

APPEARANCE & SENSE



GUSTAV SHPET

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APPEARANCE AND SENSE

Table of Contents

Translator's Introduction	ix
Gustav Shpet's <i>Appearance and Sense</i> and Phenomenology in Russia <i>by Alexander Haardt</i>	xvii

APPEARANCE AND SENSE

Introduction	3
Chapter 1. Experiencing and Ideal Intuition	9
Chapter 2. Pure Consciousness	25
Chapter 3. The Phenomenological Reduction	47
Chapter 4. The Problem of Method	69
Chapter 5. Object, Positum, Concept	97
Chapter 6. Appearance and Actuality	123
Chapter 7. Sense and Comprehension	145
Conclusion	169
Appendix. The Idea of a Fundamental Science	175
Translation Glossary	181
Index	185

*Herrn Professor Edmund Husserl
in herzlicher Verehrung
zugeeignet*

Translator's Introduction

Despite, or perhaps better by virtue of, its very brevity, *Appearance and Sense* is a difficult text to read and understand, particularly if we make the attempt independently of Husserl's *Ideas I*. This is certainly at least in part owing to the intent behind Shpet's work. On the one hand it strives to present Husserl's latest views to a Russian philosophical audience not yet conversant with and, in all likelihood, not even aware of, his transcendental idealist turn. With this aim any reading would perforce be exacting. Yet, on the other hand, Shpet has made scant concession to his public. Indeed, his text is even more compressed, especially in the crucial areas dealing with the sense-bestowing feature of consciousness, than Husserl's own. For all that, Shpet has not bequeathed to us simply an abbreviated paraphrase nor a selective commentary on *Ideas I*, although at many points it is just that. Rather, the text on the whole is a critical engagement with Husserl's thought, where Shpet among other things reformulates or at least presents Husserl's phenomenology from the perspective of hoping to illuminate a traditional philosophical problem in a radical manner.

Since Husserl's text was published only in 1913 and Shpet's appeared sometime during 1914, the latter must have been conceived, thought through, and written in remarkable haste. Indeed, Shpet had already finished a first draft and was busy with a revision of it by the end of 1913. This alone may satisfactorily account for Shpet's frequent density of expression. Yet for all that Shpet's penetration into transcendental phenomenology in so short a time, certainly in some particulars a few months at most, is nothing short of astonishing, especially when compared with other works with similar intent coming years later. It is a testimony not only to the perspicuity of the man but also of the Russian philosophical community of the time as well as to its receptivity and commitment to philosophical involvement. The period just prior to the Bolshevik Revolu-

tion, roughly coinciding with the reign of Nicholas II, while perhaps not marked by astute leadership or mass euphoria, must rate as a “golden age” for Russian philosophy.

While from our perspective today, after a reading of *Appearance and Sense* as well as other later works, it may be an exaggeration to label Shpet a “disciple” of Husserl, as have some historians and critics, few, if any other, philosophers of the time were willing to go along to such an extent with the transcendental turn of the *Ideas*. And while the fundamental concerns of Shpet may have had something in common with those of other students in Husserl’s Göttingen circle, few, if any, again were willing to take up the call for philosophy as a rigorous science. Even those personally closest to Husserl who had spent years under his tutelage were unwilling or unable to sound the clarion so forthrightly and so modestly, and this by a foreigner who could not have had any motive other than one based in conviction.

Despite the brief time span between the appearance of Husserl’s text and that of *Appearance and Sense* many of the ideas culminating in the latter surely were in incubation at least a year earlier when Shpet spent the academic year 1912–13 at Göttingen University. It was at this time that Shpet first made Husserl’s acquaintance and when the latter was engaged in bringing the project now known as the three volumes of the *Ideas* to fruition. Indeed, although Shpet’s activities during the summer semester of 1913 are not recorded, Husserl was then offering a lecture course on “Nature and Spirit” during which, according to Edith Stein’s testimony, he virtually read the manuscript of *Ideas II* to the class. Such an introduction to phenomenology may have also piqued Shpet’s interest as he was on a study tour of Western Europe in connection with his dissertation on historiographical methodology. The esteem Shpet bore Husserl appears to have been mutual despite the brevity of the personal relationship. *Appearance and Sense* was dedicated to Husserl, and so that Husserl could not miss it the dedication was written in German. Of course, Shpet sent a copy of his book to Husserl, although there is no indication the latter read it. Shortly before his death Husserl gave this copy to Jan Patočka, who in turn in the early 1970s gave it to the Husserl-Archives in Louvain, where it remains today.

Shpet had been the first exponent of phenomenology in Russia, but he certainly did not single-handedly introduce it nor, in particular, Husserl’s name to Russia. As Alexander Haardt discusses in the essay accompanying this translation, already a few years after its German publication a part of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* had been translated into Russian with a foreword written by S. L. Frank, who was to go on to become one of

Russia's most significant non-Marxist philosophers and whose thesis *Predmet znanie*, dating from 1915, shows an acquaintance with and indebtedness to Husserl's *Ideas I*, even though he does not comment on the reduction nor acknowledge Shpet's book. Husserl's *Logos* article "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" was translated in 1911, and another student of Husserl's, Henry Lanz, disseminated information about him in Russia. In short, Russian attention to Husserl was swift and encouraging for further development. Only in Germany itself can we discern a "phenomenological movement" with such vitality and at such an early date.

Yet it was Shpet who by and large made known the transcendental turn in Husserl's thinking to Russia. In the period immediately subsequent to the publication of *Appearance and Sense* he virtually campaigned on behalf of Husserl and in particular philosophy as a rigorous science, as we can see from the included appendix to this translation.

After the revolution in 1917 Shpet briefly held a professorship at Moscow University. At this time he wrote a number of interesting and valuable studies in the history of Russian philosophy as well as treatises on aesthetics. Although not a Marxist and strongly opposed to metaphysical materialism and positivism, Shpet, unlike many of his colleagues, apparently held some sympathy for the new regime, or at least for its stated goals. Whatever it be, there is no record of any open hostility to the Soviet government on his part or an attempt to flee as did so many other intellectuals at the time.

Years later after the impact of phenomenology on Shpet had already considerably waned the sycophants of the new order in his homeland inextricably tied his name with Husserl and transcendental idealism chiefly on the basis of this one short book. In this way they sought to exclude him from any participation in the remnants of Russian intellectual life. Forced on the defensive Shpet had at first to counter charges of subjectivism in philosophy and aspersions as to his political sympathies. But, of course, argumentation was to prove to be of little avail in those years. Shpet's very erudition and linguistic talents were next singled out for attack. The exact nature of the final allegations that led to Shpet's demise in the years of the Great Terror were in reality a sheer farce and need not concern us. If, and only if, we must have a reason for his truly senseless execution, it is that he had studied in the West, indeed in Germany, the land that produced Marx and Hegel. Might not German idealism sire yet another revolutionary, though not within Germany but in the new, fragile Soviet empire? Its leader's macabre paranoia festered, and in the absence of governmental checks and balances, became institutionalized. Universal fear and mass

slaughter became part of the national landscape. In this way Shpet became phenomenology's first martyr.

Already by the time he became acquainted with phenomenology Shpet's philosophical stance had taken shape under the powerful influence of the then-reigning trend at Moscow University. Fundamentally drawing its inspiration from Plato this "school" stood in sharp contrast to the neo-Kantianism then prevailing in Germany and also to that propounded by Georgi Chelpanov, Shpet's teacher at Kiev University and whom he followed to Moscow after the former's elevation to a chair there. Now rejecting the neo-Kantianism of his earlier Kiev years Shpet came to view Kant's philosophy as a, as he called it, "negativism," albeit wrapped in positive form. Indeed, curiously Shpet's relation to Kant was the reverse of Husserl's. Whereas the latter grew to appreciate the achievements of Kant more with the passage of time, Shpet moved from Kant to an ever more critical stand. Kantianism as well as Humean skepticism err in not making the cognizing being, *qua* being, the object of "first philosophy." Rather, they concern themselves with the cognizing being, *qua* cognizing. Hume's additional failure was that insofar as he did recognize the problem of the being of the cognizing subject he conceived this being empirically and so faltered into psychologism. Kant's supreme contribution to philosophy lies in having at least partially seen the non-empirical nature of the cognizing subject.

According to Shpet the main task confronting philosophy is a description of actuality by way of cognition. This problem is certainly not new, and in fact had its origins among the ancient Greeks. In another essay Shpet traces this theme and that of philosophy as a rigorous science all the way back to Parmenides. In Kant's hands, however, the problem of description was side-tracked, as it were, into considering epistemology as the foundation without which the task could not be scientifically raised, let alone undertaken. Kant views cognition merely as a means or device by which we attempt to attain actuality and not as a being itself, that is, an end. He sees cognition purely and simply as an instrument for the study of being, not as a mode of being itself.

Particularly in light of Kant's undertakings and their widespread sway, the principal task for philosophy today is a study of the being of cognition. In this way contemporary philosophy would fill in a gap left by earlier "positive" philosophers as well as correct the unfortunate course set by Kant. Husserl's phenomenology accepts this task as its own and in so doing recognizes that an immense gulf separates it from the natural sciences. The latter study the real, empirical world, i.e., factual being; the former directs

itself to ideal, essential being. I discover this region of essential being, essences, by simply turning my vision, adopting, as it were, a new attitude. If and when I do so, I find ideal being to be immediately given, just as empirical being is in the just abandoned, natural attitude. Now an ideal, as opposed to natural, relation is opened up to me between myself and the surrounding world. This emergence into an ideal world does not entail the denial of the other factual reality – merely its suspension. The phenomenologist no more doubts the world's existence than does the pure mathematician when attempting to prove a theorem. The mathematician is concerned with an ideal world populated with, for example, arithmetical propositions without regard for whether they concern apples, the fingers on my hand or whatever. So too is the phenomenologist concerned with essences without thereby rejecting the world of apples, fingers, etc. This does not alter the case, however, that a doubt in the existence of physical things is possible. Such a doubt does not contradict their sense. On the contrary, their existence is always contingent to some degree. Givenness does not entail existence.

Thus far we have revealed existents and essences. We associate a form of intuition with each of these: on the one hand experiencing intuition and on the other essential intuition. Shpet's question is precisely whether this division is exhaustive. Have we not excluded any third possibility? If we have, what could this third intuition be? What would be its object? Furthermore, are these intuitions distinct and separate?

We know that Husserl wrestled for quite some time with what we now call “the problem of intersubjectivity.” For Shpet the comparable issue was that of grounding the “*Geisteswissenschaften*.” Are these “sciences” legitimate disciplines of study, and if so, can we speak of them as sciences in the rigorous sense? In the natural sciences we deal with existing, empirical objects, i.e., objects in space and time. In essential sciences we deal with ideal objects, i.e., essences and essential relations that have no necessary correlate in the factual world. In “sciences” dealing with other people we are concerned with the other's mental life. Yet the being of an *Erlebnis*, a mental process, is essentially different from that of a physical thing. The latter is given through adumbrations, while the former is given directly in its essence. Every immanent perception is an essential intuition. Strictly speaking, since its being is not *in time*, a mental process does not make an appearance and does not possess existence. My immanent perception of my mental processes, *Erlebnissen*, is an essential intuition. To perceive the other's mental life, however, is in principle, i.e., essentially, impossible, for it does not, properly speaking, exist. Were it to exist, it would be real and

thus given in adumbrations, i.e., in time. The other's mental life would, then, not be an essence and so not a mental life. Our approach has led us to a dilemma. Either the other *conceivably* possesses a mental life, but one that I cannot possibly perceive, or the other has no mental life and there is nothing to perceive.

The complexity of the problem of the other did not go unnoticed by Shpet. Of course, in *Ideas I* Husserl barely broached the issue. Although Shpet is extremely cautious in his utterance here, committing himself to no definite disengagement from Husserl's path, he does offer a simple suggestion that, were it true, would obviate many philosophical difficulties and yet is one that Husserl himself at least glimpsed. Perhaps our original dichotomy between experiencing and ideal intuitions is insufficient. Perhaps there is a peculiar species of empirical being that Husserl overlooked: social being. Furthermore, on Husserl's own principles this species of being would have its own peculiar mode of cognition associated with it. Certainly empathy, which Husserl did notice already at this time, could play a fundamental role within this cognitive mode. Perhaps, counter to Husserl's explicit contention, empathy and such similar species of seeing are originally presentive acts. If so, we would have direct acquaintance with the other's mental activity. Shpet's reticence at one point gives way to an admission that we are forced to accept some originary givenness additional to that admitted by Husserl.

Among the features of consciousness there is not just intellectual sight (*Einsicht*) but also an understanding or comprehension of what is intellectually seen. In some unfortunately ambiguous fashion Shpet connects this feature to his suggested additional mode of cognition. Among the manifestations of this "comprehension" Shpet includes sympathy. Yet this "comprehension" is conceived as a function of reason; it conditions every social intercourse and is not a mere display of a separate mundane emotional faculty. Regrettably Shpet introduced these ideas, which would have far-reaching consequences for a fully developed phenomenological "system," with little fanfare and with little discussion.

Appearance and Sense deals with many other questions, and in fact that of the "other" is neither the central one nor the most important. Ostensibly a concern with the problem of universals is paramount and connected with it the notion of an "individual concept" as formulated by Rickert. The latter again is tied in with Shpet's concern with a methodology for the *Geisteswissenschaften*. Yet among these issues that of Shpet's conception of phenomenology is particularly intriguing. In line with Shpet's way of posing questions we can formulate ours: How does Shpet conceive the

being of phenomenology? At times Shpet leans toward the position that phenomenology is the intentional analysis of consciousness on the whole, where consciousness itself is always intentional. Yet there are passages that lead us to think that such a characterization is too narrow, that phenomenology is not merely a presuppositionless “theory” of cognition, the being of cognition, but of being in general. Finally we are faced with Shpet’s hasty but prudent resignation that he can forego the question of the being of phenomenology for now as his concern in *Appearance and Sense* is with the phenomenology of cognition.

In presenting this text in English the translator has made no attempt to render it as it would have read to the Russian public in 1914. Such a goal is methodologically questionable and would be of little value. The point is to make the text readable today. With this in mind I have adopted the terminology employed by F. Kersten in his translation of Husserl’s *Ideas I* as faithfully as possible except as where noted. Moreover, Shpet’s own choice of Russian words for Husserl’s is of the highest order as are his translations of passages. Had Shpet gone on to provide a Russian translation of the entire text of *Ideas I* this translator feels it would have been of a very high order even by today’s standards. Nonetheless unlike Kersten I have rendered Shpet’s rendering of Husserl’s “*als solches*” by “as such.” The reader will kindly note that Kersten consistently substitutes the appropriate preceding noun or adjective. I have given it a more literal rendering in deference not just to literalness but also to a contemporary interpretation of Husserl, which holds this expression to be a technical one in Husserl.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Alexander Haardt of the University of Münster for writing the accompanying essay, for reading over and correcting points in an early draft of this translation, for his help in acquiring some badly needed Russian philosophical works and, perhaps above all, for his friendship over the years. Needless to say, he is not in any way responsible for any errors in the present translation. I should also point out that I have edited his essay somewhat. I alone am responsible for any errors in my translation of Haardt’s essay, written in German, and the editing. I would also like to thank Helmut Dahm of the Federal Institute for Russian and East European Studies in Cologne, Germany for his encouragement, help and again friendship over what is now a good number of years. Sincere thanks also go to Prof. S. IJsseling for his inflinching support and unaltering graciousness ever since he directed my dissertation. Finally I would like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung under whose auspices the initial draft of this translation was prepared. Quotation from Husserl’s *Ideas* is with the kind permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Gustav Shpet's *Appearance and Sense* and Phenomenology in Russia

Alexander Haardt

With his call “to the things themselves” Husserl attempted to return to the “originary sources of intuition” and thereby leave behind a merely verbally mediated reference to the phenomena. The understanding of signs and speech are only peripheral themes in early phenomenology. Of course, the expressions used in phenomenological descriptions were here and there thematized and made precise. But these were only improvements in description whose purpose was to motivate the reader (or listener) to obtain his own intuition of the described. Indeed the relationship between expression and meaning, as well as that between sign and the signified in general, became a theme of phenomenological analysis. Yet it remained only one theme among others. The verbally mediated and, in general, the reference to actuality by means of signs is but of secondary importance for early phenomenology. In view of this it is so much the more surprising that phenomenologists turn again and again toward the understanding of speech and signs as one of their central problems (Lipps, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida). One early testament to this strong emphasis on the problem of speech in phenomenology can be found in Shpet's *Appearance and Sense* from 1914, a work which should be placed in the context of the Russian phenomenological movement – a movement still only barely known.

HUSSERL IN THE RUSSIAN MILIEU – A GENERAL OVERVIEW

Philosophical discussions in Russia at the turn of the century were in essence characterized by two tendencies. On the one side stood those who were strongly oriented toward West European movements. Particular attention was devoted to neo-Kantianism, Empirio-Criticism and Bergson's Vitalism.¹ On the other side there were those who looked back to the

central motif of 19th century Russian philosophy, in particular to its Christian-Platonic tradition and in this way initiated a “renaissance of metaphysics.”²

It was in this particular situation that in 1909 a translation appeared of the first part of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, viz. the “Prolegomena to a Pure Logic.”³ In a foreword to the translation S.L. Frank presented Husserl as the author of “one of the most outstanding works in the literature of logic in recent years.” The *Logical Investigations* are “a solitary and strong protest in the spirit of science” against the widespread “skeptical and subjectivistic frame of mind” which “threatens to shake confidence in scientific truth.” Husserl’s merit was seen in his conquest of psychologism in philosophy and logic. In doing so, Frank opposed Husserl’s “idealistic Objectivism” to the “subjectivistic” neo-Kantianism which at the time also dominated Russia.⁴

Husserl’s next great work, his *Logos* essay of 1911, “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science,” appeared in the same year in a Russian translation.⁵ Further translations of Husserl’s works, however, have not followed. To be sure, the possibility of a reception to Husserl’s thought was there even apart from the presence of the mentioned translations, since philosophical education in Russia, particularly at Moscow University, entailed reading German language philosophical literature.⁶ We can distinguish the following stages in the reception of Husserlian phenomenology in Russia:

a) A phase between ca. 1906 and 1913 during which time the central themes and theses of early phenomenology were noticed and discussed.⁷ The most comprehensive writing from this period is that by the transcendental philosopher Boris Jakovenko bearing the title “Husserl’s Philosophy” from 1913. This piece contained a relatively detailed report, with critical comments, of both parts of the *Logical Investigations*.⁸ Mention should also be made of the analysis by the intuitivist Nikolai Lossky as well as that by one of Husserl’s own students Henry Lanz, who later emigrated to the USA.⁹

b) A productive continuation of the themes and train of thought of classical phenomenology which began in an intensified degree at the beginning of 1914 after Shpet’s return to Moscow from his studies in Göttingen.¹⁰ At this time Shpet began to make Husserl’s ideas known to the Russian public through lectures and classes. After the Bolshevik Revolution, or at least certainly after the expulsion of the most famous non-Marxist intellectuals in August 1922,¹¹ a part of the Russian discussion of Husserl shifted to central and western Europe, particularly to Prague and Paris. Inside the Soviet Union the “phenomenological movement”¹² initiated by

Shpet lasted up to the end of the 1920s. Themes concerning the nature of language and of art formed the focal point of the phenomenological writings which appeared during this period. At the same time phenomenological methods, particularly that of the intuitively based description of essential structures, were combined with other ways of thinking (especially the dialectical). Outstanding phenomenological-dialectical analyses of language, myth and art were carried out by Aleksei Losev (1893–1988).¹³ Discussions about phenomenology were conducted above all at Moscow University¹⁴ and then in the '20s in the State Academy for the Study of the Arts (GAChN) in Moscow, where Shpet was vice-president and for a long time¹⁵ directed the philosophical section.

c) Outside the Soviet Union numerous émigré scholars discussed Husserl's phenomenology. We find, on the one hand, among this group such well-known disciples as the Lithuanians Emmanuel Levinas and Aron Gurwitsch, as well as the Latvian Theodor Celms, who were educated in their youth, or childhood, in Russia but whose philosophical positions, however, exhibited no direct connection with any distinct Russian intellectual traditions.¹⁶

On the other hand, mention should be made of a series of representatives of distinctly Russian currents who, although not phenomenologists, discussed the theses, themes and methods of phenomenology. A few of these treated specific, particularly the Platonically interpretable, theses of classical phenomenology with outspoken sympathy (Lossky, Frank, Jakovenko).¹⁷ Some other thinkers set off philosophizing existentially based on a Platonic interpretation of Husserl's doctrine of essence (Shestov, Berdyaev).¹⁸ Other representatives of phenomenology, particularly Scheler, Heidegger and N. Hartmann, were also warmly received among the émigrés.¹⁹ It should be noted that Shestov's polemical opinion of Husserl, published under the title "Memento Mori" in 1926 in the *Revue Philosophique* and which helped make phenomenology known to the French public, originally appeared in a Russian version in 1917.²⁰ The death in 1965 of the last of the well-known Russian émigré philosophers, N. Lossky, constituted without doubt a break in the Russian language discussion of Husserl.

d) From 1930 to the mid-'50s a scholarly discussion of Husserl's phenomenology was well-nigh impossible in the Soviet Union. Since the beginning of the '60s, however, Husserl's ideas have been "rediscovered" within the horizon of Marxism-Leninism (N.V. Motroshilova, P.P. Gajdenko) and also partially assimilated.²¹ Investigations of Heidegger and Scheler could also appear.²² A discussion with the representatives of the Russian phenomenological movement of the '20s is now beginning. So

one can see the start of an analysis, within the circles of Soviet semiotics, of the writings of Shpet, who was rehabilitated in 1956. These circles correctly see in him a precursor of their semiotically based structuralism.²³

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA BETWEEN 1914 AND 1930

One phase of the Russian reception of Husserl's thought clearly stands out: the constructive continuation of phenomenology as it took place in Russia between 1914 and 1930. The protagonists of the movement, Shpet and Losev,²⁴ used, on the one hand, such methods as the description of essential structures based on originary intuition in their analyses and also saw themselves as followers of Husserl's phenomenology. On the other hand, they belonged within the Platonic traditions of Russian thought. They are distinguished in this way from, on the one hand, the Soviet Marxist investigators of phenomenology and from, on the other hand, those Russian émigré philosophers who discussed phenomenology but who yet did not align themselves with it. Yet in another respect they stand in contrast from those Russian students of Husserl working in the West whose connection with the Russian philosophical tradition is very loose indeed.

At the beginning of 1914 Shpet, having recently returned to Moscow from Germany, wrote to Husserl: "Phenomenology arouses a great and serious interest here in all philosophical circles. The *Ideas* has not yet been studied very much but nearly everyone speaks of phenomenological questions. ...The evaluation of phenomenology is overall high and favorable. Phenomenology is considered to be the first and new step of philosophy."²⁵

From the very beginning an essential focal point of the reception of phenomenology was on aesthetics. One of Husserl's Russian students, Henry Lanz, recalled the situation at Moscow University around 1914/15: "Edmund Husserl's attack on psychology and Emil Lask's theory of 'Geltung' were the philosophical sensations of the day. 'Truth' broke loose from psychological slavery. 'Beauty' was expected to follow it... aesthetic values as constituting a universe of purely objective phenomena... similarly removed from man's subjective needs and standards...".²⁶

The most important phenomenologically inspired writings on aesthetics in Russia were Shpet's *Aesthetic Fragments I-III* (1922–23) and Losev's "Phenomenology of Pure Music," written in 1920/21 and published in his *Music as an Object of Logic* in 1927.²⁷ In Losev's *Dialectic of the Artistic*

Form, which elucidated the entire dimension of artistic types, the phenomenological approach recedes into the background. Nevertheless, Losev also attempted to integrate phenomenological descriptions of aesthetic phenomena into his dialectical theory, which stands in the tradition of ancient neo-Platonism (particularly Plotinus) and in that of German Idealism.²⁸ In Moscow, particularly at the State Academy for the Study of the Arts, there formed around Shpet the so-called “formal-philosophical school,” a group of scholars who came under the influence not only of phenomenology but also of German idealistic aesthetics and the Russian Humboldt tradition.²⁹ Investigations were undertaken of such aesthetic problems as that of “artistic representation,” “aesthetic form,” etc.³⁰

Questions concerning the nature of language formed the second focal point of Russian phenomenology. The most outstanding work resulting from this attention was Shpet’s *Internal Form of the Word*,³¹ which is a discussion of Humboldt’s conception from the phenomenological viewpoint. Shpet relies here on his earlier phenomenological reflections on language found in the second book of the *Aesthetic Fragments*, where he depicted from the perspective of a listener how the utterances of the speaker are constituted as verbal communications. With great mastery Shpet describes the functions and types of meaning which thereby allow themselves to be distinguished in a verbal expression. These analyses obviously influenced Losev’s position in his *Philosophy of the Name* (1927) wherein he integrates the phenomenological description of language into a comprehensive, neo-Platonically oriented dialectical theory of the word.

Shpet’s Husserl-interpretation also served as a crucial impulse behind contemporary structural linguistics. Roman Jakobson’s conception of language is determined not only through Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* but just as well through an involvement with Shpet’s phenomenological and structural way of thinking.³² Shpet himself was a member of the Moscow Linguistic Circle from 1920.

In summarizing we can say that Russian phenomenology was almost exclusively oriented toward Husserl. Other representatives of phenomenology hardly seem to have been known.³³ Moreover, Husserl was read within the dominant tradition of Platonism. He was interpreted primarily as an ontologist and not as a theoretician of transcendental subjectivity. To this extent Russian phenomenology stood very close to the Göttingen Circle.

SHPET'S WAY TO PHENOMENOLOGY

At the end of November 1913 after Shpet had finished the first draft of *Appearance and Sense* he wrote to Husserl from Paris: "I have been in Paris already three days, but my phenomenological hunger is becoming greater than my curiosity for travelling. In any case the spell of phenomenology makes me blind in some directions, but I do not now want to see whether it has its bad side or not!"³⁴ The fascination exercised by phenomenology on Shpet was a consequence of his period of study in Göttingen during the academic year 1912/13. That Shpet was not yet a phenomenologist before this trip is clear from an essay of his from 1912 entitled: "One Path in Psychology and Where It Leads."³⁵ In it Husserl is mentioned only in passing as a discoverer of the intentional structure of consciousness along with Carl Stumpf, while other representatives of a descriptive psychology, such as W. James and W. Dilthey, are given an unequivocal priority. What are the presuppositions and motives which induced Shpet to attach himself to the phenomenology he learned about in 1912/13? What was the course of his earlier development?

In his *History as a Problem of Logic* from 1916 Shpet himself took a retrospective look at some of the stages his thought went through since the turn of the century: "We came to the university bewitched by radicalism and by the simplicity of that solution to the historical problem which historical materialism, which at the time seemed attractive, presented to us. However a more thorough engagement with history, an acquaintance with historical sources and methods, shattered many models... The lively discussion which arose at the time under the influence of a philosophical critique of materialism and the 'renaissance' of idealism soon veered our attention from empirical problems of history to their fundamental and methodological foundations. Through Rickert's ideas... it seemed new ways were disclosed for a philosophical and methodological understanding of the historical problem."³⁶ Like so many other Russian intellectuals of the time Shpet moved from Marxism to a neo-Kantianism, and like them he also soon moved on from the latter. He too took up specific leitmotifs of the Russian renaissance of metaphysics of the turn of the century, though he arrived at a phenomenologically inspired way of thinking of his own.

Shpet's position just before his phenomenological turn is already unmistakably clear from the aforementioned article. In it he gave above all an assessment of the then contemporary psychological movements in their relation to philosophy. On the one hand, by way of psychologism "the epidemic of skepticism and relativism" has entered into philosophy.

However no less alarming is the tendency of many directions of modern psychology to replace “living and concrete facts with empty schemata and abstractions.” This “logicism in psychology” has hindered the grasping of psychic life in its “living totality.”³⁷ While Shpet has experimental and explanatory psychology primarily in mind his polemic extends also to Brentano. To be sure Brentano and his school are granted as having done much for an adequate understanding of the psychic. In this regard Shpet mentions also Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* along with Stumpf’s *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen*. In both of these works an insight essential for a future reform of psychology is formulated: the distinction between acts of consciousness and the object of consciousness. However the emphasis is on James’s efforts to “turn from the abstract concepts and schemata of traditional psychology to a judgmental free analysis of the stream of experience given immediately in self-observation.”³⁸ Finally, the basis for a new descriptive psychology was established by Dilthey in his *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*. Here the psychic life, as an object of understanding, was introduced. Dilthey recognized that the connection between mental processes [*Erlebnissen*] themselves was also experienced and that every individual reference is interpreted against the background of an originally given whole.

According to Shpet there corresponds to this new type of psychology a very specific style of philosophizing. What he has in mind is a “relative metaphysics” whose task it is to grasp “the actual in its own essence and its totality.” Such a philosophy would have to be drawn from “inner experience” which has been proclaimed by modern philosophy as the proper source of evidence.

Shpet sees the reconstruction of actuality as a living and concrete whole realized, albeit in an initial and therefore incomplete manner, in Bergson and James. But he also sees it, however, in currents of Russian philosophy of the time: “The spirit of a living, concrete and total philosophy, which is based on the evident givenness of inner experience is the spirit of Russian philosophy...”³⁹ As typical representatives of this direction three philosophers are mentioned who are connected with Soloviev’s metaphysics of Total-Unity, namely Yurkevich, Lopatin and S. Trubetskoj.⁴⁰ In this way Shpet expressed what he had expected of a future reform of philosophy and psychology before his trip to Göttingen.

Another no less important presupposition for Shpet’s receptivity toward phenomenology was his interest in the logic of history. The original point of his trip outside Russia was in fact to work in this field. His ensuing discus-

sions with Husserl allowed him to find in phenomenology that very theory of actuality which rested on the immediate givenness of inner experience which he had sought.

SHPET'S CONCEPTION OF PHENOMENOLOGY

The milieu of ideas which Shpet confronted while in Göttingen included above all Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as it was presented in the seminars and the lectures of the 1912/13 academic year and set down in the first two books of the *Ideas*.

The seminar on "Nature and Spirit" which Shpet had attended during that winter semester, along with such other now famous phenomenologists as Roman Ingarden and Hans Lipps,⁴¹ as well as the lecture course, which he presumably heard, on the same theme during the subsequent summer semester surely met his interest in hermeneutics at least half-way. On the other hand, we have to take into account the intellectual climate of the Göttingen Circle, whose representatives had developed an ontologically realist interpretation of phenomenology which diverged to some degree from Husserl's own understanding of it.⁴²

In *Appearance and Sense* Shpet sees phenomenology within the context of the history of European philosophy. In this way it is interpreted as a (preliminary) completion of that tradition which Shpet designates as "positive philosophy." Therefore it is a matter of a "current" which runs from ancient ontology, particularly Plato's dialogues, through Descartes and Leibniz, and on to Lotze.⁴³ For these thinkers what is at stake is "actuality itself." For them the central question was that of Being and its various forms, which they sought to ground in its unity. Deviations from this way of posing the question were typologically collected under the title of "negative philosophy." Its most famous contemporary expression is Kantianism's reduction of philosophy to epistemology. Here what is at issue was no longer knowledge of the "actually existing entities." Rather the very possibility of such metaphysical knowledge was called in question, and the cognizing consciousness was made the object of inquiry instead of "existing entities."

The value of the critique of knowledge for positive philosophy, according to Shpet, lies at present in calling attention to consciousness as a specific form of being, something which positive philosophy in its initial Platonic stage had presupposed without special examination. The central task of a contemporary positive philosophy would be to situate the "newly dis-

covered" being of consciousness in relation to the other (objective) forms of being. Husserl had tackled precisely this task with his correlative analysis of the forms of consciousness and the object. Phenomenology as fundamental science, which is Shpet's own view as well, turns out to be thereby that completed form of positive philosophy in which the motif of a criticism of cognition, found in negative philosophy, is taken up and embodied within itself.

The peculiar feature of Shpet's acceptance of phenomenology lies in the fact that, on the one hand, he followed Husserl's turn to transcendental idealism, as presented in *Ideas I*, and yet, on the other hand, he also interpreted transcendental phenomenology as ontology. According to Shpet, it is indeed to Husserl's merit to have integrated the modern discovery of subjectivity into his ontological thinking. Considered from this perspective, Husserl's regression from objects to the stream of consciousness appears *primarily* as a demonstration of a sphere of absolute being on the basis of which the contingent being of objects is to be grounded. The distinction of the factual from the essential proves to be a deposition of contingent from necessary being.

In this way Shpet's hope for a "realistic metaphysics" was fulfilled through an ontological interpretation of *Ideas I*. It was here that he also thought he found his anticipated descriptive, total psychology in Husserl's method of the intentional analysis of consciousness. In *Appearance and Sense* what is at issue, however, for Russian phenomenology is not just a re-examination of Husserl's noetic-noematic investigations within the context of an ontological questioning. Shpet sought, in addition, to show the incompleteness of the analysis of the object, as it is given in *Ideas I*, and to complete it through his own concept.⁴⁴ The "sense" intended in acts of consciousness, as Husserl presents it, presupposes a class of such acts which are not themselves made the special objects of an inquiry. According to Shpet, there are acts of consciousness whose aim is understanding and which participate in the constitution of all classes of objects.⁴⁵ The structure of these "hermeneutical acts" is illustrated, moreover, by a series of phenomena which played a rather peripheral role in *Ideas I*, namely in the way useful things appear, in the specific character of historical evidence and in the understanding of verbal utterances. In this way Shpet's endeavor to ground historical knowledge in a scientific manner and finally to prepare the laying down of a foundation of the human sciences was met by Husserl's phenomenology by way of a further development in the direction of a *phenomenology of hermeneutic reason*.

LANGUAGE IN SHPET'S PHENOMENOLOGY

While still occupied with the revision of *Appearance and Sense*, Shpet in December 1913 received from Husserl a copy of the newly reprinted first five "Logical Investigations." He wrote to Husserl: "The book brought me much pleasure but also along with it a lot of uneasiness... The riches, from which I should choose, is actually inexhaustible, and I am radically reworking my entire presentation. In particular I am expanding Chapter 5 of my treatise, and on the basis of the *Investigations* I am dividing it up into Chapters 5 and 6 because I want to present the doctrine of 'meaning' somewhat more fully."⁴⁶ In this way a part of the *Logical Investigations* was included in *Appearance and Sense*, a work which is otherwise almost exclusively devoted to the interpretation of *Ideas I*. In doing so, the problem of language, particularly the question of the possibility of conceptually establishing the intuitively given, begins to play a larger role than was the case in *Ideas I*.

In the further development of Shpet's philosophical conceptions analyses of language and phenomenological descriptions are entwined in various ways. In the article "Consciousness and its Proprietor" from 1916 the problem of the concept of the "Ego," as well as the use of this expression, is analyzed in terms of the possibility of experiencing on the part of a "pure Ego." In *Hermeneutics and its Problems* (1918) Husserl comes into view primarily as the author of the *Logical Investigations*. In this connection the latter work is mentioned as an essential essay on "semantics" alongside the works of Marty and Meinong.

As already mentioned, the *Aesthetic Fragments* contain, in the second book from 1923, a phenomenology of living speech, and Shpet's last great work, the *Internal Form of the Word* from 1927, finally concerns itself with the rules which determine the constitution of meanings in various types of discourse (particularly in poetic speech).

Shpet's ever more intensifying turn to problems of verbal understanding (and even more generally to understanding by means of signs) begins in *Appearance and Sense*. For this reason a reading of Shpet's text will be an enriching experience for all those interested in a phenomenology of language.

NOTES

1. Cf. the series “New Ideas in Philosophy,” the intent of which was to make known to the Russian public modern West European streams of thought. The third volume, with the title *Epistemology I* contained along with an extensive article concerning Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* (viz. B.V. Jakovenko, “Filosofija E. Gusserlja”), essays on the empirio-criticism of R. Avenarius and the immanent philosophy of W. Schuppe. The fifth volume, with the title *Epistemology II*, was devoted principally to the schools of neo-Kantianism, in particular the Marburg School. The theory of consciousness of William James was presented in the fourth volume, *What Psychology is*. Bergson’s popularity in Russia at the beginning of the century is already evident in the fact that his *Creative Evolution* (1907) was translated into Russian in 1909. Particularly influential was his *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (1889), the Russian translation of which appeared in 1911.
2. On the “Renaissance of Metaphysics” in Russia at the turn of the century see V.V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy*, London, 1967, chapters XXVI to XXX. W. Goerdt, *Russische Philosophie. Zugänge und Durchblicke*, Freiburg/München, 1984, pp. 550–564.
3. Edmund Gusserl, *Logicheskija izsledovanija, chast pervaja: Prolegomeny k chistoj logike*, Razreshennyj avtorom perevod s nemeckogo E.A. Bershtejna. Pod redakcijej i s predisloviem S.L. Franka. St. P., 1909.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. viii–xi.
5. Edmund Gusserl, “Filosofija, kak strogaja nauka,” *Logos*, 1911, kn. 1.
6. This becomes clear from looking over the list of lecture-courses of the Historical-Philosophical Faculty of Moscow University between 1905 and 1918, which contains throughout German language bibliographic

data on philosophy.

7. An overview of the Russian reception of Husserl's work up to around 1930 is given by B. Jakovenko in "Ed. Husserl und die russische Philosophie," *Der russische Gedanke*, 1 (1929/30), 2, pp. 210–212. As the earliest discussions of Husserl he mentions N. Lossky's *Obosnovaniye intuitivizma* from 1906 as well as his own writings "Was ist die transzendentale Methode?," *Berichte des 3 Int. Phil. Kongresses zu Heidelberg*, 1909. Also "O sovremenном sostojanii nemeckoj filosofii," *Logos*, 1 (1910) and "Transcendentnyj immanentizm, immanentnyj transcedentizm i transcedental'nyj pljuralizm," *Logos*, III (1912–13), 1–2. And G. Lanz, "Gusserl i psikhologisty nasich dnej," *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii*, 20 (1909), book 98.
8. B. Jakovenko, "Filosofija E. Gusserlja," *Novyja idei v filosofii*, vol. 3: *Teorija poznaniija I*, St. P., 1913, pp. 74–146.
9. See note 7.
10. During the academic year 1912/13 Shpet was enrolled at the University of Göttingen. From his report on his period of study at Göttingen it is clear that among other courses Shpet had visited Husserl's class on "Natur und Geist" during the winter semester of 1912/13 (CGAgM, fd, Mogo. Gosogo Unta. f. 418).
11. In August 1922 Lenin ordered the expulsion of the openly non-Marxist philosophers from Russia. Cf. N.O. Lossky, *Vospominanija. Zhizn' i filosofskij put'*, München, 1968, p. 216ff.
12. The Russian reception of Husserl's work between 1914 and 1930 is to a great extent a "phenomenological movement in the strict sense." This expression is used here in the sense given by Herbert Spiegelberg. *The Phenomenological Movement*, The Hague, 1982, pp. 5–6.
13. A.F. Losev, *Filosofija imeni*, Moscow, 1927. *Muzyka kak predmet logiki*, Moscow, 1927. *Dialektika chudozestvennoj formy*, Moscow, 1927 (Reprint: München, 1983). *Dialektika mifa*, Moscow, 1930. Concerning Losev's early work during the 1920's, cf. V.V. Zenkovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 833–839. A. Haardt, *Husserl in Russland. Sprache und Kunst in der Phänomenologie G. Špets u. A. Losevs*, München, 1991.
14. Cf. Elmar Holenstein, *Linguistik Semiotik Hermeneutik. Pladoyers für eine strukturelle Phänomenologie*, Frankfurt/Main, 1976, pp. 13–17.
15. That is, from 1923 to 1929.
16. In *The Phenomenological Movement*, *op. cit.*, Spiegelberg places Levinas in the French branch and Gurwitsch and Celms in the German branch of the phenomenological movement.
17. Concerning Jakovenko's relationship to Husserl during the emigration

period, cf. his article “Ed. Husserl und die russische Philosophie,” *op. cit.* Lossky’s most important publication in this period on Husserl is his article “Transcendental’nyj fenomenologicheskij idealizm Gusserlja,” *Put’*, 1939, 60, pp. 37–56. On Frank’s relationship to Husserl see Rudolf W. Tannert, *Zur Theorie des Wissens. Ein Neuansatz nach S.L. Frank (1877–1950)*, pp. 27–28, 31, 38, 87–88.

18. Concerning Berdyaev’s ambivalent relation to Husserl, cf. Wolfgang Dietrich, *Provokation der Person*, Berlin, 1975, Band 2, pp. 65–70 and Band 5, pp. 164–167.
19. Particularly interesting in this connection is Berdyaev’s discussion with Scheler, Heidegger and N. Hartmann. Cf. Dietrich, *op. cit.*, Band 2, pp. 65–70 (Scheler, Hartmann), Band 3, pp. 215–225 (Heidegger), and Band 5, pp. 167–169 (Scheler).
20. “Memento Mori. Po povodu teorii poznaniija Edmunda Gusserlja.” *Voprosy filosofii i psichologii*, 1917, 139/140, pp. 1–68. The French translation appeared as: “Memento Mori. A propos de la théorie de la connaissance d’Edmund Husserl.” *Revue philosophique*, 1926, 1/2. pp. 5–62. Cf. L. Shestov, “In Memory of a Great Philosopher: Edmund Husserl,” translated by George Kline, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 22 (1962), 4, pp. 449–471. This piece appeared in its Russian edition first as “Pamjati velikogo filosofa Edmund Gusserl,” *Russkie zapiski*, Dec. 1938, 12, pp. 126–145, and Jan. 1939, 13, pp. 107–116.
21. Concerning the discussion of Husserl’s phenomenology in the Soviet Union, cf. T. Nemeth, “Husserl and Soviet Marxism,” *Studies in Soviet Thought*, 15 (1975), pp. 183–196. E. Swiderski, “Phenomenology in the FE,” *Studies in Soviet Thought*, 18 (1978), pp. 57–66. T. Rockmore, “Husserlian Phenomenology, Soviet Marxism and Philosophical Dialogue,” *Studies in Soviet Thought*, 24 (1982), pp. 249–276. H. Dahm, *Der gescheiterte Ausbruch. Entideologisierung und ideologische Gegenreformation in Osteuropa (1960–1980)*, Baden-Baden, 1982, pp. 235–264.
22. Cf. Helmut Dahm, *Solovyev and Max Scheler: Attempt at a Comparative Interpretation*, The Hague, 1975, chapter 9.
23. Cf. the article on G. Shpet by A.A. Mitjushin in *Bol’shaja sovetskaja enciklopedija*, vol. 29, Moscow, 1978, p. 169. Shpet’s dictionary article, “Literatura,” composed in 1929 appeared with an introduction by A.A. Mitjushin in the semiotics journal *Trudy po znakovym sistemam*, 15, 1982, pp. 149–158. The reprinting in 1989 of several of the chief works by Shpet takes place in the context of the latest efforts in

the Soviet Union to refer to “alternative” intellectual currents of the 1910s and '20s, which were suppressed in the Stalinist period. Cf. G.G. Shpet, *Sochinenija, c predisloviem E.V. Pasternaka*, Moscow, 1989.

24. In his early work, *The Phenomenology of Pure Music*, written in 1920/21, Losev saw himself as a representative of a dialectical phenomenology. In his later works, particularly in *The Dialectic of Artistic Form* (1927), phenomenological descriptions form only a moment of an encompassing dialectical theory.
25. From a letter by Shpet in Moscow to Husserl dated 26 February 1914 (old style), and therefore from 11 March (new style). It is preserved in the Husserl-Archives in Louvain and was cited for the first time by Holenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
26. Henry Lanz, *The Physical Basis of Rime. An Essay on the Aesthetics of Sounds*, California, 1931, p. ix. (A copy is preserved in Husserl's library with the dedication from Lanz: “Meinem hochverehrten Lehrer Prof. Edmund Husserl. Von dem Verfasser”).
27. “Fenomenologija absolutnoj, ili chistoj muzyki.” In *Muzyka kak predmet logiki*, Moscow, 1927, pp. 5–100.
28. On Losev's aesthetics see Alexander Haardt's “Die Kunsttheorie Aleksej Losevs. Grundzüge und Voraussetzungen” in A. Losev, *Dialektika chudozestvennoj formy*, München, 1983, pp. xiii–xxviii.
29. Cf. Aage A. Hansen-Löve, *Der Russische Formalismus*, Wien, 1978, pp. 181–3 and 264–7.
30. Most of these works are to be found in the collective volumes, edited by the State Academy for the Study of the Arts, “Ars poetica,” “Iskusstvo,” “Iskusstvo portreta,” “Chudozestvennaja forma.”
31. Gustav Shpet, *Vnutrennaja forma slova. Etudy i variacii na temy Gumbol'dta*, Moscow, 1927. Cf. Erika Freiberger, “Philosophical Linguistics: W. v. Humboldt and G.G. Shpet (A Semiotic Theory of Inner Form),” *Penn Review of Linguistics*, vol. 7, 1983, pp. 95–105.
32. Cf. E. Holenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–55.
33. Yet isolated references to Scheler and Moritz Geiger can be found in Losev. See Losev, *Dialektika chudozestvennoj formy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 170f and 135f.
34. Letter from 23 November 1913 from Paris, preserved in the Husserl-Archives in Louvain.
35. G. Shpet, “Odin put' psikhologii i kuda on vedet,” *Filosofskij sbornik L'vu M. Lopatinu ot Moskovskogo Psikhologicheskogo Obshchestva*, Moscow, 1912, pp. 245–264.

36. G. Shpet, *Istorija kak problema logiki. Kriticheskie i metodologicheskie izsledovaniya, chast' 1: Materialy*, Moscow, 1916, p. iii.
37. Shpet, "Odin put'," *op. cit.*, pp. 248–9.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 257. Shpet had edited a Russian translation of James's *A Pluralistic Universe*.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 264.
40. Pamfilus D. Yurkevich (1827–1874) studied at the Kiev Theological Academy and was from 1861 professor of philosophy at Moscow University. Among his students was Vladimir Solovyev. Yurkevich's "Doctrine of the Heart," which Shpet emphasized in the mentioned article as an example of total thought, owes much to the anthropology of the Eastern Church Fathers. Shpet wrote an extensive study on Yurkevich: "Filosofskoe nasledstvo P.D. Yurkevicha," *Voprosy filosofii i psichologii*, 1914, 125, pp. 653–727. Count Sergij N. Trubetskoy (1862–1905), professor at Moscow University, played an important role in the struggle for university autonomy. He was a follower of V. Solovyev's "Metaphysics of Total-Unity." His theory of the "universal" character of the human consciousness, which Shpet mentions as another example of a total philosophy, is strongly influenced by the Slavophiles. See Zenkovsky, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 792–803.

The neo-Leibnizian Lev M. Lopatin (1855–1920) also was a professor of philosophy at Moscow and influenced by Solovyev. His principal work, *Polozitel'nye zadachi filosofii*, in two volumes, served as Shpet's paradigm of a "positive philosophy." On Lopatin see Zenkovsky, vol. 2, pp. 645–657.

41. See Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, The Hague, 1978, p. 173.
42. See H. Spiegelberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 166–168.
43. Interestingly, Lotze's philosophy was regarded by Shpet as a preliminary working-out of a "positive philosophy" (before Husserl).
44. Shpet's own conception of phenomenology is expressed above all in the last chapter of *Appearance and Sense*.
45. Whether "hermeneutic acts" participate in the constitution of all or only some classes of objects (such as organisms, things of use, etc.) ultimately remains in *Appearance and Sense* an open question.

APPEARANCE AND SENSE

Introduction

One of the essential features of negative philosophy is its denial of a unity in the development of philosophical thought and of a fixed set of philosophical problems, let alone of solutions to them. Therefore negative philosophy always advances projects and plans that are not merely reformist but indeed “revolutionary.” This feature is present in all types of negative philosophy – from simple nihilism, through skepticism and relativism, up to and including positivism. On the other hand, positive philosophy in its very essence respects the philosophical tradition and sees in the history of philosophy *its own* problems and tasks as well as the continuous development of them. Positive philosophy, therefore, is always a philosophy with positive problems and tasks. Indeed, it has never substituted the problem of knowing what is *real in all* its forms and types for any other problems. From Plato to Lotze, through Descartes and Leibniz, positive philosophy has followed one straight path.

It is not hard to see that from time to time positive philosophy has to “negate” and criticize. But this does not alter its essence, since each of its negations, by being directed against negativism, thereby acquires an affirmative character. Therefore its enemy is really not straightforward negativism but those sophistically refined modifications that appear in the form in general of a limitation and privation, namely naturalism, psychologism, historicism, “epistemologism,” etc., that is “isms” of every type. In these doctrines negativism is disguised in a positive form. But their negative meaning is revealed as soon as we notice that in every such assertion of the sort as that the aim of philosophy is “to determine the limits of reason or of knowledge,” or “to reduce everything to one,” to something that is already studied by a special science, etc. there is a *privatio* and consequently, connected with it, a *negatio*. Positive philosophy, therefore, must have a *foundation* – and historically it has always followed this path –

in which, by affirming and justifying *everything in all* its forms and types, not only would these sophistical attempts to substitute the particular for the universal be prevented, but also any μεταβάσις εις άλλο γένος at all.

We need not think that because of this negative philosophy must be qualified as a complete “mistake” or a complete philosophical misunderstanding. The value of its criticism is beyond dispute and the value of its questions even more so. But speaking of negative philosophy we should carefully distinguish dogmatic *negation* from the simple questions to which it seeks and expects answers though perhaps does not find. There is a difference in principle between doubts, searchings and “questions,” such as Hume’s, and ready answers for everything. Actually negative philosophy, particularly in its critiques, has played a rather important role in history by drawing the attention of philosophers to new aspects and to new types of what exists, and by raising new questions and doubts about it. In this sense Protagoras, Locke, Hume and Kant, for example, have rendered a real service to philosophy. Thus the critique inaugurated by Locke and sharpened to the finest edge by Hume, though then transformed by Kant into the privation of his “theory of knowledge,” opened up new problems and a new path for positive philosophy. Scottish philosophy could successfully oppose Hume, but it in turn fell victim to Kant’s critique precisely from the side that revealed a weakness common to it and its opponents – psychologism. This historical example reveals to us another side in the development of philosophical thought and is a very good illustration of how philosophy, pursuing positive aims, can nonetheless deviate into “privativism” and dry up, like a withered bough, on the living trunk of philosophy. Other such examples repeatedly show how that *foundation* of philosophy mentioned above must be constructed and “put together.” Not only must *everything* be included within it, but *each item* must also be *in its proper place*.

Already taking into account the gaps noted by critics of 19th century negativism, *phenomenology*, as it is understood by Husserl,¹ attempts this turn to a creative construction of the foundation of philosophy. Perhaps it is not yet time to establish phenomenology’s relationship not just to the other contemporary doctrines with similar aims or similar names, such as, for example, Stumpf’s, on the one hand, or Meinong’s, on the other, but also to its historical predecessors as well. Although in this regard its continuity with Lotze, Leibniz and Plato is just as obvious as is the influence on it of negative philosophy in the persons of Locke, Hume and even Mill. However, an exhaustive elucidation of the role of these influences is still as much an open question as is that of the role of Bolzano or Brentano. It is our aim here to explain the role of phenomenology itself and to do this

precisely from the viewpoint of its stated aim, namely to be the fundamental philosophical science and, consequently, to continue the work and tradition of positive philosophy. In other words, we intend to penetrate into the very sense of phenomenology itself as it is revealed above all in its manner of formulating questions and, though to a lesser degree, in its solutions to these questions.

Of course, wherever there is talk about searching for sense there must also be along with it understanding and, consequently, interpretation. Given the difficulties inherent in phenomenology, not just because of the originality of its problems but also because of the very nature of these problems, our interpretation must undergo disputation and tests in general as to the correctness of its very understanding of phenomenology. Actually the difficulties here are neither small nor few in number. But if we give an account of what we ourselves *see*, and in this case see in phenomenology, we shall be proceeding completely in the spirit of phenomenology itself and in accordance with its own demands. Of course, interpretation is inevitable here. But where there is no interpretation whatever, there is also no understanding at all.

By the way, one can see as a result of our interpretation that what matters most here is not so much the ultimate conclusions and results at which phenomenology arrives as the very cognition of its problems, their statement and formulation. Phenomenology is not revelation. There are no truths in it "given for all eternity." Much of it may be corrected; some of it may be completely rejected.² But its merits should be assessed above all by *how* it arrives at its results. And if this path proves promising, its place in the development of positive philosophy will be secure. No matter how "subjective" our interpretation of this part of phenomenology may turn out to be, we nevertheless have no doubt that its spirit and its ability to raise problems will be shown with sufficient clarity. Only those who demand from philosophy qualities not inherent in it, who look on it as an oracle demanding not work but submissive questioning, can be troubled by the fact that there are a large number of problems but only a comparatively small number of solutions.

We, on the other hand, value the very posing of problems, and therefore in order to emphasize this aspect even more, and in order to demonstrate how problems arise on the basis of the fundamental philosophical science, we conclude our presentation by indicating some additional new problems that, in our opinion, directly follow from the very principles of this science and lead us closer to the empirical life that constantly surrounds us. Again, these are not established results but rather evidence in favor of the fruitful-

ness of the field we are entering.

The method we will use may appear debatable; everything seems to be centered around just one question. But to leave undisclosed how all philosophical problems are connected and entangled with this question – since it is fundamental to philosophy – would be a genuine narrowing of the tasks of the fundamental philosophical science. Not only has the dispute between nominalism and realism not been resolved in the history of philosophy, but it provokes ever new philosophical controversies. We may also notice that every significant era in philosophy is marked by a reformulation of this dispute in a new manner. This is the pivot around which all the links in the history of philosophical thought can be arranged, strung one after another. And it is no secret that in our time this question again demands discussion, a discussion that is now the center of intense and sharp attention, since in it the most vital needs of the philosophy that seeks positive paths are focused. The problem of the logical expression of an intuition conceptually is only a new dressing on this eternal problem. It springs naturally from questions about the method of this fundamental science, since it lies at the foundation of every methodology. And it goes without saying that once raised this problem leads to a whole series of new and fundamental problems, partly directed at its own general conclusion but also partly at a deeper understanding and transition from what is expressed to what expresses it and finally to the ultimate source of everything that is genuinely rational.

Author's Notes

1. Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. by John Findlay, New York: Humanities Press, 1970.
Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science,” in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. by Quentin Lauer, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965.
Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*. First Book: *General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. by F. Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. [Hereafter this work will be referred to as *Ideas* – translator.]
2. As Husserl rightly replies to Kant, in philosophy there is no “royal path.” *Ideas*, p. 235. [Shpet gives an incorrect page reference – translator.]

CHAPTER 1

Experiencing and Ideal Intuition

Thus based on what we have just said one of the first tasks before philosophy is the problem concerning the *foundation* upon which the entire structure of our knowledge, both philosophical and scientific, both that of actuality as well as that of the “ideal world” can be erected. “Philosophy, however, is essentially a science of true beginnings, or origins, of *rizomata panton*.¹ Consequently, it is necessary in philosophy to concern oneself with finding foundations, “beginnings.” By its very idea and vocation “first” philosophy speaks of just such beginnings and principles. Whereas, however, the initial assertion of positive philosophy was an acknowledgement that the “fundamental” philosophical science must be a science of the foundations of everything existing, consequently of being itself, negative philosophy treated this fundamental thesis in a negative manner. In its pseudo-affirmation, viz. sophistry, it saw as the task of “first” philosophy not the study of cognizable being but of the cognizing subject itself, yet again not in its *being*, as a cognizing subject, but only in its cognitive forms. Precisely herein lies the principal sin of sophistry and the “theory of knowledge.”^a Psychologism is only a particular expression of this fundamental shortcoming of negative philosophy. It is evident that the “theory of knowledge” in the mentioned philosophical sense essentially cannot free itself from this shortcoming, since psychologism is part of its very essence.

Precisely for this reason the “theory of knowledge,” if it is identified with theoretical philosophy in general, leads inevitably either to a subjectivistic metaphysics or to a direct rejection of philosophy, taking the latter as the cognition of what actually is. As characteristic of positive philosophy we take that time and again enunciated principle which, in our opinion, finds its clearest expression in Yurkevich’s formulation: “*in order to know it is unnecessary to have knowledge about knowledge itself.*”²

We must recognize a very important factor in the history of philosophy,

which at least in part explains the widespread sway of negativism in contemporary philosophical thought. The fact is that positive philosophy, both in its solutions as well as in the formulations of its problems and tasks, often manifested itself, if not erroneously, then in any case at least *incompletely*. Turning all of its attention to the solution to the problem of being, positive philosophy discovered with its first steps (Plato) the distinction between actual and ideal being as well as that between the various types of each of these forms of being.

Positive philosophy, however, turns out to be *incomplete* in the sense that it has not accorded proper attention to the being of the cognizing subject itself. It is precisely this deficiency that negative philosophy has taken advantage of with such success. Positive philosophy attempted to present the being of the cognizing subject as an actual, empirical being. But in doing so it often transformed its deficiency into a shortcoming, a mistake. For in doing so that very shortcoming, which, only with a different sign, underlies the “theory of knowledge,” penetrated into positive philosophy in the form, for the most part, of psychologism, though also in the form of a naturalism in general. Kant secured his outstanding position in the history of philosophy precisely by the fact that he discovered, sometimes even seems to have clearly seen, the peculiar, non-empirical and non-actual being of the subject of cognition.

Thus the development of positive philosophy could proceed along a two-stage path. It could make up the deficiency mentioned above by acknowledging as one of the problems of “first” philosophy the problem of the *being* of cognizing reason. In this way it further elaborates its inheritance from past ages while at the same time liberating itself from sophistry. The subsequent way is through establishing the relation of the being of cognizing reason to the other types and forms of being, and so it effects a return to positive philosophy.

As I understand it, Husserl follows precisely this path. His phenomenology must be that “first” philosophy without which neither philosophy nor any science whatever is conceivable. It must be “the science fundamental to philosophy.”³

Our surrounding world of appearances, in terms of our “natural” relationship to it, is the world of *experience*. And those sciences which are directed towards the study of this world have to do with the being that we can characterize as actual, real being, “being in the world.”⁴ These sciences are empirical sciences, sciences of experience, or of the “facts” of the real world. Such facts are always individual. That is, they are always connected with a definite space and time, and that is why they are “*contingent*” facts.

To speak of the “contingency” of facts means here that although they are located in a definite place and time they contain *essentially* nothing that would exclude the possibility of their being in some other place or time, or in some other situation, etc. Their so-called regularity or lawfulness is itself merely the expression of a factual rule, which could under *<other>* circumstances be quite different. However the very sense, the essence, of such a contingency gives rise to a correlation between it and some essential *necessity*. This necessity stands opposed to the simple factual rules of empirical actuality. Thus the contingency of facts, of “being in the world,” stands opposed to something, a something which is characterized as the necessity of essence, as “being in an idea.”

Accordingly we can speak about sciences of the ideal, of the eidetic, or sciences of essences as opposed to the empirical sciences or sciences of facts. The pure ideal sciences are “free” of any experience as such, both with respect to their object as well as with respect to their^b foundation. They presuppose another, *<different>* relation to the world of appearance surrounding us – not a “natural” relation, but an ideal one. As we will see later, this is neither an annihilation nor a denial of actuality but a certain advertence of our vision, a new “attitude” of our theoretical orientation, thanks to which the possibility arises of turning immediately from “natural” being in the world to the being of another order and of other essences. Thus along with the empirical sciences we are able to talk about ideal sciences.

Taking into account this division of the contingent and the necessary, the empirical and the eidetic, or ideal – in general, fact and essence – we must recognize that phenomenology can only be a science of essences. This guarantees it that absolute character without which “fundamental science” in general is inconceivable.

Any essence whatever, and in particular that essence to which the study of phenomenology is directed, is not something arrived at by means of hypotheses and deductions. Rather, an essence is “just as much” an intuition or insight of our reason as is an individual intuition of some actual thing. In terms of immediate givenness essences are the same as actual physical things, but of course they are different from the latter in terms of what is intuitively given. “The whole thing, however, depends on one’s seeing and making entirely one’s own the truth that just as immediately as one can hear a sound, so one can intuit an ‘essence’ – the essence ‘sound,’ the essence ‘appearance of things,’ the essence ‘apparition,’ the essence ‘pictorial representation,’ the essence ‘judgment’ or ‘will,’ etc. – and in the intuition one can make an essential judgment.”⁵

Husserl does not stop with a general determination of what phenomenol-

ogy studies, as “essences,” but proceeds further to the determination of the being of phenomenology’s subject-matter and characterizes it in general as “intentionality.”^c Thus a broad field is opened up for investigation, both of this being itself as well as of all its other forms and types, both in their correlative relationship to each other and in their correlative relationship to the intentional being.

But the particular advantage of Husserl’s phenomenology – and this is just what absolutely distinguishes it from negative and sophistical philosophy – is that it does not obtain its object through a denial of actuality. Nor does it obtain its object through some theoretical abstraction from actuality coupled with a hypostatization of the process’s result.^d For any abstraction from actuality always remains either a “part” of actuality, or it is simply a fiction. Nor, however, is the object of phenomenology obtained by means of artificial deductions, constructed on the basis of ambiguous conceptions of a “limit” or “border,” ambiguous thanks to their negative character. Rather, it is obtained simply by means of a shift of the advertence of our “vision,” by means of, as Husserl himself says, another “attitude.”

Sooner or later we must confront a standard question: Philosophy wishes to study “everything.” But the other sciences already study everything, although everything compartmentalized. What is left for philosophy? This question can be rephrased in the following way: Both the natural sciences as well as psychology, i.e., the sciences of natural and cultural events, study “appearances,” “phenomena.” What is left for phenomenology?

The term “phenomena” can assume any number of significations. If philosophy wishes to study “everything,” all these significations must become its Objects of study. It is impossible for us to say here that philosophy studies “other” significations of “phenomenon” or phenomena with a different signification than do the particular sciences. Phenomenology actually wishes to study “everything,” although in another attitude than that in which the other sciences go about their studies. Only in this way can it, without annihilating actuality, be a science of “everything,” and thereby be the fundamental science. Nobody’s rights are here violated; nobody’s interests are infringed upon; no being of any sort is entered in the proscribed lists; no cognition of any sort gets on the *Index scientiarum prohibitarum*. A completely free path is clear for the cognition of being.

We will not limit ourselves to just this general indication,^e but will dwell longer here on certain ideas, since they are at least in part taken up in the following presentation. As we interpret it, phenomenology wishes to study “everything,” but *everything* “essentially” or “ideally,” that is, eidetically.

This brings to mind Plato's old definition according to which the philosopher loves *every* study and cannot get satiated. Yet, nevertheless, there are lovers of beautiful sounds, colors, and forms but whose minds are incapable of seeing and loving the nature of the beautiful itself. The true philosopher is able to strive for beauty in itself and see it in itself, i.e., in its essence.⁶ Thus an elucidation of the concept of *essence*, particularly in its role as the object of phenomenology, is our next concern. As we will be able to see, this task forms a part of phenomenology itself, since the first and fundamental problems phenomenology seeks to solve are outlined in the presentation we will give. The next problem connected with this has to do expressly with the character of the phenomenological "attitude" and its sense. The latter problem, in turn, leads us deep into the act of establishing and the specifying of the methods of phenomenological description.

Husserl's solution to the question of "essence," *eidos*, what's more, in a certain sense draws us closer to Plato. Phenomenology, as the fundamental philosophical science, cannot evade the basic question of every philosophy, the basic question arising from the antinomy: *Every being is individual, while every cognition is general*.^f Nevertheless the cognition of being, how or in what manner it exists, is the task not only of metaphysics but of science as well, although only metaphysics formulates its task in that way, taking this in all its immediacy. The "theory of knowledge" (=subjectivistic metaphysics) expressly makes this question its own under the heading of the relation of consciousness to being.

It is obvious, however, that the "theory of knowledge" makes a substitution here and, consequently, begins with nothing other than an unfounded dogma. It wishes to cognize cognition itself, yet in this case not as a being, but as a "condition" of being. This is an unsubstantiated anticipation as long as we do not know what cognition *is* and *how* it exists.^g And it is nonsense, or a *contradictio in adjecto*, to claim that real being is subject to a transcendental condition.

If we just keep in mind the "*subjectivism*" of such a solution, it is not hard to see that the epistemological solution to this antinomy essentially commits us to nominalism. The fact of the matter does not change regardless of whether we call our theory of knowledge psychological or transcendental. Here the nominalism of a Berkeley, a Hume or of a Mill is one with the nominalism of Kant and the neo-Kantian positivists. Nominalism leads to skeptical absurdity, as in Rickert's case with a proclamation about an ideal cognition removed as far as possible from actuality. Owing to this, nominalism cannot in the final analysis be held as an attempt at a resolution of the problem, since it represents a simple return to it. On the question of

how to resolve the adduced antinomy positivism answers with an acknowledgment and an affirmation of that very antinomy! This is nominalism of an extreme sort.

In our view Husserl restores the observer to his normal position. The given is taken above all *as given*, as turning up *in front of us*, as an object, as the *given* problem. There is no theory here or ready answers. Any statement about the given is subject to analysis with the aim in fact being to isolate the given, and furthermore, in fact, to isolate the *originarily* given. All existing and real things, whatever be their forms of being, represent a variety of the subjects mentioned. Our theoretical (in the broadest sense) orientation is directed to them, as a problem whose first question concerns the *originarily* given in direct *presentive* intuition. Through "perception" we obtain what is intuitively really given as individual and factual. In "perception" we distinguish what is given in a "recollection" or other forms of recall from what is "originarily" given.

We saw how the "contingency" of the individually given is correlatively established along with the "necessity" of the *essence*. Inasmuch as we determine the "what" of the individual, "put it into an idea," it is not hard to see that this "what" becomes the "what" of the corresponding essence.⁷ Empirical, or individual, intuition, thus, is transformed into "ideation," into ideal intuition or the "intuition of essences." The given of this intuition is with respect to the corresponding empirical intuition a *pure* essence or *eidos*. The situation is the same regardless of whether it be a matter of the highest category or of its specification all the way down to complete concreteness. Side by side with objects of the "natural" world we now begin to talk about new, different objects, objects of a different sort of intuition and, evidently, of a different genus of being. "*The essence (Eidos) is a new sort of object. Just as the datum of individual or experiencing intuition is an individual object, so the datum of eidetic intuition is a pure essence.*"⁸

There is good reason to speak here of an object of a distinctive genus and of an intuition of a distinctive genus, since it is a question not of a simple superficial analogy but actually of something universal. Precisely just as an empirical intuition "gives" an individual object, so "in quite the same manner intuition of an essence is consciousness of something, an 'object,' a Something to which the intuitional regard is directed and which is 'itself given' in the intuition; it is something which can, however, be 'objectivated' as well in other acts, something that can be thought of vaguely or distinctly, which can be made the subject of true and false predication – just like any other 'object' in the necessarily broadened sense proper to formal logic."⁹ But at the same time it goes without saying

that this intuition must be carefully and fundamentally distinguished from empirical intuition. As Husserl says, it is “of an essentially *peculiar* and *novel sort*.”^{8,j}

It is worth our while to look closer into the character of both “sorts” of intuition in order to make as clear as possible their relation to each other and to avoid misunderstanding in the future. Husserl speaks of two “sorts” of intuition. Is this completely accurate? “In general” intuition presents itself, consequently, as one “genus.” We have the right to establish relations and draw conclusions – which logic in general admits – when it is a matter of a relation within one “sort” or one “genus.” It is worth our while to ponder over, on the one hand, the fundamental difference between the two sorts of intuition, a difference already conspicuous from the difference between what is “factual,” or contingent, and what is necessary as to the object, and even more so from the difference in their standing among other acts and even simply among psychic processes. Yet, on the other hand, it is also worth our while to ponder over what they actually have “in common.” As to their fundamental difference, we wish to emphasize just one thing: The reproduction of empirical perceptions, taken as temporal recollections, has nothing in common with the reproduction of ideal intuitions, i.e. “recalling” one and the same essence completely outside time. Clearly from this one item an endless series of other no less fundamental differences follow.

On the other hand, certainly the only thing “in common” between the two sorts of intuition is their “originary givenness,” although even here the nature of this givenness is fundamentally different. Is our concern in such a generalization ultimately not really with “generalization” but rather simply with logical *formalization*? Certainly if this is what we have in mind we can avoid equivocation by using the term *sort*.

What, however, is actually the cause of the confusion here – a confusion resulting from a misunderstanding of the interrelation between the intuitions – is clear from the polemic that arises from the adduced division between them. Their interrelation is apparently clear: It is not a matter of two empirical “visions,” not of two “sides,” “methods of approach” or “points of view,” etc., but of some *single* advertence or “direction” of the regard of consciousness that seizes in what appears to consciousness what we in the natural attitude toward the world call facts, the experientially given by an experiencing intuition, etc. But this same “regard” does not come to a halt on the experientially given. It, as it were, goes further inward, “penetrating throughout” the individual thing, right up to its essence in the different, perhaps infinite, stages of its specification and embodiment of genera.

Clearly this “penetration” “starts out” from an intuition of something individual, although it can also “start out” from recollection and even from a form of phantasy. Nevertheless, however, it is by no means the same as the apprehension made by individual intuition itself. It is not the determination of any *actuality* whatever. Rather, it is the determination of a fundamentally new sort of objects.⁹ At the same time and in connection with this the determination of intuitions of essences certainly does not include a determination of empirical existence, and mere statements about essences do not contain any assertions at all concerning facts. In any case, from them *alone* it is impossible to draw conclusions concerning factual truths.

Thus, in spite of their intimate “connection” and even of the “inseparability” of the *eidos* from the individual, we cannot find anything “in common” between them except for their formal trait of immediate originary givenness. Finally each “sort” of intuition can determine any number of *types* of objects, and we can talk of types of both experiencing as well as ideal intuition. Between the corresponding types we can observe a constant correlative relation. But nevertheless in themselves they remain fundamentally different, namely fact and *eidos*, and with respect to their very being, “existence” and “essence.”¹⁰

Thus we can see how the rug is pulled out from under nominalism. The sense of the mentioned basic antinomy now appears in such a light that the antinomy’s very illusiveness becomes vividly grasped. Certainly, however, this as yet does not resolve the problem that forms the historical justification for nominalism, the specific question of the role of *nomina*.¹¹ Indeed, at the moment the problem has not even been touched upon.

As for the basic nature of Husserl’s “realism,” it can only insist on a clarification of a new problem, namely the one provoked by his formulation of the question: How and on what basis do we come to see a certain *X* in the originally given intuition? This is the riddle of the object that demands a theoretical solution. Or to put it in a quite general manner: *How does actuality exist?* Mutatis mutandis we repeat Hegel’s doubt addressed to Schelling’s intellectual intuition: Does not such an intuition present reality itself in an unreal manner? We will hold onto this question, as applying equally to the objects of empirical as well as ideal intuition, using it as our guide in everything that follows. We will note here only that if attempts to restore nominalism still make any sense, they do so only if they proceed in the direction indicated by this question. As for other attempts, they are partly the fruit of misunderstanding, and in part they simply erect nominalism as a disguised realism.

The latest attempt by Aster¹² to restore nominalism can serve as an

illustration of the conclusion mentioned just above. Aster sees a dilemma, either for Husserl or for nominalism, a dilemma which he formulates in the following way: "Either the talk of *one* identical, general object, for example 'the' man or 'the' color, is simply *fictitious* talk and in that case we stick to nominalism. Or there is such a formation (*ein solches Gebilde*), and we have to revert from Aristotle back to Plato, as we must seek this formation not *in* the individual, but *outside* it, even though not as a really existing thing."¹³

First of all, with Husserl there is no talk of "form" or "formation" (*Gebilde*) whatever. He speaks not about the *imagination*, but about "ideation" or the intuition of essences. Although Husserl calls it a "sort" of intuition, he, nevertheless, certainly does not think that what can be attributed to the other sort of intuition can be transferred to the intuition of essences. No less fruitless is the attempt here, where it is a matter of *fundamental* pre-theoretical problems, to raise the subject of something "*inside*" or "*outside*" the individual. Psychologically speaking, Aster's misunderstandings arise from the fact that he holds to a psychological interpretation of concepts and judgments (relying on Cornelius he considers judgments to be recollections and expectations) and understands Husserl in the same way. He expects the possibility of ideal intuitions to arise in the memory. Aster considers them to be "forms," etc., ignoring the fact that ideal intuitions are not subject to any empirical and, above all, not to any temporal determination at all. He attributes such a view, for example, to the philosophical direction he criticizes, as if the very concept of "genus" were arrived at here by means of an abstraction from every *hic et nunc*. In doing so he not only disregards the doctrine of abstraction espoused by that philosophical direction, but he simply overlooks a fact that lies at the very foundation of that doctrine. This is simply that the very possibility of such an abstraction is dependent on *already* necessarily presupposing an intuition of "genus."

Also important, however, are those considerations Aster *in essence* brings forth against the second part of this dilemma. He admits that Husserl's theory is "the sole possible theory of the universal" provided, that is, that one does not adopt the nominalist point of view. But what induces Aster to come out against Husserl is that in one way or another both Aristotle and Locke in their own minds solved the problem, yet Husserl did not. "Aristotle and Locke attempt to make clear to us to a certain extent the universal and the way by which we reach it from the individual."¹⁴ On the other hand, however, he finds no information at all in Husserl "about the relation of the universal to the individual." "And finally we have perhaps

the most important consideration. If we make statements about ‘the’ triangle, the triangle in general, these statements hold *eo ipso* also for the individual triangle, and indeed for every individual triangle, for all triangles.”¹ This connection remains incomprehensible in Husserl’s theory: “A question of a further ‘Why’ remains unanswerable.”¹⁴

As a matter of fact this is incorrect. From Aster’s account it would appear as though Husserl did not concern himself with these questions.¹⁵ What is of fundamental importance is that Husserl did not raise them in the same way as Aster does, and *there is no reason why he has to*. In this respect Husserl’s views should be compared not with Locke’s and Aristotle’s but with Plato’s. We saw how ideation penetrates through empirical givenness to the eidetic object. We saw what the correlativity of the objects of the two sorts of intuition consists of. Finally we saw the relative autonomy of each genus of objects, an autonomy which forbids us crossing from eidetic objects “alone” to empirical objects. It is true that all this comes to light not through a “why,” not by means of “theories,” but by way of a phenomenological description of the given, as it is given, i.e. as we “see” it.

Aster, however, simply refuses to *see*. In the case of the relation of an individual to a species, it “seems” to him that on the face of it there is “no givenness of a species, but knowledge of the relationship of the given individual content to something that is not immediately given.”¹⁶ There is no dispute that this relation is not immediately given empirically, “to the senses.” But if, as Aster thinks, it is given, though not immediately, surely the same old psychologistic antinomy still lingers: The *original* source of the relation has to be either empirical or non-empirical. Yet not for the world would Aster be willing to admit the possibility of the latter. Lacking interest in repeating the arguments against psychologism we find something else more interesting here, namely, the phenomenological source of Aster’s misunderstanding.

It seems to us that his last remark about “something not immediately given” leads us to the question mentioned above concerning the “object” and “actuality.” ... Aster’s very definition of his own as well as of *every* nominalism says: “Nominalism of every shade – this expresses precisely its essence – considers general concepts, general objects to be fictions. Such objects do not exist in any sense, neither as real nor as ideal, neither as physical nor as psychic, neither as independent nor as parts of objects. Therefore, such formations also cannot be known to us in any form, and under no circumstances can they be presented to us as phenomenally given.”¹⁷ If in this definition, so characteristic of negativism, categorialness is translated into the language of actual doubt and questioning, then the

problem, only touched upon here, will be precisely how from the immediate givenness of intuition we come not just to an object, but above all to the very question of the “object” as a certain “actuality.”

As we saw, the immediate intellectual seeing in ideal intuition of a special genus of object as an essence entails the problem of the “conditions” under which this *sui generis* objectivity (*predmetnost'*) is found. Under a requirement resulting from the essence of the fundamental philosophical science such an investigation must form a part of phenomenology itself. This is because any psychological or other specific scientific analysis always turns out to be a biased theory that distorts the sense of the very problem. In general, however, the first step in any independent scientific or philosophical investigation is a rigorous review, or inspection, of those concepts and ideas with which the investigator has to deal. This is true both in a large as well as a small investigation.

Doubt (“methodical”), critique, abstention from judgment (*Urteilsenthaltung*), $\varepsilon\pi\omega\chi\eta$ in general – all these are various names expressing the necessary methodological demand of cognition. And just as great eras in the development of philosophical and scientific thought are connected with instances of such a review and inspection, so too do they imbue, or at least should imbue, each particular work of scientific investigation. They should accompany each step of scientific work. The philosophical fundamental science will only fulfill its calling if it begins with an inspection of concepts, theories, assumptions and, frequently, prejudices to which people have already become accustomed and if it manages to separate the true from the false, the illusory from the actual, and establish its own content on the basis of the rigorously proven and indubitably given. Such work has been carried out time and again in philosophy, but philosophy must not get tired of doing it all again and again.

The sense or point behind an “inspection” and review of this kind is our desire to find a solid principle for philosophizing that would not be “burdened” with “prejudices” or biases and in general would have no “presuppositions” in the broad sense. It is as if Erinyes were pursuing contemporary philosophy in its aspiration to begin work without “presuppositions” and “assumptions”! ... However, we must be aware of *what kind of* presuppositions we want to be free from, since we are dealing here with an equivocation, and a rather complicated one at that.

By presuppositions we sometimes simply mean “premises,” that is, those first propositions from which we constructively derive the content of the given presentation. “Presuppositions” of this kind are, in essence, indemonstrable propositions, that is, they are not obtained from others and are

not subject to proof. In this sense they can, properly speaking, be called "insights" or pre-theoretical propositions. We can consider it the particular task of logic and of the fundamental science to reveal the content of these "insights" and to illuminate the paths leading to their achievements. The fundamental philosophical science includes these very "presuppositions" in its content, and already this alone means it must be free of them as "presuppositions." In general this science contains neither "premises" from which theoretical conclusions could be drawn nor "premises" that could serve as *conditions* either for theoretical conclusions or for their application.

Moreover, to be precise the fundamental philosophical science, as *pure* knowledge, must be free from "presuppositions" in the sense in which by "presupposition" we mean those propositions that receive their justification only through the process of a theoretical construction or through the application of such a construction. Such presuppositions essentially bear a practical character, in the broad sense, and are called *postulates*.

On the other hand, if we take "presuppositions" to mean the *principles* of the peculiar functioning of this or that knowledge-claim, then of course the fundamental science cannot be free from these. It happens to be in a quite special position here. Only in logic is there something analogous. Like logic the fundamental philosophical science includes the principles of its own functioning in its very content. And to the extent that they are utilized it is completely and exhaustively aware of them.

Finally, by "presuppositions" we sometimes mean the *empirical conditions* of cognition and of philosophizing itself. All these "presuppositions" ultimately come down to the fact of our own existence. Clearly in order to philosophize we must not only be striving for truth, believe in its attainability, etc., but must certainly be born, have parents, drink, eat and carry out many other functions. Above all, therefore, we must exist. We have to realize that phenomenology is not free from "presuppositions" of *such* a sort.

It is not without foundation that philosophy is characterized as the science of principles in general. Principles are, above all, *beginnings*.^m By this we need not understand rational principles, since it is a matter of beginnings, conceived as "starting points." The fundamental science, owing precisely to its being the *beginning* science, conceptually and by its very sense excludes the possibility of having any "presuppositions." This is evident since only in the fundamental science are heterogeneous beginnings not introduced as they are for example in the last mentioned meaning of the concept of "presupposition."

Author's Notes

1. Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," *op. cit.*, p. 146.
2. Pamphiilus Danilovich Yurkevich, "Ideya," *Zhurnal ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniya*, 1859, No. 10–11, p. 11. Also, by the way, cf. Spinoza: "...it is not necessary to know that we know that we know." "Of the Improvement of the Understanding" in *The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza*, trans. by R.H.M. Elwes, New York: Dover Publications, 1965, vol. II, p. 13. This thought is also expressed well by Teichmüller: "Epistemology cannot be produced without the concept of being, for cognition itself is something and has an existent for an object." *Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt*, Breslau, 1882, p. 3. Certainly this is the development of Lotze's thought. Cf. his *Grundzüge der Logik*, Leipzig, 1883, § 92, p. 90. There is no need to speak of Hegel. It goes without saying that Schelling's idea of "identity" is of relevance here although there is already nothing new to add here. Phenomenology occupies an original place in relation to ontology in Lotze. See his *Grundzüge der Metaphysik*, Leipzig, 1883. Cf. also Class, *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Ontologie des menschlichen Geistes*, Leipzig, 1896.
3. *Ideas*, p. XVII; cf. p. 148.
4. *Ideas*, p. 5ff.
5. Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," *op. cit.*, p. 115.
6. Plato, *Republic*: "But the one who feels no distaste in sampling every study, and who attacks his task of learning gladly and cannot get enough of it... And on the other hand, will not those be few who would be able to approach beauty itself and contemplate it in and by itself?" *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton, 1969, pp. 714 and 715.
7. *Ideas*, p. 8.

8. Stumpf very clearly expresses an analogous thought concerning the relation between “singular representations” and “general concepts”: “However else one would think the essence of concepts... this much is clear that they cannot be resolved either into a mere sum or into a mere average of singular representations and without changes of content in the latter. Under specific conditions ...a concept presents itself as above the present appearances and relations, as brought about by them but not constructed from them.” C. Stumpf, *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen*, Berlin, 1907, pp. 24–25.
9. “Certainly its own specific character is such that intuition of essence has as its basis a principal part of intuition of something individual, namely an appearing, a sightedness of something individual, though not indeed a seizing upon this nor any sort of positing as an actuality; certainly, in consequence of that, no intuition of essence is possible without the free possibility of turning one’s regard to a ‘corresponding’ individual and forming a consciousness of an example – just as, conversely, no intuition of something individual is possible without the free possibility of bringing about an ideation and, in it, directing one’s regard to the corresponding essence exemplified in what is individually sighted; but this in no respect alters the fact that the two sorts of intuition are essentially different; and propositions such as we have just stated indicate only the essential relations between them.” *Ideas*, p. 10. Cf. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 339ff.
10. *Ideas*, pp. 10–11.
11. Cf. on this question *Logical Investigations*, especially investigations I, II, and IV.
12. E. von Aster, *Prinzipien der Erkenntnislehre. Versuch zu einer Neubegründung des Nominalismus*, Leipzig, 1913.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–48.
15. In the course of the whole of the *Logical Investigations*. Of particular importance here are the pages directed against nominalism, among them being pp. 373–374 where § 17 concludes with some words about “the problems of illusion and the theories of illusion.”
16. Aster, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35.

Translator's Notes

- a. Shpet has Kant in mind here.
- b. Reading “*ikh*” for “*ego*.”
- c. Cf. *Ideas*, p. 199 where Husserl writes that intentionality is the “general theme of ‘Objectively’ oriented phenomenology.”
- d. Cf. *Ideas*, pp. 40–42.
- e. I.e. of phenomenology’s Object of study.
- f. Cf. Aristotle’s words in the *Metaphysics*: “A further difficulty is raised by the fact that all knowledge is of universals and of the ‘such,’ but substance is not a universal, but is rather a ‘this’ – a separable thing...” *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. by Richard McKeon, New York, 1941, p. 854.
- g. Although Shpet’s peculiar formulation here, at least in terms of its spirit, has roots deep within Husserl’s own thought, it can also be found, and indeed in so many words, in Aristotle. For example, in the *Physics* we find: “If it exists, we have still to ask *how* it exists.” *Op. cit.*, p. 260. Also see in the *Metaphysics*: “So that the subject of our discussion will be not whether they exist but *how* they exist.” *Op. cit.*, p. 889.
- h. *Ideas*, p. 9.
- i. *Ideas*, pp. 9–10.
- j. *Ideas*, p. 10.
- k. von Aster, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
- l. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
- m. Although as we saw at the beginning of this chapter this use of the word “beginnings” has a foundation in Husserl’s own writings we can also find it elsewhere, as for example in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, *op. cit.*, p. 752.

CHAPTER 2

Pure Consciousness

Man is conscious of the world around him, the world in all its variety. He is conscious of himself, of his aims and activities and of his own aspiration for knowledge. But it is not hard to see that as soon as he begins to realize all this what he actually and immediately *sees*, *hears* and so forth is tightly entangled in this thoughts and expressions with what he has heard from others and what he assumes on the basis of what is seen and heard, etc. The first task of the fundamental philosophical science should and must be merely to separate^a what man immediately finds in his given consciousness from what he himself dreams up and what he logically concludes, etc. There are no appraisals here, no judgments about the more or less usefulness or importance of either of these two constituent parts of what we are thinking and speaking. Here there is merely the demand to be aware of the “origin” of each concept, thought and word. Yet at the same time it is evident that with regard to the value of what we dream up, of the “theoretical,” we can judge only after we know what we possess without this theorization, that is *before* having made it.

The fundamental philosophical science must be free at the very start. That is, judging “everything” it can take anything as its starting point, its “beginning.” Those “dogmatic” principles with which every other science begins must not be contained in it, since it is indeed the *fundamental* science. And the fundamental philosophical science can take as its starting point the mentioned “natural” stance of man towards his surroundings and towards himself and carry out in it the mentioned work of analysis and separation of the actually *given* from what he himself dreams up.¹ The world of things, of animals, of people, of values, of goods and so forth in this “natural attitude” appears before us as the “natural world.” But in our own consciousness we find certain things given along with it, things that we do not consider to be of the natural world. If we would just turn our

attention towards them, we would, as it were, leave this world and land in one of a completely different character and order. Such, for example, is the world of *numbers*, the arithmetical world, where two, five, etc., are neither physical things, nor people, nor goods. We, nevertheless, find our bearings in this world, even though it exists “outside” our natural world. We easily effect the transition from one world to another without thereby destroying one and without doubting the existence of the other, just abandoned world. The latter simply remains out of consideration. That is, it can even form the background of my consciousness, but it only cannot make up the “horizon” wherein lies the new world to which we are crossing.

One thing only “unites” both of these worlds – the “actual” world and the “ideal” world – and that is that they both are given to me in consciousness, the spontaneous acts of which are constantly changing and flowing and are directed to the externally given. These spontaneous acts examine and investigate the latter. They explain and express it conceptually and in words. They describe, compare, distinguish, and ponder over it. They are glad about it, afraid of it, etc., etc. We can designate this entire aggregate of “spontaneities” with respect to the “given” by the general Cartesian term, *cogito*. The *cogito* itself can become an “object,” to which other *cogito* are directed. One thing certain is that these *cogito* are always present in the natural attitude with which we began and with the same indubitability as everything to which the *cogito* are directed, viz. the given.

Certainly it is not a matter of the indubitability of each particular mental process and its datum. Nor is it a matter of the factual presence of this or that. On the contrary, a doubt, or in any case an attempt at doubting, can always take place, particularly with respect to all that is given. Thus with respect to the entire “natural world” the possibility arises of establishing the following “general thesis of the natural attitude”: “As what confronts me, I continually find the one spatiotemporal actuality to which I belong like all other human beings who are to be found in it and who are related to it as I am. I find the ‘actuality,’ the word already expresses it, as a *factually existent actuality and also accept it as it presents itself to me as factually existing*.”^{2, b}

We are completely free to attempt to subject the entire thesis of the natural attitude and along with it all its particulars to both a doubt as well as to an *εποχή*. Nothing is thereby changed in it, taken as the thesis of the natural attitude asserting the factually existing world at hand. It remains as the goal, problem and task of the respective sciences <in the natural attitude>. Attempting to subject everything to doubt or simply abstaining from judgment about any and everything whatever, we unquestionably

effect a certain “annihilation,” a “taking down,” of the respective thesis. But it is of the greatest importance to understand precisely the meaning of this “annihilation.” It is not a transformation of the thesis into its antithesis, nor is it in general a transformation of the assertion into a denial, presupposition, assumption or a doubt. Such transformations, consisting of changes in our conviction, are independent of our will and depend on the corresponding content of the object and on its being. Nevertheless, in attempting to subject something to doubt, we subject the thesis to a certain modification in the sense that, although it remains what it was, it is put by us, as it were, *out of action, excluded, parenthesized*. In other words, we simply make *no use of it whatever*.

If we subject the thesis of the “natural world” established above to the phenomenological $\epsilon\nu\omega\chi\eta$ by means of the method of exclusion, we thereby effect a change of “attitude.” In other words, therefore, we will not be concerned in our new attitude with the “natural world.” Neither denying it nor doubting it, we make no use of it. “If I do that,” Husserl says, “as I can with complete freedom, then I am *not negating* this ‘world’ as though I were a sophist; I am *not doubting its factual being* as though I were a skeptic; rather I am exercising the ‘phenomenological’ $\epsilon\nu\omega\chi\eta$ which also *completely shuts me off from any judgment about spatiotemporal factual being*.³ Consequently regardless of how much we may value the sciences of the natural world with all its judgments and tendencies, they must not be used. But a question arises here: What remains if we exclude the entire actual world with all our knowledge of it, exclude ultimately therefore everything, even ourselves with all our *cogitare*?

The entire “*world as eidos*” certainly remains. We already saw this, for example, in the case of numbers. In phenomenology, taken as the fundamental philosophical science, there is no question about it. Although leaving the sphere of the natural attitude we will have to remain in the region of the eidetic. That particular being to which our regard is now directed is what we designated above as *cogito*, i.e., our own mental processes, consciousness, the completely unique *being* that actually includes *everything*. Our concern is not with psychological processes that in one way or another are connected with creatures of the animate world and with man, since this world is already subject to reduction and forms the object of the respective “natural” sciences. Our concern, rather, is with the pure sphere of consciousness, which is opened up immanently to our reflecting regard. In virtue of its absolute *sui generis* being, this consciousness, of which we are speaking as a consciousness in general, was not and cannot be subjected to the exclusion performed above. “It [consciousness – GS] therefore remains as

the 'phenomenological residuum,' a region of being, which is of essential necessity quite unique and which can indeed become the field of a science of a novel kind: phenomenology."⁴ Before proceeding, however, to an analysis of consciousness in the phenomenological attitude proper, let us first stop to examine the essence of consciousness in its full concreteness, in the living flux of consciousness. Every mental process can be seized, with respect to its proper intuitive essence, taking this as the distinctive "content," in a reflection directed on it. Let us concentrate our attention on this for the time being.

We must carefully distinguish what belongs to the *cogito* proper from what belongs to its *cogitatum*. In every perception something is apprehended, although this something is by no means a mental process itself. The latter is in principle a being of a completely different type. The entire apprehended something exists "here and now." It lies in the field of perception or intuition as if surrounded by other perceptions and intuitions, which also enter into consciousness or a mental process. But in virtue of the necessary correlation between the *cogito* and the *cogitatum* in every intuition and in every perception it can be said that consciousness is necessarily "consciousness of *something*."

What holds for perception holds for all other mental processes, recollections, phantasies, etc. as well as for the mental processes of sensation and desire. The difference between intuitions, clearly given and to which our "mental regard" is directed, and their surrounding background is that they can be considered two different modifications of consciousness: the actional and the non-actional, or potential; explicit consciousness and implicit consciousness. On the whole, a stream of mental processes can never simply consist of pure actionalities. One mode of consciousness always turns into another. The *cogito*, taken as an *act*, an act of consciousness, turns into a potential consciousness and vice versa.⁵

The essential property of consciousness, however, is preserved in all these transitions, and every mental process of consciousness retains its essential feature, viz. to be consciousness of *something*, to be directed to something. In this sense, therefore, every mental process remains an "intensive mental process," even though not every really inherent moment in the concrete unity of such a mental process possesses the character of intentionality. This is the case, for example, with sensations, taken as the data of mental processes, etc. Conversely, what belongs to the *cogitatum* can only be the Object of an intensive mental process and does not thereby become consciousness itself, an act. It can be an "intentional Object" and be distinguished from the simply seized-upon Object in the sense that to it a

whole series of acts are directed.

This series consists not only of acts of perception and, in general, of the seizing-upon of “things” by the physical or mental eye but also acts of valuation, of a practical orientation and the like. In any case, however, as an intentional Object what belongs to the cogitatum always remains in principle something other than an act owing to the very nature of its being. As long as we experience (*perezhivaem*) everything in the cogito, our cogitatio itself is not such an intentional Object. We can, however, always direct our *reflective* regard to it and in the form, of course, of a new cogitatio can make it the object of an “intentional perception” and consequently also an Object.⁶ In this way we arrive at a distinction among mental processes, or acts. On the one hand, we have inner, *immanently* directed mental processes. It is part of their essence that their intentional objects belong to the same stream of mental processes as they themselves and form the immediate unity of a single concrete cogitatio. On the other hand, we have *transcendentely* directed mental processes, the intentional object of which essentially cannot belong to this stream and is given not in an immediate unity but essentially independently, abstractly.

Let us examine more closely the relationship between perception and what is apprehended, namely the thing in perception (as indeed between any cogitatio and cogitatum), viewing it not from the standpoint of some *theory*, regardless of whether it be that of a physicist, a psychologist, or of a primitive, “naïve” person. Rather, as befits the fundamental science let us examine perception and the apprehended in their immediate givenness. We will approach closer to our goal of determining the essence of pure consciousness if we proceed by way of a clarification of the problem concerning the interrelation between the transcendent something and consciousness.

In perceiving some physical thing, for example a table, we have, on the one hand, a constantly changing perception, so that under no circumstances could it be the same when repeated. On the other hand, however, not only does the apprehended thing itself not change, but it remains *the same* in all our actional mental processes. It can remain the same even for the potential consciousness or without being perceived at all.⁷ Any physical thing, just as every part, side or moment of it, remains “the same,” a certain unity, a “synthesis of identification,” in spite of the fact that it is given to us in a continuously changing manifold of adumbrations in which the Data of sensations appear before us. What is more, however, these adumbrations, taken as mental processes, – although as we saw they are not intutive mental processes – are something different in principle from what is adumbrated in them. As mental processes they are not spatial, but what is

adumbrated is in principle possible only as something spatial and cannot <itself> be a mental process.

On the other hand, the apprehended physical thing is apprehended in its actuality only by means of adumbrations, as a certain intentional unity of appearances, whereas a mental process does not <itself> appear in adumbrations but is given essentially. Thus we arrive at a general proposition that must be placed at the foundation of the fundamental science itself: *The physical thing, the apprehended, in any possible consciousness in general cannot be given as really immanent*. This proposition must be placed at the foundation because it belongs to the essence of both a physical thing as well as consciousness. Between being as a mental process and being as a physical thing there appears a basic and essential difference. This means that the physical thing itself is entirely transcendent. And in this way the most profound fundamental difference is revealed between the two types of being, namely *consciousness and reality*, as well as between the ways in which they are given to us, viz. in the one case being is given directly in its essence and in the other through adumbrations in appearances.

Taken as a perception, a physical thing is necessarily always and only given through adumbrations in appearances, for otherwise it could become an immanent being and be *simply* apprehended as absolute. A physical thing is necessarily always given in a certain inadequacy, “one-sidedly.” A certain core of “what is actually presented”^c is always surrounded by a horizon of the improperly co-given, with more or less indeterminateness, which, however, is revealed as a completed determinateness prescribed by the physical thing itself and with constant transitions from one moment to another, from one new moment to another new or old moment, etc.

<The perception of> a mental process, on the other hand, is an immanent perception, a simple intellectual seeing of something that is given in perception, given as *absolute* (and not as something identical to appearances given through adumbrations). It cannot have any sides and is not presented in this way or that.⁸ Also, a mental process, the immanently apprehended, can never be apprehended completely and adequately in its unity, since it forms the flux in which our regard is directed to some single moment, while the rest swims away from it. This is why immanent perception itself is possible only in the form of retention. But it is obvious that this incompleteness and this imperfection are fundamentally of another kind than that which we encounter in the transcendent perception of an adumbrated appearance. This is because although we can speak of their relative differences in degrees of clarity or of vagueness, they, <the presentations themselves,> are still given directly as such, “absolutely,” and not

through changing and fluctuating adumbrations.

It belongs to the very being of a mental process that its perception, immanent perception, can be directed quite immediately to any mental process at all in the form of a *reflection*. That is, the apprehended mental process is given as something that not only exists and endures but *already existed before* the regard was directed to it. This property of immanent perception, which has the highest degree of importance, reveals new, profound and fundamental differences between immanent and transcendent perception. Mental processes are not only the consciousness of *something*; they themselves make up consciousness. Thus, even if a reflecting regard is not directed to them, they, nevertheless, in an unreflected way always make up the background of consciousness and are always "ready" to be perceived.

Something similar takes place with regard to transcendent perception, though only in relation to physical things that have already *appeared* but have remained unnoticed in our field of vision. Yet not all physical things fulfill this condition if only by the mere fact that our field of attentive vision is not infinite. A mental process cannot "appear." It is "ready" to be perceived only thanks to the very mode of its being with respect to the Ego that accomplishes a reflection.⁹

As it follows from everything we have already said, let us also add that the mode of being of a mental process cannot be called existence. This applies to "essence" as well. That is, immanent perception essentially does not give being in time, but being *outside of time*, or in other words, as it "always" is. In this sense the earlier reference to <the fact that an apprehended mental process is given as something that already existed> "before" <the regard was directed to it> does not refer to an empirical time, but is a statement that the given immanent perception did *not* "appear" now. It could not *appear*, because it is *not an appearance*. To be precise, therefore, it does not possess *existence*, but possesses an *essence*. Thus we necessarily come to the general and essential assertion that *every immanent perception is not an empirical intuition but an intuition of an essence*. On the other hand, a transcendent perception of a physical thing in an appearance can be both an empirical intuition or an intuition of an essence, regardless of whether this be a perception of a physical thing or animalia or something else.

Let us return to Husserl's argumentation. As a consequence of the distinction that he made between immanent and transcendent perception, we find that he draws conclusions in his work that in our view agree with the above presentation. Namely, when it is a matter of an immanent

perception we are necessarily assured of the existence of the object of the perception. It is an “*absolute actuality*,” the being of which it is in principle impossible to negate. Doubt as to its being contradicts its sense. That is, here we have to reiterate what Descartes said about his *cogito*. On the contrary, the existence of a physical thing is not made necessary by the fact of its givenness. Doubt in its existence does not contradict its sense; its existence can always be subject to doubt. It is always contingent to a certain degree. The thesis of the world, as “*contingent*,” stands opposed to “*what is necessary*,” that is, what is not subject to doubt, the thesis of the pure Ego, of the stream of mental processes.¹⁰

These conclusions drawn by Husserl might arouse certain objections and doubts, which I will attempt to avert with the following remarks. It will be shown below that in spite of the possibility of subjecting the “thesis of the world” to doubt, this unique world *in fact* necessarily exists. As we already showed in passing, in spite of the contingency of perceptions, transcendent perceptions, of this world it is an essential necessity that physical things ascribe a definite nature to their perception in appearances.

Conversely, however, the “thesis of my Ego,” taken as a stream of mental processes, in principle cannot be subject to either denial or doubt. Consequently, its very being is essentially necessary, although any actually present mental process, as such, does not represent an essential necessity but amounts to the necessity of a fact. The question can arise, however, whether it is impossible at least to *attempt* to subject the “thesis of my Ego” to doubt, or to effect an $\varepsilon \tau o \chi \eta$ with respect to it. An immediate reflection on this act would reveal to us, though, that we would thereby still remain in the “thesis of my Ego.”

It is important, however, for us to reveal something else: *the essence of the impossibility of doubting the “thesis of my Ego.”* The fact is that this impossibility means such a doubt is either nonsense or something contradicting the sense of the thesis. In the first case, the denial of sense is nothing other than a limitation, a *privatio*, i.e., an admission that “some” sense remains all the same. Thus even with a complete denial we can have the assertion of “some” sense, because something can always remain in the way of a “sense of the nonsense.” That is, nonsense has *its* sense, viz. to be nonsense.

Let us now turn to the other case, the contradiction of the sense. This is an inadmissible thing, particularly if we discover the contradiction of the sense in the *essence* of what is bestowed with sense. Thus, what are we concerned with here in the given attempt to doubt or deny? To deny the essential necessity of an immanent being or to doubt its necessity means to

ascribe to this necessity the necessity of a fact. The upshot would then be that we would be denying the necessity of a fact. Such a transformation of the matter, however, is impossible by virtue of the reflection shown. If immanent being were only to have the necessity of a fact, then, regardless of how necessary this fact may seem, it would concern a kind of being that can cease or disappear. We can say that since it is a matter of a being given in the intuition of an essence, there can be no question of disappearance or cessation. And this is correct.

Against what we have said someone may say, along with Leibniz, that although this being cannot "cease," it can be "*annihilated*." It is not difficult to see, however, that "that which does the annihilating"¹¹ must immanently perceive an "*annihilation*" in a mental process. Moreover, in that which does the annihilating, as an absolute being, all of the same laws regarding an essence are discovered. Consequently, this being cannot be annihilated and cannot have mere factual being. This shows that our attempt at doubting essentially contradicts the sense <of the "thesis of my Ego">. Since it cannot be annihilated, conversely it was also "never" "created," i.e., it did not "make its appearance." It is not an "appearance" and in general does not possess "existence." Actually it is a being of necessity, an absolute being, an "*essence*." It simply is not subject to any temporal determination. Indeed in this sense it "does not exist," "is not actual," "not real."

As we already pointed out with regard to any immanent perception, use of the word "was," or "before," does not signify a reference to time but is precisely an extra-temporal expression, an expression of "constancy," since in its essence what is *extra-temporal*, of course, "is." (We can say that it *always* is.) It is "always" in consciousness, "always" experienced (*perezhivaet*), although not always in actually present mental processes. Yet this represents a factual necessity. It is, however, "always" "ready" to be in a mental process, just as *reflection* itself "always" is, supplying an immanent perception. Thus, there is a contradiction of the sense in a doubt concerning the essential necessity of the being of the "thesis of my Ego." This contradiction reveals itself in the fact that the sense of the being of an immanent perception is itself a necessary being. Conversely, the essential necessity of this being is a presupposition for the necessity of a transcendent being, yet not as an essential necessity — otherwise it would be immanent — but as the necessity of a fact. It is understandable from this why a doubt in a transcendent being, i.e., a denial of the "thesis of the world," does not contradict the sense of the thesis, although it can be acknowledged as *nonsense*. The sense of a transcendent being is that it exists *for an immanent* being. But it is possible (logically admissible) that some other

transcendent being, some other “world,” exists for an immanent being.

Thus, the world of immanent perception and the world of transcendent perception stand sharply opposed to each other as entirely different worlds. It would be a mistake, however, to think that there is no relation at all between them or that the transcendent world can at least be *studied* outside its relation to the world of consciousness, as an object existing in itself. On the contrary, it follows from the differences we have already presented that the world of consciousness, as immanent and absolute, can be given only as it is given. The matter, however, stands differently with regard to the transcendent world.

Already by virtue of its “contingency” it, the actual world, must be studied as one instance among a multitude of various possible worlds.¹² However, as is obvious from the essence of their possible and actual givenness, these worlds can be given only to a consciousness having experience. Consequently, they stand to consciousness in an essentially necessary correlation. Whatever the physical things be, whatever we state about their being, we can talk about them only as *things of experience* and in determinate experiential concatenations. When we talk about the possibility of things being objects of experience, we have in mind not that possibility demanded by the logical law of non-contradiction nor do we have in mind causal-substantial conditionality. What we have in mind, rather, is the possibility of an actual experience itself, i.e., a possibility motivated in the concatenations of experience itself. Even if we do not apprehend a physical thing in experience at the present moment, the possibility of it being an object of experience denotes that it can enter into the sphere of being actually present and become given. Through the motivations of the concatenations of experience, the thing belongs to the undetermined but *determinable* horizon of actually present experience, which always points beyond and motivates, transgressing its own limits, to possible new experiences, etc. *ad infinitum*.

A physical thing, taken as an object of experience, is always a physical thing of the world and of the “surroundings.” Thus the actual world, like any other possible world, is conceivable only in a correlative relationship to consciousness. This accounts for the fact that the phenomenological investigation of consciousness itself never remains *empty*. At the same time it is now understandable why the phenomenological investigation of the actual world and of other possible worlds cannot be confused with a dogmatic investigation of transcendent objects as happens in the specific sciences.

On the other hand, it follows from the necessity and absolute givenness

of consciousness that consciousness is consciousness of *something* and, consequently, the whole world, the actual world, is factually the only world – this in spite of the formal-*logical* possibility of other worlds, i.e., of an absence of an interdiction on the part of the law of non-contradiction. Simply by virtue of the correlativity between things, taken as things of experience, and consciousness, it is clear, we believe, that any “other” hypothetical world would be essentially given in the same way as the world we are talking about, the actually present world. The “other nature” of such a conceivable world can only signify the factual limitedness of this or that experience. In principle any “other” world would have to be fulfilled in the concatenations and motivations of this world, which therefore is the sole world. In other words, “another” world can only be in *this* one.

In fact our consciousness may always be limited. The factual world with its various parts is accessible first only to one, then to another Ego just as it is accessible to one and the same Ego only in various degrees of determinacy. But one thing is excluded by everything we have mentioned, namely the acceptance of another world outside the given one on the ground that though it may be inaccessible, or not given to *our* consciousness, it is given to some other consciousness. Such a view is excluded by virtue of the fact that what is given to one or another Ego must be in principle accessible to *all*.¹³ This clearly follows from the thesis of the pure Ego, the absolute nature of which we have already explained.

After having adduced a clarification of the relation between the *cogito* and the *cogitatum* we can present more clearly the sense of the phenomenological attitude, characterized above, and the content of the “residuum,” to which it is directed. Phenomenology, taken as the fundamental philosophical science, actually studies everything but always keeps its eye on the immediately given relationship between the transcendent and the immanent. Phenomenology describes everything in terms of the correlative connection between the two, a connection which is also given immediately. We can explain this in the following *manner*.

Everything that is immediately given, just as with everything in general that is given, which we are talking about, thinking about, etc., i.e. everything that exists in whatever form of being, necessarily appears to us with the determinate coefficient of consciousness. On the one hand, we can investigate this or that sphere of actuality, or any being whatever, in a dogmatic-scientific fashion without taking into account the coefficient standing in front of it. Such an investigation is a quite legitimate one. It actually determines the given X or Y, or other unknown, and their algebraic connection. On the other hand, however, we can investigate the given X

also “together” with the coefficient accompanying it and in it. Such an investigation will be phenomenological, at least at the start. It is obvious that we can carry out numerous operations with the putting within parentheses of first one, then another common denominator. In this way we obtain phenomenological descriptions of different degrees of generality, each essentially of a different character.

Continuing this task ideally to the end, we can foresee that there remains some coefficient, some common denominator, to “everything” enclosed within the parentheses. The investigation of this coefficient, as the coefficient of *everything*, is the pure sphere of phenomenology in all its universal and fundamental significance. If we continue the analysis in the way we have, we will notice at once: 1) the difficulties phenomenology must run up against with its first steps, and 2) the originality of its problems and, consequently, a demand for their clear formulation.

In particular, could it not turn out that this fundamental common denominator turns out to be merely a “unit” with which we can do nothing? Yet on the other hand, regardless of what this common denominator may turn out to be, the investigation of it, simply by virtue of its generality, cannot yield knowledge of “everything” in its concreteness and specificity. Taking into account the relative nature of the conceptual pair “general” and “particular” we must recognize that by limiting our field of investigation to only the *most* general, we infinitely narrow the tasks of the science that actually wants to be fundamental with respect to everything and in every respect.

From this the necessary demand arises that phenomenology cannot and must not limit itself to a description of “just a certain” consciousness, although at the same time pure consciousness forms its main aim and task. *Anything* can be Object of phenomenology, starting here with this burning match and ashes, right up to the world and supernatural world as a whole, including in this also the deity – as a whole, meaning the actual and the ideal, the pseudo and the real, the ugly and the beautiful, the depraved and the less so.

Nevertheless, phenomenology’s main difficulties are connected with its main theme, namely pure consciousness. We must not only make pure consciousness the Object of a phenomenological investigation but also show that pure consciousness does not form an empty unit that remains on the other side of the parenthesis of actuality and ideality, like a sign devoid of content. Consequently, the first problem of phenomenology, precisely defined, is: What is the being of pure consciousness, how can it be studied as such, and what is its content?

In spite of the fact that the given experiential world is the sole factual world, we still have not established that the world in general or something or other necessarily must exist. As we saw, a transcendent something of any genus at all, by virtue of its being relative, can be subject to doubt and denial. Conversely, taking into account the correlativity noted above, an immanent something, by virtue of its absolute nature, cannot be "annihilated." It is precisely this situation that induces us to make pure consciousness a special and particular Object of investigation.

The being of consciousness, as it is given to us in the stream of mental processes, is always a certain intentionality, a "directedness" to something. "Something" in the order of a diversity of physical or living does indeed remain in the phenomenological attitude, although as a colorless or killed "something." We must stress here, however, that discoloration or killing is by no means to be understood as taking a negativistic position in relation to actuality. As we saw, we simply make no use of actuality. In this sense, the "something" forms dead stock. As we said, in the phenomenological attitude this indeterminate "something" remains. Nevertheless, consciousness itself does not lose the distinctiveness of its being. Although its being in this attitude is necessarily *modified*, this modification, nevertheless, does not affect the essence of the being of consciousness.¹⁴ The modification originates from the fact that all experiential concatenations of the empirical world are excluded from the full stream of mental processes.

Consequently, we also exclude all theoretical acts of consciousness as well as those in which we ascertain in their directedness a correlativity with the excluded transcendent something. The mental processes not thereby excluded are characterized by the fact that they have no need of any real being. They have no need of the existence of the physical things arising in consciousness as appearances. It follows from this that the being of consciousness can be studied as it is, i.e., as an absolute being, and we now have the right to determine the sense in which we talk about the absolute being of consciousness as an immanent being. In principle it "*nulla 're' indiget ad existendum.*"^d

Transcendent being, although also not "dependent" on consciousness, "points" to consciousness and demands it, moreover demands consciousness in its actually present essence. But this is not because of some causal or other type of mutual real conditionality between them nor even because of a logical relation between them such as that of form and matter or category and content. Rather it is because of the intentional character of any actually present mental process, which in itself carries a correlativity – something we are constantly stressing – between both types

of being. As we saw, transcendent being is always given in experience and in determinate, motivated concatenations of experience. It is a being that by its very sense is relative, that is *for* a consciousness. It is always a merely intentional being.

Transcendent being is always relative and therefore particular. It refers itself to consciousness, taken as something absolute which has being without any trace of the particular and relative. By no means, in general, must this "relation" be thought of as some "actual" relation, because in such a case the being of consciousness would be placed in the same genus, the genus of "actuality," with the transcendent. That is, it would become relative. It is true that we are talking here about two *types* of being, which in turn can engender the question of their common genus. We could talk about one or the other as "objects," etc. We had the chance, however, on another occasion to note the distinctive character of this "something in common" when we talked about the two "types" of intuition as different "sorts" subject to a "generalization." We mentioned there that it is really so perhaps only because of being placed under a formal, general, *logical* category. The situation gave us the opportunity to question whether it is genuinely a matter of generalization and not rather of the "formalization" of the respective *nomina* or terms.

Truly it is a matter of two worlds or, as Plato would say, of two kingdoms. But the kingdom of ideas simply stands opposed to the kingdom of the actual, not because the latter is to be taken as actuality but because the former is to be taken as something fundamentally absolute. "In so far as their respective senses are concerned, a veritable abyss yawns between consciousness and reality. Here, an adumbrated being, not capable of ever becoming given absolutely, merely accidental and relative; there, a necessary and absolute being, essentially incapable of becoming given by virtue of adumbration and appearance."¹⁵ How a relation is possible between the two "things," a relation which would connect them, though not "really," nor annihilate the absolute character of one of them in this correlativity, can be seen if we again take the example of mathematics. Every physical thing "points" to a number, demands calculation, but a number does not thereby lose its independent absolute being. It can remain the Object of a special study. Numbers form "another" kingdom than that of physical things. A physical thing is in need of a number, but a number is in no need of a physical thing. Nevertheless, there is a correlation between pure numbers and concrete objects. In this way how pure consciousness in its absolute essence, that is in its absolute being, is to be studied is cleared up, and the sense of what we referred to above as the phenomenological attitude

becomes understandable. Despite the fact that the world of physical things, of people, of living creatures, is *not* annihilated, we have the possibility, simply by leaving this world out of use, to carry out the “phenomenological reduction,” to direct our reflection to the intentional acts themselves and to study pure consciousness in its absolute being.

Phenomenology finds its object in the discovered “phenomenological *residuum*” to be that absolute, immanent being revealed by an act of reflection, an act directed to consciousness, to intentional mental processes, taken as absolute essences. It is not a question here of an empirical, a psychological or a psycho-physical consciousness. To this extent it is clear that we need not come to a halt at this point. Rather we can raise the query: Is pure consciousness not merely a simple abstraction from the actual psychological consciousness? Such a question, however, would simply disclose a “spiritual blindness” that in general prevents us from discerning the specific existence of an ideal being on the same level as empirical being but which is completely “independent” of the latter. Every ideal being is a being *sui generis*, and we can see it by means of a special attentional direction or by means of a special “attitude.”

The assertion, therefore, that claims we see in ideal “things” only the products of our abstracting cognition is totally incorrect. If ideal objects were merely the products of abstraction, they would be indistinguishable in principle from other, non-abstracted objects of actuality. The latter are able to stand in a correlative relation with ideal objects, but they are neither identical with ideal objects nor conditioned by them. Obviously all this applies to the phenomenological attitude: Pure consciousness is not an abstraction, because otherwise it would be a relative, “natural” consciousness.

In this way we arrive at a general indication of what the being of pure consciousness is, while at the same time leaving open the question of its content. We saw that the problem of the ultimate source of our cognition in the realm of the phenomenological attitude is resolved in precisely the same way as it would be with regard to any cognition at all. In the final analysis cognition is given through intellectual seeing in a direct intuition. It goes without saying that it is only thanks to the distinctive attitude of our “regard” that this very intuition becomes possible. Consequently, it must be distinguished essentially and fundamentally from other intuitions arising in connection with other attitudes.

The actual world is given to us in the “sensuous” intuition of experience. The phenomenological world cannot be given in it, if only because sensuous intuition presupposes the very consciousness that we make the

Object of a special study in phenomenology. Indeed, and also for the same reason, intuition in the phenomenological attitude cannot be identified with the intuition of a psychological experience, for such an experience is inconceivable apart from its physical correlate and historical (social) setting. In the same way it cannot be such an intuition of the understanding as takes place in social relations.

In general, we "exclude" the entire "actual" world. Consequently, we must seek the source of our cognition of the phenomenological world outside those forms of intuition that bring in along with themselves cognition of the actual world. The beginning of all beginnings, the "principle of all principles" of the most fundamental philosophical science demands that we take any originary intuition to be just as it is "originarily" before us, that is within the bounds of its givenness. Only under this condition do we arrive at the possibility of carrying out our investigation independent of the influence of false biases and *idola*. But if we would begin by asserting that *sentire est scire*, that every cognition reduces to a sensuous intuition, as its source, we would have to reject Leibniz's correction: "*excipe: nisi intellectus*." We would have to take the point of view of a theory whose groundlessness has already been disclosed to a considerable extent.

In general, one of the fundamental and most important tasks of phenomenology is to elucidate and enumerate all the types of intuition, their character, relation, dependence and scope. For the moment, we must be content with this indication and acknowledge that intuitions are fundamentally divided into two groups: intuitions of experience and ideal intuitions, the latter penetrating into the *eidos* of physical things or objects. And for the time being without deciding the question beforehand concerning the various types of intuition within these classes, we must, in any case, acknowledge that the intuitions that give us pure consciousness in its absolute being are ideal.

If, however, it is evident that in the phenomenological attitude *all* sensuous intuitions must be "excluded," the question of the essences that are revealed only in this attitude warrants a more detailed examination. This is because only after such an examination can we answer the question, posed above, about the *content* of phenomenology as the fundamental science. We already saw in our particular example of numbers that ideal intuitions exist which are nevertheless excluded from the sphere of pure phenomenology. Such is the case because they, similar to sensuous intuitions, do not represent pure consciousness itself but indicate only what consciousness is directed to. That is, they refer to the consciousness of *something*. But if we exclude these intuitions, we apparently narrow even

further the region of phenomenology's possible work. What then remains left for it to do?

The answer to the question of what remains left for phenomenology to do presupposes a deeper analysis of how we will subject to exclusion in the phenomenological reduction everything that is revealed in its specific attitude as not being pure consciousness in its absolute being.

Author's Notes

1. *Ideas*, p. 51ff.
2. *Ideas*, pp. 56–57.
3. *Ideas*, p. 61. Cf. pp. 171–172 and also p. 322.
4. *Ideas*, pp. 65–66.
5. *Ideas*, p. 71ff.
6. *Ideas*, p. 78. On reflection and its role in phenomenology see p. 174ff.
7. *Ideas*, p. 86ff.
8. *Ideas*, pp. 96–97: “Whereas it is essential to givenness by appearances that no appearance presents the affair as something ‘absolute’ instead of in a one-sided presentation, it is essential to the givenness of something immanent precisely to present something absolute which cannot ever be presented with respect to sides or be adumbrated.”
9. *Ideas*, pp. 98–99. Cf. also pp. 110–111.
10. *Ideas*, pp. 100–101, 102.
11. This postulation of an “annihilating” or a “creating” is not a simple mental game nor is it an “empty” logical postulate with the aim of carrying the doubt under examination to absurdity. It is easy to convince ourselves that the problem of “annihilation” and “creation” stands in need of elucidation and a phenomenological one at that. What we have said here gives rise to an interesting train of thought: “That which does the annihilating” reveals its absoluteness *immanently*. But by virtue of being the Absolute (not in the sense of the absoluteness of consciousness), owing to the possibility ascribed to it of “creating” and “annihilating” (not in the sense of real causality), it is projected *transcendently* (not in the sense of real transcendentness) since immanent perception itself does not reveal the mental process of “creation” and “annihilation” of essences in us, i.e., that *absolute* freedom which we ascribe to the Absolute. Whether it is a question here

of a special new species of intuition or of something else is a special topic. Still it is interesting to note that this argument concerning “that which does the annihilating,” and thereby revealing the essential impossibility of denying the “thesis of my Ego,” returns us to the Cartesian idea about the existence of the Ego “because” God exists.

12. *Ideas*, p. 105ff.
13. *Ideas*, p. 108.
14. *Ideas*, p. 109ff.
15. *Ideas*, p. 111.

Translator's Notes

- a. Reading *otdelit* instead of *opredelit* as in the original. I am indebted to A. Haardt for this suggestion.
- b. Shpet notes here that he renders the term *das Dasein* into Russian as *tubytie* following the lead of Vladimir Solovyev.
- c. *Ideas*, p. 94.
- d. *Ideas*, p. 110.

CHAPTER 3

The Phenomenological Reduction

A being given to us in the “natural attitude” is an actual being. It is given to our intuition in its *originary* givenness. Whether the givenness be that of an “external perception,” an “internal experience” or some other does not matter. Our concern here is with the *actual* world, and therefore we can talk about this givenness as that of intuitions of *experience*.

It belongs to the essence of experiencing intuition that any Object it gives is given in a definite spatial and temporal setting. Every possible motivation of sensuous givenness consists in relating an Object to its spatio-temporal surroundings. The Object can possess a certain independent constancy even with a change in the conditions of its surroundings, just as it can assume a “non-independent” constancy by virtue of being studied in isolation from its surroundings and in general from some “whole.” Its givenness, however, is ultimately that of experiencing intuition. This dependency of the Object <on a definite spatial and temporal setting>, both in its independence as well as in its abstractness, in the end makes it completely “contingent” in the sense that its very being is “contingent” and dependent on the “contingent” setting. The very *possibility of a recurrence* of the Object under different spatio-temporal conditions points to this contingency. An abstract object, therefore, is no less “contingent” than is a concrete one. In any case, its necessity extends no farther than the extent of the spatio-temporal givenness from which it is abstracted. *In this sense* an abstract law is no less “contingent” than a concrete fact. Therefore, Humean skepticism inevitably arises and is developed on the basis of the “natural attitude,” limited only by the necessity of the past, i.e. by *facts*.

Non-contingency, necessity, is established in a new way. We saw that other attitudes than the “natural” one open up before us other relations and reveal essentially different “objects,” which, however, stand in a correlative relation to the objects of the actual attitude, and in this way they impart to

this attitude the character of necessity that is essentially not present in the "actual."

We should, however, turn our attention to the following case. Talking about the possibility of a change in the situation of the surroundings, i.e., a change in the Object's situation, a change in its conditions and, consequently, in the Object itself, we nevertheless admit the possibility not only of "recognizing" it in this new situation but even of acknowledging that the Object necessarily must retain an *essential* something in order that it remain "the same" throughout all the "contingencies" of its manifestations. This something, which refers to the essence of the Object, is, as we saw, not at all the product of abstraction. Rather, simply in order to be abstracted it must be *seen as essential*. On the other hand, neither is it the product of an inductive generalization, as some theories assert, since induction itself is based on its presupposition and since we have no need at all of infinite repetition in order finally to isolate the essential or in order that it isolate "itself" for us, settled *tanquam in fundo* (Bacon).

Mill asserted that the person who is able to answer the question why in one case thousands of observations are insufficient to reach a generalization and in another case one alone is sufficient is the one who will resolve the most difficult problem concerning induction. Mill does not see, however, that Plato already solved this particular problem – only this is not the problem of induction at all. We see the essential not by means of some deductive process, but by means of an immediate intuition just like that which is seen by experiencing intuition. Thus along with experiencing intuition and its various types, we can speak of an ideal intuition also with its various types.

Turning to Husserl, we find as well such an opposition between "individual intuition" and the intuition of essences (*Wesenserschauung*), or "ideation."¹ An intuition is obtained in the latter not by means of an abstract determination of some "What," designating the essence of the individual being, but thanks to the fact that this "What" can be *put into an idea* ("in Idee gesetzt"). That which is thus seen in an idea is the *pure* essence or *eidos*. As we already said, it can be a matter here of the highest categories as well as of their specifications, right down to complete concreteness. Thus in the essence or *eidos* we have a completely new object, an object of a new sort. The fundamental difference between the two sorts of intuition is the fundamental difference of their objects: *fact* and *eidos*. Every fact or individual object has its essence, its *eidos*, and to every essence there correspond possible individuals.

In conformity with what was stated above we divided the sciences into

those of facts and those of essences, or eidetic sciences. The facts of experience cannot fulfill a substantiating function in the latter. Pure logic, pure mathematics, pure time-theory, space-theory, theory of movement, and so forth belong to the pure sciences of essences. But since any empirical science, regardless of whatever kind of experiential basis it may have, is in need of some formal principles, we can speak in general here of a complex of *formal-ontological disciplines*, which along with formal logic in the narrow sense, includes the remaining disciplines of the “mathesis universalis” having to do with “objects in general.”²

On the other hand, however, since every fact contains a *material* essential element and every truth belonging to a pure essence must appear in the form of a law connecting the given facts, there exists the possibility of speaking even of material eidetic ontologies. Empirical concrete objects, considered with respect to their material essence, are united in particular “regions” of empirical objects, which represent their *highest* material genus, thus forming “the categories of a region” along with *analytical*, “formal categories,” which have to do with the formal essence of an object in general. In this sense, consequently, we can speak, for example, of an *ontology of nature* as the eidetic science of physical nature in general with respect to the natural sciences. We understand the former as a perfectly rationalized empirical science, which makes up the most universal and fundamental foundation of the sciences of nature.

The same thing applies to the other regions. To each there corresponds a regional ontology with a series of regional sciences based on it. Depending on whether the highest genera of the sciences are regional (concrete) genera or only their dependent components, the sciences themselves appear as *concrete* or *abstract sciences*.³ Together with the formal ontologies, pertaining equally to all sciences, these regional ontologies or regional eidetic sciences in their specification make up the essential *theoretical* foundation of any empirical science at all.

Taking into account what we said and knowing that phenomenology, too, is an eidetic science, a science of essences, we can now answer the question: What remains as the field of phenomenology upon the exclusion of all objects of the empirical sciences along with all objects standing in a practical, aesthetic, cultural, etc., relation to them? In what relation does phenomenology stand with respect to the other eidetic sciences? That is, are they also excluded in the phenomenological reduction, and to what degree are they so? Finally, what remains after such an exclusion?

Troubles can hardly arise in excluding the material ontologies mentioned above belonging to the regional spheres of individual being. Although in

the highest rationalized form, these material ontologies embrace precisely those spheres of the object which we attribute to the *cogitatum*. Difficulties do arise, however, above all, with regard to the purely logical and, in general, to everything that Husserl embraces by the term *mathesis universalis*, i.e., to that which makes up the sphere of formal ontology. This is because it is a question here not of real objects, but of “universal” objects and “essences,”⁴ which make up the highest categories. These categories are obligatory for all objects and sciences.

Formal ontology, consequently, has to do with “any object whatever.” The latter is not a region in the sense in which we speak of spheres of objects of the actual world. If “any object whatever” is, to a certain extent, a regional category, it is so only in a figurative and pictorial sense. Strictly speaking, it is not a region, but a quasi-region.

Difficulties arise, in particular, with regard to logic for the simple reason that not only must phenomenology follow it, but it is also constantly concerned with the same subjects. Like logic, it constantly forms concepts, judgments and conclusions. But we must not forget that phenomenology, investigating pure consciousness, has in mind only a purely *descriptive* analysis carried out in *pure intuition*, whereas logic’s own object itself presupposes and demands a phenomenological foundation just as does the essence of any formal-categorial object whatever. Therefore, phenomenology demands an $\varepsilonποχή$ with respect to the eidetic sphere of the logical and with respect to the entire *mathesis universalis* in general. For phenomenology, even the formal theories of logic, algebra and the other mathematical disciplines, too, remain out of use, “excluded.” For phenomenology, this sphere remains transcendent, although in another sense than that when we speak of the transcendence of the actual world.

The problem arising with the “exclusion” of logic from the sphere of phenomenology has in general, in our opinion, a fundamental and principal importance and not merely in the sense just mentioned. On the contrary, in this sense the problem is not as difficult as it at first seems. It is resolved a priori precisely by the fact that phenomenology is a *purely descriptive* discipline and consequently must be *pre-theoretical*. Here “pre-theoretical” must be understood not only in the sense of a freedom from *non-practical* appraisals and motivations. In contrast, logic and science in general cannot be free from them. No, phenomenology is pre-theoretical also in the sense of a freedom from logic itself. That is, we could say that phenomenology is pre-logical. The difficulties actually rooted in this problem concern, consequently, not so much the means for its resolution as the means for *understanding* the resolution. The fact is that, on the one hand, phenomenol-

ogy is a purely theoretical science, theoretical in the broadest sense of the word, in opposition, taken also in the broadest sense, to the practical. And this opposition, is *absolute*!

On the other hand, however, asserting that phenomenology must be *pre-theoretical*, do we not thereby ascribe to it some practical significance, albeit in the sense in which Hegel suggested entering the water in order to learn how to swim? We understand very well that we can call something *pre-theoretical*, since as a matter of fact quite a bit in life is actually learnt *before* any theory. Yet how are we to understand the term “*pre-theoretical*” here? In agreement with everything presented above we emphasize once more that in phenomenology it is precisely a matter of intentionality, intentionality, moreover, in its actional modification, since ultimately every *cogito* is *in potentia* actional. Certainly what is actional can be called *sui generis* “practical.” However, it is not a matter of words here but of the correct understanding of what use is to be made of the terms and by overcoming the troubles mentioned on the road to understanding. The question, nevertheless, remains to be consistently resolved.

As mentioned above, there are difficulties here of a quite different kind. For one there is the general objection against the possibility of intuitive cognition and of a pure pre-logical description in general. These objections serve as the most powerful obstacle to the exclusion of the sphere of the logical from phenomenology, an obstacle actually to making it the fundamental philosophical discipline. It must be said that a simple appeal to intuition does not seem convincing and only provides ammunition for its opponents. This is because such an appeal is in fact inadequate as long as we cannot show that there is something in intuition itself that places it in such an exceptional position that we can speak of an intuitive pre-theoretical cognition. The simple opposition of intuition to concept says absolutely nothing. Regardless of whether we take experiencing intuition or ideal intuition, showing in what respect they are opposed to concept only makes the difference between intuition and concept understandable but reveals nothing about *how* a purely intuitive cognition exists.

We can continue further with this line of thought – and here the supporters of intuitive cognition, if they do not strengthen their own position, they at least bring down that of their opponents. In any case, they deprive their opponents of the right to make use of the weapon that the latter think inflicts the most powerful blow on intuition. Surely the same argument above has as much force against the notion of concept as it does with regard to intuition, viz., it is incomprehensible *how* purely intellectual cognition exists. Kant’s solution here is in general of no concern, since from two

incomprehensible things it is impossible to get a single comprehensible one. Intuition and concept are not “parts” and not abstractions. The question simply concerns *how we are to understand* concepts and, correspondingly, *how we are to understand* intuitions.

With Kant in mind we can also ask the question how we are to understand concepts with intuitions “subsumed” under them. As long as we have no answer to this question – and there is none – all of the objections of intellectualism against intuitivism are of no fundamental importance. It is true that this does not prove intuitivism, but, on the other hand, it frees intuitivism from answering the would-be objections. The question standing before both intuitivism and intellectualism is an actual and vital problem. It is not accidental that this problem becomes clear only on the basis of an intuitive description, and therefore the resolution of the problem ultimately calls upon intuitivism to render a great service to an intellectualism hostile to it. Husserl, however, is not concerned with this problem here. We, therefore, only wanted to point it out because of its cardinal importance. Later we will proceed to resolve it, leaving it for now in the following form: *How does an actual something in general exist; how does it exist in intuition, and how in a concept?* We ask this since the preceding analysis revealed the simple fact that for us intuitions and concepts (or intuitions subsumed under a concept) are obviously inadequate. These are dead terms, dried-up plants, herbariums, and not “alive.”

Thus let us *assume* that intuitive cognition, both pre-theoretical in general as well as pre-logical, exists. Consequently, *if* it exists, then the sphere of pure logic and formal ontology are subject to exclusion by the phenomenological $\varepsilon\tau\circ\chi\eta$. The troubles that we come upon with this, thus, are troubles not so much of principle as simply certain difficulties that demand clarity and distinctness of understanding in order to be eliminated.

The matter stands somewhat differently, and moreover is more complex, with respect to some of the material-ontological disciplines inasmuch as they are directed not to the *cogitatum* but to the *cogito* itself. The answer to the problem that arises concerning their “exclusion” not only demands clarity but can arouse a fundamental misunderstanding, and moreover a misunderstanding of a very delicate sort.

The fact of the matter is that in excluding the actual world in the phenomenological attitude we encounter no obstacles to the exclusion of the “actual,” empirical, animate and human consciousness along with “nature,” “man” and so forth. Yet in a number of material ontologies we again encounter consciousness along with “nature” and so forth. This time, however, it is not an empirical, actual consciousness but an “eidetic,” ideal

consciousness, which is taken or studied in its essence. As we said, phenomenology also examines consciousness ideally, that is in its essence. Phenomenology is a material-eidetic science.^{5,a} Does phenomenology, then, turn out to be identical to a material ontology of consciousness? After so much effort this would be a sad result. In such a case phenomenology would not only lose its significance as the *fundamental* philosophical science and would occupy a position alongside the other sciences, which demand "foundations," but this very position would turn out to be an odious "psychologistic" one. It is evident that the ontological character of such an examination, as opposed to an empirical one, would not essentially alter the situation in the least: Rational psychology is still a psychology and not the fundamental philosophical discipline. It is clear from this to what extent the problem we have approached is a delicate one.

Husserl resolves the above problem in the following manner.⁶ According to what we said above, phenomenology, concentrating all its attention on pure consciousness, addresses itself in its unique attitude exclusively to the *immanent*. In such a case, however, not only does actuality prove to be transcendent for phenomenology, but *not even all essences* are within the sphere of the immanent. On the contrary, many essences come to be ascribed to the transcendent. That is to say, not only the "essences" of the material ontologies of "nature" but also such essences as "man," "human sensation," "psyche" and "psychic experience" (experience in the psychological sense), "personality," "trait of character," etc. are transcendent essences for phenomenology. We have recognized in principle that we cannot presuppose anything transcendent in our investigation and in a pure description of pure consciousness. We, therefore, arrive at the possibility of subjecting the objects of the material-eidetic sciences to reduction. Phenomenology must remain completely independent to the end.

There is no doubt that Husserl's solution is fundamentally correct and, in any case, consistent. Phenomenology actually must remain absolutely independent. Whatever it is in need of it must establish for itself, even if it is from the world of other attitudes or spheres of the ideal. Nevertheless, precisely in view of the mentioned delicate nature of the problem, it seems to us that our answer must be more specific and intuitively clearer. Above all, it may seem that the "excluded" essences are of the same order as the non-excluded essences remaining within the sphere of the phenomenological attitude, whereas in fact this is not the case. Consequently, a simple indication of the difference between that which is immanent and "transcendent essences" will not suffice. It is necessary to show what properly belongs, so to speak, to the essence of "transcendent essences." On

the other hand, we exclude "psychic mental processes," in the *psychological sense*, not only in their empirical actuality but also in their essence. If we do not point out this essence, however, we risk falling into the error of either excluding pure consciousness at the same time or of being left without a pure consciousness. As is evident, the source of the delicate nature of the whole problem lies here.

Yet the unclarity here does not present itself as insurmountable. We can begin with the fact that although in material ontologies (fundamental sciences with regard to the various regions of objects) we are concerned with essences, i.e., with ideal objects, we nevertheless obtain them in another attitude – an attitude peculiar to the essences themselves – than the phenomenological. This attitude, in a certain sense, is "closer" to that in which we obtain the "actual world," to the natural attitude, since it too bears an especially scientific, and not a philosophic, character. In this attitude ideal objects are taken outside their necessary correlation to consciousness. On the contrary, in the phenomenological attitude we take these objects in their correlation to consciousness, and we obtain pure consciousness itself by virtue of the specific attitude in which all objects correlative to consciousness turn out to be in parentheses. With this distinction we are somewhat closer to determining the character of the transcendent nature of the essences of the material ontologies excluded by the phenomenological attitude.

But this explanation is still no less general than Husserl's own. It applies just as much to an ontology of "nature" as to an ontology of the "psyche" and the "spirit." Meanwhile the latter are still under particular suspicion. Can we really exclude them – considered in their essence? Is the difference in attitudes here not just a matter of mere empty words? ... What, in fact, belongs to the essence of the psyche, the psychic, the spiritual, the mental? Taking them in the natural attitude, we see that more or less they can be subjected to an abstract study. However, not only as concrete objects but in their abstractness, too, they stand in a necessary, i.e., empirically constant, relation to the objects of "nature." This relation is not a logical relation or some ideal one but a relation that enters into the empirical structure of actuality itself as an actual relation.

Passing to the new attitude and beginning our examination of these same objects as ideal, i.e., in their essence, we see that the relations just mentioned remain along with the objects. Consequently, *essentially* and in principle the Objects of psychology and of the so-called sciences of the spirit in general cannot be examined in any other way than in their "natural," and we might add social, setting or surroundings. And just as in

the natural attitude we determine the "influence" of the surroundings and the conditionality of the Objects mentioned, so in the ideal sciences we seek the expression of this conditionality in "laws" and essential concatenations.

Surely, however, there is no question about any conditionality in the phenomenological study of consciousness. To describe "pure" consciousness in its natural or social setting and conditionality, even if we were to take the setting and conditionality essentially, would be an intolerable absurdity, just as it would be to say that "four" or "thirteen" is conditioned by "the development of the means of production" or by "the condition of the soil and the climate." The clear fact is that in the phenomenological advertence of vision we see nothing even similar to this. We need only actually effect this advertence. If we do so, then a free field is, in fact, opened up for the pure description of the pure Data of consciousness, of pure intentionalities or mental processes.

Finally, on the one hand, an indication of the character of the excluded transcendency is still demanded. The immanent, as absolute, can still conflict with the problem of the absolute taken as transcendent. The thought can occur to examine a pure consciousness, such as the consciousness of the Deity. The simple reduction of theological objects on the ground that they have to do with "practical" Objects and the fact that these Objects, whatever the attitude be, are subject to a reduction in phenomenology is obviously insufficient, since God's consciousness can play a role as a purely theoretical motif, as for example in Berkeley and in mysticism. As Husserl has pointed out,⁷ it is obvious that this Absolute is absolute in a completely different sense and signification than that found in our use of the term when discussing immanent experience. But the state of affairs here would remain obscure if it were impossible to carry out the mentioned singling-out of pure consciousness. After accomplishing it the necessity of the reduction with respect to theological Objects clears up by itself.

Therefore after a careful elucidation of everything that actually is transcendent and their phenomenological reduction, i.e. their exclusion from the sphere of our regard, we come to the fact that there remains before us as our sphere of investigation pure consciousness alone, i.e., the sphere of pure mental processes, which can be examined ideally and eidetically in their own peculiar essence. The variety and the complexity of the stream of mental processes, as it appears to us in the natural attitude, promises for phenomenology the same rich and varied field of investigation, since, as we saw, the essential property of consciousness, namely to be directed to something, to be consciousness of *something*, is preserved in the phenomenological attitude. That is, consciousness remains an "intensive

mental process." Intentionality characterizes consciousness and allows us, therefore, to designate the entire stream of mental processes as the stream of consciousness and as the unity of one consciousness.⁸ But the intentionality of mental processes consists precisely in the fact that consciousness is always consciousness of *something*. In its most general signification perception is the perception of *something*, a judgment is a judgment of *something*. Valuation, love, activity, etc. – all presuppose a respective *something* to which they are directed. Everything that was designated above as *cogito*, which (or since it) is nothing other than a special modus of the intentional, namely *explicit* intentionality, is an *act* in the broad sense. An *explicit* intentive mental process is a certain "effected" act of the *cogito*, or, to use an expression of Kant's, of the "*ich denke*."

In every actional *cogito* "our" regard is directed to "something," – an object, a thing, a circumstance, etc. – although this actional directedness of the intentional "unity of consciousness," of our "regard," of the "Ego," is not given as actional in every mental process. On the contrary, we know the intentional in its other modality, too, where the "act" of intentionality is still "not effected," still only an "act-arousal" (*Aktregung*). The potential field of perception remains a surrounding background or a backdrop of actional perceptions where by means of new "effectings" we get new objects. We do not thereby "create" them nor are we present at their "appearance." We only move from one modality to another.

A question arises, therefore, here on its own, both with respect to the "effected" acts as well as with respect to the "uneffected" ones, to "arousals," viz. the question of the "unity of consciousness," i.e. the unity of the intentional acts of directedness, of the "us," of the *ego* *cogito*, in short, of the Ego, which has its regard directed to an object, to something, the presence of which essentially characterizes all of consciousness, the entire stream of consciousness, as the *intentional* stream of mental processes. The question arises: Who is this Ego? Is it not subject to the phenomenological reduction, too? Is not the *cogito*, at least as an object of phenomenology, made up of a simple "aggregate" of mental processes, a "bundle or collection of different perceptions"?^b On the other hand, if it is not "excluded," do we not thereby introduce a "natural" or some other transcendent something despite our efforts up to now to guard ourselves against this?

There is no need to repeat again what we said about the psychic and the spiritual. In their empirical and ideal givenness they are subject to the reduction. It is also just as evident that this "Ego," "our" consciousness, "our" *cogito*, the "our" of the phenomenological investigation is not the

empirical "Ego" of the philosopher who produces the phenomenological attitude. It is the same sense of "our" as the "we" in "we" deduce a theorem or "we" accept that two quantities that are separately equal to a third are equal to each other. It is the same sense as the "we" in "we" "represent" the substance of the law of non-contradiction, etc., etc.⁹ Obviously in phenomenology, as in all similar cases, what we have in mind is just a locution that bears a "subjective" form. What we have is an investigation carried out on objects that do not lose any of their ideality just because of these empirically inescapable turns of language. Consequently, as for the questions we have posed it is simply a matter of whether we can ascertain a unity in the intentive mental processes, a unity that could be taken in phenomenology to be the "pure Ego" of consciousness. And if in general we can, does it form part of the subject-matter of the phenomenological investigation or must it also be subjected to reduction?

This subtle question demands special attention and caution with respect to "theories" and "world-views" of any kind, in particular with respect to negative theories that deny any signification to what we have called the "Ego," or, conversely, that reduce all objects of the Ego to the Ego's active activity. But when we stand in an impartial and "pure" relation to this question its solution reveals the peculiar importance of phenomenology itself as the fundamental philosophical discipline.

In this respect the evolution that Husserl's views underwent is interesting. In the *Logical Investigations*, where the idea of phenomenology is not yet realized in all of its determinateness and completeness, Husserl resolved the problem of the "pure Ego" in a skeptical manner.¹⁰ He changes his view in attempting to ground phenomenology by determining what can be subjected to reduction. We cannot help stating, he thinks, that every cogitatio effected takes on the explicit form, *cogito*,¹¹ i.e., of course, the *Ego* *cogito*. In their continuous stream mental processes change in various ways. We can designate them with any name we please, but one does *not* change. It remains constant and identical, and this is the *Ego*, to which all the diverse mental processes and acts belong; they "proceed from out of the *Ego*."^c In it they actionally "live." But turning to the merely potential background of actional mental processes, we inescapably ascribe to it an affiliation with the *Ego*. The *Ego* unites this background together with the actional mental processes into one stream, where a constant transition from one modality of consciousness to another takes place.

On the other hand, however, if we would want to find this *Ego* in the very stream of mental processes, i.e. of intentionalities, to find it like one mental process among others, we would meet with failure. The *Ego* does

not make an appearance and then disappear along with and among them. At the same time, rather, we continuously ascertain it as being continuous. The Ego "directs" its "regard" precisely "through" the mental processes themselves, through any actional cogito, to the objective something.

Any *cogitatio* can change, make an appearance and disappear. It makes no difference whether it is a matter of a *necessarily* transitory something or whether we ascertain it only to be a fact. On the other hand, the pure Ego in principle turns out to be something *necessary* and to be an absolutely identical something throughout all possible alterations of the mental process. Consequently, as such the pure Ego cannot in any sense be a *real* part or moment of a mental process. Therefore, the pure Ego appears as a certain *peculiar* "transcendency within immanency."¹² And as such a transcendency, i.e., one found within the immanent itself, this transcendency obviously cannot be subjected to the phenomenological reduction but forms a part of the content of phenomenology. This is because to be "directed to something," "to be busy with something," to experience, to suffer, etc. something necessarily and essentially demands an emanation from the Ego or a direction toward it. Precisely these essential properties of the relation between the Ego and "its" mental processes point to the fact that the pure Ego having mental processes cannot be taken for itself (*für sich*) as and cannot be made, therefore, the proper Object of an investigation. Apart from its "modes of relation" it in its essence is "empty" and has no explicable content. In and for itself (*an und für sich*) it even defies description: the "pure Ego and nothing more."¹²

We have not, however, given here a sufficiently clear presentation. Something of a more definite nature is necessary concerning the question of the Ego's "transcendency." How is it that the pure Ego, as a certain transcendency, is not subject to the reduction and yet that this does not go against our very formulation of the problem, viz., to carry out the phenomenological attitude to the absolute and immanent alone and reduce everything transcendent, that is reduce everything that is not absolute but rather is conditioned, motivated, relative? Rigor of method demands that we reduce even an absolute transcendent such as God. Why on earth do we leave another transcendent something, which certainly also must be absolute, yet which nevertheless is similar to God in being *transcendent*? An exhaustive answer to this question would itself yield a phenomenological investigation of the pure Ego, something which we cannot yet undertake here. Therefore, we must confine ourselves merely to the elimination of possible bewilderment, proposing not so much to solve the problem as to trace the path by which the problem can be solved.

A fundamental difficulty arises in a pure description of the pure Ego. Actually our consciousness, both the actional as well as the potential consciousness, necessarily refers to the Ego, but it itself as a mental process is not given at the same time along with these other mental processes. Every mental process is "my" mental process, just as every "something" is "something" with respect to consciousness. This similarity also finds its expression in our language when we distinguish perception from apperception, consciousness from self-consciousness. But precisely the "singling out" of this "self" from consciousness presents a difficulty for the simple reason that we do not find the "self" in consciousness itself. It turns out to be a "transcendent something" with respect to consciousness. Moreover, if we ponder over the sense of this "transcendent something," that is as it is constituted in natural thought, we see that it is "transcendent" in the truest *basic* sense. For the naïve consciousness the "objective" self is not a transcendency in the proper sense. It is "its own" self, "right here," given undoubtedly and in its fullness. But this "self" of our discussion, which is found at every step, "appears" from the unknown and "departs" back to the unknown like some sort of ethereal thing. Yet does it really depart? Does it not remain at least in terms of an influence exerted from the beyond on this world, etc.? Surely these are the questions that first define the sense of "transcendent something."

We carry out the phenomenological reduction, but even in this new attitude the mentioned transcendent something, the pure Ego, again slips away from us as though it were ethereal. Yet at the same time it "exerts an influence" and cannot be reduced together with everything that has been called transcendent. Its being belongs to its essence. It is *true*, authentic being, a being in essence, but nevertheless a being that is not correlative to the being of consciousness as is every other transcendent, empirical or ideal being. Rather, it is an absolute being with respect to which, so far as it is actionally expressed in consciousness, everything else *is*. It is the being of immanent consciousness itself. Mental processes come and go. Their flow does not break off. We always have mental processes and have them in all their diversity. They are "given" with their acts, qualities and characteristics bearing an absolute character but not as absolutely above any possible reproach as to their being. They are "given" with their acts, qualities and characteristics bearing an absoluteness. But the being of these mental processes does not have an absolute non-transitory nature. Being as such, absolute being, belongs to the essence of the Ego. It can be transcendent only with respect to arising mental processes, i.e., with respect to the stream-like forming mental processes. Can this peculiar transcendent

something be reduced in this attitude to the essence of pure intentionalities?

In distinguishing between the transcendency of the object and that of the Ego, we thereby establish something generically in common between them. But we must constantly bear in mind the limits of this something in common in order to avert the rise of sterile problems and harmful confusions that can arise by transgressing these limits. To us the most dangerous thing of all is the temptation of metaphysical problems that arise concerning the relation between the Ego and the object in the form of the relation between the subject and the Object. On the one hand, these problems can exert an influence on an unprejudiced, pre-theoretical investigation in the direction of subjectivistic theories of every shade or toward the opposite extreme, the destructive denial of the Ego itself. On the other hand, a generalization of the "object" and of the "Ego," taken as something transcendent, can provide the pretext for endowing each with the other's properties, a risky path for the fundamental science as it leads in the direction of materialism and spiritualism.

As for the first aporia, in our opinion, seen from the viewpoint of fundamental philosophy, it arises from a *sham* task. Some philosophical directions are particularly disturbed by the so-called dualism of the Ego and the object, between subject and Object. It is well-known how much energy and sagacity has been spent on "overcoming" this "dualism." There is one fundamental consideration, however, that gives us the right to consider this task a sham for fundamental philosophy. The fact is that a perplexity, a "lack of understanding," as to how we can establish an intelligible relation between the subject and the Object serves as the chief stumbling block in this problem. The reason for this is that in the very formulation of the question they are posited as two poles of thought. Any possibility of passing from one to the other is thus excluded beforehand and even more so the possibility of finding some *similarity* between them, a similarity which is supposedly necessary for the sought correlation between the two.

The essential point for us here is not so much that this postulation of a "similarity" to a certain extent narrows the problem and points to a preconceived anticipation in the formulation of the question about the Ego as the very inescapable nature of this delimitation. Without even the slightest possible reservation this inevitability proves that the problem is formulated with regard to actuality and in the sense of an *actuality*.

In fact by virtue of being a sham problem for fundamental philosophy, it has absolutely vital importance within the sphere of the actual, since it arises only and completely on the basis of the actual. It springs from an *actual* separation between the subject and the Object, and only in this way

does the problem exist. That is, it is above all a psychological problem, taking psychology as the science of the subject, of subjective processes and phenomena of actuality. Therefore, any attempt at all to resolve a problem such as this, and consequently also the attempt to overcome the mentioned dualism, is by its essence a *psychological* one. Examining the matter in its essence we can discover only the “identity” that Schelling had already come across.

Every consciousness is the consciousness of something, and every something exists only for consciousness. The Ego itself is conceivable only in its acts, which are acts of consciousness. Not to grasp this and to strive philosophically to “overcome” dualism here means the same as to wish to remain within the psychological point of view. Of course, it is not necessarily a psychological point of view. But it necessarily is a theoretical point of view with regard to the actual. Consequently, it is in general either a naturalistic or a metaphysical viewpoint.

The metaphysical point of view, however, is surely a definite conception. It can give a different solution than psychology or the other sciences do. But the source of theoretical vacillations between subjectivism and objectivism inescapably remains this accepting of the problem from actuality as mentioned. As for the fundamental philosophical science, which is the only thing at issue here, it is characterized by a total *indifference* not just to any solution at all to this problem, but as is apparent, to its very formulation, indifference taken as a *principle* and a *method* and *not* as the result of philosophical carelessness.

In the second case we are dealing with theoretical conclusions whose scientific (be they naturalistic or psychological) or metaphysical character is even more evident. Therefore, their “exclusion” is an easier matter, but a few words need to be said about it in order to emphasize all the more clearly the proper and essential significance of the Ego’s transcendent nature.

In our view, what can lead to unclarity or arouse confusion is the fact that by calling both the “object” and the “Ego” a transcendency we provide a possible basis for their generalization because of their phenomenological character, for example, as “enduring somethings” or “identical somethings” in themselves, such as being “the same thing” situated at one time in the “base” as a transcendent adumbrated something and at another time as something emanating in acts. The temptation can arise in the one or the other instance or even in both to slip the concept of substance into the place occupied by the “same something.” It is clear here that we will then be forced to surrender power to an appropriate theory. Having pushed aside,

however, all theories it is not hard to convince oneself that there is an essential difference, a difference in essence, between the object's "continualness," or periods of being "the same," and the "continualness" of the Ego. Speaking of the object we attribute its continualness to its essence. This, however, does not in the least characterize the genus or the type of its being. On the other hand, the continualness and "sameness" of the Ego belongs not just to the essence of the Ego – since this essence is in its actionality – but to the essence of its being. Moreover, since the object is an object only in its correlativity to consciousness, the continualness of the Ego belongs also to the essence of the being of the object. Whether this object be actual or ideal is all the same. Therefore, although we speak in both cases of transcendency, with respect to the object it is a matter of a real (experiential) actuality, which really turns out to be transitory.

However, even if it is a matter of an ideal objectivity, it does not turn out to be a transcendent within the immanent, in the sense explained above, but something to which consciousness is directed. On the contrary, the transcendency of the Ego belongs to a completely different kind of being, to whose sense continualness and sameness belong. This is why the transcendency of the Ego belongs to the being which is not only not transitory in *its* essence but also not transitory in *its* own (absolute) "actuality." This justifies what we said above concerning the correlativity of the object and the absolute nature of the Ego. The object is correlative, but the Ego stands in consciousness absolutely, since everything "belongs" to it alone. It itself does not "belong" but is actualized. *In its own way* it is "realized" in the being of consciousness, imparting an absolute nature to it, an absolute nature which is necessary in order for an objectivity, in turn, to belong to it. We will attempt to explain this further, returning to what we said earlier.

As a stream of mental processes, consciousness is discovered, is seen, in the phenomenological attitude at the time when everything to which consciousness is directed is reduced. But what cannot be reduced is that in whose name this directedness is carried out. Everything that is reducible is correlative to consciousness. But if we also try to examine consciousness and the Ego, self-consciousness, i.e. if we try to consider the Ego as correlative to consciousness, we obtain nothing. There would be *nobody* directing consciousness itself. Not only would the being of consciousness disappear but also the being of the transcendencies correlative to it, since every mental process is a mental process of the Ego.

We can approach the Ego from another angle. If we try to effect, so to speak, a trans-phenomenological attitude and a trans-phenomenological reduction, directing our regard to the pure Ego itself, i.e. if we try to keep

just the Ego “alone,” we again obtain *nothing*. Without *its* consciousness the Ego is nothing. Consequently the similarity with which we began between consciousness and self-consciousness is only apparent. There is no correlativity here like that which exists between consciousness and the object. On the contrary, despite the immanency of the one and the transcendency of the other they themselves are in essence *one*. Any division between them under such conditions – be that division abstract or a division of “attitude” – is an impossible thing. It can lead only to the hypostatization of empty concepts: The Ego is only the Ego of its mental processes, mental processes are only the mental processes of their Ego. And this is fundamental, essential and absolute.

Does what we have just said above eliminate the contradiction that is felt in the very combination: transcendency in immanency, i.e. to be transcendent and immanent at one and the same time? But is this not a property of the absolute itself, namely to be both transcendent and immanent? Is it not that the absolute overcomes this very contradiction by virtue of its relativity and not by virtue of a conditionality of the unconditional? In fact, if the being of the Ego is to be in consciousness and the being of consciousness, as a being, is to be in the Ego, what can this transcendency of the Ego mean? The immanent is what is discovered in any mental process at all, and every mental process is a mental process of the Ego. But is something discovered in the *entire* aggregate of mental processes that is not found in each individual mental process or even in a group of them? Is this Ego discovered in its entirety and absolute completeness?

It is evident that immeasurably large “stocks” are left as the transcendent’s share! We discover the immanent only in its actionality, that is in the actional Ego *cogito*. But it is not the case that the entire Ego is actional. The Ego is transcendent insofar as our mental processes are not actional. But it must belong to the essence of absolute being that everything non-actional can be “converted” into something actional. There is no room here for secrets, for the unknown. All borders, limits and prohibitions bear only an empirical character and are themselves relative to the highest degree. To isolate oneself with their help from the absolute is an empty undertaking, like a childish game of hide and seek. If it wishes to be “first” philosophy and uphold the tradition of positive philosophy as well as advance forward toward the solution of its problems, phenomenology cannot reduce what, by its essence, makes up the authentic and true character of absolute being.

Author's Notes

1. *Ideas*, p. 8ff.
2. *Ideas*, p. 17ff. For more on the relation between formal logic and formal ontology see *Ideas*, p. 353.
3. *Ideas*, p. 162.
4. *Ideas*, p. 135ff.
5. Cf. *Ideas*, p. 161.
6. *Ideas*, pp. 137–139.
7. *Ideas*, pp. 133–134.
8. *Ideas*, p. 199ff and p. 272ff.
9. *Ideas*, p. 149.
10. Cf. *Ideas*, p. 133f. Cf. also Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, *op. cit.*, investigation 5, chapter 1.
11. *Ideas*, p. 132ff. Cf. *Ideas*, p. 190.
12. *Ideas*, p. 191.

Translator's Notes

- a. Shpet gives what must be an incorrect reference here. Cf. *Ideas*, p. 137.
- b. In English in the original text.
- c. Cf. *Ideas*, p. 190.
- d. *Ideas*, p. 133.

CHAPTER 4

The Problem of Method

After all the reductions are carried out phenomenology turns out to be a discipline rigorously shut up in its own shell – this thanks to the rigor and *purity* of its absolute object. It is free not only from all theoretical and practical presuppositions, but it also operates only with material that it is able to establish by itself. Being the foundation of all philosophical as well as special knowledge, phenomenology “accepts” nothing. It “has” only itself. In this regard we mentioned above that phenomenology can always use the Object of another attitude for its own purposes. But of course as to the content it “converts” everything in accordance with its own spirit and for its own purposes. All of this holds not only for the Objects of phenomenology but also for its means and methods. They, too, cannot be “borrowed” and cannot be founded on other attitudes and sciences. If phenomenology has to use certain formal principles, e.g. the laws of logic, it must even in those cases provide its own justification for them.

Being the “pre-theoretical” science, phenomenology rests not on discourse but, as we saw, on intuition. Consequently, its way of securing for itself the correct path and method must be intellectually seen in intuition itself. And since phenomenology is concerned not with sense intuitions but with ideal intuitions, its method, too, must be *intellectually seen* in the essence of ideal intuition itself. This by itself is perfectly clear. An indisputable demand points out the way in which phenomenology must, at least, begin its investigation. It does not need theoretical, discursive methods to establish relationships. Phenomenology can satisfy itself only by analyzing definite cases and examples and thereby establish the essence of Objects and relations through a purely exemplificational analysis. It goes without saying that the “examples” from which phenomenological analysis starts have validity only within the confines of their respective scope. But in observing these limits we find that the methodological principles are

prescribed by the object itself. And the norm of these principles, consequently, is ultimately determined by the characteristic region according to the genus of its objective being and objective structure.

Since phenomenology is the fundamental *non-theoretical* science, its path is also the fulfillment proper of Hegel's demand: Jump into the water! But neither Hegel nor the essence of the matter can prohibit phenomenology from reporting to itself on its activity while it establishes itself. Consequently, therefore, phenomenology not only checks its steps but also produces for itself certain regulatives, which can be called the methodological techniques of phenomenology. This is an inevitable path not only for phenomenology but for any science at all that is in some respect *fundamental* and to the extent that it is fundamental. It is, for example, also the path of logic.¹

The definition of phenomenology itself, the determination of its essence, of its problem and task and of its object, is itself phenomenological work by phenomenological methods. Therefore by relying on this example and picturing to ourselves the work of phenomenology in other cases we can try to establish certain regulatives of the phenomenological method. By its essence phenomenology has no need to hurry justifying and establishing its methods. Rather, they must be established and justified within the very process of phenomenological work. However, another, a more external, aspect of the matter advances the need to establish them, and this is that phenomenology still needs to defend its right to exist.

Objections, often serious and fundamental, commit phenomenology in advance to show where its originality lies and what guarantees its productivity. What we need is instructions, even if only the most originary, as to how to make use of intuitive cognition and by what means it is obtained. The objections mentioned deal chiefly with the following points: 1) A doubt is expressed whether there is any cognition whatever other than a discursive one. Those who raise such an objection think that an intuitive cognition is a *contradiccio in adjecto*. Every cognition is a conceptual cognition. 2) By itself an intuition does not guarantee the veracity of the cognition, because unclarity and vagueness are connected with it, and sometimes even preponderately so. 3) Pure description – before any theory at all and free from any theory at all – is, in general, impossible. Every description is, in fact, so intimately connected with theory that any “purity” whatever that it has can be spoken of only relatively. Ultimately the “purity” is, in general, only an abstraction.

The general siege, so to speak, not only on phenomenology but also on any attempt to break free of the fetters of the formally rationalizing methods

of intellectualistic logic is conducted from these three points. We must also recognize, however, that it is actually a question of the very essence of the new problematic and its methodology. At the same time, all three points of attack are so tightly intertwined, touching the essence of the new method, that there is no possibility of restricting ourselves to a partial elimination of just one of the mentioned doubts. What we need to do is weaken them fundamentally in terms of their interconnections and as a whole. Their deep internal interconnection, on the other hand, facilitates our critical work, since objections against any one of them touch as well that general source from which they all spring. A weakening of any of the objections is a weakening of all of them together.

The doubts mentioned are directed at the very sense of the phenomenological methods and at the sense of an intuitively descriptive cognition in general, embracing all its aspects and manifestations. In spite of the fact that it expresses, above all, a *quaestio facti*, the first doubt mentioned above, nevertheless, has a methodologically essential significance as well, since its negation of a fact is not a “blind” negation but rests on a quite general and formal argument concerning our means of “expressing” knowledge. In this sense we are chiefly dealing with an argument that is both *syntactical* and one of *general logic*.

To be precise the second doubt above is also connected to a certain extent with a question of fact. This is because in principle once having accepted a fact we obviously cannot then attach serious and fundamental significance to the criticism aimed at the means by which we should ultimately free ourselves from the contingent and merely empirical conditions. These conditions present intuitions to us in a sometimes more and sometimes less favorable setting. In any case, as a methodic doubt the second claim concerns, for the most part, the *method* of cognition. But we must bear in mind that rigorously speaking the second doubt certainly weighs not just against intuitive cognition. Consequently, its generality to a considerable degree already mollifies the force of its argument.

Finally, the third doubt directly concerns the method of cognition itself, cognition as a “presentation,” and in this sense has in principle a *methodological* significance. But its intimate connection with the first two doubts, and in particular with the first, cannot be denied. Consequently, the third doubt, indirectly, bears on the fundamental “question of fact.” If the fundamental source of all these doubts, i.e., the denial of a <certain> fact, is removed, then, thereby, we will have weakened the distrust in the possibility of expressing intuitive pre-theoretical knowledge and in the possibility of removing the conditions of its imperfection. This at least gives

rise to the idea of a specific method free from theory. Consequently, such a weakening leads to such a non-theoretical method like an imperative. Any remaining basis for doubting its realization, moreover, cannot have any significance other than an empirical one. In other words, once an intuition exists, there is also an expression of it. Consequently, it is possible in principle to seek to ascertain the intuition. From this the idea of the corresponding means to their realization and the experience of that necessarily follows as a fundamental demand.

The first doubt is the easiest of all to dispel in phenomenology. It is quite evident that it arises because of the "natural" attitude, and those who raise it have in mind the character of sensuous intuition with its varied content all of which is given simultaneously. But the genuine sense of the first doubt is to be found in the relationship between the components, which as we saw earlier are forcefully severed by nominalism. Theoretically, this issue assumes the form of the problem concerning the relation of intuition to concept. Phenomenology can also become interested in it. Its interest, however, deprives the issue of that acuity with which it was raised the moment we recall that in phenomenology it is a matter of an analysis of "essences." "Essences" are not opposed to experience in the latter's own sphere nor are they abstracted from experience. The former can be intellectually seen by means of a fundamental reduction of experience.

Regardless of how phenomenology resolves this issue, it simply is not the *same* problem but has a different content than the one that emerges in this issue as a doubt concerning the possibility of a non-discursive cognition. But it is easy to see that in general the latter doubt, properly speaking, does not concern phenomenology. This is because simply by turning to an examination of "essences," i.e., ideal objects, phenomenology provides no basis for a doubt in sensuous intuition. Even if cognition were in fact possible *only* in terms of concepts, phenomenology surely does not lay claim to a cognition in terms of sensuous intuitions of the *natural* attitude, and apparently no one disputes the fact that an ideal intuition can be expressed conceptually. We can talk only about the degree in general to which we have in a concept a sufficiently reliable tool for attaining the clarity and distinctness that we think necessary. We are, however, not now addressing the fact that the issue of a concept and of the logical in general itself demands a phenomenological elucidation of its own.

Clearly the issue in the formulation adduced above now leads us to the second point of the doubt. In any case from this angle we can hardly seriously dispute the methodological principle that Husserl makes the foundation of the methodology of phenomenology: "In phenomenology,

then, which is to be nothing else but a theory of essences <produced> within pure intuition, we perform acts of seeing essences immediately in given examples of transcendently pure consciousness and fix them *conceptually* and *terminologically*.²

The second point above concerns a doubt regarding the possibility of the distinctness and clarity of intuitive knowledge itself. This doubt is directed not at the “expression” of intuitive knowledge but at the expressible itself. Here at first the doubt has the appearance of being more rigorously founded. In any case, as early as Descartes rationalist philosophy saw certain obstacles to genuine cognition. It is true that rationalists repeatedly directed doubts at sensuous intuitions and that these doubts had empirical support. Nevertheless, however, this “answer” still does not entirely remove the principle concerning a demand for a method. This is particularly the case if we bear in mind the established correlativity between experiencing and ideal intuitions. Owing to this correlativity, the vague nature of experiencing intuition is able to act as an obstacle to our “penetration” into this intuition and through it to an intuition of essence.

We already saw that in the stream of consciousness a constant transition from the state of potentiality to the state of actionality is effected. It is a feature of the essence of consciousness that a “translation” from the sphere of potentiality to that of actionality is always under our control. This by itself, however, still does not testify in favor of the fact that every actional consciousness thereby becomes clear. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see that a transition to clarity and back, a possible moving away from the sphere of the clear, like a new recurrence of unclarity, also belongs to the essence of intentionality. What we are now in need of is to make the essence of this “translation” clearer and if possible to point out its methodic techniques and their methodological foundations. Consequently, it is a question of the method of clarifying intuitions themselves.

It is of the essence of this method that coming across intuitions at various degrees of nearness or remoteness, that is, various degrees of clarity, we must bring them to “*absolute nearness*,”³ where they attain for us complete clarity. This holds equally for experiencing as well as ideal intuitions, and in both cases we can speak of degrees of clarity of the intuition. Thus the clarification of an intuition is nothing other than leading what is given us to absolute nearness, or, in other words, attaining in intuition the intuition’s perfect degree of intuitedness. “*A presentive consciousness in the pregnant sense* and an *intuitive consciousness* in contradistinction to a *non-intuitive consciousness*, a *clear consciousness* in contradistinction to an *unclear one*: these coincide. The same holds for *degrees of givenness*, of *intuitedness*,

and of *clarity*. The zero-limit is complete obscurity; the limit, one, is complete clarity, intuitiveness, givenness.”^a

In view of this we should distinguish between clarification proper, where it actually is a matter of degrees of clarity, or of ascent by degrees within the sphere of obscurity, and clarification by means of an extensive broadening of the scope of clarity. The latter type of clarification can be accompanied by an intensive enhancement in clarity of the already intuitively given but which in fact has as its direct result the broadening of the sphere of the intuitively given itself. The attainment of complete clarity also makes indubitable all those acts that we effect in terms of a logical cognition when we study objects, viz., identification, differentiation, relating and so forth, consequently also the acts of seizing ideal objects, i.e. essences,^b and, consequently, also their objective correlates.

It might be thought, perhaps, that a clarification of an essence turns out to depend directly on the clarity of the corresponding single particulars in their full concreteness. However, the simple attempt to see intuitively the essence of a “universal,” such as for example a tone in general or a color in general, will convince us that the most “universal” eidetic differences, such as those between the mentioned essences, can be seized upon, and the full clarification of the particular intuitions in their individuality and concreteness is not required. This is a very important fact for the method of phenomenology. It does not, however, exclude the regulative signification of the principle that we look at as being a summary of the adduced considerations regarding the method of clarification: The method of clarifying essences up to their complete evidentialness demands that the mental process being studied constantly approach the degree of absolute nearness, “self-givenness.” This is to be done through a clarification of the corresponding particular intuitions as well as also through a determination of the essences that interlace with them. We accomplish this by proceeding deep into the clarification of their interconnections and interrelations, the exemplificational manner of choosing the intuitions themselves being adequate from start to finish.

Undoubtedly, two things stand in need of a more detailed examination here: 1) the question of how to recognize that an intuition has been brought to complete clarity, i.e. to the absolutely highest degree of nearness of intuitive givenness. In turn, it is not difficult to see from the essence of intuition itself that only the *evidentialness* of the given itself in intuition can and will testify to this, just as the evident presence of any intentive mental process testifies absolutely to its presence. What is intellectually seen with complete clarity necessarily must be *evident* – indeed the problem of evidence becomes a necessary constituent part of the methodology of

phenomenological investigation. 2) The question of what justifies the exemplificational techniques themselves of a phenomenological investigation. This question would not arise here if we would already have an answer to the general question mentioned above: How does the actual itself in general exist? This is because a clarification of the “actual” in the Data of intuition – whether experiencing or ideal – would reveal precisely what justifies the use of the exemplificational technique in investigating an essence, namely because this is also one of the aspects of the question concerning the relationship between experiencing and ideal intuition. But as with the earlier discussion of this question, let us put it aside for now, retaining the factual statement that an intuitive insight of the actual, like the seizing of it in general, takes place in our cognition. As for the first of these questions, as well as for the question of method itself, let us point out several things here.

These observations necessarily have to do first of all and chiefly with the mentioned identity between immediate intellectual sight and evidence. Actually there is essentially nothing to add here. If we ponder over the sense and the significance of what we call clear and distinct seeing, i.e., seeing in the full light of our consciousness, we will convince ourselves that it is a matter of an immediate intellectual sight and that this is indeed nothing other than *evidence*. We must recognize that evidence is not something introduced, something that is added or joined to our intuition. Rather it is itself this intuition, though only under particularly “favorable” conditions of consciousness, namely clear intuition. This holds for both sensuous as well as also for ideal intuition. We can in essence use the term “immediate intellectual sight” or equally as well the term “evidence” for designating this clear state of intuition.

The method of clarification, consequently, is nothing other than the method by means of which we make our intuitions *evident*. Consequently, the entire question possibly amounts to a careful elucidation of those conditions by which this highest degree of clarity is reached, which within its limits is designated as evidence. Here adding the term “evident” to “intellectual sight” necessarily results in a simple tautology. It goes without saying that our concern is not with the means of removing obstacles standing in the path of any “intellectual sight” and that overshadow it. Although this question is also in principle of great importance, it is more critical, than constructive. From this last point of view it is important to clear up just one thing: If it is not the case that every insight is evident, precisely which is? *Which is*, not empirically, not factually, but in principle? That is, this “property,” the property of being evident, belongs to the

ideal essence of which insight?

Again, nothing prevents us from beginning with the natural attitude and even with empirical *vision* in order to proceed then to an elucidation of what its essence is and, consequently, what it retains in an ideal attitude, including also the phenomenological attitude. Actually in vision (as well as in hearing, touching, and so forth) it is evident what is quite obvious here, that is, directly, really, *immediately* obvious. And it is not difficult to agree that this immediacy makes up what is otherwise called evidence: Immediacy and evidence of insight are when dealing with vision and the like one and the same thing.

The matter is, as it were, more complicated when it is a question of rational insight, for example, into the ideal objects of mathematics. Here everything is, as it were, evident. Yet everything demands "proof," a "proof" which is nothing other than making what is evident *self-evident*. But we must not leave aside here the question of the sense and the significance of what is called a "proof." We discover that *in essence (an und für sich)* there is no fundamental difference between evidence and self-evidence. Both will be by *immediate* insight.

The "proof" of any theorem with respect to an insight into a relation that the theorem formulates does not demand any "information," "deduction" and so forth. It demands only immediacy of insight. We merely need to recall the "proof" of any theorem in order to convince ourselves that the matter stands just so, since whatever sort of proof it be, it is carried out in *processes of insight* under various headings: addition, subtraction, extraction of roots, differentiation and so forth. We repeat, our concern *here* <with rational insight> is not with the aggregate and the relation of these processes, taken as processes of proving, but with their own immediate givenness as evident processes. All evidence is, in this respect if you please, self-evidence, or self-evidence is also evidence, that is, complete *immediacy*.

The entire question, thus, amounts to this: What is this *immediacy*? What conditions of consciousness produce immediacy for us? Without doubt, there is in every seeing and every intellectual sight a certain immediacy and, consequently, evidence. But where is this evidence in fact *self-evidence*? From the point of view of phenomenology with its principle of all principles there can be only one answer, viz., there, where the something that is intellectually seen *itself* actually stands before us as *ob-ject*, where it is in truth *perceived*, in short, where it is given to us in its *originary givenness*. The *originary givenness* of the Object in consciousness, thus, is also the condition by which we ascend to evident insight and consequently

to the legitimacy and foundation of all our acts of positing.⁴

The last generalization demands going much deeper into the content of phenomenology than we have been able to achieve up to now, since we are now talking of the goal of the “phenomenology of reason.” However, the results already achieved reveal with sufficient clarity the sense and the direction of our investigation. What we said in the foregoing about immediacy in the sense of the originarily givenness stretches across the entire field of reason, where we encounter opposition between the originarily and the non-originarily given. The evidence appearing in the originarily given makes up the rational motivation for the corresponding data of the second and higher orders. Presentive consciousness, taken as evidence or intellectual sight, thus, turns out to be motivated in the givenness itself, on which, of course, the character of the evidence depends. So we must distinguish between the evidence of experience, “sight,” and the evidence of ideal “insight”^c – a difference that entails a very essential difference in the evidence with respect to its adequacy and inadequacy. That which is really transcendent, in essence that which is “adumbrated,” cannot yield adequate evidence. In an appearance it is necessarily revealed “one-sidedly.” On the other hand, ideal eidetic insight stands in a quite different position. Thus, it delivers pure evidence in the precise sense.

We see that the circle of phenomenology is now closed in that we return to the point from which phenomenology set out to fulfill the tasks of a pre-theoretical description of the immediately given. Indeed, we see that it is actually assured a positive path of construction, since its starting point in essence and in principle turns out to be nothing other than evidence. The question of what to consider originarily is already part of the content of phenomenology itself. Together with Husserl we admitted above that the originarily given is given in experiencing intuition with its manifold forms of “presentable” existential being, and it is also given ideally, i.e. essentially, with manifold forms of “presentable” though essential being.

We suppose that there exists if not a species, then nevertheless a peculiar form, of originarily givenness that, properly speaking, for the first time makes possible the determination of being in its rational motivation. Through such a determination this originarily givenness phenomenologically shows how true being itself, as “actual,” exists, and *ideally* on this basis how any truth at all exists. Or on the *empirical* level we can simply say that in general it makes possible the seizing of any “actual” being at all. In other words, the question of the *rational* being of consciousness itself must still be raised. If we do so, we will immediately intellectually see the being of consciousness as a being perceiving in immediate and originarily givenness.

But it is important to stress here that in a certain sense such a being in principle *cannot* be a *non-originary* being. On the contrary, it can be called even “more” originary than a being that is obtainable in experiencing and ideal intuitions, provided we can still speak here of degrees of originariness itself. In any case, the sense we have in mind must point to “originariness” as the starting point of any rational motivatedness and includes in itself the general problem of the justification of reason and the sense of rationality.

For all their brevity the adduced considerations are sufficient not only for comprehending the essence of the matter, but they *<also>* give *<us>* the possibility to draw certain conclusions that protect phenomenology from biassed views in general, which from the very start prompt philosophy to set out on the wrong path.

First of all, the pure investigation of consciousness itself in its being and essence opens up to us what actually “exists” in consciousness and what does not, and consequently what is erroneously ascribed to it. If evidence is nothing other than intuition itself in its perfect clarity, we obviously cannot study it as something “external” with respect to intuition, as something that is introduced to intuition, something with which it is joined, a joining owing to which the ostensibly “non-evident” becomes evident. As regards this, Husserl is perfectly correct in saying: “Evidence is, in fact, not some sort of consciousness-index attached to a judgment (and usually one speaks of such evidence only in the case of judgment), calling to us like a mystic voice from a better world: Here is the truth; – as though such a voice would have something to say to free spirits like us and would not have to show its title to legitimacy.”⁵ This conclusion is of value, in particular, as it repudiates the “psychological” theory of evidence, in which a mystic *index veri*, a “feeling of evidence” or a “feeling of truth” appears.⁶

That such a “psychological” theory is “psychological” is certainly not the point. For if the theory were right, it would find its phenomenological justification. But the point is that the idea of evidence, like a kind of added burden to clear and immediate insight, simply has no justification at all in an immediate mental process. In general if in the *theory* of evidence it were a matter of some “index,” then it is clear from the preceding that the character of this “index” could only be “theoretical.” Therefore, we would have to seek its ultimate foundation and not have it pretend to serve as such a foundation.

But we must not close our eyes to the difficulties that can actually arise from the generalization of a purely phenomenological description of evidence conceived as the theoretical criterion of any truth at all. The “shortcomings” that a “description” of evidence thereby reveals, certainly,

do not demonstrate its erroneousness but precisely its *inadequacy*, an inadequacy *for theory*, since theory does not consist of just intuitive Data alone. It is appropriate, however, to pause on these "shortcomings" here not so much to prevent possible misunderstandings as to notice more quickly that a new problem for phenomenology itself lies at their foundation.

Objections are often raised amounting to the charge that with regard to evidence we ostensibly lose the possibility of distinguishing illusion, hallucination and a dream from sober and real actuality. We do not attach great value to an objection of this kind. Above all, as we will show below, phenomenology does possess the means to describe illusion precisely as illusion and a dream as a dream.

Against such an objection, however, we could bring forward yet another consideration. It is true that in a dream we take the imaginary to be actual, as though we encounter it in the state of being wide awake. Likewise in an illusion or an hallucination we ascribe actuality to what does not possess it. It does not follow from this, however, that while being awake we see dreams and under "normal" conditions hallucinations and illusions. Moreover, as a matter of fact assertions to such effect simply seem absurd to us or like a funny joke. Although when we are asleep we sometimes say to ourselves that we are awake, we must concoct the exclusive conditions under which a man who is awake would say about himself: I am asleep. But since philosophy goes about its business in the wakeful state, its problems and tasks in general have nothing in common with the problems and tasks of "the Interpreter anew of visions," and such a skepticism, without indicating the depth of its foundations, can be left aside.

Another concern is the difficulties that follow from the essence of this matter. That is why they arouse objections that cannot be eliminated by a simple "rejection." The problem of evidence is not new. Evidence for intuitive cognition was vigorously defended at one time by the opponents of Humean phenomenism and skepticism. The *gravest* objection which Scottish philosophy encountered is that it is forced to rely on *faith* as its ultimate foundation – a position with which our theoretical reason does not reconcile itself. What is more, this objection did not arise externally but was discovered in the bosom of that very school of thought as its fundamental aporia. Reid himself operated with faith as well as "universal consent," but it were particularly his successors who were unable to cope with the elimination of this non-rational foundation from our rational cognition. Some of the vulgarization of Reid's philosophy by Beattie was amply compensated for by the eloquence of D. Stewart and the thoroughness of Hamilton. Nevertheless, we can say that on this point the sun has set on the

philosophy of “general consent.”⁷

The answer that can be given to the reproach of “faith” is the same one that can be put forward against the arguments in support of any *subjectivism*. The answer can only lie in a reference to the fact that the something “real” or general itself, namely the object, *forces* us to cognize it just so and not otherwise, i.e., to recognize only the being actually peculiar to it and not another. Indeed this reference to coercion is at the same time an assertion of the integrity of the object and of “systemness,” i.e., in other words, the recognition of the rationality both of the cognition as well as of what is cognized. But such an answer still does not remove the mentioned aporia, since it leads to new questions. These are above all: 1) On what is this recognition of rationality based? And 2) How is this reconciled with what was said above – unless the uniting of intuition and rationalism is not like the uniting of fire with water? And how do we arrive at what is “actual” in this “unity”?

As for the first question, the answer to it can sometimes be downright treacherous. Here, for example, one of the advocates of the view that the rationality of cognition is expressed in the object’s appearance^d and the systemness of the real comes ultimately to a conclusion that we cannot call rational. Bosanquet identifies the question “What is true?” with the question “What is consistent with the given system?”⁸ and in this regard explains: “We never doubt this principle; if we did, we could have no science.” But what distinguishes this from the arguments based on “general agreement” and faith? That we are rationalists from birth, that the world is rational because otherwise it would be impossible to know it, etc. are arguments *ad vertiginem*, or they are an appeal to that same faith. Finally, if we would like to get out of this difficulty by relying on our division between intuitions and see the compulsory nature of the experiential world grounded in the compulsory nature of ideal intuitions, would this really help matters? Surely to *all appearance* ideal belief still does not make sensuous belief rational. ...

We must turn to the matter itself. During these reflections I approached the window. From the window I saw the city; I saw roofs of houses and a far off mountain, but all were covered with fog. I thought: “The fog is rolling in from the sea.” All of a sudden I noticed a *Negro* on the neighboring roof, his head in black curls, his shoulders like a gray canvas coat. It must be an illusion – why would there be a *Negro* on the *roof*? But why on earth is this *impossible*? More importantly, why is there a *Negro* on the roof? But I immediately put this doubt aside. I have encountered a number of Negroes, Indians, etc. here. *Evidently* it is a *Negro*! But why has he not

changed his position for such a long time? It has been too long for a *man* to be motionless. *Evidently* it is a chimney and not a Negro!

It is clear that here my sensuous intuition, even brought to the <highest> possible degree of clarity, nevertheless did not satisfy me, and my “evidently” was rejected in the name of something else that I also characterized as “evidently.” What is this second “evidence”? From the example there is clearly every reason to term the second “evidence” rational, and moreover rational in the mentioned sense: My intuition did not agree with the *whole* of my experience. As is apparent from the description, based on my experience I thought of the whole, not as the given intuitive whole but as some *possible* whole. And my intuition is “corrected” precisely by this “possibility” and “impossibility.” The obvious fact is that I relied on the “rational.” The rational entered into my consciousness as the *motivation* for my assertions concerning what is intuitively seen. In other words, an intuition brought to the degree of evident clarity is still in need of motivation or justification by my experience, and not just by present experience but also by possible experience.

Is this sufficient to answer our question? No, because: 1) the mentioned motivation is, nevertheless, an appeal to an intuition in the past, which I believe in “more” than what is now given. What is rational now is then only so by virtue of this “past”; 2) In this analysis so much “theory” has been introduced that it is not apparent what phenomenological significance “present” experience can have. Actually, the reference to the “past” can easily turn into a *regressus in infinitum* towards all our experience. Indeed, for all that it remains unclear how one intuition can make another evident. Is it really only a matter of the *past*?

As for “theories,” we must free ourselves from them. First of all, <in our example> the something theoretical basically was a “Negro.” Actually what I saw was something “black” along with something “gray” in the “fog,” etc. But all the same I had reason to say “Negro” (in quotation marks), i.e., *like* a Negro. My argument now assumes, as it were, the following form. Let us assume that it is a Negro. The objection runs, however, that it does not belong to the “essence” of a Negro that he be on a roof. Yet another objection runs: It does not belong to the essence of a Negro to be here, etc. Whether such objections actually exist or not is unimportant. What is important is that I come to a halt at the *motive* for my rejection <of the theoretical>, viz. the immobility <of what is perceived>. Mobility actually belongs to the essence of “man,” and in ideal intuition for the “ideal man” to be motionless is, *evidently*, nonsense. There is no need on paper to continue this analysis further. Everyone can continue it mentally to the

required degree of precision and distinctness required to satisfy themselves. Let us pass immediately to what we obtain from it.

“Liberation” from theory leads us to the conviction that the “rationality” of our motivations in the evidence we can analyze does not actually depend on something in the “past” nor consist of something in the “past.” This is because the essence to which we here turn has in general neither a past nor a present. It is an *essence*, i.e. an ideal object. Thus the above *<expression>* “to all appearance,” where we spoke of the foundation of sensuous belief in an ideal one, is merely “to all appearance.” Actually, in fact, ideal intuitions motivate the evidence of sensuous intuitions, and ideal objects motivate sensuous objects.

The very expression “ideal belief” mentioned above, however, was prompted by an analogy that has no place here. A cognition of the ideal being of objects is knowledge, not belief, and it is precisely this which also motivates cognition in sensuous intuitions and which Reid and others incorrectly reduced to “nature,” agreement, belief, and the like. And, by the way, they did so precisely because they basically shared the principle designated above as the principle of *Index veri*.

Speaking of the relation of the sciences of facts, of the empirical, to the sciences of essences, Husserl notes that whereas every eidetic science is in principle independent of all the sciences of facts, it is impossible to assert the reverse in relation to the empirical sciences.⁹ This is indeed absolutely correct. We can now see that this dependence reveals itself in the motivation sought by us. At the same time it becomes understandable that it actually is not a question of belief, since the rationality of this motivation is nothing other than taking part in a *system*, in the sense mentioned above. By no means do we “assume” this “systemness” because otherwise there could not be science. Rather we find it *as belonging to the essence of the ideal objects themselves*.

Going back to the second question raised earlier, it turns out therefore that we are combining “fire with water”: intuition with the rational. Going back even further to our *<earlier>* presentation, we see that this is the very question of how the relation between experiencing intuition and the intuition of an essence presents itself, the relation, i.e., between the sensuous and the ideal, the examination of which we are always deferring and which in general asks about the being of the actual or true.

In order to pass to this question let us turn our attention to what we said a moment ago about the “Negro.” Undoubtedly our presentation at the point where we said that the Negro properly is “as though it were a Negro,” a “Negro” (in quotation marks), etc. had to remain *unclear*. It had to remain

unclear how and what distinguishes a “Negro,” taken theoretically, and a Negro, taken phenomenologically. This unclarity of presentation arose owing entirely to the difficulty involved in verbally presenting the thoughts occurring in the various “attitudes” but which we are forced to express by means of words alone. Everyone who attempts to carry it out meets this difficulty of expressing his or her thought. Nevertheless the thought itself remains clear both in thinking it over and in its presentation provided we *understand* what we properly *mean* by the word in each individual case. This is illustrated here <in our present example>. By “Negro” I meant a “man” and meant a complex of “visual sensations.” Thus in our presentation and in connection with the principal question with which it is concerned a new factor arises, namely *understanding, or comprehension*. What is its role, how is it connected with the words <expressed> and in general with rational (concepts), and finally how can it help us resolve our chief problem?

We saw that the problem of clarification was the central problem of the three given earlier. Since an intuitive cognition that leads knowledge to complete clarity and evidence is factually possible, both its logic with an <appropriate> syntax and its methodology *must* exist. This is because the possibility of clarification, as a set of heuristic techniques, prescribes the corresponding path, i.e., the method of presentation. This rests on the fact that in the investigation of clarification we not only indicate the methodic techniques of the investigation but also intellectually see from them the *goal*, which for us is *evidence* with its correlate, namely truth. We already called the method of description, i.e. of *pure* description, the specific method of phenomenology, taken as the pre-theoretical discipline. Certain doubts and difficulties are also connected with this method. Through their examination we immediately approach closer to the just formulated problem. The analysis of this problem already forms a part of the content of phenomenology itself.

Up to now the method of description has not found its classic depiction as has happened with respect to the mathematical, inductive, etc. methods. We cannot help but see one of the causes for this in the historical tradition that has come down to us from the mathematizing philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries. With its ideal of an “*exact*” science arising from *determinations* of abstract objects it still hypnotizes the minds not only of representatives of the special sciences but also of philosophers. We can still find in philosophical literature naïve dreams about the at least *future* “precision” of the descriptive sciences as if it were merely an accidental and temporary phenomenon that objects conceived, at any rate, as tasks, exist

sooner in their being than in hypotheses, explanations and theories. These dreams are conceived as though it were merely accidental that the study of the being of objects demands its own method, as though it were not the case that this method follows from the very essence of the task.

On the other hand, we must acknowledge as no less naive the unexpected claim to description made by representatives and admirers of the abstract sciences – logically unexpected but with a sufficient factual foundation indicative of the urgency of the problem of “description.”¹⁰ In any case at the present time the status of the question is such that the most heated misunderstandings and, as their consequence, confusion over the question, can serve quite adequately to prove the urgency of the problem, of its importance, and, above all, of its existence. The latter, in turn, adequately substantiates also the existence of something that is sometimes denied in the thick of the dispute about description, namely description itself as a method *sui generis*. Lastly, we must get rid of materialistic logic or, as it most often calls itself, the logic of mathematical natural science. We must do so in order to understand the simple truth that from the fact that there *is* such a thing as mathematics, it does not follow that all the sciences must be mathematical, the simple truth that in general there is no room for analogical judgments where there is no analogy in the first place.

Husserl rightly points out that it is a matter of “fundamental and still unresolved problems pertaining to an essentially necessary clarification of the relationship between ‘*description*,’ with its ‘*descriptive concepts*,’ and ‘*unambiguous determination*’ or ‘*exact determination*,’ with its ‘*ideal concepts*,’ and, parallel with that, a clarification of the so-little understood relationship between ‘*descriptive*’ and ‘*explanatory*’ sciences.”¹¹ For us it is not a question of resolving these problems but only of clarifying and eliminating the objections directed against the very possibility of description as a scientific method. We accept the specification of the tasks of description in the form in which they were, in our view, most successfully formulated by Dilthey, namely as the method of attaining knowledge of an object, knowledge that happens to have its limit where theory and hypothesis start. Confronted with the tasks of phenomenology, this specification shows not only what we just said but also why phenomenology must turn to description. We can foresee possible objections here from two sides: 1) general objections leveled against the method of description in general, and 2) special objections against the method of description in phenomenology, conceived as the fundamental philosophical science with a specific character, namely with an object that is ideal, i.e. an *eidos* or *essence*.

As for the first group of objections, they concern chiefly two points. It is said that description, as it were, cannot take place because in general it is pointless. In describing we must make use of concepts and words, whereas concepts and words are always and necessarily abstractions and "simplifications" of actuality. We have had the opportunity on another, earlier occasion to notice the misunderstanding that lies in this objection, and we showed that it is precisely to phenomenology that it can be applied least of all since phenomenology speaks of ideal objects and essences. Consequently, this consideration provides us with the basis for probing deeper into the question we already selected as our principal one. We are not really concerned here with objections but only with the question: How in general are concepts used for the purposes of knowledge; how are they its instruments? We are concerned with this question because only if we have an answer to it can we seriously discuss whether concepts are of use in description or only in discourse, and how they are to be used, etc. Thus, our question is merely the consequence of a doubt concerning the role of concepts, a doubt resulting from the fact that logic has not just failed to provide a satisfactory answer to these questions but actually has provided no answer at all. Logic has simply passed over this matter, taking it as something which "stands to reason." But if "it stands to reason," then surely this also means that it is problematic for philosophy.

Actually the doubts and the questions are transformed into objections if we impart the form of a disjunctive expression to them: Either all knowledge is theoretical knowledge, or there is also non-theoretical knowledge. If, however, we subject the latter to doubt, then it is obvious that the first part of the division is correct. Therefore it only remains to be shown that in fact any attempt at a non-theoretical knowledge is *<itself>* a theory, and description, as a distinctive method, must be rejected. In order to strengthen the proof that any description must itself be a theory, the proponents of this view point to the fact, so they say, that *any* description at all, if in general it wishes to have value, is a process of expediency. This is a charge advanced against "pure description" in particular. And since description is a process of expediency, i.e., leads to some goal, theory necessarily enters into description, for the determination of a goal is indeed nothing other than a certain presumed likelihood or presupposition, and, consequently, an hypothesis.¹²

Undoubtedly the clear resolution of this problem is possible only after a clear determination of the very concept of a goal, though in a unique, evident and a priori manner. By no means is every goal a presupposition, since there can be goals dictated by the object itself that are *given* together

with it and which, consequently, are determined *only* by means of description. On the other hand, in this reference to a goal the vague distinction between it and a cause is often hidden, for example as in theories in which it appears as though the goal is also a kind or type of cause. Yet, if the cause includes theoretical elements, it does not follow that the goal must also contain them.

Finally we should not lose sight of the origin of this argument, since it reveals the true limits of the argument's application. The argument arose out of a desire to show the unfounded nature of "pure description" in the explanatory sciences to which some writers, lacking sufficient philosophical training, laid claim. The main point here is that in such an application the argument turns out to be quite correct since in essence it reminds us of and repeats the very task of the theoretical sciences, and this task is *theory*. Of course, when description is guided by a goal, viz. the attainment of theory, the goal changes descriptive knowledge into theoretical knowledge. Consequently, the goal by itself does not compromise description but only certain *definite* goals, and therefore from the fact that description is expedient it does not follow that it is impossible as a *non-theory*.

Concerning the above, phenomenology, in particular, limits its task precisely to "pure description," remaining strictly within the sphere of the *pre-theoretical*, and, as we saw, the goal of phenomenology is actually given in phenomenology. This goal is shown *spontaneously* in phenomenology's very own operative techniques as the ultimate goal of *clarification*, namely the leading of intuition to the highest degree of clarity, to *evidence*. Quite clearly it would be a complete distortion of all <phenomenological> concepts if phenomenology, with its principle of all principles and with such a goal as *evidence*, would declare itself to be a theoretical explanatory science. Obviously the general objection mentioned above to "description" just does not fit phenomenology.

Apparently the <second,> particular objection against the possibility of description in phenomenology has greater foundation since it follows precisely from the mentioned distinctiveness of phenomenology itself, namely as the science of intuitive cognition. The fact of the matter is that although phenomenology is an intuitive discipline, *its* intuitions are surely not sensuous intuitions but "ideal" ones. It is a science of essences, an eidetic science, a science of ideal objects, i.e. of objects which *in their essence* find expression *in concepts*. Husserl himself foresees this particular objection as taking the form characteristic of logical materialism: In the case of geometry and arithmetic we are dealing with eidetic disciplines. They are, however, examples not of descriptive but of "exact" sciences.

They are examples of *theoretical* knowledge. Analogous to mathematics does not phenomenology also turn out to be a theoretical science?

There certainly is an analogy between phenomenology and mathematics, but its limits are extremely narrow. In any case, they do not concern the essence of the <phenomenological> method, and Husserl firmly contrasts the fundamental science to mathematics: “Transcendental phenomenology, as a descriptive science of essence, belongs however to a *fundamental class of eidetic sciences totally different* from the one to which the mathematical sciences belong.”¹³

Properly speaking, however, there lies in the denial of the just mentioned analogy and in the assertion of our above position the elimination of the mentioned particular objection against description in phenomenology. This is because the justification for applying the <descriptive> method itself lies in peculiarities of phenomenology, which are foreign to mathematics.¹⁴ We need only remind the reader that the entire sense of the phenomenological attitude and its delimitation from simple abstraction lies in the fact that the essence of the object under study not only does not change in this attitude but, on the contrary, is shown in its complete and originary purity. It would be strange, however, to expect the essence of a concrete object to appear before us now in an abstract form. And if the object of phenomenology, viz. the essence of a pure *mental process*, must be and always remains in its essence *concrete*, then this excludes the demonstrative motives of the theoretical abstract sciences. It does not, however, exclude the description that precedes a deductive “proof” as well as also any kind of explanation.

To what has just been said above the only thing left for us is to add that the objection under consideration results from an equivocation in the term “theoretical.” In our comparison of the fundamental science with mathematical science the theoretical is referred to not as “explanatory” but as “demonstrative.” But the fundamental science cannot be theoretical in either of these senses. Only in the broadest sense of the word can it be called theoretical, viz. where this term additionally stands in opposition in the broadest sense to the “practical” and the “pragmatic.” Such “theory,” however, neither excludes description nor contradicts the idea of description.

Phenomenology sets itself the goal of studying consciousness as a complete mental process in the mode consciousness *of something*, i.e. intentional consciousness, and studying consciousness in that pure form which is revealed as the pure consciousness of the pure Ego. In view of this if we should forget that consciousness is given to us *only* as a continuous and manifold stream, with transitions between the actional and the potential

state, with changes in the general background, etc., etc., we would sin against its own determinations. But only at such a price could we reject the method of description and accept the substitution of some other methods.

Husserl recognizes that the peculiarity of consciousness¹⁵ in general lies in its continuous fluctuation, preventing the conceptually exact fixing of any eidetic *concreta* and their immediately constituting moments. Let us take as an example the mental process of a phantasy of a physical thing as it is given to us in a phenomenologically immanent perception. We can speak here of a given, determined physical thing, consequently, not only of its "genus" but also singularly of it in its full concretion, i.e. in its determinateness and indeterminateness. We can speak of the thing from this or that side of it. We can speak of it as it appears to us in its distinctness or blurriness, clarity or obscurity, etc., in short in the way in which it is intertwined in the concrete stream of mental processes.

Phenomenology accepts all this concrete content in eidetic consciousness but only in its ideal essence. Consequently phenomenology includes the possibility of countless examples of the same essence. It, therefore, only drops the specific *hic et nunc* from the given individuality. Consequently phenomenology, in general, finds its limit in any kind of *individuation*. Nevertheless, there can be no question of thinking of conceptually or terminologically fixing such a fluctuating concretion or any part of it. However, the impossibility of an unambiguous determination of an eidetic singularity does not exclude firm distinctions, identifications and conceptual formulations of essences of *higher degrees* of specification. And we can speak of rigorous concepts, for example, of a perception in general, of recollection, desire, as well as of lower species and higher genera of the perception of, for example, a physical thing, on the one hand, or a mental process in general, a *cogitatio* in general and so forth, on the other.

In connection with this we must also note that deductive theorizing is excluded from phenomenology. This certainly, however, does not forbid *mediate inferences* in it, although they, like all non-intuitive operative techniques, actually have in phenomenology only the methodic significance that they lead to things which must then be brought to the givenness of direct essential insight.

Thus description by no means prevents the rigorous fixing of concepts. It differs from a theoretical study, however, by the fact that it does not allow for the deductive construction that is inherent in other ideal sciences. The sole obstacle Husserl sees to making phenomenological cognition completely logical lies in the very essence of the objects of the phenomenological attitude, that is objects of complete concretion. Apparently, however, we

are in general here pushing up against the limit of logical expression, since that concretion itself stops us in the region of empirical experience within the natural attitude. Even more so, we are here pushing up against individuation, against the *hic et nunc* that escapes once and for all both theoretical as well as descriptive conceptual formulation.

A comparison of these factors that serve as a limit to "*ratio*" is of the greatest importance to us in the following way: Phenomenology as the fundamental science, essentially the science of concrete singularity, encounters a lower type as its limit beyond which *pure life* starts. This is the point that provokes such an exultation of anti-intellectualism and alogicism. There is no "passage" from the logical to the empirical, the living! Phenomenology does not pretend to have it. Here lies the sense of the division between the experiential and the phenomenological attitudes. Earlier rationalism, however, was guilty of attempting to find such a passage, of trying to "determine" and "fix" the "thing beyond." In fact, for it the *ordo rerum* was a restless thing. If phenomenology would also go that far, a particular danger would undoubtedly threaten it. It would cease to be the *fundamental science* and would <itself> become the *fundamental rerum*. But does this actually prove that *ratio* and narrow-mindedness are synonymous?

Let us turn our attention to the following fact. As the method of pre-theoretical knowledge, description discovers its limit where there is theoretical knowledge, i.e. in the concrete life of the mental process. But as phenomenological analysis shows, this limit is not an empirical concretion, an *individual actuality*, but rather a concretion in its very essence. It can be shown that this fact erodes even further the position of things. Perhaps by presupposition *ordo et connexio idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum!* But for us this presupposition contains the fundamental inadequacy that it is theoretical and, therefore, is obtained by means of deduction. We must turn to a pure description of the intuitively given in its most concrete essence. As long as we do not find in *this essence* the essential features that force the logical to be so narrowly construed and become ridiculous, we have no right to assert that the concept owing to an inherent powerlessness comes to a complete halt before empirical actuality, that it is a hardened form or cinematographic picture.

From the very beginning Husserl contrasts experiencing intuition, as the *intuition of something individual*, with the intuition of essence, and now for Husserl individuation is the sphere of the experiential and the actual. I do not entirely agree with this and therefore try to avoid this term as much as possible. In fact, when the talk turns to logical expression and we address

ourselves to concepts, we unwittingly feel embarrassed by this strange compound term “individual concept.” We seek to find some way out of the strange definition of it encountered in traditional expositions of logic – this concept of something individual!

On the other hand, however, even less satisfactory are the definitions of “individual concept” based on the concept of a lower type and so forth. In any case, it ultimately seems that this definition is, in fact, better if in accordance with the old scholastic division we consider *numeration* as its defining feature. However, if the individual concept, as numerical, is the concept of the *individuum* or the individual something, is it incomprehensible why an “*individual*” concept cannot be *general*. Besides, I also see no obstacles to a purely individual essence. Of course, it does not pass from this state into the actual experiential world but remains in the world of ideal essences. Certainly it is ridiculous to talk about “Napoleonness” or “Newtonness,” but Napoleon’s *hic et nunc* positively does belong to his essence just as Casanova’s also belongs to his essence, despite the fact that they essentially belong to the same genus. Equally, on the other hand, the *hic et nunc* of Newton belongs to his essence since not just any time nor any place give birth to him, to say nothing of the fact that the *hic et nunc* does not exhaust individuality in general! ...

Thus, we do not want to discard *anything* from the problem of concept, conceived as an instrument of the theoretical and descriptive method. Nevertheless we wish to question the timeliness of a logicism’s celebrations, since we doubt that the true and complete essence of a logical concept is embodied in the characterization of a concept as a cinematographic picture. Our question is now the following: We pointed out above that phenomenology would employ an unusual method were it to destroy life, to transform living cognition, living being into an herbarium. But how is it possible to preserve the living if the means to preserve it amounts in essence to the destruction of the variety of life, preserving only its scheme and skeleton? *How does the logical concept become an instrument of life and not its destroyer?*

We blamed intellectualism for the fact that it does not solve our problems and that thereby we went on to recognize the truth of a logicism. Now through intuitivism we come to a pseudo-logicism. But this certainly does not mean, as we have just stressed, that we intend to return to an old-fashioned rationalism. Rather we wish to remain with what we have said because of the *pre-theoretical*. While recognizing the power of the reproaches of a logicism, we are not satisfied with its negative position. Instead we will attempt to find a way to a positive philosophy. On account

of this our question concerns as much the given of intuition as its logical expression in terms of concepts. We ask both of intuition as well as of a concept: How does the actual exist? How do we arrive at it, and as a specific question within this general problem, how is the actual "expressed," and more specifically, how is it expressed "conceptually?"

The problem of "realism" (or "nominalism"), of the "relation" between experiencing and ideal intuition, between evidence and rational motivation, between actuality and truth, between intuition and "logos," for us comes down to one point. Uniting the questions cannot annihilate the differences between their content, since the sole attainable answer does not make these contents identical. But if there *is* such an answer, it must concern the very foundation of philosophizing about "actuality" itself. Establishing the answer to our question would be the "beginning" of an examination of these foundations. Such an answer must also concern the foundation of philosophizing about many other questions already in the process of becoming differentiated.

Author's Notes

1. On this methodological reference of phenomenology to itself cf. in Husserl's *Ideas*, § 65, p. 149ff.
2. *Ideas*, p. 151.
3. *Ideas*, p. 153ff.
4. Cf. *Ideas*, p. 326ff.
5. *Ideas*, p. 345.
6. *Ideas*, p. 40. Cf. also Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, *op. cit.*, § 51, in particular the here *corrected* text of the second edition.
7. In support of this novel translation of the term “common sense” [in English in the original – trans.] cf. T. Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*. Essay VI. ch. II (ed. by Hamilton), 1880, p. 421.
8. B. Bosanquet, *The Essentials of Logic*, London, 1910, p. 153.
9. *Ideas*, p. 17.
10. This is the place for an interesting comparison. The demand for pure description in the natural sciences originates among the supporters of the ideal of a “mathematical natural science.” As we pointed out above, however, surely only evidence in the sphere of ideal objects is adequate evidence. The ideal of a mathematization of science is revealed here from its good and authentically philosophical side.
11. *Ideas*, p. 165.
12. B.V. Jakovenko in *Filosofija Gusserlja*, “Novye idei v filosofii,” No. 3, p. 142 writes: “Pure description in general is *nonsense* because every act of cognition, in the words of Husserl himself, has a specific tendency (an intention) and therefore contains categorial forms. Hence, a purely descriptive act, if such a thing in general were possible, would, properly speaking, by its purely descriptive character realize a certain preconceived tendency, and thereby actually show its non-descriptive nature. Pure description can be seen only as one type of theory or as an

imperfect state of theory. The phenomenology of Husserl stands under a whole series of specific categories of psychic being. It operates with a specific method of forming concepts and is a model theoretical science. Moreover, it still presupposes the presence of psychic being as such.”

1) Phenomenology studies not only “acts of cognition,” but intentionality in all of its actional as well as non-actional modifications.

2) An intention has a necessary correlate: intention of *something* and to *something*. The “intentional Object” is by no means an “act.”

3) An intention can be actional, but it is *not* active.

4) Phenomenology has nothing in common with the voluntaristic understanding of “act” and “*Aktregung*.”

5) The identification of intention and tendency is a mistake.

6) A “purely descriptive act” is not an “act of cognition” but is an “expression.”

7) To attribute to it the possibility of “realizing” anything whatever means: a) to take it in the psychological attitude, b) to attribute “activity.”

8) Pure description is “one type of theory,” *pure theory*.

9) Actually from the point of view of pragmatism *pure theory* is an “imperfect state of theory” because it is *useless*.

10) Phenomenology does not “stand under” the categories of “psychic being,” since the latter is an empirical being and phenomenology speaks of *pure consciousness*.

11) Phenomenology does not “form concepts,” and it considers the very formulation of the problem concerning the “formation of concepts” as fundamentally *wrong*.

12) Phenomenology does not “presuppose still the presence of psychic being as such” because it is concerned only with the *given*, as given, which “is found” (*Vorgefundenes*).

13. *Ideas*, pp. 169–170.

14. See the development of this view in Husserl: *Ideas*, pp. 84–88 and p. 161ff.

15. *Ideas*, p. 168.

Translator's Notes

- a. *Ideas*, p. 154.
- b. Reading “*predmetov, sushchnostej*” instead of “*predmetov sushchnostej*.”
- c. By translating “*smotrenie*” as “sight” and “*usmotrenie*” as “insight” we have here tried to retain the word-play evident in the Russian text.
- d. Reading “*javlenii*” instead of “*davlenii*.”

CHAPTER 5

Object, Positum, Concept

The dissatisfaction and discontent observed in contemporary philosophy concerning knowledge expressed in terms of and by means of concepts springs chiefly from the fact that concepts, as a means of cognizing, appear to be *determinate*. Consequently, that is, they appear as limited. This is not a contingency, a temporary deficiency. It is our only, and so necessary, way of making a concept "logical."

The problem concerning descriptive cognition that arises nowadays has to do with the possibility of cognition not within these limited confines but rather despite them. There can hardly be a better method for solving such a problem than the simple realization of description itself. This certainly, however, does not answer our main question concerning *how* the actual *exists* and how it exists cognitively, i.e., how we arrive at the actual. It is the main question because it confronts both discursive as well as descriptive cognition. That we must know how we arrive at the actual, discursively and descriptively, in order thereby to illuminate fully our answer to the question of *how* it exists is the path to the solution of our main question, or at least one of the paths. The actual is ascertained not by means of a priori constructions on an unknown material but must be intellectually seen in <a confrontation with> the actual itself, i.e. in the very fact of its being. Coming from different directions the attempts, ranging from Dilthey to Bergson, to realize description have been, therefore, only the preliminary work. Such work marks a genuine turning point in philosophy only if we can find foundations in it upon which our own work can rest. Essentially in this consideration alone do we see an actual criterion permitting an evaluation of the significance and reforming role of the attempts mentioned. It is our conviction that from this point of view phenomenology proceeds further and more correctly than any of the other contemporary reforming movements. The following exposition must proceed in the direction of

establishing just these foundations.

We must address ourselves to the work of description at the very start because only by doing so can we avoid a rebuke that may arise with regard to our formulation of the main question. This rebuke asks whether in aspiring to answer how we arrive at the actual we do not reproduce Kant's sophistry, albeit in a new form. Are we not also appealing to a separate "theory of knowledge" to provide foundations? This rebuke can be presented in a dual form. The coarser of the two is essentially that which repeats the reasons leading in general, as it were, to the necessity of a "theory of knowledge" as the fundamental discipline.

This rebuke, however, we must reject since, as we have stressed, our concern is neither with a study of cognition as it figures empirically in psychology nor as it figures in logic, albeit ideally. In both psychology and logic cognition figures not in its *being*, but in its role as a means. Our concern is with a study of the being of cognition in its essence, that is as a distinctive kind of being. Therefore, if what results is a "theory" (in the broadest sense of the word), it is a theory not of knowledge or cognition but of being. Moreover, we should not forget that even if this question were in general identical with regard to its sense to the question of the "theory of knowledge," we could define our study of cognition simply as a *part of* phenomenology, namely as the *phenomenology of knowledge* or cognition.

A more subtle objection is the one that doubts the right of phenomenology to be called a science, assuming, that is, that it does want to be the fundamental science. This is because the very right in question must be grounded and leads to the idea of a universal theory of science and of knowledge in general. For the time being we can answer this rebuke only by replying with the same argument we hear from the lips originally uttering it. Regardless of the statement, it can obviously be directed against its own content. We avoid a *regressus infinitus* here by the fact that we introduce every being without exception into the sphere of phenomenology. That is why we do not confine phenomenology *merely* to scientific knowledge but keep its boundaries as indefinite as the latter itself. Therefore, the question of whether phenomenology has a right to call itself a science is not indicative of the preliminary nature of this new science but rather has to do with its very content. For us one thing is indubitable, and that is that this "science" is not a science in the sense of an explanatory or a deductive theory. Demonstrations of the deductive method are as foreign to it as are hypotheses, generalizations, predictions, inductions and the other methods of explanation.

The theory of knowledge with its postulates of universally necessary

knowledge is no substitute for phenomenology nor is the former contained in the foundation of the latter. For phenomenology as the science of being itself there is no question at all of a necessary or unnecessary nature <to cognitive elements>. Its one and only question is simply: "What *is*?" But even if phenomenology were to confine itself to what exists as the object of the sciences, the mentioned rebukes would still be misplaced as long as phenomenology would not declare, as negativistic theories of knowledge actually do, that besides the being under study *there is nothing else*. In other words, phenomenology can concentrate its attention on the being then being studied without denying another. For the time being this fact will suffice. The question of whether phenomenology is itself a science, therefore, can be left aside for now and referred to the problems associated with "another" being than the one under study.

On the other hand, however, in confining its attention phenomenology must not limit itself merely to a superficial study of the object in question. Rather, it can plough as deep as it pleases and penetrate to any stratum of the being under examination. Taking this into account we must with regard to the question of the being of cognition demand answers that refer not just to a certain particular type of cognition, e.g. scientific or non-scientific, logical or non-logical cognition, but to cognition in its very being and the essence of this being. Logic cannot raise our question in such an unrestricted way, since it speaks of *scientific*, "logical," cognition. Only psychology can raise it, and actually as regards *this question* psychology furnishes the empirical correlate of a phenomenological investigation. Similarly we can conceive of an ideal psychology, an ontology of the spirit that furnishes the ideal correlate of the respective phenomenological investigation. But we do not find any third discipline that, in the foundation of phenomenology itself, would stand for the study of the object in its absolute purity.

Thus our task now is to confirm the existence of a descriptive cognition, to show *how it exists*, though not psychologically, not empirically, but phenomenologically, in its essence so as to reveal the essence of not only the being of descriptive cognition but of any cognition as a pure mental process. Husserl shows how such a pure description of an essence is obtained. Consciousness is a continuous stream in which concretion never yields to a conceptually rigorous fixing. Phenomenology puts aside what belongs to the sensuous intuition of a physical thing, what Husserl calls the "individuation," *hic et nunc*, of the physical thing. But its full concretion is preserved in so doing, and evidently such a concretum does not yield to a rigorous conceptual or terminological fixing. If, however, we turn from

“eidetic singularities” to essences^a belonging to higher levels of specificity, we find these essences are susceptible to description in that they allow for distinction and identification and, consequently, conceptual expression. Precisely this ability of establishing “something that is the same” is essential for description, since along with it is given the “goal” in accordance with which all description must be conducted.

Husserl stresses repeatedly, and we fully share his conviction, that “each species of being has, owing to its essence, *its* modes of givenness and with that its own cognitive method.”¹ If we take this position as our starting point and turn our attention to determining these species of being, we can track *how* we get to them. Having established the principle of all principles and having shown that “reality” exists only through the “sensuous datum,” Husserl distinguishes the being of physical things, of *animalia* and of psychic consciousness as different species of being.²

From a theoretically unbiassed viewpoint, however, what strikes the eye here is that a peculiar species of empirical being is left out, namely *social* being, which, according to the position we have taken, must have its own peculiar datum and its own peculiar mode of cognition. At the very start a simple descriptive analysis of this species of being reveals that we must actually be dealing here with a quite distinctive mode of cognition in which so-called empathy and acts similar to it play a fundamental role. Husserl recognizes that in this species of “viewing” (*Ansehen*) we have an “intuitive, presentive” viewing. He refuses to recognize it, however, as “an act that is presentive of something *originarily*.”^b This, it seems to us, is the reason for the fact that in the place mentioned Husserl does not pause to isolate social being as a peculiar species of being.

We, on the contrary, however, consider a phenomenological elucidation of this matter in particular to be a task of fundamental importance, since the vistas opened up by such an analysis reveal all objects without exception, both those of scientific knowledge as well as those of philosophical knowledge, in a completely new way. Phenomenology itself undergoes a significant modification in this process. That is to say, the investigation of the problem of the nature of social being leads to the recognition of a factor that has been ignored up to now, a factor that makes a cognition merely by the fact that it *exists* show *how it exists*. But as this way is too long for our present purposes we cannot take it here. We will carry out this work in another place. What we have in mind here is only to present some of the results from it systematically and in conformity with the problem of <determining> the tasks of phenomenology as the fundamental philosophical science.

The question of social being is such a fruitful one because our answer to it reveals an inadequacy or reticence in the division we made at the very start and which we have accepted up to now, viz. the division of intuitions into experiencing and ideal. Is this division exhaustive? Is it sufficient to recognize just these two kinds of intuition in order to pigeonhole any possible cognition at all? In other words, is every being presented to us given only in an intuition of one of these two kinds? Of course, it is merely a question of the genera of intuitions – each genus can have its own species. But it is precisely in this distinction between the genera that the entire difficulty of the problem lies.

The entire history of philosophy certainly gives only the division between the sensuous and reason, in various forms and under the guise of various theories. We find one of these in Plato, Descartes and Kant. And is Husserl not right in recognizing originary givenness for only sensuous intuition and intuitions of essence? We are not considering correcting either Plato or Descartes here. Rather, let us turn our attention to another side of this fundamental philosophical division. Everywhere that we find this division, regardless of its form, we encounter a basic difficulty with that philosophy's attempt to throw a bridge across the precipice generated between these two generic sources of cognition. Properly speaking this is the point. But it hardly arouses astonishment if we say that *only* Plato provides correct remarks in this regard. Yet in spite of the interest this investigation has in itself, we are forced to terminate it at this point, since we only want to show how it leads to our phenomenological problem.

Perhaps Husserl is right in saying that properly speaking empathy is not an originary givenness but that between sensuous and ideal intuition there is a “third something” that is not a species of either of these genera and that for the first time shows *how* both of these genera of intuition are. In this way the “third something” occupies a completely independent place in relation to both of them. All of this induces us to acknowledge some originary significance and originary givenness to this mentioned third something. But sticking with phenomenology we can abstain from such acknowledgements, even though they are conclusions forced upon us, and can address ourselves to the given itself.

We see that in the very division of intuitions into two genera there is something forcing us on to a new question. It can be said that this question lies in the very essence of the division. We obtain empirical actuality in the natural attitude and by means of experiencing intuition. And we obtain the eidetic, the essence, in the phenomenological attitude, but what is the correlation between them outside of a dependence on different views of this

or that? That such a correlation, correlativity, *exists* and that it is determined by our very means of obtaining social intuitions is something we tried to show above. Now is the only question that of an analysis of *how* it exists?

It is not a question of a logical relation but of what *is*. Consequently, our concern is with *how* it happens that we are not only in possession of intuitions, as the content of our knowledge, but also that we *use* intuitions as means. In this way we discover a continuous and, we firmly believe, a necessary correlation between experiencing and ideal intuitions. Ultimately, therefore, the sole and adequate means turns out to be some *third* thing which is equally a *representation* for sensuous as well as for ideal intuition. It is evident that the possibility of such a representation, a “*reflection*,” of both genera of intuition in *one* is based on the same thing on which the correlativity of the intuitions themselves rests. Thus, our task is nothing other than the phenomenological elucidation of *how a concept presents itself* as the expression of an intuition.

It is clear that such attempts, as for example Kant’s, to resolve this problem by means of an analysis of the sophistical dilemma which he formulated, are simply sterile, since the very formulation of the dilemma excludes the *third something*, which in our opinion is necessary. Kant’s theory of the schematism is a powerless outburst to fill in the abyss he himself created with his dilemma. The incorrectness of his attempt is best shown both by a reference to Kant’s sensualistic tendencies as well as in his determination of ideal objects. Together with this there arises, prior to the *theoretical* question of the relation between the object and the concept, the question of *how* this relation exists.

In order to investigate this matter let us look at the content of Husserl’s phenomenology in some detail. Throughout the breadth of the phenomenological domain a large role is played, in Husserl’s opinion, by the remarkable “duality and unity”^c of *sensuous*^d υλη and *intentional* μορφη, which is revealed in an immanent reflection on mental processes. Namely, among mental processes we must single out those that are “primary contents,” that is “*sensuous*” mental processes or “*sensation-contents*.” These are the sensuous Data of color, sound, pleasure, and so forth. These concrete Data of a mental process enter as components in some other more inclusive concrete mental processes which, as a whole, are intentional, “and, more particularly, we find those sensuous moments overlaid by a stratum which, as it were, ‘animates,’ which *bestows sense* (or essentially involves a bestowing of sense) – a stratum by which precisely the concrete intensive mental process arises from the *sensuous*, which *has in itself nothing pertaining to intentionality*.”³ Thus the υλη is formed into

intentional mental processes insofar as a specific intentionality is introduced to them. This is nothing other than that which specifically characterizes consciousness when we say that consciousness, precisely by the fact that it is consciousness, points to something *of which* it is the consciousness. In order to avoid equivocation Husserl introduces the special term *noesis*, or *noetic moment*, to designate this moment.

Evidently the chief point on which we must now concentrate our attention is precisely this moment of *sense-bestowal*, which is introduced along with noesis. Indeed, up to now we knew only that intentionality, the directedness of consciousness to *something*, belongs to the essence of consciousness and that consciousness is the consciousness of *something*. But where does sense-bestowal come from?

Fulfilling their intentional *function* of sense-bestowal, noeses *constitute consciousness-objectivities*. "Consciousness," says Husserl, "is precisely consciousness 'of' something; it is of its essence to bear in itself 'sense,' so to speak, the quintessence of 'soul,' 'spirit,' 'reason.' Consciousness is not a name for 'psychical complexes,' for 'contents' fused together, for 'bundles' or streams of 'sensations' which, without sense in themselves, also cannot lend any 'sense' to whatever mixture; it is rather through and through 'consciousness,' the source of all reason and unreason, all legitimacy and illegitimacy, all reality and fiction, all value and disvalue, all deed and misdeed."⁴ The point of view of functions is the central point of view of phenomenology since here: "In place of analysis and comparison, description and classification restricted to single particular mental processes, consideration arises of single particularities from the 'teleological' point of view of their function, of making possible a 'synthetical unity.'"⁴

There is a lot that seems unclear to us here. Above all, how did we arrive at "sense-bestowal?" Apparently it turns out that "sense-bestowal" belongs to the very essence of consciousness, that is, to be conscious of something means to give a sense to it. But we did not see this earlier. Consequently, what new thing have we found in consciousness that reveals its sense-bestowing function? Is sense-bestowal inherent in noeses themselves? And if so, how? We uncovered what in consciousness constitutes its objectivity and what makes "synthetical unity" possible in it. But are constituting and sense-bestowing really one and the same thing? Are we not going back again to Kant, although now to a "Kant" in parentheses? Let us suppose we can state with certainty and evidence that, in the intentional function constituting objectivity, "synthetical unity" is introduced. Nevertheless, does this mean that "synthetical unity" necessarily and in itself also intro-

duces *sense*?

We just had an analogous situation in the instance of the relation between sensuous ψλη and intentional μορφη. We are not saying, however, and do not think, that along with the μορφη sensuous material, i.e. sensuous Data, are introduced into our mental process as a component of consciousness. Despite their “unity” we wish to stress their “duality.” Turning now to “synthetical unity” as an intellectual function, do we not lose the specificity precisely of what we seek, viz. “sense”? In any case, in a theoretically unbiased examination of the issue, it remains unclear how this function, to whose essence the act of “constituting” belongs, yields sense and where the sense comes from. This question is quite legitimate even if it should turn out – which we do not think will happen – that “constituting” itself is identical with “sense-bestowal.” Finally, simply as an illustration of the inevitability of all these questions a particular doubt arises: *How* do we come to know about the “teleological” point of view of the examination of single particulars? That is, *how do we arrive at* the assertion of this “teleology”? That is to say, accepting the phenomenological demand we must first ask here not how consciousness constitutes objectivity, but *how does what we have called a noesis exist?*

Husserl himself asserts that we get nowhere by merely saying and discerning that every representation relates to something represented, every judgment to what is expressed in it, etc.⁵ Penetrating deeper into what we term intentionality we can make a distinction between the *components proper* of intentive mental processes and their *intentional correlates* or their components. We obtain the former in an *analysis of what is really inherent* in the mental process, where we examine the mental process itself as a particular object among other objects and where we speak of its really inherent parts or moments. But on the other hand, intentive mental processes, such as recollections, judgment, willing, etc., are essentially the consciousness of *something*, and we can examine them in their essence with respect to this “something.” Thanks to its noetic moment every intentive mental process is a noesis, i.e. it belongs to its essence to “bear” a “sense” in itself and fulfill its function of “sense-bestowal.” Such noetic moments are, for example, the directing of the pure Ego to the object “meant” by it owing to this sense-bestowal; the apprehension of this object, holding it fast while I turn to other objects which appear in what is “meant”; likewise for explication, relation, apprehension, certainty, conjecture, appraisal, etc.

In the essence of all these really inherent components of a mental process, however, something is disclosed that is *not really inherent*. That is to say, something that is not really inherent is disclosed in what appears

under the heading "sense." Thus corresponding to the manifold Data of the really inherent noetic content there is a multiplicity of Data, Data which appear in pure intuition, in correlative "*noematic contents*" or *noemas*. In this way perception has its noema in its perceptual sense, viz., *the perceived as such*; recollection has its recollected as such, etc. In general, in relation to consciousness it is the object of consciousness, the meant as such. "In every case the noematic correlate, which is called 'sense' here (in a very extended signification) is to be taken *precisely* as it inheres 'immanently' in the mental process of perceiving, of judging, of liking; and so forth; that is, just as it is offered to us when we *inquire purely into this mental process itself*,"^f – "purely," i.e. in the phenomenological attitude, with the exclusion of everything real.

Every intentive mental process has its "intentional Object," i.e. its objective sense, since the fundamental characteristic of consciousness is "to have sense," to possess something in a way which has sense. In other words, consciousness is not just a mental process but a sense-bestowing mental process, a "noetical" mental process.⁶

Actually, however, if we pass from the natural to the phenomenological attitude and focus our attention solely on the object of consciousness as such, on the noematic, we can observe that together with the "sense" an as yet incomplete noema is given to us, just as the corresponding noetic side of the mental process is not exhausted merely by a single moment of "sense-bestowal." The sense forms only, as it were, a certain central stratum, or *core*, on which essentially the other moments are founded. These other moments, however, can, in an extended construction, be designated as "sense-moments." The full noema consists of different strata grouped around this core, around a pure "*objective sense*." The latter arises as something identical in all phenomenological descriptions, despite their variety and the different characteristics integrally inherent in the given. These characteristics depend upon whether our concern is the sense of something perceived or remembered or imagined, etc.

We now come to a conclusion of fundamental importance, which Husserl expresses in the following way: "When, again, we set aside the parentheses effected on the positing, we see that, in a parallel way, corresponding to the different concepts of sense we must distinguish different concepts of *unmodified objectivities*, of which the 'object simpliciter,' namely the something identical which is perceived at one time, another time directly presentiated, a third time presented pictorially in a painting, and the like, only indicates *one central concept*."⁷

We wish to stress the importance of this conclusion in Husserl, since it

must serve as the starting point for the solution to our problem. Actually here the mystery of the very being of our cognition is discerned and light is shed on its nature in the sense mentioned above, i.e. on the nature of its being. We know cognition, *qua* being, as a *logical being*. In accordance with the entire spirit of the phenomenological doctrine of the correlation between the noesis and the noema the logical is evidently also one of the strata in the noesis and the noema, one of the acts in the mental process as a whole. Evidently, moreover, if we seek clarification of the essence of this being in its role as a cognitive instrument the more mysterious it is that this correlation pervades equally all spheres of the different attitudes while maintaining their identity proper.

As is apparent from what we have just said, sense, the central core of the noema, together with the “object simpliciter,” *is apprehended by a logical concept* and finds its expression, that is, is fixed, in it. Such is the case. But just as it was unclear earlier *how* it happened that sense-bestowal belongs to the essence of consciousness, so now it is unclear how a concept “apprehends” this sense. Perhaps the basis of the problem is even sharper now. That is to say, if the object of consciousness as such, the sense, is retained in logical acts, does it belong to the essence of these acts themselves to give a sense, to “give life” to the “object simpliciter”? Or does this necessary “coexistence” of sense-bestowal and the process of making something logical have another foundation, and if so, what is it? *What is a concept like so that a sense is expressed in it?*

We saw that insofar as it is a question of the “object simpliciter” in a noetic-noematic mental process, the “object simpliciter” appears as a central core around which the distinctive structure of the entire noema takes shape. This structure consists of the numerous characteristics of the noematic core. An exhaustive analysis of this structure would necessarily reveal the role and importance of these characteristics both in the sphere of the givenness on hand as well as its reproductive, symbolic, pictorial and other modifications. The characteristics of this being and the modifications connected with it as well as the corresponding doxic modalities within the sphere of conviction, belief, doubt, etc. occupy a special place here in Husserl. Finally positional or neutralizing modifications of consciousness in their relation to actual^g and potential positings lead to new broadenings of the concept of an act. This concept exceeds the bounds of the pure cogito and reveals within the structure of the noema-noesis new objectivities, which, although founded in “representations,” are necessarily inherent in every complete mental process. This is also its species of “positing.”

Such positing, however, reveals the noesis, and correspondingly the

noema, not just from its cogitative side, but also from its sensing side, wishing side, valuing side, etc., etc. Essentially such a broadening of the concept of "positing" beyond the limits of the doxic modalities makes it possible to speak of all characteristics as *thetic* acts or *theses* and consequently with this broadened meaning to speak of every consciousness as actually or potentially "thetical" (in a positional modification of consciousness and, correspondingly, in a modification which neutralizes the *quasi*-theses). But, on the other hand, every positing act – whatever be its qualities – necessarily also posits doxically. That is, in whatever mode the positing is effected, the act always posits at the same time something as existing. Thus not only must every act be seen as "objectifying" but *every act* also (and correspondingly also its correlate) contains in itself either explicitly or implicitly *something "logical"* in which it can be "expressed." Evidently this in turn applies equally to both simple thetic acts and synthetic acts with their unification of a "plural" consciousness into a higher unity, and therefore with a change, on the one hand, of polythetic acts into monothetic acts and, on the other hand, with the constituting of some single aggregate object.⁸

It is not difficult to see from the above that whatever significance this complicated phenomenological analysis of the structure of the noemanoesia has in itself, what interests us here in particular is the question of the "logical" as a special or specific "*stratum*" within this structure. By virtue of its universality, which overlays all particular structural distinctions, it is easy to single out the "logical" as a separate problem that can be investigated independently of the other distinctions.⁹

Analyzing the "logical" stratum in the noesis-noema correlation and distinguishing "signification" and "signifying," on the one hand, from "expression," on the other, Husserl broadens our understanding of these words beyond the bounds of their original linguistic sphere. He, thus, extends them to the entire noetic-noematic realm and, consequently, to all acts, independently of whether they are interwoven with "expressive acts," properly speaking, or not. In just this way he explains that for him it is a question of the "sense" in the case of all intutive mental processes. "Sense," in other words, is, in general, employed as equivalent to "signification." But in order to be distinct he prefers to use the word "*signification*" for the old concept, particularly when speaking of "*logical*" or "*expressive*" *signification*, and he uses the word *sense* in the more all-inclusive range.

Let us suppose that in perceiving a certain object at hand we in the act of positing effect an explication of the given and of the moments singled out in

it according to the scheme: "Here is white." This process can be accomplished without any "expression" at all – taking "expression" neither in the sense of a phonetic expression nor in the sense of a verbal signification, which can exist independently of the phonetic expression (for example, if we would forget it). But if we have "*thought*" or "*asserted*": "Something white," then some new stratum enters into unity with the "meant as such" of the pure perception. This holds not just for the perceived but also for the remembered as well as for the fantasized. Every "meant as such" of any act in its noematic sense can be *expressed by means of "significations."* Consequently "*logical signification is an expression.*" "'Expression' is a distinctive form which allows for adapting to every 'sense' (to the noematic 'core') and raises it to the realm of 'Logos,' of the *conceptual* and, on that account, the '*universal.*' "¹⁰

Evidently we are not getting an answer here to the question mentioned above. On the contrary, having taken into consideration the adduced division between "signification" and "sense" we are convinced once and for all that if "to express a signification" belongs to the essence of a concept and if "sense" also enters as a necessary stratum in the noema-noesis correlation, then "sense" remains as something that lacks either genus or a designation. *It is conceptually "apprehended" as ready-made.* A fundamental distinction is revealed between it and "signification" in the mentioned broadened sense, broadened, that is, to the entire field of intentive mental processes. This distinction cannot be disguised by the fact that the term "signification" is extended beyond the sphere of its originary application, beyond the sphere of language, and becomes essential for the logical act. Also despite such a broadening it remains certain that although an essence grasped in ideal intuition is subsumed in a concept as its "signification" and the something logical is thereby transformed into "something expressive," we must *not* seek "sense-bestowing" and "sense" in the something logical nor in logical acts as such. *Sense-bestowal and logicization are in essence and in principle not identical.* Sense-bestowal, however, is inherent in every noesis, and correlatively sense is inherent in every noema.

Let us take the last step to elucidate our question, while at the same time holding to what Husserl has said, by posing the question whether the pure Ego itself does not play the role of the "*creator*" of sense. On the other hand, let us enter into an analysis of the objective signification of the noema in order to see what the sense is attached to in the noema, separating the "logical" or "expressive" signification from the sense.

As for the pure Ego, its presence in all acts of consciousness and in all intentional acts is always characterized as a manifestation of a certain act

with the specific characteristic that we designate as "directedness," i.e. as the "mental regard" of the pure Ego itself. It is not hard to grasp that the terminological character or designation of this act is not the only thing that points to its intimacy with the intentive mental processes customarily designated as "attention." In general we can speak here of the mental processes of "*attentional changes*." These attentional changes always presuppose some noetic core and the characterizing moments of its various genera. But these changes do not in themselves alter the correlative noematic functions, although they nevertheless represent changes of the *whole* mental process both with respect to its noetic side and with respect to its noematic side. The regard of the pure Ego penetrates through the different noetic strata. Likewise within the given general field of intentional noeses (or noetic Objects) we pass from the whole to a part or moments and, vice versa, to things standing side by side and their connections; we turn our regard suddenly from perception to the contingent Object of recollection; we return back or pass into recollection of other degrees or into the world of phantasy, etc. The attentional regard emanates from the pure Ego and takes shape in that which is objective. It is directed to this objective something or is deflected from it. But it is not detached from the Ego. It itself is and remains a regard, an Ego-ray. It is an act of the Ego itself: The Ego "lives" in such acts.¹¹

It is quite evident that this "activity" of the pure Ego cannot take on the functions we seek. We would be ascribing more to the pure Ego than is essentially inherent in it if we should say that it itself, in its characterized "vital" acts, reveals a creative faculty which "creates" their corresponding noematic sense. On the contrary, the "life" of the pure Ego can be shown in the way described. But the object with its noema, to which the acts of our attentional directedness are directed, remains *lifeless* – or it would remain lifeless if it did not bear in itself a vitalizing *sense*. The sense is not "created" by the pure Ego; it does not paint the object with the subjective color of an arbitrary interpretation. The sense belongs to that which constantly abides in the object and which remains identical in spite of all the changes of the intentive mental processes and in spite of the fluctuation of the attentional acts of the pure Ego. Thus in order to illuminate the question from another of the sides mentioned above it still remains for us to enter into a more detailed analysis of the construction of the noema itself and its objective relation, concentrating our attention now on the noematic "core" itself, independently of the constantly changing "characteristics" inherent in it.

"Each noema has a 'content,' that is to say its 'sense,' and is related

through it to 'its' *object*."¹² This is just what we need to investigate closer now. Every intutive mental process, as we know, has a "relation to something objective," or in other words, it is the "consciousness of something." But if we take the full noema in itself, we will also, properly speaking, have to distinguish within it the "content" from the "object" to which the noema refers "by means of" this content. We spoke above of the central core of the noema. Now we must distinguish in this very core a necessary central point which appears as the "bearer" of the noematic peculiarities that belong specifically to it, of the noematically modified properties of the "meant as such." This bearer is nothing other than the object.¹³

A description of the object, of objectivity, is a description of the "*meant objective something, as it is meant*" without the admixture of any "*subjective*" expressions, which characterize the means by which the objective something becomes conscious. This description gives us a firm, fixed content in each noema. Thus, we obtain a set of determinations, expressed conceptually, which make up a set of "*predicates*," which <in turn> determine in their *modified signification* the "*content*" of the objective core of the noema.¹⁴ The object is not the unity of the predicates. It is their point of connection, their "bearer." It is an identical, intentional "same something," with changing "predicates," although these are inseparable from it. "It becomes separated as *central noematic moment*: the '*object*,' the '*Object*,' the '*Identical*,' the '*determinable subject of its possible predicates*' – *the pure X in abstraction from all predicates* – and it becomes separated from these predicates or, more precisely, from the predicate-noemas."^h

Multiple acts and modes of consciousness are directed to one Object so that no Object at all is conceivable without these multiple potential mental processes connected in a continuous synthetic unity. In this unity the Object is intended to as an identical "something" though nevertheless in noematically different ways.ⁱ That is to say, the characterized core is variable, but the object, as the pure subject of predicates, remains identical. If we simply detach a part of the immanent activity of any act, taking this part as an "act" itself, then we can examine it and the total act as a unity of continuously connected acts. In precisely this way different acts can be joined together in a single harmonious unity, for example, two perceptions or a perception and a recollection, etc. – consciousness of one and the same object, in spite of the distinctness of their "cores." In general we can say: "several act-noemata have here, throughout, *different cores*, yet in such a manner that, in spite of this, they are *joined together to make a unity of identity*, to make a

unity in which the ‘something,’ the determinable which inheres in each core, is intended to as an identical ‘something.’ ”¹⁵

In every noema there is such a pure objective something as a point of unity, and we can distinguish regarding the noema two concepts of object: this pure point of unity, the *noematic “object simpliciter,”* and the “*object in the How of its determinations.*” “The ‘sense’,” that is to say, “*is this noematic ‘Object in the How,’* with all that which the *description characterized above* is able to find evidently in it and to express conceptually.” The sense, in general, can change from noema to noema, but it can remain absolutely alike and can even be characterized as “identical.” There is, however, no noema in which sense would be wanting, and there is no noema which lacks its necessary center, point of unity, the pure determinable X. It is evident, on the other hand, that because of the need for sense to have a “bearer” not only does each sense have an “object” but different senses <can> also refer to the *same object*.¹⁶

We undoubtedly sense some deficiency in all this. For one thing it remains unclear how we come to an insight of the sense in the content of the noema. That is, this very identification arouses a doubt. But also, more importantly, it is unintelligible how predicative determinations of an object can *exhaust* the content of the noema. While we can more or less admit that such determinations express the noematic sense ideally (in the Kantian sense), this, nevertheless, does not justify the identification of sense and content, since it remains unclear how sense is “introduced” or “actualized” here. Nor does the above admission give us hope that sense will be fully acquired in this operation <of predicative determination>, for we do not know how it is introduced to the content itself. The only thing that can be conceded in such a determination of “sense” is just that it inheres immanently in the *logical something* because the claim of a sense-bestowing role for the act of predication qualifying the object simply claims this. In this case, however, we have not yet made any advance over the simple statement that there is a logical stratum within the structure of the noemaoesia.

At the same time the fact of the “inexhaustability” of the content, in the sense adduced here, surely serves as a stumbling block for intellectualism and is something which the critics of intellectualism celebrate. But is it necessary in fact to acknowledge intellectualism’s impotence? The simplest fact speaks against such an acknowledgement: We not only *see* the object, where it is, but can *tell* (“express”) this fact and moreover with such perfection that the anti-intellectualist critique, sporting nothing other than intellectualistic weapons, seems extremely convincing to us! ... It follows

that it is impossible to acknowledge its impotence, but rather we have to believe in its strengths. Above all we must take its strengths into account.

Husserl clearly sees that his determination of "sense" does not lead to "the actual, concretely complete core of the noema." He says: "As we have determined it, the sense is *not a concrete essence* in the total composition of the noema but a sort of abstract *form* inherent in the noema."¹⁷ How do we obtain sense in all of its *concrete* "fullness"?

Since the noema, with all of its content, can be *given* in various degrees of clarity, the "meant," with all of its determination-content, can also be very different with respect to its fullness of clarity. Therefore together with "the object in its determinant How" we should again distinguish the object "*in the How of its modes of givenness*." Something obscurely intended to as such and the same thing clearly intended to are completely different with respect to their noematic concreteness. But this does not prevent the determination-content with which both things are meant from being absolutely identical. Their descriptions would coincide and a synthetic consciousness of unity would so envelop both sides that it would actually be a matter of one and the same meant something. Accordingly, we can consider the full concreteness of the corresponding noematic component, consequently the "*sense in the mode belonging to its fullness*," as the "full core."

In this regard we will limit ourselves merely to a brief allusion to the fact that if we clarify in this way how we come to the full core of the noema in its concreteness, how it is that we attain its senses and what the connection is between sense and concreteness, nevertheless, remains unclear. The matter is indeed complicated and obscure. The source of sense lies in the two kinds of the How of objectivity – one a determinant How, expressed predicatively, and the other a How with respect to givenness, having signification. As we found out from the presentation itself, this How is *not* the something objective simpliciter. For if it were, the possible identification of the something meant, which appears so different in different modes of givenness, and in addition also in the "way" [*kak*] of these very modes, would be subject to a large doubt, and a *fundamental* one at that. Nevertheless, if both sources equally serve as the cause of sense-bestowal, then it is necessary not only to show the proper place of sense in each of them, but also to resolve a number of misunderstandings which arise: for example, how sense can equally appear as an abstract form and as full concreteness, how it can emanate from the content as well as from the mode of givenness, etc. Finally, having turned our attention to the analysis of the noema as such, to itself, to pure objectivity, we must hold strictly to the principle that

Husserl himself established, claiming that a description of “objectivity” is effected within a determinate delimitation, “that is to say, in such a description which, as a *description of the ‘meant objective something, as it is meant,’ avoids all ‘subjective’ expressions.*”¹⁸

Therefore such expressions as “perceptual,” “intellectual,” “clearly intuited,” “given,” etc. are “*excluded*”; “they belong to another dimension of descriptions, not to the objective something *which* is an object of consciousness, but to the *mode in which it is an object of consciousness.*”¹⁹ These modes of givenness are found with the directing of our regard to the noema itself and not to the mental process and its really inherent composition. Consequently, these modes remain “ideal,” not as “*modes of consciousness*” in the sense of a noetic moment, but as modes in which the *object of consciousness itself as such* is given.¹⁹ Despite this they nevertheless do not belong to the identical “something” as its moments in the sense of an object. Actually, adhering to this principle it would be necessary for us to deny that the sense in the content of the meant as such has the signification of a concrete essence and to recognize sense only as a kind of abstract form. In other words, we would have to strip objectivity as such of sense.

Meanwhile, the very fact of recognizing the “object,” i.e. an X, as the “bearer” of noematic properties already makes it “sense-bestowed.” We must realize that not only do “words” (an “expression”) “signify” something – they “conceptually” have a sense – and not only does a logical sense lie in the content of the noema, but the “object” itself possesses an “inner” sense. Consequently, in order to establish its sources we must not only generalize the problem even more but above all go deeper into the structure of the noema and the role of the bearer of the noema’s “core.”

Before turning, however, to this analysis we must return to certain propositions established above and in this connection provide through pure description a more intimate elucidation of the place, the “stratum,” which the “something logical” occupies in the general structure of the noemanoesis. This is necessary for the sake of distinctness in formulating the question. That is to say, in connection with the question that arose just above of the object in the How of its modes of givenness it is essentially necessary to clarify the role not only of this How but also of the *modes* themselves.

The essence of the matter is that we distinguish between, on the one hand, “objective sense,” the something identical appearing as such with its identical “Objective” How of appearance from, on the other hand, the changing types of “representation” in their different *modes of givenness*. We can be conscious of the something identical as “originarily” given or

“memorially” or “pictorially” etc., as was shown. These are not noetic moments of consciousness but characteristics in the “something ideal” itself, in the “appearing something as such.”²⁰

What is particularly essential and important is that group of characteristics which refer to the different modalities of *being*. To the noetic characteristics,^k taken as “doxic” or “belief-characteristics,” there corresponds the being-characteristic as the noematic correlate in the appearing “Object.” Thus to the doxic characteristic of “certainty” there corresponds the being-characteristic “actual,” and to the characteristics of *admitting*, *questioning*, *doubting*, etc. there corresponds the *modalities of being* of “possible,” “probable,” “doubtful” and so forth. One and the same noetic, or noematic, characteristic points to a something existing now, to a something earlier (in recollection), or to a something in the future (in expectation). In any case, we are always concerned here with *being*-“*positing*” acts, “*positional*” acts.²¹ This is an essential moment of the highest degree in the structure of the noesis-noema, because, as we saw, it is extended to the *entire* field of consciousness. And therefore in the broadest sense of the word *every consciousness is either actually or potentially a “positing” consciousness*,²² even if the “*positings*” in them are not doxic in the rigorous sense.

In order to recognize all of consciousness as positional, it is enough to broaden the concept of “position,” taken as act-characteristic, so as to find in any “intuitive mental process,” taken as an act, a “position.” Above “position” in the narrow sense of modality and conviction (“doxi”) there stands its broad sense, which allows us to speak of the positional characteristic of the noeses of wishing, pleasure and so forth. But, on the other hand, it is not hard to notice that every founded position must point to some protoposition of doxic *positing* and that every positum of pleasure, wish, value, etc. can change into a doxic positum. Thus not only is “*positing*” essentially inherent in every consciousness, but every consciousness, as a positional consciousness, can in the broad sense be seen as doxic, since every positum of another quality, every positum of valuing, of wishing and so forth, is at the same time a doxic positum. The difference is only in the mode of consciousness itself, which turns out to be actual in positional acts and potential in non-doxic positings. In other words, every positional act posits and also posits doxically, i.e. whatever is “*positing*” is always posited also as existing, even though not actually.²³

From the above we obtain the already noticed universality of the *something logical*, because inasmuch as something logical is contained, be it explicitly or implicitly, in every act, every act, including the act of pleasure or of desire, turns out to be “*Objectivating*” either actually in the

doxic cogito or potentially in the non-doxic consciousness.²⁴

Let us now designate the posited itself as such by the term "positum." Hence, by virtue of everything that has been said we must see in the positum a unity of the posited characteristic and sense. Owing to this unity the concept of positum begins to play a fundamental role in the analysis of the noematic structure. This is because the concepts¹ of sense and positum are inseparable from the concept of object. We can speak of various posita, of one-membered and of many-membered, synthetic posita of doubt, of pleasure, of wish, of command, of appraisal and so forth. The concept of positum, thus, is greatly broadened. It refers to all spheres of acts, so that even in pure intuition we must distinguish between intuitive sense and intuitive positum. Husserl stresses that the concepts of sense and positum contain nothing pertaining to expression or logical signification. Nevertheless, however, they envelop in themselves all explicit posita or posita-significations.²⁵

According to what was said, however, regarding the possibility of the Objectivation of any act, we must hold that every "positum" *can* in principle be expressed, and, consequently, its logical signification can be determined. It now remains <for us> to compare this with what we said above, where the delimitation of logical signification and sense was adduced, in order to see that the problem of the relation of sense to expression earlier received an unusual broadening and that this was carried over to the entire field of intentional consciousness. The problem, however, not only does not thereby lose its clarity and rigor but, on the contrary, in this respect even gains some, since with this new formulation we become intuitively convinced that it is a matter not of a particular or specific question of logic but actually of the basic question of the most fundamental philosophical discipline. Consequently, it, in essence, concerns all of the central problems of philosophy.

Could we stop, however, at this point, taking into account the formulation with which we began? Surely, we can repeat here what we said above concerning logical significations and concepts (expressions), namely that sense is apprehended by a positum. But it is not obvious how a positional act in itself can "disclose" the sense in a noema or an object. We can even say that the unclarity in this point is shown even more vividly with the new broadening of the relations. Strictly speaking, though, "sense" appears here not as something new in comparison with "significations" but only as the concept, admittedly very broadened, of the latter themselves. As we saw, however, the set of significations is hereby nothing other than the "*content*" of the object. We can very easily distinguish and understand this separation

of "positum" not only from "sense" as content, but we can also detach the pure bearer of the latter, the "pure something," namely the object.

Nor does the relation between positional moments and the content raise doubts <for us>. Nevertheless, however, we do not grasp <this notion of> "sense-bestowal," since it is not apparent <to us> how, where and why a positional act can be sense-bestowing. Correlative to this noetic analysis, we ultimately also have to be persuaded that what we called "sense" is not really sense at all. Rather, sense is exhausted by the "content." Let us turn our attention merely to the following: Sense, being the object in its determinant *How*, is *not*, in Husserl's opinion, *the concrete essence* of the aggregate noema, but only a kind of abstract *form* inherent in it. Therefore, the full noematic core in its concreteness is obtained only in the mode belonging to the sense's *fullness*.

Our question arose at just this point. <For us> sense, conceived not as the object in its determinant *How* but as the authentic sense, is by no means an abstract form but that which is *internally inherent in the object itself, its intimate something*. Consequently, in essence, sense not only can be exclusively inherent in the concrete object, but it, sense, also determines the same. This is because what lies in the sense is what creates a whole and integral thing from the isolated content. If the object in its determinant *How* makes up only the content, then evidently something else must still be found in the noema besides the content and its bearer, something that demands its own phenomenological description, both from the noematic side and from the correlatively noetic side. In other words, it is a question of the transition from sense, as the meant noema, to the sense of this meant something, as the being of the object, and thereby of its "actuality."

It must be said that when Husserl in his definition calls "sense" an *abstract form* of a certain kind this is quite accurate insofar as the noema itself is an abstraction. But we must not forget that the very opposition of the abstract to the concrete is not absolute. And we must realize in principle that in spite of the restrictives here "more" and "less," it can be recognized that that *from which* we abstract, that from which we draw, is the concrete καὶ εξοχὴν. Naturally this concept is transferred to the "rest," which is generated by abstraction and which factually can hardly be exhausted to such a degree as to reach zero. We can sooner admit a sort of non-eradicated, absolute "root" of concreteness, on which in general the determination of objectivity, as concrete, depends. It is not difficult to see that it must be essentially connected with the motivation inherent in the concrete, and it leads us to the question of the "actuality" of the object.

Precisely this is our definition under the heading "form," since insofar as

the “determinant How” fulfills its function, it gives form. It is the formative beginning, but as sense it lies, of course, in the content. Undoubtedly the content must, consequently, include in itself also the formative principle, but, nevertheless, in order to obtain the sense of the object itself in its “actuality” it is necessary to take this principle also in its concrete *actualization* as well. In other words, we must know how to pass to actuality and to formulate the rule of this transition according to the principle which was derived from the object itself in its noematic structure. If a formula can help here to clarify thought, then we would propose the following division: The determinant How of the object gives, in our opinion, sense *an sich*, the How in the modes of givenness gives sense *in sich*. The question to which we advance is that of the sense *für sich*.

Author's Notes

1. *Ideas*, p. 187.
2. *Ideas*, §§ 52–54, p. 117ff.
3. *Ideas*, p. 203.
4. *Ideas*, p. 208.
5. *Ideas*, p. 211 and then the following citations to pp. 213–214.
6. *Ideas*, pp. 217–218.
7. *Ideas*, p. 222.
8. *Ideas*, Part Three, Chapter Four: “The Set of Problems Pertaining to Noetic-Noematic Structures”
9. In fact it was precisely from this side that Husserl himself came to the idea of phenomenology in the second of his “Logical Investigations.” In particular, cf. Investigation 1.
10. *Ideas*, pp. 294–295.
11. *Ideas*, pp. 223–226.
12. *Ideas*, p. 309.
13. *Ideas*, p. 311.
14. *Ideas*, p. 313.
15. *Ideas*, p. 314.
16. *Ideas*, p. 315.
17. *Ideas*, p. 316.
18. *Ideas*, p. 312.
19. *Ideas*, p. 244.
20. *Ideas*, p. 244.
21. *Ideas*, p. 250.
22. *Ideas*, pp. 279–280. Cf. also *Ideas*, § 105, pp. 252–253. [Clearly in error the Russian text gives § 106 as the reference – trans.]

23. *Ideas*, p. 281.
24. *Ideas*, p. 282. [Clearly in error the Russian text gives p. 224 of the original German text as the reference – trans.]
25. *Ideas*, p. 317

Translator's Notes

- a. Reading *sushchnostjam* for *sushchnosti*.
- b. *Ideas*, p. 6. Shpet here uses the same word “*uzrenie*” as a translation for *Ansehen* as well as for *Erschauung*. We, on the other hand, have brought our translation into conformity with the English translation of *Ideas*, particularly as it is clear to which passage Shpet alludes.
- c. *Ideas*, p. 204.
- d. Shpet usually renders Husserl’s term “*sinnlich*” into Russian by “*chuvstvennyj*.” Here, however, he translates the same Husserlian term this time as “*sensual’noj*.” The latter would naturally be rendered into English as “*sensual*” were it not clear that only one German word is involved. Moreover, Shpet’s failure to distinguish carefully between *chuvstvennyj* and *sensual’noj* flies in the face of Husserl’s distinction in *Ideas*, p. 195.
- e. *Ideas*, pp. 207–208.
- f. *Ideas*, p. 214.
- g. As in Husserl’s text, there is considerable ambiguity in Shpet’s usage of “*aktuall’nyj*” (corresponding to Husserl’s “*aktuell*”). Here he continues to employ the same term, just as Husserl did, to designate “actual” even though in many instances we have rendered it more appropriately as “actional.” See *Ideas*, p. 264f.
- h. *Ideas*, p. 313. Emphasis on the words “as central noematic moment” added by Shpet.
- i. Cf. *Ideas*, p. 314 where Husserl says the Object is intended to in the mental processes.
- j. *Ideas*, p. 312. Emphasis on the words “mode in which it is an object of consciousness” added by Shpet.
- k. Reading “*kharakteram*” for “*kharakterom*.”
- l. Reading “*ponjatija*” for “*ponjatie*.”

CHAPTER 6

Appearance and Actuality

Our guiding question throughout has been and is: *How does the actual exist, and how do we arrive at it?* Our broadening of the problem of sense, mentioned above, has led us directly to the answer. This answer, however, still needs elucidation from a new direction in order for its *universal*, fundamentally philosophical significance to be understood. As we shall see, insofar as it is a matter of the noema's logical, explicit stratum the discovery of the noematic sense gives us a general *method* for solving the formulated question. But its peculiar sense is elucidated by going deeper into the problem, to its ultimate philosophical source. To raise our question in light of the fundamental philosophical doubt and to show what role the question plays in the resolution of this doubt means at the same time to show its significance as the starting point for positive philosophizing. Finally, the tasks of phenomenology as the fundamental science find in this their final formulation and determination.

Philosophical dogmatics always begins with assertions concerning not just being but "actual," "authentic" being. The absence of an answer to the question of how we arrive at this being, however, gives rise to a legitimate doubt, which in turn leads to a critique directed at the "cognition" of this being. Furthermore, this critique essentially concludes with an inescapable self-restriction and, consequently, a denial. In this way positive philosophy obtains a new impulse to examine and review its own starting points, whereupon positive philosophy ceases to be dogmatic and becomes *rationally grounded*. This "dialectical process" in philosophy will continue as long as it has not experienced all dogmas and not found *all* the answers to the questions and doubts concerning how we attain the actual.

The most reactionary moment in the course of philosophical self-development is Kantian "Critical Philosophy" for the simple reason that it, being raised to a principle, as a result reduces the essence of philosophy to

universal negation and privative complacency. The falsification of positive philosophy in Kantianism consists in the fact that the question of how the actual exists is substituted with and excluded by the question of how we attain it. The value of dogma consists in what it attains; rational groundedness reveals to us the path to this attainment. The fundamental philosophical science does not intend to *prove*, and therefore it cannot decree but must *show* the path by which it arrives at its assertions. Philosophical brilliance can raise intuitive illumination and insight of the actual to a principle; positive philosophy gives an account of the paths to truth. Anticipating yet to be attained results, we will say that positive philosophy must show not only that *reason finds itself* in authentic actuality and asserts the *truth* in itself, but it must also show how reason arrives at itself by way of the *path of comprehension*.

Thus far the entire course of phenomenology^a has led in this direction. In explicating the structure of the noema-noesis we have always presented at every step a systematic treatment of the paths to the attained through use of all sorts of insights and assertions concerning the structure. It remains for phenomenology to trace the final phase of penetration into authentic actuality and disclose the path of this penetration. Phenomenology began its work with a reduction of the “actual” as experiential Data. Now it is faced with penetrating into the actual as the truly authentic being. We have no right here to expect any “synthesis” in the positivistic sense or even an Hegelian dialectical completion, since up to now we have been concerned neither with “analysis” nor with “cancellation” and “supersession.” On the contrary, from the very beginning phenomenology has stressed its *εποχή*, and it continues to do so now as well. Authentic actuality is attained in phenomenology thanks precisely to this *εποχή* with respect to the actuality of experience. Neither contempt nor arrogance with respect to experiential actuality has a place here. There is, on the contrary, a recognition of rationality in experiential actuality through its manifestation of a truly authentic actuality. And, consequently, there is an assertion of an experiential actuality itself in the sense of rationality. It is only a question of a *systematic* path engendered by the essence of the very object of phenomenology. “Intentionality is the name of the problem encompassed by the whole of phenomenology. The name precisely expresses the fundamental property of consciousness; all phenomenological problems, even the hyletic ones, find a place within it. As a consequence, phenomenology begins with problems of intentionality; but first of all it begins in universality and without drawing into its sphere questions about actual (true) being intended to in consciousness. We leave out of consideration the fact

that positing consciousness with a posited characteristic can be designated in the most universal sense as a 'meaning,' and as 'meaning' it necessarily comes under the rational opposition of validity and invalidity."¹ And the problems of actuality itself and of reason are now raised only on the second level.

We are anticipating the direction of Husserl's answer to these questions, a direction that leads to his following conclusion: "Everywhere 'object' is the name for eidetic concatenations of consciousness; it appears first of all as noematic X, as the subject of sense pertaining to different essential types of sense and posita. Moreover, it appears as the name, 'actual object,' and is then the name for certain eidetically considered rational concatenations in which the sense-conforming, unitary X inherent in them receives its rational position."²

This "return" to "actuality" provides the basis for noting yet another important fact that also demands a certain "return," a "return" moreover to the very first word of phenomenology. Between these two "returns" there is a connection.

We began with the fact that we called phenomenology the science of "phenomena," moreover the science of *all* phenomena in all their significations, although only in a particular, specific attitude. By means of the *reduction* a psychological phenomenon is "cleansed" of its "reality." Thus the essence of the phenomenological attitude lies in the fact that thanks to phenomenology's particular technique a "phenomenon" is guided from the "real" order and becomes unreal. And in this way the possibility of a "pure" examination of the phenomenon in its essence was achieved. Husserl promised: "Our phenomenology is to be an eidetic doctrine, not of phenomena that are real, but of phenomena that are transcendentally reduced."³ Only now, however, having made clear the structure of the noema-noesis in their fundamental coordination and having revealed the place of the object with its content and sense in the noema-noesis, as well as having established the role of positing acts with their various characteristics and having attained the definition of "positum," can we understand the sense of this assertion by Husserl. And together with this only now do we get a precise formulation of the phenomenological approach to actuality, both experiential as well as ideal. The following words of Husserl's can be considered as summarizing the result of the path taken:

"Just as every intutive mental process has a noema and therein a sense by which it is related to an object, so, conversely, everything which we call *object*, of which we speak, which we confront as actuality which we hold as possible or probable, no matter how indeterminately we think it, is precisely

therefore already an object of consciousness; and that signifies that whatever world and actuality taken universally may be called, they must be represented in the framework of actual and possible consciousness by corresponding senses or posita filled with more or less intuitive contents. If, as a consequence, phenomenology effects 'exclusions,' if phenomenology as transcendental parenthesizes all actual positing of realities and effects the other parenthesizings which we have described earlier, then we now understand on the basis of a profounder ground the sense and rightness of the earlier thesis: that everything excluded phenomenologically in a certain change of sign still belongs within the boundaries of phenomenology. That is to say, the real and ideal actualities which undergo exclusion are represented in the phenomenological sphere by the total multiplicities of senses and posita corresponding to them."⁴

Thus we saw in the positum a unity of positional moments and sense. The sense relates to its "the same thing," the object, a certain X, as its "bearer." "But," as Husserl then asks, "*is it* (this X-GS) *actually the same?* And *is the object itself 'actual'?*"^b In every cognition as such there lie questions about actuality, since every cognition has its correlate in an "object," which is meant as "actually existing." But the following question always arises: When is the noematically "meant"^c identity of X the "actual identity" of X and not "merely" the meant identity, and what does this "merely meant" identity signify?

Asserting something about the object simpliciter we usually mean by it some actually existing object, and if this assertion is rational, then what is meant, taken as what is expressed, must be "*grounded*," "*shown*," directly or mediately "*intellectually seen*."⁵ In the logical sphere, in the sphere of assertion, therefore, there exists a fundamental correlation between "being truly" or "actually" and "being something which can be shown rationally" or in general something pointed out. The analysis of *rational consciousness*, which makes up this rational "demonstration," reveals a number of distinctions within it. We distinguish, for example, between mental processes in which the posited *is given originally* (acts of "perception," of "seeing") and non-originarily (recollection, etc.).

This distinction concerns not the pure sense or the positum but 1) the mode by which it, being the simple abstraction of the noema, makes up the *fulfilled* or *unfulfilled* sense (of the positum), and 2) also the *How* (*das Wie*) of this fulfilledness (for example, the mode of the mental process pertaining to the sense can be "intuitive" and the meant "object as such" is the intuitively intended-to). The specific characteristic of rationality turns out to be inherent in the posited characteristic in the event that this position is

effected on the basis of a fulfilled sense and not merely a sense in general. Position, thereby, so belongs to the appearance of any physical thing that it is not only one with it but "*is motivated*" by it, and "*rationally motivated*" at that. This is to say, position has its *legitimizing basis* in its givenness. In the case of *originary givenness* this basis will be "*originaliter*." The position of the "*originarily*" given essence in ideal intuition also belongs precisely to the "*sense*" in its modes of givenness. And therefore it is rational and originally motivated in the specific character of an "*intellectually seeing*" position, a position which establishes therefore what we call the "*evident positum*."

Strictly speaking, evidence, in the proper sense, takes place only in the field of the ideal and as an "*insight*" of an essence (for example, that $2 + 1 = 1 + 2$) where it appears in adequate givenness and where it is "*rational*" in the most precise sense. This leads to further important differences, of which we will note only two, namely that, on the one hand, between *essence* (an "*apodictic*" insight) and "*the something individual*" (an "*assertoric*" seeing) and, on the other hand, that between *adequateness* in the eidetic field and *inadequateness* in the sphere of experience.

From a rational "*securing*" of the actually existing in evident and immediate positing and from mediate positing with its mediate evidence we see those universal foundations on which not only the "*actuality*" of the object, as a truly existing object, rests, but the source from which the actuality of any physical thing at all is constituted. Not only are the "*truly existing object*" and the object that must be determined rationally equivalent correlates, but also the "*truly existing object*" and the object that must be determined in "*originally perfect rational positing*."⁶ This positing must give the object perfectly and not merely "*onesidedly*." "*Since the rational positing should be a positing originaliter, it must have its rational ground in the *originary givenness* in the full sense of what is determined: The X is not only meant in full determinedness, but is given *originarily* precisely in this determinedness.*"^d The mentioned equivalence of essence signifies that: "*Of essential necessity (in the *Apriori* of unconditioned eidetic universality), to every 'truly existing' object there corresponds the *idea of a possible consciousness* in which the object itself is seized upon *originarily* and therefore in a *perfectly adequate* way. Conversely, if this possibility is guaranteed, then *eo ipso* the object truly exists.*"^e

Of particular significance is the fact that every *apprehensional category* (which is the correlate of every object-category) determinately predesignates the form of the image of the concrete somethings, be they perfect or imperfect apprehensions of the objects pertaining to such a category.

Likewise, for every imperfect apprehension there is predesignated the way it is to be perfected, the way full sense is to be attained in it, fulfilled in intuition, and the way the intuition itself is to be enriched further. Every object-category is a universal essence which must itself be fundamentally led to *adequate givenness*, in which the object-category prescribes an immediately intellectually seen *generical rule* for every particular object which becomes intended to in a multiplicity of concrete mental processes of an object. For example, the visible properties of any physical thing are, like any property in general, spatial. This already gives a rule for the completion of the unseen sides of the appearing thing, a rule which, fully developed, gives pure geometry, etc.

Therefore eidetically speaking, "truly to exist" is correlatively equivalent to "to be adequately given" and "to be evidentially positable." But it is necessary to distinguish the two different types of givenness in accordance with the division of "perception" itself into immanent and transcendent. On the one hand, one type concerns "finite givenness." In this case, being is "immanental" being, that is, being as a closed mental process or its noematic correlate. Here the presentive intuition is adequate and *immanental*. The originally fulfilled sense and the object are coincident. "The object is precisely that which is seized upon, posited, as the originary It Itself in adequate intuition; it is seen intellectually by virtue of originarity, and by virtue of the sense-completedness and completed originarity sense-fulfilledness it is absolutely seen intellectually."^f

On the other hand, the other type concerns givenness in the form of an idea (in the Kantian sense). This is a transcendent being, a being the "transcendentness" of which lies in the infinitude of the noematic correlate. Being an intuition which *transcends*, the presentive intuition cannot lead an objective something to adequate givenness. What is given is only the *idea* of such an objective something and together with it a rule for law-conforming infinities of inadequate experiences. Consequently, all transcendent objects, all "realities" of nature or of the world in a "closed appearance" are perceived inadequately. This means that in a limited consciousness they cannot be given in complete determinedness and complete intuitiveness. But as an "idea," perfect givenness is predesignated by its essential type as an absolutely determined system of infinite processes of continuous appearances or as a field of these processes, a *continuum of appearances*, determined a priori, of different but determined dimensions governed by a rigorous set of essential laws. "The idea of an infinity motivated in conformity with its essence is not itself an infinity; seeing intellectually that this infinity of necessity cannot be given does not exclude, but rather requires,

the intellectually seen givenness of the *idea* of this infinity.”⁸

A further excavation into “actuality” leads to new, fundamentally essential problems of “phenomenological constitution,” problems which give methodological indications as to how the determination of “something actual” in all the manifold species of its being is to be carried out. Husserl gives an extremely interesting analysis of the “region of physical things,” an analysis which can at the same time serve in general as the “guiding clue” for our phenomenological investigation. In a retrospective survey he traces the consistent progress of his phenomenological analysis with its finished systematic character and completeness.⁷

It is not difficult to see that according to the terminology established at the start such a transition to “physical thing” points to certain new methodological techniques of phenomenology itself. These techniques consist in the fact that phenomenology utilizes in a completely unique manner those interrelations established between itself in solving the problem of “constitution” (“constitutive phenomenologies”) and correspondingly between the formal as well as, in particular, material ontologies. Phenomenology is not “subordinate” here to ontologies and does not receive any “grounding” from them. It only makes use of ontological statements and concepts as a “guiding clue” for its own end. As Husserl says, an ontological concept or proposition serves as an “index” for constitutive eidetic connections.⁸

The essential point here is that our pursuit of the “actual,” or the “rational,” leads us to regional ontologies with problems of the constitution, above all, of the material thing, and consequently of animalia, of the psyche, etc., problems governed by the respective regional ontologies. Regional ontologies direct our attention to the material side of the essence. This side is revealed precisely in accordance with the rules and laws prescribed by the physical thing itself. “Each region here furnishes the clues to an *intrinsically self-contained group of investigations*.”⁹ The general problem arising from this is that of the “constitution” of the objectivities of a given region in transcendental consciousness or of the “phenomenological constitution,” for example, of a physical thing. The idea of a physical thing, which has been our concern up to now, is replaced by the conceptually expressed thought: “physical thing” with a definite noematic composition.¹⁰

Once more we stress the fundamental importance of the problems of “phenomenological constitution.” We do this in view of the fact that the fundamental task of phenomenology as the fundamental science is realized only in perfect *completeness* (as we said earlier, without ignoring the problem of the “actual”). But for our part we will concentrate our attention

for the purposes of the following exclusively on the *relationship* between the problems. Speaking in general, this relationship consists in the fact that the phenomenology of reason, so far as questions about the actual and the true arise, turns into a *series* of constitutive phenomenologies conforming to the regional objects. These in turn provide a guiding clue to the mentioned constitutions. "*The sequence of levels of formal and material theories of essence* prescribes in a certain way *the sequence of levels of the constitutive phenomenologies*, determines their levels of universality and provides them with 'clues' in their ontological and materially eidetic fundamental concepts and principles."¹¹ A new definition of phenomenology follows from this relationship, a definition which, once more, we can communicate through Husserl's own words. "A comprehensive solution to the problems of constitution which equally takes into consideration the noetic and the noematic strata of consciousness would be manifestly equivalent to a complete phenomenology of reason with respect to all its formal and material fashionings and, at the same time, with respect to all its non-normal (negatively rational) as well as its normal (positively rational) fashionings. But it must be admitted, furthermore, that so complete a phenomenology of reason would become coincident with phenomenology taken universally, that a systematic working out of all descriptions of consciousness required by the collective name, constitution of objects, must include in itself all descriptions whatever of consciousness."^h Such are the concluding words of Husserl's *Ideas*.

We will now make use of everything presented in order to determine better the sense and the place of our own task. The demands of the system itself, as we saw, determined for Husserl the path he took, viz. an investigation of the problem of "pure" intentionality, and only then did he address himself to the problem of the actual. Our problem also arose in a *determined* fashion in connection with the question of evidence and motivation, a fact which actually testifies to its strong connection with the problem of "reason." However, our pure analysis of the noema-noesis also pushed us in the direction of the same question, in terms of *its sense*, although it took on another form, viz. that of the problem of the source and the mode of the transition from expression to signification. As it turned out, what is more, the very possibility of proceeding from simple experience and "penetrating" to the essence demanded an answer to the question concerning the *how* of this penetration. This is all one problem for us. It is true, however, that only with the question of "reason" is this problem raised with all its characteristic integral nature and sense.

We also do not want to distance ourselves from the problematic of

Husserl's phenomenology. Thus, before definitively elucidating our own formulation of the question we must first examine from what angle Husserl's own analysis reveals the problem.

Above all, it is evident to Husserl without further ado that rational consciousness in general is the *highest genus of positional modalities*.¹² Therefore for him the simple assertion of a correlation between actuality and reason is perfectly consistent and natural. Meanwhile for us, it is precisely here that the question that concerns *every genus* of modality, or *every genus* of positing, has its roots: How does the sense-bestowing function attend to the "empty" positional act? To be sure, we raised a specific doubt concerning whether the positional act *in itself* is sense-bestowing. Yet, on the other hand, we saw that the sense of a positum without a corresponding noetic correlate turns out to be "blind." The concept of "logical expression" did not resolve our perplexity, since in the first place the positum is not encompassed by it but, rather, is broader than a "logical expression." In the second place we could again repeat here our question: How does the "lame" logical expression take possession of a "blind" signification?

We will limit our attention to the originally and immediately given, consequently leaving aside all possible representative forms and concentrating our attention exclusively on "perception." From an analysis of "positum" as the unity of sense and positional moments, we come to the concept of "*appearance*" as the sense of the intuited positum taken in its intuitional fullness.¹³ We are concerned hereby with the most important moment in the content of phenomenology, and we can already ask: *How does an appearance as the sense of a perception present itself*, and how do we arrive at it? That is, we are presupposing that a perception already includes within itself, as a *peculiar moment*, an insight not only of the givenness, not only of the "*content*" of the givenness, but, *quite separately, of the "sense of it"* too.

Furthermore, however, it turns out that this question, generally speaking, is equivalent to the question: Are we *actually* concerned here with the "same" something, i.e. with the "object" (the X, the "bearer of sense")? Is this "*actually*" the object itself? Here it is as though a new *peculiar* function, which is our concern, were being revealed: the *rationality* of the "actual" and, consequently, *reason itself. The reason that lies in an actual appearance and the reason that posits the actual are a pure undifferentiated identity* (an absolute annihilation of the subject-object!).

Is this really the case? It surely seems that *comprehension*, penetrating into the deepest and ultimate recesses of the given, permeates here both

experiencing and ideal intuitions equally through and through. No?

Well, we will not make this claim. It will then be said our “return” to the actual once and for all puts off and eliminates the question of the *intimate* sense of the *object itself* as the bearer of sense-content. Is this a fair statement? ...

But this is not all. Putting off the mentioned question prompts the posing and the answering of others. One widespread prejudice is that *complete* understanding demands a *complete* “representation.” It seems that an actual description of understanding would have to destroy this prejudice.¹⁴ In spite of the fact that we *do* understand the concrete, we can hardly ascribe the wealth of its “sensuous” content to the essential moment demanded for understanding. An understanding of the abstract, and in particular an understanding of the ideal and in general of every essential intuition, sufficiently testifies to this.

Returning to Husserl we find his view to be that the actual presents itself in an intuitively fulfilled sense, and therefore an actual something is exhausted as a rational ground by that which appears. Consequently, there is no question here at all of the sense of the actual as the peculiar “motive” of the actual itself. But, what is more, if we can recognize that the mode of givenness in its completeness motivates the positing, then nevertheless <we can ask> *how does this motivation exist* and how do we arrive at it. (That is, how is it that the given in intuition is *at the same time* that which motivates?) This question arises since it surely is unintelligible how givenness as such, filling a positum, *thereby* motivates the latter rationally. That is, we must suppose that “rationality” either is a *new* moment demanding explication or it refers to the essence of givenness and, consequently, must have *already* been revealed to us. The simple determination of the modal correlativity between being and doxic characteristics did not give us an answer when this issue arose earlier.

Inasmuch as we seek the key to the entire problem, what is essential <to us> here is not so much the motivated character of the positing as the motivated character and the rationality of actual being itself. This is precisely what is essential. That to each “truly existing” object there corresponds the idea of a possible consciousness in which the object is grasped originally and adequately is something which to me seems indisputable. But *how does the object show its “truth,” its rationality?* The category of the object in its adequate givenness prescribes a general rule for any particular object arising in the manifold of concrete mental processes. But how can an “appearance” prescribe “rules” for the positum if we do not know whether and how it itself is subordinate to a rational rule? And what

do these “rules” without a *comprehension* of actuality give us?

These “rules” certainly give us quite a lot. They form the basis not only of a *methodology* as a formal doctrine but also of a “philosophy of nature,” a “philosophy of the spirit,” a “philosophy of history,” etc. However, it seems impossible here to see intellectually how the simple *possibility* can become an *actuality*. It seems that the “rule” itself cannot be intellectually seen if there is no *comprehension* of its objective source. The object as X, as “bearer,” must be revealed precisely in the fact that this rule prescribes both for the object as well as for reason itself – only for the object this prescribing is a simple “*for*,” while for reason it is also an “*in*” it as well.

“Closed” appearances are, in Husserl’s opinion, perceived inadequately. But in the endless process of an uninterrupted appearance we are concerned with the “*continuum of appearances*.” The givenness of these appearances can be unfolded to perfect completeness and adequacy. In such a case the givenness presents itself as an “*idea*” in the *Kantian* sense.

So far as I can judge, an “*idea*” in the *Kantian* sense contains quite heterogeneous moments. It manifestly bears a “practical” character; it is merely regulative, and it forms the “concept of an upper limit.” Let us leave aside the “practical” character. According to Kant as soon as an idea ceases to be regulative, merely regulative, it gives rise to illusions. But in Husserl the “adequate givenness” of an appearance, an “adequate givenness” prescribed by its “rule,” can hardly be considered as having only a regulative signification. There remains the “concept of an upper limit,” which acquires a quite finished sense once we recall that our concern is particularly with the adequate fulfilledness of the “universal rule” of an objective category. The entire question, though, is: *How do we intellectually see* this “upper limit”? How do we intellectually see that we still have *not* filled it? How do we intellectually see what the problem *is*? Must we be content with Kant’s assertion that ideas “are imposed by the very nature of reason itself”?¹ Or in other words, now as before the question before us remains: *How does reason itself exist?* Husserl answers: “The idea of an infinity motivated in conformity with its essence is not itself an infinity; seeing intellectually that this infinity of necessity cannot be given does not exclude, but rather requires, the intellectually seen givenness of the *idea* of this infinity.”¹⁵ Well, then, the question is precisely: *How do we intellectually see this idea, or how does it exist?*

More important, however, for explicating a positive direction for solving this problem is to examine essentially the question posed of the “inadequacy” of the given itself. We accepted <Husserl’s claim> that a transcendent perception is in principle “inadequately” given. But what does

this mean, and how can it, nevertheless, turn out to be adequately given, even if in an “idea”? Husserl distinguishes between perception in a “closed appearance” and an “a priori determined continuum of appearances.”^j But it is not difficult to see that it is already a matter of *different types of givenness*. The second type cannot in any case be considered an originary givenness. On the contrary, the assertion that there is “adequacy” only in this type of givenness forms a fundamental denial of originary, adequate givenness. A “closed appearance” outstretched in an “endless series” ceases to be the latter.

We must recognize too that insofar as the object with its “sense” is understood as an intuited completeness, we must reject the idea of *crumpling* time and duration so as to represent the continuum in a closed appearance. But all this does not exclude in the least the possibility of an *adequate* givenness of an appearance, provided we understand not just “sense” but also the “intimate something” of the object as the actual center from which all the clues concerning the object’s constitution emanate. An adequate insight of this center would give the object not only as to its sense but also as to its rational motivatedness, even though only in a “potential” state, in a state of “*readiness to be*.” The latter, though, does not prevent us in the least from considering immanent perception as adequate and therefore from considering it in its complete concreteness and individuality. The mode of construction of a transcendent individual and concrete something has much in common with this. We hold that all the threads of sense, individuation and of motivated rationality are tied, as it were, in one central knot. We hold them to be “at a single stroke” in a “closed appearance.” The analogy of the psychological seeing of the other’s individuality as a “whole” can help to explain matters here.¹⁶ What is essential is simply that we could comprehend not just the “sense” of the appearance but also that of the “object” (the X, the “bearer”), that we could “catch” hold of it and find that which makes the concrete something concrete and the individual something individual and therefore gives these things in their complete rational motivatedness. Only such an insight leads us to the “actual,” answering all the questions that arose earlier. At the same time it becomes clear how an “idea” intellectually seen, or *comprehended*, in such a way acquires also its constitutive signification. To a certain degree armed with this signification of “idea” we once again return to Plato.

Let us pause on the last moment. Passing from the “idea” of givenness to the “physical thing” itself, Husserl carries the question into the field of material or regional ontologies. He speaks of *ontologies*, since it is a matter of respective studies of a “thing,” studies determined by the specific region.

In other words, we come to ontologies of nature, psyche and so forth. This "pluralism" is quite legitimate, since it agrees with the pluralism of the objectively given itself. In its foundation this pluralism is "empirical," *experiential*. "Thus in fact," Husserl says, "*each own specifically peculiar type of such actualities carries along with it its own peculiar constitutive phenomenology and therefore a new concrete theory of reason.*"¹⁷ Therefore, however, it appears that we have no general theory of "actuality."

We should not forget, though, that material ontologies begin to assume the role of a "guiding clue" in the solution to the constitutive problems of phenomenology. As Husserl also stresses, this is certainly not a "grounding." Nevertheless, however, the recognition of this fact demands certain conclusions, which <in turn> force us to fear that if we do not recognize "concrete theories of reason" as necessarily preceding the general *fundamental theory of reason*, the "ground" will come from another direction. From the fact that phenomenology in general coincides¹⁸ with the complete phenomenology of reason it only follows that the problem of "reason," or "comprehension" and "actuality," forms the central problem of phenomenology, the fundamental problem with respect to the pluralistic examination of actuality, and that if the demand for a "systematic character" forced Husserl *for the time being* to concentrate his attention on pure intentionality, the chief problem, all the same, arises only here.

As we pointed out on the other hand, if the "fundamental science" does not fulfill this demand made of it, it will be left entirely to *metaphysics* to find the sought-for "universal something." But the problem of "reality" surely also has two sides: a theoretical, purely metaphysical side as well as a fundamental, elementary side, i.e. a side of *principles and beginnings*. Strictly speaking, as Kant well indicated, without a phenomenological analysis metaphysics can indeed only be "dogmatic." Having rejected reason as the source of empirical cognition, he demonstrated that in metaphysics both a *yes* and a *no* are equally legitimate or equally illegitimate. It is all one and the same.

A small historical illustration will help us to clarify this tendency. The question that interests us is that of the "actual," consequently of actual being, namely: How does it exist or what is it like? Our answer: as it does in the immediate evidence of reason, in the insight, comprehension, (in an "expression," an "appearance" and, finally, in the "object") of it itself. The interrelation between Kant, Hume and Jacobi gives a vivid illustration of the sense of this problem. We see in them three different positions with respect to our question: pure *negativism*, *skepticism* and *dogmatism*. Kant rejects reason as the source of empirical knowledge. Hume doubts reason

and appeals to instinct. Jacobi affirms <the power of> reason. But for all three what is essential is our “belief” in actuality and our relationship to it. As we will see, however, only Jacobi grasps the true sense of the question before us.

For Kant “actuality” is a category of modality and as such, being a determination of an object, does not enrich the content of a concept but merely expresses the relationship of this concept to the faculty of cognition. Kant, therefore, concentrates his attention on the noetic moment and ignores its correlative noematic signification. This is consistent from the standpoint or “subjectivism” or “subjective idealism,” a representative of which Kant remains in spite of his “refutation of idealism.”¹⁹ But it also demands another element in order to be consistent, namely, a pure phenomenism, which, taking into account, what he *in fact* expresses, is lacking in his philosophy.²⁰ To the extent, however, that Kant preserves consistency here, i.e. that he *knows nothing* about “things in themselves,” he comes to a peculiar phenomenistic sensualism, which however is necessary given his “beginnings.” “In the *mere concept* of a thing no mark of its existence is to be found. ... Our knowledge of the existence of things reaches, then, only so far as perception and its advance according to empirical laws can extend.”²¹ But this is also that very empiricism which Kant calls “skepticism.”

Kant here turns another side to us: Shaggy actuality is subjected to a rationalistic trimming, and we obtain a *nature* “according to laws.” But the question now before us remains the same as earlier: How do positional acts of a categorial positing lead to sense and objectivity? If we do not obtain a clear answer even to this question, we are so much the more removed from our question: *How does the actual exist, and how do we get to know it?*

But in essence Kant certainly remains a pure sensualist, as Jacobi stresses with his simple repetition of Kant’s thought. “Understanding itself,” says Jacobi, “although it is *called* a second source of cognition, in fact is not at all such, since thanks to it objects are not *given* but are only *thought*.”²²

Let us recall that in Kant’s opinion, “it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us... must be accepted merely on *faith*.”^k Is it really, however, not an even greater “scandal” to accept *on faith* the being and actuality of appearances themselves? Yet we saw that *in principle* it is all *one* question here to the extent that the “being of physical things” is taken phenomenologically. Apart from his sensualism, which lies at the foundation of the “refutation of idealism,” what does Kant give? *More* than “faith,” he gives a “creed.” What else are we to call the “primacy of

practical reason"? Once again I venture to cite Jacobi: "Transcendental Idealism, or Kantian Critical Philosophy, through which true science would first become possible, would let science get lost in science, understanding in the understanding, each and every cognition in a universal *groundlessness* from which there would be no escape. If only the seemingly dead reason would not now push out again arbitrarily from its artificial grave, breaking through it by force, if it were not raised above the world and everything in it, more brilliantly than before, crying in a victorious voice: Look, I make everything anew."²³

Jacobi has put reason under his protection, but he himself relied on the "belief" of the skeptical Hume. People are inclined to believe their senses by virtue of a "natural instinct or prepossession" and preserve their *belief* in external objects in all their thoughts, intentions and actions.²⁴ But what is this belief, and how does it exist? Hume, also like Kant, asserts that the idea of existence is no different from the simple idea of objects and adds nothing to it.²⁵ But as he himself says, he goes further still and thinks that "the belief of the existence joins no new ideas to those, which compose the idea of the object." It is only a manner¹ in which our idea or representation, is grasped, and this manner is conditioned, on the one hand, by the *presence* of impressions and, on the other hand, aroused by a *feeling* of habit. As a result we are concerned only with more vivid and lively ideas. Reason as argument cannot convince us of anything here.

Does Hume consider belief sufficient? Hume considers it incompatible with the wisdom of nature to trust the "order of ideas" to reason. Between the order of nature and that of our ideas he assumes a "preestablished harmony" and trusts our thought to "instinct." Hume does not see this as particularly scandalous for philosophy, and this allowed him, at least, to discern the problem which in fact is here, even if neither his skeptical attitude toward reason nor his definition of belief as a feeling that distinguishes true judgments from false ones satisfies us. One thing beyond dispute is that he understood the problem and moreover *posed* it phenomenologically. We rejected interpreting "evidence" as a sensuous index of truth. But the question arises here: What is "to replace" it? What in fact guarantees the actuality of the actual? Hume's formulation of the question is extraordinarily clear.

Jacobi relies entirely on Hume's theory of "belief," but as the "resolute realist" ("der entschiedene Realist")²⁶ sets himself in opposition to any kind of idealism. However how, then, is Hume's doubt to be resolved? Above all, the Scots [i.e. the Scottish school of common sense – trans.] attempted to resolve it, but their solution showed that they particularly had not

suspected the *noological* problem within it. Every realism resolves it, although only *theoretically*, the theoretical means sometimes amounting to the level of a simple *analogy*. Meanwhile from the very start Jacobi remains at a position *prior* to any theory, although it goes without saying that we encounter unfortunate turns in his thought. His *answer*, however, precisely shows that these are only unfortunate turns. "The realist has nothing," he says, "on which his judgment could rest other than the matter (*die Sache*) itself; nothing other than the fact that the things (*die Dinge*) actually stand before him. Is there a more appropriate word to express this than 'revelation'?"^m And then he says: "We surely have no proof at all of the existence in itself of a thing outside us other than the existence of the thing itself, and we must consider it absolutely incomprehensible that we can perceive such existence."ⁿ Then he asks: On what is the conviction of the realist based? "In fact on nothing other than a straightforward revelation which we cannot call anything but *truly wonderful*."^o

I will not insist that Jacobi's answer is convincing or unobjectionable. I only want to note his *feeling* a need to give some kind of answer, because the question arose. "Revelation" is no better than anything else. But is this answer not also *sui generis* nihilistic or at least skeptical with respect to reason and comprehension? I do not think so, since "revelation" can only be a form of comprehension, perhaps even the comprehension of experiencing intuition or of logical expression. But in any case it is *not itself* an intuition or a concept. If Jacobi himself still conceived the role of "reason" unclearly at the moment of the publication of the "Conversation"²⁷ quoted here, so much the more vividly did he stress the sense of his thought later in the "Introduction" to his <collected> philosophical works. Jacobi again interests us here not because of our agreement or disagreement with him but simply as a witness in favor of the existence of the problem we are tracing. It is our conviction that there are in Jacobi unfortunate turns of speech made under the influence of the same in Hume. But if because of these turns of speech in the "Conversation" one can get the impression that only the metaphysical problem of the reality of the external world interests him, then the mentioned "Introduction" clearly reveals another side to the matter.

Jacobi sees misunderstandings, which were engendered by his use of the words "reason" and "belief," and he now interprets his own earlier thought. Although he also sees his presently held views in the <earlier> "Conversation," they were at that time "still covered by the fog of the prevailing ideas. Along with all then contemporary philosophers he called reason that which is not reason, namely the mere faculty of concepts, judgments and inferences that soars above sensibility, a faculty that simply

cannot reveal anything immediately from itself. What, however, is reason actually and truly: the faculty of the presupposition of the in itself true, good and beautiful with full trust in the Objective validity of this presupposition. This reason he puts forward under the title of belief as a faculty above reason.”²⁸ Now, however, he ascribes “reason” only to man. The animal possesses only sensations and understanding. “The animal is aware only of the sensory; man, endowed with reason, is aware also of the supersensory. And he calls that with which he is aware of the supersensory his *reason*, just as he calls that with which he sees his *eyes*.”²⁹

We can conclude this historical comparison on the following note. We believe that the sense of the problem we sought has been sufficiently cleared up and this not just with respect to one formulation but even with respect to the attempts made in the direction of solving it. We will summarize the questions raised as a parallel set, proposing <thereby> to find a single general key to solving all of them. Phenomenology begins with the question: How does an appearance exist? And by means of description and distinction it arrives at an affirmation of their givenness, ultimately of their originary givenness in intuition, both experiencing and ideal. The question is how do we arrive at this and what is in intuition. What is intuition, both experiencing and ideal? Furthermore, the question concerning how an object exists in an appearance is satisfied with the affirmation of the noematic object as the bearer of sense entering into the established positum. The positum also includes under itself every type of logical expression, forming one of the strata of the noema. The question concerns how sense is apprehended in a positional moment, in particular in a logical expression. Finally the question concerning how an appearance exists in actuality or how an appearance actually exists is resolved by the assertion of a rational motivation in general through an analysis of the evidence and a clarification of the constitutive problems of givenness. The question is how does this very actuality exist, and how do we arrive at the source of rational motivation.

Author's Notes

1. *Ideas*, p. 349.
2. *Ideas*, p. 347.
3. *Ideas*, p. xx.
4. *Ideas*, p. 322.
5. *Ideas*, p. 326ff.
6. *Ideas*, p. 340ff.
7. *Ideas*, pp. 358–366.
8. *Ideas*, pp. 369–370.
9. *Ideas*, p. 355.
10. [*Ideas*, p. 356 – trans.]: “the idea of the physical thing, to remain with this region, if we speak of it now, is represented in the manner peculiar to consciousness by the conceptual thought, ‘physical thing,’ with a certain noematic composition.” [Shpet here quotes Husserl in the original German – trans.]
11. *Ideas*, p. 369.
12. *Ideas*, p. 330.
13. *Ideas*, p. 318.
14. As the investigations of the Würzburg School destroy it in psychology.
15. *Ideas*, p. 343.
16. In this respect the small book by G. Finnbogason, *Den sympatiske Forstaalse*, Copenhagen, 1911, presents most interesting material. He calls this seeing of the individual something “sympathetic understanding.”
17. *Ideas*, p. 365.
18. *Ideas*, p. 370.
19. Jacobi is quite right when he wrote that Kant “in order to cure this ailment of philosophy (*belief* in the existence of the external world) invented a demonstration which, miraculously enough, refuted the

previous imperfect and vague idealisms of Descartes, Malebranche and Berkeley by means of a complete and perfect idealism, Kantian universal idealism." *Werke*, Band II, Leipzig, 1815, p. 38.

20. We stress that what interests us is not the so-called problem of the reality of the external world, which is a purely metaphysical problem. We merely wish to terminate this analysis of the content of *appearance*, taking it as the object of phenomenology in its essential givenness. Kant's "proof of the existence of things outside me" belongs to the purely metaphysical side of the question.
21. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, New York, 1965, p. 243. (A225-226/B272-273)
22. Jacobi, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
24. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1902, p. 151.
25. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1941, p. 94ff.
26. Jacobi, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
27. *David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus. Ein Gespräch* was published in 1787. To it was added the "Vorrede, zugleich Einleitung in des Verfassers sämtliche Schriften" in 1815 in the *Werke*, volume II. We will recall, by the way, that in his Heidelberg article *Hegel* already recognized that he agreed with Jacobi if not in method then *in aim*. We will also recall that Hegel knew better than anyone that this is "reason."
28. Jacobi, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

Translator's Notes

- a. Reading “*fenomenologii*” for “*fenomologii*.”
- b. *Ideas*, p. 324.
- c. Following the terminology adopted in the English translation of Husserl’s text, cf. *Ideas*, p. 325. On other occasions we have translated “*podrazumevaemoe*” as “the meant” or “that which is meant.”
- d. *Ideas*, pp. 340–341.
- e. *Ideas*, p. 341.
- f. *Ideas*, p. 343.
- g. *Ideas*, p. 343.
- h. *Ideas*, pp. 369–370.
- i. Kant, *op. cit.*, p. 319 (A327/B384).
- j. *Ideas*, p. 342.
- k. Kant, *op. cit.*, p. 34 (Bxxix).
- l. In English in the original.
- m. Jacobi, *op. cit.*, pp. 165–166.
- n. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
- o. *Ibid.*, p. 167.

CHAPTER 7

Sense and Comprehension

From the problem of giving expression to experiencing and ideal intuitions we proceeded to one lying deeper in the foundation of phenomenology itself and therefore to one of general, fundamental importance, namely the problem of objective structure. Proceeding by way of the question of the relation between positional acts and the sense in a positum we return again to the problem of expression, though^a *<now>* completely generalized, so that the solution to it has equal significance for both intuitive as well as intellectual cognition. What is more, we find revealed in this generalization a new sense to the problem of "*actual being*" and the *fundamental* significance of this problem for all of philosophy, a fundamental significance that reduces our entire set of questions and doubts to one central point.

As we noted, the distinctive feature of phenomenology as contained in Husserl's exposition lies in the fact that *for the time being* he does not so much solve problems as *pose* them. This fact alone reveals the great productivity of the phenomenological method. For philosophy there is nothing which "goes without saying." Yet to *see* a philosophical problem demands a particular philosophical way of looking as well. The phenomenological attitude facilitates the intellectual seeing of problems. Indeed, it appears fraught with them. Every solution to a problem, or every attempted solution that can now be made, in turn discloses to us a new series of questions and demands probing anew deeper into the matter. Our question appeared in the manner indicated and at the very point where Husserl presented an answer to our first question. The latter thereby appeared in the form of a problem which by no means could be called a purely personal concern. Rather it is in agreement with a noted feature of phenomenological investigation, namely a constant return to the concern or thing itself, to what has already been done for the sake of a new reflection and a new check-up. This is the place to speak of a question of no less

importance than the fundamental “principle of all principles.”

Our question arose as a question concerning a *fact*. Properly speaking, it could be formulated as a doubt, as a demand for a critical answer concerning the distinction that “goes without saying” between the two “sorts” of intuition and, connected with the problem of their “relation,” the dispute between the nominalists and the realists. The doubt can be transformed into a positive question: Does this division exhaust the characteristics of the source of “originary” givenness? This doubt, however, receives its sense and its basic direction is established only in a clarification of the problems of the phenomenological method and methodology. By proceeding deeper into the content of phenomenology and revealing the fundamental moments in the structure of an *appearance*, our aim was to demonstrate that as we suspected from the very start there actually is a deficiency <in the mentioned division> and, as a consequence, the “content” itself of an appearance does not turn out to be completely revealed.

On the one hand, indubitable and firm concatenation-relations are seized upon between the positional act and the sense in the positum, while the description of the source, indicative of this “coincidence” between each of the two moments of a single “positum,” remains unclear, *incomplete*. On the other hand, because the manifestation of the “signification” appears under the veil of an “expression” (a concept) and the manifestation of the “sense” appears under the veil of the objective noema, we had to remain before the veil of the object itself. Consequently, the structure of the appearance is traced back but not to its ultimate “beginning.” Behind the veil of the object there still lies the riddle of the “beginning” of the object itself and along with it the “source” of its rational motivation.

Nevertheless an indication of the fundamental significance of all acts that “remove the veil” follows from the unity of their essence – regardless of whether these acts are conceived as sources of the originary givenness itself or of still unnoticed properties of the originary givenness. At the same time, our method of appealing to exemplification justifies itself, particularly in light of the mentioned essential unity. It does not matter what “stage” of this “removal of the veil” we may be. The technique of exemplification was directed chiefly at a “particular something,” but at the present time it is also directed at the vitally important problem of a logical concept and an actual multiplicity.

Therefore we must begin by briefly recalling our elucidation of the phenomenological answer to the question of the role of intuition given in the first chapter. We must do this since, as we have shown, our own problematic begins from it. The fact that the *answer* apparently remains

unclear even to conscientious critics of phenomenology leads us to dwell on it longer. It is natural to expect that the importance of new problems will not be immediately seen nor will they be immediately seen clearly.

To the extent that it is a repetition of the old problem of the relation between the individual and the universal, phenomenology is blamed for not solving the problem of the relation between the sensuous object and the ideal object. For example, Aster, as we saw, considers¹ neither of the two answers, that of Aristotle and that of Locke, as acceptable by virtue of the inconsistency of their respective positions. Husserl's position is consistent, but it forbids asking "Why?" at the very point where this question suggests itself. This question is forbidden because Husserl considers both sensuous and ideal givenness as originary facts.

We had to turn our attention to the fact that the mentioned reproach completely ignores the sense of the phenomenological reduction and arises only as a result of the fact that the reproach's author himself remains in the psychological point of view. He sees the old psychological difficulty of establishing a relation between a physical thing and a concept, and he demands a psychological solution to it. Nevertheless, the solution to it can only be given on the basis of phenomenology itself, since an ideal object is not the only thing seen in the eidetic attitude. The essence of the ideal object's relation to the sensuous, like any other essence, also demands the same eidetic attitude. We intellectually see it in the presented above singling out of the object and the sense in the noema. It is clear from this singling out how we come to a clarification of what is essentially peculiar to the "that which appears" based on its merely appearing.

The phenomenological reduction, parenthesizing what is given in the natural attitude, does not thereby destroy what is given in experiential intuition. On the contrary, the reduction preserves the given in all its inviolability, but it now sees *in another way of looking*. That which belongs to the essence of what is seen *cannot be* essentially different in different attitudes, otherwise it would not be an essence. For example, the essence of twelve does not change depending on whether it is a question of twelve apostles or twelve months or simply the number "twelve." That which is seen in its essence carries along with itself in the transition from one attitude to another whatever is in it.

The positional act, penetrating all strata of the noema, right up to the sense and the object of the noema and painted with some characteristic, is directed by one idea and a single essence. Therefore a logical expression conceptually bears that and only that which is given "to the eye." It follows from this that the content of the noema, as its sense, is preserved in all

operations which can be carried out with respect to the noema. The noematic content *penetrates all strata of the noema* and therefore also enters into the logical expression as its signification.

From this solution to the question there emerges here another, actually fundamental, problem. The logical, as the expressive, is but one of the strata in the complete noema, but precisely through what it expresses, that is through the "signification," it leads us to a new, broader problem: Not only does the conceptually logical expression stand opposed to the object with its "logical significations," but *every positum* stands opposed to the "sense" containing it. Yet by its unity with the latter the positum is itself actualized *as a positum*. Without this it is only a positional act of consciousness. It is now understandable to us how a positional act, being directed toward the content of an object, forms a positum "about" this content, since the phenomenological description of this varied content reveals to us in such a way its givenness. But the first difficulty we experience is provoked by the fact that in this description we are forced to certify the content as the "sense" in the shape of some sort of "*abstract form*."

In what way can a "form" make up the "sense," i.e., the "content" of the object or noema? If we would want to answer this question "theoretically," we would unquestionably have to turn to Aristotle's theory in order to ascend to Plato's and then skipping a number of centuries meet the analogous thought of Leibniz. Here we would actually find "form" as that which "animates" the dead, the way, it seems, that sense appears in Husserl's theory. But do we not find the same thing when we turn to phenomenology itself and to its pure description?

Let us take any object in its abstract dependency. Although we find in it "the object in the How of its determinations" (*der Gegenstand im Wie seiner Bestimmtheiten*) we do not find that *authentic sense* which is shown only by penetrating into the *internal intimate something* of that which stands before us! Let us take a concrete object and recall the example given by Aristotle of the axe. We, it is true, find its "internal sense" in its "chopping." That the sense is shown in the fully concrete "independent" object is quite correct. But how can the *internal something*, which we have been stressing, be connected to the concrete independent object if the former is not in the proper "Hows" of the object? And what is more, it, this internal something, is also not in the content of the abstract dependency of the object! As we pointed out, "sense" remains a "signification," although very broadened, and what we are looking for is not included *in it*.²

If we can find what we are looking for, however, in the concrete but not in the abstract object, what we are looking for is not merely present in the

former. Rather, as is easy to convince ourselves, it actually belongs to the essence of the concrete object. It, therefore, makes up the essence of the concrete, “independent” object, “creating” it for the first time. If this is the case, it remains for us to describe the internal something as we find it exactly in the concrete object. In other words, we examine the noema not only in the How of the object, the objective How, but also in the entire concrete nature of its fulfillment, i.e. the fulfillment of its sense.

If we take the example of the axe and present an account of what we actually find given in it, seeking what is *originarily* given in the given itself, we cannot help but notice the same situation noted on another occasion above, viz. with the description and determination of the “what” and the “how” of the object. We are not limited to an “unsubstantiated” givenness and evidentness, but can also reveal its “motivation.” This motivation leads us to the essence of the thing being described and at the same time also shows us in this essence the essential “concatenations” of the thing described. Evidently they can be predicated as if they formed “part” of the object in its determinant How.

At the same time, however, there is something peculiar to these predicates of “motivation” that prompts us to speak precisely of the “motivation,” something that, as it were, “leads” us away from the central noematic core. Correlatively, the noeses, too, adopt a new direction, and we can state that intentional consciousness “passes on,” as it were, to a new sphere of mental processes, without changing, however, the direction of its attention, which as before can remain directed to the corresponding central noematic core. Therefore a new stratum is revealed in the description of the object in its determinant How, a stratum closely connected with this “how” of the object but which must be distinguished from it by virtue of the considerations mentioned above.

We have grounds for considering this stratum as lying even deeper than the examined stratum of “sense,” since the former is revealed only in the latter, though not as the property of any of the predicative determinations. Therefore the new stratum cannot arise by itself in the context of the intuitive fulfillment of “sense.” Rather, it refers to the essence of the “whole” noema. We call it an “internal something,” since the “sense” as content *by itself* does not show it but only “refers” to it. The “sense” <in other words> is a “sign” of it.

In the case of our example we “intellectually see” in the “axe” not only the stratum of its determinations (“Hows”) as pure “hows,” but we intellectually see the “internal sense” in the fact that the axe “chops.” Certainly I can predicate this “chopping” as a pure quality, but it is impossible to

ignore the fact that this is precisely that quality which “leads” me away from the “axe,” conceived as the “content” of some noema, to the mentioned motivating concatenations. If I address myself to this quality, bearing in mind precisely this “aspect” of it, it in itself will be for me only a “sign,” and the “chopping” turns out to be the intimately internal something of the objective content itself. Thereby the “chopping” on the whole turns out to be, according to Aristotle, the objective content’s “soul” or *entelechy*. It is not difficult to represent in this entelechic stratum or, more accurately, in the core of the sense itself as content something that has its bearer in the same object as the entire noema, but for which the object in its determinant How is only an “external” sign.

As it refers to the essence of the noema as a whole entelechy is not the abstract form of any genus whatever but is something that secures the object in its concreteness. Entelechy, therefore, contains within itself that which characterizes the object with respect to its determinative “What.”^b That is, it points out the object’s being in some “state” of purposeful relation or *teleologicalness*. Even with the most careful description we would not be able to discover the aim or purpose in the originally given, the relationship to which we are concerned with here. Therefore the mentioned determination “to the What” must not be understood as meaning that motivation belongs to originary givenness. Rather, although we do ascertain the presence of “entelechy” ($\tauὸ\ \epsilonὐτελὲς\ \xiχεῖν$), an inclusion in teleological motivation, in originary givenness, it is by means of “signs.”

Amazingly such an incontestable fact as this, which ancient philosophy had already spotted, has so far escaped general recognition. Nevertheless, as further analysis partly shows, we are concerned with a fact of such fundamental importance that the character of all philosophizing depends on it. The “struggle against teleology,” so characteristic of modern philosophy, played a large role in ignoring this fact, although the very fact that this struggle is unsuccessful ought at least to testify to the fact that it is nothing other than a struggle of the blind against those who can see. However, since we will discover a new side to the question here, an essentially important side to it, we should show more consideration toward the source of the bitterness on the part of those who are blind.

The fact is that the exemplificational method in phenomenology is not its <own> invention. And both the merits as well as the shortcomings of it can pass into phenomenology, just as they have in the other sciences, even the eidetic ones. In spite of the fact that phenomenology operates with essences and with the eidetic, it can with the exemplificational method turn out to be “one-sided.” It not only risks mixing up essences, but in general it also risks

attributing to an essence of a higher genus that which is peculiar to an essence of only a species. Of course, this is a shortcoming not of phenomenology but of our own. Apparently such an occurrence took place while the opponents of teleology were blind.

It is not difficult to contrast an object in which the “content” is exhausted in its fulfillment to the example of an “axe.” Not only do we not notice “indications” of entelechy in the former but actually there “will not be” any entelechy in it. By rights we should have recognized such an object as “abstract,”³ but in order not to stray from our real task we can simply abstain from addressing this issue and agree that objects can be pointed to which are devoid of entelechy. It goes without saying that with such an admission we must also ignore the problem of the relation between means and ends, on the one hand, and parts to a whole, on the other. Consequently, let us choose an example which will turn out to be as free as possible from teleological suspicion and which, apparently, can be limited to itself or taken in isolation. Whether, for example, it is a star or a grain makes no difference.

From the ontological perspective it is a “physical thing”; from the phenomenological perspective it is an object with determinations and qualities, the content of which does not directly contain entelechy nor points to entelechy. Phenomenologically, with respect to the eidetic, the axe as an object reveals the same determinations <as it does from the other perspective>. Nevertheless, however paradoxical it may seem, there is something else that refers to the “Identical”^c of the axe but, for all that, is not discovered when we come to this same Identical from another example within the natural attitude.

We must recall, however, that with its first determinations phenomenology turns its attention to the heterogeneity of what is given not just in sensuous intuition but also in the ideal intuition of an essence. We find this heterogeneity in the case we are considering: Without further ado we can pass from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude both in the example of the axe as well as in that of a grain. Nevertheless, even in the natural attitude their place is determined differently, and this difference is not eliminated by an examination of the respective essences. On the contrary, through such an examination the difference, as we see, is revealed. An axe is a phenomenon of the *social* world, and a grain is a phenomenon of the “natural” world – on the one hand an object with an internal sense, an entelechy, and on the other, an object of pure content.

The phenomenological attitude, however, now allows us to see more clearly things that, although they are or occur in the natural attitude, are not

seen in their fundamental importance simply by virtue of the individual variety of empirical givenness. It is not difficult to convince ourselves that *any* object at all – in any case any concrete object – *can* have entelechy of its own. For this only the “assistance” of a *corresponding* act of intentional consciousness is necessary. This does not mean that we concede the “creative” transformation of an essence of one genus into that of another, for example an essence of the genus “natural” into one of the genus “social.” What we have in mind, rather, is the possibility of a motivational “conversion” which “depends” on the directedness itself not only of our attentional transformations but also of positional acts, acts which in general posit and which doxically posit “posita” in particular.

As we saw, however, the determination of entelechy is not something peculiar to the positional act, as such, *in itself*. Consequently here it is a matter of a certain correlativity in the noema “connected” with positional consciousness just as “sense” is connected with the object in a “positum.” Since we leave aside the “part-whole” relationship and admit “pure” contents as contents exhausted in the determinative How of the object, we are actually confronted with a peculiar state of affairs. As a consequence of what we have done, we can see entelechy where there is “none.” We see entelechy which “does not exist.” This is not entelechy in the proper sense but an entelechy “as it were,” a quasi-entelechy.

We are constantly concerned with quasi-entelechies in the natural attitude when we “posit” in an appearance, in a physical thing, something which, properly speaking, is “unusual” for it, for example when we say a grain dances, a star predicts or an axe narrates. This “fairy tale” world presupposes a quite peculiar modification of consciousness. Although it does not lose its positional character, this modification, nevertheless, establishes *posita sui generis*. With this modification we do not remonstrate against the “falsity” of *posita*, but we also do not assert their “truthfulness.” With it we remain, in the positional act itself, *outside* the very division of truth and falsity. Husserl analyzes this distinctive modification in detail under the heading “neutralization,”⁴ and evidently we are concerned here with those noeses-noemata which correspond to the neutrality modification just as in general entelechy corresponds to sense. The only essential fact is that here where “no” entelechy is detected an entelechy can be intellectually seen as a quasi-entelechy. Therefore the determination of entelechy, being the determination of the internal, intimate noematic core, concerns not some special essence but rather can take place with respect to any noema, the content of which remains an independent, concrete content.

We must also trace the entelechy of the object with respect to its correla-

tive noesis. We already saw that entelechy makes up the core of the content itself, and we know that the entelechic noesis is revealed in the full "positum" as a distinctive "stratum" of the positional act. Turning to the very essence of such acts, we can observe that the correlative determination of being and its characteristics, peculiar to such acts, actually takes place also in the case we are concerned with here, since the entelechy in the Object is subject to all of the same modalities of "doxic characteristics" as is the Object itself. We actually even speak of the Object's doubt, presumed likelihood, certainty, assumption, etc. in relation to entelechy. It is not hard to see, however, that this is a result merely of the fact that entelechy, making up the internal core, the "soul" of the object, cannot be taken away from it. As such, entelechy demands a peculiar act characteristic not only of doxa but a quite distinctive act which animates the doxa itself. This act is not itself a positional act but is, as it were, found in the positional act, and without it the latter is simply "mechanized," just as it can be said about the Kantian categories that they acquire their content "mechanically."

In view of the already revealed peculiarities of these acts, expressed in the fact that these acts intellectually see in the content of the noema only a sign for the internal something, for entelechy, we can call these acts which animate any positum *hermeneutical* acts. Consequently, we can consider the "positum" not only as the unity of the sense and the moments of a positional character, but their unity together with the unity of the entelechy and the moments of a hermeneutic character. It is the latter unity that makes up within itself the unity of the object with its living intimate sense.

We do not think it is feasible to dwell on this extremely terse expression of what phenomenological analysis reveals with regard to consciousness and the object. Rather, we must enter into a somewhat more detailed examination of certain aspects of the question without placing restraints on our freedom to pass from a purely phenomenological description to ontological conclusions based on it, nor in like manner to place restraints on an appraisal of the general philosophical importance these conclusions can have. On the other hand, however, we must stress that it is not part of our aim here at present to solve the problems raised. On the contrary, we merely want to emphasize as clearly as possible their formulation and the importance they have.

Husserl's examination of the object leads to an analysis of "sense." We have proceeded from there. But as we already indicated in this regard, "sense" in Husserl has a rather greatly extended "signification." Undoubtedly in a certain orientation we have sufficient grounds for identifying these terms, but first and foremost we have also wanted to put into the

forefront their peculiar distinctive differences. In essence we are completely indifferent in our use of these terms mainly within the sphere of the "significations" of words, i.e. of language, in general within the grammatical and philological sphere. Nevertheless, however, we prefer the term "signification" for use within this sphere. On the contrary, in speaking of physical things, ideas and objects we not only have spoken principally of their "sense," but we have distinguished "signification" from "sense" rather sharply. In general the presence of a "sign" having "signification" is more characteristic, precisely speaking, of "expressions," qua "statements" in words or gestures, than of objects themselves as such. In the latter case "sense" acquires a deeper, more internal nuance. That which is a sign is not considered a sign *par excellence*, but its being, in its capacity as a sign, actually enters as one of the "Hows" of the object. We would rather, therefore, retain for the term "signification," in Husserl's peculiar definition, a reference to the "content" of an "expression," whereas "sense" as a term would be used for designating the object in its determinant How, the content of the object, and the internal sense of the object itself would be designated as entelechy.

In connection with this it is evident that the term "positum" (*Satz*) demands a parallel term, since the essence of the matter makes it a question not of the characteristics that establish being but, as we can already say, of acts that establish *the sense of actual being*. Actually, "sense" as "signification" – for the most part logical signification – to the extent that it "expresses" the "sense" of the object, does not transgress the bounds of the determinable "content" whereas we can speak of the sense of the object itself, or ontologically about *the sense of the physical thing*. After all it is evident that the sense of a positum also makes up its content, the object in its determinant How. But the sense of the object itself is something completely different and new. In the case, for example, when we are simply thinking a "concept" not expressed in words, we have nevertheless its content, which we can consider as the signification.

The internal sense of the object is another matter. It enters into the very concept (or positum) as something attached to the concept only because some other act, which introduced this sense with itself, was effected along with the positional act. Concepts that have a definite signification can turn out to be completely devoid of sense, for example, the concept of "nature" in the science of mechanics. And the fact that we can introduce a quasi-sense into it shows that the act of sense-bestowal is an independent act *sui generis* not necessarily attached to a pure positional act. The act of sense-bestowal, or hermeneutical act, consequently, is in need of a term whose

definition is that which fulfills an “expression,” i.e. the sense in the positum, and this term is nothing other than “*interpretation*” or “*construal*.” The “*interpretation*” itself, however, is “expressed,” and moreover *in the same* positum which forms the unity of the sense and the positional moment. This fact is extremely important, since we intellectually see from it the foundation of the tight togetherness of positional and hermeneutical acts. Εστὶ δὲ λόγος δπας μὲν σημαντιχός, οὐχ ώς ὅργανον δὲ, ἀλλ̄ ... χατὰ συνθήχην.^d

The ontological conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis are of doubtless interest and fundamental importance. The fact is that the possibility of obtaining the entelechy of an object by means of pure description shows that the relation which plays such a paramount role in all philosophical disputes, the relation between the means and the end, is not something introduced by us into our theoretical cognition for cognitive “convenience.” It is, rather, essentially a relation peculiar to the physical thing itself and is ascertained by us in such a form. As a phenomenological description, ontological constructions of teleological systems are not “*theories*.” They are, though, an expression of a certain order among essences as well as of a certain order in the action itself to the extent that this matter concerns the action in its concreteness. The “*connections*,” which we do not “construct” but actually *find*, are sense-bestowed, teleological connections.

It goes without saying that we are not asserting here that a simple insight reveals to us the purpose in physical things. But it does reveal the presence of purpose, since it does reveal the presence of sense. This is enough, since more will be revealed through an analysis of the very content of the object after we have distinguished the positional from the hermeneutic contents.

The newest form of the denial of teleology, the theory of the relation between ends and means as reversed causality^e (Wundt), obviously therefore does not correspond to the actual state of things, provided causal cognition retains its signification as a *theoretical* cognition, a signification that is peculiar to it *par excellence*. I consider this theory to be negative, since I see in it a latent form of mechanical naturalism, where, contrary to the direct declaration of its representatives, no “reconciliation” at all is reached between teleology and mechanism.

On the contrary, I see in Wundt’s theory a denial of specifically distinctive teleological grounds for an immanent spontaneity and a choice of means. The theoretical element that is necessarily introduced with the construction of a theory and hypotheses in any appeal to causality as an explanation is in essence *not* inherent in teleology. A teleological relation is established not by means of hypotheses and theories and therefore cannot

play an *explanatory* role in our cognition. It is such a role which forms the authentic sense of any appeal to a causal relation. On the contrary, since the end is established by means of description it itself is still in need of explanation similar to the other "Hows" of the object, just as are all the properties and relations of the object. The seeming strength of all deterministic assertions lies precisely in this, since actually we can always talk about every choice even our freest one <in such a way>. Or in any case we consider it legitimate to ask about those *Whys* on the basis of which we made our choice. Evidently an appeal to the end or goal itself would be here only an evasion from answering, since given the possible multiplicity of means for the attainment of an end it is important to show *why precisely this* and not some other means is chosen.

This itself, however, indicates the correct relation which in fact exists between teleology and causality. The presence of an end in particular testifies to a certain action, which as to its causes arises before us as a problem. Owing to this fact it is clear that the question of the operative cause arises, above all, where we manage to ascertain purposefulness. In other words, the true relation between causality and teleology is such that the determination of fitness to an end serves as an inducement for recovering the actual causes. The end is a heuristic means of establishing causal relations – a fact which, by the way, has already been noticed in the literature (Sigwart). Each of the moments of the system of means-ends is connected with a peculiar system of causal relations, but each of them lies in its own peculiar dimension. Proceeding by means of an analysis of causal relations and systems we are led to theoretical generalizations and to the creation of peculiar modifications of the objective content, i.e. abstract laws and relations. On the other hand, advertence toward a teleological sharpening of the system never leaves the ground of the concrete independence of the object and leads to an individualization of the system.

These conclusions induce us to return again to a question that has been left open until now and answer it on the basis of a phenomenological analysis: By what means do we come to the ultimate conclusion or sharpening of a teleological system, viz. the individual thing? The answer given to this question in contemporary logic is obviously unsatisfactory, since the very word-combination "individual concept" contains a *contradiccio in adjecto*, and its definition as the concept of an individual is *logically* far from being perfect. On the other hand, we come upon an identification of the individual concept with sensuous intuitive completeness (Rickert), an identification based on a very imperfect psychological analysis and containing absolutely no indication as to the means by which we come to a

recognition of the presence of an individual. We must now turn to a phenomenological analysis of the noetic correlate of those noemas in which we manage to note the presence of entelechy. Among them we will find an important source of our expressions about fitness to an end and individuality.

So far we characterized this aspect in a quite general manner as the specific sphere of hermeneutical acts that are attached to positional acts in general, although they are also attached to the latter in their particular modifications. We wish to investigate the nature of these acts closer without stopping until we reach necessary ontological and psychological conclusions. We saw that the unity of "sense" and positional character is expressed in a positum, taking this in an extremely broad signification, by virtue of which we obtain the possibility of examining any intentional act of consciousness as an act establishing a positum. Consequently, we were also able to speak about a specific intuitive positum as an intuitive "sense" (signification). By taking into consideration the broadened signification of entelechy, into whose sphere quasi-entelechy is introduced, we can say that any consciousness can be a hermeneutic consciousness. For this reason we can correspondingly also speak about the internal sense of an intuitive positum, the entelechy, and about *hermeneia* in general as the unity of entelechy with a hermeneutic character, but particularly also about intuitive hermeneia. We choose intuition, in particular, for analysis not because of the alleged identity of the individual with the manifold given in intuition but because in intuition we are concerned with the originally given. If we can answer here the question of how we arrive at a determination of entelechy, the task of tracing its givenness in other characters will not be so difficult.

We have distinguished two kinds of intuition: experiencing and ideal intuition, or intuition of essence. This distinction now appears to us in a completely new light, since we now see to what extent the very designation of them as "genera" or "classes" or whatever was relative. Consequently, it is simply a question of one "source" of originally givenness, of the beginning or of the original beginning, the "origin" in the specific sense, the *Ursprung*. Yet it is also a question of various advertences of the look "into" the source, of the various attitudes that yield a difference in insight. Therefore, when the question of originally givenness arises, its answer must be sought in accordance with the fundamental demand of the principle of all principles.

Above all, the question can arise here whether the givenness of entelechy is not simply an originally givenness, which we could call an intuitive

givenness. If so, we would have to speak of a separate kind of *intelligible intuition*, as is demanded in accordance with everything we have said. But how would we have to understand this? Is this to be a third "genus" of intuition alongside the other two? If such is the case, we would have the characteristic of some third genus of objects alongside objects experientially and ideally given. This would allegedly also agree with the fact that entelechy is not intellectually seen in every physical thing, nor in every object. Such a position, however, is easily refuted by a simple appeal to description. In view of the different kinds of introjection and anthropomorphism doubts may still linger here in the natural attitude. They vanish, however, in the phenomenological attitude, since it can be shown that objects exist whose essence does not show the presence of entelechy. At the most we can speak of a quasi-entelechy in them.

On the other hand, such an assertion would be nothing other than the expression of the idea of a new attitude. This, however, would not conform to the phenomenological path we have pursued, a path which has surely revealed the presence of an intelligible intuition. Along this path we found that the seeing of entelechy accompanies the positional act and cannot exist without it.

Let us turn again to a phenomenological analysis of intuition with the aim of describing the very character of the intelligibility in what is originally given. So long as we take the given in the integrity of our mental process, we find that the originally given actually turns out to be on hand. This still does not speak, however, in favor of its originality proper. On the whole we find that much of the given in the concreteness of the mental process is not originally given, since we always ascertain some more recollections, images, representations and so forth. Do we have the right, however, to ascribe the intellectual seeing of entelechy entirely to the reproductive content of a mental process?

Here we find the complete originality of the noetic side of the hermeneutic positum. If we could not intellectually see anything in entelechy except the reproductive content, we would have to recognize that entelechy amounts to nothing but the content of intuitions, and we would ultimately come to a rather strange position defending, in accordance with the principle of all principles, a pure sensualism in the natural attitude and in the phenomenological attitude a pure intellectualism. But the ascription of a presentative character to intelligible intuition imposes a great responsibility, since with the incommensurability of intelligible intuition, on the whole, with the two characteristics of originary givenness there arises before us the extremely difficult problem of the source of hermeneutic acts.

Actually the attempt to single out the presentative moments of an intelligible intuition by means of pure description runs up against an extraordinary difficulty. In all examples in the ordinary natural attitude, regardless of which one is chosen for analysis, we cannot say *uniquely* of the content of an intelligible intuition what we are saying about the content of other intuitions. We cannot immediately "feel" its originariness and say: Here it is!

In the natural attitude things continuously appear before us as signs. Language, art, any social object at all, organisms, people, etc., etc. always appear as signs and with their own inner intimate sense. Although we do not see, hear, or touch it, we nevertheless "know." We know that "*der Tisch*" means the table, that table means an instrument for such and such an end. Here is its sense, its entelechy. We know that birds have wings for flying, that a given pamphlet was written for a protest. Finally we know that something simply lies here for some reason!

A phenomenological analysis of the respective objects also shows us that it actually belongs to the essence of the social to have an end, i.e. to possess entelechy. The same holds for the essence of organism and so forth. Analyzing these examples from any field of life, it is not hard to see that determining the presentative moments in particular poses a difficulty of the highest degree, since factually speaking we will ascend or descend everywhere toward *conclusions* of different kinds. As a result of this we will lose their origin somewhere in obscure conjectures about our childhood. This natural analysis, however, has had to fix our attention on another most interesting aspect of this act of "getting to know." At each step we come to a final point, which we characterize with the words: I was told by such and such a person; I read it there; I was taught it in school, etc. Among the "facts" learnt in such ways there are many that will always remain learnt from "another," from a "witness." At the same time, however, it often happens that we "see" the entelechy or the regularity of purpose *in a different way* than does the communicating "witness," while not contesting the very fact itself. Certainly here again inferences and perhaps other testimonies, comparisons, etc. play a role. But all we have to do is turn to a phenomenological analysis, and we will see that our "independent" stance, our "critique" and "interpretation" concerns the very essence of intelligible intuition.

What also belongs, however, to the essence of intelligible intuition is that we "insert" entelechy into both intuition and every positional act. Consequently, there is always on hand a directedness of a peculiar kind in the direction of entelechy, an entelechy which likewise really does not reduce

to acts of intuitive perception, just as for example attentional changes and acts of attention in general do not reduce. But there is a fundamental difference too: Acts of attention, pure acts of the Ego in general, give nothing in themselves (except themselves). Yet something is given, “is added” here to the given of the intuition.

It is evident that we must turn our attention to this “learning” itself, this “getting to know from others,” etc. There are “facts” which we apprehend *in no other way* than as a communication from another. But communication from another is not the essence of the corresponding things. It is not an act of consciousness, *qua* directedness. The communication itself forms an intentional Object, but it is not a *consciousness of something*. We must turn precisely in this direction, in the direction of how we arrive at the fact that the “communication” is for us an “originarity.” It is not a matter of psychology, not a matter of how this apprehension and understanding of the “communication” “develops,” but of the wonderful thing that makes this communication possible. This wonderful thing also has its psychological side, but it must be intellectually seen in its essence, because – as it is not hard to convince ourselves – it alone makes any psychological examination intelligible to some extent.

Psychologically speaking we can say as much as we want about the interaction between individuals, about their common spirit, indeed about anything. But what is important is that it belongs to the essence of consciousness itself not only to see intellectually, but also to *understand*, to *comprehend*, what is intellectually seen. Indeed this “comprehension” is not merely an inference, just as it is not merely a representative function in general but also a presentative one. This presentative function actually lends wings to the objects, animates them. We can actually speak of a special group of objects to whose essence *to be comprehensible* belongs.

Phenomenological analysis by itself embraces every division of psychology and holds this wonderful uniting of individuals as one “act” among a multitude of others. For it there are no “solitary prisons” like those of which Sigwart speaks. *Absolute social solitude, “solitary confinement,” is the destiny not of the individual, as such, but only of the insane.* To forfeit the faculty of intelligible intuition, of comprehension, even granted the full perfection of experiencing and ideal intuitions, means to go mad – the sole means of escape from the social union.

This “property” of breaking down the partitions and penetrating into the Intimate of the very thing that wants to be left alone belongs to the essence of consciousness in any and all of its acts. Since this is the case, however, this aspect of the “spirit,” or rather the *spirit-reason* itself, must also be

revealed in the normal natural attitude. It is not part of our plan here to expound the psychology of comprehension. We wish to turn our attention merely to the following fact: However much we speak of the comprehension that we "learn," there is always without doubt something to be said about the "ability" to comprehend, a peculiar *bernoccolo*^f of comprehension. And, as with every "ability," it has various degrees ranging from stupidity to gifted.

The consensus,^g συνθηκή, of which Aristotle speaks cannot be taken as the result of some sort of development. Consensus is itself a condition of development, and as to our psychological-biological development evidently the *unity of birth* must first and foremost be drawn on for an explanation of this consensus. Not only the fact of understanding speech but to an even greater degree the fact of understanding within the limits of its genus, right up to its most indeterminate forms, such as mechanical imitation, sympathy, inner sensation and so forth are only manifestations of this one "*comprehension*," which, as a function of *reason*, conditions every social intercourse.

With regard to our formulation of the question in the fifth chapter we are now convinced that the sense of an appearance, to the extent that it is revealed in the content of the object, actually contains the principle for disclosing the physical thing as an actual being. But this principle is revealed in the object's entelechy only by means of comprehension. Indeed only here does this principle appear in its fundamental signification, since from it the principle that *every* object is sense bestowed is intellectually seen. Just as the sense of an ideal object lies in its very ideality and the sense of an abstract object in its abstractness as a dependent being, so the sense of the concrete is revealed in its intermediate position, its "translating" relation, between part and whole, where the insight of entelechy is nothing other than the full act of seeing the "idea" in its fulfilling signification. A purely formal assertion of the part-whole relation happens to be sufficient for determining the "actuality" of the physical thing. Thus such an assertion can serve as a heuristic means for moving toward a comprehension of the concrete, since from where in fact does the fundamental distinction between "the whole" and "the sum of the parts" spring if not from entelechy? What else but the word "purpose" speaks of the difference between two such "sums of the parts" as, for example, the "intact" glass and the "broken" drinking glass, the page composed and set and the page scattered in type, etc., etc.?

In this way of looking at actual being the problem of "expression" acquires a new form. The being of understanding is limited to the positional

activity of ascertaining posita. Only thanks to comprehension, which penetrates still deeper, does a sense-bestowing function appear, and the understanding's "expressive" stratum is illuminated in a new way. "Expression" (concept) splits, as it were, into two parts. That is, along with the purely logical form of "envelopment" and "embracing" peculiar to the understanding, we notice another, a rational moment of "sense-bestowal" and "comprehension."

The being of reason consists in hermeneutic functions that ascertain the rational motivation emanating from entelechy as the "bearer" of objective being, that is, as the "spirit of the object." The latter finds its characteristic in *logos*, in an "expression," which penetrates the object and which makes up the appearance, the "manifestation," the "incarnation" of the spirit of the object. Its "Objectification," being rational, motivated, is the directedness that organizes the various forms of the spirit according to their social essence: language, cults, art, engineering, law.

From this analysis completely new paths are revealed to the explication of the constitution both of the highest regional categories as well as of any individual experiential givenness. Taking into account the presence of *full* sensefulness only in the *fully* concrete, it is not hard to see that the very "arrangement" of the regions finds its rational principle in the very starting point of the constitution of concrete-rational actuality. Rigorous observance of the "principle of all principles," as regards "appearances," and the consistent implementation of the principle legislating "actuality" itself in terms of appearances, guarantees obtaining the "actual" sense of the "world" in its actual rationality. No "subjectivity" at all of interpretation can in principle hide the "Objectivity" of what is interpreted.

We must add to the above our final conclusion, namely that the "division" of intuitions into experiencing and eidetic intuitions is by its very sense and essence a division that excludes any third possibility. As was shown, this division is not the establishment of *two* species or genera but is a reference to the path of "advertisence" from the experiential to the eidetic in the object itself through the unrestricted perspective of specification and the embodying of genera. Therefore there exists in principle and in general only *one single* intuition, and this is *experience* in the comprehensive sense of the word, regardless of however great may be the multiplicity of the types and forms of being encompassed by this sense.

If we have in mind the actual content of any actual mental process, we can say even more, namely that every actual experience is a sensual experience with factual necessity as to its content composed of definite sensual data. In this regard there is not the slightest ground for us to make

an exception with respect to revelation or mystical experience. As an originary givenness such experience is, above all, the givenness of an experiencing intuition and thereby has a sensual content. Indeed what distinguishes revelation or mystical experience from other types of being is not simply the being which is revealed in it but, above all, what is *intelligibly* seen in it. The latter, by the way, determines in general for the first time the type and the form of the being in its specific motivation. It follows from this that a "mystical perception" is not a peculiar "species" of intuition but is also an "experiencing" intuition though its object has a specific entelechy of its own. Consequently it does not represent a peculiar species of the cognizable, but is a peculiar genus of the "comprehensible." In this light the entire world of mysticism and revelation is the *same* world, of the same *experience*, though of a peculiar comprehension.

The subject touched upon has essential significance because it is the sole form of *experience* which with an apparent basis could be opposed to or placed alongside sensuous experience. But the "illusory" nature of this basis is easily seen from any description of mystical experience, wherein the presence of the sensuous content is not only inevitably recognized but almost always also receives an especially vivid and intensive presentation.

As we see from the preceding, the claim for a mystical comprehension of experience is not a solution to the secondary problem of the place of an ethical or an aesthetic comprehension. But it is a satisfaction of the demand that the comprehensible *Spirit* itself makes for its "acceptance." The elimination of "solitude" through the common feature of birth and the consanguinity of all that is "rational" in an all-encompassing social union and in the motivation of Its Objectivations is, in this sense, the pillar of the Spirit itself.

Such an elucidation of the question, it seems to us, gives us the right to construct demarcations between philosophy as a whole and that "peculiar" comprehension which can take its stand in its own right. As is evident from the remarks just made, this new delimitation of philosophy is in principle of another kind and of another signification than is its delimitation from the "special" comprehensions of the special sciences. Through a "comprehension" of the world as it *is*, through a self-comprehension of reason, philosophy arrives at the world's "truth" and its "beauty." "Beauty redeems the world," "the world actualizes truth," "reason is its propelling agent" and so forth — all these assertions and insights are united "peacefully," mundanely, *secularly* in the one task of philosophy, namely the *justification of the world*, its *full* justification. "The *whole* world must be justified in order that we can live." Consequently the border that is con-

structed here between philosophy and the mentioned “peculiar” comprehension of the world is clearly determined: For philosophy there are no *worldly* “sins” or “crimes.”

Philosophy, hence, is always an uneasiness, always a pretension, always an anxiety. The philosopher has no shelter, and in this lies the greatest value of philosophy, namely freedom. Only as a slave and a servant can it approach “that shelter where the uneasiness of the heart is quieted, where the pretensions of the understanding are appeased, where a great calm descends into reason.”⁵

A *philosopher* says: “A flight from the world, however, is only conceivable as a flight from the world one has known, from the life one has experienced. Only the recollection of the wealth of spiritual existence, of happiness and misfortune, hopes and disappointments, which are included and produced in the social interlacing of human aspirations, can offer for solitary contemplation an object of reflection. It is in consideration of this object that contemplation forms its representation of supersensuous life. He who has experienced nothing is not made wiser by loneliness. And the intercourse with phenomena of nature and with thoughts which a mind removed from human society would still preserve could lead to no other tranquillity than that which the animal possesses.”⁶

Author's Notes

1. B.V. Jakovenko's criticism that in order to single-out the purely logical from a general phenomenological mental process the former must somehow be "mixed" or connected in such a mental process with the psychological has an analogous sense. See Jakovenko, *op. cit.*, p. 143. I think that my criticisms of Aster should also explain this bewilderment on the part of Jakovenko.
2. In the previous chapter we spoke of the role of "fullness" in the sense of modes of givenness and, in general, of intuitive fullness.
3. And thereby "abstract" not in the logical sense, but in the sense of *actuality* itself. Ontologically and metaphysically this means that, for example, matter (physically or chemically speaking), taken as the actuality of the world which surrounds us, is a *complete abstraction*.
4. *Ideas*, p. 257ff.
5. The words of P.A. Florensky, *Stolp i utverzdenie istiny*, Moscow, 1914, p. 5. He goes on to say (p. 12): "In life everything shakes and flutters like the hazy lines of a mirage. From the depths of the soul, however, arises an irrepressible need to rely upon 'The Pillar and Foundation of Truth'."^h But why must this "need" be satisfied, and why must it turn away from the place where "everything shakes"? Is it because this would be a "transgression"? In his attempt to surmount skepsis Florensky cherishes the "*hope for a miracle*," for "*a gift, qua gratia quae gratis datur*." (pp. 40–41) This surmounting must also be a surmounting of the essential antinomical character, the contradiction, that penetrates each and everything without exception. If I understand correctly, the antinomical character is surmounted "when the Comforter, *qua Hypostasis*, is known." (p. 128) It is not difficult to see that in a "peculiar" comprehension what Florensky holds is an idea to which we also adhere. But starting precisely with "Sin" everything is different.

“*Sin is lawlessness*,” (p. 168) claims Florensky in the words of John the Theologian, and “A transgression is a *trans*-gression over the border, boundary, limit of the ‘law’,” “just as adultery is a sexual act over the border, an exclusion of the line of the ought” (p. 700). But surely there is such a thing as to be *over*-wise, *over*-good and *over*-beautiful... Certainly these are also *trans*-gressions! How could this be? And surely *gratia quae gratis datur* is also a *trans*-gression? ... But the following is also a ‘sin’: “The dead husband who visits his grieving widow at night, the son or the daughter who mysteriously returns after a distant separation from his/her parents, the suitor who presents himself to a girl or vice versa, the angel of light who succumbs to the champion of pride and conceit. *All these are cases of vampirism and devilish phenomena...*” (p. 698, my emphasis)! ... Well, and what if they are also frightfully uttered!? ...

Certainly it can be otherwise. But there I can turn to Florensky only with a *question*. *First Law*: “but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die.” *First trans-gression*: Man wanted to die. “Then the Lord God said: Behold, Adam has become like one of Us, knowing good and evil; and now lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever – therefore the Lord God sent him forth...” But this did not signify a prohibition to take from the tree of life. Then came the descendants of Cain. They built cities; they lived in tents with their flocks; they played on psalteries and pipes. They forged all sorts of instruments from copper and iron. But Cain had also other descendants, “another child in place of Abel,” and from them descended Man, the Human Son, who “took from the tree of life” and by way of this *justified* the world. But to what is the Spirit attracted, to justification or to “bliss” and “eternal recollection” (p. 185)? ... [They say, perhaps, that this is heresy, Origenism? Nothing of the kind!]

6. Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, Band III, Leipzig, 1909, p. 48.

Translator's Notes

- a. Reading “*no*” instead of “*po*”.
- b. Cf. in the *Ideas*, p. 312, Husserl writes: “Each consciousness has its *What* and each means ‘its’ objective something; it is evident that, in the case of each consciousness, we must, essentially speaking, be able to make such a noematic description of <‘its’ objective something>, ‘precisely as it is meant;’ ...”
- c. Following the practice in the English translation of the *Ideas* where a similar idea occurs (*Ideas*, p. 313) we have capitalized “identical” in order to emphasize that the term is used as a substantive. However, in Shpet’s text the Russian word is not capitalized.
- d. Aristotle, *De Interpretione*: “Every sentence has meaning, not as being the natural means by which a physical faculty is realized, but ... by convention.” *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon, New York, 1941, p. 42.
- e. Wilhelm Wundt, *System der Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1889, pp. 322–325.
- f. The Italian word for “lump.”
- g. In English in the original.
- h. Florensky’s expression here is taken from St. Paul: I Tim 3:15.

Conclusion

Here in our conclusion we will not solve the problems we have revealed but only point them out. From the phenomenological problematic we proceeded to problems, which are not purely philosophical. In this way we sought to show the connection between the former and problems of a living, *empirical* cognition and thereby to illustrate how from problems proper to phenomenology new problems arise both for it and for scientific cognition in all its spheres. Actually the sphere of the questions we have developed shows that phenomenology can and must be the fundamental science in all senses and respects. The special question that we chose illustrates in a particular instance how problems ranging the spectrum from those concerning the particular sciences to those of a most general philosophical nature are connected into one when seen in the light of their phenomenological foundations. In the example we chose we found the basis for the formulation of psychological and social problems, among others. We obtained this basis by proceeding toward these problems from the general question of the aims and the motivations of the concatenations given to us in the context of the unified whole of universal sensefulness and fitness to an end in all of the whole's concrete manifestations and in those individual completions of the concatenations. Only through these concatenations can a unified integral and complete cognition be constructed. Such a cognition is in essence philosophical.

Thus we have looked at phenomenology itself here as a whole *sub specie entelechiae*,^a and we see, understand, that conceived in terms of its ultimate tasks its sense is to be the fundamental philosophical science for positive work in the field of philosophy. Such is the foundation, and thus on this ground, for which we are grateful, its philosophical problematic arises and is developed. It is impossible to defend completely this development in all of its details and particulars. But in its principles we see unassailable

grounds. These principles are foreign to the sophistic tricks of negativism and epistemologism. Perhaps not all principles of phenomenology are subjectively of equal value. As a summary of our entire presentation, therefore, we want to stress what in our opinion and from the point of view of our interpretation presents itself as of value.

The corner-stone of the entire edifice of phenomenology is that it firmly establishes a presentativism of everything that exists in all of its species and forms for our consciousness. It strikes a blow equally against both phenomenalism and Kantian dualism. The principle of all principles remains the sole criterion for establishing any form or species of being. The actual realization of this principle leads to absolute evidence, to the source of a control on statements about this being. In this way every sophistic construction of what exists "on its own" is destroyed. An analysis of the immediately and originally given leads to an affirmation of an absolutely given something in immanent perception, and thereby all the efforts of relativism to reduce philosophy to nothing are neutralized. After this the rigorous correlativity of object and consciousness serves as a sufficient guarantee of success with regard to an assertion about relations and forms of any genus of being.

Finally, ascertaining the multitude and variety of objects that always appear is a task yet awaiting our resolution. It reveals the complete fancifulness of all attempts to grasp in an a priori manner being as the product of a logicizing understanding, an understanding conforming for the most part to one already attained model. The dogma of a "model science" ("mathematical natural science"!) is hereby denied not only as dogma, but its very method of "concept construction," of "concept formation," etc. is also revealed in its isolated futility. The living and productive method of description does not support any theoretical constructions. Rather it finds an inexhaustible field for the application of its forces in the sole immediate source of and application for any creative work at all, viz. in intuition. One of the greatest contributions of phenomenology is the fact that it transferred the old dispute about universals and particulars, about realism and nominalism, from the sphere of anemic abstractions to the living depths of intuitive experience, which within the entire mental process forms the "beginning" and the "source" of any philosophizing at all.

With its method of reductions and the distinction of attitudes phenomenology reveals new worlds of being, though not across from our actual being but, rather, in it itself. These new worlds are intuitively perceptible by anyone who is "not blind with respect to ideas." The Platonic kingdom of ideas is revealed to us as our kingdom.

With the resolution of the problem about the relation between the universal and the particular we ascertain or, more accurately, once again see the immediate unity between them, that unity in which we live and act. The content of life is animated not only through the significations that we discover in it but also through that inner sense thanks to which there arises in us a feeling of our own place in the world and of everything in it. If we would not reveal the possibility of grasping its sense and signification in its being itself as a whole as well as behind its nightmarish and monstrous sides, the horrors which Bergson shows would in fact be the case. And philosophy could not be saved from them.

A being is a being not just because we state it to be so. Such an assertion must also be justified. This justification, however, lies not in the laws of being but in being's sense-bestowed character. Here also what was said on another occasion has its deep sense: "And if justification by law, then Christ died in vain."

Properly speaking we are here already going beyond the limits of what was to be a summarization, but we have dwelled on a factor which is of the greatest importance for all of contemporary philosophy and its future. On the one hand, the realization of the insufficiency and inadequateness of a cognition that logicizes in terms of concepts has received at the present time quite universal acknowledgment. This realization acquires all the more vivid expression and its signification is shown clearer, the more resolutely we turn away from sophistic counterfeit philosophies and ask ourselves a direct philosophical question with the aim of seeking its solution not in the "theory of knowledge" but in the "life of being." Bradley successfully formulated the idea of this dissatisfaction: "The universe is not a ballet of bloodless categories!"^b But is it nevertheless a "ballet"?... This depends on whether the universe has a sense or merely a quasi-sense and what this sense is. But it was impossible to answer this question as long as people *saw* nothing in the universe except anemic categories and obese intuitions.

On the other hand, however, in spite of the intense dissatisfaction with this "categorial" understanding of being, the means employed for a positive elimination of this dissatisfaction are not always suitable. Often enough an investigation of what does not satisfy us about rational cognition, consequently a critical analysis of what is unsatisfactory in rational cognition – whether it be the essence of rational cognition or not – is pushed aside. Instead of an analysis of how and why rational cognition is unsatisfactory, the instrument all of a sudden is debunked and depreciated – this after so many centuries of having correctly served truth. In short, instead of searching for what is bad in it and making the correction, the instrument is entirely

rejected. Plato used *ratio* as an instrument, and it is used by contemporary epigones of other great minds. Why must its inadequacy in the hands of the latter lead to the rejection of the instrument itself? Instead of an answer to this question we often encounter a proclamation concerning faculties, which, as faculties, are not subject to evaluation.

Nevertheless we do applaud the decadent philosophy that appeals to the obscure sides of consciousness and that is concerned with the rehabilitation of that by which man is *not* distinguished from the beast, and so the term *ratio* fades into the obscurity of instinct or *élan vital!* ... But while the author of *Le Rire*^c has managed to reveal the "ludicrous" side of rational philosophy, positive philosophy demands positive means, and as we sought to show here, these means must be not only bestowed with sense but must be the very means of sense, viz. *reason* itself.

Translator's Notes

- a. Reading “entelechia” for “endelechia.”
- b. Shpet here provides a rather free and somewhat abbreviated quotation from F.H. Bradley. See the latter’s *The Principles of Logic*, vol. II, London, 1922, p. 591.
- c. Namely Bergson.

APPENDIX

The Idea of a Fundamental Science*

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Here at this moment when science and philosophy are united in a common cause it seems appropriate to me to call your attention to the *idea* of the foundation that could serve as the basis of our common work. I am speaking only of the *idea* of a fundamental science and not of the science itself, since it is still in the process of construction or formation.

It is well-known that the term *philosophy* has been used in two different senses differing in scope. On the one hand, “philosophy” has designated *all* of our knowledge; on the other hand, only some *specific* delimited knowledge. The term in the first sense was used primarily in antiquity, while the second sense prevails today. The second arises from the first through its limitation in identifying philosophy with *metaphysics*. The latter term is a contingent appellation. Μέτα τα πνοτικά, however, has its strict delimited content. Above all, it is the sphere of principles, starting points, foundations. Therefore, when the actual content of philosophy is revealed, we see that both senses of the term, antiquity’s and our own, in all its varied directions and tendencies, unite.

It is just that the peculiarity of the philosophical method, a method that follows from the very essence of philosophy itself with its eternal affirmation and negation, an eternal dialogue that has often turned into a complicated drama with many characters, sometimes hinders philosophical thought from discerning in its history its unity, continuity and tradition. Yet

* An address delivered by the author at the opening of the Moscow Society for the Study of Scientifico-Philosophical Questions on 26 January 1914. This is taken down from memory and considerably after the fact. The author insists only that the thoughts themselves and the order of their presentation are the same.

throughout it always was and remains in search of *foundations*. Scientific views, like any world-view in general, *must* rely on a philosophical groundwork because no other knowledge of foundations is possible. This is the way it was in antiquity. Such was the role of philosophy when it, as an *ancilla*, kept order and guarded the purity of the front chambers of theology. Such has remained its role in modern times. The 17th century idea of a *mathesis universalis*, Locke's limits of knowledge, Hume's geography of the mind, Transcendental Philosophy, Science of Knowledge, Spencer's First Principles, etc., etc. – all of these despite a difference in their respective content, form and examples are attempts to realize a *certain philosophical* idea.

On the other hand, let us take a closer look at the specifics of these world-views and see their distinguishing features. One is a mathematical world-view, another mechanical, yet another biological, historical, sociological, etc. What is going on here? Each is fundamentally an unsuccessful, hopeless and *narrow* attempt to usurp the rights of philosophy. Above all, each is a narrow attempt because each of these nooks and crannies endeavors to include *everything*, basing itself on a model dear to its creator, i.e. to interpret everything through a mere part, to understand the universe basing itself on the model of the way we think or feel a region or area of it. Truly these are *provincial* world-views! But the restless spirit of philosophical creation indeed lingers beneath these constructions of the human mind. This spirit reveals itself in them as their peculiar striving, as their *idea*!

But why does philosophy itself not give a philosophical *general* view of the world. Why does it not point out this *solitary* foundation? This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the reasons. But it is a fact that *our own era* has become conscious of and has formulated this as its task. The problem *has been around long enough* to be philosophy's task. Yes, we have finally come to the time when the idea of such a foundation, our concern here, is being groped for. At least we can outline the requirements philosophy must satisfy in order to be the "fundamental science."

We seek beginnings, foundations, sources within philosophy, and we want these to be the *ultimate* foundations, *absolute beginnings*! All knowledge must rest on these beginnings, and this knowledge is above all *scientific* knowledge. We conceive scientific knowledge to be theoretical, i.e., explanatory knowledge, knowledge that establishes laws. And in this sense it is always conditional, hypothetical, relative and empirical. Certainly knowledge of beginnings can also be called theoretical knowledge. Moreover we call it *pure* theoretical knowledge, though in another sense than deductive and substantiated knowledge. It is pure theoretical

knowledge only because there is no place in it for any “practical” sanctions and assertions whatever. But it is *not* theoretical in the sense that it is free of all “proofs,” “substantiations,” and “constructions.” Being non-theoretical it is fundamentally autonomous and free of “practical primacies,” whereas scientific theoretical knowledge is unavoidably *pragmatic*. The truth of contemporary pragmatism lies not in the fact that something *must* be so but in the fact that it *is* so. Scientific knowledge is essentially pragmatic knowledge and even technical knowledge is *pour agir!* Free, pure, absolute philosophical knowledge of beginnings must be, therefore, pure, absolute and free of any theory. In its bosom the worm of pragmatism wastes away. And since this knowledge is precisely of *beginnings*, it must be *pre-theoretical* knowledge. Such is the first and chief requirement that we make of fundamental philosophical knowledge.

But where do we obtain it? What is its “source”? To pre-theoretical knowledge of science, *pre*-scientific knowledge we contrast *ordinary* knowledge. Do we not obtain philosophical beginnings from it? In short, yes! Because it is living knowledge, knowledge obtained *from the whole*, not yet restricted by theoretical limits nor by orders to parcel out the whole rationally. The non-philosophical success of Bergson’s philosophy is a sign that we have approached a new spring or, rather, dug up an old one that has been covered up over the centuries with rubbish, a spring of new knowledge. The spring, however, must not only be open, it must be *pure*. Everyday theories and acts are theories and acts no less than are scientific ones! Bergson smashes the old idols, and through his efforts a long pressing need finds satisfaction. But another satisfaction is needed. This deficiency in Bergson causes me to classify his success as *non-philosophical*: ΔΟΣ ΜΟΙ ΠΙΟΥ ΣΤΩ!

Thus the disorder of the intuitive opposes intellectual narrow-mindedness. The unconditional contingency of the stream of life opposes the conventional stability of concepts. But peer into this unconditional and unrestrained contingency, gentlemen, and you will see that all of its trouble stems from what it demands and seeks for itself. Like a shadow something haunts it: unconditional necessity! The changing, the transient, the present-day, in all its different voices calls out to us to recognize its own necessity is *to be this way*. And this alone is enough to attempt to penetrate with a gaze *through* it and to see there the essence that makes up its peculiar necessary foundation, its starting point, principle and beginning. With our intellectual eye we penetrate through the transient being of the sensuous gaze to reach being, although it be eternal and non-transient, to ideal being!

Yet isn’t Bergson right that life and movement escape our grasp here?

Isn't he right that a hypnotizing and numbing force is peculiar to our mental gaze? He holds this force to be like a poisonous snake that arrests its victim to a particular spot and strips it of its ability to move and struggle. But I, in turn, ask: How does this spellbinding gaze penetrate the vitality and fullness of Bergson's own philosophical anxiety and pathos? Is it true that we see *only* with our eyes and grasp *only* with our minds? Is it true that our heart murders with its embraces, that we are as deaf to moans and curses as to cries of joy? But if we not only see and grasp but also *understand* what is seen and grasped, then *reason* in positive philosophy must also enlist the participation of sensuality and understanding. Or does *reason* only amuse contemporary philosophy with illusions and seeming things.

So that I may reveal my thoughts I will resort to an explanation the methodological imperfection of which I clearly recognize. I ask you, however, to bear in mind that I am not trying to analyze but to illustrate. I take one specific type and form of being, namely *social* being. How do we arrive at it? Behind the cover of words and logical expressions the *objective* sense lurks hidden from us. We remove the other shroud of the Objectivized symbol and only there do we grasp some intimacy and fullness of being in it. Indeed here we find that we are not prisoners in individual jails, as we have been assured just recently (Sigwart), and in the *immediate* oneness of *comprehension* we discover the genuine unity of sense and concrete integrity which is displayed in the symbol as an object.

The truth is that neither sense experience, nor the understanding, nor experience in bondage to the understanding *gives* us the worldly and the complete. But through the manifold of sense data, through the usage of an intellectual intuition, we make our way to the living spirit of all that exists, seizing it in a peculiar, or if I may be allowed to call it this, *intelligible*, intuition, uncovering not only words and concepts but the very things themselves and allowing the *comprehension* of the authentic in its authenticity, the whole in its entirety and the complete in its completeness.

Such seems to me the path of the fundamental philosophical science, meeting the fundamental demand laid down by us in accordance with the outlined idea of it. It must be not only *pre-theoretical* and *pure* in conception but also *complete* and *concrete* in its execution as well as *rational* in its choice of path.

The necessity of such a foundation is keenly felt by all, but above all its need is felt for philosophy itself, which overthrows chimeras as much as changes beliefs. Yet it is no less necessary for science, where mathematism is replaced by mechanism, mechanism by biologism, etc., etc., where the borders and limits are muddled. At last the need for each of these "isms" to

know its place cannot be put off. Yes, and not just its place but the very basis on which its work is carried out. The mathematician tries to find *his discipline's bed-rock* and as a result of splendid discoveries and solutions to the most complex of tasks stands in bewilderment before its own foundation. The same holds true for physics, physiology and history. What *is* space, time, a number, motion, force, life, death, the soul, society? The philosophical fundamental science is called upon not to solve the physicist's problems or those of the historian but to indicate to each their own roots, sources, *principles*, leading to the universal foundation underlying the entire colossus of contemporary knowledge. Moreover, it must indicate not only how everything existing *is* and how each form of existing *being* is, it must point out to each form not only its place and purpose, but must also reveal the single *sense* and the single *intimate idea* behind all the various manifestations and outbursts of the creative spirit in its full and actual self-realization.

This task is the task of the fundamental philosophical science and only of it. And, as I indicated, it is the task of our time. But I want to add to this statement of fact the character of my personal relation to it. It seems to me that I will not have stated my thoughts fully if I have not also expressed my subjective relation to the mentioned fact. I said it is the task of our time. Now I would add that it was also the task of the *best* of some past times! Indeed, the question automatically arises: Do we not have the right to repeat the words of the best representative of another happy time: Are not the sciences prospering, the arts developing, everyone living merrily? No? As a matter of fact theories are falling, world-views are being smashed, dogmas are crashing down and thrones and altars are shaking... and yet, nevertheless, everyone is living merrily!

The hopeless time, when the "bankruptcy" of the sciences was proclaimed, is being surmounted; the materialist era, when "beggars of the spirit" ascended the throne in philosophy, is at an end. In all fields of scientific knowledge and in philosophy itself we are standing either at the radical breaking up of the old era and construction of a new one or on the verge of it. The period of doubt, decadence, sickly powerlessness, apathy and quietism are *behind us*! The unprecedented shocks in all fields of natural-scientific knowledge are only a consequence of the powerful increase and discovery of new forces and of a new life. The most fascinating bursts from and the all the more brightening light of our past in all fields of the humanities testify to the same. The penetrating aspiration of the philosophical spirit, withdrawing into its most secret depths, in philosophy, in its own self-consciousness, reveals the same features of our time! Indeed,

we do not stand on the verge of a great epoch. We are *already* in it, in its irrepressible striving!

Indeed, we are today standing before the memorable fact of the timely expression of the spirit of our age! We wish to unite our heterogeneous strivings into a *single* aim and to unite our various paths into a single idea. The spirit of our age leads us to this for its own sake. The spirit of history leads all of modern civilized humanity beyond itself. However modest our own aims, this same spirit calls us to realize them.

Translation Glossary

The following list of words, though already long, is but a select group of technical terms Shpet employs in the preceding work. The list is given with the Russian word first, followed by the English term used by the translator and then in some cases by the corresponding German word when this could be established with some degree of certainty and when it was felt the German term would facilitate the understanding of the other words.

abstragirovanie	abstraction	
adekvatnost'	adequacy	
aktual'nost'	actionality, actuality	Aktualität
bytija	being, existence	Sein
celesoobraznost'	fitness to an end	Zweckmäßigkeit
chuvstvennyj	sensuous	sinnlich
dannost'	givenness, datum	
delo	affair, matter, thing	Sache
dukh	spirit	Geist
dusha	psyche, soul	
edinichnost'	single particular	
indeks	sign	
iskhodit' ot	to emanate from	
izlozhenie	presentation	Vergegenwärtigung

konceptirovanie	apprehension	Auffassung
konkretnost'	concretion	Konkretion
kvalifikacie	the How	das Wie
mnogoobrazie	multiplicity	Mannigfaltigkeit
moment	factor, moment, phase, feature	Moment
nagljadnost'	intuitedness	
napravlennost' na	direction to	
nachala	beginning	Gerichtetsein auf
nesostojatel'nost'	groundlessness	Anfang
oblast'	region, sphere	
obobshchenie	generalization	
obshchnost'	commonness	Gemeinsamkeit
ob"ekt	Object	Objekt
ob"em	scope	Umfang
ochevidnost'	evidence, evidentness	Evidenz
odno	singleness	
opytnyj	experiencing, experiential	
opredeljaemost'	determinedness	:it
osmyslenie	sense-bestowal	
osmyslivanie	sense-bestowing	
osnovopolozhenie	fundamental thesis	
osobennost'	peculiarity, distinctive feature	Eigenheit
osushchestvlenie	actualization	Verwirklichung
otchetlivost'	distinctness	Deutlichkeit
otnosit'sja	to refer, to concern	beziehen sich
ottenok	adumbration	Abschattung
oxvatyvat'	to envelop	umgreifen
oznachat'	to signify	
perezhivanie	mental process	Erlebnis
pervichno	originarily	originär
pervonachal'nyj	original, originary	ursprünglich
podmecat'	to seize upon	erfassen
podrazumevaemoe	the meant	Gemeinte, Vermeinte

polaganie	positing, position	Setzung
polnota	fullness, completedness, completeness	
polozhenie	positum	Vollständigkeit
postizhenie	seizing	Satz
posylka	premise	Erfassen
poznanie	cognition	Erkenntnis
pratezis	proto-thesis	Urthesis
prebyvanie	continualness	
predmet	object	Gegenstand
predpolozhenie	presumed likelihood	Vermutung
prevrashchenie	change	Wandlung
priem	technique	
prisushchij	inherent in	
prosto	simpliciter	
prozrenie	insight, enlightening	
rasshirenie	broadening	Erweiterung
rassudok	understanding	Verstand
razum	reason	Vernünft
regional'naja oblast'	region	Region
reguljativ	norm	
rod	kind, genus	Gattung
sloj	stratum	Schlicht
smysl	sense	Sinn
sovershat'	to effect, accomplish	
sozercanie	intuition	
soznanoe	something intended to	Bewusstes
sushchnost'	eidos, essence	
skhvatyvanie	apprehending	Fassen
teticheskij	positional	thetisch
ubezhdenie	conviction	Überzeugung
ujasnenie	clarification	Klarung
urazumenie	comprehension	Begreifen (?)
usmotrenie	intellectual sight	
ustanovka	attitude, orientation	Einstellung

ustanovlenie	ascertainment, establishment	
ustremlenie	advertece	Festsetzung
utverzhdenie	1) assertion 2) confirmation	Zuwendung 1) Behauptung 2) Bestätigung
uzrenie	act of seeing	Erschauung, Ansehen

Index

Absolute 43–44, 55
absolute being belongs to the essence of the Ego 59
abstract object, contingency of 47
actional mental processes 29, 162
actual being 47, 132, 145, 154, 161
actual something
 how ascertained 97
 how it exists 16, 52, 75, 77, 91, 123, 135
actual world conceivable only in correlation to consciousness 34
advergence of vision 12, 15, 55, 157, 162
appearance 30ff, 33, 37, 58, 128, 146, 161, 162
 closed 134
 as sense of intuited positum 131
 prescribing rules for the positum 132
 tracing back the structure of an 146
Aristotle 17, 23, 147, 148, 150, 161, 167
Aster, E. von 16–18, 147, 165
attentional changes always presuppose a noematic core 109
attitudes, division between experiential and phenomenological 89
Beattie, J. 79
being, categorial understanding of 171
being of cognition 10, 98–99
belief 137ff
belief-characteristics 114
Bergson, H. 97, 171–172, 177–178
Berkeley, G. 13, 55, 142
Bolzano, B. 4
Bosanquet, B. 80
Bradley, F. 171, 184
Brentano, F. 4
causality 155–156
clarification, goal of 86
Class 21
cogito as aggregate of “spontaneities” with regard to the given 26
cogito is potentially actional 51
cognition
 as a logical being 106
 of being 12
 in psychology and logic 98
 non-actual being of the subject of 10

comprehension 83, 124, 131, 132, 160, 161, 163–164, 178

consciousness 13, 15, 25ff, 27ff, 31, 33, 52, 54, 59, 61, 76–77, 88, 106ff, 128, 153, 157

and reality, two types of being 30

as a continuous stream 99

being of 36, 37, 38, 59, 63, 77

cannot be subjected to $\epsilon\pi\omega\chi\eta$ 27

essence of 28, 29–30, 73, 160

essential property of 28, 55

hermeneutic 157

is always a “positing” consciousness 114

rational 130

sense-bestowal belongs to 103–105

constituting, act of 104

constitution, phenomenological 129–130

contingency of facts 11

Cornelius, H. 17

deductive theorizing excluded from phenomenology 88

Descartes, R. 3, 32, 73, 101, 142

description

- obtaining entelechy of an object by 155
- method of 83ff, 93–94, 170
- possibility of pure 70ff
- realization of 84ff, 97, 100

descriptive cognition

- existence of 99
- problem with 97

dialectical process in philosophy 123

Dilthey, W. 84, 97

dissatisfaction in contemporary philosophy 97

doubt can always take place 26

dualism of Ego and the object 60

Ego

- pure 57–60, 61–63, 108–109
- who is the 56–57

eidetic attitude 147

eidetic science independent of all the sciences of facts 82

eidos as what is seen in an idea 48

empathy 100, 101

entelechy 150, 152–153, 154, 157–159

$\epsilon\pi\omega\chi\eta$ 19, 26, 32, 50, 52, 124

essences 10, 11, 13–16, 31, 33, 43, 48, 53, 59, 72–74, 150–151, 155

not all within the sphere of the immanent 53

of higher levels 100

sciences of 10, 49

essential is seen by an immediate intuition 48, 72

evidence 74ff, 81ff, 83, 127

exemplificational technique 75, 146, 150

experiencing intuitions 47

Finnbogason, G. 141

Florensky, P. 165–166, 167

fundamental science

- idea of 175
- task of 179

givenness, types of 128, 134

Haardt, A. 45

Hamilton, W. 79

Hegel, G. 16, 21, 51, 70, 124, 142

hermeneutic consciousness 157

hermeneutical acts 153, 154, 157, 158

history of philosophy gives only the sensuous and reason 101

How of objectivity, two kinds of 112

Hume, D. 4, 13, 135, 137ff, 176

Humean skepticism 47

Husserl, E. 4, 7, 10–15, 17, 18, 23, 31, 32, 48, 52–55, 57, 72, 77, 78, 82, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 94, 99–108, 112–113, 115–116, 119, 125, 129, 130–135, 145, 148, 152, 153, 167

ψλη 102

idea in the Kantian sense 133

ideal sciences 11

immanent perception

- an intuition of essence 31, 33

immediacy 76

individuation 90, 156

induction, problem of, Mill and

- Plato on 48

intellectualism 52, 90, 111

intelligible intuition 158–159, 160

intentional consciousness 87, 115, 149, 152

intentionality 12, 23, 28, 37, 56, 73, 104, 130

internal “something” of an object 148, 149, 153

interpretation 155

- inevitability of 5

intuition of essences 17, 18, 82

- how obtained 14, 48

intuitions

- absolute nearness of 73
- experiencing and ideal 14, 15–16, 17, 48, 73, 101–102, 158, 162
- difference between 48, 146

method of clarifying 73ff

intuitive cognition 70ff, 79, 83

intuitivism 52, 90

Jacobi, F. 135ff, 141, 142

Jakovenko, B. 93, 165

Kant, I. 4, 7, 10, 13, 23, 51, 52, 56, 98, 101–103, 123, 128, 133, 135ff, 141, 153

Kantianism 124

Leibniz, G. 3, 33, 40, 148

Locke, J. 4, 17, 147, 176

logic, exclusion of, from

- phenomenology 50

logical

- as a strata in the noesis and the noema 106, 148
- as a specific stratum 107, 114

logical expression of an intuition 6

Lotze, R. 3, 4, 21

main question of how the actual exists, 97–98

Malebranche, N. 142

mathematics, phenomenology

- contrasted with 87

Meinong, A. 4

mental processes

- given essentially 30, 31
- intuitive 28, 104, 105
- in which the posited is given

 - originarily and non-originarily 126–127

- mode of being of, not existence 31

metaphysics 135

Mill, J. 4, 13, 48

mysticism 163

natural attitude 15, 25ff, 47, 54, 101, 147, 151, 152, 158, 159, 161

- general thesis of 26

negative philosophy 3–4, 9, 12
 negativism 170
 neutralization 152
 noema 105, 123–126, 130, 146ff
 noesis 102–103, 104, 153
 nominalism 13–14, 16, 18, 22, 91
 numbers 38
 object [*predmet*]
 as “bearer of predicates” 110,
 113
 simpliciter 105
 Object [*ob"ekt*] 12, 28–29, 36–38,
 40, 55, 58, 69, 76, 105, 110,
 153, 160
 dependency of, on experiencing
 intuition 47
 ontologies
 material eidetic 49
 regional 49, 129, 134–135
 ontology of nature 49
 originary givenness 77–78
 parenthesis, putting within 36
 perception 14
 immanent and transcendent 31
 two types of 134
 phenomenological attitude 13,
 37–41, 52, 54, 55, 76, 87, 88,
 101, 105, 125, 145, 151, 158
 phenomenology
 aim of 4–5, 40, 87
 as an eidetic science 11, 49, 53,
 69, 125
 as first philosophy 10, 13, 169
 as pre-theoretical 50, 70
 distinctive feature of 145
 examines consciousness ideally
 53
 limit of 89
 of knowledge 98
 method of 83, 84, 123–124, 129
 of reason 77, 130, 135
 proceeds further than other
 philosophies 97
 right of, to be a science 98–99
 subject-matter of 11–13, 35, 39,
 41, 70, 83, 98–99
 philosophy
 first tasks of 9, 25
 two senses of 175
 physical thing apprehended by
 means of adumbrations
 29–30
 Plato, 3, 10, 13, 17, 18, 21, 38, 48,
 101, 134, 148, 170, 172
 positing 114–115
 broadening of the concept of
 106
 positive philosophy 3–4, 9, 10, 63,
 90, 123–124, 178
 positivism 3, 13
 positum 154
 as unity of sense and moments
 of a positional character 153,
 157
 pragmatism 177–178
 pre-theoretical 50, 86, 90, 178
 presentativism, phenomenology
 establishes a 170
 presuppositions, phenomenology
 must be free from 19–20
 principle of all principles 100, 146,
 157, 162, 170
 Protagoras 4
 psychologism 4, 9
 psychology as empirical correlate
 of phenomenological
 investigation 99
 pure consciousness 29, 38–39, 53,
 55, 87
 being of 36, 39, 40

quasi-entelechies 152, 157, 158
reality of the external world 141
reason 131, 172, 178
 being of 162
reduction, phenomenological 39,
 69, 125, 147
Rickert, H. 13, 156
Reid, T. 79, 82, 93
Schelling, F. 16, 21, 61
schematism, Kant's theory of 102
Scottish philosophy 79, 137
sense 5, 32, 104ff, 111ff, 123,
 126ff, 130, 131, 134, 139
 as an abstract form 116
 as connected with object in a
 positum 152
 not "created" by pure Ego 109
 of an object 32, 154
 of a transcendent being 33
 vis-à-vis signification 107–108,
 148, 153–154
sense-bestowal 103–104, 108, 116,
 131, 154, 162
Shpet, G. 23, 45, 67, 121, 141,
 167, 173
Sigwart, C. 156, 160, 178
social being 100, 178
Solovyev, V. 45
sophistry 9, 10
Spencer, H. 176
Spinoza, B. 21
Stewart, D. 79
Stumpf, C. 4, 22
subjectivism of the "theory of
 knowledge" 13, 136
Teichmuller 21
teleology 104, 155ff
"theory of knowledge" 4, 9, 10, 13
 no substitute for phenomenol-
 ogy 99
theses, all characteristics are 107
thesis of the pure Ego 32–33, 35
transcendency within immanency
 58, 62, 63
transcendent being 37–38, 128
trans-phenomenological attitude
 and reduction 62
understanding 83, 132, 170
worlds, actual and ideal 26
Wundt, W. 155
Yurkevich, P. 9

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