

Investigations into the Phenomenology of Knowledge



Hans Lipps

BERSERKER

BOOKS



FOREWORD

After completing the first part of this research, Heidegger's book "Being and Time" was published. Existential analysis gave me the means — not only in terms of terminology — to see many things more clearly than I would have been able to from my original perspective.

This second part was also printed with the help of the German Science Emergency Community. I would like to thank Prof. Misch once again for his advice and Miss M. von der Groeben for her help with the corrections.

Hans Lipps

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introductio n	
1. Language and speech	15
§ 2. The statement	31
§ 3. The assertion and the aog. quality of judgements	36
4. The predicative determination	41
§ 5. The existential judgement	49
6. The so-called quantity of judgements	67
7. The Law of Contradiction	78
8. Analytic judgements	83
9. The theorem of the excluded third	80
§ 10. The decidability of a question	98

Transcendental philosophy began with a reflection. It analysed the object as having arisen in its original synthesis. In the subsequent effect of Leibniz's conception of the monad, the world could only be found in its representation

. The concept of transcendent objects is a necessary consequence of this approximately estimated, conceptual included in the concept of representation. Objects have To prove themselves to and against each other, the nerve of intentionality lies in the competition between their theses. The question quid juris is no longer one prompted by the scepticism of the outset, but has become a question inherent in the conception of the transcendent object. The epistemological discussion here revolved around the solution to a task intended for cognition.

However, this concept of the transcendent object is derived. It is important to understand it. We did not emphasise here something like the primacy of the immediately accessible over the abstract nature of the object of knowledge. We showed how cognition itself is only a certain modality of what we could initially define as "dealing with things". (This did not restore empiricism. The empiricist begins with the experiences that are made. He theorises about the significance of their results. And in doing so, he skips over the task inherent in the concept of knowledge, just like his critics. It is significant that these critics mostly only encountered the scepticism with which empiricism ends. They reflected on the "meaning" of knowledge, i.e. on what one seemed to be able to grasp in the pretence of knowledge.)

Phenomenology breaks with the framework in which epistemology remains confined. The claim that knowledge

can be reduced to one — different — motive. First and foremost, it is on the basis of my being set in the world, first and foremost from the circumstances of my situation, that the kind of engagement with the world described in cognition can be made comprehensible, which, as it were, can only be read in its abbreviation as the intentionality of consciousness. However, what is immediately given no longer presents itself as the residue of methodological scepticism demanded by positivism in its exaggeration. The emphasis has been shifted, as it were. The actuality of what is fully grasped by consciousness means something different methodologically.

With this, however, the concept of aporia changes:

Dealing with things certainly presents aporias. However, these are not "ontological" problems, i.e. timeless problems for which no solution has yet been found. The "possibility" of something should not be understood, nor should "a contradiction be eliminated". Nor does it remain with the incomprehensibility of what has been constituted in an original synthesis. The aporia does not lie in the approach to this synthesis, which as a fact has outstripped its possibility.

The factual aspect, however, concerned the result of this synthesis, namely the "object" that represents itself as *ens praedicabile*. The concept, i.e. what it is, is reduced to a definiteness of representation. In its individuality, it has absorbed the unknown nature of the boundary condition of predicative synthesis. The individual is regarded here as the "actual" existing entity. However, only the imposed execution of the synthesis is read here as the "existence" of the object. "Being is not a real predicate." The so-called "existence" of the imagined must account for the reality whose horizon was lost in the conception of the transcendent object. The properties and characteristics of the thing are levelled to features of the object, whose concept includes identifiability. In order to find what the predicates in which the object presents itself denote or "are," it is necessary to

the decline in the circumstances that originally brought them together and led to their being "discovered" as something specific. This aspect of predicates is covered in the supposition as a predicate.

Colour, for example, is not one among other characteristics that are present in their complexion in the structure of an object at different points. It is precisely the "existence" of colour that can only be understood in conjunction with colour itself. For example, from the way colours are latent in the dark, but not disappeared ¹⁾. And again — colour exists first and foremost in my encounter with things. Unlike at the moment of its birth, it cannot be found as colour at all. It arises on the surface of the body that is seen. That is, where it has just reached its limit and has become manifest in quality as in another. Colour does not inhabit the body as its substance. But neither is it an impression. Nevertheless, one thing remains the same: things themselves are seen. This means that they are not only "seen" insofar as colour is the determination of an idea whose mere object is things. Rather, things are actually seen in seeing.

"umgrifffen". One recognises them only by "dealing" with them. Namely, on a certain side that is turned towards the "appearance" of things. Nothing other than this, like grasping something with one's hands, precedes the entanglement of my existence in the world. Originally, colours do not appear as "mere" colours. Seeing is, of course, subject to conditions. The senses are affected. But it is precisely through this connection to the concrete interaction with things that colours first acquire the cognitive validity indicated by sensory certainty. This is applied blindly, as it were, when one asks, for example, whether colours exist "objectively" or "subjectively". In doing so, one cannot escape the thetic, verifiable being of the object. One goes beyond the

t) See Part I, p. 83 ff.

original meaning under which the colours are seen — "seen" not only
in the
sense of being
displayed
"taken in", but also in the sense of their natural
as a quality).

With regard to that which has thus been detached from its place of origin and has become transcendent, only its objective correctness can be called into question, or a restrictive correction can be made, as in the

"sub(i) jective" . " i ektif and
'subjective' be-

However, they do not draw any direct connection here.

But what appears under this horizon, under the aspect of trans-
appears as subsequent preservation
— — whereby the preservation only expresses the methodical abandonment of original certainty — is, strictly speaking, a self-anticipation, insofar as one only anticipates something under certain conditions.

"take". Generally speaking, it is part of my existence that I have something in mind. When you ask questions, you have already taken things for granted in advance. Determinations have, in advance, modalities of questioning, which is already ontologically burdened as questioning. This "having in advance" does not mean a prerequisite or even any preconceived conviction. Being ahead of time meets the temporality of the one who is "already there" when he searches, carries, observes.

Existing means being located in the world. The things that belong to the world, that occur or exist, etc., do not exist in this relationship to the world, which we called "enclosure." One is with the things that

1) Sensory physiology deals with the "colours that are seen". There, they are referred to as sensations. However, their origin is not a process that can simply be analysed in terms of its "conditions". Physiologically or biologically, it is a matter of isolating certain causal or final relationships as a "situational pattern". It is arbitrary what is considered here to be the cause or the effect. Both are links in a self-referential pattern cycle. (Ygl. v. Weizsäcker, Über medizin. Anthropologie, Philos. Anzeigen II 1927, p. 263.) These "situational patterns" have no conditions of their own. That there is nothing here to explain is also admitted by the introduction of terms such as "tendency", "meaning" and the like.

"vor-handen", are present. The being-in-the-D a - e ie n is at the same time as it temporally, so that it is "perfect".

"Perfect" does not mean "past"; only inner worldliness could be past if it no longer exists. "Perfect" means the facticity of existence, insofar as the data is located in, but not belonging to, the world — it is "pointed" to this. The things, objects, etc. that one encounters are something that "concerns one" (). One engages with things. Determination remains a possibility insofar as it is only possible to determine under a design. The so-called intentionality of consciousness can be derived from this. It is only a means of making up for the separation of the object. The draft was retained in the process. The object is drafted, namely precisely with regard to the fact that it is trans-endent . Here, the subject is, as it were, lost in the representation of objectivity. The preliminary stage of the design appears here as the compulsion to then also assign the object.

1) Heidegger, I. c. Being and Time, 1927 p. 136 ff.

2) This reflexivity of the subject, born of the fact of entanglement, is something other than the reflexivity of the ego. "One" is there, deals with, etc. {Daa neuter "one" here merely faces a specific interpretation. Ea does not refer here — as it does in Heidegger I. c. p. 126 If. — the subject of everyday existence, i.e. the mode of being in which existence "first and foremost holds itself to be").

The carteianiache aum cannot be represented as the analytical consequence of the cogito. The modality of this "being" remains unclear in Descartes. He excels in that — unless he noticed the entanglement of existence — he linked "being" to an "I", since analytically from existing "Given", namely consciousness, was to be gained. The fatal flaw of the Cartesian approach lies more closely in its orientation towards methodical doubt. However, this is not, for the time being, a doubt that can only be raised on the basis of a dogmatic attitude and can only be resolved there, i.e. not philosophically. (cf. Lotze, Logik, p. 687 ff.) Descartes noted that, ultimately, no existence is concealed. Namely, as the existence of this or that, insofar as it cannot be transformed into anything else. And that is, of course, an possibility that cannot be eliminated. However, it cannot motivate an attitude that should be taken as doubt. Empirical certainty has its own inherent deficiency, which cannot be separated from dealing with things. Methodologically, too, there is no liberation from existence.

3) of. G.3fisch, preliminary report on vol. V of Dilthey, gea. Schr., 198k, p. LVIII.

However, the categorical modalities of questioning could only be read here as a "formal a priori". Namely, as something that was set with the "determination" of the object . This "determination" concerned as a predicate

subject that was presented. The "concept" was nothing more than a determination of representation.

Indesaen: Not just any so-called "similar characteristics" become the quasi-retroactive basis for the determination ala *E ieen uaw*. Rather, it is the type or material or a typical appearance, etc., that is determined and characterised. However, it is also the "basic colour" that is specifically different from others — and not some "conceptual content" — that one knows or does not know. In view of the colour mentioned in Item or the material mentioned in *One*, from which the nails in the wall are made, there is certainly no numerical identity. That would be asking too much. But here, too, one cannot get by with the mere mention of a "concept" in the usual sense of the word. That would be too little. Neither the object nor the so-called concept achieve here what was intended for them.

Btau n e n nt the colour, just as *Viren* names the material that "is". What both "are" in this sense cannot be split either on the side of the so-called object or on the other side of the so-called concept. Kind, substance, etc. are not the formal categories of any particularities in the sense of (objective) truths. They encounter the original, primary and actual approach of "determinations", which, of course, can no longer appear as "conceptual" determinations. The addition of "conceptual" betrays the derogatory use of the usual doctrine. Matter, type, etc. do not denote mere "categories," but rather that which things are questioned and addressed in relation to. In the process, they have been "taken" in some way in advance. The substance is "conceived"; the nature "occurs," and not only in the metaphorical sense, as if it were merely "realised" — as one might say of the concrete.

Truths. Only substances or species, for example, can be "discovered". "Property" refers to a particular aspect of something in which reference is made to something other than the substance itself. It is only as a result of this anticipated reference that something can be "examined" and "determined" at all.

"examined" and "determined". Every property is ultimately interpreted. However, every interpretation is a specific interpretation. Namely, it is determined by the meaning within the horizon of which it is carried out.

With substances, species, etc., as these modes of reality, in anticipation of which one questions and deals with things, but whose horizon is different in each case, it must necessarily remain so. There is no universal ontology. However, for the second, there is no ontology, but rather a philosophical discipline in which that which essentially precedes any treatment would have to be dealt with theoretically. The a priori cannot be gained analytically. It now appears as the flip side of the subsequent nature of any philosophical reflection. This has focused on

the explicit execution of certain

to limit oneself to what was originally intended, namely to concern oneself with the things for which the world has been designed. The restriction of my existence to the world then presents itself as aporetic

in the sense that it is necessary for the execution of the phæno-dealing with things. However, the restriction of my existence to the world then presents itself as aporetic in the sense that is decisive for the execution of the phenomenological approach: the effective motives for why and how one deals with things remain unexplained for the time being. "Motives" here does not refer to psychological motives. It means the "tendency" of an interpretation whose meaning only becomes comprehensible retrospectively as the purpose of its determination. Interpretation of the world does not initially refer to "knowledge". Its conception is linked to a particular direction of interpretation of my existence. In

t) This does not imply historical relativism. Only "theories about" human beings, for example, are "relative", i.e. subject to change over generations. Anthropology in this sense certainly has a history. It is a doctrine that one can be convinced of or that one can correct. However, "anthropology" as interpretation, as it is inserted into an original context of meaning, is something else.

Knowing or not knowing is, for example, the mode in which one "understands" oneself, here, for example, in one's position in relation to nature.

The a priori contained in anticipations is no longer bound to truth, unless the latter can be dispensed with by restricting my position. Namely, insofar as it derives its "meaning" from this. Certainty, security, correctness, etc. are the "turns of phrase" under which one originally encounters truth. The objectivity of Kant's synthesis can be described as neither truth nor correctness. It is derived from both. What was taken up by logic under the heading of "truth" could only be "paraphrased". One had started off on the wrong foot: Kant had indeed shown that the concept is not simply completed by existence. But with the approach of the transcendent object, the "concept" had been transformed into a praedicatum, and existence into a modality of what Kant called "judgement". ("The necessity of a judgement is the condition of its predicate.") Just as the correctness of an equation, i.e. this property of a relationship in which the numbers themselves are calculated against each other, had to appear to Kant as a modality of judgement. In the synthesis, the equation can only appear as the result of this operation. The transcendent, which is constituted in synthesis, coincides with that with which experience, calculation, etc., ends in each case. Judgement is thus subject to the question quid juris. The doctrine that it is the primary locus of truth conflicts with the other doctrine that it can only ascertain this truth from elsewhere, insofar as it has to prove itself.

¶ Kant's a priori is a concept for which, moreover, the digitality of knowledge remains decisive. However, the universal validity of knowledge is something that can only be achieved on the basis of a specific science. Kant answered a question here whose solution would have to be provided by this science and its methods. The conditions for the possibility of universally valid knowledge are — strictly speaking —

specific, e.g. physically realisable conditions. Even the so-called law of causality, for example, is a problem that has been wrongly annexed by philosophy.

It is difficult to explain what to make of this judgement. Is it a statement or an assertion, or is it actually a connection? None of these apply. For even as a synthesis, it only presented itself to Kant after analysis. From an epistemological perspective, the explanation required here also seems superfluous. However, in order to find and understand the copula of transcendental logic in its proper place, it is necessary to restore its original and varied meanings, which — insofar as they were determined by its transcendental function — could be indiscriminately subsumed under the schema of intentionality. Judgement is a different way of dealing with things than, for example, their examination in a statement. Correctness as a property of judgement is something different from what is grasped as "truth" in the words one utters.

§ 1. LANGUAGE AND SPEECH

1. It is said that words "express" something. However, words are "expression" in a specific sense, which is determined by the carrying capacity of the sound. This is because "language" initially refers to spoken language. Sign language is a figurative expression. It is true that gestures can be "eloquent" in terms of their expressiveness. Or they can be "persuasive" if they are forceful and compelling.

However, "speaking" and "eloquent" appear here as phrases that denote an intensification. Namely, an intensification beyond that in which the gesture remains stuck as a structure. For the structure — as certain as it reaches into what we call "language" — remains "silent" in a special sense. Nothing in it has "become audible." A structure must appear in the field of those who understand it; their gazes must be able to meet. Only what has been seen can be interpreted.

1) cf. Ammann, *Die menschliche Rede*, I, t 925, esp. p. 27 ff.

Certainly, buildings are not simply and solely "signs". To be designated means to be marked with a specific sign and thus to be identified as a result. Or: to be designated by someone, for example by being pointed at. Only in the former case is there such a thing as "meaning". The sign means something specific. Namely, as a mark or distinguishing feature. One "understands" its meaning. And this concerns the bearer of the sign. As a mark or distinguishing feature, something usually presents itself first and foremost in a specific form. Roseola, which is symptomatic of the second stage of typhus, is originally understood as an "appearance", i.e. as something in which something else is revealed. It "serves only" as a distinguishing mark. The situation is different, for example, with a signpost. Here, the sign is the reference to me, under which I encounter the signpost. One "takes it" as a signpost when one orientates oneself by it. One merely "understands" the direction it gives. The signpost "means to me that ..." in the sense that it gives me "to be understood". However, the sign, in the way it is designed, can also express something else. For example, the seal can express the irrevocable nature of a declaration, which is only "valid" because of this. That is the meaning of the seal. The seal is not merely a sign under which something else that already exists¹⁾ is simply made understandable.

There are gestures that merely indicate; here, the implication is understood. The gesture is taken under the horizon of a more comprehensive consideration. The building is something that one "notices" in the field of experience. Only because it is set in certain contexts does it "mean something to me". Namely, insofar as it directs my gaze to something. Such a

1) The difference highlighted here is not about conventional or unconventional. The seal, for example, is also conventional. Namely, both in terms of what it expresses and in terms of its design.

A gesture is an expression of the intention directed at me to draw my attention to something that can be found in reality. However, the gesture does not "mean" anything here. It has no "meaning" in the sense that, for example, the nod of the head means agreement. Namely, agreement.

"b e s a g t". Consent is not only expressed in the sense of, for example, the twisting of the corners of the mouth „Expression" of displeasure i9t. The twisting of the corners of the mouth merely indicates something ; the displeasure is evident in it and is noticeable in the building. But this building means nothing here. Not even if I deliberately let my displeasure show through these features. By twisting the corners of my mouth, I can deceive someone about my position on something. The gesture can be insincere. But I would not be lying. Because lies are only possible on the basis of immediate perception. But "interpreting something" is a way of engaging with something. You cannot defend yourself against a lie in the same way as you can against deception, where I am the object of deception.

However, the nod of the head is not just "interpreted" by me as agreement. My interpretation could be right or wrong. Rather, the nod of the head has a meaning. One understands what is "meant". This understanding does not refer — as in the case of facial expressions — to what is comprehended and then addressed as something specific, such as "pursing one's lips over ...". The nod of the head is not a "structure" at all, die als A u s d r u c k, sondern eine "Gesture", whose meaning is understood.

"To be an expression", "to mean something to me" (in the sense of conveying something to me), "to have a meaning" each denote a different and specific "turn of phrase" under which the so-called gesture is understood. (However, the possibility of such a general term as "gesture" arises first and foremost in relation to other meanings. These are not "original" in the sense that they are used to refer to something as a gesture or a facial expression, etc.
.)

However, the meaning of a gesture — *ao sicher ala* the gesture has this meaning and is not just given meaning by the gesture — is not yet "meaning" in the sense of a word meaning. The term "to mean" allows the phrase:

"a gesture means lediglich the agreement that the word *i•E-B.* " is".

The meaning of the word */a* is *aeine* meaning. The means: The word *ha* does not have only one meaning. And from one side of the meaning: The meaning is not only associated with the word.

"connected". The meaning of a gesture had to be specified. E.g. as "approval". We know what is "meant" by the gesture. However, the meaning of a word is not at all simple and straightforward to "specify". The meaning of a word can only be grasped by using it. One grasps it, for example, by checking how the word "fits" what one means. Or also in the change that the meaning undergoes when one tries to translate the word (1). For it is the "substance" of this word. One hears what is said. One hears the words. The sound is free from the physicality that burdens the gesture. Speaking is not "shaping". The fleeting sound can only be imprinted, and it is only "determined" by what "lies within it". Through the

t) "The intention and the ability to convey meaning, not in general, but specifically through the representation of a thought, is what alone constitutes the articulated sound, and nothing else can be specified to denote its difference from the *thier achen T es ch rei* on the one hand and the *ma i kali B ch en Ton* on the other. It cannot be described in terms of its nature, but only in terms of its production, and this is not due to a lack of ability on our part, but characterises it in its unique nature, since it is not a deliberate process of the soul to produce it, and contains only so much body *th als dia* external perception cannot do without it." (W. v. Humboldt, *Über die Verschiedenheit deß menschlichen Sprachbaue*, 1836 p. 65/6.)

2) See Part I, p. 80: The decisive quality of meaning that arises does not extend into the reality of the body, which, on the other hand, has become visible or audible precisely in its reality. The birth of quality can be understood — as Goethe attempted to do in his theory of colours — but in principle it is impossible to say what colour and tone actually are (or have become). Certainly

However, in the form of its articulation, the word presents itself as part of a language. For "language" is a specific language. The meaning of a word is embedded in the structure determined by the "inner language form".

The meaning of a word is something that one has in mind. One "has" it, provided that it is "captured" in the word. One knows what, for example, "is". As an "expression", one word can mean the same thing as another. Expression here means how it is (usually) used. It often takes a special turn of phrase to pin down what a word "actually" means, i.e. in itself, as it were. For what is contained in the word tends to solidify its "lexical" meaning. However, the fact that its meaning solidifies does not make the word a "term".

A word is a term when it designates a concept that is merely associated with the word as its sign. Concepts can be outlined by characteristics or defined outright, as is the case with mathematical concepts. "Concept" here does not mean: subsumption concept. The concept of the ellipse is not general in the sense that the subsumption concept is, according to its correlation to the individual, because it is "set".

"Object" is. The definition as an ellipse presents itself, apart from what an ellipse is, only as "having the value of an ellipse"¹⁾). The concept, which is only associated with the word, and which could just as well be symbolised differently

is rejected as such. But this, what has been elicited here as a fate — how this is in its unbrokenness, i.e. in its self-containedness — it makes no sense to ask about it. The sound of the clinking glass, which so clearly reveals the material structure of the glass, more specifically its brittleness, is, in terms of quality, precisely the latter.

1.) Humboldt, 1. c. p. 55.

2.) What is said is "clear" in this respect. It is nothing other than "Exact." For something can only be proven to be exact through comparison. An expression, for example, could be exact if it refers to something specific, namely something certain. But clarity is not a relative property. One seeks and treats the clear aspect of a thing as its own aspect. For something is taken as an "aspect" insofar as it contains an indication of something else.

3.) Cf. Part I p. 101.

could be, cannot appear from the outset as an intention that would be fulfilled in conjunction with the word.

A distinction must be made between the lexical meaning of a word and its meaning. The same "phrase" can have a different meaning. The phrase reveals one aspect of the meaning itself. However, the meaning is first and foremost given to the word or phrase in question. The meaning is what is "meant" by the word in each case. "Meant" here is not the same as

"designated". Because being designated can only be understood "passively". But what I "mean" with a word is not only placed in a relationship to me that is originally foreign to it. What is meant is what I mean. And in this respect, the word or phrase is used "in a specific sense".

2. 2fisen means something, sofern this word means something. However, the meaning of a word does not simply stand alone as a meaning alongside that of another word. "Meaning" rather refers to something that is inseparable from the word insofar as only the meaning of this word can be compared with that of another word.

t) See J. Stenzel, *Being, Meaning, Concept, Definition.* (Jb. f. **Philolog. I, '925, p. 160 ff.**)

2) See Leo Weisgerber (*Die Bedeutungslehre, — Ein Irrweg der Sprachwissenschaft?* in "Germanisch-Roman. Monatsschr." XV., 4925, p. 16t ff.) "... A word is an inseparable combination of a phonetic and a semantic part, based on the function of the symbol. The meaning of a word — yes, that is what it is, what it is not, at least not in the usual sense. There are meanings in a word, namely as a function of its phonetic part; 'meaning' always proceeds from the phonetic, the signifier, and 'signifies' the content part insofar as it relates to the phonetic part as its sign. (p. 470) Weisgerber replaces the study of meaning with the study of concepts. However, insofar as he remains in the position that human language "cannot objectively grasp and designate things, but can only form them conceptually and process them in this or that context" (p. 178), he necessarily misses the crucial point here: namely, that what is addressed is what something actually "is," and that the modalities of this being become most tangible precisely in the meaningful substance of the vocabulary.

However, words differ in their meaning according to their substance. Namely, insofar as, for example, only some refer to something. This substance is called green, and this colour is called *hfnu*. On the other hand, *piece* or *dust* are not such names. With other words, it is doubtful. For example, with *rainbow*. A word such as *Pjord* was originally (*Ichi — red*) not yet a name. For it is primarily this meaningful substance of a word that is affected by the so-called change in meaning.

Depending on the meaning of a word in the sense just discussed, the nature of its characteristic function changes. As *Piren*, *hJau* was something "be s t i m nr t". Green indicates the nature of something. *Dust* has no such definitive meaning, and *rope* is merely a provisional indication that can only designate something by expressly renouncing any characteristic, simply by adhering to the random fate of the body in its formlessness[^]). Things are categorically "addressed" differently depending on the meaningful substance of a word^d).

That which is primarily fixed in a name cannot be specified in any other way than by the name. It cannot be designated like an object. We said: The species would be determined if I labelled something as *Z.tiven*. Certainly, "this animal" is called that. But "this animal" is neither the species nor its specimen. Only the species this individual is labelled. The species of this individual is that which is addressed and, in this respect, "taken", which

^{t)} See Part I, p. 25.

²⁾ See *hiemu Joannis Duns Scoti Doct. subtilia 0. F. M. Grammaticae speculativae nova editio cura et studio R. P. Mariani Fernandez Oarcia. Quaracchi t 9t0*. Duns Scotus assigns a modus ossendi to each modus significandi. "Oportet omnem modum significandi activum ab aliqua rei proprietate radicaliter oriri ..." intellectua .. ad actum determinatum non vadit, nisi aliunde determinetur ... Cuilibet modo significandi activo correspondit aliqua proprietas rei seu modus eaenendi rei (§ 6). This *propriae rei* is supplemented by *prout ab intellectu apprehenda*. And it is said of the *ratio significandi* that it is determined by the modus *intelligendi*. (See also M. Heidegger, *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duos Scotus* t9t6.)

but also insofar as it is not intentional in the sense that an object can be "meant" to be identifiable.

In the word, the object is "determined" insofar as the word defines the context in which it is used and to which it refers. In language, one does not only learn the words for something that is "given" and already known. Vocabulary primarily enables one to grasp things. When I learn the name of a colour, for example, the name does not merely capture a certain sensory content, as in a sign, or make this meaningful impression reproducible at will. The concept of *red* is not gained by abstracting common features from different "colours" (seen on different occasions). The word *red* is neither such a "concept" gained from somewhere nor a

"Intention of meaning" connected, which could be fulfilled in a "red moment appearing on the object". The meaning of *red* cannot be "fulfilled" in this simple deictic way at all, but can only be interpreted^o). Only by first understanding this word as a name can one learn what *red* is. The "meanings" are not something inserted in between. The words "mean". But that means: The

t) H. Pleaner (Die Einheit der Sinne [The Unity of the Senses], 1923, p. 453) speaks of the "eyntagmatic limitation" of the object through its vocabulary meaning.

2) "For no kind of representation can be regarded as merely the reception of an already existing object. The activity of the senses must be synthetically combined with the inner action of the mind, and from this combination the representation breaks free, becomes an object in relation to the subjective power, and returns to it as such, calling forth new perceptions. Here, however, language is indispensable. For when the intellectual striving breaks through the lips, the product of that striving returns to the ear. The idea is thus transferred into real objectivity without being deprived of its subjectivity. Only language can do this; and without it, where language is involved, even tacitly, the transfer to objectivity returning to the object is the formation of the concept, and thus all true thinking, impossible." (Humboldt, 1. c. pp. 52/53.)

Words are names, etc. One must refer to the immanent character of their reference to something in order to find what is taken possession of in them, namely what is encountered in the name. Things are "interpreted." They are addressed as something. This pre-predicative articulation takes place under the guidance of the draft, in which the things one is dealing with are questioned. The concept of meaning includes the self-advancement of the one who addresses it to something. In doing so, he "recognises" it. Only within a horizon defined by anticipations can something be recognised.

It is not the object that is determined as this or that, namely a *n* ges pro c he n, as, on the other hand, it can only be the so-called object that is predicatively "determined". The "type" is not something "general" that occurs here and there, but rather the anticipated approach to the determination contained in *Lii 'e*. Insofar as this determination is "specific" in a particular sense, *Zfee* is a name. The determination is modified as a determination in-eina with the approach of the determination. The common ending *dar* (*ler*) in the Indo-European kinship terms (*pitär, mötär, bhrktar ...*, *pater, mater, frater ...*) appears to be a diminutive suffix, insofar as it groups *pitär, mötär*, etc. into one class. However, the relationship is also the point of view here and not the result of the comparison ⁽¹⁾). As a classifying determination of the words, something appears here that was omitted or placed before in the individual determination. In the Melanesian languages, special prefixes are used for things that are characterised by an elongated or round shape. In this, there is no

1) "To call dead" — in the current sense of calling, which presupposes the underlying view of the named — and to recognise as red are, in essence, identical expressions. (Husaerl, Log. Unters., Vol. II, Part 2, 2nd ed., 4924, p. 28.)

2) Heidegger, I. c. t51.

3) See, in contrast, E. Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Part II: Language, 1923, p. 262 II. And for criticism, see P. Matthew, "Language Forms, Word and Meaning Categories, and Concepts," Halle 4 925, p. 90.

only one particular aspect of the comparison. The round and elongated shapes are not merely characteristics here. The entire "view" of things is changed. What is special lies in the twist with which something is treated here as a "thing").

The individual remains trapped in the *Banu deøsen*, which is contained in the vocabulary of his language as "understood". "Se in e" language, i.e. the specific common language in which he grew up. From this, he understands "things". The experiences they have are guided by what they "know". They are not something that starts with impressions, the processing of which would be their achievement.

Therefore, it is not possible, for example, to develop a "sense of colour" or a "development of the judgement

1) See also the manual concepts of the Zühi Indians described by F. H. Gushing. (Cited in Levy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, 1922, p. 178 ff.)

2) See also the analysis by A. Gelb and K. Goldstein of a case of partial colour name amnesia () from (Psychological Forum VI, p. 4925, 127-186). — During testing with the anomaloscope, the patient examined here behaved as if he had perfect colour vision. However, he was unable to correctly name the colours shown to him. On the other hand, he was extremely successful in selecting the shade of any given contrasting colour from a pile of colours presented to him. In doing so, he behaved more concretely than normal individuals. If none of the colours presented matched the object for the patient, he did not choose any. He never chose a colour that matched the object only insofar as it belonged to the same category as the colour tone of the object. In the Itolmgreen sorting test, too, he was "unlike normal people ... only satisfied with a selection when he had objectively identified similar colours". He carelessly ignored colours that were similar in their basic tone. He could only accept them on the basis of the specific similarity he experienced in each case. He never reached for colours that belonged to the same "basic colour". The patient was in his "conceptual" or "categorical" behaviour. The colour names repeated by the patient had lost "what normally belongs to them and what makes them suitable for use in connection with categorical behaviour ... If we understand the meaning of language in this sense, then we can hardly say that speech impairment causes impairment of categorical behaviour, because the sounds in their significant meaning, all signs of concepts, that they do not have anything else to do but to be able to take on categorical behaviour. Categorical behaviour and having language in its significant meaning are the expression of one and the same basic behaviour."

vermögens^o) in regard to colours, based on the fact that in earlier stages of a language, colour names often remain "indefinite". The so-called differences are not something that can simply be found. Rather, they do not exist between mere "contents," but rather, in order to be perceived as a difference at all and not merely as a mere diversity, they presuppose a certain conception of that which, according to the usual theory of abstraction, results precisely from the perception of a distinguishing feature. "While we apply a term such as grey to objects of all kinds, and with slight modifications, light grey and *dark grey* to all shades of grey, Lithuanian has four or five simple words with very specific meanings instead of our grey. Rest-

We find something similar in Latin and German: Lat. *canē*, German *blond* are colour terms that are almost exclusively limited to a very specific area of application, namely hair colour. For us, green is a colour that can be realised in a more or less muted form, or with various shades. The

Greek language has *zw̄os* i.e. *x̄st̄rōq* and *cpāāv̄oz* bEw.

@nuzōq and zuūvcoq have words for this or that shade of green or blue, but these different nuances are not seen as shades of the same "basic" colour. That one but the lack of certain our colour-

t) A. Marty: The question of the historical development of colour perception 4879, p. 63. — Marty goes on to remind us that "naming is not a completely reliable indicator of classification. Language did not arise from an endeavour to symbolise solitary thought through a parallel system of individual signs. On language formation led merely to the desire for communication, and therefore the means of expression were only as far as necessary an accurate reflection of thoughts, as the purpose of communication inevitably demanded. — However, it is not the purpose of communication that makes it sufficient to use one expression for something that is actually different. Vocabulary is not such a "means of expression" at all. Rather, it is precisely the place where something is stored as defined and understood.

2) Leo T'iegerber, Das Problem der inneren Sprachform (German.-roman. Monatsschr. XIV t 926, p. 244 ff.); see also Ammann, Die menschliche Rede I, t 925, p. t29.

The fact that one might even be tempted to interpret expressions in other language communities as colour blindness only demonstrates the bias of supposedly "objectively scientific" terms and explanations in our linguistic knowledge.

3. Grammarians distinguish between proper nouns and common nouns, and probably also between adjectival nouns, etc. However, proper nouns and common nouns are initially distinguished by their semantic substance. This is because the use of proper names is also linked to a specific concept. A proper noun is a noun pro pridictum insofar as it has a bearer to whom it is given as a name. That which can be given a proper name has a special "meaning". The designation of an animal as

/efir feo refers to a special turn of phrase that is used to describe what is otherwise simply called a Litten; /efis feo refers, for example — and this is also expressed in the binary form of this name — to the relationship between this and other animals^o). Grammarians, of course, give a different distinction between proper nouns and common nouns. Namely, that a common noun is a general name, while a proper noun refers to something "entirely individual"). Words such as viruses, lion, etc. are by no means general in the sense that their "meaning" is general. This name is only general in terms of its use. Something only falls under 2finen insofar as it is "made of iron", but not because it falls under a word with the same meaning.

1) Weisgerber, 1. c. p. 253.

2) See Part I p. 3t.

3) Dunß Scotuß, for example, provides the following explanations: "Modus significandi per modum communis eum mitura proprietate rei, quae est proprietatē dī e i - bilis i n plur a a u p p osi t a , vel communicabilis pluribue suppositis, a qua proprietate, aecundum Logicum, sumitur intentio univere realis ; et hie modue conatituit nomen c o mmu n e et a p p el la t i v u m." {1. e. § 28.) "Modus significandi per modum a p p ro p ri a t i Bumitur a proprietate rei, quae ebt proprietatē i n d i vi sib i li a p e r pl u ra s u p p os ita , a quo etiam sumitur apud Logicum intentio i n d i ri dia ti o ni s; et hie modus facit nomen p ro p ri u m." (1. c. § 29.)

"Begriff" subsumed become can. Chain Neo iat just as general as Läive.

The noun *adjectivum* is defined by F. Haase¹⁾ as "a completely natural progression of the concept" from the noun *appellativum* in that the number of characteristics has been reduced to one characteristic. As a noun *adjectivum*, also, for example, is

When red is considered from the outset in relation to a red object, it is understood as a predicate. And this is only a consequence of the doctrine that the meaning of a word is a "concept" derived from somewhere, for example through abstraction. However, language preserves the original "concepts" in the meanings of words. And "original" here does not mean — genetically — primitive, but rather the opposite of the

"concept" as it is used in logic, i.e. predicate.

The difference in meaning between a noun *appellativum* and a noun *properum* can only be explained by the substance of the meaning, but not by the reference of the words to "objects".

However, the "adjective" is not characterised by its "meaning" at all, but, like the noun, for example, as a means of expression.

The use of a proper noun in speech adheres to a "meaning". Just because Little is a name, it can be made into a noun by adding "the". As an adjective, a word is only characterised by its function in speech from the outset. With a grammatical part of speech such as the adjective, the question of the "meaning" that a word has as an adjective only arises in the sense that one demands an explanation of what an adjective "should" do. In the adjective, something else is "attributed" to it.

1) F. Hase, Lectures on Latin Linguistics, published by F. A. Eckstein, Vol. I, 1874, p. 52.

2) The term *Nomen appellativum* stands here for *dm*, which is not *Nomen proprium*. For the meaningless variations within the word class designated by grammarians as *Nomen appellativum*, see above p. 20/4.

Duns Scotus explains: *Modus significandi per modum a dia - ce n t ie sumitur a proprietate rei, quae est proprietas a lte ri a d-haere n tia ae c u n du m es se* (§ 32). And if one translates *Adjetic-tivum* as "property word", one means the same thing. Namely, that the adjective denotes a property in the sense that words with adjectival endings "signify" properties.

"are". However, adding an adjective only serves to identify, define and describe them in more detail. Certainly, *the blue hyacinth there* would be an inappropriate designation if the hyacinth were not blue, i.e. blue-flowered. But the addition of "blue" is motivated by the intention of the speech. A characteristic of this hyacinth, which as a hyacinth would only be described in its own way, i.e. not sufficiently, is added to identify it as the 8th hyacinth among the others. The adjective does not simply "determine", but adds a determination. The grammatical construction "*the blue hyacinth*" is an "expression" in the sense of a term used here to designate the expression; however, it is not an "appropriate" expression in the sense that what is given here has, as it were, "come to the fore" on its own. In speech, words are related to each other in this way. Namely, insofar as it refers to something whose understanding requires the designation of this particular hyacinth.

The adjectival form is something that a word acquires. It does not describe the aspect according to which the word is used, what the word "means".

4. "For the strong and therefore primary verb *s_R rechen iat* ... it is certain that it is based on a root that imitates a sound; *speech*, on the other hand, is an early borrowing from Latin *ratio*, (according to Kluge) "with the participation of a similar-sounding and related Germanic root"). The rationale lies in the understanding of speech. What one wants to say must be made audible. The words are emphasised by suggestive

i) Ammann, l. c. p. 38.

Speech is supported by grammar. Vocabulary and phrases are the ready-made inventory that speech draws on to express itself. Grammatical constructions are its means*). The genitive, for example, establishes a relationship that can only be grasped in speech. What a particular word means in the genitive — whether a particular genitive expression is a genitivus objectivus or genitivus possessivus in the language of grammarians — necessarily remains "to be guessed". Speech makes references depending on the circumstances*). What speech refers to is drawn out in the statement. The "statement" refers to only one aspect of speech — it is what one adheres to, for example, or what can be checked for accuracy.

One talks about something. But one does not express oneself about it. Namely, to someone else. But this person too — insofar as he listens to me or pays attention to me —

t) Principle of efficient construction, i.e. duplex, scil. : extrinseque et intrinseque. Intrinseque sunt modi significandi respectivi, ratione quorum vel unum conattractibile eat ad alterum dependens vel alterius dependentiam determinans ... ; And these modes of signification are said to effect construction insofar as they prepare and dispose the constructibles for actual union, which is done through the intellect ... But the principle that is effective externally is the intellect, which unites the constructibles, arranged and prepared by the modes of signification, in actual union and in the mind... And it is said that the principle is extrinsecum, as if it were extra constructabilia mane. (Duns Scotus, I. c. § 187.)

2) The grammatical function of the Indo-European verb is determined by the fact that the Indo-European verb is, in the strict sense, a word of time. This is not because what is expressed verbally refers to "time" as something that passes, etc., whereby one forms a certain " idea of both: of the "Time" is not so much what one calls a "passing process." Rather, it is precisely the opposite. In "mode of action," "tempo," etc., the very turns of phrase in which "time" originally encounters us become tangible. One finds it originally as "temporality," namely as a specific relation, e.g., as a "stage" of time, etc. (cf. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 349). However, the meaning of a verb is that upon which its nominal form is based. What "runs" is now indefinable in the same sense as "the (specific) animal" that Löue's "means", only as something that somehow "means" something at all, could be found according to its category. What is in foii/en g e t ro If en cannot be expressed by a general term such as "process" or "activity" . For the general and "abstract" concept, because it is applied retrospectively, under which this and that can be taken as a process, does not have the specific and anticipated meaning to which it originally referred and which is captured in the word's meaning.

When you hear or simply perceive what I am saying to you, —, is not merely open to and attentive to what can be gleaned "objectively" from my statement. One says, for example, *ohpteicfi, namely, iinf uaw*. The reservation that lies in *although* does not belong to what the speech refers to, but is something that is done in relation to saying something. *And* it does not establish a connection, but rather connects *).

In speech, one "expresses oneself" about something. Words and phrases are expressions in the sense of means of expression that one resorts to. The grammatical construction is subject to the réXoq of what one wants to say. "Sentence" refers to a grammatical structure; it matters little whether it can only be guessed what is related to each other and how one is connected to the other. However, the grammatical categories or word classes do not exist as a fixed system. In the process determined by the internal structure of language, they are first brought forth by each other. Of course, there is such a thing as the genitive as a specific grammatical form in

t) Reinach, Zur Theorie dea negativen Urteils (Ges. Schr. t92t p. 10t/02).

2) "The Chinese language requires all words in a state in which, apart from any grammatical relationship, they express only the concept of their meaning; even in speech, they all stand, like Sanskrit root words, in *ßtatu absoluto*.

The Chinese language presents the peculiar phenomenon of acquiring, through the mere renunciation of a feature common to all languages, an advantage that is not found in any other language. By renouncing much of what expression adds, it emphasises the thought more strongly and possesses a unique ability to string concepts together in such a way that their similarities and contrasts are not merely perceived, as in other languages, but touch the mind with a new power, as if forcing it to surrender to the pure contemplation of their relationships. This gives rise, even independently of the content of the speech, to a purely intellectual pleasure unknown to other languages, arising solely from the form and arrangement of the concepts, which is brought about above all by the boldness of placing expressions denoting purely meaningful, independent concepts next to each other in surprising isolation, and removing all those that are meaningless in themselves and only denote arrangement and connection." (W. v. Humboldt, On the Grammatical Structure of the Chinese Language 4826, Collected Writings V, p. 309ff.)

different languages; the "genitive case" is the same in all of them. There is also a system of cases in which the genitive case belongs. However, there is no system of grammatical forms or word classes that is binding on all languages. In Malay, conjugations and declensions are mixed together, and alongside the distinctly "nominal" type of Japanese, there is the "verbal" type of Mexican, where the verb forms the general pattern of sentence construction. But not only is a "general" grammar impossible — as grammar, it could not from the outset be the doctrine of forms and connections of "ideal meanings". For the sentence is not something that can be detached from speech and regarded as something 'can be considered 'in itself').

§ 2. THE STATEMENT¹⁾

The meaning of a statement is not a context of meaning that claims something like "validity." Rather, "meaning" is the result of an articulated engagement with the world in which one is entangled as an existing being. "What one says" does not have meaning in the sense that e8 here understands "intentions."

1) Husserl speaks of the idea of a general and, more specifically, an a priori grammar (Logical Investigations I I, p. 295). "Within pure logic, the pure theory of forms of meaning stands out as a ... separate and fundamental sphere. Viewed from the standpoint of grammar, it lays bare an ideal framework, ^{since}every tactical language, following partly general human and partly randomly changing empirical motives, in various weiae with empirical material, lined and covered"

(l. c. 338). However, the "changing motifs" that can be grasped in the variations of linguistic structure are precisely the actual a priori, which, of course, cannot be presented analytically as something universally binding, but only hermeneutically. But that on which the object of pure morphology is demonstrated by meanings, the "differences between universality and particularity on the one hand, singularity on the other, the syntaxes of plurality, negation, modalities, etc." (l. c. p. 339) is either — like plural syntax, for example — something that merely occurs generally, or it does not belong in speech at all, such as particularity and universality. (Particularity and universality are statements based on a judgement. However, judgement is an operation that precedes the statement. (See the later explanations on p. 66ff.)

that one encounters when following existing circumstances. Rather, insofar as the words express something "that one means". The "intention" of "what one means" lies in "what one would say". Insofar as one expresses oneself in words, what one says has a specific meaning.

One perceives something when one hears the words. Namely, a message, a question, a request, for example. In speech, not only is what exists itself expressed or "shown" as it is at present and as it is encountered, as is the case, for example, when someone e.g. **examines** a piece of wood: ... sir troc/ten'), or how Matthias Claudius merely "speaks" of the evening. In communication, questions, etc., "expression" is something whose clarity must be achieved in the sense that the speech is addressed to someone. What one perceives when one hears the words is nothing that can be found before or outside of the speech. In the case of a request, for example, one says "what one wants". This is not a pre-existing "want" related to anything. Rather, it is something that one "wants from someone" and which is "expressed" in the request insofar as it is expressed as a request. The request is an expression of oneself. The words "I *will* be able to do it" can be understood in different ways: for example, as a mere statement, or as "explaining oneself about" or as a "promise". The way in which the other person is addressed varies. However, the term "statement" was inaccurate in this context. It is

1) Heidegger, 1st ed. p. 157.

2) The right-wing philosophical theory of the promise is under the spell here of wanting to show what is "present" in the promise, what it refers to as an "expression". In doing so, it fell back on the intention of the promisor. However, communicating this intention could only give rise to some kind of moral obligation in general terms (and by no means necessarily to the obligation to stick to the intention). Namely, that an intention that has become known has become socially effective. In contrast, (Die a prior. Grundlagen der bürgerl. Rechts, 1. c. p. 174) correctly emphasised that a promise is a special act. However, he defined this **special nature** in more detail as a connection created by the promise. Namely, towards the other person, who in this respect acquires a claim. However, entitlement and obligation are something that can only be derived from the promise in certain cases. Namely, when it is a matter of a promise. With regard to the promise itself, there is only "keeping one's word" or "not keeping one's word".

Considering that we only speak of "a communication" when we want to refer to a label for what is actually meant and emphasise only the result of taking note of it. However, one either perceives a report, or a message, or a narrative, etc. What one perceives in this way is something different from what one learns through the report, etc., or what one receives as communication in this way. One expresses oneself about something. Namely in the form of a narrative, a message, etc. The term "statement" would again be inappropriate here. For "statement" refers only to the aspect of my expression that is pointed out in it. In this respect, the statement is what is true or not.

The Aristotelian term *kd2oq äzo\$nvcixdc* refers to the statement. "Echt
éköq nzxq {ixv *rr*} {invuzdc, o6y äq 6p2xvov té,

s6y{ Idyoc [clv, 611' oiiic 61g4{c oürç }eu6{c.'). Bolzano replied: "A question . . . certainly says nothing about what it is asking about; but it nevertheless says something: namely, our desire to receive instruction about the subject we are inquiring about. For this very reason, it can be both true and false⁴)." However, the fact that, by asking a question, one expresses what one wants to know from the other person does not in itself constitute an answer. Nor is the question an expression.

"true" or not. One expresses what one wants from the other person or, in the case of a report, for example, what "one wants to say to them". In both cases, the so-called expression is nothing more than a means of communication. "Being expressed" does not mean here, as in the case of a statement, the articulation of "something given",

"as it is in itself" or "as it appears."

4) *de interpretatione* t7a, II.

2) *Wissenachaf tslehre* Vol. I, t 837, p. 88.

3) See the sixth investigation in Husserl's *Logical Investigations* II, Part 2, in particular §§ 68-70. Husserl objects to the equal ranking of questions etc. with statements insofar as questions etc. entail

"The kōc reveals something (*QatvzaBai J*, namely that which is being discussed, specifically for the speaker (medium) or for those engaged in conversation. Speech "reveals" äzö ... from the very thing that is being talked about ^{1*)}). It only becomes accessible once it has been articulated and addressed. Namely in the best possible way; there is only this or that language here. However, the structured word structure is something that can only be understood via - can be set. Two statements that can be translated into each other have "the same" meaning only insofar as the meaning is contained in them; they only "mean" the same thing. But not in relation to what is said in both cases, as if the same "sentence" were simply "expressed" in different languages. The possibility of translation in no way demonstrates such an identity, but rather the casualness in the use of this term. Translation from one language to another is not a mere change of linguistic "expression".

In the statement, being is "e rs e h Ioa se n°²). In the way it is interpreted, it has become accessible in it. When hearing the statement, one is "brought before being itself"^{3*)}). However, "(being) as it is" does not explain the truth of the statement in the sense that a definition establishes a term. Being is "true" in and of itself, and only insofar as it is "somehow" or "as it is." What is shown, or was shown, is "true." And the statement is understood as "what is said."

Bolzano speaks of "truths" in the sense of true "statements in themselves". That "true" is only what is interpreted and applied

speaking the facts. In doing so, questions, requests, etc. are applied to something that exists, which, if it has found expression, is perceived and named. Speech can only be said to have a "communicative function" in this context. The "significative" expression merely replaces the "view" through which one would be placed directly in front of the existing given. Requests, questions, etc., however, are precisely what one expresses oneself in. And: the fact that something comes to the fore in the statement is something other than being "intentionally designated".

^{1*)} Heidegger, 1. e. p. 32.

^{2*)} Cf. Part I, p. 29 and above p. t 8. ^{3*)} Term coined by Heidegger.

spoken Yerwahrte has been reversed here in such a way that the "Determination" is a function taken over from the "sentence". Here, truthfulness becomes a pretence of the sentence, insofar as it represents what exists. It must therefore be "accurate". Bolzano explains, for example, that sentences such as "it is snowing, in this place #cJineit e#*)" — It is snowing now **and** here. However, these additions require the addition of such a time (and often also place) specification in order to be true. ?feufe, *in this place #cJineit e#**.) — It is snowing now and here. However, these additions are in the sense of the speech. They do not complete a "sentence in itself", as Bolzano demands, in order to ascertain its truth. Moreover, the words *here* and */ etsf* do not represent an "objective" localisation and dating. There is something processed in them ; Over and *i elzt* are separated from the circumstance of my existence, the interpretation of which is incorporated into my speech^o). Through *here* and *jetzt*, something is made clear in the speech. One makes such statements for the other person. These However, statements do not need to be objectively fixed. The criterion for the clarity of a designation is considered first and foremost on the basis of coexistence in a field of "relevant" things, objects, etc. Bolzano objects to his "statements" being taken as entities. However, the statements are also not formulations that exceed Bolzano's demand for clarity in their determinacy*).

t) Bolzano, I. c. p. 113.

2) Cf. Part I, p. 60 ff.

3) The correctness of a judgement also does not require a clear definition of the subject matter of the judgement. Or rather: this requirement is only imposed and fulfilled insofar as the procedure of the judgement itself depends on it. For in a "judgement" one operates with these "subjects". For the other person to whom the judgement is addressed — namely, its result — the object must be designated by the judgement. The requirement for unambiguous designation is derived neither from the truth of the statement nor from the correctness of the judgement, but only from the comprehensibility of the speech.

Instead of supplementing the alleged vagueness of "it is snowing," others attempted to legitimise this vagueness by interpreting interpreting "it is snowing" as a particular judgement. (See Part I, p. 63 ff.) However, the possibility of such an interpretation lies in the wake of the same

The completion of a statement is determined by the horizon of what is expressed in it and, secondly, by the meaning from which the speech is "turned". It is not "imprecise".

§ 3. THE MAIN POINT AND THE SO-CALLED QUALITY OF JUDGEMENTS

What is said is either true or not true – one is inclined to speak of "assertions" here without further ado.

However, in the case of a cry of alarm, something has certainly been said that can be contradicted. And one certainly does not contradict the warning referred to here. The contradiction is not only directed against the other person insofar as his warning was unjustified. Nor does the contradiction mean that what was said is "wrong"; i.e., one does not simply assert the contradictory opposite. "There is no fire": the negative statement contradicts the observation that it is *burning*. The observation was "incorrect". If one says to a narrative:

future concept of "truth", as it was also guiding for Bolzano. Its acceptance was facilitated by the fact that one could readily assume "Judgements." For judgements are, of course, "true" in themselves. Namely, in the sense in which Bolzano spoke of truths "in themselves." However, this "truth" of judgement is — strictly speaking — only the correctness of a judgement, and it comes to the judgement as an operation. For judgement is a process that leads to a result. (Cf. the later explanations in the text on p. 76, where it is shown that what logic lists as "forms" of judgement are only the possible results of judgements, namely certain statements that were the aim of the question that initiated the judgement.)

The "truth" of the Aussage, which is misrecognised as a "proposition", and the correctness of the judgement, insofar as one considers it only in its *Realität*, are usually referred to indiscriminately in logic since Lotze as "validity". The original meaning of this term, whose use in logic is merely an expression of a self-created embarrassment, can be found in the "validity" of a Geetzea, for example, or in the fact that "ea vom Dreieck" or "daß vom Dreieck der Satz" applies, that the triangle has an angle sum of 2 R. A validity is documented in the consequences that something is affected by. The three-sidedness is linked to "having an angle sum of 2 R"; ea is the reason why ee is so in the specific case of a triangle.

"That's not true" merely disputes its accuracy, provided that it does not stick to the facts.

"The facts" — but that is nothing definite and fixed that one could assert or "deny". One is mistaken in regard to "the facts" just as one is mistaken in regard to "things." The plural form means the same thing in both cases, namely, the renunciation of specifying something definite and individual. What one can examine and observe, what one learns about, cannot be identified in predication. The horizon under which things are addressed as this or that can be drawn arbitrarily. Taken in terms of its nature, the only thing that is *unique* is that which, when viewed in terms of the circumstances of its manufacture and purposeful use, is the "**middle eccentric**" of a particular machine.

Only on the basis of a prior interpretation of the facts can the framework be established within which something can be fixed as that which can be asserted and denied. One can only deny that it is "as ea recounts it". And likewise, one can only assert that ea "is as it was said".

Assertion and denial stand side by side on an equal footing. In terms of quality, logic distinguishes between positive and negative "judgements". However, the negative judgement remained subordinate to the positive one, insofar as the latter was taken as the paradigm of judgement. If, for example, one defines the judgement as a "connection" — as Sigwart does — then the negative judgement can only reject the preference of a positive judgement. But even before the theory of the negative judgement — an explanation of what a negative judgement should actually mean is necessary.

A case such as: *the sun is not* shining is hardly without further decision. The sentence "*the sun is not shining*" describes the weather. The non-shining of the sun is a mode of its presence determining the weather as the shining sun.

Just as, for example, the non-existence of my blotting paper means its absence. That the sun does not shine is the distinct mode of its presence. *The sun "does not shine"* is, for the time being, an a u a ge. The fact that it contains a negation, i.e. that what it says, as it is interpreted, is somewhere negatively reversed, does not justify classifying it as a negative statement. This is also true in cases where the negation belongs to the statement as an utterance insofar as something is deleted or rejected by the negation, as in: . . . *not exactly o\$...* Or another example: the words *The moon is caught* create an image of the evening outside^o). In this respect, it is described in it. The fact that it is possible to contradict a description does not mean that one can simply "negate" something here. For by adding a negation, what is said or expressed becomes something else, and it is very doubtful whether it can then still be considered a concept at all.

"Meaning". A statement does not have a negative counterpart at all. counterpart. The distinction between positive and negative

"judgement" cannot be applied to the statement itself, but only to the assertion and denial. However, the fact that *the sun is not* shining can be both asserted and denied.

What one asserts in the present example can only be indicated by the manner in which it is stated. I assert

1) Non-existent means the same as absence. It does not only refer to the same situation. It is the same situation as can be expressed by "A is to the right of B" and "B is to the left of A". Such transformations between factual relationships are something different from the translation of one linguistic expression into another.

2) Heidegger's term.

3) See H. Ammann (On the dual meaning of linguistic forms, *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse*, XI I. Abhandlung, t 920). The "ability of language to freely create images is by no means limited to the narrow field of poetic production. Rather, it goes hand in hand with a very elementary basic instinct of linguistic life, which may well be suppressed in certain forms of linguistic expression, but which is at least as fundamental and decisive for the inner structure of our entire linguistic organism as those motives which we encounter as decisive on the basis of concrete, purposeful, unambiguous communication." (p. 12)

or deny that it is as it is stated to be "shown". However, assertion and denial are not necessarily bound to statements. The assertion, for example, that $2 -\{ -5 = 7$ iat, means: It is as it is "represented" here. $2 -\{ -5 = 7$ can

It is not true, but only correct, provided that the numbers themselves are calculated in it. Correctness is a technical property of the equation that can be proven from the definition of its terms or achieved through correction. However, what is said is "true". Namely, insofar as this — said — reveals itself. Truth and correctness arise from the things themselves, insofar as one deals with the things or works on them. Assertion and denial can be neither true (or not) nor correct (or not). For "from my point of view" I assert something; the question is whether my assertion is justified or not.

Reinaeli¹ believed that he could establish something in the "facts" as that which is claimed. The facts either exist or they do not exist. Reinach distinguishes between positive and negative facts. Negative judgements are "assertions in which the copula of the fact and thus the entire fact is negated ... The only difference between a negative judgement and a positive one is that in the former, the assertion refers to a negative fact constituted by the function of negation^o)." In these explanations, however, two things are referred to as negative facts. Firstly, something that is stated negatively; in this sense, for example, the *sun* #cfieint would *not* be a negative fact, although it is certainly "can be asserted". In this example, however, "the entire fact is not negated". This second explanation only applies in cases where something is denied. "Negative fact" then means nothing more than the correlate

1) On the theory of negative judgements, Ges. Schr. p. 56 ff. — On the introduction of the term "fact" : €.. Stumpf, Erscheinungen und psychische Functionen, Abh. Berl. Akad. 1906, p. 30.

2) l. c. p. 105/06.

denial: "ea is not as stated". However, in neither case does the negative fact represent the "correlate of the assertion". As a correlate, it could only belong to the denial; it only "constitutes itself" in the denial. However, as the "asserted," it reduces itself to something asserted that is turned into a negative. But it is only possible that what is said (moreover) can be asserted and likewise that it can be denied. The fact is something that eludes definition. If it is described as a "contrary" correlate, this is precisely what is conceded. For what I assert or deny is, in the same sense, something concrete, just as the "object" is something derived and, in this respect, transcendent, in that it does not occur in any original context of meaning. Reinach emphasises that the existence of a state of affairs does not imply "existence". It is said that states of affairs exist as such. But taken on its own, the fact is only the final and internally "recognised" result of having dealt with something. One can only relate to the fact, which is detached from the handling of things, "intentionally". The assertion involves a pretence. No different from the predicative "object", the fact emptied of the scheme of eo- or non-behaviour must be assigned. Only its existence can be questioned.

By dividing the judgements into positive and negative, they should be classified. For now, positive and

t) Reinach also shows unmistakable vacillation in his determination of facts. Cf. e.g.: "There are facts that are relations, and others, such as the b-ness of an A, which are not. Accordingly, judgements sometimes refer to relations and sometimes to non-relations; but even where they refer to relations, the intentional relationship is mediated by the fact that these relations are facts, and not by the fact that they are relations." — But what does that mean? "Facts that are relations" as opposed to the other: "Relations that are facts"? Are relations types of facts? Or are relations "also" facts?

Negative non-alternative statements - provisions. What one says can only be "negatively phrased" or — as an utterance — "affirmative" or " " ly negative". Namely, in no other sense than one might also "express oneself restrictively", etc. What one has said can then still be denied. It is also possible that it is still asserted. Assertion and denial, in turn, do not necessarily refer to "what has been said". Only the correlate of assertion or denial can be described as a positive or negative statement. Assertion and denial are therefore not "types" of judgements.

Affirmative and negative, however, are the translation of what Aristotle called *zixcäyxoiq* and *lZö\$*noic**: *zacäʃfaaiz 6k* *Pony*

§ 4. THE PREDICATIVE DETERMINAT G

ἀπόφανσίς τινος κατά τινος. ἀπόφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος¹⁾. Die prädiktative Bestimmung hat eine Qualität²⁾.

"Meanings" do not primarily and "actually" belong to the words that are spoken. Dealing with things is determined by a direction of interpretation in which things are addressed from some "side" or angle, depending on whether one knows them or not. Dealing with things is supported by familiarity with the structure of the subject, in which the subject has the horizon of a situation. Things "mean" something. There is a certain "connection" with them. That is why they can also be spoken of.

1) *De interpretatione* t7a, 25—26.

2) Another possible justification for distinguishing between positive and negative judgements as judgements seems to me to be the fact that there are contradictory forms of judgement, such as the positive universal judgement and the negative particular judgement. However, it will be shown later how what has been described here as types of judgements are in fact only different approaches with which the judgement ends. (cf. p. 72.)

3) Cf. meaning as a "category of life" in Dilthey (Ges. Schr. VI, p. 3t9, YII, p. 232 ff. et al.).

In the statements "*The stove is not yet burning*" and "*It is cold*," the interpretation is not yet a predicative interpretation. Nothing is being said about the stove here. How about if I attribute something to it as a property? The **stove** is treated differently in both cases. Only on the basis of its not yet being lit was it incorporated into the interpretation of a situation on one occasion. Namely, as the thing that was at hand here. And certainly: the predication also refers to "*the stove*", namely the central heating stove in the basement, which has remained "*this stove*", even though it may have been replaced in the meantime. But in this reference, which is inseparable from "*the stove*" because it is constitutive, it becomes

"*different*", insofar as one makes statements about him or asks questions about him. And the predicates also change: one says that he "*is*" this or that, or that he has this or that characteristic.

"*Properties*". The meaning that these "*properties*" have as properties is not the one with which they were originally encountered. They were encountered in the use of the oven. The "*bad draught*" that it has was encountered as a phenomenon that is "*known*" as something typical. The relationship to the oven lay here in the circumstances of its occurrence. However, the predicative statement creates its own context of meaning here. The property of a thing here is what "*can be said about it*". In this respect, it "*belongs*" to the thing.

The concept of determination brings about a new reversal: in the concept of the object as *ens praedicabile s. str.*, the supposition of "*of what*" has also been abolished. The object is that which is "*determined*". And the predicates are that which the object "*reveals*" in the preceding engagement with things. In this respect, it is precisely an "*object*." More specifically, it is that which it has revealed itself to be. Namely, from a synthesis ala the "*given*." The separateness of its origin is revealed in the fragmentation to which the "*thing*" is subjected:

" . Determining the point in time at which a certain shadowiness can actually be attributed to an existing object is part of the preparation of the same," and therefore does not appear in the copula of the sentence.

existing object can be assigned a certain shadow in truth is part of the determination of that object," and thus appears "not in the copula of the sentence, but in the subject concept ... An object at a different time is actually a different object." It is part of the concept of "representation" that something in it has been removed from the relationships under which and in relation to which it was to appear. Representation does not denote a particular mode under which something

— namely as that which I conceive it to be — is "given." In this sense, there is no "object of" conception.

"Representation" refers rather to the intentional reference. For Kant, it is therefore also the representation that determines the position. (Kant avoids confusing the "object" with what is encountered as a thing. The fact that "really" in Kant merely signifies existence — namely in the sense of a modal predicate — follows necessarily from the concept of representation, whose existential horizon Kant was particularly aware of in this context).

The "as" of the predicative determination is something different from the "as" under which something was "discovered". Its horizon was "meaning", i.e. that to which something is addressed. That "as what" something is taken was predetermined. One

It was "true" in that sense. One had to deal with *Waeh*• or an *ftegenhogon*. In the "ein" of the second example, the connection with the rainbow as a typical phenomenon was implicitly concealed. The "als" under which "die Dinge" are conceived as "something" is predetermined by the mode of questioning things. However, objects are predicatively determined as what they have turned out to be. The copula is essential here: that which is so-and-so is the (transcendent) object. Its "existence" must be proven.

1) Cf. Bolzano, I. c. I p. 202.

2) Heidegger, in his work " " (The Question of Being), distinguishes between existential-hermeneutic "ale" (the question of being) and ontological- , which is the question of being.

the apophantic "ala" of the statement (I. p. 158).

3) See Part I, p. 22.

If one sticks to the substance of the nouns *lfomcfi*, colour, etc., then the indefinite article "means" something slightly different next to *üfonacfi* than next to *colour*. However, the differences in the nature of "relevance" that are decisive for the concept of man, colour, etc., have not simply been "smoothed over" in the indefinite articles. They remain unspoken, concealed. But dae ein e re etz t eie. Namely, through the one that is nevertheless expressed, i.e. other and "new", namely "logical" side. The direction of this is determined precisely by the renunciation of the other.

— The same applies to the copula. *Jfö6aft* and *Lösöh-papior* "are" both *blue*. They have *the same colour*. These plural statements are only possible if the ,other mode of blue appearance or blue tinge is disregarded²⁾). However, being blue is not therefore not simply "undetermined". The interpretation

The arrangement and structure extends into other contexts, for example when blue is taken as "the specific colour" in the second formulation. This was not how it originally appeared. It originally appeared in relation to its "inherence", where something (else) was blue — and in this respect blue was not a feature of it at all — "was". The "determined" by other predicates Different, ale which blue appears in the blue-of-cobalt-and-solvent paper, it is under a supposition whose meaning is determined by a seeing-dealing-with things, whose nature is different from that of the questioning dealing with things. In the fact that something "is called" lies the "turn" through which the references are dimmed, to which something like "blue" first encounters. Namely, first of all as a colour, and then insofar as this colour only occurs in

Firstly, blue indicated a special mode of property in terms of quality. Secondly, colours represented a special level of manifestation compared to other qualities, namely that of phenomenality. And thirdly, blue had a different "position" in the structure of things. It was precisely here that a hermeneutics of the concept of the "inherence" of blue. (See Part I, p. 94.)

2) cf. p. 15 ff.

can be encountered in an appearance or a habitus, etc. The meaning under which things are discovered can be expressed. Even in the indefinite article, the copula, etc., something is "expressed". But nothing that can be encountered. The indefinite article says **something***), and indeed various things. What it says is not simply "meant" or "designated" by the word. On the other hand, the original connection that it had with what the indefinite article is linked to has not simply been **replaced** by "another". The above formulation

"Replaced by" here only referred to the construction, which indicates a mere levelling. Certainly — what is being said refers to a specific structure. However, it is not "original" in itself. The indefinite article, the copula, etc. "only indicate something".

Saying something is a way of expressing something. It has been noted that the term "expression" can only be used in relation to Yocables if it refers to their transferred meaning or to language use in general. The words themselves are not "expressions" but "names", e.g. Husserl's characterisation of word meanings as expressions is correct if "expression" is understood as above. What Husserl calls apophantic logic is a logic of meaning; the nominal meanings are fixed here as elements of the "sentence". From the schema of meaning, one certainly gains something like a "concept" as the general "meaning" of *human being*. For if this **word** is separated from its connection with the indefinite article, as it appears in the sentence: *There is a human being*. Under this mode of meaning, however, nichte a n ge-

1) That something is "beap rochen" means, on the other hand, that it has been articulated and discussed as it currently stands.

2) Cf. Ammann, p. 61. — One also speaks of the many "Aus-drifioken" that Arabic has for 2tnmat, meaning the various expressions for addressing this animal, which we simply refer to as 2toznel, taking it to mean "a kind of".

s pro e hen a ls Mensch. The "general concept" does not have the meaning that the word has, which is by no means "general". The "subsumption under a concept" is bound to the possibility of saying things. It is not an original function. In particular, it is not set in the so-called "knowledge" of things. Conceptual generality arises from predicative determination.

Ontology certainly gained its tasks precisely with regard to the being-affected of things. These were tasks that only had an appearance of generality. It was not only Herbart's mistake that he adhered to the future references of being said without being able to ask the question of what this has to do with things in the first place. Ontology derived its claim *to* universality from the conception of forms. But this is also where it becomes invalid. We said, for example, that the indefinite article can mean different things. In being said, something is merely "expressed." The "form" that it has or acquires is merely a schema. There are schemata of saying. For example, a *S, being P, not being P*. What is said is not subjected to a "consequence" that lies in the preliminary approach of the specific schema of its being said. In being said, things do not experience anything new at all.

"Interpretation". In the sense of what is said, to which its schemata are the specific schemata, what is said is not taken to a new level. It does not undergo any "sup-position" s. etr. If anything is said, it is not "taken" to formal relationships between "objects".

t) The same applies, however, to logical operations, which are judgements in the narrower sense (cf. later p. 76). — The possibility of a formal ontology seems to arise only where, for example, a form is designated in the concept of characteristics. Red, hard, etc. are possible "substitutes" for this. They experience the supposition characteristic. But even here, they are not involved in the consequences of what the characteristic "applies" to. And that is nothing more than the flip side of the "formal," insofar as the formal is defined by the fact that it is not further determined by its substitutes.

"such things" exist. SGhon in the concept of this "object" reveals the confusion of general concepts with the "what" as things are encountered. If one retains the term "category" in accordance with its etymological origin, in the sense that it denotes a way of describing things, then "formal categories" are something impossible by definition. There are no logical categories by which "the concept of the analytical" could be determined.

The patterns of meaning can be fixed by symbols. Linguistic forms such as the genitive, infinitive, etc., can only be "schematised" in the same way that one can draw the pattern of a plant, namely as an "ideal" plant. For grammatical forms arise. In the process determined by the inner language form, they are brought forth one after the other. They belong to "languages".

D. i. to something whose possibility of being "dead" indicates a kind of existence.

Knedlou; and *äcb\$aaif*J* are types of saying. One says *i* or no. In kd2os, on the other hand, something is made understandable. In the case of kd os *oizo\$avsix6s*, a being, as it is from reveals itself to him. The truth of Xö2os is *Erschlossen-heit*³). But not simply in the sense that something is "spoken" in it. One learns something through hearsay. Namely, from the narrative, etc., that one hears. A narrative is true if "the facts" have been "expressed in the proper manner". "The proper manner, however, is determined by the prudence of the narrator.

1) Hußerl, Ideas p. 22.

2) 17a, 8, 25-26.

3) The same applies to sight (cf. also Aristotle 980a, 22-24). The body reveals itself in sight and is not only "felt" as it is in touch. The "appearance" can be causally changed, and then the body looks different from what it actually is. Truth is opposed to concealment, but not to appearance. Being brought to light determines the conception of truth (cf. also Heidegger 1. c. p. 28).

A claim is not "true" at all. A claim makes a statement that must be proven. The person making the claim is either "right" or "wrong".

However, the "truth" of *znevä\$*xotq** and *Äsd\$notq* is to be understood from the fact that saying is a distinct way of dealing with what is encountered in an original engagement with "things". This engagement can be "I als e h" aein. In the case of *ké2eiv*, it remained with the "not true". The fact that "the truth" has not been properly addressed is a shortcoming of the report. "Clarity" is a way in which something is self-evident. However, what is being said cannot be "clear" (), but at most "unambiguous" ().

"unambiguous". Definitions, designations, etc. are also "Unambiguous". Generally speaking, that which is not preserved in the manner of an encounter and being encountered, but only in its discovery (i xie r t iet. Internally, what is said is "expressed".

Knsd\$eoic and *ää6p \times otq* are either true or false. "False" here is not merely the deficient mode of "true". This either/or of the saying itself does not arise in the first place under the mode of being encountered. As, for example, in the "either true or not true" *dee X/evv daa* "true" only appears as some predicate of the *Xé}eiv* mentioned here. Just as "false" does not denote a definite mode, the truth of the statement is something "present" just as the truth of speech is. Therefore, "true" and "False" has not yet become a characteristic of so-called "statements" that are "decided once and for all". Certainly — true or false — the aforementioned debate is precisely insofar as something is fixed in what is said. Namely, in its discoveredness, in which it just does not show itself here. However, no particular dignity can be derived from the fact that what is said is true or false, since this saying is not at all a feeling or a sense of meaning that lies beneath the horizon of the "present".

§ 5. THE EXISTENTIAL PART

1. One mode of saying is that it is not, it does not exist. There are no real panthers other than in the sense in which it is under discussion whether, for example, a number has the property z.

"Exists." "Existence" means different things in both cases. Black panthers "occur." One encounters them *occasionally or* frequently. However, there is a number of the property n "exists" insofar as it can be constructed, for example. And in both cases, existence means something other than a "way of being," such as the "reality" of something.

In Kant, the two do not conflict. He began by proving that the existential judgement is non-analytic: "You have already committed a contradiction if, in the concept of a thing that you wanted to think merely in terms of its possibility, you introduced the concept of existence, even under a hidden name." Kant then notes the incommensurability of existence with other predicates and finds himself in the awkward position of having to demonstrate the synthetic nature of the existential judgement, while at the same time having to deny the additional nature of existence in this particular case. He resolves the dilemma by separating existence as a logical predicate from the "real" predicates. "However, in those cases where existence occurs as a predicate in common parlance, it is not so much a predicate of the thing itself as of the idea one has of it. For example, the sea unicorn has existence, but the land unicorn does not. This means nothing other than that the assumption of the sea unicorn is an experience, that is, the idea of an existing thing . . . It is therefore not entirely correct to say: A sea unicorn is an existing animal, but rather, conversely, a certain existing sea animal.

1) K. d. r. V. (Hartenstein, Works 1838, II, p. 460).

the predicates that I associate with a unicorn apply to it)."

One may note here that the occurrence of "the sea unicorn" — i.e. this animal, which is different from the land unicorn — is something other than the existence of "a sea unicorn"; only the latter is an "existing thing". However, this remark does not condemn Kant. For what he takes a position on is the "idea," which in this respect presents itself as a "concept of experience"**).

Kant took the "object" from "experience" in the sense of a v o Hz o gen e s y n t hes i8. For him, "an existing thing" is not that which is encountered when addressed from any side. The occurrence of ... and the existence of a sea unicorn are contained in the position of a "representation". But the "object" is also that which "exists".

"Occurrence" and "existence" are "logical" predicates in the sense that they only occur in the field of what is said about the given. Herbart misses what Kant actually posits as being. It is futile to search for

t) On the only possible proof of the existence of God, t 763, I, t.

2) See above, p. 63. — Kant's remark that the predicate falls with the subject is — misunderstood — interpreted to mean that every predication presupposes the existence of its subjects. Only of the centaur "imagined as existing" can it be said, for example, that it has a horse's body. Indeseen: "The centaur has a horse's body. Namely, the mythical creature known from Greek mythology. No different than "Sulphur" is yellow, namely this chemical substance, which only occurs in other contexts than the centaur. The fact that sulphur actually exists does not give it any advantage here. The alleged "setting" of the concept in the subject position is nothing more than the necessity of being able to encounter what I predict synthetically. Insofar as predication as a mode of being can only draw its predicate from the preceding preoccupation with that about which it says something. The difference from predication of that which "does not exist" remains. From a round square, I can only predicate what can be analytically deduced from its (impossible) concept (cf. later p. 86). The fact that the subject of a statement "must be imagined as existing" means something different in the case of a narrative or fable, etc.: I can only tell stories about centaurs that "appear somewhere". However, a place of their appearance is designated in Greek mythology just as it is in "my (imaginary) conception". Both are possible subjects of my statement.

To teach you. For the remark that being is not a characteristic also affects the concept of the characteristic itself: that which subsists in the characteristics ceases to exist when existence is shifted into a modal judgement.

The example later cited by Kant in the Critique of Judgment was not very fortunate: "A hundred thalers contain no less than a hundred possible thalers." What are "a hundred actual thalers"? What increases and decreases my financial situation are "a hundred thalers," namely this sum. The sum of one hundred thalers may be present or absent. But can one further specify here: the sum "with all its predicates"? Hardly. For as a sum, it is determined by

"One hundred thalers" is not only sufficient, but also completely specified. The reason for this is that it is considered to be the "amount"

Herbert formulates the sentence: "... The term that serves as the predicate is always understood in a limited sense, namely only insofar as it can be linked to the specific subject. "However, the predicate can also be established without restriction, unconditionally. Not as a concept that is linked to another, as before, since it still had a subject; nor as if it were awaiting another concept to which it itself would serve as support; otherwise it would have to take the place of **the subject**. The previous form of the statement may remain; there may be a copula to indicate this; but now it can only mean that this concept has nothing to which it can be linked as a predicate; nothing that limits its meaning: it stands alone and independently. This is the explanation of the relationship between the copula and the concept of being. The former is transformed into the sign of the latter when there is no subject for a predicate; and in this way an existential substitute arises, which is misinterpreted if one regards it as the concept of being for the original predicate." In ar sind *Mencce8*", the meaning of the copula is changed; but obviously because it no longer finds anything to which it could attach the predicate under the conditions under which it could establish it. It is precisely this that makes it the sign of unconditional establishment; as it would be if, instead of saying, "It is lightning, it is thundering," we said, "There is lightning, there is thunder." (Lehrb. zur Eial. in die Philosophie 2, § 53-63.) However, impersonal sentences cannot be compared to existential sentences at all: an (unconditional) "postulation" is only possible if one understands e# to mean that snow (in general)

"occurs", masculine alongside Waeaer etc. 2fr it's snowing, e# is blue NimmM but answers the question of what the weather is like, namely that the weather "outside". What is set as absolute in Herbert remains unclear. With good reason. For Herbart sought to derive existence by separating the "predicate" occupied by a "concept" (?).

2) 1. c. p. 661.

of approximately available funds or that such an amount is lacking. The "existence" of a hundred talers is therefore something special, not only insofar as it denotes presence here, but also insofar as the presence of a hundred talers determines the absence of an amount of **approximately** the same value — e.g. from my fortune.

The absence of a hundred thalers does not exist here in the sense of the definite mode of existence, as, for example, the absence of "a bench". There is "one there" (i.e. "in the forest", for example) or there is not. However, the existence of "a bench" can be said to be in the sense that it is not the existence of a specific bench, e.g. this bench. (However, both this bench and another bench may be present or absent.) Absence and presence, which is the opposite of absence, are modes of occurrence or non-occurrence. The land unicorn does not "exist". A bank is shared — here or there — insofar as it is sought and missed. A specific animal, on the other hand — in the sense that lions, etc. are "different animals", one or the other of which may be absent here or there — is not discovered or sought at all for its presence, but for its "kind". What one knows here is categorically different from what one knows in the case of the bank. Or rather, the act of knowing itself is different in both cases. One encounters the sea unicorn differently than one encounters a bank. One deals with this animal differently than one deals with a bench. In the case of this animal, too, the indefinite article immediately comes into play when it is encountered as something that exists and is missed as being related to a specific specimen. However, this cannot be said for both.

However, Kant's addition and explanation "... with all its predicates" cannot be applied to that which exists or does not exist. For both — that which occurs or does not occur, and that which is present or absent — remain in the context in which it is discovered as occurring

or is missing as absent, precisely undefined in relation to the horizon under which "all its predicates" has any meaning at all. For the relationship of ownership expressed in the word "its" arises from the conception of an object that subsists in the predicates.

2. Kant spoke of "real" talers as opposed to "possible" talers. "Real" talers are minted silver talers. The fact that there are "real" talers does not mean that they are real things.

We have things that are "mere appearance" in contrast to this. The word "mere" adds to, but does not explain, the meaning "Appearance". The rainbow is merely an appearance because there is "nothing behind it". Precisely because it is not what it "is", it is in itself "nothing". It has, as it were, only a "suggested" existence, but not a fully realised one*). We perceive the rainbow as an "appearance" only in the sense that it is a phenomenon, in that it "shows" something else, which, insofar as it is only indicated, cannot show itself²⁾). A body shows itself in its appearance. One was referred to the "appearance," the habitus as the "outer appearance," when one sought to grasp what gives the epistemological concept of "appearance" its original meaning. The concept of false appearance demonstrated how "appearance" is not simply reduced to what or how something is "given" in each case. The thing shows itself from itself, and perhaps precisely as it is not. "Real" — as distinct from "actual" — is primarily that which is encountered in the manner of "showing itself." That is, that which can be "seen." The concept of the "real" does not arise, like that of reality, from the experience of resistance. What we

1) Cf. Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Realontologie I (Hamburg) 1b. VI, p. 196.

2) cf. Heidegger, I. c. p. 28 ff.

3) See Part I, p. 92 ff.

pressed, it appears precisely as something "unreal." Namely, precisely because one can never come to terms with it unless one is familiar with it. Reality, which is of course experienced in "resistance," is something different from

The "reality" of things. Reality is something that can be questioned, recognised and "taken". The

"taking" is a mode of immediate engagement. However, this taking (or ability to take) has its limits precisely where we encounter something to resist and where reality will be experienced.

3. The coin on the table is not a real taler because it is "real". It is a real taler because it was minted by the state mint and is made of silver. As a result of these circumstances, it is a "taler". However, the "characteristics" of this thaler are precisely related to the circumstances in which its existence is linked. Only as a result of being minted is it, for example, "worn". This characteristic is the deficient mode of the intended markedness of the minting. Despite its minting, it remains "a thaler", even though it may be almost indistinguishable from a round piece of silver. Equality in the existing "definitions" therefore means little. And so it is a matter of "perception" when the thaler "no longer exists". This is the case when it is broken
What remains is the silver.

Nothing that subsists in terms of characteristics and is identical in terms of change can be discovered. The silver was already there before, and through the minting, etc., nothing was added to its characteristics, nor were its characteristics diminished after the coin was broken. The side according to which

1) Scheler emphasises that "our reality is not given to us at all in acts of perception, but in a driven, voluntary behaviour towards the world". (Idealism — Realism, Philosophical Anaeiger, II, p. 286.) The expression "perceptual act" obscures the decisive point: "Knowing oneself in the world" (sich-awa-kennen-in-) refers to a certain attitude of dwelling in the world.

Dien, ter one anticipates what "encounters" one. And ea iat that Ent-se that there is no encounter with reality in the counter-encounter.
aoloh-affecting "encounter".

What is represented as a thaler is different from what silver represents. The horizon under which a thing is addressed as this or that can be drawn differently, — that, for example, in the case of the taler, something is included that is not taken into account when considering its nature — without prejudice to the so-called "identity" of this thing, which remains unchanged despite the so-called changes, reveals precisely the problematic nature of this supposed "identity".

The reference of characteristics to something that "exists" and thus makes them characteristics in the first place belongs in a special context of meaning. It is present precisely where the existence or non-existence of something is not even up for discussion. For example, in the case of "silver". One recognises it by the characteristics that it "has". One encounters it as something familiar or unfamiliar. However, the changes that a thaler undergoes when it is put into circulation are not changing accidents of an identical thing. The intention was to establish that it remains "a thaler". The "existence" of this thaler is something that "it itself" (?) has no power over. The existence of this thaler is reduced to the fact that it is present as "this thaler". Namely, "for a period of time". The "past" is the fate that the taler has had. The past is something to which it refers as "this minted taler" according to its concept.

4. The coin on the table is a real thaler, insofar as it "in reality" is a thaler. "Really" here does not contrast with any appearance. The rainbow is a "real rainbow". Namely, in contrast to the rainbow transparent on the stage, for example, which "in reality is a backdrop". (It was said above: The rainbow is not what it "appears" to be. Thus

t) cl. I, p. 33.

2) The search for the "identical" in change remains necessarily futile. One can only ask about what "remains". However, this question finds its answers in the original preoccupation with things. It is not a philosophical question. (cf. later p. 89.)

was his only "hinted" existence meant. Namely, that he shows himself as something that he — strictly speaking — never shows himself to be. But in terms of his references, there is also, for example, a "real dream image".

In "really," no specific "sphere" is designated. Not even that of the so-called "outside world." The concept of an "outside world" belongs to a certain way of interpreting things and understanding one's own position in the world based on those things. The concept of the totem, for example, belongs to a different mode of dealing with things. Things have a place where they belong. They can be "far away" and close by. "What (already) belongs to me" is separated from what I "long for". What is "outside of me" is only one

1) The fact that Kant, for example, does not require proof of the existence of an external world, but rather demands proof only of its reality (Scheler, I. c. p. 266), demonstrates how he has already skipped over the entanglement of the subject in the world as the basis for the meaning of an interpretation in the first place. In the transcendental aesthetics of Kr. d. r. V. I, § 2,1, Kant uses the phrase: "... In order for certain sensations to be related to something outside of me (i.e., to something in a different place in space than where I am) ..." Particularly from the way Kant uses the 1. Antinomy, it becomes clear how Kant's theory of space determined the space of Newtonian physics. The decisive factor here is not the particularity of this physics, which is now obsolete. Rather, it lies in the fact that — instead of understanding space from the world or from its entanglement in existence — the original problem is reversed and questions are asked about the boundaries of the world "in space." However, "outside of me" does not originally mean: in another place in space than ... Rather, it only exists when space is taken in its "unrestricted" sense, according to which it denotes a mathematical-physical multiplicity of places or locations. "Outside of me" is that which does not belong to me; that is, that which I can just reach. Space originally encounters me as "around me, i.e. here"; things are not in another "place", but have a "place" that I can or cannot reach. Spatial distance is something that can be overcome. The horizon marks the boundary of what I can see with my eyes. And likewise, the inner worldliness of the subject is only approximately where it understands itself (namely, as existing in the world) through interpretation. To summarise, one can say that Kant took up space in the de-restriction that made its physical treatment possible. He then related the world to this de-worlded space. Not only in the antinomies, but already in his conception of the "outer" world. However, by not recognising it as a conception integrated into a particular anthropology, its original meaning also remained intact.

A term that characterises the eight-step interpretation of my environment. A close-up image, for example, is said to exist "only subjectively". Due to its origin in relation to the eye, it is characterised as a close-up image, and "subjective" refers to the peculiar significance it has with regard to the dependence of its "existence": it is only accessible to the eye. However, because even the merely subjective appearance is a real subjective perception and not at all "non-existent", the thesis with which the last remarks were introduced is actually proven:

"Being truly M" is the same as "being M in reality" insofar as being something in reality has familiarity with the horizon as its horizon. The "meaning" to which, for example,

hidden, which, of course — and this is the true core of Kant's transcendental aesthetics — is linked to the "spatiality" of being-there (Heidegger 1. c. p. 110 ff.). As a "form of pure intuition," however, space appears here again only when the subject is removed.

The so-called "unity" of space, for example, can be understood here in terms of the "identity" of things in the sense that a spatial thing belongs to a closed group of possible perceptions, which has the distinguishing feature that its members coincide, as it were, in the thing. Perceiving the same thing, we proceed, changing our orientation, from appearance to perception. However, we are not free in this process. We can pretend that we can change our orientation abruptly. But as long as the process of perception

"Unanimously", i.e., if the correlate of the perceptions "the same thing" is a given, we must then supplement this fiction in such a way that the gap in the continuous succession of phenomena, which is predetermined a priori by the schema of the thing as the rule of this succession, is filled in elsewhere. We see no possibility of carrying out this addition and note rather that it would destroy the first fiction from which we started. For there is no shadowing without a relative point of orientation. It is from the identity of the subject that the possibility of such a unanimity of perspectives, in which "space" could be purely grasped, is derived in the first place. The "spatial identity" is not simply the identity of a thing that appears in various ways: in this case, the schematic identity of the thing cannot be identified in the same way as the identity of the subject of possible predication. Spatial-thing identity can — when questioned — only be traced back to other identities of its kind. Moving from one group of perspectives to other such groups, all of which are united by the fact that they are the formal roots of certain thing-like overlaps, we can return to perspectives that belong to the original group.

Whether perceived subjectively or as external, questioned and addressed, it becomes noticeable in the "we feel". **Something** is in reality a rainbow; namely, "in truth" it is that. But that **does** not mean **that it is** "true" that it is a rainbow. For then the question inevitably arises as to whether it is "really true" that ... The consequence of such **an approach**, however, is scepticism. It matters little whether it is only "methodical". It is precisely as "methodical" that it becomes fatal. For if it then departs from the horizon, its presence was precisely the prerequisite for the ancient scepticism **missing something** here. **The** "true" in "it is true that ..." does not stand on its own. Nor is one committed to it by being gifted with a "consciousness" that cannot help *but* "know". Rather, it is only insofar as reality is an unlosable horizon that one is "in the truth". And one

Indeaen: The shift in perspective eats away at what is understood in the original way of dealing with things. Namely, on the basis of an interpretation in which, for example, something like the turning towards and away from a body, its "confrontation" etc. is understood. That *bo* and *ao* "turned-in" of things is something that is anticipated in seeing-oneself-dealing-with-things. The perspectival shift is originally taken as a fact. It is understood "as" a way of perceiving. Just as the appearance of a body is not a perspectival distortion, something that is, as it were, only read for a content that — if it were the "actual" aspect of the thing — but would inevitably have to refer back to my encounter with the Eärper. That is to say, what one sees is not a transcendent object, but rather what "spatially behaves" in a certain way — and somehow also towards me. The "unity" of space has to prove itself just as little as the body is originally the *ens praedicabile*, as which it can only exist. "Unity" belongs to the "concept" of space. But it is not what "space" is reduced to — quite rightly — when the manifoldness of perspectival shifts are its manifestation in the sense that in their agreement the "Space" merely indicates that his approach is justified. Namely, as a kind of "institution" of the world, which, in line with its deregulation, no longer exists below or before its horizon, but can only be understood analytically from the constraints that lie beyond it. Even in the case of the thing, it is not possible to say what actually appears. The "object" loses itself in its representations. The so-called "thing in itself" is unknowable not only in the sense that it necessarily only "appears," i.e., remains beyond cognition, but also because it remains transcendent to the dimension in which there is such a thing as being known or unknown.

It also lies in this, insofar as one allows it to remain as a subjective illusion, for example in the afterimage. Leaving things as they are is a kind of "Yer tehene" through which the comprehensibility of something is also dealt with in advance.

5. "Being M in reality" is different from "being ta ts a c h-lie h M (namely, being "determined" as M)". Insofar as ea "is something in reality", Yorhandene is not necessarily something that can be identified as this or that. Things whose meaning is unknown are dismissively referred to as "objects". They are described according to "characteristics" that remain "external" as long as the whole "aoll" is unknown. It is unknown what the thing in question "actually" is. Not only in the sense that one cannot determine it, but precisely in the sense that one does not even know how to "take" it in such a way that it can be questioned for a determination. These "objects" remain, however, something that one encounters as "objects". Not that they are "real objects". Encounters are addressed as "objects" when one does not know what they are¹). But the fact that one "only (still) does not know" what they actually are only indicates the "deficient mode" of "understanding" in terms of meaning. This "Understanding" is encountered here precisely when one "does not understand" something. What can only be described as an "object" is in reality "something".

However, "something" here does not refer to the limit of any abstraction
, as in the case of the so-called "mere something" or
"object merely as an object". On the conception of

1) On p. 53, it was noted: What "shows itself" B. str. is then taken as something real. The deficient of odua in this regard was the "JInwirkliche" (the "real"), whose concealment in "appearance" has the special emphasis that something shows itself here that is never there, as if it "shows itself". Being open-minded belongs to the conception of the "real".

2) The "object of knowledge" does not occur at all. However, the fact that epistemology chose precisely this word as a term, the use of which indicates an imposed renunciation, is significant for its use.

"Being-in-reality-something" means precisely that cc with the "Something" necessarily has a categorical relevance. The concealment of this categorical relevance is expressed in the term "object".

The category under which something is taken is the primary one and remains the actual approach to "determination". However, this remains precisely and indirectly conveyed in the phrase "to be factual (instead of: in reality), i.e. to be determined in such and such a way". The certainty arises very simply here. One need only describe *it*. And that something is actually "*zo*" only means the exclusion of an error. Or something that is actually "*M*" has the pure "nothing" as its flip side. It can turn into that if it is only what it "has turned out to be".

However, Kant bases his definition of what a thaler actually is focuses on the "possible thaler". The mere idea of a thaler certainly contains no more than a "real" one in the sense of an actual thaler. Insofar as this "actuality" can only be measured by its "idea". However, existence is not only the complement of "possibility". The Yorhandene i8t ala is that which it is, precisely not the object endowed with characteristics of a general, namely predicative concept^o).

6. A colour, a sound, "a certain yodel" exist insofar as they "occur". What has characteristics — and is discovered precisely because of this, insofar as it is something that one knows

1) See above, p. 43.

2) Perception also has no such object. It does not guarantee reality. Plan "perceives something" insofar as one perceives something as what it is in reality. That is, in terms of meaning. Perception hides nothing except itself. Of course, the senses have a "Certainty". Namely, in themselves, they have epistemic validity (Part I, p. 88). However, this "certainty" is not "assurance". By this I mean: through the senses, one "notices" and "feels" "things" and "knows" them in this respect. However, only a finding that results can be "certain". Assurance can be justified, disputed or achieved.

or does not know — does not have "existence" in the sense of being present. In the concept of the "object," the question of what exists had been answered surreptitiously in a way that was indifferent to this difference between occurrence and presence. One notices the seductive ease with which one can then assume something like the existing "individualisations of" eggs, etc. Existence appears here as nothing less than the *principium individuationis*. Indeed, that which is subsumed under characteristics can only be different from other things in a particular way*). Of course, the properties only "mean" characteristics. And precisely insofar as they are inherent, they reveal another side:

For inherence refers precisely to the turn of phrase under which something is taken as "colour" in the first place. Colour is a category like substance, typical appearance, etc. However, the fact that what is inherent can only be specified as *grf6*, i.e. as this particular colour, shows how, in the process of making this specification, the question to which it responds underwent a different turn of phrase. Otherwise, the question of what is inherent could not be answered at all. For the inherent nature of yellow means that something (else) "is" yellow, but yellow does not preserve its essence here, as if it only "belonged" to the other thing like a characteristic with which it was endowed, as if yellow "had" colour. And again: if yellow is a characteristic, then it is of course in a position to be retained in its specific difference from others, provided that

But then only here and there, and only in advance. However, there is no "existing" yellow, i.e. nothing that is actually "yellow" in the sense of the appearance of an object.

The fact of deception can only affect the certainty of what is seen, etc. In other words, something that primarily does not pertain to seeing at all, but only to what has been laid out as seen. But precisely because of their certainty, the senses are attuned to perception. The fact that perception is taken as a direct access to things precisely because of its sensuality and is assigned an authenticating function is therefore merely a doctrine that can be traced back hermeneutically to its motives, but which cannot actually be discussed.

4 *) Part I p. 53.

can occur, what is actually "(a) yellow is", ntim-
as the object of a determination.

In the object, however, existence loses its merely preparatory character. For Kant, it was by no means the being; the conception of existence as a modal predicate shows how clear the concept of effectiveness was to him in this regard. But even "things" are not "carriers" of existence. The inherent nature of a property denotes a circumstance of this property; it is a property in reality.

— Or: it is raining, for example — in reality. This does not mean that rain is "eternal" and "placed" in a specific place in reality. The so-called "inexistence" refers to the relationship between one bearer of existence and another, which is related to the bearer of "existence". Here, existence is treated as an empirical concept that only needs to be accepted. It is then used.

However, for Erato, "existence" means "present," and thus denotes a certain relation. The bank, for example, is something that is present. One is assured of its "presence." As something "present," it is taken from me in relation to my situation. That which is present is "there." It is "present" in itself. (As opposed to what is present in the sense that it is "not missing" and what, if it is, for example, "a bank", cannot "exist itself" or be missing (!). Something is present for a while, no longer present, it is "gone." What, on the other hand, has once "happened" is not "gone" in this sense. For the fact that something "happens now" does not mean its "presence." By referring to the present, the occurrence is merely dated. What occurs does not encounter its occurrence at all; material, colour, etc. "occur" insofar as one "encounters" them in a decisive manner.

1) Occurrence, existence, absence, etc. are modes of inner-worldly existence. Being-there, on the other hand, denotes a relationship to the world, which as "world" is itself intertwined with beings-there. The "situation" of being-there

The black Kanther comes sporadically, black panthers are rare.)Zerrinzeit, fiöi@g, setten are more than explanatory, supplementary provisions of the "occurrence". clarified/ig (*eoltcn*) etc. stands alongside other information: Jackals are found *in packs*, others too *steep*, and some things *are not repeated*. It would certainly be wrong to look for a difference between "what" occurs in pairs and "what" occurs frequently. But it cannot be overlooked how, in this case, what occurs plays out in different ways. But if, then, we dispense with these seemingly mere additions and speak of the simple *occurrence* or non-occurrence of something, this supposed dispensation is to be interpreted positively: that something occurs or does not occur "at all". However, "at all" does not refer to "universal validity" here, but only to the special nature of the meaning of this simple occurrence. The difference becomes clear when one examines the negation in both cases, focusing on the different relationships in which the ea ftorrimt or or the cc is (*not*) at issue:

7. A remark such as "panthers are coming" does not necessarily require a response. Nor does, for example, "it is cold". The latter statement may indeed be a response. Namely, to the question "how is the weather?". Since it is *cold*, this question is answered insofar as the state of the weather, as it is "found", is interpreted and stated. The answer could also have been anticipated in the question: "Is it *cold*?" and it is sufficient

then to say *a* or no. Yes and no "say" something here. Namely, what is stated in the question. And also whether panthers occur, or whether something specific is missing, etc., can one can only say yes or *no* in this specified sense *, a or no aagen.*

Being, i.e. belonging to the world, corresponds to things belonging to the world. Only as a result of this (primary) belonging to the world can something "occur somewhere (i.e. in a place), "be absent from its place", etc.

t ') Cf. Part I p. 16.

(However, the negative may also contradict an existing proposition. The statement will be disputed. "Disputed" here does not mean that it is "rejected". But it is correct in F. Brentano's theory of judgement that an existing proposition is "expressed" in the sentence. A contradiction exists between two statements. For example, between "it is raining" and "the sky is blue". The weather has been "contradictorily determined" in both statements. The fact that the contradiction exists between the statements must be noted, as must the fact that it exists between them. It is by no means what is "...". Supposedly, it is impossible that "atwae p and non p is". But in p-being and non-p-being, the contradiction has merely been expressed; p-being and non-p-being is the "expression" of the contradiction, the formula that states it. Nothing more. And certainly not **something** "waa un-possible").")

Ez /ehft a **bank** etc. can only be "not true", but ea cannot be f ala ch 8ein, as that exists ... or ei gi6t not ... 2fs exists ...

and ea does not apply ... a i n d not only "answers"

in the sense that *Panthor occur* under circumstances an "answer", but initially simply an "Aueeage". It applies ... and e4 does not apply ... — each is a decision. When you ask here, you don't know "something specific". "Something specific" does not mean: what one learns in the answer and what one may have already suggested in the question. Rather, it is "something specific" precisely in relation to the question. Something has remained "often" in it itself here. And it is not only "questionable" in the sense that the "questionability" of something is discovered, recognised or taken as something in terms of its questionability. For here, again, the specific is missing, which is open and therefore to be decided, but which, insofar as it then becomes apparent, not only "overtakes" its questionability

In the decision, however, the question is "raised".

1) See 5.78 ff.

6t

In mathematics, for example, we speak of "problems". These arise exclusively from what is "defined" in the axioms. What is special about the decision here is that it is a

"solution". In the course of a mathematical proof, something is accomplished that was previously "undecided"(*). Here, the construction solves a problem. And in this case, freedom from contradiction is only a necessary, but not yet sufficient, condition for an axiomatic system. It must be *definiteness* (by which we mean the requirement that in the axioms or

1) "The geometric proof consists merely in clearly highlighting the nexus on which the intuition depends." (Schopenhauer, The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 39.) It is never actually "deduced" in it. The axioms are not yet anything that —, as

"Premises" — true or false could be. The axioms of geometry, i.e. the axiomatic, which is not always emphasised in the usual axioms, although it can be used exclusively in their demonstrative function, do not contain, as Erdmann says, the "characteristics of spatial concepts". (The Axioms of Geometry, p. 91.) The axioms are neither "hypotheses" nor "postulates". It is not the meaning of the axiom decisive for Riemann's geometry that a parallel line through a point to a straight line is — for some reason — "impossible". Of course, this could only be "assumed". The axiom in question and the corresponding one by Lobachevsky contain only "less" than is given in pure intuition — at least ostensibly. It is strange enough that the axioms can contain less. Other propositions cannot help but "contain" what they express without deduction, even if it is not elevated to the sphere of explicit meaning. We note that Lobachevsky's geometry has retained a certain "pseudo-concreteness". From the outset, it is not at all clear why only one straight line should satisfy the requirements of the task underlying the statement of the parallel axiom. We encounter "possibilities" that are not "objective" in the sense that they can be supplemented technically. Accordingly, Euclid's parallel axiom does not refer to a "fact" that is supposedly evident in pure intuition. If the spatial relationships, as they are, were simply "described" in the axioms, then the conclusion, i.e. the mathematical proof, would remain without any real meaning. Similarly, Archimedes' axiom formulates something that is certainly not a fact that cannot be ignored. This axiom is "counterintuitive", but not — that would be a hasty interpretation().

— in the sense that Zufälliger, was "could also be different". We also recall the axiom that a mathematical quantity is equal to itself. The self-equality of a quantity expresses something that goes beyond

"self-evidence". (See p. 87.) When approaching axioms, I am obviously relieved of any obligation to consider whether their formulation can even be fulfilled in any given circumstance.

2) The concept of definiteness was developed by Husserl.

In axiomatic approaches, which are hidden in the definitions, all questions that can be formulated using only the defined terms are decided in principle. A negative number and a triangle are both lies. Arithmetic is a way of "handling" numbers. The fact that mathematics is "more doing than teaching" is indicated by the "correctness" of its constructions. Only as the solution to a problem does the equation $2 - 1 - 3 = 5$ "exist". It is a solution insofar as the numbers were calculated "correctly". The correctness of an equation is in no possible sense of the word a "truth" that has to be proven by any facts. However, the fact that the equation is exempt from such proof is not due to not any evidence or an necessity a priori, but to the fact that nothing (else) is merely stated in it. What is correct here, the equation, is not merely the "expression" of something. The incorrectness of a "solution" is the deficient mode of its correctness. The task has not been treated "in the proper manner".

Where it applies ... or there *is no* ... is not a task that needs to be solved. One "decides" that there is no such thing ... The expression "to judge" () characterises the attitude in which one approaches something questioningly, inquiringly. The "judgement" is — generally — something that one (ultimately) arrives at. In "*there is* ..." something has

been established. The negation *there is not* denotes — just like *there is* — the side on which a decision is made, and this is true or false insofar as it can only be positive or negative. The negation in " " ("There is no statement"), on the other hand, does not decide anything. It denies something, for example. Or

4) This original meaning of "judgement" is precisely what is referred to in transcendental logic. However, what is called "judgement" here has in fact merely been interpreted: the constitution of the transcendent object is "understood" as something that has been achieved in synthesis.

One might say, for example: ... The sun *was not shining*, so ... merely describes the cloudy weather, but does not actually "negate" anything. Similarly, the *absence of* ... something shows itself. What occurs can be described as "this animal"; "isolated" etc. are ways of saying "comes along"; and that it does not occur is a specific, namely the definite mode of "comes along" alongside the modes of "isolated" etc. occurrence.

"Frequently," "occasionally," etc., something is encountered. However, that which "exists" is not encountered "insofar as" it exists. And it is just as little the "subject" of the existence denoted by "it exists" as one can point to something that "is 5". (In the latter case, it is the number of certain things, but not *ely* these things themselves, that is "5". The addition of "rerrinzeft" etc. here does not denote a modality of "cc gi6t" — that something exists — in isolation, but merely explains this assumption. What is "determined" in it is that which can be positive or negative in the special sense that it can only be decided in this way.

§ 6. THE SO-CALLED QUALITY OF JUDGEMENTS

There are some who ... is equivalent to: *there are some who ...* *Ain4*, or *none*, are certainly not 1 or 0. That is, *there is one* and another one, *which ...* is not one singular number increased by another. 1 is itself a statement. Namely, as the quantity of what 1 "is" in the indefinable sense of the statement. But the fact that **rins**, *which ...*, (in connection with *es ict (there is) einy, which ...*) on the one hand increases, but on the other hand can only be fixed by the fact that it has a place in which it *exists*, shows the coupling of *A nz a h1* and *E x is te nz*:

1. The "specificity" of a number does not simply lie in the fact that 2, 3, etc. are specific units. According to Husserl, the concept of unity lacks "that which first gives numbers their character

•

However, "Yiel" or "little" is determined by specifying the quantity, i.e. by solving the newly conceived task in the "how much", not from something indeterminate to something definite. It is misleading here to assume that both the yield and the Ao number have an objective correlate. "Multiplicity in general ... is nothing more than: something and something and something, etc.; or someone and someone and something, etc.; or, more succinctly: one and one and one, etc." ...

"Each individual among the specific contents, which the concrete multiplicity-v o rst e11 u n Q comprehends within itself, is thought through the mediation of the concept of something^o)." But neither the "many" nor the numbers arise through "abstraction" from concrete concepts'). Moreover, the "and" that connects "something" with other "somethings" is not the decisive factor. It is not enough to say that a certain difference in meaning between one and "a thing" and "something" emerges from the fact that one "receives" the correlation to multiplicity as a co-designation[^]). For rief stands next to *little*, rrieitr uaw. Only as the poor nominalisation of ri#f does the word daa have

- 1) Hueaerl, Philosophy of Arithmetic 1 1891, p. 89.
- 2) Blocked by me.
- 3) 1. e. pp. 85/86.

4) Frege remained undecided on the question of what the number refers to. He answered with the concept. He then defined or as the number of a concept that does not fall under n. For example, the number of the concept "unequal to itself" (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, p. 84). Russell also defines the number as an abstract concept: "The number 3 is something which all trios have in common, and which distinguishes them from other collections. A number is something that characterises certain collections." Russell then discusses the case that there is only one thing in the world: "Then the inductive cardinals from o up to 9 would be what we expect, but t0 (defined as 9 -1) would be the null class." ... "Thus 10 and all subsequent inductive cardinals will be identical, since they will all be the null class." (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. p. 12, 432.) However, the assumption that the "null set is not actually a set at all" is not sufficient here. The reversal is already at work here. What is taken here as a "case", namely as a realisation of the number, is in fact only its actuality. As a statement, there is, for example, the 3; but in this case, nothing falls under 3 as a numerical "concept". (See Part I, p. 59.)

- 5) 1. c. p. 90.

makes sense; "Yielheit" does not refer to an abstract object, such as "the epitome . What is "much" (or "little"!) is not an "element" of a so-called multiplicity. "One here", which is

"one there" is increased by little or much, is "something or other". As "Something" or "a thing" only represents itself when its meaning is obscured. Through "abstraction" it becomes "something". As a mere abstraction, it leaves its result where it was originally encountered and where it can then be found again and determined backwards. Something, a *thing*, is the deficient mode of identification. But 2finer does not even identify in this deficient way. One counts "one here" and "one there"; on the basis of an observation, one assumes that there is one, without ... And the fact that the negative *none* stands next to the *one* clearly shows how what one means can only be defined in the first place through its use in statements. Nothing is addressed as one. *One in cc gives one, which is neither — generally —*

"something like" — individually — this thing that we encounter as existing. What is counted is not taken as "one" (as, for example, something is very well taken as a "part"). There are *small, u'efcfies* ... does not mean absence

t) If the ambiguities hidden in the term "something" are misunderstood, one also believes that one can classify the arithmetic of formal ontology. A distinction is made between purely mathematical and sustainable assumptions. Arithmetic loses the appearance of a general formal discipline through the actually self-evident explanation that its object is precisely the number, but not the dae ale "something" misunderstood as "... one of" — In contrast to Eanta's thesis that $5 -[-7 = 12]$ is aynthetic, Couturat argued: "If one thinks in reality of 7 units on one side and 5 on the other and thinks of these in reality as combined into a single number (which is the meaning of the sign $-$), one necessarily thinks of the number 12. "Van must not say that one steps out of the concept $7 -\} -5$, for 12 is precisely what it denotes: one does nothing other than realise it in the mind." (Die philosophischen Principles of Mathematics, ed. by Siegel 4 9t1, p. 268 ff.) Precisely **inssofar** as Couturat merely "abstracts" **from** the empirical nature of objects, these remain the actual subject of arithmetic operations. However, 7, 5, etc. are then also defined merely as "names" or signs and not as numbers.

worden.

from anything, — something like a18 expression for, that
dieaes
.nothing" would be.

Instead of *e• there is one that ...* one can also say: one thing *is ...*2). And the existential proposition becomes a particular judgement when dae *one* that or *u'efcfie*, which is determined as a *number* that ... or *T'iere*, which ...

2. Traditional logic describes the difference between singular, particular and universal judgements as a difference in quantity. "The common prerequisite for the formulation of these three types of judgement is that the subject concept in the judgement first delimits a certain or indefinite quantity of objects in some way. On this common basis, the judgements are then classified according to whether the subject concept selects only one, some, or all objects from the quantity thus delimited and makes them the subject objects of the judgement." Particular and universal judgements would thus be nothing more than plural predication. And "quantity" of the judgement would accordingly denote a difference in the relationship between the object of the predication and the concept at the predicate position . This difference would lie

So even before the actual "judgement", sotern as its schema is accepted here without question.

However, a truly plural judgement is, for example: *Fe and Hg are a metal*. Several subjects are assigned or denied the same predicate. The plural statement "contains" the say about the individual subjects. Apparently, it is no different with particular and universal judgements. And certainly — from "jedem" (or "manchem") "gilt' das, was in

1) According to Kant, it was "not entirely correct to say: A sea unicorn is an existing animal, but rather, conversely, certain existing sea animals are assigned the predicates that I associate with a unicorn. The only thing that is wrong here is the reversal of "something" in the sense of "a something that ..." to "anything that ..." motivated by adherence to the subject-predicate scheme of judgements.

2) A. Pfänder, Logic (Husserl's Yearbook IV, p. 255).

is expressed in these judgements. However, this does not mean that everyone (some people) says the same thing in summary, i.e. in the plural. Rather, it is precisely the opinion of the universal or particular judgement that something applies to everyone or some people. *All* negates the exception; *each* is *P* if there is nothing that is not *P*.

The negation of a plural predication is a simple *6cbfaas*. However, the negation of a universal judgement does not refer to the predicate at all; one denies that it applies to everyone, but does not claim that it does not apply to everyone. Site 6 contradicts *P*: some *S* are not *P*, insofar as this is equivalent to not *all S being P*.

Furthermore: plural statements have "fixed" subjects¹). However, the indeterminacy of *the single S* is by no means the indeterminacy "Any," namely "fixed" and perhaps also "given" *S*, whose determination would remain open in this case. Particular and universal judgements are not fixed judgements insofar as *some (all) S are P* is equivalent to: there *are some (old) S* that *are P*. (This taught the fixation of *deesen*, which contradicts the particular and universal judgements respectively.)

1) Sigwart correctly notes: The actual assertion is directed at ... strictly speaking, on the A11e ... The question to be answered by the judgement is whether those A to whom B pertains are all A, whether there are no exceptions. (Logic 3, I p. 217.) However, "all" does not necessarily mean "logically considered the predicate". According to Sigwart, the universal sentence actually reads: "Those A that are B are all A." However, what is correct here is only the performance of the universal judgement in the predicate of a sentence that is not, in this respect, the "universal judgement". As "predicate"

The individual things do not make up the whole. Sigwart's further explanation is therefore uncertain, and he sticks to the interpretation of the universal as a pure judgement: "All A are B is originally, according to the wording, only an expression of an empirical, i.e. through factual counting attainable, generality, and can only be expressed in relation to subjects that exist in a certain countable number and of which the predicate is asserted individually. It is the expression of a specific, limited comparison of the cases at hand, and it presupposes that I am certain of each individual judgement before I can assert it about all of them." {I. c. p. 248.)

2) In his 1942 lecture on logic, Hauer spoke of "fixed" judgements, i.e. categorical judgements, and of universal and particular judgements as "functional" judgements. "functional" judgements.

Particular and universal judgement eind also forms of existential judgements: *There are S that are P*, and there *is no S that is not P*. (This is the correct aspect of Fr. Brentano's theory of judgement.) In this respect, however, particular and universal judgements stand alongside judgements of the type: ... P S "are P, (— are (gi6tJ P S, dae ...). The emphasis here is on a statement. The number is determined. And accordingly, the universal judgement decides that it *applies to all*, was not ... , and the particular judgement that there are some *that* ...

3. The statements "att *Soind P*" and "not all *S are P*" contradict each other. Both are — in contrast to numerical data — "Contradictions", insofar as one is, in essence, the negation of the other; either they are all, or they are not all S, which ... "Positive" and "negative" are thus used in the sense of the Particular and universal judgement makes no distinction between "quality" as in the case of (fixed) predication. This is either affirmative or negative*). In the case of universal and particular judgements, however, it can be considered affirmative
Only that which is "P (not P)" can be described as positive or negative. In other words, that whose decision must be considered already made if the question is to arise at all, whose decision determines the particular or universal judgement.

However, the fact that this question is reduced to an either/or situation, that it requires a decision in the strict sense, is something special here. What is special about *some*, *few*, *all*, etc. as opposed to other specifications such as 2, 3, 4, etc. is that they are the negation of another. However, the decision here is always an existential relationship: *there is (k) one, there was (not)*. Insofar as this is stated in "all S are P", as in *there is no S that does not* ... , neither of these two are mutually exclusive.
"Equivalent".

1) See above, p. 44 ff.

Bolzano*) had already noted the equivalence of particular and existential propositions. For the theory of universal judgements, however, the doctrine of judgement as a combination of concepts was disastrous insofar as it seems to refer precisely to the scope of a "concept".

, the universal judgement is not a general statement. Examples of a general statement are, for example, *lead* is soft, or *butter* is a spreadable *fat*, *it lives longer*, etc.

This is peculiar to this animal. E8 is on average 80 cm tall and so large that it is rarely found alone, and in every case it has the aforementioned habit. One cannot say — as the additions show — that this characteristic can be found in every single zebra, which, on the other hand, only applies to "the zebra" insofar as it concerns the behaviour and characteristics of zebra specimens. And secondly, what applies to all of them is something other than what applies to them in general, because they are zebras. The universal judgement that *there is no zebra that does not...* denies an exception and contradicts insofar as *there is one* that does not... In the case of a general judgement, on the other hand, it is possible to supplement its general validity with a restriction.

t) Insofar as Bolzano interprets the existential proposition according to the subject-predicate scheme, he separates the particular judgements precisely from the propositions in which the number of these is specified, "what P is":

"But since not even the whole idea ' *A* ' exhausts the particular proposition, it follows that the particular proposition also exhausts the subject-predicate scheme."
of the particular proposition, that furthermore its predicate *eey*,
and that, consequently, the grammatical construction does not indicate any of the actual components of which the sentence consists; that it should basically be pronounced as follows: the idea of *A*, which is *B*, has objectivity: to my knowledge, this has not yet been noted. And since the actual nature of sentences of this kind was misunderstood, it was also impossible to notice that sentences containing an estimation of size, a determination of number, etc., belong to a different category. {1. c. II p. 266.)

2) Cf. hiemu Pfänder, l. c. p. 263.

3) For example, it is also generally true of a triangle that it has two right angles. Being a triangle and having two right angles are characteristics that are linked to each other. Being a triangle is the reason why this particular triangle also has the other characteristic mentioned. In this respect, what applies without restriction is necessary. And what applies in a restricted sense is possible: the triangle "can" be right-angled, for example.

However, this possibility is linked precisely to the fact that what is present here is what is referred to as with the context of the subject-

"concept". Namely, a range of "cases" designated by the specification of the subject that are affected by the predicate of the general statement.

General is the statement according to its "subject". The universal judgement has in contrast at all no such

"Subject". In "There is no zebra which is not..." Zehro merely designates that which is relevant for understanding the statement to which this statement (that there is no exception for a particular predicate) refers. The generality of the universal judgement is not necessarily "empirical"*) and that of the general does not always need to be a "necessary" generality. The possible necessity in the case of the general "judgement", which is referred to as "judgement modality", is in fact the necessity of the consequential relationship between the determination of the predicate and that of the subject. It is not something that can be missed in the case of the universal judgement in the sense that one could speak here of a "merely comparative" generality. What is being compared here is in fact *sich* *hath in Verschieden*s. For the generality of the universal judgement — i.e. the statement that there is no case that does not ... — does not at all concern the factual relationship between a particular predicate and a particular subject. The universal judgement has the factuality of a statement, insofar as this merely

"exists", and the "quantity" is what is specified. In the general statement, however, the "quantity" lies precisely in the fact that something applies generally. Here, too, "general" does not denote the "truth" of the statement, but rather the validity that is being asserted. The statement of the universal judgement, on the other hand, can — no differently than a number — only be false or true. That *all are who* ... is the

t) Cf. Sigwart (quote from note t on p. 60).

Result, but not the basis of the universal judgement guaranteed by the scope of the subject concept. A general statement requires a "scope of validity". These are the things that must be proven in order to show that it applies from A in every case, or in the average case, etc. However, universal and particular (!) judgements relate to the validity of something. They establish its universality or limitation. Their correctness is only proven in a scope of validity, or rather in relation to the question they answer. However, in neither case does a "concept" define this scope of validity*).

In the interpretation of particular and universal judgements as plural predication, the singular judgement was confused with the fixed single predication^). Strictly speaking, however, the singular is nothing more than an existential judgement.

t) J. St. Mill (System of Deductive and Inductive Logic, translated by Schiel, Vol. I, p. 232) notes that "inference from the general to the particular cannot prove anything as such, since no particular propositions can be deduced from a general proposition other than those already assumed to be known by the main proposition." In fact, however, we do not infer from the general, but from the particular to the particular. "The inference is complete once we have asserted, for example, that all human beings are mortal ... The mortality of Johann, Thomas and company is ultimately the only proof we have for the mortality of the Duke of Wellington. The insertion of a general judgement adds **nothing** to the proof." Certainly — but here, conclusions can only be drawn from the particular to the particular insofar as the mortality of Johann, Thomas, etc. was discovered or induced as a general characteristic, i.e. as a property of human beings. Mortality

"follows" — immediately — from being human. A universal "judgement", on the other hand, would be merely a statement in which, of course, the action might be right, what one supposedly "deduces" in the process, is already implied. — There are difficulties even in the concept of "premia", and the scheme of the concluding figure does not do justice to either case.

2) However, this confusion also makes it possible for a singular judgement understood as an individual judgement to prove to be fundamentally universal or particular. Universal insofar as the individual subject represents the entire scope of his concepts. And particular insofar as it is an individual instance of a general concept. "The very fact that the singular judgement can be regarded as both general and particular shows that it need not be subordinated to either of them and therefore has a certain independence from them. If one wishes to coordinate it with the general and particular

4. Only if one makes the aforementioned mistakes is it possible to divide the "judgements" according to quantity. But not even the particular and universal judgements are two types of judgements. For particular and universal are the two possible decisions on a particular question. As two

"Types" of statements could be described, for example, as zazz "ots and Äz6;noiq. These are modes of expression that belong together insofar as there is a specific difference between them. *All S are P, some 5 are not P*, are now, of course, typical statements. The "statements" are true or not true. However, as shown earlier, the contradiction is reversed, e.g. against the observation on the basis of which something was stated. Or, as here, against daa affe. All of this is "false". For the time being, therefore, the statement is true or false, but not the "judgement" contained in it. "

However, this judgement is also not what is actually false. Or rather, the judgement is only false in the sense that one might say, for example, that it was "wrongly chosen" if the number is wrong. As a "judgement", we define here a certain mode of relating to things, just as counting is a logical "operation" that is designed to determine the number to be achieved. The term "universal (or particular) judgement" is therefore ambiguous. If it is synonymous with universal (or particular) statement, then this is determined by a characteristic that does not define its "type" but its content. However, if one understands "judgement" as an operation, then ist "universal" is the determination of its result, and the universal and particular

To describe "judgement" as a type of judgement is just as much as listing the different numbers as types of counting.

When judging, it is most important to regard it as a judgement without any indication of quantity, as categorical judgements are in their simplest form." (Drobißch, Logic, p. 50).

t •) The distinction between judgements based on their quantity is attributed to Aristotle. However, Aristotle meant by zo'ß•okou or tv }stpei the actual relationship between z«cv} opouJicvov and 6nozciJicvov. ct. de interpret. 17a 38 and analyt. prot. A 24a t6.

2*) p. 36.

5. In summary, it can be said that the statement is "true" insofar as it presents the things themselves. Through hearsay, one not only learns about what exists; rather, one perceives something: the statement "contains what is spoken and articulated. The statement communicates what exists as it is "interpreted" and "uncovered". It is not the primary locus of truth. And in particular, the "truthfulness" of the statement is not a reading of its "correspondence with" things*). Certainly — it is as stated. Namely, in reality, and that is: "in truth" it is so. Only in this respect is reality the horizon of dealing with things. And it is unlosable, insofar as one deals with the things that one "understands" in this respect. The fact that the untrue leg (of a statement) is the deficient mode of truth^o) is linked to the other fact that, insofar as one recites something, one expresses oneself in the process. Namely, for example

"his" observation, etc. Or, for example, by stating something, or "determining" or "comparing" it, etc. Or by saying yes and no. However, statements, determinations, comparisons, etc., and yes and no cannot be "true" or

"not true", but only right or wrong. They are

"within the framework of" truth. What traditional logic distinguishes as forms of statement is — strictly speaking — already distinguished by the "system" to which it belongs. The truthfulness of the statement is something that can only become a problem when it is incorporated into the analytics of existence. The correlate of truthfulness is therefore also falsehood in traditional logic. Consequently, however, its content should not have included "statements". Traditional logic, however, understood the statement from the outset under the scheme of predication, and this scheme also included the "Judgement" forced. The "logical principles" etc. can

1) Cf. Heidegger, I. c. p. 2t6 and the following remarks on p. 66.

2) See p. 68.

3) Cf. Heidegger, I. c. passim.

only **gain a** fulfilling meaning in relation to logical operations. This has been misunderstood in conjunction with the difference between predication, **statement and judgement**.

§ 7. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ORDER OF THINGS

There is a contradiction between the statement *that it is raining* and the other that the sun is shining. And there are cases in which one discovers only a "certain" contradiction, for example in two reports. The reports are not "unanimous".

"Two statements contradict each other" means that what one says contradicts what the other says. However, it does not mean that two "sentences" contradict each other, or two "statements of a certain kind". Traditional logic attempts to make the well-known , what contradicts each other : Ee acien

"Judgements of opposite quality". And by that she means, "that this is the case" contradicts "that it is different, i.e. nicht - so ". There is, of course, an equivalence between "behaving differently" and "not behaving differently". But this is only because "that it is so" is the schema of the assertion, which must be supplemented by "as stated". The fact here is identical, which can only be positive or negative. For only whether it behaves or not can be asked. It is the correlate of a pretension that can only be crossed out. — Between assertion and denial ("of the same" fact), however, there is more , as the relationship is one of mere contradiction. They are original, i.e. they relate to each other on their own. It is therefore nothing more than a deception from elsewhere when logic seeks to make the scheme of positive and negative facts the one where the contradiction exists between the closer ones.

"Contradiction" refers to a relationship between statements. Contradiction is not a "normal" relationship in the sense that two statements only contradict each other in terms of their form

. It is contradictory insofar as it is precisely a contradiction. Only by taking the statement as the representative of its object could one be led to link its relationship to other statements to formal criteria.

Claims are denied. Statements can only be be "disputed". For example, by saying no. *No* is an expression of disagreement with something. "Disagreement with" is not a "statement of opinion". When I disagree, I am not only rejecting the statement on my part. I am also opposing it insofar as this statement is affirmed in the no. Yes and no are modes of affirming a statement. But *no* also affirms the disagreement insofar as it "Expression" is'). The fact that "*no*" expresses contradiction on the one hand, but also affirms the statement on the other, means that the term "besagen" ambiguous. It precisely reveals the nature of contradiction: for one contradicts insofar as the statement in question does not adhere to the facts. And in doing so, one does not actually dispute the statement, but rather what one considers to be false insofar as one contradicts the statement. In other words, a determination, or a statement, etc. One disputes its correctness. However, "besagt" then also means, in line with the contradiction it expresses (), the statement, insofar as () one () does not () "primarily" can dispute. "There" and "no" refer to the statement in the sense of of the (entire) report . For as that which "what" is true (or not true), one can only state the statement in the sense that the statement is the (secondary) "location" of the truth. "False" and "true", on the other hand, are genuine characteristics which — insofar as they apply to the statement, etc., or not — can also be disputed.

The contradiction between statements is not a consequence of any formal nature of these statements. The relationship in which they stand to each other — contradicting each other — is

1) Vgl. S. 36.

not "impossible". The fact that only "one of the two can be true" does not destroy the other. What contradicts each other does not exclude each other in this respect (in the actual sense of the word, in that the "contradictory" characteristics of an object actually exclude each other).

Is contradiction a negative criterion of truth? Bolzano remarks on this: "Criterion, i.e. characteristic (affirmative or negative characteristic), of a thing, we actually only call such a property whose observation can help us to recognise the existence or non-existence of the thing. So I would have no objection to *gar nichts dagegen wenn man das Vor-handenseyn einer Widerspruehe unter gegebenen Sätzen A, B, C, type*, a criterion or indicator of the fact that they are not all true; for the observation of that contradiction can often lead us to the recognition of this fact. We sometimes see that certain propositions before us are not all true, precisely because they lead to a contradiction. However, this existence of a contradiction between given propositions is ... by no means a proposition, neither the proposition of agreement nor that of contradiction" ¹). When we speak of the proposition of contradiction as a criterion of truth, we mean a characteristic that is fulfilled in what contradicts each other and which then indicates that certain consequences must be taken into account. Just as certain side and angle ratios are criteria for congruence

t) Bolzano, I. c. p. 203 ff. "Must we indeed first notice that a given **proposition contradicts** 'the proposition of contradiction' before we can find it false? ... The perception that it contradicts whatever we know with certainty to be true is sufficient for us to recognise its falsity. It will therefore come as no surprise that I.

was not inclined to devote a separate section of logic to the formulation of these propositions, especially since I do not find that those who have done so have made particularly important use of them, or that their formulation has enabled them to present certain other doctrines more thoroughly or more orderly than they could have done without them.

two triangles. Criteria must therefore be discovered. We find "formal" criteria, for example, in logical statements, according to which other certainties are then excluded. Only as long as the statements were taken as logical structures, namely as "sentences" in whose "validity" the "subject matter" of the statement was determined, could such (negative) criteria of "truth" be assumed. However, the existence of a contradiction is by no means an actual "criterion" that could be invoked as an objective, albeit formal, reason. The contradiction between statements indicates nothing more than what it "is".

In the usual formulations, the law of contradiction appears only ostensibly to refer to "statements," but in fact refers only to predicates. According to Pfänder, the contradiction here exists "between the positive and negative reference of the predicate's determinacy to the subject object*)." The law of contradiction supposedly establishes the "temporal-ontological fact that an object cannot be both P and non-P at the same time". Pfänder adds here: an object "in the same place" (i.e. "the same flower cannot be red in one place and yellow in another, *a18o non-red aein°*"). And in response to further objections to the validity of the law of contradiction, he reminds us that

"the judgement which asserts that the flower is red at a certain point, ... contains a time determination as an essential component^). Both corrections are superfluous. They misjudge the nature of the "predication about" or the predicative determination. For insofar as red appears as a characteristic of a subject, "at any (or a specific) place" necessarily complements "red". Or, as a characteristic, "red" differs not only specifically from "yellow", but also from

1) Pfänder, 1. c. p. 357.

2) 1. p. 344.

3) 1. c. p. 365.

e.g. "red and yellow". The colours differ specifically. However, the *ens praedicabile* only presents itself as that which results from grass at any given time¹⁾.

However, when an object is defined as *ens praedicabile*, the contradiction between two predicates remains. If the "subject" here is reduced to an unknown quantity for which the respective predicate is one among other arguments, its "identity" is only one interpretation of the unanimity of these predicates. The fact that "something" cannot be non-P if it is P does not indicate any insight into the behaviour of "something". Namely, as "something at all" understood as the supposed subject of a formal ontology.

The "predication of what" is affected by the contradiction principle insofar as it appears here as one of the premises of the principle of determinability: each thing can have at most one of mutually contradictory characteristics. The principle of determinability has a correct core, which is simply not captured in its formulation. Nothing can have "red" and "yellow" as characteristics (but "red and yellow [speckled]" can be a characteristic). Of course, this is not because, in general, "a thing can have at most one of two contradictory characteristics". For then there would be no reason for this. The "general" would remain without a basis. This line of reasoning leads into obscurity. We would rather stick to the idea that yellow and red are contradictory characteristics and arrive at the following statement: If two characteristics A and B differ specifically, then A (is) — non-B (is) and B (is) — non-A (is). This applies to characteristics in general.

The universality of this newly derived proposition is no different from that of a proposition about "triangles in general". It is not "more general". The fact that it applies to form1 only means that its validity is linked to something whose meaning includes a

1) Vgl. S. 42.

A blank space whose filling is documented. Only temporary holdings have an openness similar to that of a blank space, whose "filler" is not a further specification of these holdings. We limit the term "blank space" to these cases. For example, "feature" is a formal inventory, whereas "feature" is not further defined by red. Like "colour" in red, it undergoes a factual supplementary definition that is potentially predetermined in the inventory of "colour". It is therefore wrong to contrast the formal with the factual.

This statement of specific differences applies to characteristics, and we learn what contradicts each other. Here it becomes clear how P and non-P are merely the form of the contradiction. The contradiction is expressed in P and non-P insofar as P and non-P constitute a contradiction*). In the given version, the theorem of determinability is therefore not a theorem of contradiction, because the contradiction is stated here not as a reason but as a consequence.

§ 8. KANT'S ANALYTICAL JUDGEMENTS

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant formulates the principle of contradiction:

"No thing can be predicated of anything that contradicts it." In the Prolegomena, he states more clearly: "If the (analytic) judgement is affirmative, then the predicate must be identical with one of the characteristics of the subject; if it is negative, then one must be found among the characteristics of the subject that contradicts the predicate."

In logic, the "concept" is defined as

"a synthesis of the characteristics of the object in question, which may be more or less complete".

Kant's doctrine of analytical judgements coincides with the view that in "Gold is a yellow metal," for example, something is taken as standing under a certain concept in place of the subject.

1) *Sgt. p. 46.*

2) *Logic § 103.*

taken up and included in the predication. The characteristics that distinguish gold — namely this substance — are not, in their complexion, a "concept" under which something falls. The pieces "of" (!) gold are not the subject of analytical judgements if one wanted to say, for example, what is implied in their "concept". For example, it is part of the "concept" of a needle to have a point; one says that a needle is a "quality concept". But the point here more specifically characterises the particular "tool". And as a needle,

i.e. this tool, an object can still be referred to as such even if it has lost its tip. For only if it is manufactured for a specific purpose is it a *needle* at all, but not on the basis of any "external" characteristics, according to which alone it would be summarised as an object under a "concept". For example, it does not mean that a horse is devoid of any meaning if it is described as a "mere external" feature. Certainly, it is not "by its nature". And only because it has this particular feature...

s a c h li c h e r t ü llt, it is a *Krippertsetzer*. But the difference difference between this and the first example is simply that the animal is identified as a *cribber* or as *Sehimmel*, *Rappe*, etc. Only when this is known, i.e. based on the ity of this one characteristic, is it a white horse*).

t) See H. Ritzel, Über analytische Urteile (On Analytical Judgements).

(Hu8serlß Jahrb. III, esp. pp. 304 ff.) The understanding of the nature of analytical judgements is also made dependent there on a correct interpretation of the concept of the subject. Admittedly, here in the sense of what is "meant" in the subject. Ritzel correctly notes that *Schimmel* does not refer to a horse "as it is...", but "insofar as it is white". White is meant pointedly when something is characterised as grey. Ritzel then distinguishes between predicative and "determinative" characteristics. This distinction remains biased by the usual theory of the "concept" and, in particular, of its meaning in the so-called "judgement".

Bolzano notes that "there are propositions that are true or false in their entirety if certain parts of them are assumed to be variable". A proposition is analytical if there is even a single concept in it

So if one takes it upon oneself to investigate what is "already contained in the concept," then it is very much a question of whether what is "already contained in the concept" actually applies to what falls under the so-called concept. On the other hand, the statement that "in a negative analytical judgement, one of the characteristics of the subject must be found" contradicts the predicate and presupposes a version of the analytical judgement according to which this is not even — in general — a predication. Negative analytical judgements would be, for example, "*a compass is not square*" or "*a scarf is not heavy*". In these sentences, the subject has already undergone a determination in the direction in which the predicate lies. However, the reason for the possibility of such a second determination must also be stated here. Precisely in the case of analytically negative judgements, one can — contrary to Kant — designate "a basis for the truth of our knowledge". Namely, the sentence about the specifically different characteristics. However, the dignity of such negative analytical sentences is by no means outstanding. We also find it in other propositions, provided that they are based on some propositions of such a "formal ontology" that we could even call "analytics". Kant describes affirmative analytical judgements as Explanatory judgements. However, explanations are not "judgements" at all, whose correctness is linked to the fulfilment of a criterion. Their "purpose" is simply to "explain" something. Right and wrong are not inherent characteristics of explanations. The formulation: in *prae-*

that can be arbitrarily altered without affecting its truth or falsehood. However, the term "idea" here refers to the "concept" in the sense of a word as a sign, merely associated with a word.

"Determination". Bolzano defines the analytical judgement in connection with discussions about the validity of propositions: "How much a proposition is valid, or how much validity it has, should ... mean as much as the quantity of true propositions that develop from it when certain ideas in it that are to be regarded as changeable are exchanged for others according to a given rule, in relation to the quantity of all." {1. c. II. p. 82}.

4') Blocked by me.

2') Ksd.rY. p. 167.

dicatur continetur totum explizite, quod in subjecto est impli-zite merely describes the (correct) explanation, without thereby being the "principle" of positive analytical judgements in any other sense, al8 that an explanation proceeding in this manner is a correct explanation. The sentence in question is no more a "supreme" sentence of logic than Kant's law of contradiction, namely a negative criterion or a criterion of the form "truth"*. It only appears as such here if the term "explanation" is used solely to designate a "judgement" according to its practical meaning.

t) Both propositions are merely *conditiones sine qua non* of intellectual usage, negative criteria. Maimon objected that, just as mathematical concepts presuppose an a priori construction, so too logical propositions presuppose transcendental conditions of the reality of their concepts in terms of ideas. Accordingly, transcendental logic must precede general formal logic, since the former provides the latter with the underlying concept of real thinking. More specifically, there is no contradiction between concepts at all, but only between propositions. Thus, one cannot simply formulate the proposition of contradiction as A not non-A. For then nothing at all would be posited. But it would be posited if I added B as a predicate to A. However, if B is something different from A and, on the other hand, is only something that does not contradict A, then A could be both B and non-B, so that the law of contradiction would, as it were, dispense with itself (Krit. Unters. über den men8ehl. Geist t 794, pp. 22/23). According to Kant, he argues, "a square compass would be square". Here, however, the "a ..." is just as insidious as the "no ..." in Kant's example "no uneducated person is educated". (With this formulation, Kant had wanted to counter the objection that an uneducated person is not necessarily uneducated, insofar as he can be one thing at one time and the opposite at another, without using a time specification. That Kant's example is universally or generally understood to be just as false here as Maimon's example against Kant does not prove what it is supposed to prove. In both cases, a proposition has merely been reiterated. The question is, of course, justified: whose proposition is actually "certain" here? (However, the example cited by Naimon demonstrates how analytical knowledge in the sense of conceptual knowledge is by no means necessarily a "poor mode of cognition". Maimon is mistaken when he claims that "it presupposes the synthetic mode of cognition for its reality" (Attempt at a New Logic, p. 423/24). An angular compass is, according to what can be salvaged from the "law of contradiction," impossible, unless the compass and angularity are specifically different characteristics and the existence of such a **figure** would **indeed** amount to the combination of characteristics. This impossibility is "analytical" as opposed to the "synthetic" impossibility of, for example, a regular decahedron, in which incompatible properties are designated by the same characteristics.

recognises the concept of judgement, but in doing so abandons the original meaning of "statement," "explanation," etc., defining it instead as a transcendental achievement. Only then does the formal aspect of logic appear as a universal principle of its binding nature. Analytical and synthetic are, for Kant, types of knowledge that are taken as the result of an operation that can only be described as a judgement or predication.

Addendum.

Firstly, identity denotes non-difference. However, something is either different or identical. Difference is not a relationship that exists between those of whom we say that "it (!) is different".

"Colour" is different, but red and green are only different in the sense that they stand in a specific relationship to each other. Or two things are different insofar as they are not the same. Pure difference does not exist in relation to that which, if it were related to each other in any way, would not even presuppose difference as fulfilled in itself. In itself, it exists only insofar as the assertion that something is different is true or not. Being different denies being identical, and vice versa. And just as difference is not a multi-membered relation, identity is a single-membered relation.

"Reflexive" relation. "In itself" is not identical. That which is not different is not simply and directly "the same", but rather, for example, the same colour. "Numerical" difference is inherent. If one thinks that something here and there is identical, one is not referring to what one has merely pointed to here and there, nor to something that one would have assumed to be "the identical" in this case. But that is sufficient to demonstrate the inconsistency of a proposition of identity.

t) The formula $A = A$, on the other hand, does make sense in mathematics. It can be expressed as follows: Every quantity is equal to itself. The equality of a mathematical quantity with itself is referred to, for example, when **proving the congruence of two triangles** that **share** a side. The congruence exists — let us say for now — between the triangles that are drawn, and not between the drawings on the **board**. Secondly, however, the congruence would be meaningless if "the same triangle" **were** drawn twice, i.e. if the mathematician were dealing with "eidetic singularities" of triangles. In constructing his triangles, the mathematician only applies certain axioms, perhaps hidden under "definitions", and what is supposedly correct about the triangles is a consequence of this application of axioms and their combination with further axioms. The figure that is constructed does not come into consideration at all for the mathematician as something that exists in any sense—even in the sense of "ideal objects". The perpendicular CD filled on the basis of an isosceles triangle $A B C$ is, of course, a triangle side in $A D C$ and in $B C D$, and a subject of these and other predications.

Identical or different from *aein* are *A n ga be n*. There are cases in which both apply with regard to the *NBmliehe*. Identity then appears as that which is "preserved" in the process. *For example*, as the identity of the substance in its changing states. However, the fact that water frozen into **ice** is still "water", or that liquid water and ice are only different states of "the same thing", only demonstrates the meaning of the "concept" of water. And likewise, metamorphosis is not something whose "possibility" can be grasped. Rather, it is a concept under whose guidance things are questioned and a kind of nature is discovered. *For example*, *Papilio maehaon*, which overwinters as a pupa and then becomes an *imago*. And in the case of an object in our home furnishings, such as the stove in the corner room, it is irrelevant to the constancy of the references constitutive of a *concept* whether, for example, it was completely rebuilt from scratch. In all these cases "Remains" is not what "Waaser" or *Papilio machaon* or "the stove in the corner room" is. Precisely because it does not remain (co), or does not need to remain (so), it follows from the conceptual shift to which it refers "the same animal" new. The shift that something "remains the same" refers, of course, to a non-change, but what remains the same, namely, *for example*, "remains a *Kenne*," does not therefore eat "identically," as if it could not change in the process). — If I pick up my bicycle, then its scattered parts belong to the same bicycle, and thus only other bicycles are excluded. And even if the parts were to ever become part of a

it is "identical". But with the masculinity of *C D*, the congruence of the triangles cannot be proven from the outset. For this identity, which can only be read from certain predication, which, like these, are nothing more than a fact, is not a possible axiomatic root in the *proof* of the congruence of the triangles. However, if one insists that the statement "A quantity is equal to itself" is a mathematical proof, then there is a "necessity" for the "inevitability" of an axiom as the root of a mathematical theorem. *A = A* therefore does not refer here to the identity that makes it possible to speak of equality with itself. The special nature of this equality is often overlooked in arguments against the synthetic nature of mathematical propositions. Equality and identity are confused, or the former is corrected by the latter. For example, if one believes that instead of numbers, one must speak more precisely of numerical concepts that are only "realised" in the particular "sets" that are compared in the equation, etc. Or if one understands — it is significant that, for example, in Couturat's presentations, both are used as arguments — the "definition" of 2 by $t\{-\}1$, 2 is not understood as being the same as $t\{-\}1$, but simply as "the same as" $t\{-\}1$, i.e. defined only as another designation for it (Zimmermann, Kant's mathematical prejudice (Ber. d. Wien. Kais. Ak. d. Wies. Philos.-Hist. Kl. Vol. 67 Couturat, Die philos. Prinzipien der Math., translated by Siegel, p. 268 ff.).

1 •) For example, in Hume's view, sameness is a concept that one forms — "rightly or wrongly" — about the behaviour of things: ... a single object, placed before us, and surveyed for any length of time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity... We have a distinct idea of an object that remains invariable and uninterrupted through a supposed variation of time; and this idea we call that of identity or sameness" (A Treatise of Human Nature (Ed. Green and Grose Vol. I p. 490, 535).

be used for other purposes, — it remains part of my bicycle. Destroyed, it has only lost its material "identity" — the misunderstood meaning to which something like a bicycle can be referred and used.

What remains, i.e. what is "permanently still present", is, on the other hand "the wax" when the candle melts and becomes a lump. "Remaining" is a mode of existence. "Identical" is not at all relevant here. For After the candle has been consumed, only a lump remains. However, one thing has been transformed into another. It is not merely a case of one thing replacing another. At the beginning and end of the process, there is indeed a change. However, the second thing arose from the first. The transformation is, as it were, the counterpart to metamorphosis, in which "only the form" changed. However, both are purely conceptual, i.e. they can only be understood hermeneutically, but are not facts that can be grasped ontologically. The **so-called identity** is not **constitutive** for either one or the other. It is just as little so here as it was in the case of equality, or as it was in the case of the explanation of its principle.

And finally, a third case: a person looks like this and that. Their appearance is not their essence. But it is their appearance. They do not transform into it, nor do they actually change their form. Acquiring their appearance is not a (temporal) fate of the body. His appearance changes with his states. At different levels, he can be found as having become manifest. However, it is part of the concept of appearance that the colours in which the body appears are understood as a translation of its physical state. Insofar as colour is embedded in the appearance of something — and this is how it is encountered in its original form — the "identity" of an "object" does not come to mind at all. Namely, what it would be like — "red", for example, and "such and such". The object is, of course, "identical". Namely, if it is trans- cendent. Identity only denotes here — and here precisely — the turn towards which the object is to be understood as *ens praedicabile*. Namely, as that in which what is given in experience comes into agreement and correspondence. That a body "looks as it is" is the attempt to explain its appearance without being able to escape the indefinable "as it is". But that this particular appearance and this

1) Compare, on the other hand, Linke, *Phenomenology and Experiment in the Question of the Perception of Movement* (Husaerls Jahrb. II p. 9). There, the transformation is described precisely as a metamorphosis: In order to destroy the idea of transformation at a stroke, one need only believe that "what **stands** at the beginning and end of the transformation" are different objects that are intrinsically foreign to each other, and not mere attributes or "ways of appearing" of one and the same thing. Insofar as one thing transforms into another, there is nothing "behind" it, only "different beginnings" to be discovered. Of course

— "something transforms itself". Niimlieh **z.B.** "the scene" on the Theatre stage. The fact that it is possible here to specify the supposedly identical "something" in the transformation (al8 whose approach aonat only refers to what is at its beginning] is only due to the particular nature of this case. The scene — that is, not the wings, etc. — is linked to the concept of the "scene" in that it "changes," just as it is part of the concept of betting that something is this way or that way, i.e., that it "changes."

2) See Part I, p. 88.

Certain characteristics belong to a particular thing; the formula is something that arises from experience. Namely, as a motivation that has to prove itself. The same thing here is not something that one encounters, something that one could address as this or that. The identical bearer of properties only steps in when original contexts of meaning are missing, or when they are replaced by the vessel of a constitution of transcendent objectivity. Originally, identity is nothing more than a statement. It can only become constitutive in the first place by being restricted.

§ 9. THE REPLACEMENT FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE THIRD PART

1. Statements that contradict each other need not be true. What contradicts each other only appears as an alternative if — when — dae eich - anders - (ale said) - behaves b es a gt. Namely, as a ni c h t — s o (as said) — sichverhalten. The contradiction between the two statements appears as the result of one statement. Namely, transposed into the denial of what can be asserted with reference to this statement. However, the fact that a situation exists or does not exist does not exclude a third option in the sense that "there is no third option". For the The possibility that it exists or does not exist exists, boils down to the fact that a claim can only be (confirmed or) crossed out. The claim it makes is evident in this. One is only led to the assumption of a third excluded alternative if the negative fact is not recognised as merely the correlate of the negation. However, through position and negation, the fact is not characterised at all as the correlate of a claim (which can only find its content in a statement), nor is this statement characterised as if it had a "quality". The statement "it is not raining" can be interpreted to mean that the weather is characterised by the absence of "disturbance by rain", or that denying rain is part of the "content" of this statement. *Ea regnet not is but not simply the negative Gegen-*

piece to m *rains*. Statements lack the "identical", which can be positive or negative; the fact is constituted as identical in the first place by negation, insofar as it conveys the reference to the assertion.

2. In contrast, the SatE of the excluded third party seems to be fulfilled in the case of predication. A certain characteristic either applies to a certain subject or it does not; the subject must decide with regard to the characteristic. (The version that of two contradictory characteristics, at least one applies to a subject — this is how the second* premise of the sentence of determinability is formulated — no longer requires discussion. For contradictory characteristics are, for example, yellow and red. On the one hand, the proposition in question treats p and non-p as two characteristics, but on the other hand, it only appears to be correct because it determines the second characteristic solely from its relationship to the first. Let the characteristic be called Q; and let us assume that the possibility of distinguishing it from other characteristics R, S, T ... is sufficient to discuss it as a certain characteristic of "every possible subject". It has been shown how, for example, red, etc., i.e. the colours, are not themselves automatically the "characteristics", but in the case mentioned, for example, the "colours" determined by red, etc. In other words, something that is categorically defined. By defining it as a "characteristic", we have not abstracted from the references to which something can first become the factual occupant of the empty form "characteristic". As long as we leave it at the "factual determinations" of an "object", it is simple. But the characteristic whose occurrence or non-occurrence is in question contains, beyond the

"Definition" beyond their classification in a specific category°). And further: The zebra, for example, has characteristics, and

t) see p. 82.

2) See p. t2.

Its characteristics also apply (and even more so, namely as characteristics) to zebra specimens. However, the characteristics of the genus and of what belongs to it must again be considered as different here if the characteristics are regarded as objective determinations. The horse is not black or not; it can be both, and the fact that it can be different colours is again a characteristic of the horse, just like its single hoof. Finally: something like "Cribber" is a characteristic that is free from the difficulties arising from the validity of a general characteristic for an individual specimen — but it describes a characteristic that does not simply "define" its bearer. "Cribber" means that such a horse sometimes or often ... If, therefore, one takes the characteristics where they can be found on their own — namely in things — then it is by no means certain that it can be determined for each individual whether or not it has a particular characteristic. This question — as defined — overlooks the significance that a characteristic has as a defining and distinguishing feature. The fact that a characteristic "does not apply" to the subject always refers to the "definition" — regardless of whether the "not" may already have been predetermined insofar as the basis for this definition is lacking*). Only a

1} Under the heading "Quality of Judgements," Kant lists affirmative, negative, and indefinite judgements. "In affirmative judgements, the subject is conceived within the sphere of a predicate; in negative judgements, it is placed outside the sphere of the latter; and in indefinite judgements, it is placed within the sphere of a concept that lies outside the sphere of another. Everything possible is either A or non-A. So if I say that something is non-A, e.g. the human soul is immortal, ..., co iat dies ein unend-logical judgement" (Logic p. 160/161). Kant's example is not valid. For immortality denotes the deficient mode of mortality. Immortal = immortal. It is not a "negative characteristic", such as not yellow. Secondly, however, not-yellow is not just the equivalent of red, green, etc. They lie "outside the sphere" of yellow; and certainly it is not determined here under which concept the object belongs. But not merely that it belongs to the sphere outside "yellow", which is not actually a sphere at all, but only the boundary of a sphere to infinity or the boundary itself." Rather, the last words can only refer to the case where not only the determination B. Btr., but also the category remains open.

categorically possible characteristic. However, the fact that it can only be agreed or disagreed upon is only synonymous with the "exclusion of a third party" if "exclusion" is not understood in the same way as, for example, apetic different characteristics actually "exclude" each other. The supposed alternative is nothing more than the either/or implied by the decision as a decision. And then: if one insists, for example, that the horse is not fawn-coloured (but rather multi-coloured, i.e. "also fawn-coloured"), one thereby abandons the actual function of the characteristic as a criterion for determining the specimen. However, a characteristic does not determine an object at all. The relationships of a characteristic to a subject, designated in x«cdyxoiq and öa6\$zotq, can be modified in general. This, however, introduces a new restriction and clarification of what can still be formulated — namely, according to the restrictions already mentioned — as the excluded middle. It refers not only to categorically possible determinations, but also only to those that actually apply to the subject or do not. This not only prevents the application of the principle of excluded middle with regard to its consequences, but also presupposes criteria for its own abstract correctness instead of providing them.

3. The concept of "characteristic" is where the real difficulties lie. They became apparent in the first concrete case where the law of excluded middle could have been used, and where it was not only unsuitable for taking on the role of a criterion of truth, but where it actually gave rise to the very difficulties that led to its being invoked in the first place. I am referring to the difficulties that arose in mathematical discussions about the actual infinite. It was embarrassing to realise that the errors in the arithmetic of the infinite were not inherent here, but rather

how logic itself led to a dilemma of inextricable contradictions. The predicament that arose here was a special one. It was not simply a case of one discipline passing on the same difficulty to another. In mathematics, antinomies had been encountered. An antinomy is different from a paradox. An antinomy exists between two theses, each of which can be proven from an apparently correct approach. A paradox, however, arises when it is generally proven that A is p, that A is not p. The severity of the paradox lies in the indestructible tension that exists in the fact that A is either p or not p. Mathematicians believed that they could simply restrict this approach by means of a prohibition. But axiomatically, the root of the paradox is not attainable at all. Rather, it can only be attained by testing the principle of excluded middle itself. In particular, by testing what is designated as }Yter k-m a1 in cases where, according to the principle in question, a decision is made about the belonging of things to K1a s s e n. The solution to the paradoxes lies precisely in demonstrating that what is treated as a simple constitutive property, i.e. as something that categorically belongs to a thing or not, is in fact reduced to a characteristic that could belong to the thing in question on the basis of the decision of another alternative. For example, whether the thing occurs in a predication of a certain property or not. But here, on the basis of the decision as to whether there is — in general — a predication of a certain property in which the thing occurs, or whether there is no such predication. (The paradox then lies precisely in the fact that a predication, precisely because of its occurrence, i.e. because of its truth, seems to accuse itself of falsehood.)

The fact that the characteristics must be "defined" has also been emphasised on the other side.

. However, the question is what is meant here by a "full" p r o p e r t y . The decisive factor here cannot be that such a characteristic has some meaning.

appears to be "fulfilled" in a single specific case, and that one then has a ready solution for cases in which difficulties arise, namely to state that this characteristic was not "defined" for these cases either. For then the logical-formal differences, whose disregard is not merely any old

"Contradictions", but rather the paradox that leads to development. The question of assigning a characteristic Eu to a particular thing can only be based on the categorical basis of some determination, i.e. precisely on that in which even the cases arbitrarily excluded here correspond to the case in which this characteristic was defined as supposedly meaningful.

4. *En* does not apply to *S*, which does not apply to *cc*, there is no *IS*, which ... ; there are some •*S* that are not ... contradictory statements. But not only because they are different statements, only one of which can be correct. The fact that something is stated here in relation to marriage does not distinguish the statements mentioned from numerical data, for example. Even when I say, "There are three," I have not only "counted" three, — just as I pick up three balls "counting" them — there are "in total" three, and only for this reason does this contradict the statement that there are four. The fact that *there are three* does not characterise a given quantity of things in terms of their size. It does not determine anything in itself, as, for example, a *pair* merely characterises a quantity in itself. The information in question results from a "comparison" or — generally — from a prior engagement with the things, of which three ... However, *some* and *old* are not only necessary in the sense that *affe* and *some* cannot be determined by a quantity in themselves, but as determinate entities, these statements are based on them.

I) See Huaerl's Jahrb. VI p. 561ff. and Philos. Anzeigen Vol. II p. 193ff.

The number determines the "how much" of that which is established to be ... Counting is an operation that follows on from this determination, which is carried out on "things" or "cases". The number given is not a "decision" in the sense that something is decided by universal and particular judgement. Namely, whether something applies without restriction or not. If I say *that ea are those who ...*, then the others were "not counted". They do not belong to what — insofar as it is limited — is "five in total". In "some" or "affe", however, the limits of a particular predication or the absence of these limits are precisely what is fixed. The special feature of the judgement or assessment is that it concerns the validity of a predication and does not merely indicate the cases of this validity like a number. The difference between the existential judgement and the particular judgement lies only in the fact that the existential proposition merely concerns validity "in general", i.e. "in cases", but not for certain subjects.

That of 3, 4, ... of different statements only one is correct and the rest are incorrect means that the operation in question cannot have different results. It has been counted incorrectly. In contrast, noble ... and not old ... do not have such different "results" at all, but rather different decisions, some of which contradict each other. For judgement is not an operation that can adhere to "the given" in the same sense as the counting procedure. What is "given" for counting is precisely what judgement brings out in its own execution. Certainly — the decision it makes is right or wrong. But the choice of precisely these terms, "right" and "wrong", is determined here only by the fact that a present decision cannot be characterised in this respect (namely, in relation to the "true" of the statement, which cannot be taken as its characteristic'). But compared to other information, the judgement

1) see p. 68.

decision is distinguished by the fact that the "finished", "existing" judgement is all ... — and not the "assessment" — is the primary right or wrong. Numbers "exist"; this linguistic turn of phrase expresses the same thing as the attempt to find something in which the numbers "are realised". But judgement is granted "validity".

All S are p, some \$ are not p, no \$ is p, decide different questions. *No S is p*, namely, for example, whether there is an S that ... i.e. the question whose positive decision provides the basis for the decisions listed in first and second place above. (The question decided in *ez gi6t ...* is 'suspended' in the existential judgement); *ea* is not a question such as '*is it raining?*'. What is not known here would be the state of the weather. And nothing is decided here. The specific 'question' arises here only through its formulation in the prediction, by means of which the weather can be characterised.) Certainly, however, the three judgements mentioned denote possible and mutually exclusive decisions. One can say that only one of the three cases mentioned is possible. Only in this, i.e. very improper sense, would a "fourth case" be excluded here. However, there is an "exclusion" precisely in relation to what is true, what is not true. If one says here that a third option is excluded, then this third option is certainly not a third case. A specific question must be decided here: positive and negative do not denote possible answers, but simply the contradictory sides of the decision. The third option is excluded if the question is unanswerable.

5. However, both the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle then appear to be, as it were, belated formulations. Certainly, contradiction here is not something that merely exists in fact between any two statements and can only be expressed in the form of contradiction , but rather it appears here

t) YgL p. 64.

as the relationship in which, for example, poison S and eø giòt *ðein IS*, i.e. as these specific judgements Iø relate to each other. This possibility of being designated as elements of the contradiction derives from the specific question that is "suspended" in eø giòt 5 and es giòt Lein S. The questions contained in the contradictory forms of judgement are the only ones that can be fixed in what is presented as the "law of contradiction". One asks the questions only in relation to which there is a decision (and not merely a "response to the answer"). However, the principle of excluded middle is reduced to the compulsion to have to ask such a question, which can only be decided positively or negatively. Its dialectical strength lies, for example, in the fact that it must apparently be possible to determine something general about the validity of a predication that is fulfilled in one (or some) cases of a certain area*).

In order to address the possibility of such a question, the actual discussion turns to the validity of the law of excluded middle:

§ 10. THE DECISIVENESS OF A QUESTION

The validity of the law of excluded middle was disputed by Brouwer: "In my opinion, the axiom of consistency and the principle of excluded middle are both false, and belief in them has been historically caused by first abstracting classical logic from the mathematics of the subsets of a certain finite set, and then attributing to this logic an existence independent of mathematics and a priori

1) These remarks do not claim to be "new" in any way. They merely highlight what actually guided us when we applied a sentence of contradiction or a sentence of the excluded third as a principle.

and ultimately applied it unjustifiably to the mathematics of infinite sets on the basis of this supposed apriority'). Brouwer's argument refers to the difficulties that arise when 'judging' number sequences. In particular, this concerns sequences that are not defined by a law, but arise 'step by step through acts of free choice'. Insofar as such a sequence is a free one, it remains necessary to leave open whether a number with a certain property will occur again in this sequence or not. "Only the actual discovery of a specific number with property E can provide a legal basis for the answer 'yes', and only the insight that it is in the nature of the number to have property E can provide a legal basis for the answer 'no'." ... but these two possibilities no longer stand in opposition to each other as assertion and negation; neither the negation of one nor the other makes any sense in itself."

These remarks reveal a failure to distinguish between general and universal judgements¹⁾). "It is not by looking at individual numbers, but only by looking at the essence of numbers that a general judgement about numbers can be made." However, these general judgements are taken as universal judgements if they "can be interpreted as negative existential judgements." Weyl's scepticism is in fact directed at both general and existential judgements: he seeks to characterise both types of judgement as mere indications of judgements. "An existential proposition — for example, *there is an even number* — is not a judgement in the proper sense at all, asserting a fact; existential facts are empty

1) Brouwer, Intuitionistic Set Theory, Annual Report of the German Mathematical Society, Vol. 28, pp. 203 ff., 1919.

2) Hermann Weyl, On the New Foundational Crisis in Mathematics. Mathemat. Ztschr. 1920.

3) For a similar critique of Weyl's justification of Brouwer's position (which in no way coincides with that given by Brouwer himself), see W. Burkamp, Die Krise des Satzes vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten, *Beitr. z. Philos. d. dt. Idealismus* IV 1927 p. 77 ff.

Invention of logicians. Two is a straight line: there is a real judgement that expresses a fact, it applies; an *even* number is only a judgement derived from this judgement.

Abstract. ... Nor is there a general */e* Zelt has the Aigenscfa{f ü ... a real judgement, but rather a general

A n w e i e u n g a u f U r t e i l e ... Only the immediate, the singular par excellence, has real value ; all generalities and all statements about existence participate **in it** only indirectly." On the other hand, these general propositions, referred to as judgemental instructions, are said to "share with actual judgements that they are sufficient in themselves. They formulate

the legal basis for all singular judgements to be derived from them. In contrast, an existential proposition, taken on its own, is nothing ...".

However, the mere statement that can be formulated as a negative existential proposition is, in the same **sense**, "nothing" as the existential proposition. However, this universal judgement by no means contains "an infinite abundance of real judgements" like the general judgement, whose validity can only be grasped in the cases where it is valid. To be an indication of judgement therefore means very different things. On the one hand, it can mean to be only in the consequences (case of the general judgement). The other time, however — and this is the case of the universal and existential judgement — it is merely to assert something about the validity of a predicate.

Judgements are not abstract in either case. One could only speak of a "realisation" of the general judgement if the general judgement is understood here as a universal judgement. Universal and existential judgements are certainly not "real" judgements, for Weyl describes as such those judgements that are immediately fulfilled (17 —[- 1 1 —[- 17 as a real judgement as opposed to m —[- 1 1 —[-m 80fern 17 and 1 are individual specific numbers). However, the universal judgement is not fulfilled "indirectly" either — for example, in the cases affected by its "predicate". Of course, it says something about the validity of this predicate. And refers to

not just like a number. Nevertheless, it remains merely a statement that can only be correct — but not "true" — and whose possibility presupposes the realisation of certain conditions.

The fact that I cannot provide specific information is different from the fact that I cannot decide on something because it is not given to me or "eludes me". What "eludes" me is determined by him or something like that. Certainly — only if something eludes me can I not provide any "specific information" about it. But everyone else determines the information themselves, i.e. what fails due to my inability here. Certainly, it is due to the infinity of a multitude of things that I cannot determine whether all or none of these things have a certain property. But the fact that this is decided in itself does not treat "this multitude as something finished, given" — that is not the mistake here — but it shifts the

"Decision" in a place where it does not belong.

However, the opposite would be equally wrong: namely, to understand the possibility of a decision immediately and exclusively with Brouwer as being bound to the proof of a method by which this decision can be brought about. "Possibility of a decision" refers for the time being to the place of the decision and not to the possibility of a factual and, in this sense, "correct" decision, in that one does not have to provide for any further consideration that may arise. This guarantee could be offered, for example, by the general judgement. In the case of universal and particular judgements, however, the possibility of a decision can only be determined from the limits of their performance. The universal or *ketes* can fail here right from the start. But not only because the exception makes the judgement false. The so-called concept of the subject does not play any role here.

t) In certain paradoxes, the exception can be precisely that which arises from the general situation, so that the contradiction here reveals the limitations of the approach.

'wegs automatiech däs her, whereupon the validity of a particular predication can be determined as unrestricted or not. The elements of a class, for example, belong to this class by virtue of its "definition". However, the scope of the concept in the subject position of a universal judgement is by no means its actual scope of validity. It only appears as such if one indiscriminately understands the judgement as a connection whose links are "concepts", etc., and then subsequently reinterprets the difference between the universal and general "statement" as a difference in "modality". The scope of validity of a judgement is not something that is "actually" and — perhaps only in fact not — "completely" given, but something that is contained in the judgement. The judgement is not a process such as counting, from which the number results. But it is an "operation" whose limits are not a deficiency.

According to Weyl, *e5* denotes a set that ... and *there is no number* that ... only appears to be a complete disjunction. (Brouwer merely denies the validity of the law of excluded middle here.) The disjunctive elements would not be opposed to each other as position and negation. In fact, existence can be proven by finding such a number, but non-existence, if at all, can only be proven from the "essence of the number". However, the difference in the legal basis in both cases can only distinguish between the "judgements" in terms of their nature if when the "judgements" so-called "facts" are However, in an existential judgement, no "fact" is "asserted" in an existential judgement, but rather a statement is made. The difference between the legal basis in the positive and negative

I) O. Becker (Mathematical Existence, Husserle Jahrb. VI I p. 498 ff.) distinguishes between three possible cases: 1. "p is true", 2. "p is true" and 3. "p is not true". When considering properties of finite sets, or more precisely, subsets of a finite set, there is a possible but not necessary equivalence between 2. and 3. When considering properties of infinite sequences of numbers, however, a careful distinction must be made between the two possible negatives 2. and 3. of the positive statement 1. W. Burkamp (1. c. p. 68/69) describes 3. as the actual negation of t. "Since negation (of Fermat's great theorem) means that for ... its validity no right

The decision does not change this relationship between the two sides, according to which the decision can be made. Of course, the decision may be impossible. But not in the sense that indecision is a third possibility alongside the positive and negative decisions. Because

"Being undecided" means here that one cannot make any definite statement at all. A trichotomy only arises if one supposes three "facts" here. The requirement that "something must generally be discernible" as to whether a predication applies without restriction or not to things of a certain kind is based on the certainty contained in "things of a certain kind" of this

"Determination". But two things must be distinguished here: firstly, the certainty of what is given and what is presented for assessment, and secondly, its conceptual certainty. What is defined by the second is not necessarily "certain" in the first sense. The possibility of a general decision is limited in a different sense than that of a universal decision. For something can only be said to be "general" where the predicate stands in a certain factual relationship to the subject, regardless of whether the general statement is positive or negative. The fact that neither one nor the other applies generally only rejects an unfounded approach. The possibility of a general statement is not subject to technical limitations, unlike the possibility of a universal statement. The general statement gains

exists, that I **must** not base my decisions on it as truth ... **There is the contradictory opposition, and for** this contradictory opposition of two propositions, the positive and the negative, the principle of the excluded middle applies absolutely in accordance with the meaning of thought.

... The strictly logical meaning of negation differs only slightly from absolute neutrality. — In both cases, negation has lost its original meaning. The introduction of so-called "validity" **has the same consequences as that of so-called "facts"**. The **concept** of validity presupposes a "de-concretisation". "Validity" is something derived from concepts **such as truth or correctness**. However, only by reducing it to its origin can a question such as that **of deciding a question** be dealt with.

its "possibility" precisely from the particularity of its theme').

Quantity and modality denote different things in general or universal statements. The relationship between the predicate and the subject in one case has nothing in common with the statement that there *are* some *who do not* ... just as little as what could be described as the same "quantity" of the

judgement, as the necessity of the consequential relationship in the first case could be compared with the "mere factuality" of the statement in the second case of "modality". The same applies to "quality".

Judgements can only be classified according to quantity, modality and quality if they are understood as formulations of specific facts, or if the "judgement" is reduced to the positing — or, in this case, the assertion — of facts. In the general statement, of course, a general fact is communicated. But the validity here is to be found in the facts and not in their transposition into the so-called "judgement". The statement is not "general" as a statement. In the other case, however, the information established in the judgement was universal. "Judgement" is something that is arrived at in the process of judging as a specific mode of supporting and confirming attitude. Statements are universal or general only insofar as one can recognise oneself in what one says.

t) An infinite sequence of links, arising from acts of free choice, finds no end either in itself or in relation to anything else. However, in the inability to ever be complete, one misses something, namely that the "concept" would only be justified in relation to the class or the concept (see p. 68). Certain things are excluded by their definition. However, the universal judgement is a determination whose certainty, i.e. whose correctness, is assumed and provided by the judgement. The addition of "at all" misjudges the "limits" of the judgement, just as one misinterprets the horizon, for example, if one were to take it not as immanent, but as a boundary at the edge of the world or against others. The quantity of "all things at all" is reminiscent of the difficulties in Kant's antinomies. However, the "quantity of all things at all" is not to be criticised because it is "not a closed whole" (G. Heisenberg, *Grundbegriffe der Mengenlehre*, 1906, p. 467), but because the definition given in mtl and the reference contained in the *iiberhauPt* to the guarantee area of a conceptual definition are incompatible with each other.

auspriechtüberetwas, namely, for example, either expressing the judgement one has arrived at, or allowing the things themselves to speak for themselves.

Logic is not autonomous in its essence. It is not analytical in the sense that it is binding for everything that exists. At most, the judgement could be called autonomous.

Namely, as something that is born out of questioning and investigating things. The answer can only be right or wrong, but not true or untrue. There are no "sentences" to which the correctness of the judgement could be ontologically applied. The "universality" of logic in its turn to transcendental logic only indicates the abandonment of the horizon under which what logic deals with had its origin, and under which alone, for example, judgement can be understood.

BERSERKER

BOOKS

