition of different actual things in time.

The process itself, however, is in this way not only the being-pulled-apart of its own being in time, but also the being-pulled-apart of the chains of conditions in time, as they themselves are grasped and filled out in steady becoming. While the chains of conditions make a conditioned event possible, they simultaneously actualize the conditions of further real events that become possible through them. For the mode of the conditions is the same as the mode of the conditioned – the same real actuality. As then only "actual" conditions can make possible something real.

There are not, in real connection, two kinds of ways of being – such as one of conditions and one of conditioned – just as there are not in it "merely possible" and "merely necessary" things alongside actual things. Conditions and conditioned, reason and consequence, earlier and later all have the same real being, with the same internal modal framework; as they also appear homogeneous in relation to content alongside each other, and as every conditioned thing immediately becomes the condition of another thing. They are only temporally separated. This separation, however, is identical to the general temporal form of being of the real, to becoming. Any other basic disparity than this one, which lies in the irreversibility of the course of time, of the process, and of real dependency, must not be attributed to it.

e) The Temporal Precedence of Real Possibility and Real Necessity

If these things are brought together, then one can now say: the process – or, in general, becoming – is such that in real connection, possibility and necessity precede actuality, and actuality follows them.

If one understands this preceding and following atemporally, then both are evident in any case. For the meaning of being conditioned is to precede the conditioned; and the two relational modes are simply the rootedness of the real actual in its conditions. But the process signifies that this relation is also an atemporal one. In the process, the condition also temporally precedes the conditioned.

This relation is clearly not weakened by the fact that the paradoxical laws of implication, by virtue of their wording, seem to require something different. They say: something only becomes really possible once it becomes really actual; and something only becomes really actual once it becomes really necessary. This is merely the precise modal expression of the basic relation. It signifies

nothing other than the fact that full and direct real possibility only exists once the chain of conditions is filled out to its very last link, and that the conditioned event is then already necessary and consequently actual. This is, in view of the temporal succession in filling out the chain of conditions, only the expression of the limiting point; whereas from this point upwards in the earlier stages of the process there is the temporal precedence of the still incomplete and only being-completed chain of conditions.

Now, it is clear that as a result of the incomplete chain of conditions in stage **A**, **X** is neither really possible nor really necessary. In this respect, it may not be said that the possibility and necessity of **X** in the process precede its actuality. But the matter gains a different status, if one moves from the "chain of conditions" to the respective "complex of conditions," or, to put it in modal terms, from direct to indirect possibility and necessity. It is then a matter not only of the fact that in stage **A** the conditions of **X** are incomplete, but also of the fact that the factors which bring forth the still-outstanding conditions are already contained in the "breadth" of simultaneity. But then the appearance of the remaining conditions of **X** is already such that they can no longer fail to appear. And since, after their appearance, **X** in due course can, itself, no longer fail to appear, it may be said that the real possibility and real necessity of **X** are already present in stage **A**, and that consequently the real actuality of **X** also temporally precedes.

In the sense of indirect real possibility, the "real law of possibility" must therefore be widened. It does not hold true that the possible is only that which is actual; the law must mean that the possible is only that which is actual or will be actual (and respectively in the concept, is to become actual). It is interesting that this is the form of the law that Diodorus Cronus championed. It corresponds exactly to the aspect of becoming.

This relation now also satisfies the idea of the "future-loadedness of the present" far better than adherence to the concept of partial possibility does. Indeed, one must admit, it is only here that this dynamically beautiful idea completely comes into its own. The "multitude of possibilities" directly trusted the present with too little, leaving it in a partiality and undecidedness. A state of the present that expects any decision about what it will become to emanate from elsewhere, because it itself cannot provide it, is a barren womb of time that gives birth to nothing. Only a state of the present that in itself gives birth to decision is productive. The modal construction of becoming clearly shows the character of the inexorable pushing-forward and the inexhaustible productivity in the course of the real process. Understood in this sense, the present is, in fact, an inexhaustible wellspring of coming things.

VI Fields of Incomplete Reality

33 The Modal Construction of the Ought

a) The Dissolution of the Overlapping Relation

The continuous balance of possibility and necessity, as expressed in the "real law of actuality" (Chap. 24 a–c), has proven itself in the modal construction of becoming. Meanwhile, the investigation of real determination and of its natural limit (Chap. 27 c) showed that this balance is also a limited one, and that at the limits of the sphere, where necessity gives way to contingency, it turns into something quite different. The complete interpenetration of possibility and necessity rightly exists within the sphere, but is not in itself an indissoluble relation. Where the chains of conditions themselves cease, it is dissolved; namely, on the grounds of its own lawfulness.

It turns out that this dissolution concerns not only the paradoxical intermodal laws, but even some of the evident laws, such as the first evident law of implication (that everything that is necessary is also actual). If necessity is understood as the one connection of law in the "if – then" form, then it can rightly exist even without real cases that correspond to it. In the real sciences, this plays a wide role, since there is very precise knowledge of such lawfulness, without knowledge of the real forthcoming case.

Such necessity is not then full real necessity, but the necessity of a not given, and at any rate, incomplete reality. In this case, the modal analysis of knowledge will have to be employed. But there are also other areas of incomplete reality that have nothing to do with knowledge, that stand much closer to the completely real, and that form similar boundary areas, such as the ontic first series of links and the whole of the sphere. They merely lie in another direction. They lie far up in the stratified realm of the real world, where the highest levels of being, due to the complexity of their own structure, exceed the closed sphere of the real actual. There are the areas of willing and acting, on the one hand, and of artistic creation and its objects, on the other.

These two areas are areas of objects throughout. But their "objectness" [*Gegenständlichkeit*] is an intersection point of diverse ontological difficulties, and the less that these difficulties could be settled by the traditional approaches of philosophy, the more that one would seek to comprehend them, mainly from the side of the appropriate acts. "Objectness" as such is not being; but being can develop into an object, and not only into an object of knowledge. If one wants to

clarify these questions, which are fundamental for ethics and aesthetics, then one must analyze the ways of being of the objects involved in these areas.

Ways of being can only ever be characterized by their modality. Here, the acquired modal categories and their lawfulness now prove themselves to be productive. Regaining ontological meaning, as opposed to merely logical-formal meaning, the old modal concepts become fluid and capable of being applied. The fields of incomplete reality may be seen as a direct test of the developed intermodal laws of the real – not insofar far as these would now have to be rigidly enforced, but just the opposite, as they correspondingly would essentially displace the changed ways of being. Where the way of being of the object diverges from a way of plain real being, a divergent relation of the modes must correspond to it, i.e. directly from its own lawfulness. If the modes of the real are correctly defined, then in them there must be informally produced, with the displaced ways of being, the corresponding displacement of the intermodal relations. If they are incorrectly defined, then the displacement in them must be a violent one. Thus, in the modification of the formulated intermodal laws one gains a kind of criterion for their capacity to bear ontological weight.

The overlapping relation of possibility and necessity in real actuality is, as has been shown, a purely real relation. In incomplete reality, it must be dissolved. Its formal structure allows it to be dissolved in two directions: it either becomes a predominance of necessity over possibility or a predominance of possibility over necessity. In the first case, possibility remains behind necessity, and in the second case, necessity remains behind possibility. In both cases, the overlapping relation, and with it the balance, is disturbed. In both cases, therefore, that which is borne by the displaced relation cannot be really actual.

It turns out that we have the first case in the object of will and action, and generally in the "Ought-to-Be," but that we have the second case in the object of aesthetic perception and creation.

b) Requirement, Constraint, Tendency, Will, and Action

In the different theories of the Ought – in the Kantian one, above all, to which the later theories are all more or less oriented – a categorically unequivocal comprehension of the concept of the Ought has always been lacking. One saw perhaps in the Ought the opposition to being, but also found that there is a being of the Ought. What was to be understood by this as being remained unclear; it most likely meant something along the lines of factuality or demonstrability. But in being, they are the same.

The contrast that one felt but did not know how to grasp is not to be directly grasped in the Ought as such either, but only in its content, the being of the Ought. That is to say, the being of the Ought is, in essence, not an actual thing, and as long as the Ought in it signifies an Ought-to-be-Real, it is not a real actual thing. But one mistakenly identifies being with the real actual and thus has to misjudge the particular way of being of the Ought-to-Be. One has generally no notion of what is involved in the modal construction of such a peculiar way of being.

One gets on completely the wrong track by understanding the Ought as nonactualized possibility (a "merely possible"). The Ought-to-Be is in no way a real possible; otherwise, one would not be able to understand why, in its actualization, it could only be painstakingly "made possible," step by step. It is, therefore, in fact, the not yet made possible; and this means, it is precisely that whose conditions of possibility are not yet linked together and must first be provided. Only in this way can it signify a task or requirement for human beings. In the sense of the real modes, therefore, it is the absolutely impossible. And this is why it is the real nonactual.

At least this is how it is in every Ought-to-Be that has actuality for willing and acting. There is surely also a pure or ideal Ought-to-Be that implies nothing other than a being valuable. This Ought-to-Be also persists in actualization; otherwise the actualized as such would have to be worthless, and the character of value would have to be abolished with actualization. But actuality, and along with it the specific way of being of the Ought, is something different. A characteristic way of being generally comes to the Ought-to-Be only in its actuality, in its relation of tension with the actual, therefore prior to its actualization; i.e. only as long as it stands in opposition to the real actual. Only as long as actual requirement proceeds from it. This very peculiar way of being of the "actual Ought-to-Be" is alone involved here.

The realm of the Ought and of the acts that strive toward it is not a realm of "possibilities," as has often been thought. The Ought-to-Be is, at first, completely indifferent toward its real being-possible; it pays no regard to the making-possible and actualizing that are in force purely due to itself. But this being-in-force is precisely what, at the same time, constitutes the other side of it. The Ought-to-Be is not a plainly impossible thing, either; regardless of its not yet being possible, it is still a somehow actual thing. It is required. And the acts that proceed from this being-required are not exhausted in powerless yearning, but have a tendency toward actualization. For them, the requirement is an urging toward the required, a kind of constraint – although one without coercion.

Tendency is characteristic of the Ought-to-Be as such. The will, which in its initiative takes up the demand of the Ought, sets the Ought-to-Be as its

goal. It sets it up as a necessary thing, even before its making-possible, and thus independently of it. Indeed, it virtually leaps over the still missing totality of real conditions. It thereby adds nothing to the content of the Ought. What it provides is only the use of the force of its real initiative, which is the only thing that can really "make possible" this Ought-to-Be that is not really possible on its own.

The will, therefore, turns the ideal tendency existing in the Ought into its real tendency. And it thereby takes the decisive step toward the actualization of the Ought-to-Be. Tendency, as such, is already characteristic of the Ought, itself. But this means: in it, itself, the still nonactual is already posited as a necessary, namely, by leaping over its still-outstanding real possibility, and by disregarding it. Regard for real possibility, in fact, only begins in willing. Actualization falls to willing, and not to the Ought. Its work is the making-possible of the not yet real possible.

But the being-posited of necessity is not a logical being, nor is it somehow a subjectively conditioned being (it is only first posited by the subject in willing). Rather, it is an objective anticipation, a true predetermination, which precedes real determination. Hence, there is a teleological form in all the acts of those who are in a position to grasp and realize an Ought-to-Be. Such acts are purpose-setting and purposeful throughout.

c) The Predominance of Necessity in the Actual Ought-to-Be

This presents us with the case of a one-sided imbalance between possibility and necessity. The Ought-to-Be is a predominance of necessity over possibility, or what is the same, a lingering of possibility behind necessity. For that reason, the Ought-to-Be as actual is a nonactual.

The balance of the relational modes is abolished, as the real law of actuality requires it for the real actual. But the imbalance directly signifies nonactuality. The actualization of the Ought-to-Be can therefore consist in nothing other than the restoration of the balance, i.e. in a building up of real possibility into anticipated necessity.

The actual Ought-to-Be and actualization have the same way of being as their objects. As long as something is undergoing actualization, it is still a mere Ought-to-Be. If actualization is completed, then the Ought-to-Be has become actual. Only then does the Ought cease to be something current. The impact of nonbeing and not-being-possible on it therefore remains as long as the Ought-to-Be is nonactual. On the other hand, this impact is very relative and is graded over a wide range. Possibility and necessity here diverge from each other, but are by no means unrelated. Otherwise, every relatedness of actuality would fall away, as

would all actualization in an existing real world along with it. It could not then involve the real tendency of a living (real actual) will or a degree of actualization either. Therefore, in all diverging-from-each-other, partial overlapping of conditions must already be present, and only the total overlapping of conditions must still be absent.

In fact, a part of the chain of conditions is now really given in all actual "Oughting-to-Be." There are at least general conditions present, and on the grounds of these present conditions, the willing and striving consciousness first senses the Ought-to-Be as "possible," namely, as "possible for it," as long as it senses the objective Ought-to-Be as its Ought-to-Do, and therefore feels itself met by the demand as one of valid moral necessity. No one can "want the impossible;" whoever is of sound mind rejects this as madness, or at least as folly. Nevertheless, willing wants a really not-possible thing, namely, a temporarily not-possible thing, and also a thing that cannot become possible on its own. And this is its essential willing. For it wants something that can only become actual through its own intervention and activity – more exactly, something that, depending on whether it fights for it or not, is really made possible or not really made possible.

Willing intends, therefore, as it itself is aware, to be able to want only the "possible," and in no way to want an already really possible thing, but rather only a partially possible thing whose real conditions are not yet completely linked together. With regard to which, the important point is this: there must already be really fulfilled those real conditions that are not within its power. To them there also belongs the real conditions lying within it, itself, and the real conditions lying within the real situation. If this is the case, then the ontic – although in no way real – possible, still holds true for it as a "possible for it." And indeed, practically speaking, this is rightly so. For it is precisely thereby that something is, in fact, really possible, even if the Ought-to-Be is not: its willing of the Ought-to-Be is thereby really possible. And then it is, at the same time, a real actual willing. This real actual willing of the Ought-to-Be, however, is the beginning of actualization of the Ought-to-Be, itself. With it, active making-possible begins.

d) Detached Necessity and its Freedom

After this, the modal construction of the Ought is transparent. The Ought anticipates the process. In it is posited as necessary what is not really necessary. If it were really necessary, then it would also be really possible, and then its becoming actual could not fail to occur. In the actual Ought, the Ought-to-Be is

absolutely nonactual. The Ought is the necessity overshooting the actual, hovering over it, so to speak, and being free with respect to it. And, insofar as real possibility is missing in this relation to being-actual of the Ought-to-Be, it can just as well be said that: it is the necessity overshooting the real possible that is not held onto because of its respective narrowness in the real situation, and that is therefore free with regard to being actual.

This "free necessity" is not real necessity. The latter would have to be rooted in a totality of real conditions, and would thereby imply actuality. Its "freedom" is precisely the detachment of its existence from the fulfillment of conditions; and insofar as these would all have to be really actual, it is also detachment from actuality. Since now the real actual always follows its determinate course, in which everything that reaches actuality has its sufficient ground, free necessity appears from the law of determination and of ground, because this necessity lies in the form of demand. It is subject to the law of insufficient ground. In it is required that which does not have its sufficient ground.

In the real process, such demand can, in a meaningful way, only be that of a future thing. For only the future thing has, as yet, no sufficient real ground. And this is deeply characteristic of the will, which takes it in with the present real situation. To the will, in general, belongs only the future. It cannot will and create where everything already has its form, where everything has already been decided about being and nonbeing, in the past and the present. It only has leeway where things have still not yet been decided. Its essence is the making of a decision about the being and nonbeing of that which still is not. It can only begin where the chains of conditions are still incomplete, where real possibility and real necessity are not yet fulfilled, i.e. where they do not coincide. Only here can it oppose the real necessity of a different – also different in terms of content – necessity. For that reason, humankind, with the whole activity of which it is capable, is dependent on the future. And for that reason, its active existence consists in steady anticipation, in foreseeing, in making provisions for, in predetermining, in constant living out before the respective characteristic reality.

The categorial form of this living-ahead-of-itself is teleology: the ability to decide on a purpose and actualize it. Teleology is the form of human activity. On it depends humankind's limited freedom in the middle of the process of real events, its power to make possible and to actualize what would not become really possible or really actual without it. How this freedom rightly exists in it, itself, as a real essence is a question of categorial stratification and may here be left aside (how the question is answered was indicated in Chap. 26 d). But how freedom rightly arises from the essence of the Ought and from its position in the real process is revealed only in the modal construction of the Ought itself.

e) The Identical Character of Modal Constructions in the Ought and in Freedom

Human freedom has always been superficially understood as the "possibility to act in this way or that," without any acknowledgement that it is urged by necessity to do one thing or another. This would mean that in an already present actual thing, particularly in its own real actuality, the alternative of being-so-or-otherwise would still stand open. It would, therefore, mean disjunctive possibility in a real actual thing. This is the indeterministic concept of freedom, the "freedom in a negative sense" that Kant rightly rejected; for neither does it apply to the will – free will is not undecided will – nor can it exist in a real actual thing. It conflicts with the real law of possibility, and also with the modal construction of the Ought. For if freedom consists in a predominance of possibility over necessity, but the Ought consists in a predominance of necessity over possibility, then it is utterly absurd to think that the determinate will should be able to be free from the Ought. It can only be free insofar as the relation of the modes is the same in the Ought and in freedom.

It is the unique merit of Kant's work to have discerned "freedom in a negative sense," and rejected it in favor of the realm of the will and ethics. In its place, he posits "freedom in a positive sense," which signifies not a *deficiency*, but a *surplus* of determination. It has its determinateness from the Ought-to-Be, insofar as this Ought-to-Be adds to all respective real determination, its own specific determinant being in the form of demand – therefore, a necessity. Freedom is then not freedom "from" law, but "freedom under law."

In it there is not less determinateness than in passive natural events, but more. Indeed, here, there is even more determination than in the practical constraint of the Ought-to-Be – without regard to the respective being-able-to-be or not-being-able-to-be of the Ought-to-Be. Nothing is taken away from natural necessity; rather, something is added. A specifically different necessity has appeared and has intervened in the overall structure. Its difference from real necessity is that it does not originate from the connection of real circumstances, but from another world, from that of the pure Ought (which belongs to the ideal sphere of being). This necessity is not a coercion of the will, but only the requirement in it. However, it is the real authority that bestows upon this ideal demand the significance that its employment has for it in the real sphere, transforming it into a real power. Only through the real will, which decides for the ideal demand, does the ideal demand develop into a real determinant within the structure of the given situation. With it, the situation itself is changed. For an actual thing emerges from it that is different from what would emerge from it without the Ought. Because, from it, something different has become really possible.

The realm of the Ought is not a realm of open "possibilities." Its freedom is not a freedom of possibility, and does not mean being freed of a necessity. It is not in opposition to anything that would be necessary, but is, indeed, in opposition to that which at the moment is really possible. If the Ought is free from anything, it is free from the narrowness of the real possible. And by the same token, the will, as compared with freedom, must have both this narrowness and that ideal demand. But this demonstrates that the freedom of necessity is involved. For in this opposition to the possible, there can never appear a possible nor an actual, but only a necessary.

34 The Real Mode of Actualization

a) The Making Possible of the Impossible

This loosening of the real conditions that make things possible is, in principle – e.g. in the pure Ought or in pure value – absolute. Values have, purely from themselves, the power of their demand. But the situation is changed wherever demand becomes actual for a will that is taken up with actualization. The conditions of actualization are real conditions; and insofar as they are already present, they portray the real situation. They were skipped over (in the Ought) as a matter of principle. But only as a matter of principle. In actualization they cannot be skipped over.

Actualization is actual action. In it, the real conditions are the essential thing. They must be created, insofar as they are not present; and in their creation consists the making-possible of the still impossible. For the really impossible is that whose conditions are not completely linked together.

No will can create a total chain of conditions from the bottom up if no conditions are present. It must be able to begin with conditions that are present. Where it finds nothing that it can utilize as a means for its purpose, it cannot actualize what it wills. Indeed, it cannot actually will at all. For it can only will what is within its power. Thus, it is conditioned by the real situation in which it stands. It is always only relatively free, and not absolutely free. And since an Ought only has actuality for it as long as actualization is within its power, the freedom of necessity in the actual Ought-to-Be is conditioned, and is in no way absolute.

Ideal demand, as such, is only an absolute demand. But for willing and for actualization, it is restricted by the conditions that are already given in the real. Actualization is its own kind of real mode, and it depends to a very great extent

on given real connection. But, on the other hand, insofar as it depends on ideal demand, i.e. on free necessity, it is a process whose structure is complex, and its mode of being must itself be complex as well.

The mere overshooting of necessity is not involved here, exactly because it is merely an overshooting. It leaves behind real possibility. The task of first building up possibility in it falls to actualization. Behind demand, it must drag the weight of the real. Therein consists real making-possible. Here, one finds no speculative game being played with the possible, and no resignation to the impossible, but the creative making-possible of the impossible. Actualization itself must, indeed, be really possible; but its object should first become really possible. It must overcome the resistance of the always already determined real, and therefore, so to speak, its inertia; it must redirect the real process, guiding it in the direction of the Ought-to-Be. It can do this only by selecting the means from the real process itself and letting it work for its purpose. Thus, actualization is always tied in with what it finds in ongoing events. The free necessity that has become creative in actualization remains fettered in this way to the real possibility that is sluggishly lagging behind. Therein consists the restriction of its freedom.

The real mode of actualization clearly mediates between actuality and nonactuality. Unlike these two, it is not an absolute mode, but a relational one. This is already expressed by the Ought, by the overshooting of necessity over real possibility; and the unsteady imbalance of the two corresponds well to the dynamic character of tendency. But it is not yet accomplished by this. Actualization is rather the restoration of the balance; in this, it is distinguishable from the Ought. It is not possibility lingering behind necessity, but the tendency of possibility to catch up with necessity. Unlike the Ought, it is not the "mere being-necessary" of a not-possible thing, but the reverse: the real making-possible of the "merely necessary thing." And since real possibility implies real necessity, it is thereby the real making-possible, and also, at the same time, the making-really-necessary of what has up until now been a merely necessary thing. For the "merely necessary" thing is as little a really necessary thing as the "merely possible" thing is a really possible thing.

This is what realization is. It is the real actualization of the nonactual through the real making-possible of the impossible, provided that the latter simultaneously causes the real becoming-necessary. Thus, it upholds the real law of actuality, which it seemed to have abolished. This law is in fact reestablished by it, after having been abolished by the actual Ought-to-Be [*aktuales Seinsollen*]. For if making-possible comes to an end, then its object also becomes really necessary. In this recurrence of the overlapping relation consists the becoming-actual of the object.

b) The Aporia of Free Necessity

In this relation one clearly sees how the complex modalities of the Ought and of actualization are both based on the same disruption of the balance between possibility and necessity. But otherwise they have completely opposite modal structure. They are complementary to each other.

The Ought breaches real actuality, opposes the nonactual to real actuality as a necessary, abolishes the connection of necessity to real possibility, and makes it free but merely ideal necessity. The Ought is thereby removed from actuality. It has left behind real possibility, and must disappear into the impossible as into a nothingness; therefore, it must itself come to nothing, if it is not again reconnected. For the powerless Ought is, in fact, null and void. The reconnection, however, happens in actualization.

The vehemence of the thrust that would otherwise go into nothingness is harnessed, so to speak, as a driving force for the ponderous vehicle of real actuality. It is thus restrained, by the actual being moved along. In this reconnection, free necessity is inhibited, and disappears into the impossible; it is reduced to the possible, as real possibility itself draws near. The "merely necessary" is made possible. Only in its being made possible does it become really necessary, and thereby really actual. Balance is restored; the breach is closed. The ponderous course of the real follows the thrust of necessity as regards the extent of real making-possible. Thus, in the steady thrust – in the always new being-ahead of the Ought, so to speak – and in the steady reconnection to the real through active willing, the impossible is always being newly made possible, and through this the Ought-to-Be is actualized.

The misunderstood aspect of this complex modal relation is not its unsteady dynamic – which it shares with simple becoming – but the underlying modal concept of "free necessity." It is obvious that this necessity is something quite different from real necessity, which, as we saw, is never removed from real possibility and never comes about for any reason other than a totality of real conditions – as the latter is at the same time its sufficient reason. Is it not now incongruous to seek in the Ought a "free" necessity, detached from sufficient reason? Is there an unnoticed conceptual displacement ultimately underlying this? Can the modal construction of the Ought generally be based on a type of necessity?

This aporia may be understood more concretely: if the Ought-to-Be were necessary, then it would also have to be actual; but even as a nonactual thing, it is an actual Ought-to-Be; how then can it be necessary? Can there conceivably be a necessity detached from possibility in the real? And is it not, on the

other hand, also the meaning of the Ought that the Ought-to-Be is not already necessary on its own grounds? Otherwise it would not require a willing authority for its demand, in order to actualize it.

To that, it is to be answered: there is not, in fact, "free necessity" in the real; in the real only that which is also possible is necessary, and this is always that which also becomes actual. Because this is the case, in the course of real events, we know only the necessity of the actual. But the Ought-to-Be is not a real actual at all. For that reason, we are inclined to see it as not necessary. We know in ordinary life no other necessity than coercive, real necessity. In the Ought there is not coercion, but demand. The Ought surely "requires," but it does not determine the will like real circumstances determine the natural process.

The error, therefore, lies in the fact that the basic modal relation on which real being is constructed is indiscriminately transmitted to the way of being of the Ought. This relation, however, is not at all present here. The Ought-to-Be as such is not a real thing. Here, there is no real chain of conditions, whose completeness could involve being-actual. It is a mistake to think that necessity could consist merely in such involution. We have already had an example of lawfulness, in the fact that necessity exists even without real conditions and can then mean something quite different; in this case, it means the strict universality of an "if – then." The Ought, however, also stands on this side of all reality and realization. One may therefore expect nothing other than that in it a necessity of another kind must inhere as real necessity.

Necessity, according to form, is a relational mode. "External" and "internal" relativity belong to it. The latter implies that it is necessity "of something," and the former that it is necessity "on the grounds of something." The former is fulfilled in the content of the Ought-to-Be; the latter, however, is also fulfilled, provided that the Ought-to-Be is in no way groundless, since it, through the will, extends throughout the real. It has, peculiar to it, sufficient ground in a principle, in a value that consists in its way of being in itself, and which therefore has actuality in its sphere (the ideal sphere of being), but not real actuality.

The Ought is, therefore, also necessity "on the grounds" of an in-its-own-way actual thing. The difference from real necessity is only that this actual thing is not a real thing. And for that reason, the necessity of the Ought is not real necessity, and on its own it has no determining power over the real. It can attain such power only through the employment of a real will. But this unavoidably goes the way of real making-possible, i.e. has to take the detour through the production of the total chain of conditions.

c) Two Kinds of Necessity and Two Kinds of Possibility

Thus, a true necessity inheres in the Ought. However, because it is necessity on the grounds of a not real, but merely ideal, being, it is free from conditions of real necessity in its existence, and therefore also free from those of real possibility; for both chains of conditions are identical. For that reason, it can, unimpeded, "overshoot" the real possible. But also for that reason, within the real it is only "posited necessity" – as the necessity following from a real will – being in no way a directly determining necessity in the real process.

This is clearly expressed by the categorial form of purposefulness that is peculiar to the will and to action. In the will, the Ought-to-Be is "posited" as purpose; it is thereby "posited" for realization, about it and ahead of it. But as the settling of a purpose merges into purposeful action, real making-possible begins, and with it the conversion of free necessity into full real necessity. This conversion, however, no longer belongs to the Ought-to-Be as such, but to actualization, in which the Ought-to-Be has developed into a real component, by virtue of the employment of the real will.

Real necessity is ultimately only a special case of necessity. It is necessity of a real thing on the grounds of a real totality of conditions. Free necessity is another special case. It is necessity on the grounds of an ideal value. Just as real necessity is in accordance with real possibility, so too is free necessity with ideal essential possibility. For it is, of course, the necessity of a possible thing in the sphere of being from which it originates; in this respect, the evident laws of implication are fulfilled in it throughout (see Chap. 14 e). Otherwise, it would, in itself, be absurd. The opposition to being-possible first appears in its relation to the real sphere: whatever is necessary on the grounds of an essence must at least also be essentially possible, but it does not need to be really possible. Therefore, if a real will brings such a necessary thing into the real sphere, then in this sphere it is the necessity of a not-possible thing; and if it is to be actualized "in it," then it must first be made possible "in it."

If these two basically different types of necessity are kept in parallel, then one readily sees that they have something in common. One does not only see this while one-sidedly keeping a firm hold on the meaning of "having-to-be" that corresponds to the relations in the real process. The thing in common is the urging toward something, as toward an actual thing. If the urging occurs on the grounds of a closed chain of conditions, then it develops into an irresistible, but totally aimless coercion, a simple having-to-be or a not-being-able-to-turn-out-otherwise. In this form, we know it as real necessity. But if it occurs on the grounds of a valuational essence, then it develops only into a demand,

and as long as a will is found to support the demand, into a real tendency. As demand, we recognize the urging in the actual Ought-to-Be as a real tendency toward actualization.

This form of the real, this tendency moving the process, is the side of free necessity that we know best in everyday life. For having a tendency is the particular form of being that belongs to willing, striving, and acting. It is reflected most clearly in the categorial structure of these acts, and in purposive activity.

Wherever the total permeation of possibility and necessity in the real is dissolved, real necessity disappears. So it was at the limits of the real sphere, and so it is in the Ought-to-Be. There, chance appeared in its place; here, free necessity. Nothing here is changed by the fact that demand and tendency again press toward total permeation and toward real becoming-necessary. For the imbalance of the relational modes is unstable; it cannot be maintained. It either sinks into the nothingness of the impossible or evens itself out in the calm unity of total permeation. The former happens with the eternally unrealizable, the latter with that which is realized.

35 The World of the Beautiful and its Modal Structure

a) The Predominance of Possibility over Necessity

It is easy to see from the total relation of the modes that there is still a second form of imbalance – that possibility also overshoots necessity, and that necessity can linger behind possibility. But whether there is also a field of objects or acts whose way of being shows this displacement is another question.

It can be shown that the world of aesthetic objects, and of the acts belonging to them, those of artistic creation as well as observation and integration, is such a field. But before the proof that this is the case, the relation of the modes may here be discussed, as it must, purely of itself, result in the predominance of possibility.

Wherever a possible thing is not necessary, it is not, at any rate, a really possible thing. Only at the limits of the real sphere does this change; but this may here be disregarded, since there it is a matter of the first and the whole, and not a matter of a determinate and limited form. If there is such a possible but not-necessary form somehow within the connection of the real world, then it must be rooted in it through some sort of basis in reality, but nevertheless fall out

of real connection and its continuous real determination, outflanking it, so to speak, and leaving it behind. Its content must belong to a world of the possible that has greater breadth and freedom, and that opens up beyond the narrowness of the real possible. This world, as regards its content, must somehow be related to the real actual, and be correlated to its existence as to a firm ground, but may not claim real actuality for its way of being, or even feign it. It must still, in all proximity to actuality, be a removed and eternally remote actuality that has cast off the gravity of the real and its grossly real necessity. Its possibility cannot therefore be real possibility.

The complex total mode in which the forms of such a sphere's content appear cannot, of course, consist in actualization – since no ideal demand exists to require them to become actual – it must rather come into opposition to actualization. In actualization, the urging of the Ought-to-Be holds sway as the prevailing form of necessity. It is real process, and ends with real actuality. It restores the balance between possibility and necessity. In the mode of prevailing possibility, there can be no Ought and no urging. Here, it is precisely the pressure of necessity that is left behind. Modality of such a form is not dynamic; it does not steer the imbalance back toward equalization. It lets it remain in its remoteness from the real actual, and lets it come to rest in a detached hovering over the real, so to speak. Thus, it simultaneously removes it from becoming and from transitoriness, which indirectly is only the subjugated real. In this respect, it is far more in opposition to actualization than to real actuality itself. It is pure detachment, without recurrent attachment. It is deactualization.

b) The Artistic Object and its Modality

If the object of observation and creation in the arts were such a simple thing, then all of this would not apply to it. But its materiality is only its exterior, its nonactual aspect, its foreground stratum. Behind it appears something else, an immateriality and unreality, its background stratum. And this stratum is the true aspect of it: that which lifts the thing above materiality, something that is different from the real in its way of being, and that has a different modal construction, but still remains connected to the real foreground. Marble as a real material can neither live nor move; but the form that it presents in its being shaped in a particular manner is a living, moving form. Life "appears" in the lifeless. This is only the real foreground, and no one who aesthetically observes and enjoys an object is contented with it. Through its stony calmness, the observer sees life. This life is not really actual, nor does it pretend to be actual.

It is deactualized life, which persists in its nonactuality. Neither the creative sculptor nor the submerged qualities observed in the work waken it to actuality. Nevertheless, it is realistically presented through both its being banished into the stone and its being perceptible in it.[1]

The canvas with its colors is a real surface; but the landscape that it shows has spatial depth, perspective, and concrete natural fullness. Its space is not the space in which the picture hangs; its light is not the light that falls on it. It exhibits the same relation: a material foreground is transparent for a heterogeneous, richer form that appears in it, but this form is not real and is not taken to be real either.

The actor on the stage speaks and acts in actuality; but in his actual speaking and acting something else appears: the hero, the king, the fool, each having his own character, passions, and destiny. But none of this is real, nor is it pretended to be real. The spectator sees it in the performed action, knowing that it is performed, and is nevertheless enthralled by its lively proximity and grandeur. The play is transparent, it portrays events and lets them be witnessed directly, but it does not actualize what it portrays.

Even in music, it is not much different, although nothing is portrayed here. Musical hearing hears far more than the bars of music that are fading away at the time. It hears a collected whole, a "movement," a sonata, a fugue. It joins together what the other auditory senses generally cannot perceive, and what, if really heard simultaneously, would be dissonant. Behind the temporally fading sensual sounds appears another, a greater, unity; a construction with dimensions of content other than the really audible. This is the musically essential thing, the true object of musical hearing; a background form that is not actualized, but portrayed in the actual foreground.

In aesthetic "objectness," the beautiful is not the real actual, but its transparency for a nonactual thing that appears in it – removed from actuality and yet near actuality, banished into an actual thing. Or vice versa: it is the appearance of the background with its externally actual fullness in a limited real actual thing, which for it fulfills the function of being its real bearer, its representation, or even its grounds of being in the narrowness of the real.

1 It is, of course, not possible to give a sufficient explanation of this relation within the framework of modal investigation. Therefore, here (and in what follows) I must refer to *Das Problem des geistigen Seins*, 2nd ed., Berlin 1949, Chap. 47–49.

c) The Mode of Deactualization and Free Possibility

If one substitutes the aforementioned modal determinations in this categorial structure, then one quickly sees that they neatly fit into it. The foreground of the aesthetic object is real, and through it the object is deeply rooted in real connection. But its background is and remains unreal. Through it, the object is simultaneously lifted out of real connection, and is detached from both real conditions and the narrowness of the respective real possible. As it lays claim to neither real actuality nor actualization, and indeed, not even to the simulation (appearance) of actuality, it has room to develop in a way that the determinative connectedness of the real world leaves far behind. There opens up in it a realm of the possible that has a completely different breadth and freedom.

For the "narrowness of the possible" subsists only in the real. Possibility is unequivocally determinate and demarcated only where it is connected to the presence of a complete chain of real conditions. Wherever it is not the possibility of a real thing, it is not connected to this chain; it is unfettered, hovering detached over the real and having become free possibility. It then follows a law different from the "real law of possibility;" from the standpoint of the real, it is the possibility of a "merely possible" thing, which is not at the same time necessary and therefore not actual either. It is accordingly a possibility "free" from overlapping relation and from necessity.

Here, the detachment from the real actual is, in fact, a far more radical one than that of free necessity. The latter in the Ought-to-Be already pushes toward real actuality, and in actualization it becomes the pressure toward active real tendency. In deactualization, there is no pressure and no tendency. It is not teleological, and has no goal that it would have to actualize. It remains in the non-actual; its reconnection to the actual (the foreground of the aesthetic object) is only an approach. For it, the real is only the means, and not the end. The real for it does not lie in the direction of its aim, nor is it a result. Artistic creation does not need to actualize its gaze, and the real with its gravity does not need to be built up into an idea. Artistic creation does not need any real conditions to be provided. It simply portrays the conceived, and lets it appear. In the appearance, however, what is really impossible is possible. In order to realize something, artistic creation needs only the foreground, the approach to appearance. It is in these that the narrowness of real possibility subsists. Therefore, the rigor of the artist's struggle with recalcitrant subject matter. But it is not a struggle with the "being" of the background. For this is not the narrowness. The aesthetic object only needs to "appear" in the foreground.

Actualization is the pressing toward real actuality. Deactualization is the withdrawal from real actuality, withdrawal without return. Deactualization

does not know the demand of real making-possible; it exists without leveling out the imbalance. Possibility is predominant here, and remains so. Its freedom in deactualization is far greater than that of necessity in actualization. Necessity reverts to connectedness; it must abolish itself in the attainment of its ends. The "freedom of possibility" is the purer freedom. It does not return to connection; it remains by itself. The imbalance of the modes is, indeed, unstable, but only within the real, and not beyond the real or realization. To the merely "appearing" ideal, it is a calm existence of the object, removed from time and events.

Artistic gaze and creation has an unswerving consciousness of this "removedness" and freedom. It elevates itself toward them, and in its elevation it feels the "removedness" of its object. It abandons itself to them in the perception of the beautiful.

d) Artistic Freedom and Disjunctive Possibility

The innermost meaning of this relation would be unintelligible if it concerned real possibility in free possibility. But everything that is puzzling fades away when one realizes that this is, by no means, the case. For that "removedness" and freedom show a lower mode of being than the actual and actualization, not a higher one. This is the other side of the situation. The aesthetic object does not bring artistic creation to actualization, and it also does not need to. However, in terms of its way of being, it is not beyond reality, but lingers behind it. It pays for its higher fullness of form and for its unearthly radiance by having a lower way of being. Only in this way of being does artistic creation have its vaunted freedom "to break out wherever it wants." It is the freedom of the loosened bond of being, of ecstatic being – i.e. removed from the real actual – the freedom of whatever is consciously and knowingly dreamed, poetically composed, or played.

Freedom of possibility is completely different from freedom of necessity. It is "freedom in a negative sense," and therefore that which is not given to the will. Here, no *surplus* of determination is present: everything stands open. This possibility is disjunctive, i.e. incalculably and diversely disjunctive, a multiradial being-possible. It is not real possibility. Nevertheless, it is not a merely negative thing either. It still has "external relativity" to itself, and is also possibility "by reason of" something. But its reason is a reason *sui generis*, and is not a real reason; therefore, it is insufficient for real actuality.

Indeed, one may say that this possibility is a "free" possibility only relative to the real. In its own sphere, it is very strictly connected, and has its very

determinate necessity behind it, with which it is in full harmony. But it is not real necessity. We know it as artistic necessity, the inner self-determination and lawfulness of form of the beautiful, which may very well be appreciated or even pursued creatively, but can never be described or expressed. It is deeply related to essential necessity, and shares its relation to essential possibility (concerning this, see Chap. 41 d and e). It is therefore, in fact, of another world, although in its "basic approach" it remains connected to the real, through portrayal and the relation of transparency.

The portrayal is portrayal "in" a real world, and is, therefore, restricted by the narrowness of real possibility. But portrayal is not real actualization. Its content remains beyond the actual. And in this, its "otherworldly" sphere, it is only connected to its own laws, and not to those of the real. The circumstances are different for it than for the Ought-to-Be: it does not encounter the resistance of the real anywhere, and thus does not need to overcome its inertia. In its sphere it is that which is directly possible on the grounds of its own lawfulness – a perfected being, i.e. a being that is in its own way actual, an aesthetic actual.

The immense freedom of the artistically possible is only freedom in comparison to the restrictedness of the real possible. It does not require real conditions for the way of being of whatever it conjures up into existence. But it has its self-determination in itself, and whatever "is" in its realm has its sufficient reason, unable to be other than it is.

Part Three: **The Modality of the Unreal**

I The Modal Construction of the Logical Sphere

36 The Particular Nature of the Modes of Judgment

a) The Position and Lawfulness of the Logical Forms

The modal relations of the spheres that are in opposition to those of the real sphere should be dealt with here under the modality of the unreal, although these spheres are anything but homogeneous. The ideal sphere is the only sphere besides the real sphere that is an actual sphere of being with its own independent way of being. The logical and the epistemological spheres are of a secondary kind; their modes are secondary modes, and in this respect, they cannot be placed alongside the primary modes of the two ontological spheres (see Chap. 5 b and c). That here, nevertheless, the essential modes are summarized and discussed along with the modes of logic and of knowledge is justified by their structural relatedness, as well as by their shared opposition to the radicalism of the real modes. The investigation must adhere to such areas of similarity; even in such an arrangement the difference in ontic weight can be maintained without difficulty.

The last observations, which result from the modality of the real, anticipate all of this to a great extent. Much of what is found within the layering of strata has been skipped over; as the modes of ideal being are then already deeply involved. Above all, the world of knowledge and of thought has been skipped over. The modality of the former is complex and not without difficulties. The modality of thought is far simpler. It is the best-known modal sphere, the sphere of logic. It is, moreover, closely connected to the sphere of ideal being. And since the ideal sphere of being is now under consideration, the next step will be to begin with the logical sphere. All categorial analysis is compelled to begin with the familiar.

The logical sphere is the sphere of concepts, judgments, and conclusions. But only judgments have actual modality; concepts and conclusions have no modality, or at least no independent modality. Otherwise, the sphere is an absolutely objective one, although it is not a sphere of being. Its constructs are not acts, but objective structures with their own lawfulness; however, they do not exist in themselves. Rather, they exist only as possible objects of thought. They are entities of thought. Their sphere is a projected one, and yet at the same time detached from projection. Therein it has its hovering objectivity, which can arbitrarily differ from being and yet keep its inner correctness. This "correctness" is nothing but unanimity in itself – be it individual concepts

and judgments or greater connections – it, therefore, has nothing to do with "truth," although it has, for the most part, been confused with it. For truth is the being-true of an object (a real or ideal object), and is, thus, the relation to a entity in another sphere. The epistemic value of judgments depends on this, their being-true; but their epistemic value is not their logical character. A judgment must necessarily be true or untrue, but this does not involve its logical character and is not to be gathered from merely logical connections. Even when generally "correct," the connections can be based on false presuppositions, and can also be false in their corollaries. The false follows from the false just as logically as the true does from the true. The logic of judgment is gnoseologically indifferent. It concerns only the correctness of connections in themselves.

This is important, inasmuch as in it the detachment of the logical sphere of objects from the extralogical being or nonbeing of thought becomes visible. It is on this detachment that the otherness of the logical modes and of their intermodal relations is based.

It is further to be remembered that there are three kinds of logical lawfulness – corresponding to the sphere's dual boundary-relation to the being-in-itself of objects (real and ideal) on the one hand, and to the being-in-itself of acts (of thought, judgment, assertion) on the other.

First of all the logical stands to a great extent under ideal lawfulness of being. Laws of being include, for example, the familiar three "logical laws," the law of identity, the law of contradiction, and the law of the excluded middle; and likewise, the particular laws of deductive syllogism, of classification, etc. But secondly, the laws of acts come into play, these being of a very different kind, and coming into conflict with the others. The evidence for them lies in the so-called "logical errors" of thought. The realm of thought is clearly determined not from just one direction, but from two; it is thus the battleground of two kinds of determination. And thirdly, there is a self-lawfulness of the logical itself, which does not lead back to ideal laws of being. It begins wherever the structures of syllogism merge into the methodological, therefore fitting into the procedures of knowledge in terms of content; thus, for example, already in the simple induction, it shows the *ratio essendi* running in a counter-direction to logical dependency, being unable at any rate to originate from this logical dependency.

This distinction becomes decisively important for the modality of judgment. If all logical lawfulness were transposed ideal lawfulness, then the intermodal laws of judgment could scarcely differ from those of ideal being. But if there is also a lawfulness of ideal being that differs from the self-lawfulness of the logical, then the distinctiveness of the modality of judgment is basically very understandable.

b) The Table of the Modes of Judgment

The modes of judgment may be adopted in their traditional form without further deliberation. This form approximately coincides with the table of the neutral modes indicated at the beginning (Chap. 1 a; see also Chap. 11 b, Fig. 1). We may distinguish between apodictic, assertoric, and problematic judgment. The first expresses logical necessity, the second, logical actuality, and the third, logical possibility. All three are also found in negative judgment, where they produce the corresponding negative logical modes. It is, thus, to be noted that negative apodictic judgment is a judgment of impossibility (not of contingency), but negative problematic judgment is a judgment of negative possibility.

The following gradation applies to this arrangement: apodictic judgment is the most determinate, it is more determinate than assertoric judgment; problematic judgment is less determinate than the latter, and is the most indeterminate. "S must be P" implies more than "S is P;" "S can be P" implies less. It is likewise in the negative sense. But, here, the most negative is the most determinate, namely, the negative apodictic judgment ("S cannot be P"), while the least negative is the most indeterminate ("S can be not-P").

If the latter is compared with the affirmative problematic judgment "S can be P," and both are taken strictly and formally, then one sees that the indeterminateness is one and the same in both. This possibility of being is at the same time the possibility of nonbeing, and vice versa. They imply each other; logical possibility is undivided, it is disjunctive possibility.

This is quite compatible with the meaning it has been recognized to have in logic since antiquity: non-contradiction. "S can be P" means: the characteristics of S are not contradicted by P's appearing as an additional characteristic; but they also are not contradicted by the non-appearance of P. Either is equally possible, and one of the two "must" be the case. Thus, the law of division of real possibility (see Chap. 15 b) is abolished in logical possibility: P and not-P are always simultaneously "possible" in one and the same S. Otherwise, if one of two S's becomes actual, then the other must be excluded. What is compatible in logical possibility is excluded in logical actuality.



Fig. 8

This state of affairs is taken into account in the table of the modes of judgment (Fig. 8), where possibility is placed as a uniform, simultaneously affirmative and negative mode on the boundary line. The absoluteness of the line of division that cuts through the table of real modes (Chap. 17 e) is thereby abolished in the logical modes. And one can easily foresee that with the now incipient indifference of possibility the other indifferences (Chap. 11 a) must also be reinstated. Similarly, the schema shows how logical necessity stands as the highest mode, and logical impossibility as the lowest, while assertoric actuality is positioned between possibility and necessity, with assertoric nonactuality positioned between possibility and impossibility.

c) The Position of Contingency in Judgment

Finally, the absence of contingency becomes evident. No place can be assigned to it among the modes of judgment, since formal logic does not foresee a type of judgment for it. But in this sense, contingency is not banished. The situation here is not the same as in the real, where contingency is not found within the sphere. Otherwise, everything assertorically valid would also have to have apodictic validity. Which logically does not hold true by any means. For an irresolvable logical difference exists between the thesis and its "provenness" (apodeixis).

It is even more so for the meaning of the validity of judgment: whatever merely assertorically holds true is *eo ipso* a logically merely contingent judgment, i.e. it is all the same whether it is an affirmative or negative judgment. The merely thetic forms of judgment "S is P" and "S is not P" have the meaning of a mere declaration, i.e. a detached validity that is indifferent to the judgment's context. And this is the form of logical contingency: connectionlessness, the not-following from the otherwise valid.

Thus, logical contingency remains disguised in the two absolute modes of logical actuality and logical nonactuality; or perhaps to put it more correctly, in their shared assertoric character of judgment, their mere thetic validity.

It is important to make this clear. Otherwise, the modal table of judgment would become contradictory in itself. It has already been shown in the law of division of real possibility that wherever this is valid, chance is eliminated, but wherever it is abolished, chance returns (Chap. 17 c). If logical possibility is, thus, undivided disjunctive possibility, then there must remain room for chance. And the widest conceivable scope for it is obviously in judgment. For everything that merely assertorically holds true is logically contingent.

This can already be learned in the first steps. This is the commonly held view of the logical, that it is an area of lawfulness and necessity throughout. As such, it is pitted against the real, which seems to be exposed to chance at every turn. But precisely the opposite is true. The real world has its thoroughgoing necessity; in contrast, the realm of judgment stands unrestrictedly open to the contingent. This does not refute that it is the logical in our thought that continuously pushes toward connection and necessity. On the contrary, the pushing-toward is only meaningful when necessity is lacking in the actual state of judgment.

d) Relational and Absolute Modes of Judgment

A further peculiarity of the modes of judgment is the withdrawal of the opposition of the relational and absolute modes. This is already expressed in the gradation. Assertoric judgment has a kind of median validity between apodictic and problematic judgment. Apodictic has the strongest validity, and problematic the weakest. One can see from this how one could be tempted to further simplify the modal table by completely deleting the difference between the fundamental and relational modes, and simply arranging the five modes in a linear order.

The simplification is beguiling. There are a number of things that are opposed to it, however. Thus, the indifferences are already reemerging. Wherever modal indifference subsists, it always "crosses the line" (Chap. 11 a), namely, the boundary line between the absolute and relational modes. If the boundary line is taken away, then so is the dimension in which the indifferences are at play. No room is left for them.

But it can also be directly shown that the heterogeneity of the modes in no way disappears, but only recedes. The recession is the accompanying appearance of validity's gradation; but nothing can be inferred from this gradation. It is, in fact, very questionable whether it is modally essential to judgment.

Is it actually true that the judgment "S is P" has stronger validity then "S can be P" and weaker validity than "S must be P?" It is rather the case that the three judgments assert different things, but show entirely the same character of assertion. The problematic judgment expresses a being-able-to-be, while the apodictic judgment expresses a having-to-be. The two are not the same as the expression of simple being (the being-P of S). But the validity of all three judgments is the same. Their modal difference is therefore basically not a difference of "validity."

On the other hand, what the judgments express – their content – clearly shows the difference between the absolute and relational modes. The judgment

"S is P" obviously holds true in a non-relational, independent, and detached sense. Nothing is changed by the fact that it, itself, is a relation – it expresses even now that P "is ascribed to" S. The absoluteness of the ascription is intended in assertoric judgment; and in it subsists the logical actuality. Only from here is the absoluteness transferred to validity – indeed, with good reason – but still only secondarily.

It is completely different in problematic judgment. "S can be P" presupposes something else, on the grounds of which it is valid. As a rule, the case is as follows: S is determinate in a series of characteristics **a b c d**; the judgment then indicates that P is compatible with **a b c d**. But it also indicates that not-P is compatible with them. The "being-able-to-be" in the judgment is disjunctive; it merges into non-contradiction. In this, the relational character of problematic judgment is clearly given. It means a being-able-to-be-ascribed-to on the grounds of the existing characteristics of S; or even simply the compatibility of S with **a b c d**. The being-able-to-be-ascribed-to is something conditioned, something relative to the already presupposed characteristic state of S. This, in turn, corresponds exactly to the "external relativity" of possibility to a preexisting actual thing.

The relationality in apodictic judgment is quite obvious. "Apodictic" means proven. But the proof is supported by something that it presupposes. It has the form of a syllogism; the premises presupposed in the conclusion. Necessity in the logical sense is generally only that of syllogisms, even if it is not present in an explicitly syllogistic form. It implies nothing other than the unavoidable consequence; indeed, this consequence is, in a narrower sense, the logical, as syllogistics has always been at the core of logic. This is the reason why necessity plays the dominant role among the modes in the field of the logical. And this is at the same time the reason why logical necessity always depends on presuppositions, thus remaining relative and regressively tracing back to the not-necessary – the merely assertoric. In it the universal boundary law of all necessity is proven true, meaning that, taken in the totality of its connections, it is contingent necessity.

e) The Logical Modes as Modes of Predicative Being

Thus, despite its recession, the opposition of the absolute and relational modes remains in judgment in all determinateness. It is veiled only when the modes are understood as grades of validity. But this gradation is logically secondary.

The true gradation involved here is a primary gradation lying in the essence of judgment itself. It stands on this side of all differences in validity, and refers

to predication, and to the "ascription" (or "non-ascription") respectively, just as the copula expresses it. The modal difference then lies in what the judgment implies. It implies an "ascription" that is different in respect to its content, depending on whether P is ascribed to S plainly or not-plainly. In the first case, the ascription is detached, in the second it is relational and connected. And then again, with the relational and connected ascription, the judgment implies a different ascription, depending on whether P can be ascribed to S merely without contradiction (problematically) on the grounds of a preexisting thing, or whether P must (apodictically) be ascribed to S on the grounds of S.

It is always, therefore, a matter of the judgment's basic element, of the ascription itself, and not of the assertion or the validity. It is not even a matter of the S or the P, which are only *relata* in the relation of judgment. In the form of judgment, this basic element is expressed only in the copula. For that reason, the modes of judgment already externally appear in the copula, namely, in linguistic expression ("can be," "must be"). The copula is the expression of predicative being. The modes of judgment, however, are modes of predicative being. Therein lies the precise logical meaning of their hierarchy. And only if one strictly adheres to this meaning can the particular nature of logical modal lawfulness be unequivocally understood.

Obviously, the same holds true for the modes of negative judgment, for logical nonactuality and impossibility. They imply nothing but non-ascription and not-being-able-to-be-ascribed-to. Thus, they are the true mirror images of the affirmative modes. Logical negative impossibility, however, is contained in disjunctive dual possibility (which therefore came to stand on the dividing line in the schema, see Fig. 8); here, the possibility of non-ascription is firmly linked to that of ascription.

It may be noted here, in parenthesis, that the modality of judgment, with its adherence to the copula, follows a universal logical law, according to which all differentiation of judgment is a differentiation of ascription itself and, therefore, depends on the copula. In quality (the "is" and "is not"), this is directly evident, and has scarcely gone unrecognized; in relation, it is, at least, easy to see, even though it has not always been seen. If, for example, one misjudges the hypothetical judgment as implying an "if – then," then one cannot grasp the copulative meaning of the relation of conditions (here, the ascription does not lie in the "is" of the corollary, but is concealed in the "if – then" itself). The quantity of judgment has always been misjudged. It has always been thought, pursuant to linguistic expression, that the difference between the universal and particular judgment lies in the scope of the subject; the opposition would be that of "all S" and "some S," while the statement "are P" would be the same. Far from it! The difference is rather that in one case P "is ascribed to" all S, but

in the other case it only "is ascribed to" some S. The scope of S is not changed at all – this would mean the alteration of the concept's content – only the scope of the ascription is changed; therefore, formally speaking, the scope of the copula.

37 The Intermodal Laws of the Logical Sphere

a) Modality of Assertion and Modality of Statement

For logic, it is ultimately crucial to determine whether one has grasped the root of differentiation in the types of judgment. If one does not insist on the ontological meaning of a proposition (the ascription) and concerns oneself only with its formal validity or way of assertion, then the inevitably formal nature of the conclusion is changed in the external schematic that is foreign to living thought. It is this kind of mistake in the field of the quantity of judgment that has been responsible for the externalization of syllogistics. As a result, one is no longer able to recognize that a concept's scope is related to the synthetic result of the *terminus medius* and the meaning of the logical conclusion. For that reason, however, the essence of syllogistic law is lost. What remains is the empty system of forms, figures, and syllogistic procedures.

Seldom has misunderstanding gone this far in the modality of judgment. In general, predicative being-able-to-be and having-to-be have been correctly differentiated from mere being (the "is" of assertoric judgment), and laws of *consequentia modalis*, which show a purely logical character, have been established accordingly. But there is no lack of theories that have created confusion in this area. The most recent theory of this kind is that of A. Pfänder, which works out all the more disastrously, since it is based on "phenomenological" argumentation. It points out something that surely is there, but only concerns the modality of assertion, and not the modality of predication, itself.[1]

One and the same assertion can be made with very different degrees of emphasis. The same "S is P" can be proposed as conjecture or as certainty, or can simply be proposed as given fact. This difference does not need to lie in the "act" of assertion; it can also be understood objectively as a difference of validity. This surfaces in the forms of judgment when they are arranged in a

1 See, Alexander Pfänder, *Logik*, Halle 1921 (in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Volume IV), p. 233 f.

corresponding manner. Problematic judgment then does not state that "S can be P," rather it states that "S is possibly (perhaps) P;" apodictic judgment does not state that "S must be P," rather it states that "S is necessarily P." In one case, the "assertional impact" is minimized or attenuated, while in the other it is strengthened or intensified. Between the two, the assertoric "S is P" stands as an assertion of median logical impact. However, one and the same thing is asserted in all three cases; only the assertion itself is graduated.

This conception leads to a striking consequence. It produces laws of *consequentia modalis*, according to which all positive modes imply one another. That is to say, if the judgment "S is perhaps P" holds true, then with this the facts of the case "S is P" are asserted. The same facts of the case, however, are also asserted in assertoric and apodictic judgment. What, therefore, follows is the simple "S is P" and, at the same time, the "S is necessarily P." Likewise, the apodictic judgment must then follow from the assertoric judgment; which renders a proof of the thesis absolutely superfluous. For it adds nothing but necessity to the thesis, and this follows from it anyway.[2]

What Pfänder here deduces is, therefore, a lawfulness of implication that would very precisely apply (although for different reasons) to the modes of the real. But according to him, it is the other way around. This continuous implication is to be a logical implication of the modes of judgment, while for the "ontological" modes another, much more restricted implication holds true, according to which necessity implies actuality and possibility, and actuality implies possibility, but not vice versa. He is acquainted with neither the law of division of real possibility nor its abolition in the possibility of judgment. For that reason, the intermodal laws in both spheres are falsely defined. The true relation is precisely the opposite.

The misjudgment of modality should, in this case, not be a cause for wonder. It is common to nearly all theories, and moreover is not transparent from a logical point of view. Pfänder argues phenomenologically, not ontologically; it does not occur to him that being and the phenomenon of being are not one and the same.

Surely, however, the misjudgment of the logical modes is surprising. They are directly accessible in the phenomenon. In general, it is only a matter of grasping the phenomenon of their differences. In their differentiation lies the assertion of "ascription," and of predicative being, respectively.

The "assertion" is still too close to having the character of an act; in Pfänder, the gradation of the "impact" becomes quite perceptible. This unwanted

2 *Ibid.*, p. 410 f.

remnant of the character of an act is at the root of the error. Possibility of judgment and necessity of judgment have nothing to do with the strength of an assertion. One can assert a problematic judgment just as emphatically as an apodictic judgment. There is indeed a gradation of assertion, but its meaning is exhausted in the grade of validity. It is not a modal gradation of judgment. In judgment, itself, there are only the different modes of "ascription," or of predicative being.

b) Relation of Logical Possibility and Necessity to the Real

There are three such modes: plain ascription, being-able-to-be-ascribed-to, and having-to-be-ascribed-to. The first is a detached, non-relational ascription; the latter two have a relational structure, they exist "on the grounds" of something. An assertoric statement can be completely non-relational; logic is not concerned with its content's kind of givenness, the content can even be fictitious (as is often seen in the examples used in logic textbooks). Problematic and apodictic statements are tied to preexisting judgments; whereby again their givenness is indifferent, and they can even be fictitious. Both kinds of statements express a connection, the one expressing mere compatibility, the other expressing strict consequences.

In all three cases, however, it is a matter not of the connection of being or detachment of being, but only of the connection of concepts and the connection of judgments themselves. The logical necessity of "S must be P" does not yet imply that a real S would necessarily have to be P. It would only imply that eventuality, if it had been established that the judgments from which it follows are true. But they could also be untrue. In the conclusion "S must be P" the "must" is justifiable simply on the grounds of the premises – perhaps "M is P" and "S is M." It is only a logical "must." Real having-to-be [*Seinmüssen*] would be something completely different; it would require that totality of real conditions, which would at the same time be its sufficient real ground. The logical premises do not need to have any similarity to this totality, and they cannot grasp it in regard to its content, at all. This is the reason why all "proof" remains questionable as long as knowledge of real connections is not forthcoming. It is not a function of logical consequence alone that proof, and with it logical apodicticity, can gain ontological importance; rather, it is a function of their being methodologically integrated into epistemological connection. But this is no longer a matter of logical modality.

This is even clearer in logical possibility. The judgment "S can be P" does not yet imply that a real S could in reality be P. It would not imply this even

if it had been established that the real S actually has a way of being-so with which P can coexist without contradiction. This is because non-contradiction is not sufficient for real possibility; a totality of real conditions is required for real possibility. But the totality of the logical "characteristics" of S with which P is compatible is nothing of the sort. Nevertheless, the predicative "can-be" rightly exists in the statement, if P is compatible with those characteristics. It does not at all pretend to express real possibility (which would also exclude the possibility of being-not-P). It expresses nothing but non-contradiction. This rightly exists, even if, in the real situation of S, determinations are found that make P impossible. Thus, it comes about that the judgment "S is able to be P" does not exclude "S is able to be not-P," while the real being-able-to-be-P of S would exclude the real being-able-to-be-not-P of S.

In its indeterminateness, logical possibility remains far behind real possibility; not only because a judgment can be consistent while still being untrue, but also because true judgment, "on the grounds" of which logical possibility exists, does not even remotely approximate the long chain of conditions, only "on the grounds" of which real possibility can exist.

Logical possibility and necessity are based on connection, that is, on logical connection and not on connection of being. The same is seen to occur negatively in logical actuality. It is the detached ascription that is detached from logical connection, but not from real connection. Of course, it can also be detached from real connection (as in the fictitious examples of logic). But it does not need to be detached from real connection. The detached ascription can express an empirically given real situation; this does not change anything in the lack of logical connection. Logical actuality is, in the same way, essentially different from real actuality; namely, if it is understood as a mode of predicative being (of ascription), and not as a mere mode of assertion.

This essential difference of the logical from the real modes serves as the foundation for the understanding of their intermodal lawfulness. This intermodal lawfulness diverges significantly from that of the real. The divergence is so significant that it would have to render the application of thought to real relations illusory – in life as in science – if the modes themselves were not different from the real modes. But since they are absolutely different – namely, modes of predicative being – their application is justifiable; without it, after having been equipped with such a lawfulness of thought, human beings would be lost in the real world, unable to orient themselves, as if they had just been delivered from the deceit of the Cartesian *deus malignus*. The otherness of the logical modes, as well as of the logical laws generally, compared with those of the real, represents an absolutely vital apparatus of abbreviation and summary, without which one would never find one's way in the boundless diversity of the real. But for

that very reason, the apparatus cannot be identical to real structure and real modality.

c) The Laws of Implication of the Positive Modes of Judgment

If, the modality of judgment is fundamentally taken into account in the sense developed here, then it follows that the Pfänderian laws of implication are inapplicable – they could only survive on the grounds of divided possibility, which does not exist in the logical sphere – and that in their place the laws of classical logic have to appear, as they are known as laws of *consequentia modalis*. These laws, insofar as they concern the positive modes, can be summarized by two principles, in which the radical opposition to the intermodal lawfulness of the real immediately becomes evident.

> Principle I: Every higher positive mode of judgment implies the lower, but no lower mode of judgment implies the higher.
>
> Principle II: The abolition of a lower mode of judgment implies the abolition of the higher, but no abolition of a higher mode implies the abolition of the lower.

Three laws of implication reside in these principles. The laws following from the second principle are the true mirror images of the laws following from the first principle. Principle I, therefore, states:

1. Necessity of judgment implies actuality of judgment;
2. Actuality of judgment implies possibility of judgment;
3. Necessity of judgment implies possibility of judgment.

The negative apodosis of the principle indicates that these are the only affirmative implications, and that the converse of each is logically false. Thus, the three paradoxical laws of implication, which were justifiable in the real, fall away in judgment. The following principles can, therefore, summarize principle I, according to both its affirmative and negative sides at the same time:

> From the problematic judgment ("S can be P") follows neither the assertoric nor the apodictic (neither "S is P" nor "S must be P");
>
> From the assertoric judgment ("S is P") follows the problematic ("S can be P"), but not the apodictic ("S must be P");
>
> From the apodictic judgment ("S must be P") follows the assertoric, as well as the problematic ("S is P," as well as "S can be P").

Principle II can similarly be explicated by laws of negative implication:

4. Negation of the possibility of judgment implies negation of the actuality of judgment;
5. Negation of the actuality of judgment implies negation of the necessity of judgment;
6. Negation of the possibility of judgment implies negation of the necessity of judgment.

The negative apodosis of principle II further indicates that these are the only negative implications, and that the converse of each is logically false. Thus, the three paradoxical laws of implication of the negative modes, which held true in the real, fall away in judgment. Accordingly, the content of principle II can be summarized as follows:

> From the abolition of the apodictic judgment – therefore, from "S is not necessarily P" – follows neither the abolition of the assertoric nor the abolition of the problematic judgment (neither "S is not P" nor "S cannot be P" follows from it);
>
> From the abolition of the assertoric judgment – therefore, from "S is not P" – follows the abolition of the apodictic, but not the problematic judgment ("S does not necessarily need to be P" follows from it, but not "S cannot be P");
>
> From the abolition of the problematic judgment – therefore, from "S cannot be P" – follows the abolition of the assertoric as well as the abolition of the apodictic judgment ("S is not P" follows from it, as well as "S does not necessarily need to be P").

d) The Laws of Implication of the Negative Modes of Judgment

At the same time, one sees how these laws already contain the implications of the negative modes. They are, taken logically, simply the modal implications of negative judgment, and therefore they do not form any new laws. Logical impossibility presupposes logical nonactuality, which in turn presupposes the logical possibility of nonbeing. This sequence, however, cannot be reversed. Thus, in negative judgment the assertoric statement implies the problematic, and the apodictic implies them both, just as much as it does in affirmative judgment. With regard to increasing negativity, if one posits the negative

apodictic judgment as modally being the lowest, then principle II can be expressed thus:

Every lower negative mode of judgment implies the higher negative mode of judgment, but no higher negative mode of judgment implies the lower negative mode of judgment.

Corresponding to this version of principle II, laws 4–6 must then read:

4. Impossibility of judgment implies nonactuality of judgment;
5. Nonactuality of judgment implies negative possibility of judgment;
6. Impossibility of judgment implies negative possibility of judgment.

The fact that in these principles negative possibility appears divided – although logical possibility could be shown to be disjunctive (undivided) elsewhere – creates a particular problem, which must be deferred for the time being. The negative apodosis of the principle, however, contains the laws: nonactuality of judgment does not imply impossibility of judgment; and negative possibility of judgment implies neither nonactuality of judgment nor impossibility of judgment.

These intermodal laws of negative judgment can now be easily recognized as special cases of affirmative judgment. In order to do this, one only needs to take the three summarizing corollaries of principle I and insert negations throughout. The principles then read as follows:

> From the negative problematic judgment ("S can be not-P") follows neither the negative assertoric nor the negative apodictic judgment (neither "S is not P" nor "S cannot be P");
>
> From the negative assertoric judgment ("S is not P") follows the negative problematic judgment ("S can be not-P"), but not the negative apodictic judgment ("S cannot be P");
>
> From the negative apodictic judgment ("S cannot be P") follows the negative assertoric as well as the negative problematic judgment ("S is not P" as well as "S can be not-P").

This consonance of the intermodal laws with affirmative and negative judgment proves that the modality of judgment is generally indifferent toward the quality of judgment. Whether judgment is affirmative or negative, possibility always represents a minimum level of modal determinateness, which is at least presupposed by the more determinate modes, although no higher modal determinateness follows from it, at all. Likewise, logical actuality (and nonactuality, respectively) represents an intermediate level of determinateness, which is

presupposed by the highest level, represented by logical necessity (and impossibility, respectively). The being-able-to-be-ascribed-to is presupposed by ascription, the ascription is presupposed by the having-to-be-ascribed-to. And likewise in its negative form: the being-able of the non-ascription is presupposed by the non-ascription, and the non-ascription is presupposed by the not-being-able-to-be-ascribed-to.

The direction of presupposition and implication cannot be reversed at any point in this formulation. Implication is in force in the affirmative relation only from the higher to the lower mode of judgment, and in the negative relation only from the lower to the higher mode of judgment.

But this means: in the logical there are no intermodal laws that would correspond to the real law of possibility and the real law of necessity. Whatever is logically possible is still not logically actual; and whatever is logically actual is still not logically necessary. Consequently, there is in the plane of logic a "merely possible" that is not actual; just as there is a "merely actual" that is not necessary. This is what fundamentally differentiates predicative being from real being. And this agrees quite well with the indifference of judgment toward the true and untrue. Logical connection in itself is indifferent toward the laws of real connection and its ways of being. It has its own lawfulness, the lawfulness of correctness and incorrectness, and this lawfulness is of a different kind.

e) The Modal Indifference and Laws of Exclusion of Judgment

The logical-modal laws of implication have formal evidence. What they understand and what they prove is absolutely one and the same, as they then coincide, point for point, with the universal (neutral) laws of implication, whose evident nature was demonstrated by the differentiation of modes according to spheres (see Chap. 14 e).

On the other hand, the associated laws of exclusion and of indifference are indirectly given through them. From the latter, the indifference of possibility toward logical actuality and nonactuality, in the sense of non-contradiction, is directly evident (Chap. 36 b). Along with it, however, logical actuality and nonactuality also become indifferent; this is expressed by the fact that the former does not imply logical necessity and the latter does not imply logical impossibility. If the judgment "S is P" is not connected to any logical having-to-be, then it is indifferent toward necessity and contingency, i.e. toward logical consequences or non-consequences; and if the judgment "S is not P" is not connected to any logical not-being-able-to-be, then it is indifferent toward impossibility

and contingency (of nonbeing, and respectively toward possibility of being), i.e. again, toward logical consequences or non-consequences.

Under such circumstances, little room remains for the relation of exclusion, which is necessarily a mutual relation. Where possibility is undivided and disjunctive, not only are both of its limbs, positive and negative possibility, not excluded (since both merely signify non-contradiction), but so too does actuality not unequivocally exclude the possibility of nonbeing, nor does nonactuality unequivocally exclude the possibility of being. The converse is also true in both cases.

This sounds surprising. But just a simple consideration already puts us in a position to prove it. "S can also be P" does not contradict "S is not P." Only "S is P" would contradict it. The assertoric being-posited in the judgment implies no necessity (no not-being-able-to-be-otherwise). Likewise, "S can also be not-P" does not contradict "S is P." Only "S is not P" would contradict it. The assertoric being-abolished in the judgment implies no impossibility (no not-being-able-to-be). The logical possibility of nonbeing remains alongside the mere assertoric being-posited, and the logical possibility of being remains alongside the assertoric being-abolished. The one, like the other, is not excluded, because only a firm connection could exclude it. But assertoric positing and abolition are without connection, and thus detached. Both exist in judgment in a way in which actuality and nonactuality could never exist, for themselves, in the real. Of course, the possibility of nonbeing would contradict the assertoric positing of being, if it were total possibility. But since it is only partial possibility, and accordingly implies for the being-posited (of "S is P") nothing other than that with the given characteristics of S, not-P would be compatible without contradiction; it is consequently not abolished by that being-posited. For this absence of contradiction remains; it is indifferent toward assertoric judgment.

This, in fact, changes only in apodictic judgment. "S must be P" is not merely a positing of something, but an irrefutable being-posited-along-with another already-posited thing. This other posited thing excludes S's being-able-to-be-not-P; if it were not P, S would, "on the grounds" of the already-posited thing, be contradictory (namely, contradictory to the latter). Thus, for example, "on the grounds" of the premises "M is P" and "S is M." It is the logical connection that is excluded by the possibility of nonbeing. The same holds true for the apodictic judgment "S cannot be P;" here the exclusion of the being-able-to-be-P is already directly visible in the grammatical form of the statement.

From the modal laws of exclusion, which in the real world radically separated all positive modes from the negative modes, there remains only a modest

remnant in the sphere of judgment, namely, that which the three indifferences have left behind. It can be summarized in three principles:

> The apodictic judgment – regardless of whether it is affirmative or negative – excludes all three modes of judgment of opposite quality;
>
> The assertoric judgment excludes from the judgments of opposite quality only the assertoric and the apodictic, but not the problematic;
>
> (The problematic judgment excludes only the apodictic judgment of opposite quality).

The third principle is placed in parentheses, because the problematic judgment, as the disjunction of P and not-P, has no definitive quality from the outset. The principle, therefore, is valid only if logical possibility is taken as one-sided (divided). But it remains quite questionable in what sense this is permissible for the particular nature of the possibility of judgment. This is the root of all further aporias in logical intermodal relations.

If one disregards this difficulty, and therefore considers possibility to be divided, then, with due regard to quality, one can formulate the laws of exclusion in the following way:

1. Logical necessity excludes logical impossibility, nonactuality, and possibility-of-nonbeing;
2. Logical actuality excludes only logical impossibility and nonactuality;
3. Logical possibility of being excludes only logical impossibility;
4. Logical impossibility excludes logical necessity, actuality, and possibility-of-being;
5. Logical nonactuality excludes only logical necessity and actuality;
6. Logical possibility of nonbeing excludes only logical necessity.

38 Inconsistencies and Indeterminacies

a) The Disappearance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

The sphere of the logical has always been regarded as a domain of unequivocally continuous order, unanimity, and lawfulness. For that reason, it has been placed alongside the mathematical. In the real sphere, ambiguity, confusion, and irrationality may exist, but logic remains transparent in its classic clarity, a field of pure rationality.

Meanwhile, just as one must relearn mathematics, in this respect, so too must one relearn logic. Namely, one must relearn it from the ground up, from predicative being, and from its modes and intermodal relations. This is exactly the opposite of the traditional teachings of logic: the modality of the real is clearly and in itself concordant within the limits of its sphere; the modality of the logical is not. It is full of difficulties and inconsistencies, despite all evidence of its lawfulness. There are not actual paradoxes here; the most important intermodal laws of the real sphere were paradoxical. But they were paradoxical only to the habitual way of thinking that comes from logic. In themselves and in their connections, they were without essential aporias. In logical modality, on the other hand, paradox completely recedes; for that reason, the inconsistencies accumulate.

The just developed intermodal laws of judgment attest to this state of affairs when they are more closely examined. Already, the return of the indifferences brings in some indeterminateness. Logical possibility, as disjunctive, is obviously indecision; even logical actuality and nonactuality, despite their attachment, display a certain remaining-open. Indeterminateness spreads to them from possibility. Only necessity and impossibility are actually determinate modes here. But not everything logical shows this determinateness. Whatever is assertorically posited must be free of contradiction, but it does not need to "follow" as the consequence of something that would constitute its sufficient reason.

One is used to seeing the principle of sufficient reason fulfilled, above all, in the connection of judgment and of conclusion. This may very well hold true for the extent to which this connection reaches; but it does not reach very far. It does not completely traverse the sphere of the logical. There is no continuous law of logical determination, in the way that there is a continuous law of real determination. Not every judgment has its sufficient reason. Only for apodictic judgment can this principle hold true; for assertoric judgment, it does not hold true. The principle of sufficient reason in the logical sphere can only read: whatever is logically necessary has its sufficient reason. Whatever is tautologous is not worth expressing. However, not everything that is logically actual and assertorically posited is logically necessary, but only that which follows from premises.

The "merely assertoric" therefore has no sufficient reason. A principle of sufficient reason that holds true for only a limited number of judgments is not a continuous logical law. It is such, at most, as a syllogistic law, but not as a universal law of judgment. But precisely because of this limitation, it is a superfluous principle; since being logically necessary means having sufficient reason in the premises. If the principle of sufficient reason said that every judgment has a sufficient reason, then it would be an important logical law; but this does not correspond to the state of affairs in the realm of judgment. If it, therefore,

says only that the apodictic judgment has a sufficient reason, then it says nothing at all. Thus, as a continuous law of determination, it disappears from the logical sphere.

b) Predicative Being as Softened Being

The logical is not the sphere of continuous determinateness that rationalism has considered it to be. It is lacking all "decidedness," and possesses no analogue to the "hardness of the real" (see Chap. 15 d and 17 e). It is a sphere of softened being. Its possibility is undecided, its actuality contingent, its necessity sporadic, its determination defective. Predicative being cannot be integrated into the unity of a world; it does not have the continuous consequence that has been accredited to it. Certainly, the sciences show the tendency to make logical consequence continuous and to raise all assertoric judgments toward the apodictic. But this is not a logical tendency, and it does not carry through. Even if it were descended from logic, it would still not be a "law" of the logical.

Within the logical, only the field of syllogism is actually strictly consistent. Insofar as conclusions are aligned with one another, sufficient reason and continuous determination prevail. All conclusions are apodictic. Everyone automatically thinks about syllogistics whenever "logical consequence" is mentioned; and if one thinks that something may consequently be inferred, then one says: "That is logical." One forgets that there is judgment even without a chain of conclusions, and that syllogistic consequence does not even remotely extend to every setting in which there is judgment. This consequence finds its limit not only as the real determination at the boundaries of the whole sphere; it is interrupted in the middle of the sphere as well, and a connection of conclusions stands there next to another unconnected one – as, for example, in only slightly differently oriented branches of science – although the field of objects in the real is, by no means, unconnected. Everywhere the "merely assertoric" pushes in amidst the apodictic. As absurd as it may sound, the realm of the logical is just as much a realm of inconsequence as of consequence.

Predicative being is not intrinsic being, not being-in-itself, but only a being-posited in judgment. Indeed, it stands on this side of the truth relation that would, at least, strictly relate it to a being-in-itself. It is free to move toward real being and nonbeing, as well as toward truth and untruth. In the indeterminateness of its general concepts, there rightly exists without contradiction that which is really quite impossible. For that reason, predicative being is a softened being that has received the unabolishable impact of indeterminateness. Its modes are amphibolous; its intermodal laws get into conflict.

c) Aporias of Logical Possibility and Actuality

The main difficulty clearly lies in logical possibility. It is the root of modal inconsistency, the pure form of ontological indeterminateness. It directly reveals the coexistence of predicative being and nonbeing in the mode of "being-able." From it, logical indeterminateness spreads to actuality. Wherever everything that is possible is also actual (the real law of possibility), as holds true for the real sphere, there too is everything that is actual, also necessary (the real law of necessity). But wherever something other than what is actual is possible, as holds true for the sphere of judgment, there the actual as such is not necessary. Necessity is the exclusion of the being-able-to-be-otherwise.

In the course of further reflection, one must clearly keep this connection in mind: because there is in the logical the "merely possible" that is not actual (those same ghostly possibilities that could not be maintained in the real); for this reason – and only for this reason – there is in the logical also the "merely actual" that is not necessary.

But how is this to be understood if, on the other hand, everything that is logically actual must at least be logically possible? For logical actuality presupposes logical possibility. How then can the possible be a "merely possible," if it is presupposed by the actual? Problematic judgment also lets not-P be able to be, at the same time as P is able to be. But now an S must at least "be able" to be P, if it "is" P. Where then does the "not being-able-to-be-P" that belonged to the problematic judgment remain? Has it disappeared into being-actual? Then only half of logical possibility would have arisen in logical actuality! Possibility would have to be presupposed as possibility in actuality, and the implied mode in it would have to be divided. But logical possibility is undivided disjunctive possibility. How is that to make any sense?

Or, in other words: possibility, insofar as it enters actuality as presupposition, would have to be "indifferent possibility" (Chap 3 a). This should be understood as a possibility that is indifferent toward whether or not the possible (in this case, the being-P of S) is actual. But if, in problematic judgment, the being-able-to-be is a disjunctive being-able-to-be, then it contains within itself the counterpart ("S is also able to be not-P"). And this is not indifferent to the assertoric "S is P;" for "S is P" cannot always hold true if S can also be not-P. Undivided possibility, therefore, cannot enter logical actuality; for as disjunctive possibility, it is not indifferent possibility.

This is even further magnified in the relation of necessity and possibility. Whatever is logically necessary must at least be logically possible. If it were not logically possible, then it would be contradictory; however, the opposite of the logically necessary would be contradictory. But how should disjunctive

possibility as presupposition be involved in necessity? It states: S can be P, but can also be not-P. But necessity states: S cannot be not-P. Here, the contradiction is strikingly obvious. Possibility would have to be indifferent toward whether or not the possible is necessary. Then it could, as presupposition, be involved in necessity. But as disjunctive possibility, it is not indifferent toward necessity. The other limb remains attached to it, the possibility of S's not-being-P. This other limb contradictorily opposes – therefore logically opposes – necessity. Should one perhaps draw the conclusion that the logically necessary does not need to be possible, at all? This would be "illogical;" the impossible (contradictory) cannot be logically necessary, in any way.

Ultimately the same inconsistency is repeated, as well as concealed, in the relation of actuality and necessity. The apodictic judgment also implies the assertoric; whatever is logically necessary is thereby also logically actual. Being-posited is less than being a consequence; the lower mode is contained in the higher. But if the actual in judgment is a "merely possible," then it is a contingent. How can it, as presupposition, be involved in necessity? As contingent, it in fact excludes necessity. Necessity, according to basic modal law, is the necessity of an actual thing; but if the actual is contingent, then it is the necessity of a not-necessary thing. This is an obvious contradiction.

This aporia can also take another form. Just as the disjunction of P and not-P belongs to possibility, so too does the disjunction of contingent and necessary being-P belong to actuality. This disjunction cannot enter into necessity. The other component of the disjunction does not allow it to do so. Actuality would have to be strictly indifferent in order to be able to enter into necessity. But as disjunctive, it is not indifferent. It seems that actuality and necessity exclude each other in judgment. Which is all the more "illogical." The nonactual can absolutely not be logically necessary.

d) The Amphiboly in the Indifference of Logical Possibility

As these aporias developed, possibility was consistently understood as undivided. And one can easily see that this is the actual focal point of the difficulties. For only as undivided possibility is possibility disjunctive. But, on the other hand, the first law of indifference states that logical possibility is "indifferent." Now, indifferent possibility is not disjunctive; it is, in fact, already divided, and must therefore break down into two modes. Such a breakdown is completely accounted for by the laws of exclusion of judgment (Chap 37 e, Laws 1, 3, 4, 6). Here, on every side, the possibility of being and the possibility of nonbeing are separated in judgment: logical necessity and possibility of nonbeing

mutually exclude each other; and likewise for logical impossibility and possibility of being. If possibility is left undivided here, and the counterpart of each alternative is included in both cases, then the laws of exclusion become contradictory, since necessity cannot exclude possibility of being. Impossibility cannot exclude possibility of nonbeing. Indeed, not only not in the realm of predicative being, but also not in any sphere at all.

Shall we now cut through the Gordian Knot with a single slice and proclaim logical possibility not to be undivided possibility? And, thus, not to be disjunctive, either?

This absolutely will not do. Logical possibility is based on mere non-contradiction. This amounts to a very tenuous partial possibility: in S exist some characteristics, and with these, P is compatible – but without following from them in the least – and, therefore, not-P is not excluded. It would be excluded only by a total chain of conditions. But then it would also imply the necessity of P, as is the case with real possibility. Non-contradiction, as such, forms a weak base; it can only support a highly indeterminate mode. It provides only the negative sense of a true possibility of being, only the precondition, and for that reason it produces the indecision of P and not-P. And it is this indecision that cannot enter into the higher modes. But this indecision in logical possibility cannot be explained away, either.

The same difficulty returns, shifted to logical actuality, as long as the indecision of being-necessary and being-contingent belongs to this mode. Indecision cannot enter into necessity, since this is, in fact, its abolition. But its presence in the actuality of predicative being cannot be explained away either. Otherwise, all assertoric positing would simultaneously have to signify apodictic consequences. This is, by no means, the case.

This brings us to a further phase of the aporia. It lies in the relation of the disjunctive and indifferent character of logical possibility. These two characters must coexist in it. But they cannot coexist. In real possibility, they were both abolished, and for that reason it does not include this aporia. Real possibility is divided. Undivided possibility, however, is necessarily disjunctive; at the same time, however, it should be indifferent toward the higher mode, and must be contained in it. But its disjunctive character cannot be contained in it. Thus, the disjunctive possible cannot be indifferent toward either being-actual or being-necessary.

Now, of course, the disjunctive relation of P and not-P signifies a certain indifference: namely, the two-sidedness of the mere absence of contradiction. This does not imply a being-able-to-be-at-the-same-time of P and not-P; rather, it implies the "either – or" between them, the disjunction [*Auseinandergebundenheit*] (*disjunctio*). Only the undecided being-able-to-be of both stands in

conjunction. In this respect, disjunctive possibility is indifferent toward both. But the indifference takes on another meaning insofar as disjunctive possibility must enter into the higher modes. The possible must remain possible as it becomes actual and necessary, and it must, therefore, be indifferent to whether it is a "merely possible" or a "not merely possible."

In this second and actual meaning of modal indifference, however, the first meaning is abolished. This is to imply: logical modal indifference is, in itself, amphibolous. It is equivocal from the ground up, and is therefore not unequivocally comprehensible, not to mention unequivocally obtainable by other modes in intermodal relations. If logical possibility is now afflicted with this dual meaning, then it is no wonder that it appears to be non-uniform in the table of modes; undivided and disjunctive, on the one hand, divided and one-sided, on the other.

39 Toward the Solution of the Aporias

a) Internal and External Indifference

Once one has uncovered the focal point of the difficulties, it becomes possible to cope with them. This does not mean that they can immediately be solved. The realm of judgment is not a realm of unanimity. Theory would misjudge it if it tried to make it unanimous.

Even if we cannot repeal the dual meaning of indifference in the possibility of judgment, we can still do what logic itself fails to do, namely, clearly distinguish between the two meanings as such. There is thus a distinction to be made between possibility's indifference toward its two limbs and its indifference toward the higher modes, toward its entering or not entering into them, respectively. The former may accordingly be described as "internal indifference," the latter as "external indifference."

The opposition of the two indifferences is clearly comprehensible in the fact that the internal is the indifference of the "merely possible" as such, while the external consists of the indifference to whether this possible is a "merely possible" or a "not merely possible." The second is the one that enters into the intermodal laws of judgment; the first is the one that constitutes the disjunctive character in problematic judgment.

The same holds true, in a weakened sense, for logical actuality. In it, the disjunction of necessary and contingent (consequences or non-consequences) shows the type of "internal indifference;" it is the indifference of the "merely

actual." Beside it exists the external indifference of "being-merely-actual" or "not-being-merely-actual," the indifference of its being-able-to-enter-into or not-being-able-to-enter-into necessity.

If internal and external indifference now coexist in one and the same mode, then they are in conflict with each other and tear the mode apart, making it amphibolous. If this amphiboly is not remedied, then the mode is "softened" and deprived of its unequivocality. It is, in itself, a different mode from the one in the intermodal relations that it enters. The "merely problematic" has no external indifference, but the "not merely problematic" has no internal indifference.

Thus, the softening of logical possibility must inevitably be accepted. This logical possibility, in its relations to the higher modes, does not hold onto its internal character. A strictly disjunctive mode could generally not be implied in higher modality. Since a logical contradiction cannot lie directly in a mode itself or in its implications, the softening must be understood in such a way that possibility only enters into the higher modes with one limb of the disjunction, but the other remains excluded, i.e. in such a way that it nevertheless is divided in its entering into them. But this means that it does not hold onto its "internal indifference," and that it surrenders it as it gains "external indifference."

Logical possibility is, "in itself," undivided and disjunctive (P is only possible to S provided that not-P is also possible), and is therefore predicative indecision. But it does not carry this indecision into the higher modes as it enters into them. The higher modes have determinateness (being-posited and unavoidable consequences), as well as modal decidedness. Logical possibility, therefore, does not keep ahold of its indecision. And so only as it, itself, becomes unfaithful, so to speak, can the intermodal laws of judgment unequivocally and rightly exist.

b) Non-Contradiction, and Indeterminateness

The concept of logical possibility will have to be correspondingly grasped. The sense of non-contradiction in it must be unconditionally maintained. This sense, in itself, is not the one evoked by disjunctivity and internal indecision. Rather, the limitation of the relationality in which non-contradiction moves is to blame. The "principle of contradiction" is not a logical self-law, but an ideal law of being, and the fact that concepts, judgments, and conclusions conform to it is, in itself, external to it. This law is, on all sides, fulfilled in the sphere of ideal being; non-contradiction carries through the whole sphere as a single uninterrupted connection. Hence, if something there is not contradictory to

itself, then it exists not only in unison with itself, but also with all other ideal being, and thus with the whole sphere; therefore, it is, at the same time, an ideal actual. The principle of non-contradiction, as long as it constitutes the grounds for a type of possibility, is therefore in no way a principle of indeterminateness.

In the realm of judgment, however, indeterminateness comes into this principle, because here it appears with limited content. The realm of judgment is not a realm of continuous connections. Here, non-contradiction is always restricted to a segment of the already-given or presupposed, and it is related to determinate "characteristics" of S. If P is compatible with these characteristics, then it is a logically "possible" predicate of S. Only in this way does possibility become disjunctive, an undivided "being-merely-possible." Wherever the being-P of S is in this way "possible," of course, there remains much else that is also possible. The summary expression of this "much else" is S's being-able-to-be-not-P.

As far as this restriction reaches, positive possibility necessarily goes together with negative possibility in judgment. But the logical itself does not posit the restriction; it only accepts it neutrally. The logical is not an independent sphere of being. Lawfulness is the only content given to it. Now, however, the content is only sporadically given to it, and thus connection is limited, as is non-contradiction along with it. The indecision of possibility is thus in the logical a function of the extralogical, of that which is already given. If this already-givenness is exceeded by a self-producing greater connection, then space for the "merely possible" immediately shrinks.

Apodictic judgment is the borderline case of this shrinking. In it, all of S's being-able-to-be-not-P has disappeared, and the being-P of S is necessary. With this, the non-contradiction that was in problematic judgment is not abolished, but adopted, and becomes complete. Possibility has lost its indecision, but not its basic structure of compatibility.

The syllogistic realm is the realm of logical necessity. But it does not coincide with the realm of judgment, and does not permeate it. For that reason, there remains in the total sphere of the logical much that is "merely assertoric" and "merely problematic." These are the limits beyond which the aporias of the modality of judgment cannot be solved. There are aporias of discrepancy between the ideal lawfulness of being of continuous logical connection (determination) and the connectionlessness of "contingent" givenness, whereby the contingency of the latter is only relatively based on ideal connection. In itself – in real connection – the empirical, together with its sporadic givenness, is by no means contingent. But the whole real connection as such, viewed with regard to and for its ideal lawfulness, is a contingent connection.

c) The Neutrality that Non-Contradiction Bears toward Internal and External Indifference

The last considerations also show how the appearance of the "merely assertoric" in judgment is to be understood. It is here that the contingency of the empirical becomes perceptible. Its form is detachment; it exists only in opposition to logical connection. Indeed, logical possibility already presupposes connection, but only of a limited kind; thus, the assertoric judgment "S is P" leaves the being-able-to-be-not-P unabolished, as long as it does not merge into an apodictic judgment. The negative counterpart continues to exist alongside the affirmative assertoric being-P, because this does not imply any not-being-able-to-be-otherwise.

It proves to be true that: wherever the real law of necessity is abolished, the real law of possibility is abolished as well; wherever the actual is not necessary, something other than the actual is possible. Logical actuality is also a "softened" mode; it too has been impacted by indeterminateness, and its amphiboly is the same as that of logical possibility. Only if the consequence originates from the premises, and the posited "can" no longer be otherwise, does indeterminateness fall away. Only "in" necessity does the assertoric find decidedness, i.e. not from itself, but from necessity. Only in conclusion does judgment become logically perfect.

The conflict between internal and external indifference consequently persists in logical possibility and actuality. But it is not of such a kind as to disrupt predicative "being-able-to-be," and "being" itself, respectively. It concerns only one factor in it. And this is not the central factor.

This can best be shown with regard to logical possibility. As long as it is non-contradiction in limited relatedness to given characteristics, it is undivided. In this case, positive possibility is "compatible" with negative possibility. But this "compatibility" is not implication; it persists only as long as the given characteristics of S are neutral to P, which can only be true of S when S is at a lower level of determinateness. Only one characteristic X not neutral to P needs to be added to change the relation. Then, only P is possible as a predicate of S, but not not-P; or vice-versa.

It follows that the possibility of being-P was, from the outset, compatible with the possibility of not-being-P, but was not connected to it. Therefore, the disjunctivity is by nature not the essence of logical possibility, any more than its entry into logical actuality and necessity is its essence. If the latter were its essence, then everything logically possible would also have to be logically actual and necessary; which is obviously not the case. But if disjunctivity were its essence, then a logically possible thing could not be actual (posited)

or necessary (consequent); which in itself is absurd, since a logically actual or necessary thing would then be a logically "not possible" thing.

This can now be expressed as follows: neither internal nor external indifference belongs to the essence of logical possibility. Each can only exist in it by evading the other. For they cannot coexist in it. But each of them must be ascribed to it in a determinate respect. It must, as the "merely possible," have within itself internal indifference, but at the same time, as the actual or necessary, it must have external indifference. Thus, its own essence must be neutral toward both.

Its essence must be versatile and capable of having external or internal indifference, depending on the range of logical connection (and the given characteristics of S, respectively). Logical possibility is therefore, in itself, not divided, but able to divide into two different modes, each of which, unchecked by the other, enters into assertoric and apodictic judgment. This versatility is the amphibolous quality belonging to it, the ambiguity, the softened modal character.

If non-contradiction is considered to be the essential core of logical possibility, then this relation in it can be proven without difficulty. It is readily compatible with internal, as well as with external, indifference. It is only incompatible with the two of them at the same time. It is absolutely neutral toward both. The non-contradiction in "S can be P" is compatible with that found in "S can be not-P," but it does not coincide with this. There are two different kinds of non-contradiction. For that reason, the one can continue to exist, even if the other drops out; likewise, the one can enter into logical actuality and necessity, while the other can enter into nonactuality and impossibility. Namely, when the undecidedness of the disjunctive relation comes into decidedness, be it through logically contingent positing, as in assertoric judgment, or be it through strict consequences, as in apodictic judgment. In both cases, one limb of the disjunction is detached from the other. Decision is the falling away of the other limb. Non-contradiction is not directly affected by this. It is merely relationally expanded and completed. It, in itself, is neutral toward the coexistence of the other limb. The principle in it is the same, whether possibility is divided or not. In this respect, it may be said: the essence of logical possibility is its neutrality, its versatility with regard to the self-excluding, unstable factors of internal and external indifference. It is, indeed, a softened mode, but it remains faithful to its modal character.

The same can be shown of logical actuality. If one takes being-posited as its essential core, then this being-posited remains identical and unharmed, regardless of whether it involves a "merely actual" thing or a "necessary" thing. The "merely actual" is contingent, but the being-posited as such is not identical to it. It is in fact neutral toward its being-contingent or being-necessary. The two

stand in it disjunctively, but their coexistence means only that both are compatible with being-posited, and not that they are inseparably connected. Even in logical actuality, internal and external indifference must evade each other. When they enter into necessity (therefore, when the posited develops into the consequence of premises), internal indifference gives way to external indifference. Contingent being-posited is abolished in a necessary being-posited-along-with the already-posited. But the being-posited as such remains the same.

d) The Aporias of Logical Contingency

If the table of logical modality is oriented toward the modes of judgment (as occurred in Fig. 8, Chap. 36 b), then there is no room in it for the contingent. There is no particular type of judgment of contingency, in the way that there is such a judgment of necessity. With regard to its modal meaning (of unavoidable consequence), apodictic judgment stands without opposition. Even negative possibility does not in any way signify an absence of logical consequence. It is something completely different from contingency. It stands, of course, in strict contradictory opposition to affirmative apodictic judgment, but only with regard to another factor. The judgments "S must be P" and "S can also be not-P" exclude each other, but only by taking a detour through another predicate (not-P), which has nothing to do with the consequences or non-consequences. In contrast to negative possibility, only the possibility of not-P is excluded by logical necessity; in contrast to contingency, however, the absence of logical consequence is excluded from it.

The particular nature of the relation is, therefore, as follows: logical necessity stands simultaneously in two kinds of contradictory opposition, to contingency and to negative possibility. But since the two counterparts are entirely different modes, necessity standing in opposition to contingency is clearly not the same as necessity standing in opposition to negative possibility. Since it, in the modal table of judgment given above, stands only in opposition to negative possibility (for negative possibility is, after all, contained in undivided possibility), it is represented in this table by only one of its factors; moreover, this is not the central and essential factor in it. Its essential factor lies in "logical consequence," but for that the opposite mode is missing.

It could be the case that this mode is rightly missing, because it is not found in judgment (just as it is missing among the real modes, since it is not found within the real sphere). But then all assertorically posited things would have to follow apodictically from premises. This is obviously not the case. The logically actual can be logically contingent throughout. Moreover, the intermodal laws of judgment have shown that the contingent plays a considerable role in

them, and is, by no means, to be removed from them. All external indifference of a mode is two-sided; it always plays between two opposite modes. If logical actuality is indifferent toward logical necessity, then it is indifferent toward both logical necessity and contingency. And if logical nonactuality is indifferent toward logical impossibility, then it is indifferent toward both impossibility and contingency (of nonbeing). This would already give us two reasons why contingency belongs among the modes of judgment. A table that has no place for it cannot be complete. The question is only: how is it to be inserted?

A third reason arises in the relation of genus and species, as well as in the construction of the logical conceptual pyramid. Whenever a series of species emerges under a genus, these species are contingent in relation to the genus. They must be possible "under it," but they do not need to be necessary from it. They do not follow from the genus. The characteristics of the genus are not responsible for the *differentia specifica*; they only exclude every *differentia* that contradicts them. Therefore, if a series of "natures" is given under the genus, then these natures form a logical actual, which is entirely possible from the genus, but not necessary. Here, contingency is already contained in the relation of subsumption itself. This always specifies only the common characteristics of the genus in the descent toward the species, leaving open the particular characteristics. This only changes where an unbroken connection of content is produced. But the connection cannot be logically anticipated. Logic is only formal lawfulness.

Only in the syllogistic realm is chance eliminated. But syllogism does not govern the whole realm of judgment and of concept. It, itself, is only a sporadic connection. And, in this respect, the logically contingent can best be seen in the syllogism. Here, it stands not only at the limits of the sphere (as it does in the real), but also in the middle of it. It stands wherever a chain of syllogisms begins and wherever it ends. Necessity is relational; it reaches only as far as the relations of dependency are logically produced. But they are not produced everywhere that givenness appears. Thus, it is in accord with the first principle of modal implication: the higher positive mode of judgment implies the lower, but no lower implies the higher (Chap. 37 c). Whatever is "posited" must be free of contradiction, in itself as in relation to the already posited, but it does not need to "follow as a logical consequence."

e) Contingency of Judgment and Necessity of Judgment

Therefore, the table of the modes of judgment has on the one hand no room for contingency, but on the other hand must have room for it. How is this aporia to be solved?

One may seek the contingent in the "merely assertoric." It is then concealed by another mode. But this is unsatisfactory insofar as detached logical possibility is indifferent toward necessity and contingency, and likewise insofar as detached nonactuality is indifferent toward impossibility and negative contingency. Contingency as such cannot coincide with that which is neutral to it. Moreover, since the logically actual is also indifferent toward necessity and possibility of nonbeing, and nonactuality is indifferent toward impossibility and possibility of being, one would return to the twofold contradictory position of necessity to possibility, as well as to the twofold contradictory position of contingency to possibility.

If one wanted to draw a conclusion from this in a purely formal manner, then one would have to posit contingency as a dual mode – namely, as a mode of being and nonbeing – "alongside" possibility, and therefore on the same boundary line as it (the "horizontal"). But one would thereby disrupt the table of the logical modes, for as a matter of law, contingency would then have to take the place of possibility. It cannot be placed on the other side of the "vertical" line (see Fig. 8), since it would then fall among the absolute modes, to which it does not belong. It does not mean neutral detachment from relationality, but its negation, and the position external to it, respectively. Which is, again, itself a form of negation.

Moreover, the indifference of actuality claims its position to the "right" of the line, since all indifferences "cross over the line." On the other hand, it cannot be placed "under" the horizontal boundary line either (as in Fig. 5), because it is not a purely negative mode. It is only the negation of necessity (of logical consequence, not of being-posited). It is the contingency of being and nonbeing at the same time, even if these are not one and the same. In this respect, it properly stands "next to" undivided possibility.



Fig. 9

This state of affairs can best be taken into account by placing contingency "more or less" (as the parenthesis indicates) at the intersection of the two boundary lines (as above, Chap. 11 c, Fig. 3). This at least reflects the instability of its modal character: namely, that it is not only a simultaneously positive and

negative mode, like disjunctive possibility, but that it is also a simultaneously absolute and relational mode, and that it, therefore, fluctuates between opposite extremes, namely, in both dimensions. Thus, it is parallel to negative possibility (P-) in contradictory opposition to necessity, and parallel to positive possibility in contradictory opposition to impossibility. This correctly positions it with regard to the internal indifference of actuality, as well as to that of nonactuality. On the other hand, it also stands in opposition to the three relational modes, namely, as an absolute mode, which means simply the detachment from all relation. It conceals itself affirmatively behind the "merely actual" and negatively behind the "merely nonactual."

In any case, with this, one can formally do justice to the logical intermodal laws. The unequivocality of the relations cannot be restored. It suffers just as much as contingency from being brought into instability and ambiguity. Contingency infects all modes with which it enters into a relation; actuality and nonactuality most of all, and possibility least of all. Possibility itself already has a similar indeterminateness. It is its undivided appearance as mere absence of contradiction (namely, as delimited in terms of its content) that grants contingency admission to the logical sphere. Contingency is eliminated wherever possibility is divided (namely, "merely" divided), as it is in the real; since in that case, nothing is possible that is not necessary. And it is in this that the unequivocality and decidedness of the real is rooted.

f) The Alogical in the Logical

Necessity (and impossibility, along with it) is not encroached upon for as far as it extends, since chance is eliminated to the same extent. But it is limited in range and becomes sporadic. The ideal lawfulness of the logical has the tendency to permeate the whole realm of the concept and of judgment. This permeation would be continuous following-from-premises, needing to be abolished at the limits of the sphere. But the intrusion of the contingent sets quite different and much narrower limits to this, and these do not coincide in the least with the natural limits of the sphere. Thus, the lawfulness of the logical remains stuck in a kind of partiality; it retains the impact of the alogical. The strict syllogistic connection is there, but it does not govern the sphere, and remains connected to only a section. And even all pushing-forward does not make it complete.

Nevertheless, logical necessity, at least as far as it extends, remains intact. Chance cannot force its way into it. This works differently for logical actuality and nonactuality. Logical actuality is the proper space for the logically contingent.

It is abandoned by necessity, and outside of its reach it is relinquished to an absence of logical lawfulness. Only non-contradiction, which freely follows logical actuality in all directions, is not in a position to fasten it into firm connection; it has, through its limitedness, fallen into indeterminatenss.

Thus, assertoric judgment appears as the proposition of "merely-being-actual" (and being-nonactual) in its detachment from logical consequence, and in its exemption from the principle of sufficient reason, like a foreign element in the logical sphere. And yet directly on it lies almost the whole weight of that which is related to material content, which presents the logical formulation. It is not in itself a contingent thing, but rather, is in itself indifferent toward contingency and necessity. But, certainly, it is logically contingent to a great extent. In this respect, it is the alogical in the logical.

This corresponds very closely to the situation indicated above in the logical sphere. Here, we encounter ideal lawfulness of being and empirical-sporadic givenness. The realm of judgment is the battleground of these heterogeneous powers (Chap. 36 a). It formally follows the ideal lawfulness, but even with it does not overcome the foreign element. And the impervious foreign element, thus, remains in "merely assertoric" judgment as the logically contingent.

The realm of the logical is an intermediate realm. With its absolute modes, it is tied to the real and its continuous process – from the ideal, the process is always a contingent one – but with its relational modes, it is tied to ideal being. It is the imperfect equation of the two ontological realms in the plane of thought. The "imperfectness of the equation" is the internal, not-to-be-dismissed inconsistency in its modes and intermodal relations.

The aporia of the logically contingent is unsolvable within the sphere of judgment. It is ontologically solvable, but only because of the boundary relation of the logical to the two ontological spheres, and because of their modal opposition. Predicative being, however, whose modality is involved, is and remains a softened being, even where, from a higher vantage point, the inconsistencies in it are solved. They are not solved "in" its domain. Its modal table remains non-uniform, and its realm of validity remains a realm of impervious indeterminateness. Chance is admitted into the sphere, and condemns it to partiality. Chance is the alogical in the logical.

II The Modality of Ideal Being

40 The Particular Nature of the Essential Modes

a) Predicative and Ideal Being

Everywhere in the realm of the logical, whenever thought is elevated to it, one already stands close to ideal being. Essential lawfulness is the core of logical structure. It rules most strictly in syllogism. Logical "following" is so irrefutable, because it expresses essential necessity. This essential necessity is the most familiar and most forcefully evident mode that we know. Through it, the sphere of ideal being is directly accessible from the logical. One already stands near it when one deduces logical consequence.

One has, therefore, always been inclined to identify the realm of the logical with that of essences. If rationalism had built a conceptual metaphysics on it, then it would seem to govern all fields, finding only an insurmountable boundary in real being-there (existence). The temptation that emanates from this equation still has not historically played itself out; it is still almost as alive in phenomenology and the theory of objects as it once was in the work of the ancient masters.

On the other hand, the knowledge of the aporetic acquired in the last chapter is of great critical value. The realm of the concept and of judgment does not coincide with the syllogistic realm; the logical sphere is already in itself not homogeneous. It is only one-sidedly determined by ideal being; from the other side enters the nonessential and the essentially contingent. Ideal necessity does not come through. The other modes of the logical then correspond in no way to the essential modes. So, something like logical actuality and nonactuality, which is derived from the empirical givenness of reality and which remains a foreign element in regard to necessity, is not to be found in ideal being. It does not extend into ideal being, because the individual case with its character of existence does not reach this far. Ideal being includes only essences and essential connections; these are universally necessary, indifferent toward reality and realization, and therefore also indifferent toward the singularity or plurality of cases, toward real individuality and real universality. Here, the meaning of "being-actual" is completely different. And correspondingly, its position with regard to necessity is different, as well.

This becomes even clearer in ideal possibility. Certainly, it shares with logical possibility the form of non-contradiction. But logical possibility itself can be

very diverse, depending on how far its connection reaches. In the logical, only a limited series of "characteristics" is included; but in the realm of essences, the whole of that which ideally exists is included. This whole has continuous connectedness, and that which shall be essentially possible must not be contradictory to it. In ideal being, the delimitation that makes the logical non-uniform is abolished. Its realm is not a realm of thought. Here, no recourse is made to empirical approaches – not because the relation to the real is missing, but because it is not a matter of being accessible, being given, or being posited. The essential realm of contingency of thought and of knowledge is just as exempt as the temporality and individuality of the real. It is indifferent toward whether and how far thoughts can follow it and represent it in their forms. It is not a realm of concepts and judgments, any more than it is a realm of syllogisms; it is not predicative being.

Ideal being in itself has nothing to do with positing or validity. With its modes, it can approximately understand and represent a statement. But even where the representation is adequate, it does not coincide with the represented. Ideal being is being-in-itself, in itself independent of all understood being. For this reason, it is not a softened being, and one should expect it to know no modal amphiboly, no indeterminateness, and – within its limits – no contingency. In fact, it has historically been considered to be that in relation to which everything else, even the real, is contingently excluded.[1]

It is not without justification that the concept of possibility has historically been firmly linked to that of essentiality. This linkage is not to be shaken. Skewed consequences would never have arisen from it, if it had not been forgotten that there is also a necessity of another kind.

b) Ideal and Real Being. Relatedness and Opposition of their Modality

This preliminary consideration immediately puts an end to the expectation that we could rediscover the logical modes and intermodal relations in ideal being. If anything, it moves ideal being closer to the real. Both realms of being have in common the fact that their being is a true, actual, and unsoftened being.

1 This, as well as the following, generally presupposes what is laid out in the volume *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie* (3rd ed. 1948) concerning the position and givenness of ideal being; see Part IV, specifically Chapters 41 to 45.

Accordingly, quite the opposite is to be expected. One must find in the realm of essence an analogue to the hardness and decidedness of the real. And since such an analogue must be expressed in intermodal relations, it is to be expected that these relations will turn out similarly to those of the real. Above all, the law of division of possibility would have to come back into force. With it, however, all indifference would, on formal grounds, already disappear. Hence, it would also have to follow that 1. all positive modes exclude the negative modes; and 2. all positive modes have to imply one another, just as all negative modes have to imply one another. To put it succinctly, the three principles of intermodal relations would have to return (see Chap. 14 c, d, and e). This would correspond quite well with the independent character of being of the realm of essence. And the fact that essential relations determinately extend deeply into the real would also make sense.

However, this cannot be the case. One quite simple consideration already proves this convincingly. The ontological character of a sphere consists in the particular nature of its modes and intermodal relations. These are its ontological exposition. If the modes and intermodal relations of two spheres are perfectly identical, then their ways of being are also identical. And this means that the spheres themselves are also identical; in fact, together they form a sphere, and can distinguish themselves within their sphere only as special fields. Thus, in the real one can, in any event, distinguish fields of incomplete reality from those of full real actuality; therefore, within the logical, the field of syllogism and of logical consequence can be distinguished from that of the "merely assertoric." But in both cases, the distinction remains close to the basic character of the sphere. On the other hand, ideal and real being radically differ from each other, forming the most perceptible contrast. Numbers, triangles, essences of action are not only something different from things, events, persons, values, and situations; they "are" what they are in a basically different way. The latter "are" unique, temporal, arising, elapsing, individual, and are themselves either material or connected to materiality; the former "are" timeless, eternal, freed from the past, universal, immaterial. This profound dissimilarity has led to the fact that one may want to recognize only the real as "that which is," and deny the ideal its own being. One thereby moves the latter into questionable proximity to the logical, and then finds no further means to distinguish it from the logical.

This is, at least, an understandable error. The differences are concealed here. However, the differences between ideal and real being are evident, having been recognized ever since the time of Plato. One could very well misjudge or deny the realm of the ideal itself, but one could not confuse it with the realm of things and events.

But if the difference between the ways of being stands firm, then there must necessarily also be a difference in the modes and intermodal relations of the two spheres; namely, a difference that is categorially sufficient to sustain the opposition between the ways of being. Only further analysis can reveal where this is to be sought.

c) The Regression of the Absolute Modes and the Autocracy of the Relational Modes

A well-known aspect of difference now forces its way into our analysis. It concerns the character of the essential modes themselves, and is deeply characteristic of the ideal ways of being: the fading opposition of "actual" and "non-actual," i.e. the regression of the absolute modes to the second conception. This means that in the realm of essences, possibility and necessity – as well as their negative counterparts – virtually claim the field alone.

But if, as relational modes, these two in themselves have relativity to actuality (according to the basic modal law, Chap. 7), then the regression of actuality must, at the same time, modify them. Possibility and necessity themselves must display an altered modal character, in a positive as well as in a negative sense. But this means that the modes all gain a basically different meaning. Even the intermodal relations that are formally the same in them must, in truth, be different from those of the real modes.

The phenomenon underlying this is well-known; but it is not easy to describe it precisely. One automatically thinks first of all, of the indifference of essences toward the individual case in which they are realized and from which they are detachable as the empirically "contingent." Real cases are subject to many kinds of essential lawfulness.

Phenomenology has grounded its method on this relation: it begins with the real actual, brackets its real actuality as "contingent," and lifts from the bracket whatever is inseparable from the character of the object, i.e. what "essentially and necessarily" belongs to it.

Thus, actuality is bracketed here, and something necessary is lifted out. Ever since Plato's search for *eidos*, this has been the procedure for all who viewed *eidos* as having to do with pure *essentia* but in fact independent of it, as they metaphysically utilized the *essentia* found. Here, ideal being is seen from real being, and in opposition to it. It has always been regarded in this manner. But, here, the difference between the ways of being is already assumed to be known. In truth, it is not known. The certainty with which one "deictically" points out the essential characteristics of the real has nothing to do with an

ontological understanding of the relation. Indeed, the relation is given, but only as something that has not been understood. It could be understood from the mutual ways of being; but the ways of being are what is puzzling. Only modal analysis can clarify them. But for this, any basic approach in the procedure is lacking.

Which "actuality" is now bracketed? Surely not the actuality of the essences themselves? Not ideal actuality, which may thus only imply "existence" in the realm of essences. It remains essential, and whatever is lifted from the bracket may always signify it. Only real actuality is completely eliminated. But this is obvious, if it involves research into essence. Thus, phenomenological bracketing, and everything that is procedurally similar to it, is not proven to be evidence for the regression of actuality in ideal being. For this regression is a regression of ideal actuality-of-being itself.

One can much sooner require the lifting out of the opposite. For what is presented in it is always shown in a certain ideal factuality; it develops into givenness, brought to ascertainability, and must, therefore, have the character of ideal being-present. One understands what, in the essence of the thing, "is so." The presented appears in the mode of essential actuality.

Nevertheless, this is not the *ultima ratio* of the presupposed relation. Here, there is in fact a kind of self-misunderstanding on the part of the procedure. Phenomenology isolates the individual phenomenon, gazes spellbound at it, and intends to describe it as it "finds" it. It works with isolating, "stigmatic" intuition. But this work is already conditioned; it is concentrically focused on one point, but comes from a structural connection of essences, which it already presupposes and already knows about. Behind stigmatic intuition already stands a conspective [*konspektiv*] intuition, which is no longer taken into account, because it is accepted as obvious. But where it has failed or has insufficiently led the way, the stigmatically seen also turns out poorly; it has no way of resisting connection. One notes the result as a naked "it is so," forgetting that everything that one is able to consider in observation, has already passed the test of being able to coexist with the otherwise known – thus, the test for non-contradiction. Indeed, what is more, one forgets that one only considers what was inseparably related to previously comprehended essential characteristics, which was essentially and necessarily evident from these essential characteristics.

Thus, here, one thoroughly conforms to ideal possibility and necessity. And only the form of the summing-up, as it appears in the result, simulates the mode of a merely ideal actual for the seeker. The pursuit of this path to knowledge would, therefore, allow access to the modality of essence to be thoroughly blocked. One must look around for another path.

d) Essential Actuality as a Concurrent Modal Factor

In doing so, it is highly instructive to orient oneself toward such fields of knowledge as those that have, since antiquity, dealt with their subject matter through generally proven methods. Mathematics provides the best example of this. Here, there are verifiable results. The principle of the angular sum of a triangle plainly expresses an "it is so;" that there are logarithms of all positive real numbers, that there is no logarithm of a negative number, this "there is" and "there is not" clearly expresses mathematical being and nonbeing. If ideal actuality becomes tangible anywhere, then it becomes tangible here – in the concept of mathematical existence.

This is to be seen in two ways. First: there is ideal actuality and nonactuality purely as such. It lies in the plain existence of essences, in their position, and in their essential connection. Mathematical existence is only a special case. In itself, all ideal being also has "ideal existence," i.e. an existence in its sphere; namely, completely independently of whether it also exists in some other sphere, perhaps in that of consciousness, in logic, or in the real. All of this plays no role for ideal actuality.

But then: it is also apparent that ideal actuality, or ideal existence plays a subordinate role in its own sphere. It plays the role of a modal factor in ideal being that is obviously concurrent but somehow not relevant – in its content or way of being.

If one looks at this more closely, then one finds that all verification of mathematical existence involves the demonstration of ideal possibility and necessity. This becomes quite clear, if one looks at a negative case. From the fact that there is no logarithm of a negative number, and from the content-related connections in that fact (and only from them is it evident), it is to be understood that there "can" be no such logarithm. The reasons for this can be brought to light. They lie in the form of the logarithmic function. An impossibility lurks behind the "there is not."

In exactly the same way, a possibility and a necessity lurk behind the "there is." That there are logarithms of all positive real numbers means: 1. for every positive real number, a logarithm is possible; and 2. for every positive real number, a logarithm is necessary. The function has a sufficient range for this, and must encompass it. One can be very certain of both, even if one does not have the specific logarithm of a number or cannot calculate it with sufficient accuracy. The law does not have to do with the special case; it cannot indicate anything other than this mathematical general possibility and necessity. Everything here depends on the connections and modes of connection. Ideal actuality is then a matter of course.

This is even more obvious in the ordinary (not existential) principles of mathematics. The principle of the angular sum of a triangle does not have to do with the fact that there "is" an angular sum, or with the fact that this sum is plainly equal to two right angles. Rather, it has to do with how the constancy of this value is possible with the various changing angular values of the triangle itself, and with why this constancy is necessary. The proof of the principle has to do with nothing other than this.

41 Preliminary Version of the Modality of Essence

a) Transfer of the Paradoxical Laws of Implication

Thus, the relational modes acquire a kind of autocracy in the ideal sphere of being. It is sufficient that something ideal is possible; it thereby already exists as an "ideal existing thing." There is not another kind of actuality here. This is already a full, ideal being. Beyond it, there is only real actuality, but it does not come into question here. Not only essential possibility, but also essential actuality, is indifferent toward it. They belong to a different sphere of being, and with it begins another possibility and necessity.

The autocracy of the relational modes means the universal relationality of ideal being. This being essentially consists in relations; it forms a realm of pure connections, relations, associations, and types of lawfulness; or even, as it has often been called, a realm of pure form and lawfulness of form. Which is how *essentia* has been understood since antiquity, as pure form.

This signifies indifference toward reality, temporality, individuality (the individual case), and materiality. It is a diluted atmosphere that belongs to essences. Its being is a diluted and disempowered being, so to speak. It is not a softened being, like logical predicative being. It is true being-in-itself; it has entirely its own rigor and decidedness, which is missing nothing. There also exists in it a hardness of being. But it is a different kind of hardness than that of the real. It is weightless, "light," hovering, formal being.

This state of affairs, which, of course, can only be captured by means of figures of speech, is well illustrated by the term "ideal being." One must simply be careful about understanding it subjectively, or even merely logically. If one carefully maintains the delimitation here – it depends solely on pure relationality – then in the sense of what was stipulated above, it can be said: everything that is ideally possible is also ideally actual (has its "existence" in the realm of essences).

This principle is now obviously a formal analogue to the "real law of possibility" (Chap. 14 f). Nevertheless, it means something quite different from this law. It connects modes that are structurally quite different. In the real, the principle has no formal evidence; there, it is a paradoxical principle, of whose validity one can only be convinced in a roundabout way. In ideal being – in the disempowered sense of being-actual – it is perfectly evident. Here, there is no totality of conditions involved in possibility, but rather merely non-contradiction; and of course, non-contradiction in widely branched connections, by no means limited to logical connections. But it is indeed the case that this branched relation of uncontradictory self-integration already, in itself, suffices to constitute ideal "existence."

The foundation of the whole intermodal lawfulness of ideal being now seems to have been found. For one may now expect that whatever is ideally possible in this way must also be ideally necessary; since it, as an ideally necessary thing, already has its place among the essences. There is no authority that could take that place from it. Thus, the paradoxical laws of implication, as we know them from the real, *mutatis mutandis* (i.e. with the modes themselves having a similar change of meaning) would then be transferable to ideal being. All that is ideally actual would be ideally necessary, all that is ideally nonactual would be impossible, and the negatively possible would be ideally nonactual and impossible.

And it would further have to be concluded that the law of division of possibility would return. For these implications can only rightly exist where possibility breaks down into two different modes. Whether the law itself is compatible with the meaning of ideal possibility as non-contradiction may, for the time being, remain undiscussed. This requires a different investigation. Beforehand, one has to allow the paradoxical laws of implication to be transferred to ideal being. The consequences are best learned from their tenability.

b) The Scope of Essential Possibility and its Delimitation

If one wants to set up a table of the modes corresponding to these intermodal relations, then one must take into account the changed meaning of actuality and nonactuality. Neither of them play a distinctive role in ideal being, apart from the possibility of being and of nonbeing. They are posited along with it; they are a matter of course, and signify no "more" than the being-able-to-be and the not-being-able-to-be. So, one must bracket them in the table and place them next to the two parts of divided possibility (Fig. 10). They are positioned neither above, nor below them, being no more or less than them. They are

	N
(A)	P+
(NA)	P–
	I

Fig. 10

purely concurrent modes. On the other hand, they remain on the opposite side of the vertical line of separation, because they nevertheless imply something different, existence and nonexistence.

Possibility and necessity are also relative here to the actual, in the sense of internal as well as external relativity. But the weightiness of internal relativity has been lost: that necessity and possibility are the necessity and possibility of an ideal existence signifies nothing other than the relation itself. Both have become autocratic in the realm of this being, but the autocracy is weightless; and hence, they themselves are also weightless. For they rule over nothing other than their own structure. They have no contents other than that of the relationality itself in which they exist. The realm of essences is a realm of idle relations, without any substrate other than its own state of relations. Considered purely in itself, it may just as well be called a realm of the essenceless. It becomes a realm of essence only with respect to the real, "whose" essence it constitutes.

This dovetails nicely with the ancient conception of the realm of "pure forms." These forms were present and remained in all such metaphysical accounts of disempowered being; even where one has sought to understand them as "that which truly is" or as substances of being. For this substantiality was and remains merely "substance of form."

Ideal being, thus, presents itself as a unique and immense realm of pure possibility; as a realm of hovering relationality, in which everything that "rightly exists" and that consequently has essential actuality is uncontradictory. This realm of possibility is, by no means, unlimited. Non-contradiction, as long as it is on all sides and throughout, sets limits to it from within. The contradictory is that which is not possible in it, and which therefore does not exist in it. It has its limitation in itself, in its principle. But it has only these limits, having no other, no external, limits. It applies its own lawfulness to itself. Of course, it has not much to apply. It consists in nothing but this hovering possibility.

Such a realm of pure possibility was contemplated by Leibniz, whose "possible worlds" have strict, absolutely "hard" lawfulness but still remain heedlessly in abeyance. One might think that here the particular nature of this

possibility might be appropriately comprehended ontologically. Only one circumstance stands in the way; namely, that Leibniz viewed this pure possibility as being merely in opposition to real actuality, and not in opposition to real possibility. The principle of convenience that he sets at the threshold of actualization of the "best world" is understood as nothing other than the making-possible of a real but not yet possible world. Leibniz knew only the counterparts of the heterogeneous modes: essential possibility and real actuality. He did not recognize, any more than later thinkers did, that essential possibility is firmly connected with essential actuality, and that real actuality is firmly connected with real possibility. For that reason, the possibility of being had to appear undivided and disjunctive to all of them. However, neither as ideal nor as real is it undivided and disjunctive; neither ideal nor real possibility is indifferent toward the actuality of the same sphere. Only essential possibility is indifferent toward real actuality. But only because it is, at the same time, indifferent toward real possibility (totality of real conditions); or, one may say this is so, because in general, ideal being is indifferent toward reality.

c) The Meaning of the Overlapping Relation of the Relational Modes in Ideal Being

If one now accepts this arrangement and intermodal lawfulness of the modes of ideal being, then regardless of the formal consonance of the intermodal laws, one may very well clarify the opposition to the modality of the real. Namely, if in this realm of pure possibility, all of the possible is also necessarily ideally actual, then one cannot avoid the conclusion that there must also be a mutual permeation of possibility and necessity, here. Whether this is the case still remains to be seen. But insofar as it holds true or does not hold true, what does it actually mean here?

In the real, it means the disappearance of both relational modes behind actuality. This was the consequence of the real law of actuality (Chap. 24 d). The disappearance clearly does not occur in ideal being. That is why essential actuality is taken far too lightly, becoming something merely incidental. It has disappeared, and is a modal factor that is demonstrable only in theory. It is weightless in comparison with the autocracy of the relational modes. In a word, exactly the opposite of what happens in the real takes place here: actuality disappears behind the relational network of possibility and necessity.

These two permeate each other in it, but they do not "indifferentiate" themselves. Together they constitute a single connection in which their external

relativity exists; but they do not set up anything beyond it in which they could disappear. Thus, they themselves remain in the foreground, as the essence of the ideal connection. And ideal actuality, itself, which signifies nothing but the "existence" of the form in them, in fact disappears behind them. It is still there, and can be demonstrated at any time, but the actual way of being of essence does not lie within it. Within the structure of relations, it plays only the subordinate role of a concurrent modal moment.

Formally identical intermodal relations are, therefore, absolutely different relations, as long as they exist in essentially different and ontologically heterogeneous modes. In a realm of pure relations, the relational modes must completely cover up the absolute modes; just as much as in a realm of substrate-saturated and terrestrially bound being, the absolute modes must cover up the relational modes. That is to say, in both cases, without the being borne by the one thereby affecting that of the other.

It is, by no means, immediately evident from the formal character of the modes that in ideal being there is generally an overlapping relation of possibility and necessity. After looking at the logical, one may become quite accustomed to looking at the realm of the ideally possible as an almost unlimited one, but at the realm of the ideally necessary as a very limited one. And it is proper to this conception that essential possibility is the complete non-contradiction, while necessity is here a consequence; therefore, they are, in sufficient knowledge of essence, both comprehensible in the schema of the logical modes. The difference between them develops in their relation to actuality. The essentially possible is also essentially actual. In ideal being there is not the "foreign element" of a factual actuality, rising up from another sphere. The sphere in itself is thoroughly homogeneous. Givenness does not concern it at all, because it is a sphere of being. In fact, it itself is an only partially given sphere.

Thus, the range of the non-contradictory may very well coincide with that of the "existing." Indeed, this overlap is an analytic principle that follows from the meaning of ideal existence. In this respect, the law of implication, stipulating that all of the essentially possible is also essentially actual, is quite dissimilar to the real law of possibility, no matter how much it formally conforms to it. And the same dissimilarity is true of the other paradoxical laws of implication. For this necessity is a different necessity. It means a "consequence" that is different from a temporal, real one. It is related to logical "consequence." It merely has a much wider foundation than the latter; it is not limited to the contingent range of what has been comprehended, but exists ideally in itself, in constant completeness.

d) The Ranges of Possibility and Necessity. The Law of Consolidation

The formal conformity of the relational essential modes to those of judgment expresses quite simply the essential lawfulness extending into the logical. And likewise, the diversity of the associated intermodal laws expresses quite simply the limit of this extension. The logically contingent in the "merely actual" (posited) drives a wedge into the continuous unequivocality of logical connection. This limit is abolished in the realm of essence; no heterogeneous wedge forces its way into its internal relations. The connection becomes continuous, allowing it also to remain intact.

If one now places the homologous modes of the logical, of ideal being, and of real being alongside one another, then a simple, quantitative relation is produced, which clearly reflects the characters of the spheres. It can be summarized by two principles: 1. essential possibility is much narrower than logical possibility, and much wider than real possibility, since it is more complete (more determinate) with regard to content than logical possibility, and at the same time more incomplete than real possibility; and 2. essential necessity is much wider than logical necessity, and much narrower than real necessity, since it is more complete (more determinate) with regard to content than logical necessity, but at the same time more incomplete than real necessity.

At first glance, this seems paradoxical. Compared with the logical, possibility becomes narrower in ideal being, while necessity becomes wider; compared with the real, possibility conversely becomes wider, while necessity becomes narrower. Nevertheless, for just this reason, it is absolutely clear. The relation between range and content in the mode of possibility is different from that in the mode of necessity. With increasing content, determinateness grows; and wherever determinateness is greater, the range of the possible is narrower (it is "less" possible). But, at the same time, wherever determinateness is greater, the range of the necessary is wider (it is "more" necessary). For necessity has the meaning of "following" from another thing; but this "other thing" must have determinateness. The further determinateness reaches, the more necessity must follow from it. It must, therefore, hold true for a whole sphere that: the more determinate the content in it, the more that is necessary in it; and the less determinate the content in it, the more that is possible in it.

This produces the simple consequence: in a sphere of continuous determinateness, the range of the possible must shrink to such an extent, and the range of the necessary must expand to such an extent, that both come into congruence. Both ranges approximate each other to the extent that their

determinateness is condensed. The law expressed by this consequence may, thus, be called the law of condensation of the relational modes.

This law is, of course, only immediately discernible where possibility is similar in different spheres, e.g. consists in non-contradiction; which fully applies to the logical and the ideal spheres. For the real sphere, this type of possibility is too little, being only a minimum, a precondition in the real chain of conditions. But it is easy to see that if determinateness of content is properly understood, then it will be evident that the real sphere aligns itself with the law of condensation, and that the law finds in it the extreme case of complete congruence. For it is this sphere that demonstrates the characteristic "narrowness of the possible" that results from the real law of possibility (Chap. 21 d).

e) The Gradation of the Density of Determinateness in the Logical, Ideal, and Real Sphere

The familiar law of the indirect proportionality of range and content, which governs logical conceptual relations, is not a specifically logical law. It also extends to other spheres, and even to the relation between them. But it is indeed thereby limited, insofar as it is a specific law of possibility (in the ideal being and thus also of actuality, because here this is merely a concurrent modal factor). It does not apply to necessity. Necessity, in fact, follows the converse law: for it, the range grows with the content, and also recedes with it. A logical conceptual relation is, in the first place, a relation of possibility; it lets opposite species stand disjunctively under an identical genus. Therefore, it follows the law of possibility. From the genus to the species, necessity holds sway only with respect to the general; the particular remains undetermined in this relation. Necessity is restricted. Its law does not come into question here.

The logical is a pure realm of the formal. Content is external to it. Everything that is already compatible with a minimum of determinateness (of some "characteristics") is logically possible. In this minimum of determinateness, the range of the possible is the greatest. In such an ebbing away of content, the necessary can only be less. But in this "less," necessity must be easily discernible. Thus, the much admired rationality of the syllogism. Here, possibility and necessity diverge widely from each other. There are always incalculably many possible things that are not necessary. In the real, it is the other way around. Here, there is the highest fullness of content and of determinateness. The possible is only that which has full determinateness from a totality of

real factors. In this maximum determinateness, the possible has the smallest range: there is only ever "one" possible thing. At the same time, the necessary has the greatest range. Thus, here, only what is necessary is possible. The ranges coincide.

The realm of essences is a sphere of median determinateness. The content here is far poorer than in the real, but far richer than in the logical. Therefore, much is essentially possible that is not really possible; while much is also logically possible that is not essentially possible. Logic must count on "impossible objects," i.e. on essentially impossible objects (such as a quadrangular circle); depending on what it recognizes in given characteristics (perhaps of the circle), such objects are or are not possible for it. The "impossibility" of such objects is an impossibility of being (perhaps a geometrical impossibility of being), not a logical impossibility. And precisely because in the logical much is possible that is ideally not possible, in the ideal sphere much must be necessary that is logically not necessary (e.g. that in a square, the side and the diagonal are incommensurable). But, at the same time, much is necessary in the real sphere that is not necessary in the ideal sphere. As far as essence is concerned, real being is, itself, contingent, as are temporality, becoming, and individuation, along with it.

Thus, possibility and necessity are both of median range in the realm of essences. From the logical, one immediately understands that the ranges of the two must approximate each other here; their wide divergence from each other is overcome by their relatively high and continuous determinateness. They come together, and they may very well coincide.

But seen from the real, they always diverge widely from each other in their ideal overlapping relation. For, compared with the complexity of real determinateness, essential determinateness is indeterminate. Even if everything that is essentially possible were also essentially necessary, it would not by any means be really necessary, and thus would not be really possible, either.

The real, as seen from the ideal, is the over-determinate. The realm of essences has no room for the overflow of real determinateness; it leaves room for it only outside its way of being. But if the overflow in content remains completely outside, then it does not form any zone of indeterminateness in ideal being, either. Insofar as this is what is truly important, essential possibility and essential necessity could still coincide and permeate each other in their sphere, just as real possibility and real necessity could in theirs. The fact that determinateness stands in abeyance is compensated for by the hovering weightlessness of the sphere. Necessity, itself, is only essential consequence, not real consequence. As such, it can be complete in its way without extending to the latter.

42 Aporias of the Essential Modes. Compossibility

a) The Inconsistency of Presuppositions in the Understanding of the Modes

Thus, one could get the impression that the modal table of ideal being may, in itself, be simple and without difficulties. But it was presupposed that 1. possibility and necessity overlap here; 2. the law of division is valid; 3. the meaning of essential possibility merges into non-contradiction; and 4. essential necessity has the form of logical consequence.

If one looks closer at these presuppositions, then among themselves they show a certain incompatibility. How can possibility be divided, if it consists in non-contradiction? Looking at this from the standpoint of mere compatibility – the compatibility of **A** with a complex of preexisting kinds of determinateness – must not not-**A** also be possible at least in principle? But this would make possibility disjunctive, while denying it its indeterminateness, which is incompatible with necessity. Where not-**A** remains possible, **A** is not necessary on the grounds of the preexisting things that make it possible. How then can possibility and necessity permeate each other, if possibility merges into non-contradiction?

This would, at best, be conceivable if necessity had a meaning other than that of logical consequence, perhaps a looser, disempowered meaning; if it meant a mere also-having-to-exist, this would obviously be consistent with possibility, just as it would be consistent with disempowered essential actuality. On this basis, however, continuous determination of ideal being would be excluded. But this now proves to be the main feature of the realm of essences. The most that we comprehend in clearly evident necessity is essential necessity; thus, the mathematical structure of essence is contained in the field of the mathematical and of all the real. And it does not seem to be any different for any other positing of essence. The term “essentiality” has almost become synonymous with “necessity.” Such necessity with regard to the real case is regarded as contingent.

These aporias are not to be remedied by compromises. Ideal being is not a field of compromise. If one may expect transparent unequivocality anywhere, then it is here. At least here, for the extent of its reach, rationality is not empty appearance. The vicinity of the logical, with its conflicting modal nature, does not deceive us about it; there, compromise arises through the dependency of the sphere. In a sphere of ideal being, there cannot be compromise.

One must, therefore, conversely revise those presuppositions. It is no accident that inconsistency already begins among them, themselves. According to all appearances, the aporias in the mode of essential possibility crowd together.

This corresponds to the findings obtained in the analysis of the previously discussed spheres. The critical point, on which everything further depended, always lay with possibility.

Either it is some particularity of ideal non-contradiction that cannot be seen from the logical, or the law of division must experience a restriction. In either case, the change must encroach upon necessity. And this must not happen in such as way as to cause the determinateness of consequence to forfeit its unequivocality. The meaning of essential possibility stands in question, but the meaning of essential necessity stands relatively firm, namely, on the grounds of a long series of unequivocal phenomena of ideal being. The revision has consequently begun with the question of the dividedness or undividedness of essential possibility.

b) Proof of the Law of Division in the Ideal Sphere. Genus and Species

What actually was the reason to presuppose the validity of the law of division in ideal being?

1. It has been shown that along with plain essential possibility, there also exists essential actuality. If this coexistence is expressed in general terms, then it takes on the form of a law of implication, which formally corresponds to the real law of possibility; of course, only formally, since materially it means something quite different, as has already been shown. Nevertheless, it follows from its validity that there could not be a "merely possible" in ideal being. But undivided possibility can only exist in a "merely possible." This, at least, we know from the real. Thus, there can be no undivided possibility in ideal being.
2. It has further been shown that the indeterminateness of logical possibility is not characteristic of non-contradiction as such, but is only the limited foundation of relations. If one relates it to a comprehensive system that is firmly determinate on all sides, then it itself becomes determinate, becomes "narrow," and does not, by any means, let many kinds of disjunctive elements exist alongside one another. It then approximates the continuous determinateness from the connection. Of course, it does not follow from this that in the borderline case it coincides with necessity; but the convergence is not to be disputed. And it would have to lead to an overlap, if the foundation of determinateness is closed to the system.
3. With regard to this, it can further be shown that wherever it appears the essentially necessary must be essentially possible. But a possibility that

> enters into necessity can only be a separated, positive possibility. Its external indifference toward being-necessary is required for this, but it excludes internal indifference (Chap. 39 a). It follows from this that it cannot be disjunctive (undivided) possibility. If this were the case, then it would already have to be just as amphibolous as logical possibility. But then ideal being would be a softened being, just like predicative being. –

However, another group of essential phenomena remains, which does not permit a division of possibility in ideal being. In the logical this may be designated the relation of subsumption, and it absorbs the group into the overall schema. The conceptual pyramid implies that, in ideal being, the relation of subsumption is a universal continuous relation of vertical order; the concept imitates the relation in its sphere, only within narrower limits. Genus and species are relational categories of essences, not of concepts.

But what does it mean that a plurality of species is coordinated "under" each genus? The species are all equally "possible" as far as the genus is concerned. But insofar as they exclude one another, their reciprocal relation is disjunctive. Thus, there is no doubt that in the subordinative relation of essences, disjunctive (i.e. undivided) possibility of the coordinated species from the genus always exists. The fact that a triangle is either right-angled or acute-angled or obtuse-angled obviously means that from the genus "triangle," the opposing angular relations are all equally "possible;" but it does not mean that they are possible together in one and the same triangle. The possible particular cases are "disjuncted." Therefore, one cannot say that the possibility of the species is not determined by the genus; on the contrary, it is determined by it precisely to the same extent that the *genus* itself is determined. But the latter is always and necessarily less determinate than the species, because it is the general category. Essential determination [*Wesensdetermination*] does not conclude with the genus. On the level of species, it is fuller; there, what was coordinately possible under the genus is not "possible together."

If one ascertains the consequence of this, then one cannot avoid distinguishing the "possible together" – which Leibniz called "compossibility" – from the graded possibility that becomes narrower with each step downwards from genus to species. But a new mode is thereby introduced into the modal table of ideal being, regarding which it must, first of all, be shown how its position is provided in relation to the other essential modes. But it is easy to see that its difference from disjunctive possibility directly concerns the law of division. For compossibility should, in fact, mean divided possibility. At least, if **A** is compossible with a system **X**, then it is no longer said that not-**A** would also be compossible with it.

In contrast to compossibility, however, undivided double possibility – or more correctly, indeterminate, disjunctive, or many-limbed possibility – retains unlimited range in the superordinated genera. For the higher one rises in the general, the more indeterminate the essences become.

c) The Range of Disjunctive Possibility in the Construction of the Levels of the Essential Realm

Here, there is present a formal, perfectly transparent relation, to which one can unconditionally adhere. And this speaks against the law of division in the realm of the essential sphere. It leaves the widest range for disjunctive possibility in the layered realm of essences: disjunctive possibility appears here as a continuous mode of the species under the genus, namely, independent of the absolute height of generality. And at every altitude the opposition to compossibility holds true: things that are disjunctively possible alongside one another (under a genus) are never compossible; and things that are compossible are never disjunctively possible alongside one another. Therefore, "under" this relation, there is, in further specialization, always the disjunctive, alongside-one-another possible.

From this position, therefore, one must revise the above three principles, which seem to speak for the law of division in the essential realm.

1. What does it actually mean that along with plain essential possibility, essential actuality exists as well? Only this, that there is no other ideal "existence." It is a purely analytic principle, which directly follows from the nature of ideal being. One can only figuratively call this principle a law of implication; one may thus be misled by what is nothing but the formal analogy to the real law of possibility. But the meaning of both modes, as compared to the real modes, is changed in such a manner as to render the analogy purely external. Essential actuality proves itself to be a disempowered mode. Essential possibility merges into an non-contradiction. Even insofar as one can see a series of conditions in it, this series is total only in the sense of the genus, not of the species. And the species is precisely what it would depend on.

   Thus, it is, indeed, formally true that there is no "merely possible" in ideal being. But in an accordingly modified sense of the possible, it does not follow that disjunctive possibility would already have been displaced. This would only be the case if ideal actuality were an independent mode, which could, if need be, appear detached – as assertoric being-posited

appears detached in the logical, or as the real contingent does at the limits of the real sphere. This does not come into consideration within the essential sphere. It turns out that even the possible thing that always simultaneously has ideal actuality is nevertheless a "merely possible" thing. In order to actually exist, it needs to be nothing more than a merely possible thing. And in this respect, it is and remains a disjunctively possible thing. It does not exclude conflicting species under the common genus. The general does not answer for their particularity. The species are only necessary from the genus in the general, but are contingent in the particular.

2. Furthermore, what does it mean that non-contradiction, itself, becomes "narrow" and determinate, if it is related to a system that is, on all sides, determinate? It means, first of all, that the disjuncted limbs disappear. But does it also mean that such a comprehensive, determinate system is given in ideal being? Obviously not. Of course, the determinateness is total at every level of generality, and in this respect, ideal actuality, as opposed to logical possibility, is brought to maximal "narrowness." But this dimension is absolute only for a particular level of the hierarchy; for the genus that is at this level, but not for the species that stand under it. Every lower plane of essences is partially indeterminate from the higher. For that reason, non-contradiction in the particular, as opposed to the general, is incomplete at every level in terms of content. Nowhere can it be said to be complete in terms of a totality of conditions. Because what would be a totality for the more general and poorer essence is in no way a totality for the lower and richer essence. And thus the borderline case, in which non-contradiction in the foundation corresponds to essential necessity, cannot enter into the relation of subordination of essences.

There ensues the peculiar relation that the "merely possible" is, in itself, already actual but not necessary. From which it follows that the ideal actual as such is not ideally necessary. Possibility and necessity, therefore, do not totally permeate each other in ideal being. They do not overlap. This is analogous to the real law of possibility, but not to the real laws of ecessity and of actuality.

But this appears to be a contradiction in itself. For wherever the actual is possible, anything other than the actual is impossible; therefore, the actual must also be necessary. To draw this conclusion makes good sense wherever being-actual as such means something other than being-possible; one was permitted to draw this conclusion in the real sphere. But wherever being-actual is disempowered, the case is quite different. If everything that exists non-contradictorily has *eo ipso* ideal actuality, then a necessity of this being-actual implies only that its being-possible is necessary. In this sense, ideal

possibility and necessity coincide. But here the basic modal law (the internal relativity to actuality) is not fulfilled; such necessity is, therefore, not the actual essential necessity whose full meaning is that of strict consequence and of inseparable connection with preexisting things. A consequence of this kind obviously does not accompany being-possible, which rules disjunctively from genus to species.

3. What the entrance of possibility into necessity finally arrives at must, therefore, have external indifference, and this cannot coexist with internal indifference. But the meaning of internal indifference also changes with the essential realm's layered construction. This construction has the particular characteristic that, under each genus, not-compossible species peacefully remain alongside one another. They mutually exclude one another, their peculiar determinate characteristics standing in opposition. But the species mutually excluded from one another are, by no means, excluded from the total state of ideal being. The sphere has room for the coexistence of species that mutually exclude one another. If **A** therefore ideally and rightly exists, then not-**A** is not abolished; it is only excluded from **A**. In this wideness of ideal range, essential necessity can always extend only along the individual line of connection. Or, to put it concisely, it can enforce the possible only within the limits of the compossible.

   But the compossible has much narrower limits than the general ideal possible, which only needs to be non-contradictory in itself and in relation to the general of a higher order. In the compossible, possibility is no longer disjunctive. Here, for every level or altitude, it is completely determined and has unequivocality and determinateness. In the mode of compossibility, if **A** is possible, then not-**A** is absolutely impossible. They are not "possible together."

   But this is now, in due form, divided possibility, which enters into necessity without contradiction.

d) The Multiradiality of the Possible and the Parallelism of the Incompossible

It is not without reason that these considerations lead back again and again to the relation of genus and species, and thus to the construction of the levels of ideal being. This alone is the point from which the aporias can be solved. For it is here that we also find the opposition to the real through which the otherness of intermodal relations becomes understandable.

The real is also a layered realm, but a quite different one. In the real, there are strata of being that overlie one another as they are transformed or rebuilt [*überformen oder überbauen*]; one stratum is not a specialization of another: spirit is not a species of the life of the mind, the mind is not a species of the organic, etc.; in each stratum something new begins, for which the lower stratum serves only as a foundation. With respect to the hierarchy of genus and species, on the other hand, all of the real lies in a single plane. For, all of the real is specialized up to the last, all is individual (unique and single), and generally has "under" it no more particularities. "Above it," on the other hand, the real has the whole layered realm of species and genera, right up to the *ens absolute indeterminatum* [absolute indeterminate being].

Seen from the standpoint of the essences, the real moves only within a boundary stratum "in the territory," so to speak, of the essential realm, in its absolutely lowest stratum – which, in fact, can only formally depend on ideal being (as long as the "essence of an individual" is an absolutely analogous postulated borderline case). The real is firmly connected to individuality, just as it is to temporality and to becoming. Outside of the individual case, the generality of its kinds, genera, orders, etc. has no reality. It is real only "in" them. However, it certainly still has detached from them and from reality, an ideal being.

This unity of plane gives unequivocal, continuous determinateness to the real. If there really were detached "kinds" as such – not in the totality of their representatives, but simply as their free-floating general categories – then in the real there would also have to be disjunctive possibility. But in the real there is no simple appearance of "the animal" that does not have a particular nature, e.g. horse, sheep, dog, etc.; there is not "the horse" or "the man" either, but only the determinate horse and the determinate man. This is different from ideal being, where there is the "man as such," the "animal as such," the "living creature as such." These generalities form a graded hierarchy. Their detachment exists here not only in deliberation – perhaps in abstraction – but in the essences themselves.

Ideal being is graded throughout according to the principle of subordination. This principle requires that the lower is always disjuncted from the higher (more general). The ideal ontological mode of the particular cases disjuncted in this manner under the common genus is undivided possibility. It is not compossibility, since the disjuncted cases exclude one another; it is rather the parallel possibility of the incompossible. But it is already continuously accompanied by ideal actuality; not only the compossible, but also the disjunctive essentially possible has a thoroughly "ideal existence." This ideal existence means nothing other than that ideally all things are possible, not with each other in the same essence, but parallel to each other. From this arises the apparently paradoxical

principle: the ideal actual is, in itself, by no means continuously compossible; it has leeway for the parallelism of the incompossible, i.e. of the merely disjunctive possible.

If one wants to accentuate the peculiarity of this law even further, then one can also say: the essential realm as a whole is constructed on the ideal coexistence of the incompossible. It is laid out multiradially in its layered construction; the different, widely diverging, and mutually exclusive series or systems of the compossible subsist in it undisturbed, alongside one another. Ideal being has an inexhaustible dimension of breadth for such juxtaposition.

Non-contradiction is, therefore, not a continuous law for ideal being. It is only a law for coexistence in the same form, and for coexistence in the same system of related forms, respectively. And thus, essential possibility may not be characterized simply by non-contradiction; and likewise, ideal actuality may not either, insofar as it indiscriminately accompanies everything essentially possible. Ideal actuality is rather the coexistence of the contradictory (incompossible) in the multiradial parallelism of essential connections that are not contradictory in themselves. The systems of the compossible that are disjunctively arranged from each genus are mutually exclusive, conflicting, and incompossible. And it is the peculiar feature of ideal being that it includes, rather than excludes, this conflict. It has a breadth in which all conflict of the parallel possible can be indefinitely evaded.

Thus, in a far greater sense than was recognized initially, it is a realm of pure and seemingly all-powerful possibility.

e) The Ideal Law of Possibility. The Widened Modal Table of Ideal Being

We now have the most extreme opposition to the real. There, possibility exists in no other way than on the grounds of the continuous overlap of possibility and necessity; whereby possibility is not only not disjunctive, but also does not merge into being-able-to-coexist. On the contrary, it presupposes an unbroken chain of positive conditions. In ideal being, on the other hand, everything that stands in disjunctive parallel possibility has actuality. Compossibility is, therefore, not required. For that reason, the affirmative chain of conditions plays no role here.

This changes the intermodal laws from the ground up. If one wants to grasp the developed relation in the formula of an “ideal law of possibility,” then one must separate the two essential modes, possibility and compossibility, and give the law a correspondingly dual form:

> Essential possibility implies essential actuality, but does not imply any compossibility; however, compossibility, for its part, implies essential possibility. Compossibility is the more determinate and higher mode.

Consequently: both essential possibility and compossibility imply essential actuality. On the other hand, essential actuality implies essential possibility, but not compossibility with the forms of the whole sphere. The two main points on which this relation depends can, therefore, be expressed in detached form as follows: Whatever is ideally possible has ideal coexistence in the sphere; but whatever has ideal existence in the sphere is not yet compossible.

Compossibility is obviously the higher mode of ideal being, not only in comparison to possibility, but also in comparison to ideal actuality. Ideal actuality requires no "being possible together" of parallel coexisting things. This can be expressed by the classification of compossibility (CP) and its negative counterpart, incompossibility (ICP) in the modal table of ideal being. Thus, one must insert compossibility as a mode of median determinateness between ideal possibility and necessity, and likewise insert incompossibility between negative possibility and impossibility (Fig. 11). In this way, the preliminary modal table of ideal being (see Chap. 41 b, Fig. 10) is widened into an eight-limbed system. The disjunctivity of possibility is indicated by the bracket that connects P+ and P-. The regression of the absolute modes is expressed by their bracketing.



Fig. 11

The whole weight of the hierarchy lies to the "right of the line," with the relational modes. And, at the same time, one sees how the four modes of possibility (from C downward to IC) form a self-contained central group, while necessity and impossibility are purely boundary modes. This corresponds to the character of ideal being as a sphere of prevailing possibility.

This widened modal table now has room for the more specific development of the peculiar intermodal relations prevailing here. One can easily see that they are not only different from, but also more complicated than, those of the real.

43 Metaphysical Problems of Essential Possibility

a) Leibniz's "Possible Worlds" and the Real Making-Possible of the Actual World

In a sphere of being whose possibility is disjunctive, there must be necessary room allowed for the multiradial development of the compossible, and therefore for the unrestricted parallelism of being. The realm of essences can, in its way, have full determinateness – namely, on every plane of its construction the determinateness corresponding to it and sufficient for it can exist – without causing its modes to be amphibolous or its way of being to be softened. As opposed to this "wideness," the real has its characteristic "narrowness of the possible." For it has only one plane, and in this plane there is no room for the parallelism of being. Here, all forms of the sphere stand in one and the same system; one could also say that here everything is encompassed by a single continuous compossibility. As then the real is absolutely unique both as world and as whole, and as individual form.

It is this opposition that underlies the Leibnizian idea of many "possible worlds" and of one real world. If one now disregards in the idea all that is metaphysical, all that is concerned with God's justification, and indeed, anything that is concerned with the creation of the world – thus, also the conception of essential laws as the embodiment of divine reason – then one has a great example to easily illustrate the relation of the spheres and their clear-cut modal opposition.

Thus, in their plurality, Leibniz's "possible worlds" are not compossible. Only each individual world in itself is compossible. Their common being-possible is only a disjunctive being-possible. For that reason, only one of them can be real. The real has no multiradiality, disjunctivity, parallelism, i.e. not only in its mode of actuality, but also in its mode of possibility. The real possible has the same "narrowness" as the real actual; in ideal being, on the other hand, the actual has the same "wideness" as the possible. Only the ideal possible has range beyond that narrowness. The range is the parallelism of incompossible worlds.

This state of affairs, which in itself is perfectly plain and transparent, is obscured in the usual representations that have understood the "possible worlds" as possible real worlds. But in order to be possible real worlds, they would, in fact, have to be real possible worlds. And, they, of themselves, are not this by any means. If they were already really possible, then they would also have to be really actual, or would have to be on the verge of becoming really actual. But this, they surely are not. That is why even in their plurality, only one of

them can become really actual. They are all lacking something in real actuality to begin with; and consequently, they all lack something in real possibility as well.

According to Leibniz, what they are missing is "sufficient reason." For the compossibility of the individual world, in itself, is insufficient as reason. Here, also begins, according to Leibniz, the principle of *convenientia* (which, modally interpreted, is the real contingent, which must be necessary at the beginning of the whole real sphere). This principle selects and realizes at the same time. For the two are one: as soon as one of the "possible worlds" moves into the real sphere, it falls under completely different ontological laws, and therefore, most importantly, under different intermodal laws. In this sphere, there are no parallel possibilities. Here, the possible is merely the one thing that is actual; and everything else is, therefore, really impossible.

Thus, in ontologically stricter conceptual language, one must say: the many "possible worlds" are, as such, only ideally possible worlds – and if one does not shrink from the appearance of contradiction, then one must say: ideally possible real worlds. With the *principium convenientiae*, however, this makes the reason "sufficient" (namely, as sufficient real reason), and real making-possible begins. And thus, according to the law of division of real possibility, the remaining ideally possible worlds become really impossible.

It is, therefore, basically misleading to say that the "one" world would be "actualized." On the contrary, it is "realized." For, as "possible world," it is not at all really possible. On the other hand, it already was ideally actual. It is therefore not at all made from a merely possible world into an actual world; rather, it is made from an ideally possible world into a really possible world, since it thereby develops from a merely ideally existing world into a really existing world.

Realization is not the same as actualization. Even if practical life finds no reason to distinguish between them, their difference is still ontologically present. The modal displacement in "actualization" moves from possibility to actuality, namely, within an ontological sphere; in realization, on the other hand, it moves from possibility to possibility, and at the same time from actuality to actuality, namely, both in one, and both from ideal mode to real mode. For real making-possible is already real actualization (compare this to Chap. 32 c and 34 a).

It is ontologically of great didactic value to bring clear, carefully outlined concepts to Leibnizian thought, precisely because it enjoys a certain classicality. If what was said above is now substituted for Leibnizian thinking, then the essential point is not that a multitude of worlds are "possible," but that they "ideally exist" – just as the parallelism of incompossible systems coexists in

the realm of essences. There are, therefore, strictly speaking, no possible worlds at all, but only ideally existing worlds. For that reason, the "creation" of one of them is not actualization, but realization.

b) Kant's "100 Possible Thalers"

The modal analysis of ideal being is the truly critical field for the revision of traditional ontological concepts. It is not the Leibnizian terminology alone that was just now recognized to be misleading. It is the terminology derived from Scholasticism, which led to the consequence that, with the strengthening of nominalism, the realm of *essentiae* was reduced to a realm of mere possibility.

The result is well known, having been popularized by the Kantian argument concerning "100 possible thalers." This argument has always been met with a not unjustified resistance on the part of the later defenders of the "ontological proof of God," e.g. Hegel. Indeed, the counter-arguments themselves are all assailable; they are no less metaphysical than the old theory of Anselm criticized by Kant; they stand and fall with their unproven premises. But it is still to their merit that they revealed the weak point that produced the refutation of Kant's theory, even if they were lacking in their own roots.

By no means does this weakness lie in the factual content of the argument, but rather it lies in the terminology. And behind the skewed construction of the terminology is the conflation of two dimensions of opposition: the dimension of possibility and actuality with the dimension of *essentia* and *existentia*, i.e. the dimension of ideal and real being.

The ontological argument deduces real existence from essence. But Kant appears to refute a completely different deduction, namely, that of actuality from possibility. In this form, the refutation is in fact fallacious. The real possible is also really actual; and likewise, the essentially possible is also essentially actual. Whichever of the two possibilities he means (and a third does not come into question here), in either case the deduction of actuality in the same sphere is justified. Only the deduction of real actuality from essential possibility is unjustified, since it presupposes the deduction of real possibility from essential possibility; or simply the deduction of reality from essence. Which, in truth, is also the deduction made by the "ontological argument."

Kant's refutation does not, by any means, mistake the meaning of this argument. If the terminological side is brought into order, then the refutation immediately becomes clear. It is not the derivation of 100 actual thalers from 100 "possible" thalers that is objectionable, but the derivation of the real presence of 100 thalers from the bare "essence" of 100 thalers. Just as in the ontological

argument, it is not a deduction of the actuality of God from the possibility of God that is in question, but a deduction of the reality of God from the idea of God.

If God were really possible in the full sense of this mode – which admittedly, one could not know – then God would also necessarily be really actual. Just as the full real possibility of 100 thalers, of which one may very well be aware, would guarantee its real actuality. In both cases, however, the premise is not, in fact, real possibility, but only essential possibility. If one substitutes this sense of the "100 possible thalers," then the Kantian counter-argument is valid.

c) The Confusion of Ontological Terminology

Kant is not at fault for the terminological confusion that caused this helplessness in the face of the ontological argument's subtlety. It is rooted in the ontological thought that was at its height in the late Middle Ages. Underlying it is the perfectly accurate and valuable insight that all of "that which ideally is" (*essentia*) is a mere schema of possible real being. Compared with the fullness of the components of the real, the epitome of the determinateness of an essence is merely a fragment. The realm of essence is graded, and no matter how specifically one attempts to understand the essence of a thing, one always remains far "above" its individual real determination. Thus, according to the yardstick of real possibility, essential possibility is always only partial possibility. It does not need to be real possibility in its own sphere, but real possibility is necessary to it in the real sphere. And if essential relations deeply extend into the real world, then it is understandable that this partial possibility would be taken for real possibility.

Thus, it came about that in later ontology "possibility" was generally understood as mere essential possibility, but in contrast to it, "actuality" was generally understood as real actuality. This was encouraged by the ancient misconception that actual possibility is only disjunctive possibility. But one had such a possibility in the essential possibility of a species under a genus, and in the "cases" under a species. At the same time, the particular nature of real possibility disappeared behind the factual importance of real actuality; a disappearance which should come as no surprise, since the difference between them is not related to content. One was in no position to see the purely modal difference as long as one had not subjected it to a modal analysis of the real.

Indeed, the error that was committed here did not remain limited to possibility and actuality. It also encroached on necessity. One knew about the relationality of necessity, and about the relationality of the essential realm, but did not know to the same extent about the relationality of the real. Thus, the

real could appear as contingent, as atomized in its individual cases, while one reserved all necessity for the essential realm. There is a half-truth in this error, and it was for this reason alone that it could be maintained for so long. For from the general character of essentiality, the real case is, in fact, always contingent. It is, however, not really contingent, but merely essentially contingent. The other half of the truth is that the essentially contingent is nevertheless a real necessary.

In all of this, it is already a question of second-order intermodal relations, i.e. relations between the modes of different spheres. In this respect, the continuation of this discussion belongs in another context (as follows in Chapters 55 and 56). Here, we are concerned with these relations only insofar as they encounter ancient preconceptions that are superimposed on the understanding of ideal being and its modes. We must, by all means, seek to encounter these preconceptions. They are responsible for the century-long stagnation of ontology and for its present backwardness as compared with other philosophical disciplines. It is an entangled throng of traditional mistakes that is concealed in the apparent simplicity of the dual equation of ideality and possibility, reality and actuality. Its disentanglement lies in the principles: 1. there is a real possibility that does not even remotely merge into essential possibility (and not even into compossibility); 2. there is a real necessity that does not merge into essential necessity any more than real possibility merges into essential possibility; 3. there is an essential actuality that has nothing to do with real actuality, but that already exists with mere essential possibility.

With the modal analysis having made these principles evident, it should be obvious that something that is merely essentially possible is not yet really actual, since this does not yet make it really possible.

Traditional ontology has equated the difference of spheres with a difference of modes. For that reason, its principles remain ontologically ambiguous – even where they are truly indisputable – to such an extent that even objective, valid counter-arguments had to put themselves in the wrong merely by utilizing its conceptual language. If one focuses again on the difference between the two opposite dimensions, and if one lets the opposition of possible and actual overlap with that of ideal and real, then both spheres stand in the full richness of their modal diversity, and the confusion of the ontological concepts is resolved with a single blow.

d) Humankind and "Its" Possibilities

Even without Leibniz, one need not be at a loss for examples of the multiradiality of essential possibility and the parallelism of incompossible systems – thus, of the

principal opposition of ideal being to real being. It is nevertheless the case that in everything that really exists or happens, an also-being-able-to-be-otherwise, on account of essence, remains open. Of course, this is only on account of essence, and not on account of reality. Everyday life does not, by any means, lack the circumstances for imagination to survey a certain diversity of essential possibilities.

Thus, for example, it is always immediately evident to the personal self-consciousness of an individual, deriving from his essence – as he understands it – that he can view his "possibilities" from his own perspective; namely, quite consistently, as multiradial disjuncted lines of development, in ideal parallels to each other. These are just mere essential possibilities; in life he learns with irrefutable certainty that there are no real possibilities. But this does not, by any means, devalue this loose essential relation. For the living out of one or another of these possibilities is by no means illusory. However, it is not a matter of actualizing an already possible thing, either – namely, on the same grounds as the Leibnizian creation of the world – but of realization of a merely ideal existing thing.

Here, it does not need to be decided what the limits are within which the purposeful work of an individual may, in itself, be in a position to accomplish the realization of such a "possibility," if one takes ahold of it and makes it one's life task. No one basically denies that this may occur, even if, in retrospect, much human self-deception may subsequently tarnish the picture. There are human beings who, straightaway in full certainty, find the way to such a distinct "possibility," in order to pursue it undeviatingly to its end. And there are individuals who only catch sight of their essential possibilities after they have missed the moment in life to decide on one of them.

However it may be, the same must hold true for all realization that comes into question here as held true for the realization of a world in the Leibnizian plurality of "possible worlds": it can only consist in the real making-possible of that which really is not yet possible.

For the merely essentially possible as such is not really possible. In order for it to become really possible, the whole chain of relevant real conditions must be produced. But in other respects the process of real making-possible exhibits, where it actually begins, precisely the same teleological structure as was found in the field of the Ought and of the actualization in it: it takes the detour through "free necessity." Here is the point at which this whole perspective regarding the "possibilities of a human being" once more proves itself to be something quite different: the only positive thing in it, the driving force of the idea in real human life, does not have the mode of possibility – nor the mode of an essential possibility, since little would be gained by this – but rather the mode of necessity, namely, in the particular form that this mode gains as

"free," possibility overshooting necessity in all "Oughting-to-be" and all things of value (see Chap. 33 c and d, 34 a and c). Only after this process of necessity hurrying ahead does there follow the creation of a totality of conditions depending on real possibility. This process of real making-possible, which can only move forward gradually in time, is identical to realization.

e) Mathematical Possibilities

The field of mathematical objects also provides instructive examples of the parallelism of the incompossible in essential possibility. In them, the other side of the phenomenon, which comes up short in the practical field, moves into the foreground: the simultaneousness of "ideal existence" (of essential actuality), as long as it is not limited by the self-exclusion of parallel systems.

The best known present day example of this kind is the plurality of non-Euclidean spaces. Real space is absolutely singular, it cannot simultaneously be both Euclidean and elliptical, or both Euclidean and hyperbolic. It can only be one or the other. But this "being-able" is only essential possibility, and not real possibility; in fact, the space of the real has its dimensional character and its lawfulness decidedly in itself, and in this decidedness there is no longer any "either – or." There is just as little room in it for a parallel heterogeneous spatiality. Elliptical space may very well approximate Euclidean space in the boundary relation (in the measurement of a small straight line); but even in the borderline case, it remains an elliptical space and does not merge into a space of a different nature.

Geometrical space is quite different. It is not singular. Here, exist parallel to one another a multitude of different "spaces" that exclude one another and are, therefore, not compossible, but are all mathematically equally possible and consequently they have the same mathematical existence. Each in itself forms a continuous compossible system; i.e. all that is encompassed by one of these spaces in lawfulness and diversity of form is in continuous agreement with its own basic qualities. From these qualities proceeds a necessity that governs all particular cases in a descending manner. But since the basic qualities of different spaces stand disjunctively to one another, the spaces themselves do not only exclude one another, but also all particular forms of the one exclude all of the other. In this respect, the far-reaching parallelism of the figures in relation to content and their laws changes nothing. Parallelism is not transferability.

Here, one struggles to recognize the ordered relation of genus and species. In ideal being, spatiality is a genus, and this genus as such already includes certain basic characteristics (dimensionality, continuity, etc.) that are common to

all particular spaces. The particularities "under" them (such as the form of the space or its amount) are necessarily disjuncted; and from each there proceeds downward to wider particularity of the figures a diversity of determinations, which is self-contained, in itself, free of contradiction, and necessary, but which opposes that of other spaces.

What holds true for geometrical dimensions applies to other fields of the mathematical and to diverging axiomatic systems as well. Each one leads to inescapable consequences for the whole field of objects. The dispute over axiomatics that has taken hold of the mathematical disciplines today is – even without our being able to foresee its outcome – clear proof that we are dealing with a general law of ideal being. The fact that we do not experience the corresponding situation in essential fields of higher concreteness is due to the complexity of the essences and to the lack of precision with which we comprehend them. It is, indeed, to be expected that we will never come so far with them as to know their foundations in axiomatic accuracy; but this is only a difference of knowledge, and not of being.

The law that is involved here is the law of parallelism of the systems, themselves. The examples employed are only special cases in which it becomes particularly concrete for us. In truth, the law is much more general. In the relation of genus and species, it divides the essential realm, level by level, into parallel systems. The content becomes ever the more diverse, the further downwards it goes in its particularity. Possibility grows in scale, and with it grows the richness of the ideally existing. But at the same time the disjunctivity and the incompossibility also grows.

Where the essence approximates the individual – the level of being of the real – there, everything is mutually exclusive. But the real itself has other dimensions in which it informally unifies whatever is excluded. However, it is precisely for this reason that the real, as seen from the essential realm, is only a selection. And, therefore, in all fields of the real the appearance persists that much more would be "possible" than what is actual. There is, in fact, always much more that is essentially possible. But it is not really possible.

44 The Unveiling of Ideal Being

a) The Delimitation of Essential Necessity

If one has become clear about this principle, then one has a foundation from which to discuss, first of all, the intermodal relations of ideal being. Their

laws themselves, however, are in no way given, and the aporias are not all solved; indeed, even in the table of modes, inconsistencies still remain.

The reason for the confusion lies directly in the factor through which the first group of aporias is remedied, in the insertion of compossibility into the root of the traditional modes. The essential realm is split into parallel systems; it therefore becomes nonuniform. For, between that which has only parallelism, there are no connections other than those leading through the common genus. There can be a continuous necessity, at best, only within the compossible, but never beyond it, and therefore not uniting the whole sphere. Necessity can, at each height of this layered construction, only govern from genus to species, and only with respect to the general, not the particular; but never from species to species. That is to say, the direction of necessity is restricted, in the essential realm, to the "vertical" direction of the hierarchy, and it runs only "downwards" in it. It is deprived of the horizontal dimension. There is no essential following of the coordinated from each other.

It is, therefore, not the case, as Leibniz and many of the rationalists thought with regard to the essential realm: there does not proceed downwards a diversity of specialized forms from a few "first" and relatively simple essences or laws (the *simplices*), and the construction of levels does not progress downwards according to a principle of logical "consequence" or even of combinatorics; on the contrary, there "follows" in the particular case only a little from the general, namely, the general in the particular itself, as a general thing maintaining itself and holding sway in it. The particular case as such remains essentially contingent. There can basically never "follow" a greater diversity of particular forms than there was in that from which the given diversity of particular forms follows.

This retreat of essential necessity to an always narrower line downwards of ongoing consequence does not, in any way, mean its softening. On the contrary, precisely for this reason, it is the strictest and most unequivocal type of necessity imaginable. It rightly deserves to be preferentially considered as a clear example of unavoidable consequence. But it pays for this preferred status with its narrowness; it cannot expand in order to fully permeate the realm of being that it concerns. It does not weld this realm together into the unity of a consequence; the realm of being breaks down into parallel systems, which divide further and further downwards.

The delimitation of essential necessity is the flip side to the parallelism or multiradiality of ideal being. And since this multiradiality is rooted in the divergence of the possible and the compossible, one can also say: the delimitation of essential necessity is the flip side to the incompossibility of the disjunctively possible.

With this insight, the difficulties begin to be resolved. Here, one sees how undivided possibility gains leeway as compared with necessity. It is obviously the case that: it can divide, and as divided, it then enters into necessity (for the possibility of nonbeing is negated in necessity, but the possibility of being is presupposed in it). The compossible stands here in the middle. In it, possibility is divided; for if **A** is compossible with a system **X**, then not-**A** is, by no means, compossible with it. On the other hand, necessity can only hold sway within the compossible. So the opposition of the compossible and incompossible in the essential realm obviously forms the boundary between necessity and disjunctive possibility. For, as long as possibility remains disjunctive, no necessity can exist.

At the same time, it becomes clear why, in the essential realm, there is no total permeation of possibility and necessity. And the regression of actuality is in harmony with this, as is the regression of merely ideal existence. For these, being-possible is generally sufficient. And thus, the indifference of essential actuality toward essential necessity and contingency is again produced.

With this indifference, however, the most important consequence occurs: the permeation of contingency into ideal being. This consequence seems extraordinarily paradoxical – with respect to the conventional validity of the essential realm as the only field of being that is free of chance. But it is precisely at this point that one must break with antiquated preconceptions.

b) The False Nimbus of Ideal Being and Essential Contingency

One must change one's ideas about this matter, just as one must change one's ideas about the appearance of the contradictory in parallel coexistence. The realm of essence has always been considered free of contradiction. It has been shown, however, that only the compossible is free of contradiction. And everything in the realm of essence is not even remotely compossible. The "ideal law of possibility" has, therefore, already broken with a hallowed preconception (see Chap. 42 e).

The same is done from another direction by a further law, which expresses the delimitation of essential necessity by undivided possibility and by the appearance of contingency in ideal being; a law that, in analogy to the previous law, may be called the "ideal law of necessity":

> Essential necessity is implied by no other mode. The negative modes are excluded from it, while the lower positive modes are indifferent to it. It, itself, implies the latter. Its scope is restricted to the compossible; within its scope, it concerns only the general in the particular.

This narrow line of essential necessity allows the contingent wide leeway in the realm of essences. Thus, the aspect of ideal being is, in fact, changed from the ground up.

The traditional *pathos* of philosophical thought, with respect to the realm of essences, is that of admiration, veneration, and indeed, devotion; the essences appear to be divine, or at least related to the divine, a realm of the immutable, and of perfection. This nimbus is as ancient as Platonism; its obscure beginnings reach back to mythical thinking. That is why it seems so self-evident. But perfection is paid for by incompleteness; ideal being is an incomplete being, a being remaining in mere generality, in relation to the real not the higher, but the lower being. Thought must break with this nimbus if it wants "to know." Knowledge and adoration do not easily conform to each other. Platonic philosophy was, to a significant extent, adoration, no less so than the pious-speculative attitude of the Middle Ages toward *essentia*. But ontology has no choice, it may only know. It must dispel the nimbus, and must unveil ideal being; it beholds it as it is, in itself, without human idealization.

The changing of one's ideas is quite radical at this point. The real has always been considered to be the field of chance, and the realm of essences to be the field of necessity. Both conceptions have proven themselves to be mistaken. The relation is the other way around: the real, within its limits, does not know chance, and is a single, closed connection of continuous determination; but ideal being is not a closed connection, not a uniform system, not determination running multiradially in parallel sequences that exclude one another, and for this reason, it has room for the contingent.

There are obvious reasons why, to more sober consideration, ideal being appears to be free of chance. One is used to seeing the real case as "contingent" in relation to the essence under which it falls, whereby the essence then stands toward it as necessary. From this perspective, truth and error are disastrously intermingled. What is actually implied by the well-known relation referred to here? Surely not that the real case is really contingent? For it is not, by any means. It is, in fact, only essentially contingent. It is necessarily so, as the essence under which it falls requires this; but as it is beyond it in its individuality as "this" case, the essence therefore requires nothing that is contingent in relation to it. This is the same essential contingency that suited the particularity of the species under the genus.

If there were no other necessity than essential necessity – and this was the belief promoted by ancient theories of essence – then the individual in the real case would, in fact, generally be contingent. But since there is a totality of real conditions on the grounds of which this individual is at the same time really possible and really necessary, the situation is flipped around (Chap. 19 b). For

this necessity corresponds only to the real, and not to essence. The real case is essentially contingent at the same time as it is really necessary.

It is, therefore, essential necessity that is not sufficient here. It fails in all that still has an individual determination "under" the general essential characteristics. In all things it concerns only the general, it surrenders the particular to chance – or to a different necessity. But even this necessity is contingent in relation to it. Real necessity is continuous in its plane, while essential necessity is limited.

At the same time, one sees how this relation most assuredly does not concern the boundary of the real alone, but a much more general boundary. It is the same failure of essential necessity that constituted within ideal being itself, from level to level, the contingency of the particular in the species. For through no artifice can the richer determinateness of the species emerge from the poorer determinateness of the genus. There is, in the realm of essences, no "sufficient reason" for the particular as such. For it could only lie in the general (determination only goes "downwards"); and that is where, it cannot be. This applies to every level of the layered construction.

In no way does this mean that "everything" in the realm of essences is contingent. Necessity is and remains the general in the species, on the grounds of the genus, at every level of layered construction. But precisely because of such limitations, the importance of necessity is, in all strictness regarding its validity, only slight.

c) The Contingency of Parallel Systems

The permeation of contingency can be illuminated from another direction. It lies within the essence of all necessity to be limited by contingency; its external relativity to the actual brings this along with it. All spheres are subjected to the basic modal law. In the real, this limitation is revealed only at the boundaries of the sphere; only the "first" of the connections and the whole is contingent. But it can only be so in a sphere that knows no disjunctive possibility, and that, therefore, has no room for a plurality of parallel systems.

It is otherwise in a sphere divided into disjuncted parallel systems. Here, the continuous connection of determination can hold sway only within the systems. In each system, necessity has recourse upwards to the general – but neither *ad infinitum* nor up to the boundary of the sphere; rather, only up to the boundary of the system, i.e. up to where a system splits off from other systems that run parallel to it.

This is how it works in geometry. The necessity of the theorem of elliptical space – i.e. of the particular qualities of its figures – is rooted in the basic

qualities of this particular space, therefore, in the elliptical form of its dimensions or, what is the same, in the system of its axioms. But geometrically, there is no necessity for these basic qualities to be exactly the same as they are. This is, therefore, essentially contingent. And for that reason, there remains leeway for a spatiality characterized by other basic qualities, e.g. for a spatiality with dimensions that take a hyperbolic or even Euclidean form. These disjuncted types are essentially possible dimensions as particular aspects (species) of spatiality in general, and have in themselves the necessity of their common genus. But, on the grounds of the latter, their particularity is not necessary. Hence, the relative "first" of the parallel geometrical systems is essentially contingent, and the totalities of these systems are also contingent. For, if one of them were essentially necessary as a whole, then the others – since they are excluded from it – would be essentially impossible. And this obviously contradicts the way things work out in pure geometry. It is exactly the same with Leibniz's possible worlds, just as it is with the personal essential possibilities of a human being.

Thus, the same internal law of necessity that, in the real, banished the contingent to the limits of the sphere draws the contingent into the middle of the sphere in ideal being. The undividedness of essential possibility (its disjunctivity) splits up the essential realm into small totalities. It slices through the unity of determination, breaking down the realm of necessary connection, and not allowing a sufficient reason for disjuncted systems to emerge.

The consequence is that the parallel realms of the in-itself necessary stand as essentially contingent totalities. Even here, the contingent logically stands only at the "beginning" of the system. But, because the systems coexist as plural, a plurality of "beginnings" and corresponding totalities also coexist. And these are the essentially contingent remaining within the sphere.

If one now considers that this relation does not merely characterize a particular level in the general, but instead passes through the whole layered construction of the essential realm and runs downwards from genus to species, then it is clear that the impact of the contingent permeates the whole realm of essences, increasing as it moves downwards with greater particularization. In the hierarchy of essences there remains only a thin thread of necessity.

d) Essential Nonactuality and Incompossibility

After this clarification, one could move on to the derivation of the intermodal laws, if the modal table were not still defective and the negative modes unsettled.

The arrangement of the table in Fig. 11 (Chap. 42 e) does not as yet account for the contingency that has proven itself to be an important factor in ideal being. If one recalls the previously discussed unsteadiness of this mode, i.e. its partly positive, partly negative, but at the same time, partly absolute, and partly relational nature, then one can have no doubt as to where it should be placed: it belongs at the intersection of the boundary lines, where these oppositions meet. It, therefore, stands in parallel to undivided possibility, but not to its limbs. Thus, essential possibility, which stands in parallel to positive possibility, can always still be indifferent toward necessity and contingency; just as it is also indifferent toward necessity and negative possibility.

But, if one compares this with its negative counter-mode, essential nonactuality, then one is easily convinced that it does not stand at the right place in the schema (Fig. 11). It seems to be so simple: if the purely positive being-possible of **A** already means its ideal existence, then the being-possible of nonbeing would have to mean its ideal nonexistence. In which case, essential nonactuality would have to be the companion mode of negative essential possibility, just as essential actuality is the companion mode of positive essential possibility. But it is precisely this that now proves to be false.

It would be true, if essential possibility were divided. But if the possibility of nonbeing disjunctively coexists with the possibility of being, and if actuality, of itself, already implies the latter, then the possibility of nonbeing cannot imply nonactuality. Otherwise, one and the same **A** in the realm of essences would simultaneously have to exist and not exist. Which, in itself, would be contradictory. For, here, it is not a question of existence and nonexistence in different systems, but of ideal being in general. The limits of compossibility are not involved at all in this. The possibility of ideal nonbeing is the possibility of nonexistence-in-general. It could, therefore, only imply essential nonactuality to the same extent. And it cannot even imply this, because positive possibility excludes it.

Therefore, negative possibility in ideal being does not have the same weight-bearing capacity as positive possibility. It is insufficient for nonactuality. That thing whose being is essentially possible thereby already has ideal existence; but that thing whose nonbeing is essentially possible is not thereby excluded from all ideal existence. Thus, one can also say: ideal nonexistence is a mode of greater determinateness than ideal existence. It means exclusion from the whole realm of essences, while ideal existence only means existence "somewhere" in it. For such exclusion, no possibility is sufficient. But there is more to it than that.

Accordingly, we must now consider incompossibility, instead of negative possibility, to be the bearer of ideal nonexistence. It directly means a being-excluded; and it would, in fact, be sufficient for that, if ideal being did not

encompass the parallelism of incompossible systems. The compossible is only that which belongs to "one" system, and is not the whole sphere. The systems themselves are in no way compossible; nevertheless, they coexist alongside one another in a sphere. Incompossibility is, therefore, only exclusion from "one" system, and not from the whole sphere. That which is merely incompossible may very well have ideal existence in the sphere. Incompossibility can answer for ideal nonexistence no more than the possibility of nonbeing can answer for ideal nonexistence. It obviously does not imply essential nonactuality either. Therefore, one cannot place the latter next to it as its concurrent mode in the modal table; it calls for much greater determinateness.

One must move it further downwards, to the extreme negative mode: impossibility. Only this mode is sufficient for it. For it means, in fact, the whole sphere's being excluded. And this is the meaning of ideal nonexistence. Essential nonactuality means a nonbeing on the grounds of a not-being-able-to-be. In a sphere in which being-able-to-be is sufficient for being, there must be nonbeing of being-able-to-not-be. The ideal realm is a realm of possibility; not much in it belongs to being-actual. But precisely for that reason, far more in it belongs to being-nonactual. Not even the contradiction of something that exists elsewhere is sufficient for it. The contradiction excludes being-actual only from one system, and not from parallel systems. Only being-able-to-not-be-in-general is sufficient for ideal nonactuality; i.e. only what is contradictory either in itself or to the genus is ideally nonactual.

Even purely formally, this consequence is quite clear. For if everything that is essentially possible is already essentially actual, then obviously, only the essentially impossible can be essentially nonactual. Everything else is ideally actual, because it is possible. Actuality and nonactuality stand in contradictory opposition; if actuality is firmly assigned to positive possibility, then nonactuality must necessarily be assigned to the contradictory opposite of positive possibility. However, this is not the possibility of nonbeing, but rather its impossibility.

e) The Definitive Table of the Essential Modes

If, on the side of the absolute modes, essential nonactuality now moves from a position parallel to negative possibility (see Fig. 11, Chap 42 e) and into a position of far greater determinateness parallel to impossibility, then we get in the modal table a peculiar, eccentric position of the opposition of actuality and nonactuality.

For essential actuality, the most indeterminate positive essential mode is sufficient; but for essential nonactuality, only the most determinate negative



Fig. 12

mode is sufficient. This opposition is, again, deeply characteristic of ideal being. By already being formally obvious in the schema's arrangement (Fig. 12), it best expresses that regression of the absolute modes in ideal being that is given with the autocracy of the relational modes (Chap. 40 c). Mere "ideal existence" is a modal minimum in the relational wideness and multiradiality of the realm of essences – in extreme opposition to real actuality, which, in its sphere, means a modal maximum – and from such a minimum, something is not easily excluded. Only the in-itself contradictory and the contradictory-to-the genus are excluded. Everything else, even the one other existing contradictory thing, still has ideal existence. Essential actuality implies much less. It has room for everything that is not directly impossible. So, in a negative sense, only the strictest necessity is sufficient, whereas in a positive sense, the faintest possibility is already sufficient to decide ideal being-actual and -nonactual. This is reversed in the real sphere: there the absence of a single real condition is sufficient for nonactuality, but only the full overlapping relation of possibility and necessity, on the grounds of the total chain of conditions, is sufficient for being-actual. In the real, only a little is ever possible, but in ideal being, only a little is ever impossible. There, nothing exists, but here by far the greatest part is without sufficient reason. Thus the absence of contingency in the modal table of real being, as well as its assumption of a central position in the modal table of ideal being.

Many further implications arise from this. Actuality and nonactuality do not have the same significance in ideal being. It is a continuous phenomenon of modality that indifferences appear only in relatively indeterminate modes. Necessity and impossibility are, in all spheres, free of indifferences. In the real, the indifferences have generally disappeared, and there, no single mode is indeterminate. In the ideal sphere, not only possibility, but even compossibility and incompossibility show a certain undecidedness. The consequence is that, here, all middle modes are indifferent, and only the extreme modes are free of indifference. However, this means a striking asymmetry for the absolute modes: essential actuality is indifferent toward necessity and contingency, but essential nonactuality is not indifferent toward impossibility and contingency (of nonbeing), rather it implies impossibility. Essential actuality excludes only

impossibility; whereas essential nonactuality excludes all positive modes, and implies the two other negative modes.

This asymmetry now asserts itself throughout the entire modal table and its laws. The negative modes here are not true mirror images of the positive modes, or even of the relational modes. The arrangement of the modal table could be deceiving in this regard, but one should not forget that every arrangement is generally only an assistive device, with which it is impossible for everything essential to come to expression. All of the details can only be grasped by means of the intermodal laws. Only in these laws are revealed the consequences of the asymmetry for the modal construction of the ideal sphere.

45 The Intermodal Laws of Ideal Being

a) The Laws of Exclusion of Essential Modality

Among the three possible types of intermodal relations – indifference, exclusion, and implication – a mutual dependency governs their dispersal in a given modal table, which can be briefly defined in the following way: exclusion and implication yield to indifference. Indifference is their shared counterpart, the indeterminate relation that remains behind, everywhere that neither a negative nor a positive determinate relation (exclusion or implication) takes effect. In the real, indifference has disappeared, because all modes show a determinate relation to each other. In ideal being, indeterminateness permeates disjunctive possibility and the delimitation of necessity. It appears as the coexistence of the incompossible, and as ideal contingency. Indifference can thus spread out over the middle modes. Exclusion and implication are pushed back.

The relations of exclusion are crowded together around the extreme modes. Necessity and impossibility belong to these relations, as does nonactuality. Otherwise, only the contradictorily opposed modes of compossibility and incompossibility stand in a relation of exclusion. The other four modes exclude only those modes from which they themselves are excluded, since all relations of exclusion are mutual. The two modes of possibility (P+ and P-) appear separately in these relations. In any case, the following four laws of exclusion may be considered to be directly evident, on the grounds of the discussion above concerning the particular nature of the ideal modes of being.

1. Necessity in ideal being excludes impossibility, nonactuality, incompossibility, and negative possibility; likewise, contingency. And vice versa;

2. Impossibility in ideal being excludes necessity, compossibility, actuality, and positive possibility; likewise, contingency (of nonbeing). And vice versa;
3. Nonactuality in ideal being excludes the same modes as impossibility (to which it is a parallel mode), and is likewise excluded by them;
4. Compossibility excludes incompossibility, and vice versa.

Of these four laws, the third is the most important. For if essential impossibility excludes contingency – which itself is negative necessity – then essential nonactuality also excludes contingency. This puts it in a quite striking opposition to essential actuality, which may very well be contingent, and usually is. It implies impossibility, while contingency implies only possibility and does not imply necessity. There is, in the ideal sphere, no contingent nonbeing, but it is quite clear that there is contingent being. Here, nonbeing is merely whatever is in-itself contradictory, but being is all of whatever is in-itself not contradictory.

Perhaps one might expect that incompossibility would also have to exclude positive possibility, and that likewise, compossibility would have to exclude negative possibility. But this is, by no means, the case. For the positive essentially possible is also the incompossible (in disjuncted parallel systems); and the compossible does not exclude negative essential possibility, because the latter may very well exist parallel to it.

b) The Laws of Indifference of the Essential Modes

The space occupied by the indifferences is not only wider in ideal being, but is also widened by the multiple indifferences of one and the same mode. This brings along with it the greater diversity of the modes. And related to this is the further peculiarity that not all of the indifferences "cross over the line;" this peculiarity results from the regression of the absolute modes. The boundary line between the absolute and relational modes is blurred by the autocracy of the latter. The ideal modes are, in themselves, more homogeneous than the real modes.

What is missing here, above all, is the otherwise characteristic and central indifference of possibility toward actuality and nonactuality. It is missing because the positive limb of essential possibility (P+) suffices to imply essential actuality and to exclude essential nonactuality, for behind these stands impossibility (see above, the third law of exclusion). Instead of this, negative possibility (P-) has a specific kind of indifference, namely, one that is twofold. From this, it emerges that despite the undividedness of essential possibility, its negative limb is positioned differently than its positive limb. The asymmetry of the

modal table affects the mode of possibility. Aside from that, the indifferences are the following:

1. In ideal being, positive possibility – and along with it, actuality – is indifferent: a) toward compossibility and incompossibility, b) toward necessity and negative possibility, and c) toward necessity and contingency (in which case, the two sides of necessity appear separately in b and c);
2. In ideal being, negative possibility is indifferent: a) toward positive possibility and impossibility, and b) toward actuality and nonactuality;
3. In ideal being, compossibility is indifferent: a) toward necessity and negative possibility, and b) toward necessity and contingency (but not toward actuality and nonactuality);
4. In ideal being, incompossibility is indifferent: a) toward positive possibility and impossibility, and b) toward actuality and nonactuality.

Lastly, in the fifth place, one could speak of an indifference of contingency, since contingency directly appears only in the absolute modes, but nonactuality in ideal being is connected to impossibility, and contingency is, therefore, excluded, only able to belong to actuality. Concerning actuality's indifferences, the only ones that come into question for contingency are those toward compossibility and incompossibility. But they play only a subordinate role here.

In these indifferences of the essential modes, the asymmetry very strikingly takes effect. Positive possibility behaves very differently from negative possibility, and compossibility behaves very differently from incompossibility. Nonactuality does not have any indifference at all, while actuality displays three kinds of indifference. Neither positive possibility nor compossibility is indifferent toward actuality and nonactuality. This all ultimately goes back to the eccentric position of nonactuality. For neither the possible nor the compossible can be impossible; but only the impossible is essentially nonactual. On the other hand, the incompossible may very well be impossible; and the negatively possible likewise. Nevertheless, both can also be possible, and can, therefore, even be actual. For the incompossible is not, in itself, impossible; ideal being has leeway for it in the parallelism of its systems.

Clearly, the detachment of positive and negative possibility from each other emerges in these laws. They appear disjuncted, but in intermodal relations they appear separately, with different indifference and different exclusion. They do not cling to each other. The internal indifference softens the external. It is, from the outset, undercut by the position of essential actuality, which, as parallel mode to positive possibility gives this mode an immense preponderance over

negative possibility. For negative possibility has no corresponding parallel mode; nonactuality does not follow it, but only impossibility.

The flip side of this relation is the "removedness" of nonactuality from all indifference. One should expect nonactuality to have a dual indifference: 1. toward positive possibility and impossibility; and 2. toward contingency and impossibility. Neither of these is the case. It stands rather in a mutual relation of implication with impossibility, and consequently excludes positive possibility, as well as contingency (of nonbeing). There is, in ideal being, no negatively contingent. Contingency is restricted to the essentially actual. Essential necessity is, therefore, only restricted in a positive sense, and only here do we see the immense wideness of the possible.

Moreover, it is of particular interest that compossibility is also indifferent toward necessity and possibility of nonbeing. If it were non-contradiction on all sides, then it would have to verge on total determination and imply necessity. This condition is nearly fulfilled within the field of a simple essential structure – e.g. within a certain field of mathematical being. But it is not, by any means, fulfilled everywhere, and it does not belong to the essence of incompossibility. The parallel systems remain open to another possibility.

The compossible has non-contradiction only within a limited system, and not beyond it. For that reason, it basically cannot coincide with the necessary. Mere compossibility of an **A** with a complex of determinations **X**, however firmly joined together this complex may be, does not exclude the compossibility of not-**A** with **X**. **X** can at any time constitute a parallel system with **A**. If **A** "followed" from **X**, then not-**A** would be excluded from **X**; but the mere compatibility of **A** with **X** does not mean that it follows as a consequence. From this, we see the indifference of the compossible toward necessity. Compossibility as such is not contingent, because it expresses a content-bearing essential relation. The only contingent aspect of it is that an **A** appears. **A** is the particularity of the species, as compared with **X** as the genus. Necessity holds sway in ideal being, from genus to species, but only with respect to whatever is general in the species.

c) The Laws of Implication of the Essential Modes

From the outset, the circle of implication in ideal being is severely limited by the laws of indifference and exclusion. In this limitation, the opposition of the ways of being is clearly revealed once again. In real being, all positive modes imply one another, and likewise all negative modes imply one another (Chap. 14 e). In ideal being, the indifferences concentrate around the middle modes, and the implications are thereby pushed away to the extreme modes. Ideal being

obeys the law stipulating that the more determinate mode implies the less determinate mode, and not vice versa. Put into the terms of the schema (Fig. 12), this means that the implications all have the tendency to move toward the middle. For the indeterminateness becomes greatest around the horizontal boundary line that separates the positive modes from the negative modes. The farther one moves away from it, the more the indeterminateness decreases.

A special position is taken by the two mutual implications that the absolute modes indicate in their parallel position toward each relational mode. But here the character of implication itself is modified. It verges on equivalence, and expresses a completely overlapping relation.

It is to be anticipated that, in ideal being, the two limbs of disjunctive possibility will not imply each other; which is synonymous with the restriction of their disjunctivity. The possibility of being, purely as such, leaves open the possibility of nonbeing, and vice versa, although they are also found divided. And only insofar as they are divided can they satisfy the remaining implications. As then the first two laws of indifference of the essential modes say that both positive and negative possibility are, in principle, indifferent toward each other.

The laws of implication of the positive essential modes can be summarized as follows:

1. Essential possibility implies compossibility and positive essential possibility;
2. Compossibility implies positive essential possibility;
3. Positive essential possibility and essential actuality mutually imply each other;
4. Essential necessity and compossibility also imply essential actuality.

The last law is a mere corollary, but is not any less important. One could even add as a fifth law, that contingency "implies" essential actuality (and thereby also essential possibility); for in ideal being, contingency is, as has been shown, restricted to the positive modes. This cannot properly be described as implication, since contingency appears only as a dependent mode of ideal being.

The summary of the four laws can also be arranged differently. They can be expressed in detached form as follows:

> Whatever is essentially possible is also essentially actual, and vice versa: whatever is compossible is also essentially possible and essentially actual, but not vice versa;
>
> Whatever is essentially necessary is also compossible, essentially possible and essentially actual, but not vice versa;

(in addition: whatever is essentially contingent is also essentially possible and essentially actual).

In the second and third principles, it is to be noted: essential actuality allows the incompossible as well as the compossible, the necessary as well as the contingent. For that reason, these implications suffer no reversal. The indifference of essential actuality pushes its way in among them, and it thereby once again reveals the two fundamental features of the realm of essence: the ideal coexistence of the incompossible, and the essential contingency of the particular.

In contrast to this, the laws of implication of the negative essential modes are as follows:

1. Essential impossibility implies incompossibility and negative essential possibility;
2. Incompossibility implies negative essential possibility;
3. Essential impossibility and essential nonactuality mutually imply each other;
4. Essential nonactuality, thus, also implies incompossibility and negative essential possibility.

The last principle is a mere corollary. At least, this is the case if one proceeds from the first three principles. But such a starting point is not offered, by any means. On the contrary, the laws in themselves are all evident; which is obvious for the negative modes. If one now regroups them in a way that is analogous to the way in which the positive modes were grouped, then the opposition of their laws of implication to those of the latter emerges more concretely:

Whatever is essentially nonactual is also essentially impossible, and vice versa;

Whatever is essentially impossible is also incompossible and negatively essentially possible; but not vice versa;

Whatever is essentially nonactual is thus also incompossible and negatively essentially possible; but not vice versa;

Whatever is incompossible is also negatively essentially possible; but not vice versa.

The incompossible is, therefore, not essentially nonactual, because it is not essentially impossible. The parallelism of systems that are in themselves compossible is simply the possibility of the incompossible. For that reason, the incompossible is also not ideally nonactual. The nonactual is only the in-itself

contradictory, but is, by no means, the other merely ideally existing contradictory; thus, only the impossible. And since impossibility is negative necessity, the contingency of essential nonactuality is excluded.

The principle of contradiction, which alone governs everything here in a negative sense, is the basic principle of the strictest negative necessity. Ideal existence is conditioned by nothing but non-contradiction; so it implies no logical "consequence" and no necessity. Ideal nonexistence, on the other hand, is conditioned by contradiction itself. But the contradiction has strict "consequence" in it, namely the annihilation of the contradictory. For that reason, chance has wide leeway in that which ideally exists, but has no leeway in that which does not exist.

d) The Incompleteness of Ideal Being

Not all inconsistency disappears in these intermodal laws. A certain amphiboly remains, in relation to possibility. Possibility soon appears disjunctive and divided – disjunctive in the sense of non-contradiction, as well as in the coexistence of species under the genus; divided in the intermodal laws. This amphiboly would have to soften the mode, if something else did not remain behind it.

This "something else" is the incompleteness of ideal being. Incompleteness is something quite different from the "softened" being in judgment, which actually was no being at all, but only posited being – which means being mediated by conditions that always lie in another sphere (givenness). Ideal being, on the other hand, is true being, although it is not thoroughly determinate being. A certain indeterminateness remains in it. Thus, we see the restriction of necessity, the predominance of possibility and its disjunctivity, the parallelism of the incompossible, and the weightlessness of essential actuality.

All of these basic features trace back to the structure of the hierarchical order, to the indeterminateness of the particular in the species from the genus. Each plane in this hierarchical order is, in itself, completely determinate, but in parallel species it is always disjuncted, and the particular in it remains contingent. This leads to the consequence that, as seen from the realm of essences as a whole, the determination of individual planes remain incomplete. Where there is only one plane, as in the real, such incompleteness is excluded. This one plane, the plane of the individual, is not achieved in ideal being, at all. All essences remain hovering "above it," stranded in generality. And it is in the nature of the general to leave further particularization open. Even the essence of an individual as such is not individual essence. For that reason, ideal being, as

seen from the real, seems to be a realm of "possible being." The appearance can be discerned, but not abolished.

The state of affairs in the hierarchical order is thus: within a system, everything is compossible and, therefore, not disjunctively possible. The compossibility of an **A** with a system **X** does not exclude the compossibility of not-**A** with it, but it does not require it, either. This affirms the third law of indifference: compossibility is indifferent toward necessity and negative possibility. If not-**A** were excluded, then it would have to imply necessity. Even compossibility ceases outside of the system, however. This is where parallelism rules. And it has the form of disjunctive possibility.

Essential possibility is, therefore, divided by compossibility, so that when it has been divided, compossibility can enter into it. For it is not necessary to dividedness that the disjuncted limbs repel each other; it is sufficient if they do not cling to each other inseparably, and if they do not draw toward each other. This is fulfilled in compossibility. Therefore, essential necessity can imply it, and along with it, it can imply positive possibility at the same time without implying negative possibility.

Thus, we come to understand how essential possibility can be contained in essential necessity. In a sphere of complete being, as in the real, this would not be permissible without the radical repulsion of both possibilities from each other. But if determination of the forms of a sphere is only relatively complete – i.e. complete only for a determinate plane, but incomplete "downwards," then it is a quite different matter. Possibility as undivided is then only a mode of the particular in a species; whereas the general in a species has only one-sided possibility. For that reason, necessity adheres to the general alone and does so in a continuous fashion. For in no specialized species can the general be any different than the genus from which it follows.

III The Modal Problem of Knowledge

46 The External and Internal Modality of Knowledge

a) The Real Modes and Real Determination of Knowledge

The way of being of knowledge as such is not an inherent way of being; it belongs completely to reality. Knowledge is a form of spiritual being. But the spirit is real in the full sense of the word. This is paradoxical only if one understands reality as tangibility or materiality, in short, if one foists on the term, which only means a way of being, one of the common popular theories, such as materialism, naturalism, or something of the kind.

Ontology must be freed from all of this. The characteristic features of the real are none other than: 1. temporality with its categories of process, arising and passing away; 2. individuality, singularity, uniqueness; and 3. completeness of determination in real connection (the real law of actuality). Everything else that one is used to associating with reality applies only to individual strata of the real, indeed predominantly only to the lower strata.

The characteristics mentioned are fully applicable to spiritual being in all of its particularities. Wherever it appears, this being is always a temporally limited being. It has a specific form of development, its own law of development, its own lawfulness, and is in all stages unrepeatable, singular and unique, an individual being; namely, the latter just as much in world populations and historical eras as in individuals. With this, it also has, in itself, the determination of everything characteristic of a process; the spirit is, in every form that it assumes, a product of an interwoven and historical chain of conditions. It can never be other than it is, and cannot become anything other than what it becomes. In short, it follows the universal "real law of actuality" no differently than the being of the lower strata of the real.

This real character adheres to all knowledge. It is already expressed in its basic structure the subject-object relation. Both subject and object have the character of the real; the relation between them is ultimately a real relation. It is only one among many that, in the connection of life, connect the same subject with the same object world: possession, use, adaptation, and formation are such relations. With all of these, knowledge shares the character of process and development. We generally recognize knowledge in a way that is formally no different from the process of knowledge. In every stage, it is singular and unique, and in this individuality, also transitory. For the process does not stand still; the one stage merges into another similarly unique stage. A theory of knowledge cannot

disregard all of this; it cannot deal abstractly with content as mere "semantic content." Otherwise, it grasps only the structure of meaning of content, and passes over the actual nature of the understanding of the object. Instead, it must halt right at the latter.

Thus the "real law of actuality" is fulfilled in knowledge, as is the whole modal and determinative lawfulness of the real along with it. Knowledge, if it is possible, becomes actual; and if it is actual, it is also necessary, cannot fail to be attained, and cannot arise differently. But where it fails to be attained, it is not possible. This possibility and this necessity are modes of the process of knowledge, or real modes of knowledge. They concern knowledge as that which "is" real, as act, as relation, and as a relation-of-being of its own kind. The lawfulness of these modes and modal relations is in no way to be doubted.

The determinateness of the process of knowledge "from the bottom up" (through external situations, circumstances, relations of givenness, or even through internal physical disposition) is, thus, in no way to be denied. This is simply the categorial dependency of the higher on the lower, and must not be confounded with naturalistic interpretations. If the real were not stratified, then, indeed, a single type of determination would have to govern the whole; in a stratified real world, however, the forms of determination lay over one another. Higher determination does not generally arise from lower determination; it is, on the grounds of lower determination alone, not really possible, and the totality of its particular conditions is missing. Knowledge is only "possible" if its own determination enters into all of the other forms. This is a novum, as opposed to the forms of determination of the mental, and especially as opposed to the forms of determination of the organic and physical.

b) The Modality of the Form of Knowledge and Modal Knowledge

Nothing new is to be gained from these real modes of knowledge. There are, all along the line, the same things to be gained as from all other real modes of determination. It is not a question of their involvement in the problem of the modality of knowledge, but of other, quite unique modes and intermodal relations that are characteristic only of knowledge, and that otherwise are found in no stratum of being. They are those modes in which knowledge of their own content appears, and is given, respectively.

For knowledge as real process is not identical to its content. The process is, indeed, one related to content, and is the accumulation of content; but the content itself is different from, and has modes of being that are different from, the process; the process itself is also different from the subject and object. These

modes of appearance are the actual modes of knowledge. They constitute the *novum* of the modality of knowledge. In the following discussion we will deal with them alone.

These are, of course, secondary modes, and not independent modes of being. But they have the utmost significance – even for an ontological investigation – insofar as everything that becomes known is given to us through their modal gradation. Knowledge is the given instance of all knowing, but ontology is knowing about being as being. All understanding of being is initially acquired from this form of givenness. Our knowledge about the modes of being is only reacquired as a result of mediation by the modes of knowledge. The reacquisition proceeds by stripping away whatever has been superimposed by the modes of knowledge. For that reason, the methodological working-out of the modes of knowledge simultaneously puts to the test the modes of being, and particularly the real modes.

There is a fourth aspect that belongs to the essence of knowledge, aside from the subject, the object, and the relation between them: the content created by it that belongs to consciousness, or the form of knowledge – the Leibnizian form, the representation (conception) of the object in the subject, or the image of the object in the subject. This form belongs to the realm of content of consciousness; the thing that it represents always remains (transcendent) in relation to it. It is consciousness of the object, but is not itself an object. For that reason, its kind of being is the kind of being of consciousness. This kind of being is highly differentiated and dependent on-many-things, but still independent in its singular nature. The modality of the form of knowledge, therefore, moves into the modes of consciousness. But since it is not concerned with the being of consciousness, but rather with its content, these modes appear for knowing-consciousness itself in the object. For a consciousness of the content – and of the epistemological form, respectively – is normally not at all present alongside consciousness of the object. The content is, itself, the consciousness of the object; it is the form in which the object is given to consciousness. But it is not a second thing alongside the object of knowledge.

This is the point at which the particular modality of the form of knowledge clearly separates from the real modality of the process of knowledge. The latter is concerned with the possibility of knowledge, and the actuality and necessity of knowledge likewise; this can be called the "external modality" of knowledge. In contrast to it is the "internal modality" of knowledge – the modality of the form of knowledge – in a modal consciousness to which the object is given in graded modality.

Here, it is not a matter of the possibility of knowledge, but of the knowledge of possibility. Likewise, it is not a matter of the actuality and necessity of

knowledge, but of the knowledge of actuality and necessity. As the internal modality of knowledge is brought to these simple determinations, the difference between modal consciousness and the modality of consciousness clearly emerges.

c) The Dissolution of the Real Modal Connection in Comprehension

In this modal consciousness, which constitutes the internal modality of knowledge, there now appears a peculiar relation to the modes of the object. These modes are modes of being – real or ideal modes, depending on what the object is. The modes of the object are reflected in consciousness of the object; but they are not faithfully reflected, being shifted and warped, as if reflected in an uneven mirror.

Knowledge is, indeed, comprehension of the object, but it is not at all complete. If all comprehension were adequate, then all real necessity of the object would have to correspond to a consciousness of necessity, and all real possibility would have to correspond to a consciousness of possibility. By no means is this the case. Real possibility and real necessity are made indifferent in the real actual, and thereby disappear for consciousness. Everywhere in everyday experience there is the consciousness of possibility, which is not followed by any knowledge of possibility and necessity. The given real actual appears detached from the relation supporting the relational modes; it appears "contingent," which, in truth, it is not. And a knowledge about necessity, or an understanding of possibility, can only be acquired by means of a special penetration. But this penetration can fail to occur. The everyday demands of knowledge do not require it, and where they do require it, they are satisfied with fragments from the chain of conditions. Only actual research and science proceed further. For that reason, with them a second, displaced modal consciousness begins once again.

Thus, the modal consciousness in knowledge is, in fact, an uneven mirror; no different, incidentally, from the consciousness of an object's content. The law of inadequacy, which governs the progress of knowledge from the bottom up, separates the internal modality of knowledge from the modality of its object.

Ontologically, this can more deeply be understood by looking at the peculiar relation that the object has to its comprehension. The object "in itself" is what it is; in it as "that which is," it makes no difference whether and to what extent it is comprehended. It behaves indifferently toward comprehension, thus, also indifferently toward the limits of comprehension. These limits are not its limits of being; they are merely the limits of knowledge, which are projected onto it.

Whatever therefore is inseparably related to the object itself may very well appear to be separated from it in knowledge of the object.

If one transfers this to the modal consciousness of knowledge, then it directly follows that a consciousness of actuality can appear detached from a consciousness of necessity, and indeed, even from a consciousness of possibility. Comprehension dissolves the modal connection of the real – not in the real itself (which is impossible), but in the conception of the real, in the idea or intuition of the real that we ourselves develop in the form of knowledge as such. This form is different from the object of knowledge, but otherwise, the dissolution that occurs in the structure is the same. Although comprehension is inadequate, the object is indifferent toward this inadequacy. This does not deform the object, but only the conception. The consciousness of actuality is detached, because the comprehension of the object's content does not carry through the series of the object's real conditions, much less comprehend their totality. But, in this totality, the real necessity is rooted, as well as the real possibility that belongs to the object.

If the internal modality of knowledge is not distinguished from the external, then this relation must remain completely incomprehensible. The comprehension of the conditioning mode of the object, of the real possibility of the object, has nothing to do with the conditioning real mode of the comprehension – the real possibility of the comprehension. The possibility of the comprehension may very well be restricted to mere comprehension of actuality, and may still exclude a comprehension of its possibility. A mode of comprehension is not a mode of the object, and by no means is it a mode of the consciousness of the object. Thus, the otherness and relative independence of the internal modality of knowledge from the external. And thus, the dissolution of the modality of the object in the knowledge of the object.

The real is constructed on the foundation of its conditionality, i.e. its possibility and necessity. Real knowledge does not comprehend from the foundation, but from givenness, the outer side, the ontically secondary. And the given appears to it in the mode of consciousness of actuality.

47 Modal Consciousness and Modal Comprehension

a) Direct Intuition and Comprehension

Knowledge, itself, is a graded realm of content. And if there is knowing consciousness of all grades alongside one another, then the grades appear, in a certain sense, to have been lifted away from one another.

It is not a question here of the opposition between a naïve and a developed, perhaps scientific consciousness of knowledge. Rather it concerns another opposition, which can be described as the opposition between the intuitive and the comprehending consciousness. For the philosophically inquisitive person cannot know how "naïve" consciousness may be provided; he can only try to guess and reconstruct it, but it is not given to him. His consciousness, if it is capable of reflecting on itself, is not naïve. On the other hand, scientific consciousness is also hardly ever purely given. But in everyday life, just as in science, a direct, intuitive consciousness should be distinguished from a conscious penetrating, searching, defining the problem and solving it, although both are diversely interwoven with each other in the household of knowledge.

The former is a mere receptive consciousness, complying with "givennesses;" in it, the mode of actuality must be predominate, all down the line. The latter, on the other hand, asks for conditions and grounds, it traces connections and dependencies, and produces unities of overview that have failed to be comprehended by receptive intuition. Comprehension consists in this activity. Comprehension means to bring something to light "on the grounds of" something else, or from something else, since this thing could not be understood, if it were detached in mere intuitive givenness. For that reason, in comprehension, the relational modes appear in the foreground. Comprehension moves wholly in consciousness of possibility and necessity. Its function is conspective, while the function of receptive intuition is stigmatic.

Intuitability, as such, does not need to recede in comprehension. Comprehension is not abstraction; it requires concepts as a means of assistance, but it itself is not a concept. Comprehension is the pulling together of the perceived in the unity of an overview, the progression of knowledge in the compendium of the connections of objects – in opposition to direct intuition, for which the individual form stands isolated.

This aspect of "viewing," the actual living and supporting element of comprehension, constitutes the original meaning of the word "theory." For θεωρία [*theoria*] means "viewing," and it is this sense of the word that was introduced in Aristotle's time. But with the presently faded meaning of the word, one has forgotten this fact; "all theory is gray," grumbles the layperson about all fields of knowledge. He keeps to conventional concepts, not knowing how to make use of them as perspectives of penetrating insight, and, therefore, having in them no moving vehicle of comprehension. Whoever does not know how to fulfill a concept through living intuition – to him, it is a fetter, a stiffened product; but it then has already been withdrawn from living knowledge, and the thing about which it is concerned has been lost; it is stuck in a rut, and whatever it acquires in theory is in fact "gray."

In comprehension, the viewing is thus the main thing throughout. But the viewing as such is not a *novum*. Even the immediacy of the given is viewable. The *novum* is the comprehensive viewing, as such. And this, of course, goes its own way.

b) Aposterioristic Consciousness of Actuality; Aprioristic Comprehension of Possibility and Necessity

The essence of this difference is shown most easily from the side that pertains to content. Immediate intuition proceeds from the individual case in its empirical givenness; comprehension begins with the universal, with the similar, with the law. Thus, there may very well be comprehension of a single case in its individuality; it still comprehends from the universal, for it sees the principle and essence in a certain independence from the individual case. Likewise, direct givenness may very well lead to the comprehension of a universal thing; it proceeds from the individual case, and everything that it comprehends remains dependent on it.

In everyday life, just as in science, both kinds of comprehension almost invariably accompany each other. We perceive nothing individual that we do not immediately include under recognized universal categories, thereby already comprehending it within certain limits. And we comprehend nothing universal that we do not necessarily correlate to previous individual experience, thereby including it in the connection of givenness. It is, therefore, not a question of the isolated difference of these kinds of comprehension, but of the heterogeneity of comprehension itself, which even in its being interwoven never completely vanishes, often remaining sufficiently tangible as an internal opposition.

The opposition amounts to the familiar epistemological distinction between the aprioristic and aposterioristic. The latter is the source of direct givenness, the former is the source of comprehension and penetrating insight. For the problem of the internal modality of knowledge, this opposition is fundamental insofar as in it the dual relatedness of our knowledge is represented in one and the same existing thing. Knowledge is, on one side, the aposterioristic, directly connected to real actuality, leaping over real possibility and real necessity, which ontically stand behind it; but on the other side, it is the aprioristic, not just as directly connected to real possibility and real necessity, but, first of all, directly connected only to the corresponding essential modes, and only through their mediation to real connection.

The real is permeated by the structures and modes of lawfulness of the realm of essences; and if these do not exhaust the fullness of real connection,

then they form a general schema of its essential structure. Thus, aprioristic knowledge as such directly comprehends only essential possibility and essential necessity. And only from it do they permeate the far more complex fabric of real relationality.

Two things are to be learned from this. First, in aprioristic knowledge, it is a question of insight into possibility and necessity; and therein is rooted the conspective character of comprehension, in contrast to the plain acceptance of the given. But second, this insight is initially only an insight into essential possibility and essential necessity. It appears, on the one hand, in the form of primary, irreducible evidence – according to the nature of the mathematical and essential insights – but on the other hand, broken in the form of logical modes, as noncontradiction and as logical consequence, in the characteristic limitedness of the overview proper to the logical, namely, relative to whatever is given and foreseen at that time. In principle, it makes no difference whether or not the foreseen is, itself, aprioristically grasped.

This is the reason why, for the aprioristic impact of knowledge, even in its strictest scientific form, actual full real possibility and real necessity generally remain unattained, only being approximately understood. These real modes adhere to the totality of real conditions; and insofar as these conditions are not given – which very strictly demarcates the kind of empirical intuition – they themselves can only be deduced *a priori*, namely, on the grounds of essential insight, and thus always on the grounds of a universal thing, which cannot coincide with the real case in terms of particularity and fullness of content. Thus, aprioristic knowledge always comprehends only fragments of the chain of conditions; and the possibility on which it relies is not the required total possibility. For that reason, it is a mere disjunctive possibility, and does not imply insight into necessity.

A posteriori knowledge is a naked consciousness of facts. It directly completes real actuality for us. And it is not this alone that does so. Behind it stands the far greater significance of emotional-transcendent acts, of life, of experience, of suffering, and of all the other aspects of real actuality. Together with this background, aposterioristic knowledge is the actual evidence of reality.[1] For the modality of knowledge, this is of decisive importance insofar as from it emerges the fact that all actual evidence of reality has the mode of a consciousness of actuality, but not a consciousness of possibility or of necessity.

All knowledge concerning the possibility and necessity of real objects, on the other hand, makes a detour via comprehension of essential possibility and

1 See, *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, Chap. 27–35.

essential necessity. Therefore, it is not with the same directness that it infers real being-possible and being-necessary. To reach these, knowledge always has a long road to travel – one that, as a rule, it cannot follow to the end.

Thus, the modality of aposterioristic knowledge is not only basically different from that of aprioristic knowledge, but it is also of a quite different directness and stringency. There is, indeed, direct aprioristic knowledge, but not in the field of real knowledge. For that reason, all "comprehension" of the real is mediated. The sphere of essence is interposed. But its modes are not sufficient for reality.

c) The Modal Detour of Comprehension and the Impact of the Hypothetical

Comprehension and direct intuition do not in any way form the same opposition as aprioristic and aposterioristic knowledge, since each of them includes the other. But the aprioristic element dominates in comprehension, and the aposterioristic element dominates in direct intuition.

This relation is reflected in its modality. The same modes of knowledge are shared by comprehension and intuition, but they play a very different role in each. Consciousness of actuality is predominant in intuition, but insight into possibility and necessity is predominant in comprehension. And since the two never completely coincide in knowledge, the modes of total knowledge are never completely in unison with each other. They differ from each other, and display variable intermodal relations.

The next task, at first glance, is to take as a foundation the differentiation of real knowledge from ideal knowledge, and to work out the internal modality of each separately. This, of course, results in a clean distinction, but the connection comes up short. And the connection is the decisive factor for the total construction of knowledge. We have pure knowledge of essence only in scattered fields of knowledge – in those of pure mathematics, and in those of philosophical essential intuition. This is too narrow of a sector. In everyday life, as well as in the concrete sciences, ideal knowledge and real knowledge always accompany each other. The given real actual is the foundation of essential insight; essential insight infers real connections, and consequently leads to comprehension of the real actual. And this relation of knowledge corresponds very precisely to the relation of being. For ideal being is contained as the essential structure in all of the real. Only by way of exception do we exceed the limits of the real with essential knowledge.

Thus, it may be seen that the internal modality of pure essential intuition has no proper structure of its own. It follows the modality of the logical to the

greatest extent. The gradation of the universal governs it completely. Only in its first principles does it basically go beyond that gradation. These are drawn from the connection of conditionality. They can only either be seen intuitively or be inferred once again from things dependent on them. In both cases, they remain in a certain epistemological contingency that is not to be remedied, and whose awkwardness one seeks, to no avail, to belie with so-called "direct evidence." In truth, the first presuppositions for knowledge remain hypothetical; a fact that very insistently makes itself felt in the dispute over axiomatics in the mathematical sciences.

But this impact of the hypothetical is not characteristic of ideal knowledge alone. It has, indeed, failed to be recognized in it the longest. But real knowledge, all the more, leads back to first presuppositions that remain hypothetical; and by no means is this true only for scientific knowledge. The essential laws of spatiality are already contained in the plain perception of things, and within certain limits, can also be gained from perception. It is not perception as such that answers for them, but the aprioristic essential knowledge that is interwoven in them. Science makes the greatest possible use of the hypothetical, and by no means does it do so only with respect to principles of universal lawfulness, but also with respect to the real, actual, individual things that it infers.

This last point is eminently instructive for the understanding of the internal modality of knowledge. There is indeed the conclusion that a thing may be actual on the basis of an actual thing, that is to say, that a given thing is actual on the basis of a not-given thing. Every causal conclusion is of this kind. One knows the causes, and draws a conclusion regarding the unknown (perhaps future) effects; or one knows the effects, and draws a conclusion regarding the unknown causes – whether it be causes and effects that belong to the past and that can no longer be perceived, or causes and effects that are basically inaccessible to perception (e.g. the movements of electrons in an atom, or the radial velocities of bodies in outer space). One is not always thereby conscious of the impact of the hypothetical; but it repeatedly comes forward whenever the consequences lead to inconsistencies.

Here, a conclusion is now reached regarding the real actual, but by means of a detour via the comprehension of possibility and necessity. In scientific comprehension, this modal detour is unavoidable. And, because it makes use of knowledge about essences and laws of essences (in which it finds its major premises), it is, at the same time, a detour via ideal knowledge. But since the essential modes are insufficient for real possibility and real necessity, the conclusion remains on this side of the totality of real conditions. It is, therefore, for inner reasons that it is affected by the impact of the hypothetical.

d) The Modal Construction of Hypothesis

This modal detour of comprehension is, in itself, independent of the impact of the hypothetical. The detour becomes particularly understandable only where this impact is considerable. And this is the case everywhere that the conclusion is noticeably removed from the given; thus, everywhere that a deduction is involved that, according to its whole nature, is not to be brought into immediate givenness. As long as science is concerned with the investigation of the not-given, it accepts this impact.

At this point, it is important to be clear about the modal character of hypothesis. The conventional approach attributes the hypothesis to the mode of possibility. This is why indecision about what is true or untrue can be misleading; one is accustomed to bringing this mode of possibility together with the form of problematic judgment, in which the alternative between **A** and not-**A** remains open. Such a problematic character is, of course, contained in the hypothesis. But what then is the difference between the hypothesis and another kind of insight into possibility, perhaps logical possibility, which consists of nothing other than non-contradiction as compared with the given? Why choose to comprehend the respective position of the hypothesis by making a determinate assumption about innumerable, in-themselves likewise logically possible things, and thus try to defend it?

Obviously, comprehension is somehow pressed toward that assumption. But being pressed toward something is quite different from merely gaining insight into that thing's non-contradiction. Comprehension stands in modal opposition to consciousness of possibility. It has, rather, in all incompleteness, the expressed form of the consciousness of necessity. In order to understand a given complex of facts **A**, it is "necessary" that one, for want of better knowledge about its real conditions, hypothetically accept a determinate **X**. This necessity does not, by any means, coincide with real necessity, whose direction even runs counter to it (since **X** should be understood as the real ground for **A**, even though in the procedure of the hypothesis, **A** is the ground of knowledge for **X**); nevertheless, the incomplete consciousness of necessity in the hypothesis is an unequivocal aiming of knowledge at the comprehension of full, real necessity; that is to say, on the detour via real necessity, the concealed real actual is made accessible to comprehension. The basic mode of the hypothesis is the nascent comprehension of necessity.

In this situation, the most illuminating examples are those that are concerned not with knowledge of a universal thing (a mode of lawfulness), but rather with an individual case. Examples of this kind are most often found in the investigation of the taxonomy of plants and animals (the reconstruction of

descent), or likewise, in inferences regarding geological periods or regarding the movement of the stars; but they are no less also found in the investigation of historical facts, on the grounds of defective documentary evidence, or in the philological reconstruction of garbled texts (by conjecture). Everywhere, the searching adheres to that which is the "necessary condition" of the given. And the more completely that this necessity can be comprehended, the closer the sought-after real actual comes. As Leverrier calculated the existence of an eighth planet from the disturbances in the orbit of Uranus, the completeness of consciousness of necessity went so far that in addition to its place in the heavens he could also approximately indicate the distance, mass, movement, and orbital elements of the undiscovered planet [Neptune]. Even here, the hypothesis had come out of the question of the possibility of the observed appearances. Their determinateness itself, however, was that of an absolutely strict necessity. In this respect, it changes nothing that only the subsequent visual discovery of the planet has proven the true character of this strictness. If the planet had not been visible, due to unfavorable relations of light, then today, with our knowledge about it, we would keep to this necessity of the hypothesis alone.

The modal construction of the hypothesis can now be defined as follows: it proceeds from the consciousness of actuality, asks how the actual is possible, and answers with the comprehension of the necessity of certain conditions; but since the conditions on the grounds of which a real thing is possible must themselves have real actuality, comprehension reverts to the detour via possibility and necessity toward consciousness of actuality. If one adds that all hypotheses require confirmation by experience – since comprehension of conditions is incomplete – then it becomes quite clear that here comprehension is ultimately knowledge of actuality, and only takes the detour via the relational modes because of it.

e) The Freedom of Movement in the Comprehension of Possibility and Necessity

A characteristic of this complex modal structure is that the comprehension of possibility and necessity is not a direct comprehension of real possibility and real necessity. This means not only the detour via the essential modes – and formally via the modes of judgment – but also the appearance of a special form of the relational modes of knowledge, in which the direction of dependency is reversed.

If in the real, **X** is the unknown reason and **A** is the known consequence that is given to direct consciousness of actuality, then conversely for comprehension,

A is the reason and **X** is the consequence. And since **X** initially is not confirmed by any direct givenness, it is comprehended, on the one hand, as a necessary thing, namely, comprehended in a certain indeterminateness as regards its content; on the other hand, because of this indeterminateness, it is taken for a merely possible thing, i.e. for something that, in actuality, could also be different.

The reason for **A** is therefore understood as a necessary reason, but its particular property is understood as a merely possible property; which would be an ontically impossible relation, but may very well exist in the content of knowledge. The consciousness that this possibility does not coincide with the real possibility of **A** is diversely graded. But even in its most obscure form, it is still knowledge about the hypothetical character of whatever has been inferred.

The relation that is present here is well known in epistemology, but only in terms of its constitutive side. It is known as the difference between *ratio cognoscendi* and *ratio essendi*. Knowledge is very flexible in the way that it reaches conclusions, as compared with the directedness of dependency of being. It can comply with it, but can also run contrary to it, depending on where the particular given is situated in real connection.

Knowledge can only move from the known to the unknown. If what is known is dependent on being known, then knowledge must progress from the dependent to that upon which it depends. Knowledge thereby follows the connection of being, and traces back to it. It is not within its essence to run contrary to real dependency, although it is, indeed, within its essence to "be able" to run contrary to this dependency. For it must do so when the dependent is given to it. Comprehension as such is, by no means, already the reversal of real dependency; but it is capable of reversal, and is needed in certain situations.

The principle of the ground of knowledge is quite different from the principle of real ground. It is not only not a continuous law of knowledge – since all directly perceived given things are accepted without sufficient ground – but it also does not directly concern the real ground of the object of knowledge. Rather, at first, it always concerns only the epistemological grounds from which something is recognized as necessary. And insofar as this something is the ground of being of the given, it is a matter of the epistemological grounds of the ground of being, situated in the given.

Modally, this means that the relational modes of knowledge appear in a peculiar fusion. The conditions from which **A** is comprehended as possible appear themselves to be necessary conditions of **A**. But this necessity of conditions is not the necessity of **A** itself. For **A** only becomes necessary from the totality of its conditions. On the other hand, the necessity of knowledge in whose mode the conditions of **A** are comprehended, also concerns the individual

conditions. Knowledge breaks up the overall task of comprehension into smaller tasks, thus moving gradually toward the whole. It always exists as a mode of comprehension before the comprehension of full real necessity. It is the gradually advancing comprehension of the real possibility of something that has already been comprehended as actual – by means of the epistemic necessity that penetrates backwards from this already comprehended thing. Therefore, the task at hand always remains that of comprehending real necessity. And often enough, it is a task that cannot be completed.

With this freedom of movement, the relational modes of knowledge gain wide leeway, as compared with the structure of the real modes. This stands in striking contrast to the firm connectedness that consciousness of actuality has to the real actuality of existing cases. The relational modes of knowledge always remain turned towards real connection; they are and remain the tracing of real possibility and real necessity, but in their structure they progress with free mobility. This mobility only belongs to comprehension, and not to direct intuition. For it only belongs to the consciousness of possibility and necessity. These are the basic modes specific to comprehension, as opposed to receptive intuition.

48 The Law of Knowledge of Actuality

a) Modal Cycle of Knowledge

If one wants to summarize the aforementioned in terms of a short formula, then it can be expressed as follows: consciousness of actuality does not presuppose any consciousness of possibility and necessity; but the comprehension of actuality presupposes comprehension of possibility and necessity.

This dual principle is the decisive basic law of the modality of knowledge. It can be described as the "law of knowledge of actuality."

Knowledge is a modal cycle. It begins and ends with actuality. The difference between beginning and ending is only that of direct intuition and comprehension. There is a world of difference between mere acceptance of a given as "actual" and comprehension of that which is actually [*eigentlich*] in it. Between the one and the other lies the entire expanse of the path to knowledge – a path whose end we can nowhere foresee – but at the same time the whole interwoven fabric of the relational modes of knowledge. For in comprehension of possibility and necessity, as long as it leads to comprehension of actuality, the actual process of real knowledge is reflected.

Thus, the modal cycle of knowledge is also more than a cycle. It arrives at the same actuality from which it proceeded, but not at the same comprehension of actuality. The comprehension of actuality is not only something incomparably richer in content than the merely receptive consciousness of actuality, but it is also something completely different in modal terms. This signifies the law of knowledge of actuality. The comprehension of actuality presupposes comprehension of possibility and necessity; none of this is presupposed by the receptive consciousness of actuality. This is an intermodal law of comprehension, in which comprehension is clearly withdrawn from direct givenness. The presupposed relational modes of knowledge separate comprehension from givenness.

Comprehension draws nearer in this way to the real relation of the modes, as expressed by the real law of actuality (Chap. 24 d). For the real actual, itself, which forms the object of comprehension, presupposes real possibility and real necessity. Since comprehension is not an acceptance, but rather a penetration, it reaches deeply into its object. But there it runs into the chain of conditions, on whose totality real possibility and real necessity depend. Comprehension depends on the recognition of these conditions.

But one thing is never to be forgotten about this: with its modal construction, comprehension approximates the construction of the real, but does not achieve it. It tends to aim at the totality of conditions, but can, in no way, master it. The comprehension of possibility and the comprehension of necessity do not push all the way through to full real possibility and real necessity. They are only the idea of a comprehension of real possibility and real necessity, and not the fully achieved comprehension itself. In simple cases, the approximation reaches a degree that may be practically considered to be an achievement of the goal; but neither is the achievement a strict one, nor can it be universalized. Between idea and achievement lies the entire historical path and work of knowledge.

The discrepancy between idea and achievement is the tension in the tendency toward knowledge. A merely receptive consciousness of actuality is without tension. The objective consciousness of tension is the consciousness of the problem, i.e. the knowledge that there is something in the given that has not been comprehended. This knowledge is already the beginning of comprehension. It anticipates the recognition in knowledge that a real connection to the given actual adheres, and from this connection the given actual must be comprehended. For that reason, consciousness of the problem involves the progress of knowledge.

In the “problem,” the direct consciousness of actuality is already converted into an obscure, but persistent, consciousness of possibility; and within certain limits, there also follows an anticipating consciousness of existing necessity. The process begins with the conscious tendency to convert consciousness of

possibility into a "comprehension" of possibility, and to convert consciousness of necessity into a "comprehension" of necessity as well. In this tendency, however, the actual is factually comprehended, although only gradually; namely, the actual from whose givenness the consciousness of the problem emerges, as well as another actual, which is connected to the far-flung chain of real conditions.

b) Comprehension and Real Actuality

In this modal cycle, which in terms of content is a steady progression and inclusion, lies the modal structure of the progress of knowledge – at least insofar as the latter is a spontaneous progress coming from an internal tendency and is not merely externally pushed along from givenness to givenness. There are two things of importance with regard to this.

First of all, here is visible in all concreteness how comprehension does not withdraw from the actual but rather moves toward the actual. One radically shuts oneself off from this insight if one takes as a foundation the traditional, misleading concept of actuality that equates the directly given (perhaps the perceived) with the actual. With such a presupposition, comprehension must, of course, appear as an abandonment of actuality; since its cycle does not lead back to the merely perceived, it opens up whole fields of the not-perceived.

This elementary error in the basic approach of epistemology has unforeseen consequences; once committed, it cannot be remedied. To it belongs the popular conception of the "gray theory": an involuntary evidence of one's incapacity to provide a more concrete overview – consciousness then making a virtue out of this inability. True comprehension is exactly the opposite, the concrete overview itself, namely the view of real connection, which passes completely into the actual. But this actual is not restricted to the perceptible. It also spans the depths of whatever is concealed from perception.

The comprehension of possibility and necessity is the progressive bringing-to-intuition of the real actual. To directly given intuition, the real actual is accessible only within restricted cross-sections in which every wholeness of connections is abstracted. The modal detour of knowledge via the comprehension of possibility and necessity is the abolition of this abstractness; it is, in its whole course, a steady standing in the real actual, but also, at the same time, the advancing of the consciousness of reality into the fullness and depth of the real actual. For direct givenness adheres only to its surface, to phenomenon. The modal detour is the path of the phenomenon to being. It is the innermost essence of all true θεωρία, the penetrating and comprehensive view of the

real actual, by virtue of the structure of its possibility and necessity, which has been made indifferent in it.

c) The Rootedness of the Modes of Comprehension in the Modes of the Real

The other factor in this progression is the ever-lingering incompleteness of comprehension. Comprehension approximates the modal construction of the real, but does not achieve it.

This incompleteness is not a factor that can be neglected with respect to the idea of knowledge. It is not a matter of the internal modality of the idea of knowledge, but of the internal modality of actual knowledge. If need be, this may be disregarded in the constitutive relation of the stages of knowledge; here, at least, it is speculatively meaningful to argue from principles, even if some lack of clarity can be traced back to it.[2] In the modal relation, this incompleteness cannot be disregarded.

This is the essential inadequacy. It is an innermost essential aspect of the relational modes of knowledge in relation to the modes of being of that real thing, which they have as their object. An incomplete series of conditions produces no real possibility; as long as a single condition, even the least important one, is missing that which is based on them remains really impossible. If the comprehension of possibility does not then bring it to the totality of real conditions, then strictly speaking, there is no comprehension of real possibility; and thus no compression of real necessity, either.

If comprehension had in itself the hardness of the real, as well as its absolute decidedness, then it would be crippled by the inadequacy of its content, and could comprehend nothing. But this is, by no means, the case. It grasps fragments of real connection throughout, as it gradually penetrates the chain of conditions. This penetration is, indeed, abbreviated, and inadequate in this respect, but it still opens up whole fields of the real actual. It grasps partial relations of real possibility and real necessity, and therefore reaches an approximate understanding of the not-given. Whatever escapes it, the cycle replaces by returning to real actuality, as long as this real actuality does not remain dependent on merely being opened up, but indirectly either confirms or refutes by inspecting new givenness. The hypothesis, and generally the conclusion regarding the

2 Consequently, there is always the unwanted intrusion of mere essential knowledge into the foreground, and one forgets that this is only a schema of possible real knowledge. All argumentation with the *intellectus infinitus* suffers from this error.

unknown, does not remain self-dependent. It finds its reconfirmation within certain limits.

However, the implicit presupposition underlying this is the hardness and decidedness of the real. For all confirmation and refutation of whatever has been unlocked in comprehension would be made illusory by the recourse to perception, if one did not have in advance the certainty that the chain of conditions, which one only partially discerns, is always a total chain in the real, and that, consequently, in the real, only that which is possible is also actual. Only in this way does confirmation by the givenness of a result carry weight as an unequivocal cross-reference.

The modes of comprehension therefore do not coincide with those of the object of comprehension, but they are based on their strict lawful relation in the object. And in this respect, they are, with their unacknowledged presupposition, clearly correlated to the real law of actuality, thereby being correlated at the same time to the whole intermodal lawfulness of the real. This lawfulness is the internal, categorial presupposition of the comprehension of reality, a presupposition that comprehension has implicitly always already made when it begins to penetrate the chain of conditions. Such presuppositions have therein the true character of categories, that they – with full independence, and without being noticed – govern cognition and yet are not raised in consciousness to the level of cognition, itself.

Only under the presupposition of this categorical rootedness of the modes of comprehension in the modes of the real does the inadequate comprehension of possibility and necessity gain its significance in the total results of knowledge. These are the modes of an incomplete, but always a priori certain knowledge of the completeness in the object. For that reason, they are modal categories of a process that, in its own way, is highly complete, and that, in all of its inadequacy of content, is certain of its goal.

49 The Twofold Modal Table of Knowledge

a) The Modal Table of Direct Intuition

The conclusion that is to be drawn from all of this directly concerns the modal table of knowledge. The peculiar dual position of actuality, as direct givenness on the one hand, and as last result on the other, makes it impossible to apply the modes of knowledge unequivocally to all cognition. The naked consciousness of actuality in unreflective intuition is obviously the lowest and most elementary of

the positive modes, above which the relational modes can only first be raised. In progressive cognition, on the other hand, the comprehension of actuality is the highest and farthest-reaching conditioned mode, which, for its part, presupposes the relational modes.

If one wants to take this into account, then one must disassemble the modal table of knowledge by separating it into two different tables, corresponding to the opposition of receptive intuition and comprehension. It is clear that the two tables must widely diverge not only in the arrangement of the modes, but also in the intermodal relations. Nevertheless, they must be laid out in such a way that they allow the free interlocking of intuition and comprehension. But this implies that they must, themselves, be insertable into each other, if the difference between the modes of intuition and those of comprehension is to be expressed.

The modal table of direct intuition is characterized by the fact that in it the absolute modes are dominant, directly exercising a certain autocracy, while the relational modes completely recede, and have only the faded meaning of, at best, concurrent (but not continuous) components of the consciousness of the object.

Direct givenness is, in general, only consciousness of actuality and non-actuality. This is not hindered by the fact that it is accompanied by an obscure consciousness of possibility, whether it be of positive or negative possibility. However, this consciousness is not independent insight, but only the very vague presupposition that, in general, the actual must somehow be possible.

The relation is not clearly and completely assignable to necessity, or to impossibility, respectively. Since the actual is taken as pure factuality, in its direct givenness it appears to be contingent. But even this is, by no means, unconditionally mandatory. Rather, it only signifies the absence of reflection on the difference between contingency and necessity. One can only take this into account by letting necessity stand in its place as the highest mode, but in brackets; and likewise, by letting impossibility stand as the lowest among the negative modes, and placing it in brackets (Fig. 13).



Fig. 13

Therefore, we have in the modal table of intuition the extreme opposite of the modal table of the real. The arrangement alone can only vaguely express this. The opposition itself, however, corresponds exactly to the reversal of the relation in the progress of knowledge, as compared with the real relation. The consciousness of reality begins with the result, it isolates the result and lets the structure of connections disappear in it. This is possible, because in the real actual, possibility and necessity are mutually made indifferent (Chap. 24 d). Consequently, for a merely observational and receptive consciousness, they must disappear behind actuality.

In perception this disappearance of the relational modes is almost complete. For that reason, perception is an isolating knowledge. For it, the "things," as they present themselves to visual examination, are something absolute and not further reducible. And this standpoint of perception remains profoundly authoritative in practical everyday consciousness. It remains a firm point of departure, even in cases where long-past experience works with great impact upon comprehension. The importance of real givenness is lasting for perception, correlated to the transcendence of emotional acts, which all – differently graded – display the same certainty of real givenness.

The path of knowledge, described by Aristotle as a gradation – perception, memory, experience, knowledge – has its foundation in this absolute domination by the consciousness of actuality. The latter is, indeed, only a surface consciousness of the actual, and for that reason the consciousness of things is the prevailing process in it – until the unavoidable temptation to think of things as substances takes hold – but at the same time, it is also the enduring starting point for all penetrating comprehension.

The position of contingency, at the point where the lines of separation intersect, corresponds exactly to the bracketing of both modes of necessity. Perception is not an actual consciousness of contingency. But the isolation of sectors of the real and the deep impenetrability of further real connection actually makes it appear contingent. Necessity and impossibility, on the other hand, remain open, as unfilled blank spaces.

Ultimately possibility sharply contrasts with the modality of ideal being. There, it was the basic mode, and actuality followed it as a mere companion mode, adding nothing to it. Here, this is reversed: the consciousness of possibility as an inconspicuous companion mode accompanies the consciousness of actuality; and likewise, the consciousness of the possibility of nonbeing accompanies the consciousness of nonactuality. But this is only a matter of course: whatever direct intuition comprehends as actual cannot be considered impossible; thus, it is also recognized to be possible. However, this has nothing to do with penetrating the chain of conditions and understanding why it is possible.

This consciousness of possibility in the direct givenness of the actual has the form of neither divided nor disjunctive possibility. It is completely indifferent toward both. It is a completely loose, unconnected, and flexible mode, thus being an extremely softened mode. It is only the indeterminate and empty consciousness of being-possible-in-general. It is indifferent insofar as in naïve acceptance of being-actual, the possibility of nonbeing is already split off and left behind, while on the other hand, its exclusion as such is in no way recognized.

This relation cannot be exactly expressed in the schema; it is thus indicated in Fig. 13 that the two possibilities stand far apart, with the absolute modes interposed between them, but that they, nevertheless, remain bracketed with each other across this distance.

b) The Modal Table of Comprehension

The modes of comprehension are quite different. It is the same real actuality – the real actuality given to perception – that is penetrated by insight here. But it is a consciousness of actuality that is quite different from the perceiving consciousness, and its modes of knowledge are different.

The same object in the same mode of being is given to comprehension in a modality of consciousness that is completely different from intuition. The difference is that of the beginning and end of knowledge. The "detour" via the comprehension of possibility and necessity lies between them. The modal cycle of knowledge is complete where there is a complete comprehension of actuality. And only because this comprehension is never complete, does the cycle remain incomplete.

The modality of comprehension is, in contrast to that of intuition, the modality of a dynamics, of the progress of knowledge; not the external dynamics, which concern it as real process, but the internal dynamics, the dynamics of the development of content, which concern the conception. The image of the actual is, for comprehension, essentially different from the image for perception, an infinitely differentiated, richer image; and it is a link in an immeasurable chain of content that forms a whole world, a counter-world to the world of the real, its representation in consciousness.

In the modal table of comprehension, actuality and nonactuality move far apart, in a manner similar to that found in the modal table of the real; and between them lies the series of relational modes. For if the comprehension of actuality presupposes the comprehension of possibility and necessity, then the comprehension of nonactuality presupposes the comprehension of negative possibility and of impossibility. Comprehension, whether positive or negative,

includes knowledge of the "why." But the "why" depends on the chain of real conditions. The comprehension of nonactuality is, thus, the most determinate and most extremely negative mode.

Of course, this does not mean as much to the comprehension of actuality in a negative sense as in a positive sense. This lies in the modal structure of the object. In the real, anything that has even one link missing in its chain of conditions is impossible; but the knowledge that a link is missing is much easier to come by than the knowledge that all of the links are completely connected together. The comprehension of nonactuality is, therefore, in no way equivalent to consciousness of actuality. For the comprehension of impossibility can in some circumstances be very simple; but the comprehension of possibility, and along with it the comprehension of necessity, is in all circumstances only possible in the total penetration of real connection. This asymmetry of the modal weight above and below the line cannot be expressed in the modal table, but the apparent symmetry in the schema (Fig. 14) must not deceive us about this.

The disappearance of contingency, which plays such a wide role in the modes of intuition, is explained here by the essential nature of comprehension. To comprehend means to grasp the sufficient reason for something. But if one grasps this sufficient reason, then one thereby grasps the necessity of that thing. For that reason, the principle holds true: the consciousness of contingency is suspended for far as comprehension reaches. This consciousness of contingency is nothing other than the knowledge missing from the modality of intuition, regarding necessity. The suspension of the consciousness of contingency is the beginning of this knowledge.

On the other hand, one must not exaggerate this disappearance of contingency. It does not mean that with the beginning of comprehension, everything that is considered to be contingent eludes knowledge. On the contrary: not only does much uncomprehended givenness always remain, but also comprehension itself does not completely penetrate its object. It remains behind its idea, and is not attained until the totality of conditions is reached; only the totality produces real necessity. Nevertheless, for the extent of its reach, it is comprehension of necessity.



Fig. 14

This comprehension of necessity remains, even if its reach is minimal. For, with the mere beginning of comprehension, the consciousness of the object appears under another categorial presupposition, under the supposition of real modality. It is *a priori* certain of real necessity, even in the apparently contingent. Only under this presupposition can it generally go on its way, searching for real conditions: it must have the certainty in advance that on the grounds of its chain of conditions the actual thing in question is just as it is, and unable to be different. In this respect, the mere tendency toward comprehension already underlies the principal abolition of the consciousness of contingency.

Here, the convergence of the modal table of comprehension to the modal table of the real is clearly expressed. The schema (Fig. 14) almost coincides with that of the real modes (Fig. 7, Chap. 14 b). But the bracket yoking together positive and negative possibility shows that a difference is still present, and that the comprehension of possibility is still not the comprehension of an absolutely divided and unequivocal possibility.

The underlying difference, namely, that in comprehension the real relation between the modes only consists of a tendency, and is not fulfilled, cannot be expressed in the form of a mere arrangement. This can only be grasped by means of the intermodal laws, themselves, and therefore, it falls to the development of these laws.

c) The Aporia in the Comprehension of Possibility

Concerning the modes of comprehension, there remains a certain difficulty only with the comprehension of possibility.

Insofar as it is a matter of comprehension of real possibility, negative real possibility must be separated from positive real possibility. Since it is there that the real possibility of being excludes the possibility of nonbeing, the former cannot be comprehended as long as the latter remains open, and vice versa. On the other hand, the experience that scientific knowledge opens up in all fields of the real teaches us that the comprehension of positive possibility leaves negative possibility open. From this we can see that possibility does indeed remain undivided here, thus retaining a certain disjunctivity.

This situation is only mitigated by the fact that an obscure aprioristic consciousness is present, which surpasses the respective comprehension; this means that, in truth, only **A** is possible, and not not-**A**, i.e. not because this consciousness has insight into the impossibility of not-**A**, but because it knows that only **A** is actual. Here, the categorial presupposition of the real modes in the consciousness comprehending the object is tacitly involved. Comprehension

thereby anticipates itself. And in this anticipation, it divides possibility. Of course, it does this only in principle, only with respect to whatever is still to be comprehended, and not as a result of comprehending the excluded opposite.

So, it may also be said of possibility: as far as comprehension reaches, possibility is divided in it, and in this way the approximation to real modality is revealed. But at this point nothing more than approximation can be demonstrated. Comprehension begins with insight into possibility. This is linked to the unreflective consciousness of possibility, which as a concurrent mode, obscurely follows the givenness of the consciousness of actuality. This consciousness is restricted, however, to a totally vague presupposition that the actual must somehow be possible. In this presupposition, possibility is still completely disjunctive.

The first steps of comprehension now single out individual conditions of possibility, and as insight progresses, these are added to a certain series of conditions. But the series remains incomplete. It does not reach total possibility. It stops at partial possibility. But partial possibility has two basic features: firstly, it is always completely disjunctive – for how the remaining conditions turn out remains indeterminate in it – and secondly, it is still not real possibility.

d) The Amphiboly of the Possibility of Knowledge

Nothing is more characteristic of the incompleteness of human knowledge than this experience of coming to a standstill in partial possibility. If penetrating comprehension reached the totality of conditions, then by doing so it would also reach real necessity and full penetration of real connection. But real necessity is the last thing that it can reach.

Instead of this, it has only the anticipatory consciousness of uncomprehended necessity. And in the same sense, it has only an anticipatory consciousness of uncomprehended total possibility. This anticipatory consciousness, however, is an indeterminate consciousness, being in no way a comprehension.

For that reason, in the finite mind, the progressive consciousness of possibility is always a dual consciousness: a comprehension of partial possibility, while also being an aprioristic anticipation of total possibility. In scientific, strict comprehension, both factors are distinguished, and they exist without coming into conflict: the conflict has completely merged into the tension of the tendency to knowledge, which, for its part, merges into the acquisition of knowledge, which conforms to the comprehended partial possibility of the anticipated total possibility. It is different in everyday life and in practice. Here, one cannot wait for the circumstantial course of the progress of knowledge. The consequence

is an abbreviated comprehension that the comprehended partial possibility pushes underneath the unforeseeable total possibility, thus always being in danger of falsifying this total possibility.

This is the reason why human consciousness of reality sees a plurality of "possibilities" at all times and places, where actually only "one" possibility exists. Even the trained thought of the practitioner obstinately holds onto this misconception. Such obstinacy would be incomprehensible if it were not objectively justified by the position of finite comprehension: a comprehension of partial possibility is, in fact, the view of a plurality of disjuncted possibilities. The latter as such are not real possibilities. But since insight surveys only a part of the conditions, in order to become properly objective about the comprehended situation, it must see the multitude of eventualities. And even the knowledge that only one of them is added in real connection to real possibility changes nothing here. Only insight into the rest of the conditions would change the situation. But this insight is not given to finite comprehension.

This is the point at which the modality of comprehension deviates from the modality of the real. But the deviation from the total structure of knowledge is, by no means, to be understood as an error. It is rather that mode of comprehension by virtue of which it remains as near as possible to real relation. For it cannot coincide with it. Its own limitations get in its way.

The comprehension of possibility is, thus, to be understood as an amphibolous mode, whose pliancy allows unlimited approximation to real possibility, and which nevertheless remains near unreflective consciousness of possibility. It is thus at the same time the boundary mode of intuition and of comprehension. Along with it, the immediacy of intuition ceases, and comprehension begins. It is a transitional mode, in which the iridescent disjunctivity of "eventualities" meets clearly divided possibility. In it, they themselves are in conflict. And it is this conflict that comprehension in this mode does not let come to rest; it is driven out in the progress of knowledge. But in this progress, the direction is clear. It leads irreversibly to the ever further demarcation of eventualities, and beyond this, to the comprehension of a real possibility.

IV The Modes of Knowledge and their Laws

50 The Modal Connection of Intuition and Comprehension

a) The Combined Modal Table of Knowledge

If in everyday life or in science, the directly intuiting consciousness of the object were separated by a chasm from the comprehending consciousness of the object, then one could leave this separation in the binary form of the modal table and consider the heterogeneity of the arrangement to be final. But this is certainly not the case. All along the way from perception to strict, scientific comprehension, the connection of knowledge is a single, uninterrupted connection. Nowhere are the extremes purely given; only the idea of them can be grasped. Actual knowledge takes place, multiply graded in transitions. And throughout it, we find the modes of intuition and the modes of comprehension together.

Admittedly, this togetherness is not unconditionally peaceful. The antagonism makes itself felt in a certain tension; internal conflict is not absent. For the tendency is always present to transfer whatever is directly intuited into comprehension. And in the progress of knowledge, this tendency is always the driving force.

The dynamics of this tension itself cannot be expressed in the table of the internal modality of knowledge. But the connection of the modes of intuition with the modes of comprehension must be able to be represented in a combined modal table of knowledge. In this table, actuality and possibility must doubly appear, above and below the line, in their positive, as well as their negative, senses. We, therefore, obtain four modes of actuality and four modes of possibility.

But since the reduplication is based on the opposition of nakedly accepted givenness and penetrating comprehension, one can only express its strict meaning by accepting this opposition of the modes of knowledge. “Givenness of Actuality” (G.o.A.) and “Comprehension of Actuality” (C.o.A.) are contrasted with each other as different modes of knowledge; and likewise, “Givenness of Possibility” (G.o.P.) and “Comprehension of Possibility” (C.o.P.) are contrasted with each other. Only necessity, positive as well as negative, and contingency do not appear doubled. There is no givenness of necessity and no comprehension of contingency. Givenness excludes necessity; and comprehension abolishes contingency.

In this combined modal table (Fig. 15), it is immediately obvious that the two heterogeneous modal tables of intuition and of comprehension are maintained



Fig. 15

and supplemented in it as they are completely and freely joined together. Here, the modes of intuition, or of givenness (G), lie closely together. They are grouped around the intersection point of the boundary lines, where contingency stands (as in Fig. 13). Even positive and negative possibility, as concurrent modes of givenness, still remain yoked together (as the bracket indicates).

The modes of comprehension (C), on the other hand, form the higher and more determinate modes in a positive as well as a negative sense. They, therefore, lie relatively far from one another. On the one hand, this fact reveals the sharp separation between being and nonbeing in comprehension (and even between the possibility of being and the possibility of nonbeing); between them lies not only the line of separation, but also the whole complex of modes of givenness. On the other hand, this reflects the cycle of knowledge (indicated in the schema by the dotted line), as well as the law of knowledge of actuality (see Chap. 48 a).

This law corresponds to the wide distance between the givenness of actuality and the comprehension of actuality, and likewise between the givenness and comprehension of nonactuality. The series of relational modes lies between them. The course of knowledge begins with direct givenness; this is the givenness of actuality (and nonactuality, respectively). In this givenness, whatever is grasped stands as contingent. Knowledge then progresses beyond the concurrent consciousness of possibility to the comprehension of possibility, and from this, further beyond the comprehension of necessity to the comprehension of actuality. But through the incompleteness of comprehension, it remains dependent on being controlled by the givenness of actuality. Therefore, its ascent is converted into a falling-back from the highest mode of comprehension to the most elementary mode of givenness.

In this cycle, all modes are and remain mutually dependent on one another. As then, in the familiar constitutive relation, comprehension is “empty” without

the givenness of intuition, but the intuition of the given is "blind" without comprehension.

b) The Dynamic Relation between Consciousness of Contingency and Comprehension of Necessity

In these modes, the process moves progressively, not in the way that leaves intuition and givenness behind in order to ascend to "pure" comprehension – as the one-sided, scientifically oriented methodologies of the nineteenth century and many earlier centuries have contended[1] – rather, it always moves beyond comprehension to new intuition, and usually also to opening up new kinds of givenness. Strictly speaking, comprehension itself is a widened intuition, a continual opening up of the not-given in order to bring it into view, a steady bringing-to-givenness. And the "theory" in which it ends is the in-itself diverse overview on a greater scale, in which the originally given comes fully into its own.

The justification for the combined modal table, thus, becomes evident, but the heterogeneous modes that are united in it come into a certain conflict. It is not possible to unite the contingency of the intuitively-given with the comprehension of necessity, and therefore not with the comprehension of actuality, either. Wherever it reaches, comprehension abolishes contingency. Is the original intuitively-given also abolished here?

That is impossible. Givenness is an enduring foundation, and on it, everything else is built. But it is not identical to the contingency in which it appears. It appears to be contingent only because of its detachment. The mode of consciousness of contingency, which accompanies the unreflected givenness of the actual, is not a true mode of knowledge; it is nothing but the apparently positive expression of the disappearance of real necessity in the direct givenness of the actual. If real necessity emerges – and it already begins to be revealed in the incipient comprehension of possibility – then that tentative, accompanying consciousness of contingency disappears.

1 I also add to this the methodology oriented to the humanities that puts so-called "understanding" in the place of comprehension, as it, in a more or less anthropomorphic way of thinking, presupposes a certain constitutive semantic content in real relations. As it imperceptibly encroaches on other fields (e.g. the field of the organic) this methodology exchanges the knowledge of real necessity for the knowledge of an assumed essential necessity, and thus disastrously withdraws from givenness.

It is, therefore, not appropriate to assume that the consciousness of contingency, as accompanying appearance of the givenness of actuality, is a continuous and unabolishable mode of consciousness. There is no obvious concurrent mode parallel to it. The directly given appears to be afflicted with contingency only as long as it remains hovering in its immediacy. But this does not belong to its essence. For, as comprehended, it still remains a directly given thing.

One must, therefore, draw the conclusion that the givenness of actuality is in fact indifferent toward the consciousness of contingency and the comprehension of necessity. Which fits in very well with the fact that these two modes exclude each other; for all external indifference of a mode refers to two counter-modes that are contradictory to each other. And the same holds true, in a negative sense, for the givenness of nonactuality; it is also indifferent toward the consciousness of contingency and the comprehension of impossibility.

Related to this is the fact that the disappearance of contingency is not complete. If the comprehension of necessity were complete, then it could completely eliminate the appearance of contingency. But it is only ever an approximate comprehension, and often enough it is only an incipient comprehension. It stands under the categorial presupposition that the chain of real conditions "is" complete, and that in it lies a sufficient real ground for the given. But the presupposition is aprioristic, and as such, only general; it does not mean that the chain of conditions are completely recognized either. Thus, the comprehension of actuality remains hanging in suspense. It has knowledge about necessity, but does not penetrate into the individual case; and the individual case is the real actual thing that stands in question. Comprehension does not know how the chain of conditions is brought to completion in real connection. So, it cannot overcome the original concurrent consciousness of contingency.

The consequence is the peculiar phenomenon that, even in the ongoing progression of comprehension, the consciousness of contingency and the comprehension of necessity conflict with each other. Contingency retreats slowly, step by step. It has, by no means, been remedied within the wide range of the real sciences. For the path of empiricism is circumstantial, and only seldom, in cases of relatively simple real relations, can it be brought to a certain conclusion from finite knowledge.

In practical knowledge of everyday experience, the consciousness of contingency remains in force almost all the way down the line. Life moves in actualities; it does not wait for the labored progress of comprehension. This is the reason why a human individual, even as knower and seeker, continually lives in a world of the apparently contingent. He calculates the chance offered to him, and thus evinces a silent knowledge about the necessity of real connection; but in the long run, he does not trust chance at all. Consciousness, in its

perplexity, always makes a pact with the unknown that, as such, must appear contingent to it. Thus, it remains caught in its partiality, and only scientific thought is in a position to at least basically rise above this.

c) The Double Shape of Knowledge of Possibility

The earlier analysis has shown how almost all inconsistencies in intermodal relations have their ground in possibility, but that they can be detached from it. This was the case in the real, in the realm of essence, in judgment; this was also the case in knowledge. Only here the difficulty is of another kind. In the table, the two modes of possibility stand opposite the same sign, not in such a way that they merge into each other, and not in such a way that they penetrate each other, but in a peculiar autonomy, joining nevertheless in the same consciousness of the object.

It has further been shown how the comprehension of possibility is already in itself an amphibolous mode. Only partial possibility is factually comprehended throughout, but this is not real possibility, and the counterpart of the disjunction always remains adherent to it. It is not unconditionally disjunctive, and therefore does not need to comprehend the object as simultaneously not being possible; but it is also not strictly unequivocal. Nevertheless, it is that possibility which, with further penetration, grows into comprehension of necessity; it can only grow into this as it approximates totality. But, in the approximation, it divides. And if it simultaneously anticipates total possibility, then in this anticipation, it is also divided.

Thus, already in the comprehension of possibility, two different modes are found that do not fit in well with each other. But there is something similar in the consciousness of givenness of possibility. This is only a concurrent mode (and not even a continuous mode, at that). In any case, only actuality is given, and without the modal background of the relational modes. Here, the consciousness of possibility consequently implies only the aprioristic but undifferentiated, self-evident proposition that an actual thing must also be possible.

Possibility, understood in this way, is not even partial possibility; reflection on conditions has not begun at all. So, it is disjunctive now more than ever. For it, the opposite of the given is no less possible than the given itself. This is vividly shown in cases where the given contradicts the expected, and departs from the familiar or from the already half-comprehended, or even has something "unbelievable" in it. One may very well experience the given as "actual," but at the same time as puzzling or miraculous. The "miracle" is nothing other than the suspension of that otherwise so obvious concurrent consciousness of possibility.

Nevertheless, with the "miracle," the pure, aprioristic consciousness of possibility is not completely extinguished. The miraculous must also somehow be possible, for impossibility of the actual is contradictory. This is also the case insofar as the most tentative acceptance of facts has already adapted to real relation. One sees this clearly in the occasional doubting of givenness itself, when the perceiver perhaps "does not trust his own eyes."

But the modal peculiarity in this relation is that the aprioristic presupposition in the concurrent consciousness of possibility is not the same as the aprioristic presupposition in the comprehension of possibility. In it, disjunctive possibility is presupposed; on the other hand, in comprehension, a distinctly unequivocal and uniradial total possibility is presupposed, this having in turn the law of division as its presupposition. Here, an obvious contradiction is present, which cannot be remedied by any evasion of the modes. Nevertheless, the two aprioristic presuppositions must somehow fit in with each other. The question is only how this takes place.

d) Logical Possibility and Epistemic Possibility

The answer lies in the fact that the categorial presupposition of possibility in the two modes not only differs, but is also a different one depending on the sphere. The consciousness of givenness is still far from the construction of the real; it is a simplified conception. But this simplified conception corresponds – as one, at least, ought to expect here – to logical possibility. It is the disjunctive, simultaneous possibility of **A** and not-**A**. And on its grounds, there holds true the being-presupposed in actuality, even as far as this actuality stands as contingent.

It was characteristic of the modality of judgment that the "merely assertoric" remains a foreign element in it. Judgment is thereby dependent on givenness, but givenness is an alogical factor. By including this factor, the modality of judgment proves itself to be much more than mere modality of judgment: the logical thereby extends deep into the consciousness of givenness, and includes its basic mode, the consciousness of actuality. It arranges it, however, not with the appropriate real modes, but with its own, the relational modes of the logical. Thus, here, mere non-contradiction in problematic judgment stands together with the real givenness in assertoric judgment. And this constitutes the heterogeneity of the modes of judgment.

This same heterogeneity, however, is also found in the intuitive consciousness of the object. For here is revealed the origin of that givenness of actuality that stands behind empirical judgment of facts. Tied to it, however, is that

accompanying consciousness of possibility, which is only an indeterminate aprioristic presupposition; and it has the same purely formal, empty character as non-contradiction, without, of course, being a true consciousness of non-contradiction. It is an obscured logical mode, so to speak, in which only the one factor is clearly lifted out: the consciousness that "nothing can stand in the way" of the respective content being as it is. It is a mere consciousness of possibility.

In view of this, the emergence of knowledge about determinate real conditions is already a huge step upwards, in the sense of comprehension. Only with this step does partial possibility emerge, and along with it, the consciously experienced disjunctive plurality of eventualities. This all belongs to comprehension already. But, at the same time, the other aprioristic presupposition begins in comprehension, that is, the presupposition of unrecognized total possibility, which excludes the disjunctive counterpart. This categorial presupposition displays the greatest approximation to the real relation. It is the striking through, so to speak, of real modality into the modality of knowledge.

And here lies the reason why, despite all contrariety, the two heterogeneous aprioristic presuppositions – the presupposition in the vague consciousness of possibility, and the presupposition in the comprehension of possibility – fit in quite well with each other: namely, the full real possibility based on the totality of conditions excludes formal non-contradiction in only one way. What it actually excludes is only disjunctivity. But from it, we saw earlier that it is, by no means, a necessary essential characteristic of non-contradiction; disjunctivity can, of course, come to it, but only in the delimitation of the content of these determinations, relative to which non-contradiction exists. It is not inseparably connected non-contradiction. Otherwise, a totality of real conditions could not, in itself, be without non-contradiction. Which obviously must always be the case.

Logical possibility is limited essential possibility. But essential possibility must, of course, always be included in full real possibility; as then essential modes of lawfulness pass through all of the real. It is the minimal possibility-of-being presupposed in all real possibility.

And that is why the positive content of unreflective and indeterminate consciousness of possibility can be maintained without difficulty in the progressive comprehension of real possibility. This positive content, as inapparent as it may be, is neither abolished nor reduced in even the most complete approximation of comprehension with regard to real possibility; on the contrary, in the progression of comprehension, it is always further supplied with content. On the other hand, the disjunctivity appearing in the beginning stages, as well as the plurality of eventualities that still govern the partial consciousness of reality,

is abolished more and more from level to level, until it gradually disappears in scientific comprehension.

e) The Impact of Essential Modality on the Modes of Comprehension

The process of unraveling and solving the aporia in the double shape of epistemic possibility has led to a further issue: the involvement of the modality of essence in knowledge. For the comprehension of necessity is obviously concerned with it. But, first of all, this issue deserves a word about the modes of essential knowledge, themselves.

A special analysis is not required for these modes. As has been shown, they are not essentially different from those of the realm of essences. All essential knowledge stands at the level of comprehension, and is purely aprioristic: there is not a related givenness of perception here, since ideal being knows no individual determination. Intuition and comprehension do not diverge from each other anywhere in this realm. To be sure, a more isolating view is distinguished from a more comprehensive view. But the modality of both is the same. Both are comprehending, but differ in their range of overview.

Wherever and however essences are comprehended, essential actuality is comprehended along with essential possibility, as is essential nonactuality along with essential impossibility. Essential necessity, on the other hand, must be grasped independently of essential possibility, and even independently of compossibility. It can only be grasped as the necessity of the general in the species from the genus; the particular as such cannot be grasped as necessary, because it is essentially contingent (see Chap. 44 a). On the other hand, within parallel systems, compossibility is directly recognized, and likewise, the incompossibility of the systems themselves. In short, we have here the pure adaptation of the modes of knowledge to the modes to being.

This relation is complicated by the fact that essential knowledge extends into real knowledge. Real being is traversed by essential structures. And these play such a large role in the comprehension of possibility and necessity of the real that the total picture is shifted once again.

For the peculiarity of this relation is that a comprehension of essential possibility, of compossibility, and of essential necessity is relatively easily attained, yet it is far from sufficient for comprehension of real possibility and real necessity. Nevertheless, in real knowledge these modes play the role of the precondition, with which one always penetrates a bit further into real connection. The comprehension of the real takes here the detour via the comprehension of

ideal being. And this detour proves itself as necessary for further penetration; it is the natural path of aprioristic insight.

With regard to its content, the relation is represented in this way: it is the detour via comprehension of the universal to comprehension of the real individual. Penetrating comprehension must take this path, because only the universal is directly accessible to aprioristic knowledge as such – and it is to this that comprehension adheres. It can only encounter the individual case insofar as the nature of the individual case falls under the universal. Of course, this does not mean that knowledge must explicitly carry out subsumptions. Subsumption already takes place in intuition, and, as a rule, is already carried out if things and relations of things are understood in the context of everyday life. In this respect, the universal is not noted as such; it is, in most cases, already present in ongoing experience, and the particular enters its forms without logical operation. It "falls under them," and is comprehended "in" them. Subsequently, one can lift out the universal. But only philosophy does this.

Whether this process is carried out with or without conscious control makes no difference. Its form is that of a "falling under." For that reason, in all comprehension of real possibility and real necessity – and in the intuitive experiences of everyday life – the detour via comprehension of the essential modes is already contained. If the general were not ontologically contained in individual cases, then the detour would take us down the wrong path. For real possibility and real necessity are not by any means universal; both are just as individualized in the individual case as this itself is individualized, and both are not transferable from one case to another. Every real case has its absolute, unique totality of real conditions, just as much as its individual components display traits in common with those of other cases.

If it were given to real knowledge to directly and intuitively comprehend this totality, then it would not require the detour via the universal. But this is not given to it. It does not penetrate the totality, and remains standing with partial possibilities, with which it can only draw nearer to full real possibility. But partial possibilities are themselves of a certain universality, which announces itself in their indeterminateness. In them, therefore, the aprioristic insight into the essentially possible, as into a homogeneous element, is not abolished. It modifies its structure according to them, and therefore forms a legitimate factor of knowledge in the finite comprehension of real possibility.

The same holds true of insight into essential necessity. Wherever we do not come close to comprehending the immense range of the unique collocation of real conditions, we may still very well comprehend the universal character of a typically recurring real connection – whether it be as strict lawfulness or as

a merely hypothetically understood form of dependency – and clarify it with the help of this universal character in the particular structure of the conditions. Exact natural science takes this path, and its great success consists in the fact that it ultimately brings to a certain overview, that looks out over the recurrent, typical features of characteristic real conditions, on the grounds of a widely laid out knowledge of law.

Thus, the recognition of essential necessity serves as a powerful guidepost for the comprehension of real necessity. As a particular case, the given real actual falls under the ideally understood genus, whose essentially necessary traits are thereby transferred to its content.

Essential knowledge, with its characteristic modes, fits right into the incomplete comprehension of real possibility and real necessity. The contrast only first emerges in the final goal of real knowledge, and in its categorial presupposition. This presupposition is that the totality of conditions is present in every given actual thing; the final goal of that presupposition is the comprehension of this totality. Thus, wherever real knowledge – as in certain exact sciences – comes close to comprehending full real possibility and real necessity, it must leave behind essential knowledge as such with its modes of the universal. It assimilates its positive content, but in surpassing it, sheds its incomplete modality.

51 The Intermodal Laws of Givenness

a) Amphibolous and Complex Intermodal Relations

On the grounds of the preceding considerations, the intermodal relations of real knowledge can now be brought together. According to the twofold modal table – that of givenness and that of comprehension – they must be considerably more complicated than the intermodal relations of the two spheres of being and of the logical. Nevertheless, they are already more or less contained in the relations that have been thoroughly discussed above. Thus, they require no proof.

It is characteristic, first of all, that among the modes of knowledge, indifference plays an extraordinarily broad role. This is related to the position of disjunctive possibility, which is still maintained at the lower levels of comprehension. Since the comprehension of possibility, itself, consequently develops into an amphibolous mode, its intermodal relations also become amphibolous. Strictly speaking, a dual mode is always to be distinguished in the modes of comprehension: a mode of complete comprehension with strict intermodal laws, and a mode of incomplete comprehension with amphibolous relation.

But if both remain closely related to each other, and practically speaking, only incomplete comprehension comes into question, then for the sake of overview, the situation can be simplified, insofar as it is the modes of incomplete comprehension alone that underlie it, and displacement from them is only noted where it is able to be grasped in the approximation to complete comprehension.

The complex intermodal relations that appear here present a further peculiarity. They begin everywhere that a single mode in and of itself does not have the power to imply another, but may very well imply another mode with a second mode supplementing it. Thus, it makes a difference whether or not one has a counter-hold on the given intuition of actuality in the incomplete comprehension of necessity. An approximate comprehension of actuality is produced along with this counter-hold, although the totality of conditions does not fully come into view. But without this counter-hold, comprehension is out of the question. This is not because the content in which the aprioristic presupposition could begin is missing. The same, of course, also holds true for the comprehension of possibility, and correspondingly, for the comprehension of impossibility.

The consequence is that one cannot bring the intermodal laws of real knowledge into the same arrangement as the intermodal laws of the other spheres. One must bring the relations of each individual mode together with the relations of the other modes, insofar as they come into question for it. The picture that is then obtained of the central modes is that of a more or less fan-shaped arrangement of different relations to different modes. To what extent these relations can be brought under general laws is a *cura posterior* [later concern].

For the same reason, we must hereafter dispense with a clearly arranged compilation of the intermodal laws. The external overview, which at least has introductory value, becomes illusory under such circumstances. The laws can be fully integrated into an overview more than it can; and what is more important, the amphibolous character of relations cannot be expressed in them. But this amphibolous character cannot be missing if the laws are correct.

b) The Immediate Consciousness of Nonactuality

If one proceeds from the combined modal table (Fig. 15), then one easily sees that the main emphasis is placed on the absolute modes in real knowledge, while the relational modes have only a transitional character. The cycle begins with the givenness of actuality (and nonactuality, respectively), and returns to it. We will begin with it for this very reason.

The immediate consciousness of actuality is intuitive; it is, therefore, basically only positive. Consciousness of nonactuality is not equivalent to it; negative givenness is only the absence of givenness – in a particular connection of givenness. For that reason, perception here is no longer misled into disregarding the possibility that the perceptible may very well be present in the real, but that perception has not yet penetrated it.

Thus, consciousness of nonactuality is a very weak and amphibolous mode. It unequivocally excludes only consciousness of actuality. It in no way excludes consciousness of possibility; indeed, it does not even completely exclude the comprehension of possibility. It is, therefore, indifferent toward the comprehension of possibility and the comprehension of impossibility. On the other hand, a mere concurrent consciousness of the possibility of nonbeing is firmly connected to it. But it does not play any kind of determining role; it is insufficient to completely exclude the comprehension of necessity, as one ultimately would expect. Hence, here there exists neither exclusion nor marked indifference, but rather a looser, obviously amphibolous relation.

Thus, it holds true for the modal construction of our knowledge: we can, on the grounds of a multifold, comprehensive view, comprehend something as necessary with a high degree of certainty, even though we can in no way bring that thing to givenness. In science, this is a very common situation; one thinks, for example, of the phylogeny of the organism: everything clearly supports the existence of certain forms of transition, but in most cases confirmation (such as through fossil findings) fails to occur; knowledge remains suspended, and comprehension remains hypothetical.

The comprehension of necessity is, therefore, excluded only from comprehension of nonactuality, but not from mere consciousness of nonactuality. Comprehension of nonactuality presupposes comprehension of impossibility, and far more is required for the latter, since the condition for it would be the comprehension of negative possibility. But mere consciousness of nonactuality is far removed from this.

From all of this emerges the fact that even the relation to contingency is a loose one. Neither the comprehension of impossibility nor the comprehension of necessity are excluded. Consciousness of nonactuality is not unequivocally accompanied by the consciousness of contingency on either side; even here it shows the same indifference. On the other hand, it is accompanied by an obscure consciousness whose characteristic feature is that it, itself, is a contingent consciousness. Even this is partial deception, since it is in no way contingent in the real process of knowledge; but of course, a contingency exists here, in the sense of internal modality; namely, with regard to the being and nonbeing of the object. The consciousness of nonactuality is a mere not-being-given

without firm relation to the nonbeing of that which is not given to it. It can only metaphorically be subsumed under givenness.

Intuition is necessarily positive. In this respect, the immediate consciousness of nonactuality can be described as a pure *modus deficiens*. It only gains determinateness if it stands in a wider connection of the given; however, the determinateness is then not its own, but that of the positively given. Thus, the consciousness of nonactuality is a dependent mode. And this is not to its disadvantage, because in this way it approximates real relation: even real nonactuality shows a similar dependency.

Nothing follows from naked nongivenness (one thinks of the false conclusions *ex silentio* [from silence] in the history of ideas). It cannot be seen whether nongivenness is evidence of the nonbeing of something or merely the not-being-given of something that exists, in itself. In this indeterminateness is rooted the whole amphiboly of the mode.

c) The Givenness of Actuality and the Modes of Possibility of Knowledge

In this respect, its positive counter-mode is of a completely different kind. Here, in all detachedness there is a high degree of determinateness. The consciousness of actuality is positive givenness. This mode is not deficient, and is, in itself, something independent. It is, of course, exposed to distortion (like all intuition), but even in this distortion, it remains immediate positive givenness, and the latter as such is in no way to be removed from it. All comprehension can only explain, not abolish, it; it does not even abolish the appearance, wherever this persists. Comprehension can only show that the thing itself behaves differently. But then, it must also explain the appearance.

The givenness of actuality, as has been shown, implies an obscure consciousness of possibility. But this has nothing to do with comprehension of possibility. Arguably, comprehension of impossibility is thereby excluded, and so is comprehension of nonactuality at the same time along with it – which should be obvious, since the immediate consciousness of nonactuality is also excluded. But neither the plain consciousness nor the comprehension of the possibility of nonbeing is excluded. The relation to both is amphibolous.

A complete comprehension of negative possibility would, of course, abolish the consciousness of actuality. But the finite comprehension is incomplete; the possibility one acquires from it is disjunctive, thus leaving open the positive counterpart. The possibility comprehended does not coincide with the unequivocal possibility of nonbeing of the real, which excludes the possibility of being.

Even more important is the relation of positive possibility to comprehension. It is a central, basic feature of knowledge that the givenness of actuality implies an indeterminate consciousness of possibility, but no comprehension of possibility. Givenness generally does not imply comprehension.

On the other hand, it cannot be said that complete indifference exists here, either. An impetus to comprehension of possibility steadily arises from the givenness of the actual, on the detour via the concurrent, obscure consciousness of possibility. This impetus may be slight, in everyday life; in a very undeveloped tendency toward comprehension, it may even be null. But the borderline case remains hypothetical; practically speaking, we know hardly any intuitive accepting without a certain classification of at least partially grasped connections. But in such classification, there is already an impetus to comprehension. One sees this most clearly in the fact that we experience the incomprehensible as puzzling or miraculous; something that is, indeed, peculiar to naïve consciousness. Unfamiliarity alone does not sufficiently explain this feeling. Rather, the "unfamiliar" as such shows clearly that a familiar classification must have already preexisted in a universally accepted connection. But this is already a comprehension, even if it is a skewed one. That we experience something as miraculous is already a failure of comprehension on a certain level. From this it follows that the tendency toward comprehension was already there. Otherwise, it could not have failed.

One may, therefore, say at least this much: in no way does the givenness of the actual imply the comprehension of possibility; but for comprehension, as long as the tendency toward comprehension exists, it means an urging toward the investigation of possibility. At a highly developed level of knowledge or at a theoretical level of engagement, the question of possibility directly emerges. And on it is based the well-known impact of the problem of comprehension, which always proceeds from givenness.

Therefore, it is not the case that real possibility has completely "disappeared" in the consciousness of actuality. It is only concealed; it is uncomprehended, but still obscurely represented in the consciousness of reality. It is already presupposed in the developing tendency toward comprehension.

d) The Givenness of Actuality and the Comprehension of Necessity

On the other hand, real necessity has completely disappeared. The relation to it in givenness is a quite different one, a strict relation: the givenness of the actual is absolutely indifferent toward the comprehension of necessity. Not only does the givenness of the actual not imply the comprehension of necessity, but it does not give any direct impetus to it, either.

The reason for this lies in the fact that there is no concurrent obscure consciousness of necessity, even though there is such a consciousness of possibility. Whatever is not classified in known connections and was not to be expected from them, is experienced as contingent. And in this consciousness of contingency, as in the case of a "miracle," the tendency does not exist to comprehend whatever is experienced as contingent – at least, not for the practically engaged consciousness, and not for a more highly developed consciousness. In contrast, there exists the opposite tendency of consciousness to reassure itself regarding contingency, to accept it. Thus, it comes about that only under the high pressure of scientific tendencies does the drive toward comprehension of necessity begin. Real necessity for the receptive consciousness of the actual, has, in fact, "disappeared."

In this respect, nothing is changed by the fact that an incipient comprehension of possibility also means a developing comprehension of necessity. For this connection is a mere connection of content, and is, at first, absolutely not modal. The partial possibility comprehended at first is still not by any means real possibility, but is, at least when considered in terms of content, a piece of it. Although the chain of conditions is the same in both real modes, a part of it is not the same for comprehension of necessity as it is for comprehension of possibility. Necessity is comprehended only from a totality of conditions. It can be anticipated on the grounds of aprioristic insight, but this anticipation is not a penetration of the given case. The consciousness of contingency is abolished by it, but not refuted. And above all: the anticipation of necessity is in no way caused by the givenness of the actual – not even in the sense of an impetus – but only arises in opposition to it from the independent impulse of completed comprehension.

The givenness of the actual is consequently indifferent toward necessity and contingency. But practically speaking, this indifference turns out to be in favor of contingency. Necessity is an extreme mode of comprehension; it is difficult to grasp, an extreme imposition on the energy of penetration. Even where it could come close to a decision about necessity, the consciousness of actuality is always inclined to forego making this decision. It is also inclined to leave givenness hovering in the incompleteness of the consciousness of connection. It prefers to accept the vague consciousness of contingency, and to content itself with this rather than taking on the difficult task of comprehending necessity, which is most of the time practically irrelevant anyway, since its attainment does not keep pace with the rapid variation of the given even to a slight degree.

Thus, the consciousness of contingency is a mode of accommodation and renunciation, a mode of practical economy of knowledge. In short, more a *modus vivendi* than a *modus cognoscendi*. It is a compromise between knowledge and

the urgent demands of the moment. In a highly developed consciousness, it leaves behind something like remorse: suppressed better insight – which always adheres to the beginnings of comprehension – is not completely silenced. But only with the overcoming in principle of this mode of consciousness does the uncompromising comprehension begin, without being reassured by the appearance of contingency. This is the step that everyday knowledge takes toward science.

Consequently, the consciousness of actuality is indifferent toward the comprehension of actuality. For it is generally indifferent toward comprehension. There is, indeed, the impetus to comprehension. But this impetus is not sufficient to set in motion the comprehension of actuality. The active impetus comes, rather, from comprehension itself.

e) Consciousness of Positive and Negative Possibility

Consciousness of possibility is not an independent mode of knowledge. It merely follows the givenness of the actual. For this reason, its relations to the other modes are not independent either.

However, it has a unique relation to consciousness of negative possibility. It does not quite include this consciousness, but neither does it exclude it. Thus, the two modes together do not directly form a disjunctive dual possibility, but rather stand in a certain indifference toward each other. For instance, if I see a complicated machine at work, whose mechanism is not evident, then I am well aware of the fact that the particular, conspicuous movement of one determinate part must somehow be possible; but I do not know whether a different movement of that part at that position would also be possible.

And since indifference toward a consciousness of possibility has a counterpart – in the comprehension of negative necessity with reversed signs – the total relation can be expressed as follows: the consciousness of positive possibility is indifferent toward both the consciousness of negative possibility and the comprehension of necessity (positive necessity); and the consciousness of negative possibility is indifferent toward both the consciousness of positive possibility and the comprehension of impossibility.

In this respect, the two modes of consciousness of possibility are not amphibolous, but show unequivocally merely the external indifference that makes them capable of separating from each other and entering into correspondingly higher modes. On the other hand, internal indifference (pure disjunctivity), plays no particular role in them.

It is now obvious that both of them exhibit the same indifference toward comprehension of possibility (positive and negative possibility, respectively),

and likewise toward comprehension of actuality (and nonactuality, respectively), insofar as this depends on comprehension of possibility. Except that, here, indifference goes a step further: consciousness of positive possibility can persist in the incomplete comprehension of negative possibility, and consciousness of negative possibility can also persist in the incomplete comprehension of positive possibility. Incomplete comprehension of the conditions for something does not exclude the opposite of that thing.

So far, the intermodal relations of the two modes have been symmetrical. The asymmetry only begins when they are correlated to the absolute modes of givenness. That is to say, these modes of givenness are not equivalent. The givenness of nonactuality is a deficient mode, and this deficiency is transferred to the concurrent mode of possibility. Mere "nongivenness" (in perception) implies an obscure consciousness of the possibility of nonbeing, but it does not completely exclude the comprehension of positive necessity. Something not given may very well be conceived of as necessary, but something given cannot be conceived of as impossible. Positive givenness is an absolutely independent and unequivocal mode; unlike negative givenness, it cannot be based merely on a nonoccurrence of perception.

The consciousness of negative possibility can, therefore, paradoxically coexist with the comprehension of necessity; but the consciousness of positive possibility cannot coexist with the comprehension of impossibility. The former is indifferent toward the necessity of the opposite, but the latter excludes it.

If the comprehension of necessity were as complete as the comprehension of impossibility, then that indifference would be inconceivable. But finite knowledge does not so easily bring to completion the comprehension of necessity. And the practice of knowledge, even that of scientific knowledge, confirms this. This relation is present everywhere that a partially grasped real connection (perhaps on the grounds of comprehended lawfulness) urges one to accept something not-given that, for the time being, cannot be confirmed. The urging is an incomplete comprehension of necessity; but the not-givenness leaves open the possibility of nonbeing. Consciousness of this relation is the index of the hypothetical.

This consciousness is only excluded if the hypothesis is confirmed; this happens through the beginning of givenness in any form, even a mediated one. The consciousness of negative possibility therefore gives way only to the comprehension of actuality. For the latter results wherever the comprehension of necessity and possibility coincide with the givenness of actuality.

This relation cannot be turned around in a positive sense. The consciousness of possibility is not compatible with the comprehension of impossibility; not even if this comprehension is incomplete. The givenness of actuality, which stands behind the consciousness of possibility, is not a deficient mode.

For that reason, the consciousness of possibility, in all of its indeterminateness of content, is still a modally completely determinate consciousness. The given must somehow be possible; otherwise, it could not be given. Even when it is afflicted with error, there must be something given, on which the error is based; and this must, again, be possible. This consciousness of possibility, because it is ascribable to no mere error of givenness, cannot coexist with any comprehension of impossibility, but it cannot be abolished by it either. Rather, in case of conflict, it proves that comprehension is on the wrong track.

The most well-known example of this situation is the famous thesis of the Eleatics concerning the impossibility of multiplicity, space, and movement. The thesis was a concept of impossibility based on certain presuppositions. Opposite to it, there stood unshaken the consciousness of actuality, the immediate being-given of multiplicity, space, and movement. This was indissolubly related to consciousness of possibility: movement must be possible, because it is actual; and likewise for multiplicity and space. But if all three are only illusions, then the appearance of their being-actual must be made comprehensible. For this appearance still persists.

History has, in this dispute, borne out the plain consciousness of possibility. The comprehension of impossibility has proven itself to be an appearance. And the reason for this appearance has been demonstrated in the implicit presuppositions of comprehension. As evidence of existence, immediacy is stronger than comprehension. Phenomena cannot be argued away. The classic insight emerging from this dispute was that there is no authority to the argument against immediate givenness, nor is there against the obscure consciousness accompanying it of possibility – that on the contrary, all comprehension and all theory has to maintain the phenomena at any price.

This does not mean that the givenness in everything that is related to content turns out to be right. Comprehension can very well prove the deception of something given, but only when the givenness is in a position to be comprehended along with the deception.

52 The Intermodal Laws of Comprehension

a) The Comprehension of Possibility

It has already been shown how disjunctivity in the comprehension of possibility initially arises. Here, a limited series of conditions is grasped; such a series produces partial possibility, and partial possibility is disjunctive. Or at least this is

the case in incomplete comprehension. And this alone comes into question. The well known consideration in everyday life of eventualities is entirely a matter of a comprehending consciousness, even if only a partially comprehending consciousness. Thus, emerges the peculiarity that the comprehension of positive possibility stands nearer to the comprehension of negative possibility than the obscure consciousness of positive possibility stands to consciousness of negative possibility.

The reason for this lies in the detachment from givenness. The consciousness of possibility is a companion mode to the givenness of the actual; the possibility of nonbeing is not excluded from givenness, but it is not given along with it, either. It is an entirely different matter, however, if no being-given of the actual is present. The notion of possibility then arises from another source: a part of real connection is grasped, but from this part, the consequences are not unequivocal, leaving open a multitude of "possibilities." This disjunctivity is a strict consequence of the situation of knowledge, itself.

Clearly, in the progress of knowledge there is the connection according to which all comprehension of possibility is caused by given things or events; comprehension is always related to these, beyond the consciousness of possibility. However, in comprehension as such, insight is detached from givenness, having become free and movable as compared with givenness. Comprehension cannot remain standing in the given, because it takes the detour via the universal – or what is the same – because it is connected to essential knowledge, and only from this essential knowledge turns back again to the individual case.

But the path backward is long, and seldom traversed all the way to the end. From the universal, only essential possibility is directly understood, and essential possibility is not sufficient for the real case; it can only approximate it as it differentiates itself (in the widely laid out knowledge of law), but it never replaces the chain of real conditions. Therefore, the seeking, groping, always unready posture of the comprehension of possibility; it finds many things and reveals them, but whenever a given thing runs contrary to what has been found, this comprehension is quickly thrown from the saddle. Our empirical consciousness of the world presents itself at all times as a narrow circle of the immediately given, which is only partially comprehended, and which is surrounded by a wide wreath of things that have been ascertained in comprehension. In the latter, the comprehension of possibility plays the main role. But it is an incomplete comprehension, and as long as it does not find confirmation in givenness, it remains suspended.

In this incompleteness, comprehension of possibility is indifferent on almost all sides. It does not, of itself, imply any comprehension of necessity and actuality; and as a negative mode, it does not imply any comprehension of

impossibility and nonactuality. Of course, for this latter comprehension, only a single real condition would have to be seen to be missing; but even this presupposes that the missing condition is seen as indispensable and "necessary" beforehand, and this is only to be achieved in a certain completeness of comprehension.

This incomplete comprehension of possibility is, therefore, indifferent toward knowledge of necessity and contingency, being likewise indifferent toward knowledge of actuality and nonactuality. The same holds true for comprehension of negative possibility. Both modes of possibility have detached themselves from givenness, but they have not penetrated through to full comprehension. They are, in fact, hovering modes, characteristic of the seeking and groping of emergent comprehension.

On the other hand, this indifference is only the expression of insufficient penetration. It does not exclude the unequivocal tendency toward the comprehension of necessity, but includes it. This tendency proceeds steadily as a kind of urging by it, exactly like the urging to complete comprehension of possibility itself. Indeed, both are basically a tendency. The incomplete comprehension of possibility always aims at comprehension of necessity; it thereby strictly counteracts the consciousness of contingency, accepting this consciousness only as compromised knowledge. The consciousness of contingency lies just as deeply within its essence as the need for completion through givenness and the steady searching for it.

This connectedness is ultimately rooted in the aprioristic, categorical presupposition of all comprehension that all of the real actual has total possibility standing behind it, and that this total possibility coincides in terms of content with its sufficient reason. With this presupposition, the comprehension of possibility is reconnected to the intermodal laws of the real, and a completely different relation holds sway, according to which the comprehension of possibility would conceptually imply the comprehension of necessity and actuality, just as it is in a negative sense for the comprehension of impossibility and nonactuality.

But in finite comprehension this asserts itself only as a tendency that remains far from its goal.

b) The Comprehension of Necessity and of Impossibility

There is no plain intuitive consciousness of, and no direct givenness of, necessity. There is only a comprehension of necessity; and likewise, only a comprehension of impossibility.

Thus, the detachment from givenness in the comprehension of necessity is far more radical than it is in the comprehension of possibility. The departure from given actuality takes place somewhere farther behind. The given is, first of all, that which should be comprehended. However, its necessity cannot be seen from the latter, but is only visible from its own sufficient real ground. This real ground lies "behind it," and must be investigated first.

Comprehension of necessity, positive as well as negative, presupposes comprehension of possibility; it therefore implies such comprehension. But the chain of conditions in real connection, on the grounds of which something is really possible, is the same as the chain of conditions on the grounds of which it is really necessary. This identity fetters the comprehension of real necessity to the comprehension of real possibility. One cannot understand the sufficient reason for something without understanding the conditions for it. But this does not work vice versa: one may very well understand the conditions for something, without understanding the reason for it. For only the total chain of conditions constitutes the reason (see Chap. 25 c). This stems not only from the incompleteness of comprehension, but also from the varying degrees of comprehensive overview. With possibility, one has already, by means of a brief survey, grasped a fragment; the partial possibility understood is not real possibility, but it does begin to approach it. On the other hand, there is no "partial necessity." A partial reason is no reason at all – nothing results from it, and the thing in question remains contingent. Only a total survey of its conditions allows one to comprehend it as necessary. But such a survey is difficult to accomplish in finite comprehension. And if beyond the comprehended fragment there is not an aprioristic anticipation of necessity, on the grounds of categorial presuppositions, then in ordinary life we may never arrive at a comprehension of necessity.

Meanwhile, this is only fully the case for the comprehension of positive necessity, and not for the comprehension of negative necessity. Real impossibility – as was shown earlier – already exists if even one condition in the totality is missing. Such an absence is not very difficult to recognize. Of course, one may not rely on nongivenness; it is a deficient mode. Even though the absence of a condition may very well be demonstrable under certain circumstances, there often still remains, even in the long deductive chains of scientific knowledge, the finite task of gaining insight into such an absence.

Comprehension of impossibility is, therefore, much easier to come by than comprehension of necessity. One can, for example, comprehend the impossibility of the eternal continuation of organic life on Earth, without in the least understanding the internal conditions for the development and death of natural species; rather, one may find sufficient reason in the much simpler insight that

certain basic conditions of a cosmic nature – such as the unlimited, continued existence of warmth, light, air, and water on the surface of the Earth – are not fulfilled. Of course, one can dispute the conclusions of modern physics about the duration of solar radiation; but one cannot deny that there is a comprehension of this kind, and that it is counted among the most determinate and well-proven modes of comprehension.

The same comprehension of impossibility also plays a broad role in practical life, although in a looser form. It limits our decisions and undertakings: one can wish or long for the impossible, but one cannot will it, as long one seriously considers it to be impossible. From the outset, all practical considerations stay within the limits of an at least partially comprehended possibility. The faintest comprehension of impossibility already bars activity. And in this case, it is not a matter of conditions merely not being together; such a not-being-together leaves open the making-possible in which actualization exists. It is rather a matter of the insight that certain conditions of making-possible itself are missing, and that it is not within our power to supply them.

The comprehension of impossibility is an epistemic mode with a high level of certainty and weight-bearing capacity. In its own way, such comprehension tends to be right, even when it is surpassed in content by subsequent deeper insight. One need only think of the "impossibility of flying." For centuries, human beings were convinced of this impossibility, namely, that flying was, in fact, really impossible. They could not create the technical preconditions, and for that reason, they were right. But with an obscure consciousness that the case could be otherwise, they recognized that the preconditions were not completely lacking. The present-day consciousness of possibility does not in the least contradict this obscure consciousness. With advances in technology, the real conditions themselves have changed. And due to this result of the historical process, one must absolutely agree with the comprehension of impossibility in earlier times.

c) The Essential Knowledge in Comprehension of Real Necessity

From this, one understands the peculiar relation between the comprehension of impossibility and the consciousness of nonactuality. Namely, the latter hardly adds anything to it. Positive givenness of actuality would abolish it; givenness is stronger than comprehension. But if neither is present, if neither actuality nor nonactuality is given, and one does not know what actually "is," then the comprehension of impossibility is sufficient for a certain comprehension of nonactuality.

This was the case in our first example of the continuation of organic life on Earth. Here, the confirmation does not come into question, because it lies in the distant future. Therefore, one may say that a certain implied comprehension of nonactuality emerges from the true comprehension of impossibility. In a negative sense, the modes of comprehension are stronger than the modes of givenness. For negative givenness is a deficient mode. But negative comprehension is in no way deficient. It can even indirectly be a very positive comprehension. Impossibility of **A** is the necessity of not-**A.** Under certain conditions, this not-**A** can, however, be something very determinate.

Things are not so favorable in direct positive comprehension of necessity. Properly, a totality of real conditions must be grasped here. By no means does a part of them suffice. It is a recognized fact that such a comprehension of necessity comes about only in the field of the exact sciences, and even for concrete individual cases this is only with certain restrictions that limit accuracy or have a hypothetical impact. The exact sciences, however, are only concerned with the lowest levels of the real. There, the relations of real connection are relatively simple. Or more properly, they are of a more schematic nature, thus being clearer. From here on up in the hierarchy of "that which is," real connection becomes ever the more complex. In the mental and spiritual realms of being, a complete overview is quite out of the question.

And yet, in all of these fields there are many kinds of comprehension of necessity, often surprisingly clear and unerring. Indeed, even far outside of science, in the midst of everyday life, where all strata of being in the human world are superimposed and exist undivided, we rely on the necessary, e.g. in the form of the clearly foreseeable, and adapt our actions accordingly.

How is this possible, we ask ourselves, where all this comprehension, without exception, is incomplete? The answer lies in what we have come to know as the detour of comprehension via essential knowledge, via the universal and its aprioristic categorial conditionality. Whatever is directly recognized in such cases is not at all that which is necessary here and now, but only that which is necessary under determinate conditions. But it is not directly recognized whether precisely these conditions are fulfilled in given cases. Only the belonging of types to the situation comes to consciousness, and this suffices for determinate tasks of knowledge; but this consciousness of the situation is incomplete. If basic insight into necessity is strictly expressed, then it always has the form of "if – then." It is the insight into a universal, an essential connection, or a mode of lawfulness. This insight can be exact, even if it is not deliberately expressed in the form of a law. But taken by itself, it is only a comprehension of essential necessity, not of real necessity. Whether it applies to the given case, and to what extent it concerns the particular aspects in it, is a quite different question.

From such general insights, which are basically essential insights, all of our knowledge is drawn, even practical knowledge, which proceeds without reflecting on how it presupposes them. The given individual cases, as grasped by consciousness of actuality, always fall under certain essential insights. And on these is based the comprehension, anticipating the totality of conditions, of necessity. At the same time, however, the incompleteness and corruptibility of comprehension is rooted in this relation. For knowledge is at risk of being subsumed under a pre-established universal. The givenness of a case is not, as a rule, sufficient to validate its subsumption under a type.

In practical life, this risk is concealed by the implicitness with which a case is included among a type, as if it were merely a matter of course. But even in an exact field, where its inclusion is critically scrutinized, uncertainty remains. One sees this clearly in the example of the famous "computation" of Neptune's orbit by Leverrier: the calculations are checked, the underlying laws are tested, but the data could still somehow be misinterpreted. For that reason, the full comprehension of real necessity still depends on confirmation by the givenness of the actual.

It can be seen from this fact that: on its own accord, the complete comprehension of necessity already implies the comprehension of actuality. But the incomplete comprehension of necessity does not. And because in finite knowledge the comprehension of necessity in relation to the real case remains incomplete, and because it can complete the partially grasped series of real conditions only by comprehending the universal, one must, therefore, say that: it does not yet on its own accord imply the comprehension of actuality.

The opposition to comprehension of impossibility becomes very striking here. This comprehension is sufficient to imply a comprehension of nonactuality, and negative givenness can add little to it. Here, no completion is required; proof that a single condition is missing is already sufficient for comprehension of impossibility. This is quite different if affirmative necessity is to be discerned, that necessity on which scientific and practical matters thus ultimately depend. The modes of comprehension are stronger than the modes of givenness in the case of negative necessity–thus, where they have less value for knowledge. But in the case of positive necessity, where the true importance of human orientation to the world rests upon them, they are weaker than the modes of givenness.

It is paradoxical that a comprehension of necessity does not imply any comprehension of actuality. The paradox cannot be completely remedied by making reference to incompleteness. For one would think that incomplete comprehension could not be comprehension of necessity. But opposed to this is the fact that insight into the universal is already a certain comprehension of necessity.

It is indeed directly only a comprehension of essential necessity, but because the real stands under essential laws in its relations of dependency, any comprehension of essential necessity already illuminates the structure of real necessity as well. And in this respect, incomplete comprehension, despite its uncertainty and hypothetical impact, is still not to be scorned. Despite all of its incompleteness, it is a quite valuable state of human knowledge.

The same paradox is revealed by the relation to negative possibility. In its restriction to finite knowledge, comprehension of necessity does not exclude a consciousness of possibility any more than it can exclude the givenness of nonactuality. Only confirmation by positive givenness can exclude the consciousness of negative possibility.

d) The Comprehension of Actuality and of Nonactuality

All of the positive modes of knowledge press for the comprehension of actuality, while all of the negative ones press for the comprehension of nonactuality. But the pressure is only their emerging tendency toward knowledge; it is not implication. There is true, simple implication in this pressure only in a negative sense: from comprehension of impossibility to comprehension of nonactuality.

In a positive sense, on the other hand, only a complex relation of implication holds sway. We saw just now how the incomplete comprehension of necessity alone does not imply any comprehension of actuality; it is only a "universal" comprehension based on law, and therefore, it is not sufficient for real necessity of the individual case. But this changes where the immediate givenness of that which was inferred on the grounds of the universal enters into this comprehension of the universal. Namely, for the missing completeness of the comprehended real connection, the comprehension of the actuality of the result comes into play, and this elevates the comprehension to further completion. It cannot replace the latter; but the incomplete comprehension, as far as it reaches, is nevertheless elevated to a certain comprehension of actuality, through the givenness coming to meet it.

The complex relation of implication can, thus, be formulated as follows: neither the givenness of actuality nor the comprehension of necessity is in a position to imply a comprehension of actuality – the former lacks comprehension, while the latter lacks knowledge of being-actual – but the two together imply a comprehension of actuality. Thus, the contrasting aspects of the two implicative modes enter into a synthesis, in which the comprehended is proven to be an actual thing.

The implied comprehension is, of course, no more complete than the comprehension implying it (the comprehension of necessity). It is and remains only a comprehension of the universal in the real actual, and in the particularity of the case, various uncomprehended things remain. But this changes nothing, insofar as it is still a certain comprehension of real actuality – within the limits in which human knowledge is capable of such comprehension.

Despite its incompleteness under certain conditions, the epistemic value of this comprehension is extraordinarily high; for the heterogeneity of the mutually complementing and supporting modes in it affords it a high degree of certainty. Moreover, with progressive completion of the comprehension, this value can increase indefinitely. Even in the experience of everyday life, where the synthesis of the modes of knowledge is completely unconscious but effortlessly completed at every turn – e.g. in all so-called life experiences, in all human knowledge, in all mastery of situations – comprehension of this kind attains such great importance that the experiencing person relies on it with good reason.

If one looks closely, then one finds that the implication involved here is even more complex. For, in point of fact, the comprehension of necessity always already presupposes a comprehension of possibility; and likewise, the givenness of actuality accompanies consciousness of possibility. Thus, the two positive modes of possibility become involved; and it is evident that, in truth, not merely two, but four positive modes of knowledge (i.e. all except the highest) collaborate in order to imply this highest mode of knowledge, the comprehension of actuality.

This highly complex implication corresponds to the reversal of the relation. For obviously the comprehension of actuality, on its part, implies all of the modes involved in its modal construction. It, thus, implies the comprehension of necessity, as well as the givenness of actuality. And since one cannot comprehend necessity without comprehending possibility to the same extent, and cannot comprehend actuality as given without a consciousness of possibility, it is clear that the comprehension of actuality, on its part, implies all the other positive modes of knowledge. It excludes only the consciousness of contingency. But this consciousness is not a purely positive mode of knowledge.

On the other hand, this implication of the lower modes by the highest is hardly to be called actual implication. At any rate, it hardly comes into question for the synthetically constructed progress of knowledge. Knowledge takes the opposite path, from the lower mode to the higher. One never comprehends necessity or possibility from already comprehended actuality, any more than one proceeds from it to reach plain givenness (according to the "cycle of knowledge," one reaches new givenness, but not the old givenness that was already presupposed). Rather, one only conversely comprehends actuality

from comprehended possibility and necessity, on the one hand, and from given actuality, on the other. The comprehension of actuality presupposes the lower positive modes of knowledge, but actual implication only holds sway in the opposite direction: from the totality of these modes toward the comprehension.

But things work differently and more simply in the comprehension of nonactuality. It has already been shown how and why the mere comprehension of impossibility implies the comprehension of nonactuality. Since the latter presupposes a comprehension of negative possibility, but does not need the givenness of nonactuality to confirm or complete it, it follows that the comprehension of nonactuality, on its part, implies only the comprehension of negative possibility and the comprehension of impossibility, but not the givenness of nonactuality and its companion mode, the consciousness of negative possibility.

Even this reversal of modal dependency is not true implication, but only a presupposition. Even in the negative sense, the course of knowledge proceeds only from the less determinate to the more determinate mode.

e) The Consciousness of Contingency

Throughout the entire realm of comprehension, the tendency toward contingency is excluded. Of course, only according to the tendency, and this is not effectively excluded from incomplete comprehension, which is dependent on the universality of essential relations wherever it does not grasp the impenetrable complexity of real conditions. Among the universal as such the particular remains ontically contingent, as the intermodal relations of ideal being have taught (Chap. 42 c and 44 a). Thus, in finite knowledge, no sharp boundary line can be drawn that could define the range of possible consciousness of contingency.

According to this conception, the boundary line must lie exactly where the two heterogeneous elements of knowledge – givenness and comprehension – come into contact. But in finite knowledge, this boundary is shifted; it is not a line at all, and is dissolved in a series of transitional phenomena. There is no actual comprehension of contingency; but all incomplete comprehension retains to some extent the impact of the consciousness of contingency. This impact is an aspect not of comprehension, but of noncomprehension. It accompanies comprehension just as faithfully through all of its levels as does knowledge of the incomprehensible.

On the other hand, since the modes of intuition are completely at the mercy of appearing contingency, anyway, the range of contingency in real knowledge is indeed exceptionally wider. It is only dammed up by the comprehension,

which occasionally appears with full stringency, of impossibility. In a positive sense, this damming up is already much weaker, because the coincidence of the incomplete comprehension of necessity with the being-given of actuality is only a substitute for strict comprehension, and is only achievable under favorable circumstances. Everything that lies between is and remains penetrated and virtually disintegrated by the consciousness of contingency.

In this mode, we have the most extreme contrast between knowledge and object. For the real excludes chance from its sphere; it is the field of continuous determination and sufficient reason. Knowledge brings the real only negatively to sufficient reason, or in partial aspects that the universal allows. In positive comprehension of the real case according to its particularity, knowledge remains incomplete. Therefore, consciousness of contingency's breadth of scope – even in comprehension – begins wherever comprehension encounters its own limits. The consciousness of contingency is actually the boundary mode of human comprehension.

But it is not an independent mode. It can only appear as a companion-mode to givenness. Therefore, formally it implies givenness, that of actuality as well as that of nonactuality; indirectly it also implies the consciousness of possibility (of being and nonbeing, respectively). Again, this is not actual implication, but only the being-presupposed of the fundamental mode, as well as the being-presupposed of that which is implied by it. And thus, in truth the consciousness of contingency implies nothing.

But it excludes other modes, namely, not only the comprehension of necessity and impossibility, respectively – which is self-evident – but also the comprehension of actuality and nonactuality. For the real actual can only be comprehended if it is comprehended as necessary. Indifference, on the other hand, holds its own against the comprehension of possibility. –

Aside from all of this, the mode of contingency makes yet another appearance in knowledge, as an actual comprehension of real contingency. This expression is to be taken with a great deal of caution; it would be nonsensical if the object were not also contingent. And if the object is really contingent, then an incomprehensible aspect of it remains in being contingent; comprehension can be restricted only to the "appearance" of the real contingent.

The real is of such a nature that within its limits it is subject to continual dependency, and therefore in the particular it is always necessary, but at its limits and as a whole it remains contingent. Philosophical comprehension, however, is very well capable of grasping this – the fact of its being so-natured. It understands it throughout, precisely in the structure of real determination. This has the form of a series, and the first components of the series must be undetermined, i.e. contingent.

This comprehension of contingency, however, can in no way be universalized. It remains restricted to one point. And in merely speculative and metaphysical considerations this one point develops into an object of knowledge, therefore in science and everyday life the knowledge of the real remains free from the comprehension of contingency.

53 Determination of Knowledge and Ground of Knowledge

a) The Double Error of Rationalism and Modal Analysis

The philosophy of rationalism understood the principle of sufficient reason in a double sense: that which is and the knowledge of that which is should, without exception, have sufficient reason. If knowledge was understood as consisting only of complete comprehension, then this was a simple consequence of the continuous determination of that which is. Indeed, the ground of knowledge and ground of being must ultimately coincide, no longer being two kinds of ground.

But the presupposition on which this was based is the basic prejudgment of rationalism: that there is a complete comprehension of the real actual, but that we do not have the least hold on it. Comprehension can approximate it in limited sectors of "that which is;" and then of course there also lies in this the approximate comprehension of sufficient reason and of the necessity resulting from it. But neither can this be universalized nor is full insight into necessity possible within the narrowness of a sector. There always remains a state of real conditions that lies beyond the limits of the sector; this state is then basically to be disregarded, and only through this disregard does the necessity comprehended appear to be complete.

And, consequently, this insight is not actual comprehension of necessity. What is comprehended is not the sufficient ground, which must be complete, but only a fragment of it, a limited series of conditions. Thus, the insight into necessity, itself, remains hypothetical. And only by being correlated to newly given factuality can it be elevated to certainty. This kind of completion, however, does not come from comprehension of the ground, but from the givenness of the actual.

Thus, the old rationalistic way of thinking, and everything related to it in recent times, is rooted in a deep misunderstanding of the essence of knowledge. But the misunderstanding directly concerns the intermodal relations of knowledge. It is tacitly presupposed here that all knowledge of an actual thing is

based on comprehension of its reasons for being. The character of direct givenness, which knows nothing of reasons, is misunderstood. One thinks that there must always adhere to direct givenness a comprehension of actuality, even if this comprehension is incomplete; and the fact that in a developed state of knowledge, all givenness falls into a standby network of ongoing comprehension, so to speak, encourages this conception. Thus, Leibniz intended to trace back all *vérité en fait* to an in-itself indistinct, discernible rationality. There would then be required only the deeper discernment of the actual contents of knowledge in order to reach complete comprehension. On that basis, the logical, scientific, and theoretical orientation of epistemology in the late nineteenth century, in particular the Neo-Kantian orientation, shifted.

The modal analysis of knowledge puts an end to this error, once and for all. No empiricism and no positivism was in a position to do this, because both fell into the reverse-extreme, which falls away in this analysis as a kind of secondary benefit of the investigation. It demonstrates the wide distance, in the mode of actuality, between intuitive givenness and comprehension; a distance which is not based on the gradation of one and the same insight, but rather on the heterogeneity of differently natured insights. In the givenness of an actual thing, nothing needs to be contained by insight into its real grounds, neither openly nor latently. Modal analysis thereby exposes the double error of rationalism; on the one hand, the blurring of the difference between real ground and ground of knowledge, and on the other, the false playing out of human knowledge in the gradations of absolute (or "divine") knowledge, in which knowledge about actuality must coincide with comprehension of possibility and necessity.

The two are closely related. The ambiguity lies in the concept of the term "rational," itself. On the one hand, *ratio* is understood as reason, and, on the other, as ground; what is meant is that there may be rational insight in knowledge just as much as there may be recognition of the grounds of the object. This makes sense if the grasping of the object is equated with the self-transparency of reason. It, therefore, goes on into absolute apriorism (Leibniz), which presupposes the grounds of "that which is" in the background of consciousness. But it does not go on, if one discerns the independence of the aposterioristic source of knowledge. Then not only do the grounds of being not need to be comprehended, they do not need to correspond in terms of content to the grounds of knowledge, either.

An insurmountable boundary is thereby drawn between human knowledge and the dreamt of *intellectus infinitus*. It is the boundary of the only indirectly reflecting intellect proceeding from the ontically secondary form (the *posterius*) to the grounds of being, as opposed to the pure knowing intellect proceeding

from the ontically primary form (the *prius*). The latter would, indeed, be able to recognize purely sufficient grounds [*zureichende Gründe*], but it is not our intellect, and can never be attained by our intellect.

The consequence of this state of affairs is that – contrary to what is assumed by that theory – knowledge, as it is, does without sufficient grounds for the most part, and in any case, it is far from establishing itself in its totality on the comprehension of the grounds of being. In general, knowledge is satisfied with absolutely "insufficient" reasons – insofar as it basically comprehends grounds – and must look elsewhere for completion of all the missing strictness of necessity. Corresponding to this is the familiar situation that, in all fields of the real, science necessarily has a lengthy, seldom completed task of hypothetical forging-ahead, at least in order to achieve a partial comprehension of necessity, namely, wherever sequences of facts are present in the widest range.

b) The Real Ground of Knowledge and the Knowledge of Real Ground

These principles should not be misunderstood as suggesting that knowledge were ever to be something groundless. There is always sufficient ground that something is known, and that it is known precisely in such a way and to such an extent, whether these principles recognize it or not. Knowledge cannot turn out otherwise than it in fact turns out; if it could cognize in that other way, then it would have to cognize in that other way.

That something is perceived has its sufficient reason in a collocation of circumstances; in the presence of the object, of the sensory organ, of consciousness; in the direction of attention, etc.; likewise, that something is comprehended has its sufficient reason in the presence of internal and external conditions of comprehension. The chain of real conditions is always filled out. And the real actual recognition is always really necessary.

In this sense, there is always a sufficient ground of knowledge. For knowledge, ontologically understood, is a real process – a process of spiritual real life – and it underlies the intermodal laws of the real. The ground in this sense, may be called the "real ground of knowledge." Its presence is rooted in the real modes of knowledge, which are not different from those of other real things in the world. But the real ground of knowledge exists quite independently of whether it itself is known or not. It generally is not known. Indeed, even if it is actually known, it does not essentially contribute to knowledge of the object; it does this only in special cases, such as those where the exposure of an appearance or deception is involved. It is not the real ground of the object, but only the real ground of knowledge of the object.

On the other hand, what is epistemologically called the ground as the foundation for comprehension is something quite different. By this, one means the ground from which the necessity of the object is comprehended. The ground of knowledge, in this narrow sense, must be the real ground of the object, as long as it itself is recognized, and as long as from it the necessity of the thing is comprehended.

What is therefore referred to as the sufficient ground in knowledge is not the real ground of knowledge, but the knowledge of the real ground of the object of knowledge. And with this knowledge, it stands that it does not, by any means, immediately accompany knowledge of the object, although the real ground of the object is always present. Knowledge, insofar as it is attained, is always necessary, but it is not therefore knowledge of necessity; that is to say, neither of its own real necessity nor of the real necessity of the object. The internal modality of knowledge does not coincide with the external, even if it occasionally agrees with it. If the two coincided, then all knowledge of actuality would at the same time have to be comprehension of necessity.

The fact that this is not the case constitutes the internal "situation" of knowledge, which manifests itself in the fact that the intuitive consciousness of actuality – together with the accompanying obscure consciousness of possibility – does not see the sufficient ground of the actual. The concrete consciousness of the object separates its objects from their grounds. It is, so to speak, blind to them. For that reason, the objects (situations, events, etc.) appear to it to be groundless, contingent, as if they were governed by no law of determination.

Knowledge is far from being able to follow real connection. That is why – contrary to the presuppositions of rationalism – it is precisely the kind of thing for which no law of sufficient ground holds true. Only for comprehension does such a law hold true, but that is only according to the idea of comprehension; or more correctly, it would strictly hold true only for a complete comprehension. But complete comprehension remains, by and large, a *desideratum*, and is not counted among the consistently essential categories of real knowledge.

c) The "Grounding" and the Demonstration of Real Grounds

The principle of sufficient reason is not a universal law of knowledge. It does not say that all knowledge knows about the grounds on which its object is based, and still less, that it gathers from them how it is provided. Indeed, there is always sufficient reason why we know something, and why we know it in precisely such a way and to such an extent. But this is only the real ground of

knowledge, not the real ground of the known; and whatever is known is, for the most part, not known "from" it, but known despite our ignorance of it.

There is a knowledge from grounds; but neither is it inherent in all knowledge nor is it already knowledge from the real ground of the thing in question. The ground of knowledge can also be the ontic consequence of that which, is known from it.

So it is, for example, in all causal inference from the effect to the cause. This inference is justified wherever it is based on sufficient knowledge of the law of being that governs the case. However, it is not an inference from the real ground of the thing as to this law of being, but an inference from the givenness of the thing about its real ground. Knowledge is not only a field of incomplete determination, but a field that forges ahead in a freely varying direction against real dependency. The direction in which knowledge progresses is not tied to the direction in which the real progresses; it may just as well run with it as against it. If one considers that givenness, as a rule, presents only the external phenomenon of the thing, thus, the ontically dependent, but that the real grounds for this kind of appearance can only emerge "behind" the thing, then it is easy to see that in knowledge, the relation between ground and consequence is often reversed with regard to content.

The consequence of this is: the "grounding," as cultivated by science, and as governing our deliberations in everyday life, is not at all identical to the demonstration of real grounds, and consequently not to knowledge of them, either.

The grounding consists of demonstrating the grounds of knowledge. But the ground of knowledge does not coincide with the real ground of the thing. The grounding ultimately merges into the comprehension of the thing, and this is only possible from its real grounds. But the path leading to this comprehension is long. First of all, the real grounds must, themselves, be found. And at best they are only discoverable as one converts into the ground of knowledge the givenness of that which in real relation is the consequence, i.e. as one draws a conclusion from the latter about the former.

Meanwhile, this alone does not constitute the difference between the grounding and demonstrating of real grounds. For conversely, the situation is as follows: if one has actually found the real ground **X** of a thing **A**, then it thereby is in no way said that one already understands how **A** emerges from **X**. One may very well know that **A** is based on **X** without comprehending exactly how **X** brings it forth. The internal connections of the "consequence" as such do not tend to be comprehended as actual consequence. Comprehension usually goes only as far as lawfulness, i.e. as far as the general type of a determinate, consistent, repetitive logical succession; one then understands how, under the presupposition of a law in given cases, there can be no **X** without

consequence **A**. But this is still not comprehension of **A**'s emergence, itself, and therefore is still not ontological comprehension of necessity.

Causal comprehension is characteristic of this relation; as a rule, the connection of **X** and **A** can be understood in the form of lawfulness, and it often leads to more general laws. But with all of this, one does not, by any means, see how a cause is able to bring forth dissimilar effects. Rather, the universal itself, on the grounds of which one comprehends the particular, initially remains uncomprehended. Comprehension does not penetrate the real nexus. It cannot follow it in its mysterious, internal dynamics, and the real nexus remains for it an irrational thing.

It is one of Kant's deepest insights that for our knowledge of causal connection, only one "analogy of experience" matters, which we rightly apply *a priori* to the consequence of phenomena, but in no way understand. For how a cause brings forth its effect, "of which we have *a priori* not the least concept."[2] And since *a posteriori* we have even less of a concept of it, we have no comprehension of it.

Under favorable circumstances, we can demonstrate the ground **X** for a given **A**. And if **X** is sufficient – which, in simple cases, may approximately hold true – then in this ground actually lies the complete chain of real conditions under which **A** really necessarily appears. Nevertheless, knowledge about these conditions as conditions of **A** does not in any way need to be a comprehension of the necessity of **A**. For this would, moreover, require that one also comprehended why **A** cannot fail to occur under these conditions, and how **X** actually manages to bring forth **A**, respectively.

But for this, our knowledge of law is insufficient in even the simplest cases. If one, for example, traces back the Keplerian ellipse of the Earth's orbit to the Newtonian law of inertia and gravity, then in no way does this mean that one has grasped how inertia of mass and gravitation interact to bring about the elliptical form. In order to do so, one must also know what inertia actually is, and what gravity actually is. But we know both only as formulations for certain basic moments of appearances. What gravitation is as force, and what inertia is as a quality of matter (and this means, what matter itself is), remains absolutely unknown. The most puzzling questions of physics are tied to both of

2 Kant writes: "How, in general, something can be changed, how it is possible that, on one condition at one point in time, a contrary thing can follow another; of this we have *a priori* not the least concept," *Critique of Pure Reason*, Second Edition, p. 252. That the emergence of the effect is intended by the cause shows a further connection.

these problems, and the deeper their aporetics are penetrated, the more puzzling they become.

Thus, the demonstration of the real grounds (insofar as they are grasped) is not comprehension of real necessity. It is a "grounding" only in the sense of leading back to the universal (essential features), but not in the sense of deducing, or even proving, from it.

d) Essence and Ground, Comprehension and Grounding

What already fails in such simple cases certainly does not come into question for more complex cases. Even the demonstration of real grounds is, therefore, in no way a comprehension of real necessity from them. Nor does it concern a fulfillment of the principle of sufficient reason in knowledge. In this respect, knowledge and its object display the deepest heterogeneity.

What has always been deceiving about this is the traditional conception of the "essence" of the thing. One imagines the "ground" of the thing to be nothing other than its essence. Indeed, it seems that if the ground is not the essence of the thing, then it must be external to it; and then, it can explain nothing in it. This was Hegel's view, and an old metaphysics of essence underlies it. This metaphysics reaches back beyond the classical theories of *essentia* to Aristotle, who saw in τί ἦν εἶναι [*ti en einai*, essence] the "internal αἰτία" [*aitia*, cause]. If one generally works from the teleological schema of real connection, then this is at least consistent, even if it does not suffice for the phenomena. But if one grasps the ontic richness of form of real connection, then simplifications of this kind become falsifications.

The world is in no way so constructed that each thing bears within itself its own principle, independent of the rest of the real. Real connection runs through the world, one real connection is always rooted in another and is correlated to conditions that in no way lie within it itself; and only the totality of these conditions, together with the developed internal form of the thing, constitute its sufficient real ground.

The Hegelian dialectic of the "ground" is laid out incorrectly from the ground up. It rejects the "external ground," and considers it to be something that would be falsely brought over to the thing from the mind grounding it. It instead turns back to the Aristotelian essential substance, and from that results the whole series of self-made difficulties in which the dialectic consists, and likewise the fundamental misunderstanding of real connection. The ground is not identical to the grounded, is not its essence, that is to say, neither in real relation nor in grounding knowledge. The law of ground is not a tautological principle.

Neither Hegel's "formal" nor his "material" ground come into question here; form and matter are essentially the form and matter of the thing itself. Its real ground, however, is not it, itself, but rather something other than it, which is never contained in it. And the law of ground is thereby a law of unity of the world. It signifies the continuous necessity of dependency in the unity of real connection.

But while the real ground **X** is always a different thing "behind" **A**, and can never be given "in" it, nevertheless, the "grounding" in the progress of knowledge is still not a "carrying-over" of the grounds. It is rather a demonstration of already existing real factors that underlie **A** and which are nevertheless external to it, and whose totality (**X**) always includes a whole field of being. Knowledge can add nothing to being. In comprehension of the ground, as in intuition of the fact, knowledge concerns nothing but the things present. Only the relations of givenness are different; for the present as such is not yet given.

What is always already present, wherever there is an **A**, is its being based on a complex of conditions that constitute the real reason **X**. This relation exists independently of comprehension. This implies the "real law of necessity," as well as the law, resulting from it, of real determination. This relation of "being based on," however, is not given with **A**, but has "disappeared" behind the consciousness of actuality. Knowledge must first expose it, must demonstrate it, if it wants to comprehend **A** in its real necessity. For that purpose, it must understand **A** as a link of a real connection, which it must first uncover. Therefore, it must understand **A** as "dependent" on **X**, that is to say, as something dependent on, but not given to, it. For there is no manual for the detection of concealed real necessity, insofar as it is the complexity of the real in real dependency itself.

For that purpose, the "essence" of the thing is of little help. One may bend the literal meaning of "essence" and say that the real connection with **X** is the essence of **A**. But this is only wordplay. "Essence" has its quite determinate meaning; it signifies the impact of ideal being, as a universal thing, in the real. And this impact does not coincide with the real collocation of circumstances and conditions.

The real ground is never essential ground, and the comprehension of the real ground is never mere essential intuition. This comprehension is rather the insight into the real dependency of **A** on **X**. The dependency that this insight, itself, has on its conditions of knowledge – its ground of knowledge – can never be the same as the real dependency that it is obliged to recognize. Here, the latter is the object of insight, but the former is its presupposition. For that reason, the ground of knowledge as such is never the ground of being of the thing, and the recognition from the grounds as such is not yet comprehension of real grounds. On this fact is based the limitedness of all comprehension of necessity.

Part Four: **Second-Order Intermodal Relations**

I The Modal Relation of the Two Spheres of Being

54 The Problem of Spheres in Light of Modal Analysis

a) The Distribution of Ontological Weight in the Relation of Spheres

The relation of spheres has already clearly emerged in their modes and internal intermodal relations. And this relation is the foundation for all further ontological consideration. But there is a way to specify it more precisely, namely, on the grounds of the developed diversity of the modes. This way lies in the pursuit of the relations between the corresponding modes of different spheres, i.e. second-order intermodal relations.

The modes of lawfulness that hold sway here are not entirely strict. A part of the relations is loosely joined and yields no unequivocal relations, be it of implication or of exclusion; and even the indeterminate relation of indifference no longer applies here in many cases. For there is something like the "tendency" of a mode of one sphere toward a corresponding mode of another sphere, without the tendency having the same power to carry through and to merge into regular implication. There is manifested in this tendency a certain looseness of relations, a kind of room for the play of the spheres against one another. And this is deeply characteristic of the relation of the secondary spheres (the logical and the epistemological spheres) to both spheres of being. But in other cases, the relation assumes an absolutely determinate form. And then, one may speak of actual second-order intermodal laws.

Given that each of the four spheres stands opposite to the three remaining spheres, formally speaking, there must be twelve different total sphere to sphere relations (two of which run toward each other in terms of direction, but do not coincide). And since, in each sphere, a multiplicity of modes constitutes the reference point, one would in a purely combinatorial manner very quickly reach an incalculable diversity of second-order intermodal relations. It should not be denied that an exact pursuit of all of these relations has, in itself, a certain philosophical interest. They are unequal, however, in relevance to problems of a deeper kind. And for the purpose of ontology, only a few of them play a decisive role; namely, not only because these relations are not all of sufficient determinateness to fundamentally and philosophically carry weight, but also because those twelve total relations of the spheres themselves only partially touch on the systematic, fundamental problems of philosophy. Admittedly, the few relations that matter are of such a nature that their exact determination is of uniquely clarifying importance.

There are two relations of the spheres on which, in this case, all importance rests: the relation of the ideal to the real sphere of being, and the relation of the sphere of knowledge to the real sphere of being. In the former lies the focal point of the ontological problem, in the latter, the focal point of the epistemological problem.

The relation of knowledge to the ideal sphere is, in contrast, much less significant, at least insofar as it is considered purely in itself, since in this respect, it concerns only ideal knowledge as such. But as soon as one includes the ontic relation of the ideal and real spheres of being, it extends indirectly to real knowledge. And a part of the importance of the latter thereby falls back on ideal knowledge.

Such indirectness of interest holds true even more of the relation of the logical sphere to the three other spheres. In itself, this relation would be of no importance if it did not play out deeply within the realm of knowledge, namely, within the realm of real knowledge. The logical is simply the lawfulness of form of cognitional structure and consequence. Modal analysis has shown how this lawfulness in its essential existence is ideal lawfulness of being. It produces within the household of knowledge the connection to the essential sphere, and consequently also, insofar as the latter extends into the real, a connection to the real sphere.

Thus, an absolutely essential component of our knowledge about the real lies indirectly in those intermodal relations that connect the logical sphere to the ideal sphere of being. And therefore, in a roundabout way, the logical sphere is included in the ontological significance of the relations of the spheres.

b) Faulty Transfer of Logical Relations

The historical fact that logic attained a certain perfection sooner than other philosophical disciplines has enabled it to have a significant influence on metaphysics, which has in no way corresponded to its true position. Since the beginnings of ancient philosophy, knowledge has been understood more and more according to a kind of logic, and ultimately, so has the object of knowledge, real being. The principles and categories that have been found have been given logical form; and those that have not been found have been completed by analogy to logical form. Categories have basically been understood as "concepts," and connections of things in principle as "judgments." Just as logic was originally ontologically oriented, the study of being was logically oriented.

Despite the almost complete disappearance of the old ontology for one and a half centuries, right up to the present day this conception has not been uprooted. The errors inherent in it have, in part, long since been recognized, but still, these are only the more ghastly ones; the hidden ones have remained. Moreover, they have been unequivocally replaced by nothing new; nothing, at least, that would have had penetrating force. The logical is simply the realm of thought, and according to sphere, philosophy belongs in this realm. The fact that its forms are transferred, again and again, to the content of philosophical problems cannot be avoided; at least, not until the opposition of the spheres and their positive relations are actually clarified.

The logical rationalism in philosophy cannot be overcome by mere negations, by counter-theses or "irrational" points of view, but only by exposure and exact determination of the natural relations of the spheres. But this has always been lacking. Idealistic and realistic theories joined in the same error, while the anti-intellectual tendencies – of sensualism, intuitivism, etc. – remained mired in negations, and thereby took on the logical schema without noticing it. For no human thought can avoid this schema, if it does not know how to positively grasp the categorial structures and modes of its object that are in opposition to it. The fact that logical relations and laws, within certain limits, overlap knowledge and its real objects cannot be disputed; but the fact that they do not coincide with the relations and laws of the real sphere is only ever to be seen in the inconsistency of remote consequences.

It is, therefore, already of great value if one recognizes how this "overlapping" is limited. But for this, one must understand wherein it has its ground. Modal analysis has uncovered this ground. The logical sphere has proven itself to be a completely secondary sphere; its modes have proven themselves to be transferred and "softened" modes, standing non-uniformly in relation to one another. They are not suitable for grasping "that which is" in its determinate way of being, and even less so for grasping the real in its reality. All comprehension of "that which is as it is" [*das Seiende als Seiendes*] can achieve this only by means of a certain self-abolition of its own modal structure. The fact that such a thing is not impossible should have already been proven through the act of modal analysis. It is not its act alone; for whole branches of science have preceded it in this respect – characteristically without completely knowing the way in which they did.

After the analysis that has been performed, it is not difficult to say what remains behind that overlapping of the logical, and in what respect it has its relative justification. To the laws and modes of the logical adhere laws and modes of ideal being; but since the latter as essential factors extend deeply into real relations, and those real relations constitute the field of objects of knowledge,

the logical structure of thought, insofar as it is determined by ideal being (which it is not entirely) is in fact adapted to the comprehension of the real. But the adaptation does not reach the final foundations of being. And since in ontology it is a matter of these very foundations of being, the opposition must appear within its field of concern. It is precisely the principle of being and knowledge of being in which the transfer of the logical proves to be misleading.

This result can also be expressed differently. The principle in that which is and in the knowledge of being constitutes the field of concern for the categories. The problem of categories is that of explaining the fact that the indiscriminately transferred logical structure breaks down. Categories are the universal character of the content of a thing and of its ways of being; whoever confines them, from the outset, to the logical relations of thought does not at all come to their independent essence. Even Kant believed that the categories could be derived from a table of judgment; indeed, he thought that in this way they could be guaranteed a certain completeness. At no other point was his great work, the *Critique*, allowed to go so very astray as here. It is no accident that in this respect his work has had the least historical impact.

At the beginning, it was shown how this skewed form of transfer solidifies in the Kantian modal categories (Chap. 12 d). These modes are not in any way more suitable to be considered modes of the object. To them in no way applies that identity of categories – as such, of experience and of the object of experience – no more than it applied to that on which Kant sought to ground the objective validity of synthetic *a priori* judgments. But situated in the modal categories are the most important conclusions about ways of being and particular kinds of being of the realm of objects with which knowledge is concerned.

Kantian philosophy remains responsible for these conclusions. The same fate awaits any philosophy that transfers the modes of a secondary sphere to "that which is as it is." Here, precisely the reverse procedure is offered: the independent working out of the ways of being, on the grounds of the only approaches that stand open for the analysis of their internal modal relations. But if this analysis has taken place, then the relations between the whole spheres themselves and their ways of being are also demonstrated. Only in this way can the foundation be established for the specialized work of the theory of categories, insofar as this means the basic orientation of the philosophizing spirit in the world as it is.

c) The Hiddenness of Modes as a Source of Metaphysical Misunderstandings

One may now expect that by means of the worked out intermodal relations, as they exist within the individual spheres, the relations of the whole spheres to

one another can be understood. For it has been shown that already in many cases those internal (immanent to the sphere) intermodal relations point beyond themselves to the intermodal relations of the other spheres; this most powerfully came to light in the modes of givenness and in those of comprehension. But the sought after relation of the spheres, itself, must finally be revealed in these intermodal relations, in which modes of one sphere imply or exclude a mode of another sphere, and respectively, in which modes of one sphere show indifference toward the modes of another. Indifferences in second-order inter-modal relations obviously show a certain independence of the sphere in whose modes they appear. Implication and exclusion, on the other hand, reveal the particular forms of connectedness, relatedness, or dependency between the spheres. As one investigates these relations, the ontologically fundamental question of the connection between the ways of being and their ways of appearing – in judgment, in givenness, and in comprehension – must be dealt with on a more secure foundation.

It is the same foundation on which the rightness and wrongness of ontological rationalism can be critically separated from each other. Logical form, ideal essence, and real law are neither identical to each other nor totally divergent. They are so no more than the modes of the corresponding spheres are. No doubt, one has always been inclined to rashly identify them with each other, without suspecting that one has thereby blurred the most important ontological differences.

Thus, one repeatedly comes across the error of considering essential necessity in the particularity of the real case to be real contingency; likewise, the error of considering the logical disjunctivity in problematic judgment to be a multitude of "possibilities" presenting themselves in real events. No less frequent is the conflation of essential possibility, and even of compossibility, with the "comprehension" of real possibility. And one can hardly be rescued – even in present-day theories – from the conflation of the opposition between the ideal and the real with the opposition between the possible and the actual. A further source of innumerable misunderstandings is the restriction of that which is considered "actual" to the "givenness" of the actual (therefore, to a mode of knowledge); likewise, the restriction of that which is considered nonactual to the absence of givenness. And just as misleading is the restriction of possibility and impossibility to the very narrowly drawn boundaries of knowledge around them. In the case of necessity, such restriction leads to a world picture of indeterminateness and disorder.

There are many preconceptions of this kind. They all have the form of misunderstood second-order intermodal relations. They arise in the diversity and hiddenness of true intermodal relations, themselves. These are underlying,

regardless of whether we know about them or not. But as the consciousness that is not attentive to them encounters scattered threads of their network at particular points of its considerations, it forms a skewed picture of them according to the attitude that it brings along; for the most part, it is a simplified picture in accordance with a logical model. And as long as this picture then turns out all right in everyday life, it remains standing.

These preconceptions in ordinary consciousness of the world and of life can, by no means, be eradicated, not even if one goes to their roots by employing philosophical means. Life does not, in general, require their eradication; it finds in them its *modus vivendi*, and, in the incompleteness of their adaptation to the true relations, it is not badly placed at all. But ontological reflection is a quite different case. It cannot be left in incompleteness. For it, it is a matter of being – the being of the world, as well as the actual being of individual human beings – its first concern is the abolition of misunderstandings and the clarification of the relations of spheres. For that purpose, it requires the working out of the actual second-order intermodal relations.

d) The Metaphysical Significance of Second-Order Intermodality

If one now expects the forthcoming working out to be a simple, easy, and clear explanation revealing the ongoing relation of spheres in concise laws, then one will quickly be disappointed. The spheres are too dissimilar for this. Their multiplicity is derived from the levels of givenness and the fields of knowledge connected to them. Their arrangement alongside each other is only justified πρὸς ἡμᾶς [*pros hemas*, for us]. Only the two spheres of being share a certain homogeneity; the secondary spheres would hover weightlessly in the air next to them if they were not ontologically established on them.

But even in terms of content, it cannot be a matter of simple relations. A relation that shows neither consistent agreement nor consistent divergence is obviously a highly differentiated relation, and cannot be summarized as a simple lawfulness. One must therefore investigate it in its particularities. The truth is that in principle most of the time, and thus here as well, things are not one simple entity, but are rather a subdivided whole. And as such, they do not lack uniformity by any means.

Thus, we are presented with the task of sifting through second-order intermodal relations in the same way as first-order intermodal relations were sifted through, and letting the matter come down to whether lawfulness is thereby produced and the extent to which it is. Beforehand, it may only be said that the already analyzed first-order intermodal relations do not only provide the

grounds for this, but – since they could only be gained through the steady comparison of the spheres – have already in many respects led to the sought-after relation of ideal and real modes, of real modes and modes of knowledge, etc. In this respect, we stand here on extensively prepared and tilled ground, able to immediately harvest the fruits of earlier efforts.

Meanwhile, it is something very different if one illuminates the merely secondary results of an investigation elsewhere or takes as a theme the overview of relations of characteristic dimension and structure. It is not the *principium divisionis* alone that is consequently shifted; on the contrary, the aspect of the whole, and because of it, the ontological significance of the modal categories, themselves, is shifted. Indeed, in a certain sense, only in this overview does modal analysis provide the proof that it is a basically systematic discipline. For only from this standpoint can it become clear that it is impossible to give logic, epistemology, and indeed, metaphysics as science of world view a determinate position and foundation as long as one is not well versed in the relation of the real and ideal modes to each other, and in the modes of knowledge and judgment.

55 Possibility and Actuality of the Two Spheres of Being

a) Essential Actuality and Real Actuality

Since the approach taken to this task is supported by the results of the preceding investigations, it can move freely with regard to the groups of problems that it determines, and does not have to start from the known. One can calmly begin with the relation between the two fundamental spheres, of ideal and of real being, and compare their modes directly with each other. With this very first step, one thereby enters into the center of the relations of the spheres, and after mastering them, one can take on the more peripherally placed relations in any order.

It can generally be anticipated that ideal being is indifferent toward reality, but that reality in any form presupposes ideal being. Reality has essential laws in it; it is constructed with them and on them, unable to be separated from them. But ontologically it is more than mere essence; it is a fuller being. For that reason, this relation is nowhere reversible. Real cases conform to essentiality, but essentiality exists independently of whether real cases correspond to it or not. This is, at least, generally and basically the case.

In the individual modes, however, very particular relations appear. Thus, it is easily seen that the negative modes must have the tendency to turn around

the basic relation. This is not an exception to that basic relation, but its direct consequence. And if one further considers that in the real, many kinds of things are contained that do not merge into essentiality, and that the modes themselves take on an absolutely different meaning in each sphere, and are in no way to be distinguished merely through the solidification of content, then it can easily be seen that the general relation is only a schema, within which room for diverse kinds of displacement remains open. But on this displacement, insofar as it holds true, depends the clarification of the relation between the two spheres.

Among the essential modes, actuality is the palest and most essenceless, a mode that merely follows essential possibility. Since essential possibility now means mere non-contradiction, and the latter is not even remotely sufficient for real possibility, but real possibility is the presupposition of real actuality, it follows that essential actuality can in no way imply real actuality, and is completely indifferent toward it.

This is such a well-known proposition that there is nothing further to be noted about it. But the opposition between actuality and the actuality of different spheres of being has been mostly misunderstood, namely, as an opposition between possibility and actuality. Ideal being is considered only as a possible being, real being only as an actual being, whereby the dimension of opposition is displaced and the relation of the spheres, as well as the relation of the modes, is falsified. The consequences have been shown in the example above of the Leibnizian and Kantian arguments (see Chap. 43 a to c).

It is completely otherwise in the reversal of this relation. Whatever is really actual must at least also be ideally actual. For it must at least be ideally possible. So, at least, this must basically hold true; for – within the limits of that which we comprehend from it – the real requires non-contradiction. But essential possibility already implies essential actuality.

There consequently exists, strictly speaking, a one-sided implication here: real actuality implies essential actuality, but essential actuality does not imply real actuality. Thus, the relation corresponds to the extreme weightlessness of the one mode and the extreme weightiness of the other. Ideal being, in itself, is only an incomplete and, so to speak, hovering being; on the other hand, real being is the only complete and ontically full-fledged being. But the mode of actuality is a mere concurrent modal factor in ideal being; in the real, on the other hand, it is the peak of fullness of being, and the synthesis of possible and necessary being (Chap. 24 c and d). Therefore, a greater range of opposition with respect to determinateness and fullness of being is not possible among the modes of all spheres.

Meanwhile, the first part of this dual law – that real actuality implies essential actuality – finds its limitation both in the individuality of the real, which is inseparable from its kind of being-actual, as well as in the fact that certain real antinomies simultaneously limit the comprehension of real relations.

The realm of essences is incapable of true individuality; it excludes it, and in the particularities of its forms still remains in the general. There is the essentiality of an individual, but it is not individual essentiality, it basically remains a general thing. And that in the real world there is only a single "case" that corresponds to it lies not within it, but in the nature of real connection, which again and again drives forward differently and never in exactly the same way. The real actuality of individuality, therefore, does not imply the essential actuality of the same individuality; namely, simply on the grounds that there is no being of the unique and individual within the essential sphere. Which is synonymous with the principle that this sphere is timeless and moves only in the universal.

And as far as the real antinomies are concerned, they are the form in which internal contradiction appears. The essential realm, however, excludes that which in itself is contradictory as essentially impossible. As long as the real contains antinomies, their actuality does not presuppose essential actuality; for essential actuality can only follow essential possibility, and the latter is excluded by the contradiction. Of course, the question remains as to whether there is actual contradiction in the real, i.e. whether the antinomies in question are antinomies of being, or as Kant thought, merely antinomies of reason. But it may well be said that there are many serious reasons speaking for this, and that we must at least reckon with the fact that they could be real antinomies. But in this case, we have to deal with something really actual in them that might not correspond to any essential actuality.

What becomes tangible here is nothing less than the fact that it is by no means generally the function of essences and essential laws to establish or govern the real world; that there could also very well be real relations that behave differently, and respectively, a lawfulness other than essential lawfulness underlying the real world. Whether this is the case can hardly be unequivocally decided; but certainly, ontology must recognize that it could be so.

The proposition, therefore, that real actuality implies essential actuality is to be restricted: this implication holds true only insofar as the real corresponds to essential laws (and is governed by them, respectively).

This kind of limitation, together with its hypothetical validity, does not concern this implication alone. It recurs in another; for it is basically characteristic of the whole relation between the essential sphere and the real sphere.

b) Essential Nonactuality and Real Nonactuality

One would think that the corresponding negative modes of the two spheres would have to behave in the same way. But the opposite is the case; the relation is reversed.

Real nonactuality is clearly indifferent toward essential nonactuality. This must be the case, because essential actuality is indifferent toward real actuality, and is, therefore, also compatible with real nonactuality. From the real nonexistence or nonoccurrence of something, it never follows that this thing is not essentially possible; but if it is essentially possible, then it is also essentially actual.

One may perhaps take the proposition that there is no purposeful natural process. For it is not yet said concomitantly that the essence of such a natural process does not rightly exist. One may, for that purpose, employ an unobjectionable, speculative line of thought: there could, in itself – i.e. due to its essence – very well be a real world in which such a process comes to an end. But there is in fact no such world. However, this is not due to an essential impossibility (an internal contradiction in the essence of the thing), and consequently not to an essential nonactuality, either, but to the particular structure of the only actual real connection, and of the only actual real world, respectively. That real nonactuality has, in this case, so little to do with essential nonactuality already illuminates the fact that since antiquity, speculative theories that are oriented not to the particular nature of real relations but to a merely aprioristic discussion of essential relations have indiscriminately accepted the existence of purposeful natural processes.

But the relation of the two modes appears differently when the direction is reversed: from essential nonactuality follows real nonactuality. For the essentially nonactual is only the essentially impossible, i.e. that which, in itself, includes a contradiction. And as long as the real stands under essential laws, this is also a real impossible, and therefore also a real nonactual.

The question remains, to what extent the stated condition applies, i.e. to what extent the real actually stands under essential laws. Only within these limits does the proposition that essential nonactuality implies real nonactuality hold true. It holds true, therefore, with the same restriction that appeared in the relation of the two positive modes of actuality. The proposition does not hold true for individuality or for the antinomous appearing in the real. The fact that there is no fully valid individuality in ideal being does not preclude an individual from having real actuality. Likewise, essential nonactuality, such as that of the beginning of the world – which can exist neither in time nor outside of time without contradiction – is not in a position to prevent the real world from having a beginning.

c) Essential Possibility and Real Possibility

The relation of the two-sided modes of actuality presupposes the relation of the modes of possibility. The latter is the truly authoritative relation in it. Just as the most important developments from the spheres always concern possibility, this is also the case for the relations between the spheres.

1. Essential possibility does not imply real possibility. It is indifferent to it.

   Essential possibility is a formal mode, depending on a merely negative condition. For it, nothing but non-contradiction, in itself, is required. This condition is easily fulfilled, and for that reason, there is an immense breadth of the possible in ideal being. For real possibility, the fulfillment of such a general condition is far from sufficient, because it requires the presence of the total series of real conditions, from which the thing in question must be really actual in a full sense. As long as even a single one of these conditions is nonactual, the thing is really impossible.

   Thus, for real possibility, incomparably more is required than for essential possibility; it is the immeasurably fuller and more determinate mode of being. This deep dissimilarity and inequality of the two modes clearly determines their relation. Essential possibility implies infinitesimally little in real relation. It is far from having the power to imply real possibility. It is completely indifferent toward the latter.

   Thus, it may be essentially possible that a perpendicular object placed on the tip of a pencil may remain standing in a precarious balance; but, it is not therefore really possible, and the real conditions for it cannot, in practice, be fulfilled. Thus, Leibniz's "possible worlds" are, in fact, only essentially possible, and not really possible. If they were all really possible, then they would also (according to the real law of possibility) have to be really actual. For then all of the real conditions on which their actuality depends would have to be already fulfilled. Which in their plurality is impossible, since they are not compossible. In ideal being, the incompossible is evaded; in real being, it is excluded. Only the one world that becomes really actual was, from the beginning, really possible (see Chap. 43 a). It was really possible, because its ground of being was sufficient.

   Formally, the relation can be more simply understood: real possibility is divided possibility, and as such, it far surpasses disjunctive possibility in determinateness. Since essential possibility is disjunctive, as the more indeterminate mode, it cannot imply the more determinate mode.
2. But the converse relation is otherwise: in general, real possibility implies essential possibility. Since real possibility is based on a totality of real

conditions, and these stand under essential lawfulness, internal non-contradiction in them must be fulfilled, and along with it, essential possibility.

More precisely, it must be fulfilled insofar as those real conditions are subject to essential lawfulness. Insofar as they are not subject to it, the essentially impossible can also be really possible; namely, wherever the real is, in itself, antinomous, which of course only enters into certain borderline cases of the knowable. These cases consist in the fact that the ideal contradictory really coexists. Thus, the principle of contradiction does not need to be abolished in the real, at all. For whatever is contradicted in essential relation and is thereby experienced by thought as contradictory does not yet need to be contradicted in the real.

Nevertheless, there is the possibility that the conflict itself is real – perhaps in Heraclitus' sense, as the internal movement of the real process. Only in this case would it be a matter of true real antinomies.

56 The Modes of Necessity of the Two Spheres of Being

a) Compossibility and Real Possibility

The modality of ideal being is an intermediate mode that is much richer than the modalities of the other spheres. One would expect that its relation to the real modes would consequently somehow become complicated. By no means is this the case. Compossibility is only a particular form of ideal possibility of being insofar as ideal being has room for coordinated parallel systems. Things that are incompossible may very well coexist as essentially possible. In the real, however, there is no room for incompossible parallel systems; here, continuous relatedness in the unity of parallel systems prevails, and things that are to be really possible must be able to coexist with one another.

For that reason, in the compossibility of the essential sphere there recurs the same relation to real possibility that resulted in essential possibility. The increase in determinateness that begins here still remains far below the level of determinateness found in the totality of real conditions.

1. Compossibility, therefore, suffices for real possibility no more than simple essential possibility does; it does not imply real possibility. But conversely, real possibility implies compossibility – at least within the limits in which

the real underlies essential laws. For things that are to really coexist must obviously also, according to their essential features, be possible together.

Compossibility is generally distinguished from essential possibility only by the cohesion of systems within which contradiction is excluded. The fact that the incompossible is ideally possible is of no concern to real possibility.

2. On the other hand, the incompossible excludes real possibility, which also means that it implies real impossibility. But we, therefore, already stand at a mode of necessity, in which particular relations hold sway. But this implication rightly exists only within the limits in which essential laws in the real have validity. In the case of diverging determinateness of the real, the ideal incompossible may very well also be really possible.

b) Essential Impossibility and Real Impossibility

The negation of possibility is negative necessity. For that reason, the relation of the modes of impossibility of the two spheres of being is the converse of the relation of their modes of possibility.

1. (In general) essential impossibility implies real impossibility; and thereby also, real nonactuality.

For real being-possible would imply essential possibility. Non-contradiction in coexistence is already presupposed by the totality of real conditions; otherwise, these conditions could not come together, they would exclude one another. If something is not even essentially possible – i.e. free of contradiction in itself and in its conditions – then it obviously cannot be really possible, either.

This can also be made clear in another way. Real possibility is a highly determinate mode; in this respect it equals real necessity, for both require the same totality of the chain of conditions. If even one condition is missing, then the thing in question is really impossible. Therefore, little belongs to real impossibility. Far more belongs to essential impossibility; whatever is not possible in real connection, on account of a single missing condition, is obviously not essentially impossible. For if it were essentially impossible, then it would also have to be, in itself, contradictory. But if it is contradictory, and thereby essentially impossible, then of course it cannot be really possible. Far more belongs to essential impossibility than to real impossibility; for that reason, it surpasses the latter in intermodal relation, and implies it.

A curtailment is to be made in this implication only insofar as the essential lawfulness in the real is not demonstrably and unlimitedly applicable. Within the limits of this applicability, the ideal contradictory cannot be really possible. Beyond these limits, it is otherwise. Where the real is subject to other laws, where it exhibits true antinomies, it is there that the contradictory, i.e. the essentially impossible, can very well be a real possible thing at the same time. Whether there are such limits, and whether the case occurs somewhere down the line, is a different question. But the dependency of the implication on the range of ideal lawfulness in the real has an immediately enlightening effect.

2. And then again, the converse relation is quite different: real impossibility does not in any way imply essential impossibility. It also does not imply incompossibility, nor essential nonactuality. It is indifferent toward all of these modes.

This is simply the flip side of that implication. For real impossibility, it is sufficient that only one real condition is missing. Such an absence leaves essential possibility completely untouched; essential possibility is generally indifferent toward the presence of real conditions; it is sufficient for it that the thing in question be, in itself, free of contradiction.

Real impossibility is, therefore, compatible with essential actuality – which is only a companion mode of essential possibility – and with compossibility, as well. Indeed, it is even basically compatible with essential necessity. For essential necessity is completely indifferent toward the reality of those conditions on which real possibility depends. It can exist unchallenged as a general dependency of the species on the genus, even in the determinate individual case where the chain of real conditions is incomplete. In such an instance, the case does not fall under the genus. But since the absence of a condition already means real impossibility, it is clear that, irrespective of any essential necessity that in its own generality, rightly exists, the thing in question is really impossible.

One may perhaps ask how it shall then be permissible under such circumstances to exclude essential impossibility from real impossibility (which must be possible, according to the law of implication under numeral 1). The answer is: this is precisely the converse relation; essential impossibility implies real impossibility, but not vice versa. Essential impossibility is not directly related to any given real conditions; but these conditions do not stand indifferently toward it. Their connection must, at least, be essentially possible if the thing in question is to be really possible. Moreover, in a real case, it is never a matter of pure essential impossibility (in mere generality), but always of an essential impossibility that is related to determinate real

factors whose real actuality is given. If the "essence" of **A** is not compatible with this, then **A** is thereby really impossible.

c) Essential Necessity and Real Necessity

In ideal being, necessity is based on essential belonging; in real being, it is based on a sweeping collocation of real circumstances that, in their totality, bring forth the thing in question. The one has only a little to do with the other; they are kinds of dependency, which play out in different dimensions.

1. Essential necessity and real necessity must correspondingly stand indifferently toward each other. This sounds surprising enough, especially since one is used to looking at only essential connection in the real as "necessary." But closer inspection shows the whole depth of heterogeneity between real and ideal spheres of being.

   Essential necessity – the indestructible connectedness of the particular to the essential connections of the general – is not sufficient for real necessity; even if it is actually contained in it, which is always the case within the limits of the rule of essential laws in the real. But real necessity does not, for its part, presuppose the essential necessity of the same thing in question. At most it presupposes the essential necessity of something else, such as connections of a special kind (but by no means the individual connections of the individual case) on the grounds of more general connections. It does not, for example, presuppose the essential necessity of a determinate effect on the grounds of a given complex of causes. For generally the fact that something brings forth an effect is not explained by the "essence" of that thing, but simply by the nature of real connection.

   On the other hand, real connection is also subject to essential laws. Thus, the spatial movement of a material form is subject to mathematical laws, and the latter have essential necessity on the grounds of their axioms. Such essential necessity alone would never exhaust the network of real necessity. It is included in this network, and constitutes a part of its structure. But, as such, it is not yet direct necessity of a determinate real actual thing in determinate real connection. For the presupposed real factors are not provided by it, but by the existence of the determinate, unique, given real situation.

   Therefore, a peculiar relation arises here. In the real necessity of **A**, on the grounds of a complex of conditions **X**, essential necessity is contained, but not the essential necessity of **A** (the essential necessity of the

determinate, unique, real case), and not on the grounds of **X** (not on the grounds of this determinate, unique collocation of real circumstances). Rather, another kind of essential necessity is contained, namely, the necessity of the being-associated of a certain, general, essential factor with a likewise general essentiality. For example, if the radius of the horizon visible from the top of a determinate mountain in a surrounding plain is given as 30 km, then it follows that the size of the visible surface-area is equal to $30^2\pi$ km^2. This follows from the essential law of the circle that its area is equal to $r^2\pi$. This essential law transfers its content to the real case. However, it does not, in terms of content, imply the same necessity as the real relation; rather, it implies only a general necessity independent of determinate dimensions.

According to this viewpoint, the basic indifference of the two modes of necessity toward each other is not abolished, but essentially modified:

2. That is to say, real necessity implies essential necessity, but does not directly imply the essential necessity of real case **A**, and only implies the essential necessity of a universal category under which **A** always remains indeterminate as a particular case, if this is not the case, then also the particular conditions that the unique real situation brings along for the determining of what **A** is.
3. And likewise, it can also be conversely said that, all essential necessity, insofar as it extends into real relations, conditionally implies real necessity. It implies real necessity in the case of the converging of a whole collocation of real circumstances that fall under an existing essential law (as in the example above, it falls under the law of the area of a circle). Whether such a collocation converges does not only not depend on essential necessity, but rather it remains dependent on the particularity of the real connection appearing here-and-now.

The significance of these two conditional second-order implications – particularly the latter – is well known in the field of all knowledge of real necessity. For all comprehension of real necessity, scientific comprehension most especially, takes the detour via knowledge of essential laws, which are then introduced in the givenness of the real case. And conversely, all investigation of natural lawfulness proceeds from this givenness, which as such has nothing to do with necessity; it thereby presupposes the real necessity of the event, without knowing it, and judges the case as representative of a more general lawfulness, whose essential form it seeks to extract from it. It therefore assumes that essential necessity (such as mathematical necessity) is contained in

the sought-after real necessity. For that reason, it can regard the universal, which it consequently figures out under the essential laws known to it, as real lawfulness.

But the two implications come up against a limit in the range of validity belonging to essential laws in the real, and therefore wherever it is a matter of strict uniqueness and singularity, or real antinomies.

II The Real Sphere and Knowledge

57 Real Actuality and the Knowledge of It

a) Indifference of the Real Modes toward Knowledge

It belongs to the essence of knowledge that its object is an in-itself existing object, i.e. independent of knowledge and even existing without ever becoming known. This relation constitutes the object of knowledge's transcendence beyond merely being an object, which means nothing other than that the object of knowledge does not merge into its being known.[1]

An indirect consequence is that the being itself of knowledge neither shuts it out nor comes to meet it. It is not opposed to the action of the knowing subject; if this knowing subject makes it into its "object," it obliges. For it is not innately an object, and cannot of itself become an object, but can only be made into an object by a subject. Thus, in its state of being, it is not modified, but is still somehow otherwise affected. And for that reason, it is indifferent toward its becoming known. The becoming known is thereby identical to the fact that it is made into an object or is obliged to be made into an object. And it is likewise indifferent toward the limits of objectification; since no knowledge penetrates the whole of a being, it always adheres to an object's determinate aspects or features, depending on the surfaces of attack that this object offers to it. Knowledge can transcend such limits, as it itself progresses. But the object as such is just as indifferent toward this transcendence as toward the becoming known.

If one now transfers this relation to the problem of modality, then from it results the fact that the modes of being, and consequently the real modes, can never in any way imply a mode of knowledge. They must be just as indifferent to the corresponding modes of knowledge as their bearer, the existing object, is in principle toward becoming known.

Concerning this, one recalls what the "internal modality of knowledge" actually means – for only this is involved (see Chap. 46 b and c). It is not a matter of possibility and actuality of knowledge, but of knowledge of possibility, knowledge of actuality, etc.; the internal modality of knowledge concerns the knowledge of the modes of being, i.e. the modes of the object. These modes of the object exist just as independently of all becoming known and behave just as indifferently toward knowledge as all the other ontological characteristics

1 Compare these stipulations with, *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, Chapters 22, 23, 25, 26.

of the object do. For that reason, their becoming known varies within wide limits, independently of them. This, their becoming known – and consequently also their not becoming known or their becoming misunderstood – is the field of play for the internal modes of knowledge. For that reason, the principle holds true that the modes of the real are basically indifferent toward the modes of real knowledge.

But the principle holds true only insofar as the concept of knowledge is understood in a non-binding way, i.e. as a consciousness of the object, whose content may just as well be true as untrue. We must advance beyond this concept of knowledge, because there is not an absolute guarantee of the truth of consciousness, and because in our respective consciousness of the object we continually take as knowledge a mixture of knowledge and falsity. But if one considers the fact that only the being-true of consciousness deserves to be called "knowledge," that the being-untrue is falsity, and that, therefore, knowledge in an actual sense is only the "true," then the relation between the two-sided modes is changed. Real possibility, for example, does not imply knowledge of possibility, for it itself can remain completely unknown. But once knowledge of the modal character of an object is present, then the real possibility of the object would, of course, have to imply knowledge of possibility.

But this concerns only the ideal case of a kind of knowledge that could in itself bear the criterion of truth, and whose truth could therefore be certain at any time. Human knowledge – the only knowledge that could be involved here – is, in any case, not constituted in such a fashion. It can, therefore, be said that in the given truth of knowledge, the mode of knowledge must follow the real mode of the object. But the condition for this, the being-true, cannot be presented as an object, nor can it be measured according to a general standard. The consciousness of the object, which we call our knowledge, is subject at any time to the possibility of falsity. The knowledge of an *intellectus infinitus* would, of course, follow in its modal consciousness the modality of being; human knowledge does not do this, it has leeway in relation to the modes of being. Its inadequacy and uncertainty is the true mirror image of the indifference that the real modes display toward it. –

On the other hand, since knowledge is only possible where an object is present, the relation with the negative modes must be reversed, at least wherever it is a matter of givenness. That which is absent cannot be given. There can, of course, be simulated givenness, but even the simulation arises from something that is there, and not from nothing. This means: in the mode of nonactuality there exists a certain implication back and forth from the real toward knowledge – conditioned, of course, by a preexisting connection of knowledge in which, alone, the *modus deficiens* of nongivenness can make itself applicable.

Whatever is really actual does not need to be given (therefore conversely, the consciousness of nonactuality in no way implies real nonactuality); but whatever is really nonactual cannot be given in an actual sense. Within the limits of this conditionality, one may, therefore, say that real nonactuality implies the absence of consciousness of actuality.

Furthermore, this principle is valid only if it is correlated to pure or unreflected nongivenness. It is, by no means, valid for the numerous detours of a mediated consciousness of nonactuality, which proceed via the manifold kinds of combination, conclusion, or comprehension. The knowledge of actuality can be deceived. Yet, in all deception there remains a kernel of reality's givenness. And it is on this kernel that the consciousness of actuality depends. But wherever no real actual thing is present, there is nothing that deception could evoke in a purely receptive consciousness of givenness.

The following consideration serves as an explanation. If a mythically minded person gazes at a wellspring and beholds a divine essence in it, then this essence itself is not given to him, but only its interpretation. If I see a broken rod obliquely submerged into water, then it is not the brokenness that is given to me, but rather a real relation, the complexity of which I am not aware. On the other hand, if the rod is not submerged, then there is nothing to deceive me about its brokenness; if no wellspring is present, then the mythically minded person finds nothing in which to behold a nymph. The not-givenness is, therefore, connected in a certain way to the nonbeing of the thing. If something that, according to its nature could very well be given is not at all present, then it cannot actually be given. Only in this sense does the principle that real nonactuality implies nongivenness rightly exists – i.e. the consciousness of nonactuality.

Since real actuality is conditioned by real possibility and real necessity (see Chap. 24 c and d), it follows that real impossibility and negative real possibility are sufficient to imply – under the same circumstances and with the same restrictions – the consciousness of nonactuality. But with this, nothing new is said. For it is precisely in the penetration of impossibility and negative possibility that real nonactuality exists.

b) Consciousness of Actuality and Real Actuality

In all of the other intermodal relations between knowledge and reality, there is only involved the question of the extent to which the modes of knowledge imply or exclude the real modes, or leave them untouched. Under these absolutely one-sided relations, the implications require that attention is focused completely on them. The question for them is nearly identical to that for the

truth-content of knowledge. For the true and untrue, it is a matter of whether the consciousness of actuality corresponds to real actuality, whether the comprehension of possibility corresponds to the real possibility of the object, and so forth for all of the modes. And considering that there is no universal criterion of truth, it becomes clear that the discussion of these implications is of higher epistemological importance than might have been previously thought. –

In the mode of simple givenness of actuality, the relation now takes a fully positive shape. In its own way, the plain consciousness of actuality always implies real actuality. But by no means does it always imply the real actuality of that which it has in mind with regard to content. The real from which it is determined can, according to its being-so, be other than it appears.

The unmediated and unreflective consciousness of actuality is nothing more than a mere consciousness of givenness. And givenness cannot arbitrarily be imagined by consciousness; there must be something present – i.e. really present – that is the given instance in it. Otherwise, there is no givenness. But consciousness can misjudge the given instance with regard to its being-so; and thus this given instance does not, in respect to its content, need to be the same thing that consciousness has in mind.

The difference in content is characteristic of all misperceptions and of many kinds of conceptual errors. But there is always something real underlying it. This is the case in the examples of the wellspring and of the broken rod. Something really actual is given, but the nature of that really actual thing, as it appears to the subject, does not coincide with its real determinateness. One is mistaken not about the givenness itself, but only about the particular nature of the given.

The positive thing that can be taken from this is that this implication generally holds true for perception. One cannot perceive something where there is nothing. Pure misrepresentation (hallucination and similar phenomena) is not counted here as perception. Apart from that, subjective misperceptions (such as the after-image of a spot projected on the wall) are themselves conditioned by a real relation, without which they could not occur. The latter can also exist in purely internal states of the subject, physical or mental. But even these are still real states, being by no means unreal.

It is generally characteristic of perception that it serves as the kernel of its object's reality. The apparatus of givenness that the elements deliver to it is situated in the systems of their quality of meaning. The system of audible tones or that of visual colors is laid out in such a manner that a determinate real property (e.g. frequency of vibration) "corresponds" to the quality experienced, without coinciding with or even resembling it in the least. Only the determinateness and firm unequivocality of the correlation, in this relatedness of the heterogeneous, constitutes the actual relation of knowledge.

From this perspective, the certainty of reality of the consciousness of actuality is graded in the following way: it decreases with increasing complexity and reflectivity of the given. In response to the complexity and the removal from the terrain of firm correlation, it is withdrawn from the primary givenness of actuality. This increases the impact of interpretation, of opinion, and of consideration, along with the susceptibility to deception.

But the relation of implication, according to which a real actual thing corresponds to the consciousness of actuality, does not consequently disappear. Nor does it decrease to the same extent as the certainty of content. For example, the awareness of the situation in daily life, the awareness of someone else's subjectivity and mental interiority significantly underlies one's susceptibility to deception. But a real thing always corresponds to the given, from which the real thing originates. The manifold sources of error are not in a position to change that fact.

A further consequence of this relation is: since real actuality is based on real possibility and real necessity, the consciousness of actuality, insofar as it implies real actuality, must also imply real necessity and real possibility. But for both, it holds true that: 1. this implication does not need to be of the same content; and 2. it in no way means that a consciousness (or even a comprehension) of possibility and of necessity would also be implied. Quite to the contrary, the mere "being present" (existence in itself) of real possibility and real necessity is implied, and not the knowledge regarding it. The consciousness of givenness does not, as "consciousness," overlap with the relational real modes; both remain concealed, "indifferenced," disappeared from consciousness. Only being-actual is directly given.

Corresponding to this is the relation of the modes of knowledge analyzed above: the consciousness of actuality is not comprehension; it is indifferent toward the comprehension of possibility and the comprehension of necessity.

The implication of real actuality by the consciousness of actuality ultimately reaches back – beyond the consciousness of perception and its elements – to the emotional-transcendent acts (predominantly in learning, experiencing, and suffering) that all have the mode of being-concerned. In these acts is rooted the basic certainty of the consciousness of reality as such.

c) Real Nonactuality and Consciousness of Nonactuality

If the consciousness of nonactuality is a deficient mode, therefore signifying merely the absence of givenness, then it follows – since givenness does not lie within the essence of being – that consciousness of nonactuality as such

must be indifferent toward real nonactuality and real actuality. It never follows immediately from this consciousness that the thing in question does not actually exist. The absence of givenness can be due to something quite different, e.g. to being unnoticed, or to being concealed. For it does not lie within the essence of the real to be given. "That which is" is indifferent toward objectification.

In this relation, nothing is changed by the fact that real nonactuality is in no way indifferent toward the consciousness of nonactuality (as shown above). Indifferences are not reversible. A real nonactual thing cannot be given. Even the illusion of givenness does not argue against this; in it, a real actual thing is ultimately given, even if it is not what it was assumed to be.

It is important to be clear about the fact that this indifference toward the presence or absence of the thing in question holds true only for the unreflective consciousness of nonactuality, and by no means for any similar consciousness of nonbeing external to it. There is also a very certain knowledge of nonactuality; e.g., when the astronomer knows that at a determinate hour, darkness does not fall on any of Jupiter's satellites.

This knowledge is something altogether different. It is not at all a matter of nongivenness, i.e. of a *modus deficiens*, but of an entirely positive knowledge of nonactuality, indirectly acquired from reflection (evaluation). The mediation goes beyond the united modes of comprehension of nonactuality and of positive givenness of the real actual (a series of observations of successive positions of the satellites). The two together produce a completely different mode of knowledge: the comprehension of nonactuality. For this comprehension, it suffices to have knowledge regarding the absence of a factor recognized as necessary in the chain of real conditions (see Chap. 52 b).

58 The Modes of Possibility Belonging to Reality and Knowledge

a) Real Possibility and Consciousness of Possibility

It has been shown with the modes of knowledge that a certain unreflective consciousness of possibility – namely, of positive as well as negative possibility – is already implied by the simple consciousness of actuality, and of nonactuality, respectively. It is a purely concurrent mode, without its own form of insight; no particular givenness or deliberation corresponds to it. It signifies no comprehension of "how" **A** (or not-**A**) is really possible, but only an obscure consciousness "that" it somehow must be really possible, since it is indeed actual.

1. For this obscure consciousness of possibility, it now holds true that it is sufficient to imply real being-possible; namely, in the same sense and within the same limits as those in which the consciousness of actuality, whose companion mode it is, implies real actuality.

   If I see that someone jumps 2.70 meters [8.85 feet] high, then I am also aware that this must be possible; if I have seen rightly, then it follows moreover that it "is" also really possible. For real actuality presupposes real possibility. But if I have "seen wrongly," then something other than what my misperception made possible must have been actual; and his other thing must be a really possible thing.

   Here, the nature of certainty, as well as its limitation in terms of content, becomes very clearly understandable. The comprehension or non-comprehension of how a thing is possible plays no role here whatsoever. The relation is, in fact, mediated quite differently: namely, in its sphere real actuality already implies real possibility, whereas consciousness of actuality (simple givenness) implies real actuality – even if the real actuality of the content contemplated is not necessary. It follows that the obscure, merely concurrent consciousness of possibility implies real possibility; namely, within the limits of the same uncertainty as to content (or susceptibility to being deceived about it) that underlie the givenness itself.

   This is a very remarkable result, and indeed, all the more so since this obscure consciousness of possibility is a very vague acceptance of an inevitable consequence, which cannot imagine anything at all from the chain of real conditions on which the possibility of the given is based. It is only a mediated implication, and for that reason is not knowledge of the real connections. Indeed, one must add that only such an obscure concurrent consciousness of possibility has, in itself, this kind of implication. The same does not by any means hold true for all methods of deliberation that seek to comprehend being-possible. That is to say, they are subject to error to a very considerable extent.
2. But this holds true only for consciousness of positive possibility. This implication cannot be turned around into a negative one; here, it merges into indifference: consciousness of negative possibility does not imply negative real possibility.

   Since real nonactuality in its sphere implies negative real possibility, but the mere consciousness of nonactuality is a deficient mode, and as such, it in no way implies real nonactuality (see above), the concurrent consciousness of negative possibility cannot imply negative real possibility. Rather, it is indifferent toward the possibility and impossibility of real nonbeing.

In order to concretely understand this, one need only slightly adjust the example of Jupiter's satellites. If, after reading the almanac, I expect darkness to fall at 10:22 in the evening, and I observe that it does not occur, then along with the consciousness of its nonactuality (the observation of its failure to occur), there also arises an indeterminate consciousness of the possibility of its failure to occur. But this consciousness does not need to correspond to any real possibility of its failure to occur; this could only be the case if there were an error in the almanac. On the contrary, the almanac may very well be correct, in which case along with the real actuality of the darkness, its real possibility would also be present. The error could be due to slight carelessness in observation, e.g. in the fact that I looked for the darkness an hour too early (I made the observation according to Central European Time, while the almanac indicated Western European Time, which is something I should have known).

b) The Comprehension of Positive Possibility and Positive Real Possibility

The "comprehension" of possibility is not very favorably placed in real knowledge. If comprehension, like direct consciousness, were connected to givenness, then it would indirectly have to imply real possibility. Since it is not connected to it, but spreads out its content far beyond the narrow limits of the given, and indeed in this freedom of movement has its peculiar epistemological advantage, it accordingly remains to a large extent indifferent toward the existence or nonexistence of real possibility, and this means: indifferent toward real possibility and impossibility.

This seems paradoxical enough. Comprehension is the "coming behind it," the tracking-down of connections and conditions, exposing and correcting errors and skewed conceptions. This indifference would be understandable if one could immediately trace it back to the opposition of essential possibility and real possibility, and thus to the opposition of mere non-contradiction and the highly affirmative chain of real conditions. But in no way does it depend on this opposition alone. The comprehension of real possibility is never limited to the comprehension of essential possibility, although it always includes the latter, and with its help seeks to penetrate the network of real conditions. There is rather a direct recognition of real conditions as such, namely, through knowledge of their conditional character. Without such knowledge, essential insights are of no help to the penetration of real relations. Therefore, the focal point of comprehension of real possibility is found in this recognition.

But this recognition is limited, and the chain of conditions is branched and complicated, running backwards virtually without limit. Comprehension does

not grasp all conditions, although – as far as it reaches – it may be a true recognition throughout. However, real possibility is found only in the totality of the conditions and not in merely a portion of them. Therefore, as long as not all conditions have been grasped, such a "comprehension of possibility" in no way corresponds with certainty to positive real possibility.

This is the reason why so many kinds of things that are not really possible can appear really possible to finite comprehension. This opposition of appearance and being of real possibility is nothing other than the popular expression for the absence of unequivocal relations of implication from comprehension of possibility to real possibility. We do not mean anything other than this when in everyday life we say with regard to the present and future that much is imaginable or conceivable, and that much may arise as an eventuality from the given situation, which in real connection is absolutely not possible. It is the internal inconsistency of the consciousness of actuality, which knows this fact and nevertheless holds firmly to the multitude of "possibilities" (see Chap. 24 b).

In stricter form, this can be expressed as follows: the incomplete comprehension of possibility always relies on partial possibility, and this, according to its essence, is still far from real possibility; it relies, therefore, on a multitude of possibilities, which do not exist at all in the real (see Chap 52 a). At any time in real connection, only a single one of these possibilities exists, the real possibility; it is always the possibility of that which also becomes actual. If comprehension already knows which possibility it is, then it can hold onto it and stop relying on the others. But then it does not do this of its own accord, from comprehension of conditions, but on the detour via a mode completely heterogeneous to it, via the givenness of the actual.

This is seen most clearly in our consciousness of the future, which always relies on a multitude of possibilities, because through givenness it cannot yet know which is the only real existing possibility. The "many possibilities" based on the aspect of partial possibility are perhaps not in themselves false conceptions; they are factual and completely consistent with the limited sector of conditions grasped at any given time. But they do not, therefore, exist in reality, since the sector is ontologically arbitrary, and external to real connection. In truth, there is at any time only the wholeness of the real situation, however complex it may be; and in it is always found only a total possibility (see Chap. 31 b and c).

The failure of comprehension is felt the strongest where the real actuality of the thing is directly given but the decisive conditions are not grasped, and indeed cannot be properly conceived. The given then appears as something "puzzling," or "miraculous." The miraculous is then in opposition to the obscure

concurrent consciousness of possibility, which implies: the thing must still somehow be possible, because it is actual.

Certainly, there is a way to offset the failure of comprehension and to adapt the comprehension of possibility to the conditional structure of real possibility. Science continually takes such a path, without regard to whether it can continue along it to the very end; the path consists in the exploration of the real conditions, themselves, from which one can discuss the question of what actually, with the given presuppositions, is "possible." A discussion of this kind is of an essentially aprioristic kind, but it is empirically conditioned and practically limited in its outcomes. And due to this limitation, it is also susceptible to deception.

At this point, other modes of knowledge are already required. The consciousness of given actuality is required, as well as knowledge of the presence of that which is a condition. A comprehension of necessity is likewise required, as well as knowledge about the laws of dependency between condition and conditioned. The object of this knowledge includes many kinds of real lawfulness and essential lawfulness. A comprehension of essential necessity is, thus, also required.

c) The Comprehension of Negative Possibility and the Real Possibility of Nonbeing

In comprehension, negative possibility is better placed than positive possibility, this is, thus, the converse of how they stand in mere concurrent consciousness of possibility. What comprehension of positive possibility can achieve only in borderline cases, comprehension of negative possibility can achieve relatively easily: the applicability of the concept to the present real relation, and the implication of negative real possibility, respectively.

The absence of a single condition is already sufficient for real possibility of nonbeing. Therefore, no overview of the chain of conditions is required for knowledge of this real possibility; it is sufficient that one recognizes that a determinate condition is missing. And incomplete comprehension can do justice to this requirement relatively easily. The precondition for this is, of course, that one has some understanding of the indispensability of this one missing condition. An understanding of the relevant lawfulness is, therefore, presupposed, and in it, the comprehension of essential necessity is found once again.

A comprehension of negative possibility is tantamount to the comprehension of impossibility. For if I know that a condition for **A** is missing, then I know not only that not-**A** is possible, but also that **A** is impossible. The same

absence of a condition is already sufficient for impossibility. And, once again, this further implies a comprehension of nonactuality.

d) Real Impossibility and Comprehension of Impossibility

If the comprehension of negative possibility were not tied to the condition for the knowledge of law (the "indispensability" of a missing factor), and if no error were possible in this "knowledge," then not only would comprehension of negative possibility have to imply negative real possibility, but also comprehension of impossibility would have to imply real impossibility.

However, this is not unconditionally the case, only being so under determinate circumstances. That is to say, the intermodal relation becomes amphibolous here. If one wants to find an unequivocal relation, then one must restrict the implication in accordance with its internal conditionality.

The conditionality now depends on a knowledge of law, or more precisely, on the lawfulness of the relevant categories, which is tacitly presupposed in knowledge. The crucial question is that of the extent to which the aprioristic lawfulness in cognition agrees with the lawfulness of the real. The extent to which the comprehension of impossibility implies real impossibility depends on the extent to which there is a relation of identity between categories of knowledge and categories of being. Thus, it corresponds to the categorial basic relation on which the aprioristic impact of all real knowledge depends: it can demonstrate only a partial identity of the categories on both sides.[2]

The intermodal law would, thus, be accordingly formulated: within the limits of the relation of identity between categories of knowledge and categories of the real, the comprehension of impossibility implies real impossibility, but not beyond those limits. And since these limits coincide with those of the objective validity of the aprioristic elements of knowledge, one can also say: this implication rightly exists within the limits of objectively valid *a priori* knowledge of the real.

But since we can never strictly specify these limits on the grounds of a givenness or with the help of epistemological analysis, and nevertheless are only occasionally struck by the ensuing consequences – such as when these consequences come into conflict with given real cases – in putting knowledge (even philosophical knowledge) into practice, we can only be certain of this

2 For the sake of the epistemological grounding of this categorial basic relation, I must at this point refer to *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, 5th ed., Berlin, 1965, Chapter 48 a–d.

implication insofar as we have understood the relevant aprioristic lawfulness itself, and have already verified it in many real cases.

What we consider to be "impossible" in incomplete comprehension does not always correspond to an in itself existing real possibility, because there is no guarantee that such a comprehension actually surveys what is really possible under the given circumstances. What is in fact really possible (indeed, even that which is already really actual) may very well be considered to be impossible. The comprehension of impossibility thereby becomes amphibolous.

One may remember the historically outdated and often repeated argument against the spherical shape of the Earth: people who live at the poles would have to be "standing on their heads." Behind this popular saying is concealed a supposed impossibility; one cannot conceive of the fact that spatial directions, i.e. up and down, only exist relative to the Earth. And even this, the fact that one cannot conceive of it, is based on the fact that one tacitly accepts the absoluteness of directions as if it were an aprioristic certainty. Practically speaking, the supposed impossibility continues to exist until one has understood the dynamic conditionality of directions (as a result of the force of gravity), as well as their relatedness to the center of the Earth.

e) On Encountering and Mistaking Real Possibility

In the popular form of incomplete comprehension of impossibility, there very strikingly remains a certain degree of reliance on the "multitude of possibilities," which in no way corresponds to the unity of the respective real possible. Nevertheless, this multitude rightly persists for limited comprehension, in opposition to real relation. If one has in sight only part of the conditions, then from them one cannot see what kind of further determinants belong to the case; and thus, more eventualities remain open, not of course in the real, but in the comprehension of the real.

Partial possibility is, according to its essence, disjunctive. But it exists only relative to partial knowledge of conditions. And in erroneous "comprehension" of a supposed impossibility, the situation is such that the single real possibility, that in fact exists, is unrecognized; thus, in the example above, the relativity of gravity, the nonexistence of absolute directions in space, etc.

On the other hand: the fact that within certain limits the comprehension of impossibility, nevertheless, encounters real impossibility – thus, implying and obviously displaying a much tighter relatedness to it than the comprehension of possibility has to real possibility – explains why this comprehension of impossibility is not a deficient mode, but rather an absolutely effective mode

of knowledge. This mode does not subsist in mere ignorance about a being-possible, but in positive knowledge of the nonexistence of possibility. And in a favorable case, this can be absolutely certain knowledge.

This knowledge is then present if 1. on the grounds of an *a priori* comprehended (or categorially presupposed) lawfulness one has understood that certain conditions for **A** are indispensable presuppositions, and 2. one knows that one of these conditions is in fact absent. For the absence of a single condition already makes the chain incomplete, thus making **A** impossible. So one can, for example, comprehend with due accuracy that it is impossible for the rings of Saturn to be solid bodies; as solid bodies they could have no stability, according to the third Keplerian law. And likewise, one can understand that they can be neither liquid nor gaseous; the internal friction at different speeds of rotation of their strata would break them apart.

Such a knowledge of lawfulness, however, is not present everywhere. It does not support every consciousness of impossibility (e.g. it does not support the argument against the roundness of the earth). But science can approximate it in a given case: thus, the essentiality of knowledge of law, and thus, the delimitation of comprehension of impossibility by the limits of the identity of categories of knowledge and categories of being. The impact of the hypothetical in comprehension of real impossibility is similarly based on this knowledge.

The mediating role in this knowledge about lawfulness falls, in large part, to ideal being. This is the peculiar position of essential lawfulness, that it, on the one hand, governs real lawfulness, but, on the other, also at the same time determines the lawfulness of knowledge. But this governing and determining is limited on both sides. And moreover, essential lawfulness is by no means sufficient for real lawfulness. Essential impossibility (e.g. mathematical impossibility) is easily recognized; but real impossibility can exist even without essential impossibility. Essential impossibility is rooted in being contradictory, but real impossibility can exist even in complete non-contradiction, and thus in given essential possibility. It then exists on the grounds of a missing condition. Therefore, it is of little help that essential impossibility is *a priori* immediately apparent; even without it, there is the real impossible.

Within this relation, there is the extreme case of the obviously mistaken "comprehension" of impossibility. Of course, it is, in truth, a non-comprehension of possibility. This is the case already mentioned above of the "miraculous," of the puzzling, of the unbelievable, or of the paradoxical. In this case, the real possibility of an event **A** is directly given, and in epistemic modality it conflicts with the consciousness, following givenness, of possibility, and the "comprehension" of impossibility. The latter here is based on a mistaken presupposition of law. The "miracle" is the mode of consciousness of

the erroneous comprehension and retention of impossibility in already given real actuality.

The consequence is: there is a true comprehension of impossibility, despite this mode's apparent simplicity, only within the limits of exact scientific knowledge, whose aprioristic impact on presuppositions has been well proven. Moreover, there is only a hypothetical, approximate comprehension of impossibility, which can expect its confirmation only from the actuality of the being-nonactual.

59 The Modes of Necessity and of Actuality

a) Real Necessity and Indirect Comprehension

Knowledge of necessity in real knowledge can be of two kinds: indirect or direct.

Indirect knowledge takes the detour via the comprehension of the impossibility of the opposite. One proceeds from the starting-point that something must be either **A** or not-**A**; one then proves that it cannot be not-**A**, and the consequence is that it is necessarily **A**. The same is the case if, instead of the contradictory relation, more positive, strictly disjuncted limbs stand alongside one another, provided, of course, that the disjunction is complete. The *modus tollendo ponens* can always then be implemented, as long as the impossibility of all limbs except for one can be demonstrated; this one limb remains as "necessary."

This is the so-called apagogic procedure, and one cannot fail to recognize here that necessity is comprehended. There is only the question as to whether it is real necessity that is comprehended in this way.

A good example is that of the rings of Saturn (see above). If one has comprehended that they can be neither firm nor liquid nor gaseous, then the only remaining alternative is that they consist of clouds of small particles. This is – assuming that the disjunction is complete – a necessary consequence, and in this respect, absolutely true. But it is still not on that account comprehension of real necessity. The fact that Saturn has rings must have a sufficient real ground, and this must consist of the complete chain of real conditions under which rings are formed. Of all of these conditions, the indirect mode of inference tells us nothing. One by no means comprehends in this way how clouds of particles must have formed around this planet. But a comprehension of real necessity would have to subsist in such knowledge.

In other cases, of course, one comes closer to real necessity with this apagogic procedure. Thus, for example, if from the law of maintenance of

equilibrium of masses one drew a conclusion about the spherical shape of the Earth, deliberation would show that with any other shape, the internal equilibrium of the mass of the Earth would be impossible. Even here, comprehension of impossibility is excluded. It is only a matter of an impossibility, which in the process of formation of the shape of the Earth is really limiting, and is in this respect determinatively involved; it is therefore indirectly a matter of a very positive basic condition, which is numbered among the totality of conditions, and which by no means subsists merely in deliberation. (One can frame this example far more clearly if one correlates the apagogic deliberation with a historically later stage of science, relating it to the dynamics of rotation and the more exact form of the ellipsoid.)

The apagogic comprehension of necessity can, therefore, approximate positive knowledge of the chain of conditions; indeed, it can occasionally be merely an external, "logical" veiling of such a positive knowledge. And since it depends on a comprehension of impossibility on the grounds of a well proven law, it must, of course, imply real necessity, insofar as the identity of its categories ever reaches those of the real.

But one must not be misled by that fact; this implication of real necessity is in no way a comprehension of real necessity. What is comprehended here is not the totality of conditions, and therefore not the sufficient ground as such, through which alone the thing becomes really necessary; only the necessity of the consequence in the connection of knowledge is comprehended. Here, one recognizes from the grounds of knowledge, but not from real grounds, how a real thing must be created, why it, together with its particular qualities, here and now must come about. If one cites, for example, the deceleration of pendular movement towards the equator as a "ground" for the ellipsoid shape of the earth, then one does not mean that this phenomenon is the real ground for the shape of the Earth; the converse relation is in fact quite clear. The *ratio cognoscendi* does not coincide with the *ratio essendi*. It runs directly counter to it, in the latter case (see Chap. 53 c and d).

Comprehension has its own kind of dependency, and this, in its stringency, leaves nothing to be desired. Whatever may be needed by it for inspection has the mode of internal necessity of knowledge, but not the mode of true comprehension of real necessity.

b) True Comprehension of Necessity and of its Conditions

There is also, however, a direct comprehension of necessity, which is rooted in the knowledge of real conditions. This is the only proper and true knowledge of

real necessity; even if in the connection of knowledge it depends on the mediation of another procedure.

Since a totality of conditions, as a rule, can only be grasped in an abbreviated manner, an impact of the hypothetical remains with this comprehension, which can only be remedied by examination of actual givenness. Nevertheless, even without such examination, the approximation to the true comprehension of necessity is possible, namely, on the grounds of a lawfulness that is either understood or, in the aprioristic impact of comprehension, presupposed. The real possibility of **A** then appears to knowledge as a consequence of certain facts that are given, and at the same time as a consequence of certain known laws, under which the facts are subsumed. The facts appear in the mode of a consciousness of actuality, and the laws appear in the mode of a comprehension of essential necessity. Both joined together yield a certain limited but cogent comprehension of real necessity.

From this state of affairs, the second-order intermodal relation that is tangible here can be formulated in the following way: provided that the given facts are correctly understood, the comprehension of necessity implies real necessity, but only within the limits of the identity of categories of knowledge and categories of the real.

For the impact of the aprioristic, with its "objective validity" in the applied knowledge of law, traces back to this identity; and the same holds true for the participation of essential necessity in comprehension of real necessity. It is the same apriorism in human real knowledge that, seen one way or another, traces back to the categorial basic relation.

On the other hand, if we have, for the delimitation of the categorial relation of identity, no other sign than the unanimity between the laws themselves and the given facts, then it can be said: the direct comprehension of necessity must imply real necessity, insofar as the laws on the grounds of which the comprehension comes about are verifiable and provable for a sufficiently wide range of facts.

The impact of the hypothetical is, of course, consequently never completely eliminated. It remains in the content-related side of the given facts as well as in the empirical confirmation of the applied laws. But the approximation to the true comprehension of real necessity remains nevertheless unlimitedly open, and science, working with precision in its disciplines, can, therefore, bring it to the highest degree of hypothetical certainty.

It is characteristic of this kind of comprehension that in terms of direction it goes together with dependency of being (the *ratio essendi* and *fiendi*, respectively). It begins with the real conditions, and these must be given to it in essential parts. The consequence is that this true and direct comprehension of

necessity extends, in the first place, to cases that lie in the future: to prediction and projection (e.g. the prediction of a solar eclipse or future position of the planets); something similar is taken as a foundation for the calculations of technology, except that for these the temporal relation is not decisive. A convincing picture of this kind of comprehension of necessity's extraordinary power is painted by the exact sciences' astonishing accuracy in all cases that structurally resembles those mentioned earlier. The mystery of this power lies, in part, in the certainty of mathematical lawfulness, but in part also in the content-related coincidence of conditions, from which one knows the conditions on which the real necessity of the thing is based, independently of all knowledge. Despite the height of the requirement, the situation is simplified by the content-related overlapping relation between necessity of knowledge and real necessity.

On the other hand, in that tendency of science that merges into the working out of laws (such as natural laws), this mode of comprehension plays only a subordinate role. This sounds strange, because the tendency toward necessity governs the investigation of law, and because the direct comprehension of necessity most purely represents this tendency.

Thus, one may not externally identify the apparently related aspects of necessity in knowledge, even if they appear closely linked to each other in the methods of science. The truth is that lawfulness contains only a general schema of a determinate kind of real necessity. If one has found lawfulness, then of course "under" it, the necessity of the consequence from the given conditions in the individual case is clear; however, lawfulness itself is not recognized as a necessary consequence from real conditions, but as a much more complicated consequence of analytic penetration. And this penetration is characterized by a reversal of direction in the *ratio cognoscendi* as regards the *ratio essendi*. For insight into universality of the law must arise from the fact. Of course, this arising also reveals a characteristic necessity of knowledge, but it is not insight into real necessity. The latter only begins when the law is applied to the individual case; whatever is then comprehended "under" the law as really necessary is, however, something else: the following of a not-given real from the given real.

c) Real Actuality and the Comprehension of Actuality

Previously it was shown (Chap. 52 d) how the comprehension of actuality is an in-itself complex mode of knowledge, and how in it the comprehension of possibility and necessity, on the one hand, and the plain consciousness of the givenness of actuality, on the other, are presupposed. This is to say that it is an

extreme mode, which is difficult to achieve in knowledge, and which appears only under particularly favorable conditions. It appears relatively frequently in the exact sciences that deal with real objects of a lower order; but even there, most of the time it is only approximated. In the historical sciences and in practical life, we find it, for the most part, only in certain basic approaches or within the limitations of certain sides of the real actual. The fact that even within such limitations we experience it as true illumination of "that which is" does not contradict this. For even a partial comprehension is a true penetration and clarification of something, even though it may not be able to penetrate the whole of the relevant real connection.

The comprehension of actuality remains generally incomplete in human cognition. And as incomplete, it is not actual comprehension. The mere penetration "into" [*Eindringen*] is not sufficient here; the penetration "through" [*Durchdringen*] depends on completeness. This cannot be otherwise, because real actuality is constructed from the mutual interpenetration of real possibility and real necessity, which both depend on the totality of conditions; an incomplete chain of conditions yields neither the one nor the other. But, since the true comprehension of actuality is connected to the comprehension of possibility and necessity, and this latter comprehension must include the complete chain of conditions, incomplete comprehension is obviously not a true comprehension of real actuality.

This fits in well with this mode's ranking as the highest and most positive mode of knowledge. And at the same time, it is very understandable that despite its being unachievable, all real knowledge aims at this mode. It is the synthesis of the positive modes of knowledge, the organic unification of givenness and comprehension.

From a purely structural point of view, the comprehension of nonactuality is likewise the synthesis of the negative modes of knowledge. Here, the plain consciousness of nonactuality, on the one hand, and the comprehension of negative possibility and of impossibility, on the other, is presupposed. But the incompleteness in negative comprehension does not draw as narrow boundaries as the incompleteness in positive comprehension.

It can now be said of the two modes that – insofar as they are produced in cognition – they imply the corresponding real mode. Comprehension of actuality implies real actuality, and comprehension of nonactuality implies real nonactuality. This lies in the character of the highest modes of knowledge – that they – if knowledge can be lifted up to them – actually comprehend their object.

As regards the comprehension of actuality, there is already in its internal construction a certain guarantee that it implies real actuality. The correlation to givenness is contained in this construction. The modal synthesis includes

it. Here, the dead-end of misjudgment of content, like the misjudgment of mere givenness, is not to be feared; the intended real actual cannot as easily be another thing as the actually present real actual, and it does not allow for recovery by the two relational modes of comprehension. For even if the comprehension is incomplete, it firmly adheres to certain links of the chain of conditions, and these are in every case strictly outlined with regard to their content, and are never arbitrarily transferable from one content to other contents. And likewise, the misjudgment of the real relation through the urgency of the relation of knowledge, as occurs in the comprehension of necessity, is not to be expected; therefore, the correlation now conversely protects the plain consciousness of actuality. Through this consciousness of actuality, comprehension is connected to the direction of dependency present in "that which is;" for if the direction in the *ratio cognoscendi* were reversed, then comprehension would not comprehend the given from its conditions, but would comprehend something other than the given from something other than its conditions.

Even more important perhaps is another aspect of this modal synthesis. As the comprehension of possibility and of necessity enters into the complex comprehension of actuality, it is no longer limited by the condition that it implies, only within the limits of the identity of categories of knowledge and real categories, real possibility and real necessity. Of course, this setting of boundaries is not abolished; rather, it is, fulfilled from the outset, thus no longer being a limitation. For it is guaranteed by the correlation to the givenness of the actual. In the givenness alone lies the criterion of the range of that categorical identity. The synthetic mode of knowledge has to a great extent, through the duality of authorities that cooperate in it, the guarantee for the strictest upholding of the limits of objective validity of the aprioristic in it. The cycle of knowledge is fulfilled in the comprehension of actuality, as what is understood to be necessary proves itself in each new series of facts. And likewise, this synthetic mode exercises control over identification of the content of the given, through the comprehension of necessity from its real conditions in it. For after one has comprehended the consequence from the conditions, it is no longer possible to regard the given as something other than what it must be, on the grounds of those conditions.

d) Real Nonactuality and Comprehension of Nonactuality

In the comprehension of nonactuality, there is a synthesis of a similar kind, namely approximating the same result. But here, the share of comprehension is incomparably stronger and purer. For in negative comprehension, that of

negative possibility and of impossibility, the recognition of a totality of conditions is not necessary. Here, it is sufficient that one ascertains that a single condition is missing. Which, in many cases, happens quite easily. On the other hand, the conditionality of the comprehension of nonactuality, through understood or presupposed lawfulness as well as through its restriction to the limits of the transcendent identity of the categories, is basically the same as it is for the comprehension of actuality. For if one wants to comprehend, from the absence of one or even some conditions, the nonactuality of a thing, then it is necessary that one recognize, with full certainty, the indispensability of those conditions. But such insight is only to be gained in an aprioristic way.

On the other hand, the counter-example is weaker: negative givenness is a deficient mode; in this respect, it is at a disadvantage as compared with positive givenness, since one cannot tell whether something is actually missing from it or whether something has merely gone unnoticed. But this disadvantage is offset by the fact that a comprehension of nonactuality does not actually require this counter-example (see Chap. 52 e). Comprehension of nonactuality can exist even without it – as so frequently happens in fields where only one procedure suffices for reaching a conclusion – the relevant modes of negative comprehension are strong enough for comprehension of nonactuality. One must not interpret this in such a way that the direct consciousness of nonactuality would appear to be superfluous. The counter-proof of negative givenness remains absolutely of value, and can seldom be completely dispensed with. But it is not of the same decisive importance as where the overview of a totality is required of comprehension, which in this case the latter basically cannot achieve.

Furthermore, the synthesis in a negative sense is the same as it is in a positive sense. And if one includes the impact of the hypothetical and moves within the limits of categorial identity, then the result is strictly analogous: the comprehension of nonactuality implies real nonactuality.

But if one looks more closely with regard to content, then the formal difference from the positive comprehension of actuality disappears more and more. Actually, in a larger real connection, negative comprehension cannot always be strictly distinguished from positive comprehension. The connection itself turns negative determinateness into a positive determinateness. This can be easily seen in the following examples. The fact that the surface of the Earth is “not flat” does not yet signify the spherical shape of the Earth, but may very well signify the curvature of the Earth; which is something quite positive. The “absence” of a certain part of the spectrum, and its respective obscuration in the otherwise continuous spectrum of a star signifies the presence of an absorbing gas in its atmosphere or perhaps in the path of its radiation in interstellar

space. The "signification" depends on certain experiments in the laboratory, and it, therefore, goes back to their theoretical interpretation; but its certainty is high, and the affirmative character of that which it implies can in no way be denied.

In this way, however, the comprehension of nonactuality moves closer to the comprehension of actuality; and it thereby falls under the same conditions as the latter. Its modal components (nongivenness, the comprehension of negative possibility, and the comprehension of impossibility) are themselves converted, through embedding in connection – that of "givennesses," on the one hand, and that of the comprehended, on the other – into the corresponding modes of knowledge. And the particular form of real implication is thereby transferred from comprehension of actuality to the comprehension of nonactuality.

This transfer fails only when the embedding in a larger connection of knowledge is missing – in the boundary questions or original questions of the whole field of knowledge. And in that case, there is much less relatedness to reality in the comprehension of nonactuality; the hypothetical impact takes up more space, and the implication of real nonactuality becomes questionable. The whole weight lies on the breadth of the included connections. For all comprehension is based on the recognition of connections.

e) Consequences. The System of Two Authorities of Knowledge

In none of its modes does "that which is" imply cognition. And cognition only conditionally implies the being of that which it intends to comprehend. This relation goes through all modes of knowledge with very essential gradations; it is, in its total aspect, nothing other than the well-known particular nature of human world consciousness, having no absolute criterion of truth.

Meanwhile, it has been shown that the conditionality of real implication in the highest and most positive mode of knowledge, the comprehension of actuality, disappears within certain limits and approximates certainty, and that this mode is thereby synthetic. Thus, it takes up a peculiar position among the modes of knowledge. Of course, it does not bring comprehension of actuality to "strict" (unconditional) implication of the corresponding real mode; but under favorable circumstances – with frequently supplemented givenness and a sufficiently widely laid out connection of comprehension – it can bring it to such close approximation to complete certainty that one can speak of fully valid implication of real actuality for the concerns of everyday life, as well as for the concerns of science. With mere consciousness of actuality (givenness), certainty as regards content is missing; for the given authority of perception

conceals too much of the object's being-so. With comprehension of possibility and of necessity, and even with comprehension of impossibility, the controlling authority is missing for the presuppositions, without which no comprehension can succeed. But in comprehension of actuality there is present a synthesis of both ways of knowledge, in which the sources of error of one-sided modes of knowledge are compensated for.

Of course, one must add that this unique mode of knowledge is the most difficult to achieve. Precisely because it consists of a widely laid out synthesis of a heterogeneous modality of knowledge, its appearance is dependent on whether and to what extent the presupposed modal elements converge. And, in this respect, one must say: the mode that most closely approximates unconditional real implication is the most extensively conditioned mode within the structure of human cognition. The conditionality is, therefore, merely shifted from the truth-value of knowledge to its achievability and feasibility.

Precisely for that reason, however, the comprehension of actuality stands as the actual *desideratum* of all real knowledge. All cognition aims at this mode as at its natural fulfillment. All science (with the exception only of pure mathematics, which is a purely essential science), and all practical knowledge in life, all human knowledge, and knowledge of situations, aims at it. The whole of real knowledge, regardless of which level of development or fulfillment is under consideration, can be understood as an unequivocal process of approximation to this mode of knowledge. And everything that it brings about consists in values of approximation to this highest mode.

This is a result of modal analysis that is of vital concern to epistemology. If one translates it into the conceptual language of the constitutive relation, then one comes to the system of two authorities of real knowledge. The aposterioristic authority corresponds to the modes of givenness, the plain consciousness of actuality, and the plain consciousness of nonactuality. The concurrent consciousness of positive and negative possibility indirectly belongs here, as well. The aprioristic authority corresponds to the modes of comprehension, positive as well as negative, insofar as they have a relational character; therefore, with the exception of the highest synthetic mode itself. For the comprehension of possibility and necessity is the discovery of real conditions by means of recognized or unrecognized underlying lawfulness.

These modes of comprehension do not completely coincide with the aprioristic impact of knowledge. For the actual *a priori* element in them is merely that of the knowledge of law, and in addition to this, elements of givenness are always also underlying. But the aprioristic element remains the authoritative one, opening up the connections of being-possible and being-necessary or being-impossible. Aprioristic insight is, in accordance with its essence, connected

to the form of comprehension of connections and conditionalities. Even where it amounts to the particular existence (being-so) of the thing, it is basically an overview; it is also a relational knowledge (an insight into relations) with regard to content. For that reason, it is the type of knowledge that the relational modes are concerned with. *A posteriori* knowledge, on the other hand, is essentially directed at the individual. It is the form taken by the absolute modes of givenness.

The single criterion of truth that we now have in real knowledge is a "relational" criterion. It is rooted in the independence and heterogeneity of the two sources of knowledge, the aprioristic and the aposterioristic. The two have their corrective in each other; their mistakes and errors are compensated for, because the mistakes of the one do not easily coincide with those of the other.

This structure of the criterion of truth corresponds to the synthesis of the modes of knowledge in comprehension of actuality. These are heterogeneous modes that come together here as one: the relational modes of knowledge exercise control over the absolute modes, and the absolute over the relational; givenness completes comprehension, and comprehension illuminates givenness. The result is the implication of real actuality in the comprehension of actuality.

This implication is nothing other than the "objective validity" that knowledge attains in its highest mode, and in the applicability of its content to the real object, respectively. But this applicability is the meaning of the "transcendent truth" of knowledge. It is, therefore, one and the same relational criterion of truth that lies constitutively in the synthesis of the content of aprioristic and aposterioristic knowledge, and modally in the synthesis of the modes of comprehension with those of givenness.

The dividedness of knowledge, according to its two heterogeneous sources, is brought together in comprehension of actuality, again in a synthetic unity. In this respect, one can say that all actual knowledge of real objects, even everyday knowledge, insofar as it makes a claim to truth, takes on the shape of this mode. As a matter of fact, in the structure of knowledge, the isolated appearance of givenness is to be found no more often than the isolated appearance of comprehension. But the degrees of connectedness are graded very diversely, and along with them, so is the fulfillment of the modal synthesis.

III The Position of Ideal Being and of the Logical

60 The Essential Sphere and Knowledge

a) The Proximity of Ideal Being to Consciousness

How ideal being stands toward real being has been previously discussed (Chap. 55 and 56): none of its positive modes imply a real mode, but certain positive real modes imply the corresponding essential modes. One would think that, after the relation of knowledge to the real sphere has been determined in its fundamentals, the relation of knowledge to ideal being would have to emerge as a result. By no means is this the case. Rather, it is a matter here of a peculiar position that the ideal sphere has toward knowledge, as well as of a characteristic second-order relation.

The meaning of knowledge, modally expressed, consists in the implication of the mode of being through the corresponding mode of knowledge. This implication is the being-true of the form of knowledge to the being that is its object. It is, therefore, nothing less than the modal formulation of "truth." And the certainty of such implication is the knowledge of truth and falsehood.

In relation to real being, it is extraordinarily difficult for knowledge to achieve this implication. It can only succeed through the synthesis of all positive modes. But this is difficult to produce within the limitedness of its overview. Thus, it remains standing with approximations to its real issues almost all along the line.

In its relations to ideal objects, however, the situation is quite different. Here, the implication of the corresponding mode of being is, in general, easily produced. This mode is only an essential mode. The realm of essences is, in a certain immediacy, accessible to internal view.

The accessibility is not to be understood in such a way that ideal being as such would already be directly given; even without any givenness, it exists in itself; it is, in this respect, not positioned any differently than real being. The accessibility means only a being moved nearer, a being comprehensible independent of experience and given circumstances; ideal being can, at any time, be brought to givenness, namely, purely internally in realization. And this realization has the form of spiritual vision. In this way, one understands geometrical relations, essential laws, and characteristics of value. This understanding must also be developed, and under certain conditions, this is a difficult bit of work.

But it consists in the correct guidance of inner vision, itself. If this vision succeeds in bringing the ideal object into the field of view, then understanding results of its own accord, and is the immediate certainty of what has been seen.

This lies in the essence of pure intuition, as well as in its character of apriority. And in this respect, nothing is changed if, in practice, direct evidence in a particular case remains subjected to misinterpretation. The widening of the field of vision always stands free, the confrontation with the otherwise ideally recognized. The isolated, stigmatic view finds its completion in the conspective view, in which the misinterpreted drops out completely of its own accord.

But this conspective view is just as much a pure intuition, and it is just as aprioristic and independent of the circumstances of givenness. It is related to immediately accessible essential connections in the same way as the stigmatic view is related to essences and essential features. Therefore, it remains on the same ground. For it the same internal "proximity" of the ideal object holds true just as, in mere viewing, the same direct recognizability holds true for the stigmatic view.

The modal meaning of this internal accessibility or proximity is, however, nothing other than the implication of the ideal mode of being by the corresponding mode of knowledge. For that reason, the second-order intermodal relations that exist between knowledge and ideal being must be completely different from those that exist between knowledge and real being. And it can easily be anticipated that here the implication forms the basic relation that recurs, only slightly modified, in the individual modes.

But even here it is only a matter of the mode of being's implication by the mode of knowledge, and not vice versa. For knowledge cannot at all be implied by the being of its object. Ideal being is, in itself, no less indifferent toward ideal knowledge than real being is indifferent toward real knowledge.

b) Essential Actuality and Intuitive Givenness

In the field of ideal knowledge, no sharper boundary line can be drawn between givenness and comprehension. There are, indeed, gradations here, but not abrupt opposition. The recognition of essential actuality remains basically the same, whether or not it is mediated by a comprehension of essential possibility and essential necessity, and therefore by a comprehension of connections. In truth, it can never be detached from such comprehension. At least a certain comprehension of possibility is always contained in recognition of existing essential features.

This is related to the intermodal law of ideal being, that essential actuality is a concurrent mode of essential possibility (see Chap. 40 d). Mere being non-contradictory is sufficient for ideal existence. But non-contradiction, for its part must always somehow be grasped along with it, wherever an essential feature is understood as "existing."

In principle, the intuitive givenness of an essence now implies essential actuality. This means: everywhere that true essential intuition is present, it meets its ideal object and does not by any means look past it. There is essential blindness to an essential feature, but there is not in the same way an affirmative illumination of something that does not lie within the essence of the ideal object. It is only a question of whether and when actual essential intuition is present; and this is, by no means, directly decided by the appearance of sensory evidence. This can be quite deceptive.

Thus, for example, in ethics it has long been assumed that there lies, within essence, an accompanying purposeful action, aiming at something of value. One thus proceeded from the ancient intuition that no one voluntarily does evil. The error here lies in the conflation of wanting and doing. The human will cannot, of course, want something unfavorable for itself. But firstly, it can want it (as a means) for something else that is favorable; and the action can then, if it does not extend beyond actualization of the means, be a purposefulness toward something unfavorable. And secondly, even if the human will cannot pursue something that is unfavorable for itself, this does not lie in the essence of purposefulness, but in the essence of the human will. For the idea of a "satanic" will, which pursues evil for its own sake, is not in itself contradictory and, above all, does not contradict its own purposefulness (which is not identical to the willing itself), but only contradicts the particular essential nature of the human will.

At the same time, one sees how a deeper penetration into the complex essential relations of purpose, value, and will can uncover error. The progressive disclosure of these relations can mean that true essential intuition takes the place of supposed essential intuition. As long as this is not the case, the error is reported in essential intuition itself – more precisely, in its further connections – as an obscure consciousness of inconsistency. And this already has the form of a nascent comprehension of impossibility. Thus, the corrective of essential givenness lies in the higher relational modes of essential knowledge, itself.

With this restriction, one may say: positive essential givenness attests to essential actuality. But this principle cannot be turned around into the negative principle: negative essential givenness does not by any means attest to essential nonactuality.

For it has the form of a *modus deficiens*, and may very well be based on mere nongivenness. And if one considers that, under certain conditions, further detours are required to bring an existing essential relation to givenness, one sees that from the outset, there is always a great danger of something escaping essential intuition. It is a well-known fact that phenomenological essential intuition, as fruitful as it is in positive "demonstration," has failed almost everywhere that it has undertaken to refute something. Demonstration is an exclusively affirmative mode of knowledge; it cannot be turned around into a negative mode. The argument that something "cannot be demonstrated" is deceptive, because it can never guarantee that nothing has eluded demonstration that could perhaps be demonstrated in a different way. The same can be shown in the fields of exact knowledge. The fact that there could be elliptical space was far from being recognized by ancient mathematics; one had only Euclidean space in view, and one could, therefore, not see what contradicted it. But the essential realm has room for incompossible systems. For the other spatial systems, a way of recognizing them must first be found.

Negative givenness does not imply essential nonactuality. It is, to a great extent, indifferent to it. Indeed, negative essential givenness is hardly to be called a characteristic mode of knowledge. At least, it is not directly characteristic. Mere not-seeing possibility is not sufficient here. Essential impossibility would already have to be recognized. As essential nonactuality is, by no means, the companion mode of negative essential possibility, but is the companion mode of essential impossibility (see Chap. 44 d and e). But this is a completely different mode of being, and likewise, a different mode of knowledge corresponds to it.

c) Essential Possibility and Comprehension of Possibility

Possibility is the underlying basic mode of ideal being. Actuality has here no modal independence apart from it; necessity is externally limited in the essential realm, it does not keep step with essential possibility. And compossibility is only a particularization of essential possibility. In this sense, the realm of essences is ultimately a realm of possibility. And accordingly, one ought to expect the mode of possibility to be proven as the dominant mode in the intermodal laws of essential knowledge.

This holds perfectly true, insofar as the internal proximity of ideal being to consciousness makes itself most strongly felt in this mode. This is very clearly shown by the fact that in comprehension of essential possibility, the ideal demand of all knowledge is fulfilled, i.e. by the fact that in it, the *veritas* is

simultaneously *norma sui et falsi*.[1] In other words: in this mode of knowledge, the comprehension bears, in itself, the criterion of its truth. This criterion is non-contradiction. The principle of contradiction, which expresses it, is the only law of being on which possibility depends in the essential realm, it being at the same time the law of knowledge on which the comprehension of possibility depends. Thus, non-contradiction is the internal indicator of the essentially possible in comprehension itself.

The strictest and simplest relatedness to the corresponding mode of being is, thus, given in this mode of knowledge. As a second-order intermodal law, this relatedness signifies the principle: the comprehension of essential possibility implies the existence of essential possibility itself.

In a certain sense, of course, there must be an error here. In complex essential relations, contradiction can be hidden and can remain unrecognized. Comprehension can also lack an overview. But this is hardly changed by the fact that contradiction, wherever and however it is understood, excludes essential possibility in comprehension itself. Moreover, the missing overview is, itself, internally revealed. For example, whether or not the relation between the circumference and radius of a circle can be expressed as a ratio of integers is not to be seen in the intuition of the circle; thus, the recurring attempts to square the circle. But even this, the fact that one cannot see it in the circle, is consciously known, or can be brought very easily to consciousness, since the emergence of the question is sufficient to lead the contemplator from intuition to knowledge. And if knowledge about impossibility does not arise here at all, then knowledge about the possibility of nonbeing (of not arising in relations of integers) is still attained, as soon as one has understood that there are relations of a different kind. Therefore, the criterion, itself, is given to comprehension of essential possibility, even in its failure. It obscurely announces itself, even amidst ignorance of possibility.

Thanks to its power of implication, the comprehension of essential possibility plays a leading role in the total structure of knowledge, and plays out deeply in real knowledge. For even real possibility presupposes essential possibility (see Chap. 55 c), insofar as the real always generally presupposes essential relations. According to procedure, all comprehension of real possibility begins with the comprehension of essential possibility. And it remains the eternal *desideratum* of real knowledge to push forward the recognition of essential possibility to

1 [Translator's note]: Spinoza, *Ethica*, Prop. XLIII, Scholium: "*sicut lux seipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est*" ("just as light reveals itself and darkness, so truth is a standard of itself and of falsehood").

such an extent that it forms a meshwork, so to speak, in what has been preliminarily understood for the incalculable diversity of real cases.

Here is rooted the importance of essential laws as major premises of possible real knowledge, as well as the tendency toward deductive comprehension. But at the same time, it is here that the mediating role of the logical also begins. And in this way, still further second-order intermodal relations get involved.

61 The Higher Essential Modes and Comprehension

a) Compossibility and Comprehension of Compossibility

In relation to universal essential possibility, compossibility plays no separate role for knowledge. Only in the existence of ideal being itself does it carry modal weight, as long as it constitutes a complementary factor for the parallelism of systems that exclude each other in the intelligible construction of the essential realm. But this does not mean that essential knowledge has nothing to do with it. Rather, it is the other way around; almost all comprehension of essential possibility has the form of comprehension of compossibility.

All contradiction and all non-contradiction only apply to a coexistence of essential determinations that can somehow be outlined. But, in contrast, the fact that the incompossible coexists in the realm of essences signifies only the plurality of possibilities, as it is always contained in the multitude of species under a genus. This plurality can, by no means, always be brought together in its completeness; one considers the great difficulties that science has to deal with in the major premises of disjunctive conclusions, because here the decisiveness of positive conclusions depends completely on this completeness.

The comprehension of essential possibility, therefore, always adheres to compossibility, just as it may adhere to a far more determinate and tangible mode. And thus the relation of implication, which attained such peculiar strictness in comprehension of essential possibility, is fully and completely transferred to the comprehension of compossibility; the latter implies the compossibility subsisting in ideal objects.

But knowledge of otherwise parallel essential possibility is, by no means, directly contained in this comprehension of compossibility. The comprehension of disjunctive relations of possibility is, in fact, quite different; it depends on comprehension the next-higher genus, and is limited by the one's ability to recognize that genus at any given time.

The same holds true for comprehension of incompossibility. Here, relative impossibility is comprehended as it exists within an already given complex of determinations. In this correlation, the comprehension of incompossibility is the consciousness of the contradiction that exists between **A** and a system **X**, thus being the basic form of the comprehension of impossibility.

But in both cases, in the positive as well as in the negative mode, the mode of comprehension implicates the corresponding essential mode throughout. For the implication is guaranteed by the same internal criterion as is found in comprehension of possibility. Therefore, the high epistemic value of comprehension of compossibility, and of comprehension of incompossibility; an epistemic value that indirectly benefits real knowledge.

b) Essential Impossibility and Comprehension of Impossibility

But at one level, the strictness of the relation to the essential mode increases in comprehension of impossibility.

Here, it is always comprehended that something is not compossible with a certain other thing. But as long as this other thing is established as ideally existing, i.e. is understood as plain "being-so" ["*so seiend*"], the relation of inconsistency itself is thereby related to confirmed initial links, and in this respect one grasps something more, something beyond mere relative incompossibility: the plain essential impossibility. In this sense, it is impossible for the angular sum of a triangle to measure more than two right angles, for there to be a ground without a consequence, and for there to be consciousness without intentional objects.

Principles of this kind are rightly considered to express insights that are, in themselves, illuminating, whose applicability to ideal being – and indirectly to real being – is immediately apparent in the content itself. We call a "ground" only that which has a consequence, and call "consciousness" only that which has an object; if the consequence is missing there, and the object here, then the "being of the ground" becomes just as contradictory as the "being of consciousness." This means that the one, like the other, becomes essentially impossible; namely, in thought, and all the more so in essential content. For the principle of contradiction, which already governs thought (insofar as thought is consistent), governs the essential realm even more strictly.

Comprehension of impossibility, therefore, implies essential impossibility. The inconsistency that we, in thinking of the object, experience as resistance – as inconceivability – is the contradiction in the ideal object itself.

This holds true at least as long as it is a matter of true comprehension of being contradictory. A deficient mode of comprehension does not, by any means, suffice here. Thus, the mere non-comprehension of possibility is something quite different from the comprehension of impossibility.

One would think that in essential knowledge, the noncomprehension of possibility would not easily be confused with true comprehension of impossibility. And in general, this confusion should not easily occur. Nevertheless, there is a limiting problem in which it is noted; and this produces a limit to the accuracy of essential knowledge. In the field concerned, there is the paradoxical case in which one does not comprehend the possibility of the subsumption of not-**A** under **A,** although it is required by the situation. It is so, for example, in the familiar paradox of the heap. There is no dispute that there must be a "heap of all heaps that does not contain itself;" nor is there any dispute that it must be possible, for there cannot be ideal existence without essential possibility. But how this possibility shall rightly exist is incomprehensible; for the heap can neither contain itself, nor can it not contain itself. This goes against the principle of excluded middle. What fails here is the comprehension of possibility.

One must not, by any means, generalize this situation. It appears this way only in certain limiting areas of concern. And this should come as no surprise. For the regular intermodal relations are abolished at the limits of the sphere. Whatever stands within the limits remains undisputed by the abolition. The example cited above is also characterized by the fact that here an actual comprehension of impossibility is not present; the impossibility of the questionable heap is in fact abolished by its ideal existence. What remains is only the deficient mode, the noncomprehension of possibility.

What is present here is, thus, a limit of comprehension, and not a limit of implication of the essential mode by the mode of comprehension. It is clear in advance that if comprehension is in any way attained, then it must imply the ideal being of the comprehended. If a comprehension of possibility is attained, then it implies the possibility of the heap itself; but if a comprehension of impossibility ensues, then it reveals the essential impossibility of the heap, itself, thus refuting its existence.

The comprehension of impossibility is, therefore, stronger in ideal knowledge than the intuitive givenness of essential actuality. It is the latter that much more likely underlies delusion. Conspective intuition is clearly superior to stigmatic intuition. And so it must be, in knowledge of an essential realm, whose predominant modes are completely relational. For conspective intuition follows along the track of these modes. This is why, all essential intuition

seeks its criterion in an overview for what is understood initially in isolation; but not vice versa.

c) Essential Necessity and Comprehension of Necessity

Above it was shown (Chap. 44 a, b) how, in ideal being, the role of necessity, as compared with the role of possibility – and even that of compossibility – is limited: essential necessity holds sway only from genus to species; thus, only the general in the particular is necessary. It is clear that true comprehension of essential necessity accordingly cannot be anything other than of the recognition of this relation of dependency. And in this respect, in essential knowledge, the comprehension of necessity, as compared with the comprehension of possibility, is very determinately restricted.

But this in no way means that it is a mode of less epistemic value; and likewise, it does not mean that it has any less power to imply the corresponding essential mode. On the contrary, the latter remains the same throughout, its gnoseological importance being all the greater, since necessity is the higher and more determinate mode. Relatively little is required in order to recognize essential possibility, but little is accomplished by such recognition; much more is required in order to comprehend essential necessity, but such comprehension is also more significant. And if here one remembers the kind of important mediating role that the comprehension of essential necessity plays in the far more difficult task of comprehending real necessity (and real actuality), then this mode of essential knowledge rises to a considerable rank in the total structure of human world consciousness.

As with real knowledge, there is also an indirect comprehension of necessity here on the grounds of a comprehension of the impossibility of its opposite, i.e. an apagogic comprehension. It presupposes the certainty and disjunctive completeness of an alternative, which is directly given only in cases of contradictory relations. And here it should also be said that such a comprehension does not grasp genuine essential necessity itself. The same holds true for all inferences as to the universal and principles, whereby the dependency of knowledge is directed toward the dependency of being. In all such cases, no necessity is comprehended; it is only recognized "with necessity" that the inferred is as it is.

From all of this arises the actual and direct insight into essential necessity, as the affirmative and antegrade comprehension, in ideal being itself, of the present determination of the particular from the general. This kind of insight

begins in the way that the implication of the essential mode itself develops into direct certainty: the given essential elements **a b c** of **A** from the genus are related to a further element **d** and "imply" it in the existence of **A**. The form of intuition is, in this case, markedly conspective, and is a necessary seeing-along-with of **d** in its connectedness to **a b c**. So it is in mathematical propositions. As one intuitively recognizes the relations of a triangle's shape, one understands the quantity of the angular sum; as one recognizes the particularity of a circle's figure, one is able to understand why its area must be = $r^2\pi$. Here nothing is changed by the fact that such recognition often takes a detour, needs auxiliary construction, and must include the foreseen. In accordance with its essence, conspective intuition cannot be simple. What is important here is only that it is certain of the dependency in which it progresses and at the same time can arise for the existence of the perceived in the object.

And it is no different for grasping higher-order essential connections, even if it lacks exactly the same form. Thus, one can, with full certainty, recognize that only a free being can be morally good or evil, that attitude presupposes personality, that a work of music subsists not in itself (like things and events), but only relative to a musically-hearing being. Relations of such a kind are comprehended as essentially necessary, namely, always from the general – regardless of whether or not the reasons for comprehension lie in the particular, or even in real individual cases.

In comprehension of essential necessity, the one who comprehends is immediately conscious of being compelled by the object. He cannot, in accordance with the meaning of the thing, comprehend it any differently from the way in which he comprehends it. Of course, this mode does not force him into comprehension itself; but if he arrives at comprehension, he arrives at an understanding of the determinate relation. Essential necessity does not force itself on any consciousness; on the contrary, it is just as indifferent to becoming recognized as are all other modes of being (the ideal as well as the real). But the "forcing" commences as soon as a comprehension of essential connection begins; the knowing subject is then no longer free to comprehend it in just any random manner, but must comprehend the necessity in the ideal object as it is.

One can, therefore, never say that essential necessity implies the comprehension of necessity. But the converse holds true: the comprehension of necessity implies essential necessity.

Of course, here we must add: within the limits of the identity of categories of knowledge and categories of essence. But it is obvious that if conspective intuition never transcends these limits, then this stipulation becomes superfluous. The "coercion" in comprehension by experienced necessity is the coercion by categories of essence. In this sense, comprehension of essential necessity is the

absolute coercive mode of comprehension; that in which the internal proximity of ideal being to consciousness becomes directly experienced. The stringency of essential connection here gives direct evidence of itself in consciousness.

d) Essential Intuition and Comprehension of Essential Connections

It is not the same in ideal knowledge as it is in real knowledge, where a certain risk always remains in the "objective validity" of categorial presuppositions, making itself felt in the gradations of certainty. Being and knowing have here moved closer to each other; comprehension is directly governed (as in mathematical thought) by the already unconsciously presupposed laws of the object. The axioms of the object are underlying in comprehension of the particular, without already being understood as such. And only insofar as this relation holds sway is there affirmative essential knowledge.

Thus, the comprehension of necessity arises as the predominant mode of essential knowledge. Clearly, this does not go without saying, if one remembers that in ideal being itself, necessity does not by any means play the role of a predominant mode, and that it is very restricted here, basically only holding sway in the direction that runs from genus to species. But for knowledge, it also becomes highly meaningful in this restriction. For wherever knowledge has grasped the universal, in this way it is sure of the universal in the particular.

Wherever essential intuition looks into its object and declares there to be an "it is so" in it, it has, as a rule, already comprehended an "it must be so," even if this has not risen into consciousness. This is best seen in cases where it is disputed: intuition immediately has grounds from which to defend its understanding of the object. It must, therefore, have already seen the grounds, along with the object. But this having-been-seen-with of the grounds is the preceding intuitive (not explicit) comprehension of necessity.

This is where we find the main difference from real knowledge. The latter comprehends, in the mode of givenness, the real actual, without discerning its necessity or even its possibility. It superficially isolates the accessible actual from its background, from real connections; for that reason, the comprehension of necessity is something completely different in it, an altogether new approach to knowledge. The case is otherwise for ideal knowledge. It never isolates the modes from each other; here, givenness and comprehension inherently go together. It progresses in the ideal connections themselves, and is basically always conspective. That is why the relational modes hold sway in it. The comprehension of essential necessity already hides in disguise in knowledge about essential actuality. There is no being hidden or being disappeared of essential

necessity in essential actuality that could be compared to that of real necessity in real actuality.

From this now emerges the great importance of ideal knowledge for the comprehension of real necessity. For essential lawfulness resides in real necessity, and the latter cannot be understood without essential lawfulness being possible. In science, as in everyday life, the intuitive comprehension of essential necessity is the ground on which the comprehension of real necessity can, first of all, grow, although the latter is something quite different with regard to content, and in accordance with its dependency, never coincides with the former. This finds its confirmation in the impact of aprioristic, pure knowledge of law, which is always contained in comprehension of real necessity (see Chap. 52 c).

The comprehension of essential necessity is, in this way, a particularly supportive mode. It supports not only the consciousness of essential actuality, but beyond that, a significant share of real knowledge. On its mediation depends the unity of real knowledge, whose heterogeneous authorities, givenness and comprehension, directly coincide with one another in this respect.

62 Intermodal Position of the Logical Sphere

a) Indifference of Being toward the Logical Modes

The logical sphere, understood as the sphere of judgment and of concepts, is ontologically quite secondary. It would require no particular integration into second-order intermodal relations – since its modes are softened and restricted modes of ideal being – if it did not have the peculiarity of containing the most general basic forms and modes of comprehension itself.

These basic forms are shown in full purity not as much by the concept, and indeed hardly ever as much by the judgment, as by the conclusion. And even if the actual schema of conclusion is merely a schema of subsumption, then this function of subsumption, the simplest-of-all, is a central one in the carrying out of comprehension, even when this function is not consciously performed. Its applicability to ideal and real relations is a continuous factor and the framework, so to speak, of aprioristic knowledge, insofar as this knowledge does not continue to stand in empty generalities, but mediates insight into the particular case. This mediation takes the form of logical consequence.

From this, it is immediately apparent that here we have a matter that exclusively concerns the relational modes. Logical possibility is basically an

extra-logical mode and a boundary mode of the logical; it may also be called a logically deficient mode. It reveals none of the relationality in which the logical relation moves; as then mere givenness stands behind the assertoric judgment. This is an extra-logical moment.

What alone can be involved in the second-order intermodal relations standing in question are the logical modes of necessity, possibility, and impossibility. But even that is still too much to say, because here problematic judgment counts only halfway. Since possibility is disjunctive in it, it is a judgment of indeterminateness; it falls subject to everything – affirmative as well as negative – that is not in itself directly contradictory and, thus, not logically impossible. Formally a logically deficient mode is present here, an absence of determinateness. And an eventual second-order implication, which would lead from such a mode of judgment to a mode of being or knowledge, would hardly be of importance.

Consequently, there are only two remaining modes of judgment whose consideration is involved here; necessity and impossibility. However, these two together constitute the modal type of apodictic judgment, which in affirmative and negative quality implies one and the same kind of predicative being (and nonbeing, respectively).

A second factor concerns the irreversibility of the second-order implications that depend on the logical modes. It is never the case that a mode of being implies a mode of judgment. All being, as such, is indifferent toward concept and judgment, just as much as it is indifferent toward knowledge. Concept and judgment are secondary; they appear only as a comprehension or impression of the known. If, now, that which is in both spheres is basically indifferent toward knowledge, how much more indifferent will it be toward their mere impressions!

This does not quite hold true to the same extent for the relation to the modes of knowledge. Of course, it is not necessary for knowledge to be converted into forms of judgment; and in this respect, it is just as indifferent as being is toward logical form and its modality. But there is still another connection here, and this depends not on concept or judgment, but on conclusion. The logical "inference," in its manifold forms, is very essentially involved in the connection of knowledge. It mediates new insight, particularly where the actuality of a thing is already given but its necessity still goes uncomprehended. This is, by no means, merely the case wherever something is consciously and explicitly "concluded;" it is rather the case wherever in concrete and intuitive comprehension something is recognized in a thing from the general category under which that thing falls. In fact, here, it is always subsumed, even if one is unaware of the general category under which it is subsumed.

The "conclusion" in knowledge leads to the formulated judgment as well as to the defined concept. This fits in well with the internal relation of the concept,

judgment, and conclusion – a relation that, of course, has been mostly misunderstood in formal logic – since the judgment usually arises only in conclusion, but the concept is integrated from judgments.

Thus, concerning the forms of conclusion alone, the logical plays a decisive role in the vital progress of knowledge. And here we will have to expect the converse implication: the implication of the mode of judgment by the mode of knowledge. And since it is only a matter of impossibility and necessity, it involves the mutual relation between the comprehension of impossibility and necessity, on the one side, and the apodictic judgment acquired by conclusion, on the other.

b) Apodictic Judgment and Real Necessity

Logical and real necessity are fundamentally dissimilar to each other. Logical consequence has hardly anything in common with real consequence. The former proceeds from premises, leading from the universal to the particular, while the latter proceeds from the real situation, leading from the strictly individual particularity of a situation to the equally individual real consequence. Everything that can exist in relatedness here extends only to lawfulness, or to the universal in real connection, insofar as the latter can be captured by logical premises. But whether the particular real case is directly affected by that lawfulness, which in the major term of the conclusion is chosen as the starting point, depends on whether the subject of the minor premise is brought under the middle term (*terminus medius*) in a valid way.

Logic cannot decide whether this is the case. It is a matter of knowledge, namely, of the modes of comprehension. Thus, the logical necessity in apodictic judgment offers scant prospect of implicating real necessity.

In addition to this, there is a second consideration. Even if the universality of the major premise is based on a true real law, the particular case is rightly recognized, and the subsumption is carried out flawlessly, the conclusion still yields only the necessity that comes from law. But under certain conditions this law may be quite skewed toward real necessity, and in each case it may be a different law from the last. If one concludes, for example, from the lawfulness of the moon's orbit and from a particular position of the moon at a particular time, that a lunar eclipse will occur, then a part of the real necessity with which the eclipse will occur is in fact reflected in the apodictic judgment that forms the conclusion. But, on the grounds of the laws, one can also infer from the occurrence of an eclipse at a particular time, the particular position the moon had at that time (at an intersection point of its orbit with the shadow

of the earth). This is also a logically valid conclusion, and it leads to an apodictic judgment as a corollary.

But in this second case, the necessity in the judgment is, in terms of its content, quite different from real necessity. In real relation, the eclipse is necessary only on the grounds of the moon's position, but the position of the moon is not necessary on the grounds of the eclipse. The relation of real determination is irreversible, but the relation of logical determination is reversible. The former leads from real causes to real effects, but the latter leads from the given to what is sought after. If the real effect is given, then the relation of ground and consequence in the conclusion is reversed, and does not coincide with the real relation.

From this it follows that: logical necessity as such does not imply real necessity; not even if it is unequivocally grounded on its real lawfulness (in the major premise), and logically inferred from it. But in such a case – the favorable case – an approach to hidden real necessity is laid open. For in logical inference, the conditions come to light, and in the totality of conditions is rooted real necessity.

On this is based the relatively forceful impact that logical conclusions have on comprehension of real relations. This impact does not consist in true implication of the real mode. It represents a far more complex relation, which is grounded on the reversibility of the logical ground-consequence relation as compared to the real one. All scientific deduction, which proceeds from the factuality of real consequence and infers grounds (whether they be universal laws or past events), takes this path. And so it directly corresponds to the difficulty and eternal incompleteness with which the comprehension of real necessity must wrestle. Conclusion, and along with it apodictic natural necessity, is the formal vehicle of this comprehension.

The relation in negative apodictic judgment is more favorably and simply shaped. Here, the same reversibility and indirectness also holds true. But the parallel case in negative judgment has a quite different kind of completeness, since the absence of a single partial condition is sufficient for real impossibility. Such an absence can be given; this givenness can be expressed in the minor premise, while the major premise expresses the law of basic conditions under which that missing condition is posited (one compares the syllogistic modes of Camestres and Baroco). In these cases, there is also the direct implication of real impossibility – even if understood in terms of content – on the grounds of the negative apodictic judgment.

This case is also of even greater importance. In science, it underlies the apagogic proof of necessity. And in practical life, it forms the means by which "eventualities" are reduced when making calculations about the future.

c) Apodictic Judgment and Essential Necessity

The relation of the logical to the essential realm is far more direct. Its laws are essential laws. But it is only a very narrow sector of the most general essential lawfulness that adheres to logical lawfulness: the lawfulness of dependency of the particular and the general. Ultimately, there remains behind it the relation of genus and species, namely, only with respect to what is general in the species.

The *dictum de omni et nullo* unequivocally and formally expresses this lawfulness of dependency. This dictum is an essential law. As such, it is valid not only in the sphere of the logical, but also at the same time in the sphere of the real. On it is based the possibility in logical inference to infer real relations. Here, the essential realm plays the role of mediator, namely, in the form of a superordinate sphere of law.

It may, therefore, be said: if the premises are true (corresponding in terms of content to ideal being), then the apodicticity of the conclusion expresses essential necessity. Under this condition, the following principle holds true: logical necessity implies essential necessity.

But the condition itself does not mean any very troublesome restriction, since it is relatively easy to fulfill: the essential contingency of the premises has already directly announced itself in the sphere of judgment. The premises need only to comply with the requirement that they be non-contradictory; since in the realm of ideal being, everything that is, in itself, free of contradiction is "possible;" it does not by any means depend on compossibility with the whole sphere. Thus, an overview can be easily produced. And since, on the other hand, everything essentially possible is also essentially actual, the above condition itself is immediately fulfilled by the simple fulfillment of logical laws.

The law of implication can, therefore, also be expressed as follows: essential necessity does not imply any apodicticity of judgment; but an apodictic judgment always implies essential necessity, provided that the premises correspond to general logical laws, which are the presupposition of logical consequence in the conclusion.

This extraordinarily favorable relation is ultimately rooted in the peculiar proximity of ideal being to consciousness. On it is based the tremendous importance of logical form in the conspective intuition of ideal relations of being. And, in truth, since purely stigmatic intuition of isolated essences does not occur without being incorporated into comprehended essential connections, it follows that all essential knowledge is based on logical apodicticity. The fact that this way of establishing a foundation fails in its simplest essential elements is not

a contradiction, which would have to make the whole chain of insights equivocal, but only a general expression of that relativity of all necessity to the first links of the chain, which remain contingent – as this relativity recurs in every sphere.

d) Apodictic Judgment and Epistemic Necessity

The relation to knowledge has thereby already come to light. The field of the logical is, in conformity with its structure, not a field of knowledge, but always factually bound to the connection of knowledge and not found outside it. Only *in abstracto*, for the sake of logical theory, can one detach it.

The logical connection of consequence performs a very particular function in knowledge. It is that form of aprioristic-conspective intuition that comprehends the particular under recognized laws. This form is precisely that of subsumption. The mode of comprehension is thereby always a comprehension of necessity. That a characteristic "**m**" necessarily belonging to **A** is always understood on the grounds of a supposed law. This belonging could not be grasped merely through **A**'s empirical way of givenness.

This is how it works in the geometrical "proof," as well as in the derivations of physics. The necessity that is grasped here may be absolutely one-sided, limited, or hypothetical. It cannot arise for the supposed laws (in the major premise) or for the appropriate understanding of the particular case (in the minor premise). It guarantees only the consistency of the connection of judgment as such. Logically it may, therefore, be an absolute necessity, but for knowledge it remains always a hypothetical necessity, i.e. it retains the form of an "if – then." Namely: "if" the premises are correct, "then" the conclusion is as well; in which case "being correct" means being true, thus meaning a being true to real, or at least ideal, being.

This may be generally formulated as: logical necessity, of itself alone, implies neither the comprehension of real necessity nor the comprehension of essential necessity; but it implies both, if the premises are true.

But this principle, together with its restriction, has a very different meaning for ideal knowledge and for real knowledge.

In ideal being, non-contradiction is already a sufficient indicator of essential actuality. If the contradiction in any readily apparent aspect of the content of knowledge makes itself directly felt, as a rule, ideal knowledge, along with its premises, can guarantee essential actuality. Under such circumstances, however, syllogistic certainty develops from a hypothetical into a categorical certainty. And logical necessity thereby also develops into an absolute necessity.

It then immediately implies the comprehension of essential necessity; namely, affirmative as well as negative.

Only the limits of the overview itself restrict it. However, these limits coincide with the whole field of operation of ideal knowledge. For this knowledge has gnoseologically also the form of conspective intuition.

The case is quite different with real knowledge. Here, the questionability of the supposed laws, as well as of the subsumed givenness, limit real implication. The former ultimately depend on the transcendent identity of the categories (of knowledge, and of the real); the latter depends on the accuracy of the empirical data. But beyond that still remains the reversibility of the relation of determination in knowledge. Founded and logically drawn "real conclusion" does not need real necessity in order to be valid; it can just as well run in the opposite direction and merely lead to certain "necessary" conditions of real necessity. An inference from the total knowledge of real conditions from the actual real necessity of a particular **A**, along with its individual here-and-now, is a great rarity, a borderline case that can only appear under particularly favorable – in truth, always only simplified – conditions.

Nevertheless, even this case is entirely possible, and is found in fields of knowledge with transparent real relations. One may, therefore, say: under certain conditions logical necessity implies real necessity – e.g. in the exact prediction of a particular natural event – but its importance for real knowledge is far from exhausted by this narrow delimitation. Rather, logical necessity is always at least leading up to the comprehension of real necessity, and through it indirectly to the comprehension of real actuality. And in this respect, we have in it a powerful means of orientation for knowledge of real connections.

The fact that it does not immediately indicate real necessity, but has freedom with regard to its direction of dependency, gives it the mobility that an orienting authority of knowledge must have. And thus, it turns out that even though the relation of implication is loosened from the logical relation to necessity of knowledge, in the field of the real, all knowledge of necessity still works with logical necessity, and comes to valid results indirectly through it.

This can also be paraphrased as follows: logical necessity in apodictic judgment does not directly imply the true comprehension of real necessity; but it always implies a comprehension of connections that, for their part, are based on real necessity. And it thereby indirectly leads, in the realm of real knowledge, to the comprehension of necessity. It is the natural gateway of knowledge to real necessity.

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