

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE OTHER



A. DUGIN

BERSERKER

BOOKS



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SECTION 1.

SEYN UND SEIN

CHAPTER 1

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THINKING AND ITS AUTHORITIES

Martin Heidegger is a highly fundamental author. He is one of those figures in the history of thought who are inevitable. There is much that can be omitted, considered optional, thumbed through at leisure. But there is something that requires careful and thorough study. Without such a study, our understanding of thinking, philosophy, and cultural history will be flawed, incomplete, fragmentary, and therefore unreliable.

Heidegger is necessary for anyone who lives in today's world, in today's Russia, and tries in any way to justify the fact of his *presence*. Of course, most often we cannot speak of presence: after all, "presence" etymologically means "to be at the essence," and who is "at the essence" nowadays? But maybe we should at least think about *presence*? And anyone who in any way wonders about his presence cannot pass Heidegger by.

It is impossible to think, and in particular to think about existence, about ourselves, about the world, about life and death, without reference to one or another school of thought. If we ourselves do not know which philosophical system underlies our thinking, it does not mean that there is no such system. It must exist, because our thoughts and ideas are derived from somewhere. If we take a close look at the content of our own consciousness and make a rough inventory of it, we can see that some of it is from Plato, some from Aristotle, some from Descartes, some from Descartes, and some from Descartes.

Hegel's dialectic, some thoughts are taken from the arsenal of theology and some from Marxism, in some ways the influence of Kant is noticeable, and somewhere a shard of Nietzscheanism shines through. The fact that philosophy reaches us not directly, not directly, but through hundreds of semi-anonymous echoes - in school, family, society, media, education, everyday conversations and fragmentary cultural consumption - does not change anything.

We think *we think we are* thinking, but this illusion arises only from ignorance or poor education. Once we start working on ourselves, it becomes clear that we are constantly *quoting*, most often from sources that we do not realize exist. That is why anyone who wants to think *honestly* will start by identifying the authorities and reference systems of thought in philosophy, science, and art.

A thinking person is always a bit of a philosopher. And a philosopher always belongs to some direction of thought: either he follows religious philosophy, or he is a Kantian, or a Hegelian, or a liberal, or a Marxist, or a Freudian, or a positivist, or a Nietzschean, or a structuralist, or a supporter of the "philosophy of life", or a solipsist, or an existentialist, or a materialist, or a Darwinist, and so on. In very rare cases, a philosopher is able to realize an interesting and original synthesis of different directions, and even more rarely, with intervals of centuries, there appear those thinkers who pave new paths and open truly new horizons for the rest of humanity. These are the great men who mark the milestones of the thinking of all mankind, and it remembers and honors them for centuries.

Whoever understands the greats and takes one of the possible philosophical positions secures for himself the status of a philosopher, a fully thinking being. And here honesty is the main thing: one must first *bow* to authority (even if with a "secret thought" to overturn it later) and think of oneself and the world in the shadow of great ideas and theories. Those who strive for originality at once and at any price do not stay in philosophy for long - they belong on the market.

HEIDEGGER: GREAT OR GREATEST?

Among the great thinkers, Heidegger may be given two places - depending on how we look at him, to what extent we study him, and to what extent we believe him.

At the very least, Heidegger is the greatest thinker of our time, one of the best thinkers in Europe from the pre-Socratics to the present day. In this sense, he has been called the "prince" or "prince of philosophers". Even those who are indifferent to his philosophy or who disagree with it recognize his unquestionable greatness.

As a great philosopher of world history, Heidegger is universally recognized. No one seriously disputes this, but some pass by quietly, relying on other philosophical trends, while others react strongly to his message, using his terms ("Dasein," "existential," "Angst," etc.) and allowing themselves to be carried away by his thought.

A different, special, exceptional place in the history of philosophy that can be assigned to Heidegger must be recognized if we trust Heidegger completely, if we immerse ourselves in his thinking, if we make him our supreme authority. In other words, Heidegger in Heideggerianism will be essentially different from Heidegger in the average and conventional history of philosophy. In this case, Heidegger will be revealed not just as a great philosopher on a par with the other greats, but as the greatest of them all, taking the place of the *last prophet*, completing the unfolding of the first stage of philosophy (from Anaximander to Nietzsche) and serving as a *transition*, a *bridge to a new philosophy*, which he only anticipates in his writings. In this case, Heidegger is revealed as an *eschatological figure*, as the final interpreter and expounder of the deepest and most mysterious themes of world philosophy and the creator of a radically *new way of thinking*. In this case, he can be seen as a figure of the religious pantheon, as a "messenger of being itself", a herald and preparer of the great *event* that will conclude the old history of the eu-

of the European world and a new, never-before-seen world will begin.

It seems to me that the second approach (even if at some point in the distant future it will be revised) is the most fruitful for a proper understanding of Heidegger. It allows us to immerse ourselves in Heidegger's thinking fully and completely, without rushing to interpret it through appeals to other authorities (and to their scattered traces in our minds), and allowing Heidegger to communicate to us unhindered what he intended to communicate. It is only by accepting this message in its essentials, by believing in its meaning and its inevitability, that one can, if necessary, take a certain distance from it.

It is unlikely that everyone should become Heideggerian forever, but this thinker is certainly worth devoting considerable intellectual time to him, enough time to say, with a slight note of doubt in one's voice, "I think I understand something about him. Some will take years, some will take decades. Some will slip in their first steps. But the experience is worth it. In studying Heidegger, we are studying philosophy as it is today. This is exactly what it is, and there is nothing to counter it.

Heidegger is important not only for professional philosophers - for them he is a must: a modern philosopher who does not know Heidegger looks ridiculous. Heidegger is also important for people who claim to have a minimal competence in cultural matters: humanitarians, politicians, artists, psychologists, sociologists - all those who, by the call of their heart or duty, are concerned with the fate of man, humanity, society and history.

M. HEIDEGGER IN THE USSR: THE DISTANT SHELF OF THE SPECIAL GUARD AND BIBIKHIN'S VAIN ENDEAVORS

Heidegger's legacy in the Russian-speaking context is a deeply specific phenomenon. Firstly, the philosopher's works and ideas, his intellectual and world outlook

position during the Soviet era were relegated to the most dangerous and unacceptable ideological boxes, placed in the most

Heidegger's interest in Heidegger was regarded as an epistemological crime or a completely empty occupation. Interest in Heidegger was regarded as an epistemological crime or a completely empty occupation. Even criticism of Heidegger's ideas received little attention. Thus, Heidegger, like many other non-Marxist philosophers, was *closed to* late non-Soviet (not to mention early Soviet) philosophy. He was read, translated, and discussed "under the table," which had an impact on the quality of these readings, translations, and discussions.

Nevertheless, a group of Soviet philosophers, led by the late V.V. Bibikhin, the founder of the late non-Soviet Heideggerian school, who fought off the right to engage in a critical reading of Heidegger. However, a group of Soviet philosophers who resisted the right to engage in a critical reading of Heidegger, led by the late V.V. Bibikhin, the founder of the late non-Soviet Heideggerian school, did form, and from this small circle emerged most of the existing translations, many of which were made during the Soviet period and have been circulating in Samizdat.

Without questioning the sincerity of these enthusiasts, it should be noted that their translation work and the degree of penetration into Heidegger were completely unsatisfactory. The complexity of ideological conditions, the limited access to sources, the specificity of philosophical education, the shortcomings of philological knowledge, and, in general, the inadequacy of late-Soviet social space to the vastness of Heideggerian thinking are responsible for the fact that the intellectual array generated by this circle can be sadly forgiven, if we do not want to struggle forever with the chimeras of a historical epoch so insignificant that in some ways it still cannot end.

It seems that Bibikhin and his like-minded colleagues are really passionate about Heidegger, but there is nothing in Heidegger's translations and exposition except this passion. It is impossible to read them at all, since these texts tell us a great deal about the states, endeavors, and sufferings of Bibikhin himself and his fellow translators, but practically nothing but coincidences.

about Heidegger or give a picture that makes one's hair stand on end. If these texts are recognized as correct translations of Heidegger's texts, then one will have to admit rather quickly, with regret, that Heidegger himself did not understand what he was saying and writing.

HEIDEGGER AS THE MOST WESTERN OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHERS

The second circumstance related to the specificity of Heidegger's legacy in the Russian-speaking context is that Heidegger is the *fundamental star of Western European* philosophy and corresponds to the internal logic of its development. He is therefore generally comprehensible to a Western European philosopher who is fluent in the taxonomy of ideas and theories of Western European culture. To understand Heidegger, one must be at least a European, since Heidegger himself constantly emphasizes that he thinks in Europe, about Europe and for Europe, understanding it as a special historical-philosophical and civilizational whole.

Dogmatic Marxism and the Russian intellectual milieu, highly confused both in the last decades of the USSR and today, intersect with the mainstream development of Western European humanity in a very fragmentary, episodic and tangential way. We think of ourselves as Europeans, and in some respects we resemble them (appearance, phenotype, language, religion, sociopolitical system, etc.). But philosophy highlights the nuances: thought is the area where it is most difficult to deceive or falsify the state of affairs, and in this area there is very little of the Western European in us. If there is, it is caricatured. But it is more likely that we are dealing with a special kind of Russian thinking, which is still poorly understood by ourselves, not to mention the peculiarities of other cultures.

In a sense, Heidegger's philosophy is the quintessence of Western thought: it is deeper, more central, and at the same time more *Western* than that of other European thinkers, who are easier (though not easy) to reach.

A calm, measured and careful, dignity-preserving reading of
Heidegger is,
Perhaps the most serious test for the Russian-European dialog.

HEIDEGGER AND THE META-LANGUAGE OF THE NEW PHILOSOPHY

Thirdly, Heidegger consciously sets himself the task of establishing a *new language of philosophy*, a kind of meta-language. This derives from the specific *philosophy of language* (*Sprachphilosophie*) that he developed in parallel with the general unfolding of his thought. The essence of this approach is:

- 1) in dismantling the influence of Western European philosophy and metaphysics (with their logic, grammar, implicit ontology, etc.) on the language and its structures, i.e. in refusing to present philosophical themes in the context of the meta-language that Western European philosophy has developed and established over two and a half thousand years of its history;
- 2) in a return to words (instead of terms, categories, concepts) and their original extra-philosophical meaning, to their etymology, their own pre-logical and pre-metaphysical content;
- 3) in the elaboration of a new meta-language for the new philosophy, which will be built on the basis of words that *speak* of *being*, on a trajectory radically different from the messages of the previous philosophical discourse.

The level of Heidegger's texts requires a tremendous effort even from a full-fledged European philosopher (in general, a thinking European) and presents a considerable difficulty for German-speaking readers. But it is even more difficult for speakers of other European languages.

The question of correct interpretation and adequate translations of Heidegger has been addressed in European philosophy throughout the twentieth century, giving rise to a kind of "Heideggerian vocabulary" with which philosophers operate, involving a fan of translations, every nuance of which

Heidegger is the subject of a special debate. The comprehension and translation of Heidegger involves not only philosophers, but also philologists, historians, scholars of Antiquity, psychologists, because the difficulty of understanding Heidegger is not a technical problem, but a question of choosing the *radical turn* in the path of Western philosophy that Heidegger called for. By translating, interpreting, and commenting on Heidegger, Europeans are *co-creating this turn*. There are as many difficulties in translating his texts into French or English as there are in translating them into Russian, but for almost a century the best minds in Europe have been struggling over it, starting with those who were among the first to read and try to understand him in the original (for example, Jean-Paul Sartre, who owed much to early Heidegger, including the name of his philosophy, "existentialism").

HEIDEGGER'S SILENCE

When getting to know Heidegger, one cannot omit the historical circumstance that in the 1920s-1940s he belonged to the philosophical and ideological trend "Conservative Revolution" (together with such prominent thinkers as E. Jünger, F. Jünger, O. Spengler, O. Spann, C. Schmitt, A. Müller van den Broek, W. Zombart, F. Hilsher, etc.). Being in opposition to Hitler's "national-socialism" and rejecting the racism, primitivism and brutality of his populist propaganda, these thinkers were forced to interact with it in one way or another, not only for reasons of survival in a totalitarian regime, but also because of the superficial similarity of some slogans of the Third Reich to a set of conservative-revolutionary ideas, which, for example, included:

- New Germany's political romanticism and idealism;
- ideas about the need for Europe to return to its roots, to Tradition and to myth;
- The imperative of synchronous struggle against liberalism (England, USA) and Marxism (USSR) as two expressions of the same value nihilism (Pragmatist in one case and proletarian in the other);

- Nietzschean diagnosis of Europe's humanitarian illness and the need for a "new heroism", etc.

Heidegger in the 1930s and 1940s openly criticized aspects of National Socialism that he considered erroneous from the point of view of his philosophy. In his book *Introduction to Metaphysics*, in particular, Heidegger wrote: "What is thrown on the market today in the form of the philosophy of National Socialism has nothing to do with the truth and significance of this movement, which is concerned with the comprehension of the connections and correspondences between modern man and planetary deterministic technology, and fishes in the murky waters of 'values' and 'totals'.⁽¹⁾ . It should be noted that the term "National Socialism" emerged in Germany to designate one of the directions of "conservative-revolutionary" thought long before Hitler came to power, and even more so before Nazism was formalized as an ideology. It was only later usurped by the racist theorists in Hitler's entourage.

It is obvious that Heidegger thought of National Socialism through the conservative-revolutionary ideas of Ernst Jünger's programmatic work *"The Worker"*⁽²⁾ . In it, National Socialism was presented as a response of modern European humanity to the challenges of the modern era, consisting in a paradoxical liberation through the domination of technology.

The "bottom", "elemental", titanic foundations of the human being. According to Jünger, in the mechanical meat grinder of modern warfare, with gas attacks and the grinding of tank tracks, the twentieth-century European who was losing his rapidly evaporating cultural heritage heroically, against all odds, returned to basic human impulses consisting of a vivid experience of bonding with comrades ("frontline socialism") and a keen sense of the nation as a future-oriented project ("nationalism"). Jünger's "national socialism" and "total mobilization" appealed to the existential roots of the European beyond petty xenophobia, chauvinism, and even more so any kind of racism. This national socialism was European rather than German, humanist rather than ethicist, existential rather than totalitarian and ideological. Heidegger considered the ideas of

Jünger believed that National Socialism could evolve in the direction of a "conservative revolution".

Jünger's national socialism, while initially having a huge influence on the entire Third Way movement in Germany in the 1920s, gradually came into violent contradiction with the official tenets of Nazism and was lost. It was eclipsed by the much less intellectual but incomparably larger (including in its criminal consequences) Hitlerism that triumphed in Germany in the 1930s, appropriating the name of this current of thought, distorting it, and tarnishing it for a long time, if not forever.

The same fate befell the ideological legacy of other exponents of the European conservative-revolutionary movement. Since the 1920s, German intellectuals of the "right" and "left" - from Thomas Mann to Oswald Spengler, from Heinrich von Gleichen to the communists Wolfheim and Laufenberg, from Arthur Müller van den Broek to Carl Schmitt, from Ernst Nikisch to Harro Schulzen-Beussen - sought new worldviews, philosophical and political horizons beyond liberalism, dogmatic communism and the old limited conservative tradition. They actively experimented with the riskiest combinations of tradition and revolution, of historical constants and innovative technologies, of religious values and progressive social theories. Far from being dogmatic, they developed many original doctrines, theories and philosophical concepts. But the tragedy of their situation was that, in the realm of big politics, this wide range of quests, revelations and intuitions became firmly associated with Hitler's totalitarian regime after the victory of the NSDAP in 1933. Although all these thinkers gradually found themselves in opposition to Hitler's regime - from "internal emigration" (the brothers F. and E. Jünger, M. Heidegger, C. Schmitt) to direct participation in anti-fascist and resistance movements (E. Nikisch, Harro Schulzen-Beussen, and others) - the complex of their views was for a long time taboo in political thinking.

West because of the superficial and deceptive similarity of their views to the political declarations of the Third Reich era.

Heidegger's formal collaboration with the Nazis lasted for a short time, when he served as rector of the University of Freiburg and had to obey some orders from the official leadership⁽³⁾. Tellingly, Heidegger was probably the only cultural figure of this magnitude (if his magnitude is at all comparable to anyone else's) who, after 1945, never once repented for his past. Heidegger was simply "silent," and since *silence* in his philosophy has the fundamental meaning of one of the dialects in which *being* speaks of itself, this "Heideggerian silence" can be interpreted in various ways (as can all other aspects of his work), but always *philosophically*.

Because of Heidegger's decisive influence in the 1920s and 1940s on many prominent intellectuals in the victorious camp after 1945 (from the Freudo-Marxist Herbert Marcuse and the communist Sartre to Heidegger's student and former lover Hannah Arendt, who was a harsh critic of all forms of totalitarianism and emigrated to the United States, In the general philosophical context, the episode of collaboration with Hitler's regime, and even the philosopher's later "silence", has been politely forgotten (although the period from 1933 to 1945 was one of the most fruitful in Heidegger's philosophical activity). No one, except some superficial scandalizers (like Victor Farias and the like⁽⁴⁾), touched the subject any more. Heidegger means too much to the West to be thrown around, even if his actions went beyond the accepted norms of public morality. Everything is forgiven to geniuses.

Obviously, for both the USSR and modern liberal-democratic Russia, these political details of Martin Heidegger's personal fate did not contribute to an adequate understanding of him and encouraged a deliberate prejudice and selectivity towards his ideas and texts (primarily from the 1930s-1940s).

FLUKE

As a result of the totality of all these circumstances, Heidegger is an almost unknown quantity for us today. If there is anything sane in what has been written about him in Russian or how he has been translated, it is more likely a coincidence or a successful imitation. Russians are very successful at imitation: we can often easily reproduce what we do not understand at all and what is internally alien to us. This is the plasticity of our culture.

But even automatic, machine translation of Heidegger's texts into Russian can, in rare cases, produce an entertaining result. There are such successes in Russian Heideggerianism. But since it is impossible to distinguish between success and failure without first understanding Heidegger either in the original or through adequate translations into European languages, it would be more useful to set ourselves the task of building everything from scratch. Builders know that rebuilding an emergency building is many times more expensive, takes longer and poses more additional problems than demolishing an old building and building a new one from scratch.

This is what we invite those who have accidentally or consciously become interested in the figure and philosophy of the greatest of thinkers, Martin Heidegger, to do.

So, since we do not know Heidegger, I propose to make a *journey in Heidegger's direction, to try to approach him*, just as Eugene Golovin (by the way, one of the first and most profound connoisseurs of Martin Heidegger in Russia) proposed to "approach the Snow Queen"⁽⁵⁾.

PHILOSOPHER AS IDENTITY

Heidegger, as we have already noted, thinks and presents himself exclusively within the framework of Western European philosophy. This remark is extremely important for the precise location of Heideggerian thought. However much one might be tempted to think of Heidegger as a religious type (as many scholars do),

However much one might want to parallel Heidegger with the traditionalists and their critique of modern Western civilization⁽⁶⁾, one should put aside such comparisons as much as possible and first get to know Heidegger in the context to which he belonged, wanted to belong, and in which he himself understood his place and significance.

Heidegger is a philosopher, or rather a West European philosopher, responsible for, shaped by, well-versed in, and familiar with the smallest nuances of the heritage of West European ontology and metaphysics. Heidegger spent his entire life trying to keep within the axioms of Western European philosophy, even when he set out to explode, transform and overthrow them. With German meticulousness, he follows from what is conventionally thought of as the *beginning* of Western European philosophy, i.e., the pre-Socratics, to what is conventionally (or slightly less strictly conventional) thought of as its *end*, i.e., Nietzsche.

Heidegger sees his own place in this chain as a summarizing moment for the whole of Western philosophy, which is why he understands all its stages: each of them breaks down into a whole fan of significant details and says much to the philosopher. Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides represent the brilliant trinity of pre-Socratic thinkers, Plato and Aristotle the highest peak of Greek thought and the creators of all subsequent European philosophy and culture. Heidegger sees the Middle Ages and Catholic scholasticism as a mere episode, and the metaphysics of the New Age (from Descartes through Kant, Leibniz, Schelling, Fichte, Goethe and Hegel to Nietzsche and Bergson) as the bringing to the last logical limits of what the Greeks had begun.

To a certain approximation, Heidegger's philosophy can be likened to a pastor's requiem speech at a funeral:

"The deceased was a very good person, helped the poor, did not hurt the younger ones as a child, lived a decent life, worked hard, and then died, and his memory is blessed. And then the pastor begins to go through the episodes of the deceased's life in detail ("studied, married, divorced, got sick, changed jobs, retired, got sick again..."). Fi-

Heidegger's philosophy is an extended requiem for Western European philosophy, based on the presumption that "something was," "something began," and "something ended." "finished," "dead" (we will come to what Heidegger means by "*beginning*," what "something *was*" means). "to *be*" is the main concept for him in general - and what it means that "what was, is no more").

Heidegger proposes to turn to Western European philosophy, first as what *was*, and second as what is *no longer*, since what we have now is not Western European philosophy. The latter ends, according to Heidegger, with Nietzsche. Heidegger himself stands on the border, on the line. From this grave cliff (*Abgrund*)⁽⁷⁾ Heidegger's narrative is dedicated to what is dead.

It would be incorrect to include religion, traditionalism or mysticism here. For Heidegger, only philosophy is decisive, only its processes and curves, its stands and postulates, its highs and lows are of interest. This is his peculiar asceticism: in order to cope with the deepest crisis of modern nihilism, Heidegger does not look for a point of support in exotic cults, initiations or secret doctrines. He courageously assumes responsibility for the fate of all Western European thinking in its most Western, *logological* aspects, which cannot be found in other cultures and which constitutes the *essence* and *destiny* of *Western civilization*.

THINKING IN WORDS: INDO-EUROPEAN ZONES OF THOUGHT

In order to understand Heidegger, we must learn to perform two operations, to which the previously noted features of his thinking lead. First of all, we must listen to his language. Heidegger does not think in concepts or categories, but in *words*. Not ideas, not principles, not beginnings, but the *roots of words*. His thinking is verbal and root-based. This must be kept in mind when touching his texts. Reading and comprehending them requires a certain (albeit initial) amount of thought.

We must learn to think with the words and roots of our native Russian language.⁽⁸⁾ . In addition, we, just as Heidegger himself did in the case of the non-Metz language, must learn to think with the words and roots of our native Russian language. Therefore, when we read Heidegger, we are simultaneously:

- listening (to German words);
- comprehend (meaning, conception, intension of thought);
- translate (looking for Russian equivalents in words that can convey the meaning).

Reading Heidegger should be our way to *our own Russian language as a language of thought, a language of philosophy*. This poses a serious problem for us. The point is that if we consider the range of Indo-European languages, we see that each major language group has its own philosophical systems with a more or less developed apparatus based on the discovery of the philosophical meaning of the basic words of that language, either completely or partially mixed with the borrowing of concepts from neighboring languages.

This is the case with European culture, where there are three basic linguistic groups: Greek (which includes the language of *the beginning of philosophy*), Latin (which, in addition to Latin, includes French, Spanish, Italian, Romanian and other languages) and Germanic. All three groups have an established philosophical language with a long tradition of translating basic meanings. Heidegger breaks this norm and proposes to introduce new meanings by listening to the roots of words. The work of "breaking" the philosophical meta-language constitutes almost the lion's share of his texts on the European philosophical tradition, which is Heidegger's native and understandable.

This continent of European meanings - with three language bases - is not something we take for granted today. It is increasingly rare that we study Greek and Latin in a qualitative manner, and it is not certain that we have a sufficient command of modern European languages (at least German and French). But this would not be fatal if we had at least an outline of *Russian philosophical language*. By drawing parallels with European meanings, we would be breaking old meanings together with Heidegger, realizing *that de-*

We would build a new one together with it, following the trajectory of destruction and enriching the new endeavor with the treasury of Russian roots. In principle, this is what we should do, with the only exception that we have *nothing* to break, since our culture has not developed an established meta-language of Russian philosophy with conventional translations of European meanings. This creates certain problems.

In order to reject European metaphysics with Heidegger, we must understand it correctly and unambiguously.

Otherwise, we will understand neither the meaning nor the scope of his philosophizing. This is a serious obstacle. Before outlining a way out of this situation, let us see how it is with other Indo-European cultures: do they have their own meta-languages of philosophy? In the case of Indo-European

Iran, there is an extensive tradition of a specific language of philosophy, where the Persian roots proper are combined with a huge layer of Arabic terminology introduced during Islamization. The French philosopher and historian of religion

Henri Corbin⁽⁹⁾ (who was responsible for the first French translation of fragments of Heidegger's major book *Sein und Zeit*) has shown in his numerous and well-documented works

the scope and specificity of Iranian thinking, with its specific meta-language, its own meanings, and its particular linguistic and hermeneutical rules and practices. Corbin gives us a

penetrating and detailed account of the "Res Iranica", the "Iranian thing". Almost the same thing Heidegger did about "Res Europea"⁽¹⁰⁾. Another Indo-European, namely Hindu,

culture also possesses an extremely developed and refined philosophical apparatus based on Sanskrit. Sanskrit can be seen as a kind of meta-language of Vedanta and the Vedantic cycle,

and Hindu mimamsa is a separate field within the Hindu religion devoted to the systematization of Sanskrit sounds, letters, roots, and their meaning.

combinations, etc.⁽¹¹⁾

Among the Indo-European cultures⁽¹²⁾ only the Slavic world, which is not inferior in socio-political, demogra-

As a result, the Russian language, which is the most stable and established, unambiguous and understandable for everyone who thinks in Russian, does not have its own philosophical meta-language, which would be something stable and established, unambiguous and understandable for everyone who thinks in Russian. This makes one wonder about the meaning of such an anomaly: why does the unconditionally existing *Russian thing* (Res Russica) just as unconditionally lack its own *logos*?

Attempts to fill this gap were made by both Slavophiles, who sought a *Russian logos*, and Westerners, who tried to artificially transfer the European logos to the Russian cultural soil. Their efforts should be appreciated, but as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution they were overridden, and "philosophical Russia" once again entered the zone of twilight consciousness, as in many previous periods of its history, when it had anything but full-fledged and adequate philosophical thought.

I would venture to suggest that among all Indo-European cultural zones, the Russian zone stands "*under the steam*" not by chance and not because of our inferiority and backwardness. In other issues (statehood, economy, technology, science, military power) we are quite adequate. It is just that Russians were waiting for the moment when it was time to create a *new philosophy*, and we rejected the old European metaphysics, which was persistently imposed from the West, not out of irrationality, but on purpose, not wanting to participate in it, observing and saving ourselves for something more interesting and important, for something more fundamental. If this suspicion is correct, then we have waited for our hour: the old European metaphysics has collapsed, and the most profound, serious and responsible of European thinkers, having certified this fact, is calling for radically different thinking. Maybe it is time to engage in the process of real philosophizing and unpack the virgin treasure of Slavic Russian speech in order to create new meanings and new intellectual horizons based on the newly comprehended Russian antiquity⁽¹³⁾. Maybe we were standing "*fallow*" precisely in anticipation and expectation of just such a turn in the world history of thought⁽¹⁴⁾.

EVENING MIND

At the same time, however, *the* profoundly *European* nature of Heidegger's thinking should not be overlooked for a moment. For Heidegger, Europe and the West are synonymous and signify a particular form of philosophizing, historical existence and cultural path that expresses the idea of "evening". Heidegger emphasizes: "Europe is an evening country" (German "*Abendland*"). Its corresponding philosophy is "evening philosophy", "evening metaphysics". The task of Western European philosophy is to "*pack being to sleep.*"

In Heidegger's *Die Geschichte des Seyns*, in a footnote to the third section of *European Philosophy*, we read:

"Der seynsgeschichtliche Begriff des Abendlandes. Das Land des Abends. Abend Vollendung eines Tages des Geschichtes und Übergang zur Nacht, Zeit des Übergangs und Bereitung des Morgens. Nacht und Tag".

"Seynsgeschichtliche understanding of the West (country of the evening). Evening Country. Evening (West) is the fulfillment of the day of history and the transition to night, the time of transition and preparation of the morning (tomorrow). Night and Day"⁽¹⁵⁾.

Clearly aware of his identity as a European and a European thinker, Heidegger, like all Europeans, has no doubt that the path of the West, its "great black path," expresses in itself a universal trajectory of being followed by all peoples and cultures, but where Europeans are the first to go, and thus the first not only to descend into the night but also to see the dawn. Heidegger says:

"Today the whole planet has become European (Western) (...). By "European" (Western) we must understand not geography and not the expansion of influence, but history and the primordality of the historical in it"⁽¹⁶⁾.

By "history" Heidegger means Western history, i.e. the history of Western philosophy as the quintessence of history, and he considers the most important moment to be the "*beginning*" - the epoch of the emergence of philosophical thought in Greece. The equation of Western European culture with universal culture reflects the "cultural racism" common to Westerners, which was fully characteristic of Heidegger's.

ger⁽¹⁷⁾. However, to his credit, it must be said that he himself was never mistaken in believing that the West brings to others not "progress" and "development" but nihilism, "desert", "oblivion of the question of being", decay and ruin (all the delights of the night). The modern West is universal, but so are decay and ruin. Heidegger saw the clearest form of this degeneration in "Americanism," which he saw as "planetarism" (today we would say "globalism" and "globalization"). "Planetarism, then, is the overturning of the beginning (of Western philosophy) in the eventlessness of its development."⁽¹⁸⁾ In the beginnings of its evening journey, the West was still illuminating other cultures to the world with the rays of the setting sun. In the last epoch, "Americanism," "pragmatism," "technicism," and "calculation" have brought only decay to humanity. But even in this decay, perversion and insignificance of the modern West, Heidegger saw meaning and universal significance.

As a thinker of the West, Heidegger thinks in the black. Even more than evening, he thinks *night*. He sees his mission as summarizing the entire Western philosophical tradition. In a sense, his books are the last thing that can be said in the "evening language". Heidegger's language is not the language of Heidegger as a person, it is the final chord of Western European language. Heidegger is the final point of Western European thinking. He and his philosophy are not a special case - they are fate, fate (in the sense of the fulfillment of *the pro-rection*). "At the beginning of language lies the poem," Heidegger says. At the end of language lies Martin Heidegger's philosophy. And it also wants to be the beginning of a new language, the foreshadowing of the language of the morning.

Heidegger believed that in recent centuries, among all mainstream Europeans, beginning with Goethe, Leibniz, Kant, the Romantics, Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, and up to Nietzsche, the Germans were responsible for the world (he called the totality of *things as a whole* - *das Seiende im Ganze* - "the world", *die Welt*). He traces a direct line from the ancient Greeks to German classical philosophy, and then to himself.

CHAPTER 2

a{Šhe h qryee

DISTINCTION ("ONTOLOGISCHE DIFFERENZ")

At the heart of Heidegger's philosophy, at the heart of all his thought, is the notion of *ontological difference* ("ontologische Differenz"). This concept (French "*la difference*"⁽¹⁹⁾, German "*Unterschied*") becomes for Heidegger a fundamental philosophical action: not any distinction, but the distinction of all distinctions, namely the *distinction between being (das Seiende) and being (das Sein)*.

Being and being are not the same thing. In this gap, in the presence of identity and non-identity (at the same time), in the pairing (and non-pairing) of these two concepts, lies all the poignancy of Heidegger's philosophy. Having been "anointed" by Heidegger, having penetrated into the nature of thought, into the nature of metaphysics, into the depths of human existence, affected by this crucial dialogue of "*being and being*" as Heidegger understood it, we will now think in a Heideggerian way in every situation, in solving any problem, in reading any philosophical work.

It is very important to determine which German words correspond to these fundamental Russian words. Heidegger calls "*Being*" in German "*das Sein*", based on the indefinite form of the verb "*sein*" (i.e., the Slavic form of the verb "*sein*"). "*being*" or the Greek "*εἶναι*" is something between a verbal noun and a gerund). In German, there is a form of verbal noun formation which implies the addition of a middle article to the verb. If we were to translate "*das Sein*" absolutely strictly, we would have to use the unpretentious and rather late and artificial Russian middle article.

the bare noun "*being*," which is very convenient for translating theological texts and Western philosophy, but

Church Slavonic verb "*be*" in the indefinite form, i.e., "*to be*". We have no direct possibility of using the indefinite form of the verb, so we use the noun "*being*," but we must always keep this in mind, otherwise we will fall into an error, the meaning of which will become clear in the following exposition. We will not understand Heidegger unless we understand exactly what he is talking about.

DAS SEIN AND DAS SEIENDE

So, "*das Sein*" is what we translate as "*being*", meaning "*be*". And "*being*", which in German is expressed by the active participle of the same verb "*sein - das Seiende*".

What is "*essence*"? In Church Slavonic there was a form such as "*siy*", meaning: "*that which is*." The distinction between *being* on the one hand and *beingness* on the other, the distinction between *das Seiende* and *das Sein*, is the meaning and foundation of Heidegger's entire philosophy. Here again, therefore, we must turn to grammar. Heidegger emphasizes that the conjugation of a verb or the formation of various forms is always its *inclination*, its *conjugation* with something, its *elastic bending*. In its pure infinitive form, the verb "*sein*" (or the verb "*be*") exists by itself and does not refer to anyone or anything, does not signify anything, does not "worship" anyone, and does not "bow" to anyone.

Let's think about a simpler verb: what is a "*doing*?" We understand what "*he does*" means, we can know the "*doing*", we can see the "*done*". But are we able to imagine, to visualize, to imagine what is "*to do*" in its purest form? The infinitive does not have a definite object, nothing *of things* corresponds to it directly. "*To do*" ("*act*" in Old Slavonic) would be something that is done by whom and in relation to what, and such a degree of abstraction is unattainable. If we nevertheless try to treat the infinitive as an infinitive

If we look for correspondences and images of the verb "*to do*", we will immediately find ourselves in a strange situation. On the one hand, it will tell us something, but on the other hand, no matter how hard we try, we will not be able to grasp what we are talking about. The act becomes visible only in the course of conjugation, "co-conjugation", when it is paired with a pronoun or a noun, i.e. with a person (person, subject) or an object. We grasp the meaning of a verb when it is clarified by the person and number, when it is already "bent". In its pure form, when the verb exists by itself as ῥῆμα, as an infinitive, we *do* not grasp it, it escapes us - even a concrete verb like "*to do*".

What, then, can be said of the much more complex and elusive verb by virtue of its supposed obviousness "*to be*"?

If we try to grasp the meaning of this verb (by analogy with the verb "*to do*") in its indefinite form, the infinitive, it evades us even more decisively. The infinitive is the fundamental operation of consciousness in disembodiment of the visual *being* in action; it is linked to the very roots of thinking, and the way it is carried out largely determines the whole structure of thinking, which is built on top of its original base, where it is still found in close proximity to the *being*.

This is precisely the difficulty and the problem of Martin Heidegger's philosophy.

THE ESSENCE IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND: THE BASIS OF THOUGHT

What is *being*, *das Seiende*? We understand this very well. It is what is *present*, *what is present*, what is *before us*. *Being is*, and the fact that it is *there* as *being*, as being present, makes it clear and obvious. *Being is* intelligible, and the directness of this intelligibility, i.e. the strict conformity of the first operation of thinking, the statement of presence, is the basis of thinking as such. Thinking can take various forms, the most bizarre ones, but in all its twists and paradoxes it constantly refers us to the *being* as its own.

her main statement. Thinking states that *there is being*. This is where it begins. If there is doubt about that *being is*, that it is *being*, then thinking immediately goes astray, meaning is lost, mindlessness comes.

The experience of *being* is the primary and starting experience of thought. *There is* a third person, a very concrete thing. The whole totality of things and each of the things, including ourselves, can quite and without problems assign to itself the status of *being*, of that which *is*. There is no difficulty in this: the *being* can be easily encountered. Everything we see, everything that has been, everything we think or remember is *being*. *Being* is perhaps the clearest and most basic idea of man's relation to the world, to himself. It is very simple to understand the *being*: it is that which gives itself to us, that which is *present*, *that which is present*.

Of course, in philosophy, the question that interested the ancient sophists, Kant, and the feminologists in their time may arise: does the knowledge that an *entity* exists refer to the *entity* itself or to knowledge? Is existence inherent in the being itself, or is it a predicate of reason, which is bestowed on the being in the basic operation of thinking?

Kant clearly formulated this problem by posing the question of the "thing-in-itself" and the "thing-for-us," i.e., the no-men and the phenomenon. Husserl, the founder of phenomenology and Heidegger's teacher, in order to circumvent this question, proposed to introduce the notion of "noema", i.e. the being that is the being in the sphere of thought and is an intellectual object, a phenomenon of thinking, corresponding not to the being itself but to thinking about the being, including attributing to it the property of the *being*.

For all the apparent complexity, in essence, everything remains quite simple. It does not matter so much whether there is an essence in itself or whether it is legitimate to ask about something "in itself" at all when it comes to philosophy, i.e., a field of thought where only the laws of thought are unconditional and fundamental, determining how it postulates with everything else. Whether the being exists in itself as a noumene, or whether its existence is pre-di-di-

katom of reason, i.e., "that which has been previously stated" (Latin "*praedecire*", "to proclaim", "to speak in advance", German *Zuspruch*), and is not decisive for reason. In both cases, it is a "noema", in one case with a strictly corresponding and independent object, in the other case with a subject that is neither strictly corresponding nor independent, or with no subject at all. As an object or as a phenomenological "noema" the being is, and this is obvious. It is obvious to thought. Thought deals with it as a first-obviousness. By recognizing the opposite - that there is no being - we destroy the mechanism of consciousness, disable it, and thus cease to be thinking beings. Having ceased, hypothetically, to be thinking beings, we can no longer be sure whether we exist, i.e., whether we exist, because we no longer possess the procedures for asserting the existence and non-existence of either ourselves or what is around us. In that case, someone else - someone who retains reason - will decide for us whether we are or are not. The ancient Greeks, beginning with Aristotle, defined "man" as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον, i.e., "*an animal endowed with words-language-mind.*" In losing the *logos*, we lose not only our humanity but also our animality, leaving others to take care of our categorization in the multiverse. the difference in species.

BEING IS A PROBLEM: THE LEADING QUESTION OF PHILOSOPHY

If *being is* comprehensible and transparent, and this comprehensibility and transparency form the basis of thinking, then *being is* much more complicated.

When thinking takes the first step, often unnoticed by the thinker, it asserts (implicitly) that there *is* being. This is neither a problem nor a question, but the basis of thought. The one who simply thinks always carries out this first movement.

But when the thinker begins to think about *how* he thinks, i.e., to think about thought, the reflection on being takes on a completely different character and unfold-

is realized on another, higher, floor of consciousness. Reflecting on our own thinking, we, in one way or another, also

we attach to it the property of being. Although not as clear as Descartes with his "cogito ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am, I exist"), but something similar was recognized by the ancient philosophers. This time it requires questioning the being in order, at the very least, to separate the properties of *the being* that *the* thinker thinks about from the properties of the *being* that the thinker is.

This, according to Heidegger, is the "leading question of philosophy" (Leitfrage), which is formulated as "what is the *being of the thing* as such?" or else: "what is *common* to all *things* that make these *things exist*?" or "what is inherent in *being as a whole*?".

That to which this "leading question of philosophy" is addressed is *being*. It is conceived through being, but as something distinct from being, though inherent in it. The genesis of this question can be described in two ways: empirically and rationalistically. Empirically, it would appear as two successive stages of "natural" reflection on the givenness of being. The first stage is the simple statement that *there is being*. The second stage is an aspiration to generalize the observations of being, to systematize and hierarchize the properties of being. Observing things, consciousness begins to notice certain regularities and at some stage (the emergence of philosophy in the ancient world) comes to the discovery that *things as a whole* have a common property. This is how the idea of *being* and the corresponding question arises: "what is this *being*?", "what is it like?"

The second way to the same question can go through thought over thought with the underlying and growing conviction that a *being* capable of thinking about another *being* is a *being of a* higher order and its existence requires a different, higher form, i.e. a thinking being *is* fundamentally different from a non-thinking (or thinking) being. This higher form of being is also correlated with *being as a whole*, with the *general in being*, and leads to the problem of "what is the *being of being*".

So, *being as das Sein*, as the Greek εἶναι, as an in- finitive appears in the realm of thought at that moment,

when thinking begins to think of something that exceeds the thought of *being* as such. This is the *beginning of philosophy* - going beyond the primary thought statements from the realm of "*being is*".

There is a fundamental point here. Thinking only about things as they are in direct experience is potentially limitless.

Thought can go through the being, rearrange it, compare, distinguish and combine it without going to the second level - the level of *thinking about being*. That is why the thought of the *essence of being* was perceived by the ancient Greeks as an intrusion of something divine into life. This is what is implied in Heraclitus of Ephesus' 1st fragment on the unity of *being* and *logos* - οὐκ ἔμεῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογέειν σοφὸν ἐστὶ, ἔν πάντα εἶναι ("If you listen not to me, but to the logos, it will be wise, abiding in it, to say: all is one"⁽²⁰⁾). In lectures on Heraclitus' logos⁽²¹⁾ Heidegger emphasized that Heraclitus associated logos with *divine lightning*. Only the lightning of the divine logos, which exceeds the thinking capacity of the philosopher himself ("listen not to me"), is capable of prompting a judgment about *being as a whole*: in this fragment, a judgment about the "unity of all things. Heidegger emphasized that in Aristotle's philosophy, *unity* is almost synonymous with *being* - ἔν is synonymous with ὅν - so we can interpret this fragment as linking the *logos* to *being*, raising the whole problem of thinking to a second, higher level. On this level and formulates the "leading question of philosophy".

Where the question of being is raised, philosophy begins. This boundary separates *mere thought* from *philosophical thought*.

"THE LEADING QUESTION OF PHILOSOPHY" WAS INCORRECTLY FORMULATED

All of *what* has been said above about *being* and *being* does not yet contain anything new and specific, except, perhaps, the persistent fixation of attention on the *relation* between *being* and *being*. This *relation* (*das Bezug*) is the most important problem for the whole of Heidegger's philosophy. Approximately

This is precisely how the classical history of philosophy describes the ontological problematic, assuming it to be a general mes-Vol.

Heidegger's radical novelty can be seen in the fact that from his first phenomenological texts he expresses clear dissatisfaction with the very formulation of the "leading question of philosophy". He is suspicious of the original philosophical foundation in the justification of *being as a general property of being*. He sees in this something profound, fundamental, decisive for the whole process of Western European philosophy and interprets it as a fatal error, as a mistake, as the omission of something most important, which is not so easy to express and describe, but which he intuitively grasps as a turning point in world history.

According to Heidegger, the relation *between being and being* was already misunderstood in Antiquity, and although this error was infinitesimal in the first stages, it grew as all the consequences were deduced from the foundations of philosophy, until it finally turned into the total ontological nihilism of New Age philosophy, and especially of the twentieth century. The key to understanding the present state of affairs in philosophy, history, culture, even politics, according to Heidegger, must be sought at the dawn of Western European civilization - in the solution of the question of the relationship between *being (Sein)* and *being (Seiende)* by the first philosophers.

Even then, *something went wrong* in the clarification of the relation *between being and being*, in the very formulation of the "leading question of philosophy". "*What went 'wrong'? Why did it go 'wrong' and how should it be 'wrong'?*" - these questions form the main nerve of Martin Heidegger's philosophy.

CHAPTER 3

trmd`lemŠ`ft|-nmŠnftnch."⁽²²⁾

BEZUG'S FREQUENCY

In clarifying the nature of the ontological problematic, Heidegger puts forward the thesis: "*Sein ist das Seiende nicht*", "*being is not being*". On the one hand, this means nothing except that thinking about *being* as *being* must take us somewhere away from being, which is almost obvious. It does, but not in the way it should. This is where the structure of *the Bezug (relation)* comes to *the fore*.

Bezug, the *relation* consisting in the clarification of the correlation between being and *being* is structured in ancient philosophy in a very definite way. The idea of *being of being* leads ancient Greek philosophers to the concept of essence, as that common thing that unites all things in their most *general* quality. "Essence" (in Greek "οὐσία") is a feminine noun formed from the present participle of the verb "εἶναι", "to be", "*sein*". In Latin, the term was later translated as "*essentia*" or "*substantia*", which made the meaning vague. In Russian, the word "essence" most accurately conveys this meaning.

Here we should again turn to Heidegger's meta-language. He insists that οὐσία is *Seiendheit*, that is, an understanding of *being* that identifies it precisely with the *general quality of all things as being*. It is this understanding that predetermines the special way of development of Western philosophy, where *being* as εἶναι is stably and invariably thought of as οὐσία, which is expressed by the formula *Sein = Seiendheit*, "*being is the essence of being*".

This is the *Bezug of Western European philosophy*, which is structured around just such an ontology.

of this picture and is based on this way of thinking: "*being is the essence of being*", and accordingly, "*being is the essence of being*".

Heidegger, therefore, establishes two parallel levels - *the level of being and the level of essence* (οὐσία, Seiendheit). And here Heidegger makes the most important, fateful statement: ancient philosophy, and after it all modern Western European philosophy, differentiating *being* and *essence* through *essence*, fundamentally overlooked the difference between *being* and *essence*, and constructed an abstraction from *essence* by direct analogy with *essence* itself. The result was that *being* (as the *essence of being*), although thought different from *being in its separateness and specificity*, coincided with *being in its generality*, i.e. was ultimately thought of as *being*. It was, of course, a different *being* - a *being of a higher order*, or a *supreme being* - but still a *being*. As a result, *being* acquired the property of being, i.e., it became possible to say of it that "*being is*", as Parmenides did. Such an assertion is possible only in relation to an *entity*, even if it is the most sublime, primordial, simple and unified. If "*being is*," then it is *being*, not just as *being*, but as the *essence of being*.

The Greeks, like the people of the West, were too fond of the creature and the

Heidegger does not say this with irritation or arrogance, but with deep understanding and empathy. Heidegger says this not with irritation and arrogance, but with deep understanding and empathy. *Being*, as that which makes *being existent*, must in some way be contiguous with *being*, connected to it. And if we follow this thought, we will indeed at some point come to the conviction that *being is*, that *it is the being*, the most essential and pure of *things*. The assertion to the contrary, that *being is not being*, can be accepted only up to certain limits, when it is necessary to emphasize that *being as a general* is not the same as *being as a private*, but that both the private and the general have the property that makes them one: both *are*.

But, realizing the depth of the ontological distinction and Bezug's of traditional philosophy, Heidegger says: this is the point; here is the root of the principled

If *being* is not *being*, then this must be its essential property. But in this case it cannot be identical with the *essence of being*, and hence it is not *common to being*. In such a case, *being is not, is not being, is nothing of being* (including not the essence of being, and not common, not οὐσία and not κοινόν).

In short, "*being is nothing*" (*das Sein ist das Nichts*), Heidegger argues, and Western European philosophy, which has not realized this, is a great delusion of two and a half thousand years.

ONTICA

In considering the problem of the relation (Bezug) of being (Seiende, ὄν) to *being* (Sein, εἶναι), Heidegger introduces three levels of ontology according to which this problem can be viewed from a different perspective. Heidegger gives these definitions in his major work *Sein und Zeit*⁽²³⁾.

He calls the first level "ontic", from the Greek ὄν (*being*) (ὄντος is the genitive case from which compound words are usually formed in Greek). When we try to answer the question of what is *being* in the most direct and accessible way, we are in the realm of ontic dimension. The ontic dimension is the direct apprehension by the mind of the world around it, with its differences and diversity, although here the mind does not yet ask itself what is the *being of being* or the *essence of being*, and confines itself to the simple statement that *being is being*. Thinking as such in its most natural and simple form unfolds precisely in this dimension. To think of *being* as *being* means to compare one *thing* with another *thing*, to build up a series of *things*, to juxtapose them with each other, always remaining at the same level of the thought topicality (i.e., the space of thought) without going beyond it, i.e., without asking questions about the *origin of being*, *what is the being of being*, *where is the end of being*, and *what is this end?*

The ontic field is intrinsic to both positive sciences, and everyday thinking, as highly developed systems of

counting and categorization, as well as the most trivial mental reactions of the average person of various cultures. from the primitive to the most sophisticated.

The ancient Greeks defined the *field of being* by the collective notion of "φύσις", and the *field* of ontic thought can be called, following Aristotle, "physics". We shall see a little later how much is invested in this notion.

As far as philosophy is concerned, ontic thinking can be seen as something preparatory - as something that lies at its core. It is already thinking, but not yet philosophical thinking (in the full sense of the word). It is thinking in words rather than concepts, thinking in evidences rather than abstract concepts; it is operating with things rather than entities, even if these things are of a mental nature, i.e. "noemes" in Husserl's sense. For Heidegger, this level of thinking is extremely important, since it is where philosophy begins. And the *way* it begins, the *way* it deals with the layer of ontic worldview and world-view, the direction in which it pushes away from it and where it goes next, is of fundamental importance for the entire trajectory of the formation of philosophy and to a great extent predetermines its fate and its end.

ONTOLOGY

Heidegger calls the second level *ontological* proper. Ontology begins where the "great question of philosophy" is posed: "what is the *being of being*", "what is being as a *whole*", "what is the *essence of being*"?

This is where the problem of the qualitative distinction between *being* and *being* appears, and hence ontology is based on the elucidation of the structure and quality of the *relation of* one to the other. Here the question of being is placed at the very center of thinking. This is the beginning of philosophy, which, unlike thinking as such, reaches a fundamentally new level, where the question of the *being of being* and the non-identity of *being* and *being is* put in the center of attention.

According to Heidegger, the foundations of ontology, as well as of philosophy itself ("philosophy" and "ontology" in terms of the

the question of *being* are identical notions), were laid down by the pre-Socratics, finalized by Plato and Aristotle, and in such a finished form they came to Christian theology and New Age philosophy. The way in which the first philosophers conceptualized the question of the *existence of being* became the fate, the fate of all Western European philosophy, since their choice and their solution of this problem laid the fundamental framework for the entire further philosophical process. They are the creators of the ontology of the Greeks, which became the ontology of European philosophy.

This ontology, in addressing the question of *being*, identifies the *being of being* with the *essence of being* (οὐσία) and, while affirming the distinction between *being* and *being* (as a property common to all *things*), at the same time treats *being* as the same *thing*, but only of a higher order. Heidegger argues that what is most important is that ontology, from its earliest stages, strays from its pre-determined path. The birth of philosophy and the lightning-fast breakthrough to logos pushed thought to break away from onticism, to *leap* beyond the horizons of *being* and to discover and reveal *being*. This would be true *transcendence*, i.e., the beyond, and it and only it would provide philosophy with its irreversible and irresistible fundamentality. By comprehending *being* ontically at first, the fierce thought of the Greeks, who *were getting* a taste of freedom, *would* have had to make a dash into *nothingness*, into the *bearing*, where *being* as the true basis of *being* was *to be* sought. But the Greeks did otherwise and created an ontology based not on *nothingness* but on the *essence of being*, i.e., on *being as a universal property*. Being as a universal property of *being*, thus giving rise to a "fictitious transcendence" that did not break through to the background of *being*, to its hidden foundation, but doubled the topics of *being* with an additional storey, which remained *being* (however it was called), but at the same time acted as a higher beginning, i.e., *being*, for *being* in ontic terms.

In later works (especially of the period 1936-1946) Heidegger introduced the most important element of his meta-language, the spelling of the word "*Sein*", "*being*", in two variations: the usual "*Sein*" and the obsolete "*Seyn*".

This distinction is of radical significance. (There is no way in Russian to convey this distinction with a by relying on Russian words - even the most pretentious ones).

Ontology deals with *being* as *Sein*, understanding it as *Seiendheit*, *essence*. *Seyn* is a *being* that, by contrast, completely eludes ontology, apprehended not from the side of *being* but otherwise (rather, from the side of *not-being*, i.e., *nothingness*), and represents the true trans-valence and authentic philosophy that Heidegger proposes to create.

Ontology as it is, therefore, creates an artificial construction of "essentialism" over the *being* (and onticism), which becomes the field of philosophy, and philosophy itself takes the place of the queen of the sciences, conditioning in turn the principles, foundations, and methodologies of the physical sciences, as well as ethics, grammar, mathematics, geometry, philology, aesthetics, and so on. All this is the result of one initially infinitesimal error.

Instead of becoming a truly deeper and more fundamental, primary and conditioned level of thinking, ontology, as it developed, only increasingly frustrated the normal functioning of ontic thinking, created blockages and deadlocks, distorted and corrupted *being* and the apprehension of *being*. Instead of explaining φύσις, ontology raped it, imposing abstract constructions on the being based on a misdirected basic movement of the logos.

Logos in ontology, which distinguished it from ontology, was configured in Greek philosophy in such a way that it operated with *essence as if it were being*, equating *being* with *essence* (whence Parmenides' "*being is, non-being is not*"), and by this excess of false positivity brought negativity, destruction, and death into the ensemble of *things*. Instead of saving *being* through *being*, logos ruined *being* through essence (essentialism).

With Aristotle, the philosophical intuitions of the first Greek philosophers acquire a complete and systematized form. It is significant that one of his works is called *Metaphysics*, "that which comes after 'physics'" ("physics" both as a phenomenon and as another of Aristotle's treatises). *Metaphysics* turns out to be virtually identical to

ontology (and Western European philosophy in general), since it aims to justify the field of *beginnings* beyond the limits of physics (i.e., onticism).

Heidegger insists that all Western European philosophy is metaphysics (i.e., ontology) - even that which explicitly rejects any appeal to metaphysics, such as Nietzsche's philosophy, the "philosophy of life," positivism, or pragmatism. Metaphysics as ontology has long been the sole and obligatory *style* of Western European thinking, which is always and in all cases essentialist, whether it is a system of ideas (idealism), things (realism, materialism), concepts (conceptualism) or values (axiology), a system of utility (pragmatism), vulgar political worldviews or even nihilism. All these are expressions of metaphysics, since the matrix of thinking is the same in all cases and is based on a (falsely) transcendentalist (doubled) topics.

TO FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY

Let us turn to the most important thing, to the core of Heidegger's philosophy. The critique of ontology (and metaphysics) as a false ontology and the identification of the origins of the main error in the first steps of Greek philosophical thought (which predetermined the entire further course of Western philosophy) already presuppose in themselves the existence of an alternative. If we have seen *what* was "wrong," we can try to determine, by analogy, how things *should be* or should have been in order for them to be *the way they are*.

"like this," "the way it should be."

Heidegger brings us close to the following chain of thought. The question of ontic thinking - natural thinking that does not yet ask the question of the *being of being* - remains the basis on which further philosophy is built. But as this philosophy develops, and as a more and more developed and weighty ontology (metaphysics) is constituted, we move further and further away from the *ontic*, replacing it with the *ontological*. Parallel to this is the increasing displacement of nature by techno-

koi, artificial products of human society. Ontology subsumes everything, including its ontic-the grounds.

If we are invited to reconsider ontology at its origins, then it is necessary to revisit the ontic - and in the form in which it resides at the beginning of the history of philosophy, in its original and fresh form. (This problem is solved by Heidegger in his book "*Sein und Zeit*"⁽²⁴⁾, and the peak of its solution is the foregrounding of *Dasein*⁽²⁵⁾). In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to shovel the colossal load that is the entire edifice of European philosophy from the pre-Socratics to the twentieth century. However, this crucial operation will not yet yield results, but will only lead us to the starting level - to the elucidation of ontic thinking and its structure. To a certain extent, phenomenology with its concept of "*Lebenswelt*", "lifeworld", and its basic methodologies, has set itself the same task.

Having reached the ontic and cleansed it of ontology, we find ourselves in the same position as the creators of Western philosophy, who laid down the basic trajectories of its future development. This means that we face the same problems and the same questions. This is where the difference begins. We have to answer the *basic questions of the unfolding of the logos in a different way*, but the *basic questions have to be posed anew*. Heidegger says that if "the leading question of philosophy" (*Leitfrage*) was the question of the *essence* (as a general property) of *being*, then "the underlying question of philosophy" (*Grundfrage*) must be the question of the *truth of being* (*über Wahrheit des Seyns*: it is *Seyn* through "y").

Philosophy begins wherever the question of the *being of* things arises. It is a flash of the divine logos, illuminating a new dimension of thought, leading to new horizons. But we have seen that, in the case of ontology, this question was very poorly formulated, and the answer to it was catastrophic. Ontology, in its attempt to soar above ontology, created a false transcendence, metaphysics as a doubling of the topicality of *the being*, where the ontic entity was ontically added to the plan of *the same being* - but with the same onticity.

only this time in its essential slice, in the slice of essence. In ontology, the Greek logos severed ties with the *being* and its ontic perception, thus shattering it, but could not break through to *being* as such. From this tragedy emerged the history of Western Europe and its philosophy.

Heidegger proposes to fix our attention on this point. It is not enough to return to onticism in its unspoiled state; we must go through the *explosion of logos* again, a new *experience of lightning*. This time, learned from the bitter experience of a fatal mistake, we must formulate the question of *being* directly, not through *being* (*Seiende*) and the dead-end path of essentialism (*Seiendheit* - as *Sein* through "i"). The *ontological distinction* must this time be made radically and with the concentration of philosophical attention on *being* itself - *Seyn* (which is not being, cannot be defined by attributing the at-ribut "is"), i.e. on *being* which *is not being* and which is therefore *nothing*. Starting from the ontic (*from the being*), we must this time go in a different direction: we must not rise *above the being*, remaining attached to it and destroying it with this ambiguous relation, as in the case of European metaphysics. We must look *beneath it*, deep into its *ground*, where there is *nothing*, where there is nothingness. But this *nothingness* is not simply *non-being* (counting from being). It is a *nothingness* that makes the *existent exist* without becoming *existent*. It is a life-giving *nothingness* that constitutes everything with its quiet power.

This will be a "*fundamental-ontology*" - an ontology built on fundamentally new lines than all previous philosophy. In this "*fundamental ontology*" a new logos must shine, this time centered not on being, but on *nothingness*.

The logos of classical metaphysics thought of *nothingness* as the antithesis of *being* and, in general, as the antithesis of *essence*, and ultimately as the antithesis of itself, which led it to total nihilism: for in doing so, it demeaned, ignored, the *nothingness* (*Seyn* = *Nichts*) that animated *being*. In turn, the logos of "fundamental ontology" will not think of *nothingness* as the antithesis of *being*,

but as its *life-giving and ever-present source*, which, by removing *being* as *being*, affirms its belonging to-
to *being*.

How is *fundamental-ontology* possible? It is possible because philosophy is a field of absolute freedom, where thinking can take the most daring and the most unimaginable turns. But it is possible only if the *freedom of* the thinker interfaces - at the *ultimate risk* - with the truth of *being*, if he allows this truth to come true.

Martin Heidegger's philosophy is a philosophy of transition to the construction of a "*fundamental-ontology*".

CHAPTER 4

DAS SEYNSGESCHICHTLICHE

DIE GESCHICHTE AND SEYN

The noun "*Seynsgeschichte*" and the adjective "*seynsgeschichtliche*" derived from it play a huge role in Heidegger's philosophy and are directly related to the project of developing a "*fundamental ontology*". We have seen how profound and difficult this project is, requiring the construction of an ontology alternative to the entire body of Western European thought. Therefore, the range of expressions and words used in the direction of "fundamental-ontology" requires our increased attention.

Before we begin to clarify the meaning of the compound word "*Seynsgeschichte*", let us consider the two constituent roots. We have already met "*Seyn*". This word, spelled with a "y", in Heidegger means "*being in the fundamental-ontological sense*", i.e., *being* not as a *general property of being*, not as *essence*, not as a statement of a logos constructed on the basis of a consideration of being through being itself, but as a *breakthrough into a pure element*, i.e., as *nothingness* (*Nichts*).

Now let us turn to the word "*Geschichte*", which is translated into Russian unambiguously as "*history*". But Heidegger himself, and we should be used to this by now, not only does not agree to identify "*die Geschichte*" and "*history*" (*die Historie* in German), but opposes them. Therefore, if we translate "*Seynsgeschichte*" as "*history of being*", we fall short of Heidegger's intention. The case is even worse with the adjective "*seynsgeschichtliche*", to convey the meaning of which in Russian

language is not possible at all: "*being-historical*" or "*being-historical*" is not only a

sound ridiculous, but also remotely resemble a very different circle of convergences and meanings than what Heidegger has in mind.

SEND AND RUN.

Let us look at the etymology of the German word "*Geschichte*". It comes from the verb *geschehen*, which means "to proceed", "to happen". In its original meaning it is close to the German "*Ereignis*"⁽²⁶⁾ (literally "event", "accident"). Heidegger likens this word to another German word "*Geschick*" (more commonly used today in the form "*Schicksal*") - "fate", which, in turn, is derived from the verb "*schicken*", "to send", "to send". Heidegger therefore reads in the word "*Geschichte*" as a report of noteworthy events the meaning of "fate," "unheard," and, even more profoundly, "message." What happens in history in its most essential dimension is a *message*, which is *what happens and happens, giving meaning to everything*. If "history" is the narrative of incidents, phenomena, acts and events, then *Geschichte* is the path of meanings that runs through history as what is *sent in it*.

"History" is the envelope, "*Geschichte*" is the content of the message. Destiny is that everything that happens is a common connected and purposeful action in which something is transmitted from someone to someone through something and for something.

If we delve further into etymology and beyond, we see that the words "*geschehen*" and "*schicken*" actually go back to the common Indo-European root "**skek*", which meant "In Russian, the verb "jump" (meaning "to jump") is derived from this base. In Russian, the verb "jump" (meaning "to jump") is derived from this base. It is important to note that Heidegger's interpretation of the word "*jump*", "*leap*" (*Sprung*) as the main philosophical action that brings us into the socio-physical world is the same as the word "*jump*" (*Sprung*).

the realm of "fundamental-ontology". In order to move from ontology to "fundamental-ontology," one must make a *leap*: not just a smooth transition, not evolution, not re-translation, but a sharp and traumatic, risky *leap that passes over the abyss* (*Abgrund*). At the same time, Heidegger emphasizes that this leap can be fatal, since we are standing on the edge of a precipice and have no room for escape.

Thus, *Geschichte*, according to Heidegger, is not a smoothly unfolding canvas of history, of the historical process, but a set of individual sharp *leaps* over the abyss, preparing the last and most important (most complex and dangerous) *final leap*. The content of the *message of these leaps*, which prepare the final *leap*, is communicated to us by the use of the word "*Seyn*". Thus, we learn that the originator as well as the recipient of this message was being *itself* (*Seyn*), which *notified itself through leaps* (each *leap* is a stage of philosophical thought associated with a great philosopher and his discoveries) in order to move from ontology (which revealed itself as modern European nihilism) to "fundamental-ontology" at the culminating point (the eschatology of *being*). This is *Seynsgeschichte*.

SEYNSGESCHICHTE AS COMPLICITY IN BEING (SEYN)

Seynsgeschichte is not just a field of thought or a branch of science, but a strenuous effort to recognize the *mode of being* (*Seyn*) embedded in the historical process by deciphering the deep philosophical intentions of the thinkers who have raised ontological issues, who have spoken about them indirectly or who have been silent about them (which is no less important). Culture, all social and historical events and transformations in *Seynsgeschichte* can only serve as secondary decorations, distant consequences of what is solved in philosophy.

Seynsgeschichte is possible as meaningful and affirmed from the horizon of "fundamental-ontology". Without this, it is just a *Geschichte*: it can be seen in it.

child both the message and the *leaps*, but we have no certainty that this message contains the message of *authentic being*

(*Seyn*) rather than the false transcendence of the old ontology. For example, Hegel's philosophy of history is a *Geschichte*, i.e. no longer just *history*, but no longer *Seynsgeschichte*. Therefore, *Seynsgeschichte* and its very existence depend intensely on whether the *decision* (*Entscheidung*) to move to a "fundamental ontology" is taken and whether this *transition* (*leap, jump*) is successfully accomplished.

Therefore, *Seynsgeschichte* is a project, not an actuality, not a given, but an assignment. If we are able to discover the truth of *being* (*Seyn*) through itself, not through *being* and not through a *general property of being*, we will discover *what the historical process really was* and *what the great thinkers ultimately communicated to us about the last horizons of their thought*. Then we will enter the realm of *Seynsgeschichte*, not only having realized what has been, but having won the right to be present in this realm, and will be able to be in the *being of the future* (the *being* that will be). But if this does not happen and it is decided to continue to remain under the "yoke" of the old metaphysics, then we will not even have a *Geschichte*, only a dead history with its meaningless and endless recounting of the details of the past, which say nothing to the spirit of recent people and represent only a cultural convention.

One can understand the *message of being* (*Seyn*) only in a state of *leap (jump) over the abyss*, and this understanding will be a statement of *being* (*Seyn*) itself. Therefore, *Seynsge- schichte* can, in turn, serve as the starting point for all philosophizing within the framework of *fundamental ontology*: by breaking through to *Seynsgeschichte* and comprehending the meaning of this word, we already by virtue of this event itself constitute the process of unfolding *fundamental ontology* and express through us the *message of being* (*Seyn*).

But if we participate in the *jump*, we will not only radically change the trajectory and structure of our actual existence and move to new horizons along a completely new path, but we will also discover for the first time what *was* truly in the past. What *was* in the past *was a message of being* that remains always *there*

always fresh and sharp, always new and alive. Therefore, the meaning of the adjective "*seynsgeschichtliche*" means to grasp the *past as present*, to become contemporaries of what did not pass and happen in the past (but was unimportant, obsolete and gone), but what was *truly there*. Through the adjective "*seynsgeschichtliche*" we become co-temporaries of great ideas and great men, because we ourselves climb to the last heights, from which other mountain peaks are clearly visible, while the swarming of the small things in the dark valleys is indistinguishable neither in the present nor in previous epochs. The true thinker knows as little, if not less, about the details of the society in which he lives than he knows about the details of the lives of the people of distant epochs. But he understands the *voice of being*, which sounds from the mouths of the ancients more clearly and louder than the itch of senseless crowds, both ancient and modern.

SEYN IST ZEIT

The view of history as *Geschichte*, and even more so *Seynsgeschichte*, may be perplexing to those who have uncritically, as unquestionable axioms, absorbed the norms of Western European ontology and metaphysics and are accustomed to viewing time as something objective or, at least, independent and autonomous. Modern philosophy and science, and the modern philosophers derived from them⁽²⁷⁾ think of *time as something in which existence unfolds*.

But for Heidegger, *Zeit* (time⁽²⁸⁾) is not something separate or additional to *being*, not something where and in what this *being* is realized, not some a priori condition (even if subjective or transcendental, as in Kant). For Heidegger, *being is time*, and, accordingly, *time is being* (*Seyn ist "Zeit"*⁽²⁹⁾).

Heidegger sees *Zeit* as *Seynsgeschichte*, i.e. as the unfolding of *being* in time (while *being* is not thought of as something separate unfolding in time, but as time itself). However, this is neither time in the natural-scientific sense (the a priori modus of the object's existence) nor history as understood by the humanities.

science (as a totality of human acts, responses to challenges, etc., where the subject is man and the human being). In time (*Zeit*) as *Seynsgeschichte* there is neither an independent object (nature) nor a subject (man). The hero of *Seynsgeschichte* is *being* itself, which is *time*. This *being* (*Seyn*) relates to itself and to the *being* (*Seiende*), unfolding as time. But let us note at once: we are talking about *being* as *Seyn*, not being as *Sein*! That is, Heidegger understands *time* (*Zeit*) *fundamentally ontologically*, not ontologically.

In such a time (as in *Seynsgeschichte*) the *past* in the sense in which it *was*, *is*. And what is *not there* is *not there*! And the *future* (*das Kunstige*), in the sense in which it *will be*, *is already there* and *has necessarily been there* before. The *present* is the *presence* (*parousia*) of *being* (*Seyn*); any other present, except for the presence of *being* (*Seyn*), is not the present.

Since being (*Seyn*) is time (*Zeit*), then, accordingly, not everything in history that seems to us to *have been*, in fact, *was*, and much of what *was*, we do *not* know exactly to the extent that we *ourselves* are *not* (in Slavonic it would sound: "*we are not ourselves*"). Here we could recall the formula of the poet and philosopher Evgeny Golovin

"*he who died never lived*"⁽³⁰⁾. That which has passed away and become *past*, *past* (*Vergangene*), has never been. And that which truly *was*, *truly was*, is never *Vergangene* (*past*): it is everlasting.

THREE LAYERS OF HISTORY

The introduction of the dimension of *Seynsgeschichte* and the consideration of time and its events and patterns from a "*foundation-ontological*" perspective distinguishes three levels in what is usually referred to by the general word "history".

It is indicative that the word appeared in Russian from the German language in the 17th century under Peter the Great, and in German it came from Greek (ιστορία) through Latin (*historia*). Until then, there was no concept of "history" in Russian: historical information was reported in chronicles (e.g., in the Tale of Bygone Years)

and literature of the church cycle (in the Old and New Testament, saintly literature, precepts, hagiographies, hagiographies of saints, explanatory Paley, etc.). Russian "bylinas," "were" and

In Russian society, "bylichki", which corresponds in meaning to Heidegger's *Seynsgeschichte*, was attached either to the Bogatyr epic or to semi-mythological-half historical stories of everyday understated content, which makes these words unsuitable in this context. In the Orthodox tradition, *Seynsgeschichte* corresponds most precisely to the concepts of "fate" and "Providence". "Fate" is the "original judgment," the "reasoning" that predetermined the unfolding of world events, determining each of them a place, order, and meaning. *Promysel* is a direct reference to divine thinking, to the Wisdom of God (Sophia), which has deliberately ("in time it is", in eternity) ordered the existence, the sequence and nature of its emergence (γένεσις) and disappearance (φθορά). These parallels are important for us because Heidegger performs two operations with the notion of "history": on the one hand, he incorporates familiar ("school") Western European concepts in their classical and generally accepted interpretations, and on the other hand, he etymologically brings these concepts to the original meaning of ancient words and at the same time overthrows the established constructions, pushing for the creation of radically new, "*fundamental-ontological*" ones.

In order for the Russian consciousness to strictly follow what Heidegger does and calls for, it is necessary to keep in mind the distance between Russian culture and the Russian tradition of thought (I would hesitate to speak of Russian philosophy, and even more so of Russian ontology), on the one hand, and the structure of Western mentality and the Western intellect, on the other. In fighting the axioms of Western European historicism, Heidegger fights against what is far from obvious to us and what we have perceived from the West late, fragmentary and superficially, what has managed to clog our consciousness but has not become a full-fledged system of a priorities that can be clearly reflected upon if necessary.

Here it is worth recalling again *what* Heidegger says about Western European history, which he (by default,

like all Westerners) considers the one and only universal and which we Russians are not obliged to recognize at all.

We will take it as such, but we will take it into account in this capacity in order to better understand the context in which Heidegger's thought moves.

Thus, in history, from the perspective of *Seynsgeschichte*, we can distinguish a first slice, corresponding to the *ontic dimension* and narrating about the *being as such*. Such an *ontic history* would be an account of how one being collided, diverged, conflicted or reconciled with another being, how a being was born and disappeared, reappeared, changed and faded away again. In purely theoretical terms, ontic history would be a documentary account of being *as such*. However, although modern historians (especially the "annals school") have attempted to construct such a model of history on the basis of a painstaking study of household notes, household documents, and other practical texts that record the routine life of the average person of past centuries, it quickly became clear that it was impossible to obtain a reliable picture of the past, since the selection of what was to be described was not a matter of fact. The selection of the documentation to be described, and even more so its multilevel interpretation (from compilers to scribes and historians themselves), reflects anything but the real thing as it is.

In other words, when dealing with *history*, we are always dealing with *interpretation*, and thus not just with a neutral description of things, but with a description that reflects the ontology and metaphysics of those who write, those for whom they write, and those who, after a while, study what they have written. Ontical history as a set of atomic historical facts is a purely theoretical hypothesis, not supported by the empirical experience of encountering historical documents that bear, directly or indirectly, the traces of metaphysics.

This is the second level of the ontological or metaphysical interpretation of *being*, unfolding in time from the perspective of *being as the essence of being*. This history is history as *Geschichte*, since it unfolds in time.

History as *Geschichte* tells us about the being in its relation to *essence*, the content of such a history will depend on the configuration that *metaphysics* takes on, which defines philosophical philosophy. Since history as *Geschichte* tells us about being in its relation to *essence*, the content of such a history will depend on the configuration of the metaphysics that defines the philosophical axiomatics of a given epoch. Each major change in this axiomatics will mean a change in the historical paradigm and, in fact, the emergence of a new version of history. Such a history is an *ontological history*, which ultimately focuses not on being but on the *metaphysical message* encoded in the dynamic unfolding of being and in the dialectic of many beings.

The fullest picture of *ontological history* is presented in Hegel's philosophy of history⁽³¹⁾, who created a grand panorama not of the history of people, things and events, but of concepts and ideas, or, more precisely, of the Absolute Idea, which unfolds its "message" through the diverse dialectical stages of the human journey through time.

Heidegger emphasizes that, after Hegel, this point has been made perfectly clear: all history is not a narrative of the thing, but of the *essence of the thing*, i.e. the story of metaphysics about itself. Western European history is thus a narrative of Western European metaphysics, i.e. history is nothing other than the *history of philosophy*.

However, according to Heidegger, *ontological history* is the history of *Sein*, but not of *Seyn*. It is based on an incorrect comprehension of the relation (*Bezug*) of *being* to *being*. This means that this history is subject to rethinking. This rethinking is the discovery of a "fundamentally ontological" dimension, which implies not only the elevation of *being to being-Sein* (as in the ontological history), but a thorough investigation of how the understanding of *Sein* has changed in the course of the (this time) ontological-historical process. In other words, Heidegger is not thinking about simply constructing history as the history of the Idea, but about considering the history of the Idea (*Sein*) in its relation to *being* as *Seyn*.

Here we come to the very essence of *Seynsgeschichte*. *Seynsgeschichte* is the comprehension of the vicissitudes of being as *Sein*, seen through the eyes of being as *Seyn*.

SEIN IN THE ONTOLOGICAL CROSS-SECTION OF HISTORY

In one place⁽³²⁾ Heidegger gives an extremely brief but expressive sketch of the main stages of the transformation of *Sein* in Western European metaphysics, which, in fact, means the creation of a "*fundamental-ontological*" scale within which to build *Seynsgeschichte*.

Seyn		
φύσις ιδέα οὐσία		
ἐνέργεια.		
actus		
<i>perceptum (representation) objectum (subject matter)</i>	}	<i>The subjectivity of a</i>
<i>reality (Wirklichkeit) (energia - vis primitiva activa, Leibniz) will and reason (German idealism)</i>	}	<i>Subjectivity b</i>
<i>Power (Macht, The Will to Power, Nietzsche)</i>		
Machenschaft		
<i>Seinsverlassenheit</i> (forgetting about being - as <i>Sein</i> , i.e. discarding ontology - pragmatism, utilitarianism, liberalism, Marxism, technocracy. - <i>A. D.</i>)		
delayed arrival (Verweigerung)		
deprivation (Ent-eignung) marketing (Er-eignung)		decision (Ent-scheidung), "transition"? (<i>Übergang</i>)
<i>event (Ereignis)</i>		
outcome-conclusion-staging (Austrag)		
<i>Geschichte</i> (either as <i>Geschichte</i> proper - ontological history - or as <i>Seynsgeschichte</i> - it depends on the decision. - <i>A. D.</i>)		

The explanation of this dry scheme could take up a whole volume, and we will consider some fragments explaining its meaning later. Some points were developed in Heidegger's philosophy, others remained in a state of undisclosed intuitions and sketches. The main line of Heideggerian intuition can be summarized as follows.

Seynsgeschichte sees history not as the history of ideas or ideas, but as the history of the transformation of the *relation of thinking to being*: both when this *relation (Bezug)* is described explicitly and when it turns out to be hidden, implicit. And this consideration begins not with *Sein* (where ontology originates from), but with *Seyn*, which is postulated by "*fundamental ontology*" and, accordingly, by the "*fundamental ontology*".

in effect, changes the whole philosophical topicality.

Seynsgeschichte describes the stages of putting other instances in the place of *Seyn* (at the very top, in the origins): *nature - idea - essence - energy - reality - will and reason - will to power - Machenschaft(a), and so on*. Here we could break the chain of enumerations and say that Western European history from the point of view of *Seynsgeschichte* represents a degradation of the thought of *being*: from *nature* to the *will to power* and *mechanistic (Machenschaft)*. In the very two-story ontological topical framework within which this history unfolded, fundamental changes took place, the common vector of which was a progressive *oblivion of being (Sein)*. In other words, what had created this topicality (the thought of being) was gradually being lost from view, replaced by increasingly crude and distant surrogates of *being*. Sometimes Heidegger includes "categories," "concepts," in this chain,

"values," "worldviews," etc. But it all comes down to "*oblivion of being*", into *nihilism* and "*desertification*". At each stage of descent, the second, metaphysical, floor of this topicality is gradually distorted, perverted, and presented in an increasingly nihilistic, ugly (from the point of view of the thought of *Being*) form. Something similar can be found in the everyday understanding of history, but instead of Heideggerian pessimism, there is every chance to find in it either a neutral statement of this change or an optimistic assertion that this is how man is liberated.

is given from the external constraints of metaphysics. Heidegger argues that all of this is *pure metaphysics*, which has created a false topic and maintains it regardless of the constantly changing nature of the underlying ontological argument.

"*Oblivion of Being*" is the last point of *Seynsgeschichte*. From this point, the turn to *fundamental-ontology* proper begins. *Seynsgeschichte* prepares for a radical regime switch - from the inauthentic deployment of *Geschichte* to the authentic onslaught of *Seynsgeschichte*.

The first phenomenon of *Seynsgeschichte* in the new mode of waiting for the switch of register to the *fundamental-ontological* is the encounter with "delay" (*Verweigerung*). It would seem that the "midnight point" has been reached, but apparently it is "still not". "It is always 'still not'," Heidegger marvels. "*Fundamental-ontology*" delays.

Nevertheless, the moment following *procrastination* is the "*decision*" (*Entscheidung*). This is the most important category of *Seynsgeschichte*. The "*decision*" is the *decision* to pass or not to pass to *fundamental-ontology* (that is why in the diagram the word "pass" is in quotation marks and with a question mark). The choice is between *deprivation* (*Seyn-existence*) and its *realization*. In the case of the choice of *fulfillment*, an event (*Ereignis*) takes place: *Seyn* reveals its truth. What follows is the unfolding of being along the line of *Seyn* rather than along the trajectory of *Sein*, i.e., a "*fundamental-ontology*" that affirms the primacy of *Seyn* in relation to *Seiende* and the manifestation of a being that will be thought not of itself and its *common* (*essence*) but of *being* (*Seyn*) as *nothing*. This is what Heidegger calls "*staging*" (*Austrag*) or "*Geviert*" (*Geviert*)⁽³³⁾.

All of this comes together to form a history (*Geschichte*), taken as *Seynsgeschichte*.

LANGUAGE AND THE VERB "TO BE" IN SEYNSGESCHICHTE

By adding the *Seynsgeschichte* dimension to the consideration of the Heideggerian topicality, we can better understand how the

A symmetry arises between the most important words and their meanings pertaining to *being*. By separating *Sein* and *Seyn*, Heidegger is forced to build a double semantic structure connected with the formation of secondary words from them.

On the line of onticism we are dealing with *being* (*Seiende*).

"*Being is (das Seiende ist)*" is a quite correct ontic statement. It is the basis of language and thought. Language allows an entity to say the most important thing that it cannot do in any other way: it makes it possible to say that *there is an* entity. The predicate "*being*" used or implied in speech makes that speech, whatever it states, a unique and exceptional phenomenon. Man is a *speaking* being, a *thinking* being, and the uniqueness of this consists in assigning to what is spoken of the status of being. This ontic language precedes metaphysics and belongs to prehistory, to the epoch when philosophy had not yet begun, had not yet taken hold. In this language, the presence of *Seyn* is visible, but this *Seyn* is not conceptualized, it washes over being spontaneously and naturally, beyond human freedom and human choice. This *Seyn* does not yet enter into *premise*, into destiny, into *Seynsgeschichte* or *Geschichte* (history as an ontological phenomenon).

Ontical language is prehistory and pre-philosophy. In this language *there is being*, but the nature of this "*is*" is not conceptualized. All things here live alongside other things and are not yet separated from them.

For example, a path and a thicket. In ontic pre-torical being they can freely flow into each other. The path gets lost in the forest and descends imperceptibly to the forest.

"no." Culture is lost in nature. And in the same way, dense thickets cut themselves and open up a free path, not when the traveler wants it, but by themselves, forming a road where and when no one asked for it or expected it. In this way the being is free to play in itself, and the fact that it is, and that there is someone who speaks about it and about what it *is*, does not harm this ontic play in any way. When metaphysics begins, everything changes. Having thought about the *being of things* and having come to the conclusion that this *being* is the *common property of things*, i.e. *their essence* (*Seiendheit, essence*), man begins to create the *essence of things*.

history proper as *Geschichte*. This is where a new language arises. It is the language of concepts and categories. It introduces into being additional being is the *essence of being*.

In language, the being is no longer thought of and named in itself, but through its correspondence with something else, with the *essence of the being*, with the *being as a whole*. This *being as a whole* becomes the intermediate instance; between the *concrete being* and the *being as a whole (being as Sein)*, the *essence of this concrete being* emerges as its basic (*being*) property. Thus, a path becomes a concrete expression of "path-ness" and a thicket becomes "thicket-ness". The path has no right to be lost (what kind of path is it if it leads nowhere), and the thicket must be dense (otherwise it turns into a sparse forest, a forest edge or a meadow). There is an abyss between one thing and another thing, which is only covered by an appeal to their *essence*.

This is how a special language with logical rules, rigid structures, and, most importantly, which is based on reference, the correlation of *essence* with *essence*, which can be an idea, concept, universal, etc., emerges. Being is bifurcated. Language becomes the imposition of representations from the expression of essence.

In tracing the emergence of metaphysics, Heidegger shows how, on the way to the clarification of *the being of being*, thought grasps *being as a whole* and hypostasizes it as the *essence of being*, identical with the being sought. But this *essence* is thought of as a *new being*, gradually becoming independent of the original moment when it was affirmed as *being as a whole*.

According to Heidegger, there is a subtle catch in this sequence: Seyn-being is "being as a whole," and thus this development of thought is correct, but Seyn-being is *not only and exclusively* "being as a whole," since *it is the "nothingness of being," i.e., "nothingness, "not being,"* even more precisely, what makes "*being*" more "*not being*." The ignoring of this nuance would become the guiding principle for the trajectory of the entire subsequent development of Western European metaphysics. Constituting *being as*

The Western European metaphysics doubles the "*being*" and thus overlooks *Seyn-existence* in its *essence* (*Wesen*). The *essence* stituted by this metaphysics is transformed at different stages of its development through the following chain of transformations: "*being as Sein, not Seyn*"; "*nature*", "*idea*", "*ουσια*", "*energy*", "*reality*", etc., up to "*will to power*" and "*global machine*".

In this process, the meaning of the verb "*to be*" changes fundamentally. In the metaphysics that profoundly affected the language and thinking of Western European humanity, the *being* ceases to be in *itself*: it is no longer in *itself*, but derives its *being* from *essence*. It does not exist directly, but indirectly, through its involvement with *essence*. This is how the concept of *being* (*Sein*) as *essence* (*Seiendheit*) emerges, which lends the *essence* its main sign - that it *is*. From now on, "*is*" has to be understood differently than before. *It is* no longer thinking, but philosophy or the theology and science built on its basis that decides whether or not *there* is being. From now on, *being is as if there is*. Maybe it *is*, maybe it *is not* - everything depends on something radically different from *being* itself.

Western European philosophy does not come to this radical conclusion immediately. But after Kant and Hegel, in Schopenhauer, Kirkyegaard and Nietzsche, as well as in the philosophy of the phenomenologists, it becomes obvious. In the beginning, being *was* insofar as it corresponded to the *idea* (Platon). At the end of the New Age, *being* became *being* because the "*will to power*," "*reason*," and "*representation*" demanded it (in other terms, because it was "*useful*,

"*valuable*", "*convenient*", etc.). Whatever the instance that

decreed that *being* was or *was not*, it was no longer direct thinking or the *being* itself expressing its ontically understood *presence* in *being*. Here Heidegger again reconsiders the relation to the word "*to be*", suggesting that it should be treated differently, in accordance with the structure of *Seynsgeschichte*.

Being in the ontic (prehistoric and pre-philosophical) sense is *there* only if we abstract from metaphysical *being*.

and history. When superimposed on each other, the ontic and the ontological confuse meanings. We cannot look at *being* without taking into account Western European metaphysics and, accordingly, abstracting from *Geschichte*. Therefore, when we say that *being is*, we most often mean precisely the ontological sense - i.e., that it *is* by its involvement with *being as being as a whole (Sein)*. But such an "is" is no longer an ontic "is" in its unconditional and pre-ontological, non-referential expression. Such

The "is" is the "is" of philosophy, not of thinking in its ontic simplicity and naiveté; it is no longer the "is" of language. To make this distinction, Heidegger recalls the existence of the archaic (Homeric) form of the Greek participle ὄν (*being*), where the first sound ε was retained, not as ὄν, ὄντα, but as ἔον, ἔοντα⁽³⁴⁾. ἔον is *being ontically*, it exists in such a way that it does not need to be proved by any reference; ὄν is *being in the philosophical sense*, ontological, drawing its being from something else. To simplify terminologically the nuances that are at the heart of his philosophy, Heidegger suggests that in certain contexts the Latin verb "*existere*", "*exist*", which he is careful not to translate into German, should be applied to the ontic level instead of *being*. *Existence is existent*. There is no doubt about this, neither ontically nor ontologically. Whether it *exists* is the question. And although in the optics of ontology proper the *being* is, and this is obvious (so says language and direct pre-philosophical thinking), this "is" in the space of metaphysics can be misunderstood. *Existence* of the same being is beyond question.

The verb "to exist" is formally translated into Russian as "to exist". But this is not at all acceptable for conveying Heidegger's thought. To "exist" is either "to be being" (ontic) or "to be through essence" (ontological). And it cannot be used where Heidegger speaks of *existen-*tion, precisely to avoid any misunderstandings and ambiguities concerning the relation between ontic and ontological and, consequently, the particular moment of *Seynsgeschichte* in question.

But at the same time, for fear of distorting his thought through a misinterpretation of "is", Heidegger is forced to take radical linguistic steps and puts forward a new verb "wesen", formed from the passive past participle of the verb "sein" (to be), i.e. from

"gewesen." In German there is also the noun

"Wesen," formed from the same form and denoting a

"essence," "essence." Heidegger, however, strictly separates

essence as *Seiendheit*, i.e., *being apprehended as common to being* and built up by repulsion from *being*, and essence as

Wesen, which expresses this time the relation to *Seyn* and

being in its *fundamental-ontological* sense. *Wesen* as the

artificial verb that Heidegger inflects - *ich wese, du wesest, er,*

sie, es west, wir wesen, ihr weset, sie wesen - is applied to what

is as an expression of *Seyn*, is truly *Seyn-being*. This is where

the Russian verb can come in handy for us

"to exist," which, fortunately, is not endowed with any

philosophical meaning at all and means only the fact of the

being of things, without any clear reference to onticism,

ontology, or fundamental-ontology. It seems to me that it

would be quite correct to reserve for it, when conveying the

meaning of Heidegger's philosophy, precisely the

fundamental-ontological meaning. "Exist" could become the

leitmotif of the new *fundamental-ontological* language in its

Russian-language edition. There is an equally interesting and

simple possibility in Russian to distinguish between

"*Seiendheit*" and "*Wesen*", which in German means

"essence". *Seiendheit* can be steadily translated as "essence"

(and assigned an ontological and metaphysical meaning), and


Wesen as "essence" (and used as a priority in topics related

to *fundamental-ontology*).

So, in Heidegger we can encounter *being* in three positions in relation to *Seynsgeschichte*:

- *ontically* (pre-philosophically, prehistorically) *the existent exist* (*Das Seiende existiert*);
- *ontologically* (philosophically, metaphysically, but which can be interpreted also ontically and fundamentally ontologically) *the being is* (*Das Seiende ist*);

- *fundamentally ontologically existent*
(*Das Seiende west*).



"Is" can always be understood in three ways: as "*exists*," as "*existent*," as "*existent*," and as "*is*" proper (i.e., as *belonging to being as common to all things*). But in any case, we will get rid of the Russian insufficiently thought-out and hasty neologism "to be", which Heidegger's head-on translations are full of.

Heidegger's use of the verb *wesen* is the starting point of a new language, the language in which "fundamental-ontology" must speak. This language should be the expression of the *decision to jump* to the last and main chord of *Seynsgeschichte*. The very phenomenon of such a *fundamental-ontological language* must not be a mere instrument of *Seynsgeschichte*, but its *essence (Wesen)*.

CHAPTER 5

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WHY EVENING?

Having defined the general vector of *fundamental-ontology*, having fixed the idea of what *Seynsge-schichte* is, let us trace the main stages of the history of Western European philosophy as Heidegger understood it. In this case, we turn again to the theme of the "sunset of the West" - a civilization in which the sun is setting; to *Abendländische Geschichte*, to the history of the evening, the history of the evening countries.

With regard to this history, Heidegger puts forward a basic thesis: from the point of view of *Seynsgeschichte*, the history of Western European philosophy is a *process of progressive oblivion of ontological questioning* up to pure nihilism; a process of gradual loss of *being*, loss of *being* - abandonment of *being* and *abandonment by being* (*Seinsverlassenheit*). To put it another way, the history of Western European philosophy, with all its brilliance, all its splendid breakthroughs, revelations and deviations, is nothing but a *process of parting with being*. It is, therefore, the *history of the sunset*, the history of an ongoing catastrophe, the history of wandering and wandering. It is not by chance that Heidegger calls one of his books "*Holzwege*"⁽³⁵⁾ (in French it is translated as "*Les chemins qui ne mènent nul part*" - literally "*Roads that lead nowhere*"; in German the expression "*Holzwege*", literally "*tree paths*", can be understood both as "*forest paths*" and as "*tree-covered roads*"). This wandering leads from clarity to darkness, which is why we are dealing with evening. It is a process of losing *being*, of its loss, of its gradual depletion. By ceasing to think about *being*, philosophy gradually ceases to *be*.

Already at the dawn of this philosophy, *being* as *Seyn* (*fundamentally-mental-ontology*) hides behind *being-in-its-principle* (ontoo- logical - *Seiende-im-Ganze*), merges with it, becomes *being* as *Sein* and ultimately becomes another kind of *being*.

Then being (*Sein*) as *being-in-its-principle* is substituted a *representation* (*Vorstellung*) of him.

Representation then becomes more and more abstract, abstract, mechanical and contingent, in which all links with the *real* are broken, until finally the epoch of *nihilism*, recognized and described by Nietzsche, arrives, when *being* finally disappears over the horizon, revealing an all-present *nothingness*.

The whole segment of Western European philosophy can be labeled (*fundamentally-historically*) as the last quarter of humanity's day, as pre-midnight. And it is not surprising that in this sector of the cosmic twenty-four hours, it is Western civilization that comes to the fore, which establishes laws and norms, subjugates all others, and forces them to accept its forms, thoughts and values as universal. The West comes into its own because it is entrusted with the fate of the night, because it acts in the name of the night, in its power. The sun of *being* sets. And then civilization finally goes to sleep, the last candles that still illuminated people's homes with a farewell, artificial, nostalgic light are extinguished.

To ask in such a situation: "Why Europe? Why the West? Why is Western European history something inevitable and universal?" - is like asking, "Why evening?"

THE GREAT BEGINNING AND THE "DAIMON" OF PHILOSOPHERS

Heidegger considers the beginning of Western European philosophy to be pre-Socratic thought and calls it the *great Beginning* or, otherwise, the *first Beginning*.

At this stage, *philosophers* emerge as an independent type of people engaged only and exclusively in thinking, and most often in thinking about the beginning, about being, about thinking itself.

Thinking is a human characteristic. It is wrong to assume that people did not think before the emergence of philosophy and outside the area of its spread. They *thought*, but they *did not philosophize*. What is the difference?

This is the difference between the *ontic* and the *ontological*. The *ontic* corresponds simply to thinking, i.e. to the property that defines man as such. Man speaks and thinks, and by doing so he stands at a distance in relation to the world around him. This distance arises with man and is expressed in the ability to think. Thinking, in its turn, is based on the division of things in the world. This separation is the main property of thinking, because to the extent that man distinguishes himself from the world, he is a man. It is the main distinction that becomes the basic attribute of man. By distinguishing himself from the world, man begins to distinguish the things of the world. And the more piercingly he realizes his distance from his surroundings, the clearer the boundaries he establishes in these surroundings. Thinking can take place in the realm of myth, archaic cults, rituals and legends. It may be rudimentary, or it may be richly developed, but no matter how great the distance between man and the world and no matter how acute his ability to distinguish between the things of the world and their qualities, it is not yet philosophy. Such - *ontic* - thinking is *pre-original*. Philosophy begins at a different moment.

This moment of the *beginning of philosophy* is that man makes a fundamental *leap* into an area that is radically different from the sphere in which the "merely" thinking and the world he thinks about resides. The philosopher, by virtue of some miraculous and unique ability, suddenly finds himself in the position of one who *does not simply distinguish between himself and the world, but who distinguishes in himself the one who distinguishes and the one who distinguishes the one who distinguishes*. A philosopher is a thinking person who is able to think *about how, about what and why* he thinks.

According to Heidegger, this *leap* passes through the comprehension of *being* and the emergence of the *questioning of the being of being*. At some point, man is no longer satisfied with the distinction within the *ontic* coordinate system, and in a unique

action opens (constitutes) a new dimension. It is the dimension of *being*. By asking oneself: "what is more primary than *being*? What is the *being of being*, why is *being* and where is *being* going?", man realizes the highest form of his freedom, which at this moment manifests itself as his nature. The freedom of distance within being is revealed as a half-freedom, and man makes a *throw*. This is where philosophy begins.

Philosophy, as defined by Plato⁽³⁶⁾ (as later repeated by Aristotle⁽³⁷⁾), is "*the expression of surprise, amazement*" (Greek θαυμάζειν)⁽³⁸⁾. The two Russian words by which we translate the Greek θαυμάζειν or the German

"*Erstaunen*", is very expressive ("to wonder" imagin- is derived from "marvel", i.e., "miracle", something "sacred" beyond ordinary perception). The Greek word ἔκστασις ("ecstasy", literally "ecstasy") is similar to the Greek word ἔκστασις.

"coming out of oneself", "coming out of the mind"). Amazement, which lies at the beginning of philosophy, is the realization of a gesture, an action, a movement that is in no way implied in ordinary human thinking. The ability to marvel (to go beyond the mind), to wonder, to discover the "wonder", the "miracle" in the world, is very close to the *leap* that thought makes when it thinks about the *being of things*. This very *leap*, and the posing of the question that lies at the beginning of philosophy, refers to the presence of something that goes beyond the human. Surprise, in the original sense of the word θαυμάζειν, evokes something divine, superhuman, that does not fit into the space of ordinary human thinking, that goes beyond the ontic.

So the *leap* of the first pre-Socratic philosophers - Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides - *from ontology to ontology* - were perceived by themselves as an *encounter with the divine*, as the *discovery of divine determination*.

Heraclitus' statement about the logos: "If you listen not to me but to the logos, it is wise, abiding in it, to say: all is one"⁽³⁹⁾ confronts Heraclitus himself as a human being with the logos as the divine beginning. It is in the *leap* to the divine logos that man for the first time

can think about *how* he thinks, and therefore philosophize. Philosophy is made possible by the discovery of the divine dimension and the fixation of this dimension as a new plane of consciousness on which man and the world are henceforth founded. Heidegger shows that Heraclitus' logos has all the properties of a divine beginning, as does Parmenides' Moira (holding the ball of being in fetters), and Anaximander's "chreon"⁽⁴⁰⁾.

This *leap*, which reveals the divine or, in a different lens, constitutes it, is the *great Beginning*. The philosopher, breaking away from mere thought (ontic) in an ecstatic "out-mind" (transcending the boundaries of the mind), realizes for the first time the fullness of human freedom and establishes the horizon of the divine. The difference between this philosophical act and religious experience is that it is in philosophy that consciousness is at a distance from itself.

In myth and religion, the sacred in myth and religion comes from an *essence* that amazes the imagination and makes man tremble before its inexorable power; it comes from outside. The sacred in philosophy is revealed internally, not as the great power of *the being*, but as a falling out of it, a sudden acquisition of a unique inner space that illuminates lightning-fast not just the *whole of the being* as prior to man, but man himself *as part of the being* - *as the discerning part of the being*. This *inner sacred* of the philosopher is on the other side of man, just as he himself is on the other side of *being*, creating a truly new dimension of the topics of consciousness, in which a point appears in a different plane from the entire ontic plane, including the thinking center and the thinking periphery of the ontic.

In the *great Beginning* of Western European philosophy, man encounters the element of divine thinking, on the basis of which he can henceforth think about *how* he himself thinks.

In the Greek world at the time of the *great Beginning*, belief in δαίμον's, "daimons," "minor deities" ("numen" Latin numen) was widespread, but only among the philosophers does *daimon* become not an object of worship as a

endowed with a special energy a powerful and invisible being, but a point radiating thoughts of thinking. This is the meaning of

Heraclitus' statement "ἥθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων", which can be translated as: "The Demon (the deity of the lightning instant) is order for man". From other passages of Heraclitus we can understand that this δαίμων is identical to his logos - "the soul has an inherent self-multiplying logos"⁽⁴¹⁾.

Socrates' δαίμων belongs to the same category: in his stories, it appears as a special instance, at a certain moment illuminating Socrates the man's actions and thoughts with a special light.

The philosophers' *daimon* is not simply a tamed deity of *being* placed inside. It is an element of a radically new model of consciousness, which now has as its *fulcrum* a point from which man can look at his surroundings and at himself with the same degree of abstraction.

The *Beginning* is the affirmation of this point, the foregrounding of this key figure. In this *Beginning*, the question of the *existence of being* is crystallized, i.e. ontology begins. It becomes possible only because there is an instance (the "*daimon*" of philosophers) from which it is possible to encompass the *whole being* as something whole and unified ("all is one" - the "daimon-logos" of Heraclitus).

ΦΥΣΙΣ AND ΛΟΓΟΣ.

Heidegger details the formation of the *first Initiation* through the introduction of two fundamental words by the pre-Socratics: φύσις ("phusis", "nature") and λόγος ("logos"), "thinking", "word". The word "φύσις", which has long ago become a philosophical *notion* applicable to nature as something strictly different from man (subject, culture, society, consciousness, etc.), has completely lost its original meaning in Modern times, having turned into a ready-made concept, the semantics of which no one thinks about. Etymologically, it goes back to the Proto-Indo-European root *bhū-, "being." The meaning of "φύσις" is "sprouting".

Heidegger sometimes substitutes the Greek word "φύσις" for the German "Aufgehen" to emphasize its pre-philosophical semantics. The Greek "φύσεῖν" meant "to rise", "wither," as sprouts sprout that bear fruit, but also, "generate" - not in the sense of "separate from itself," but rather,

"The earth, the first spirit, sprouting up, pushing various beings out of itself. This is what the earth, the primary essence, does, giving sprouts, pushing out of itself various beings. Earth, water, air, fire, the primary elements in the doctrines of the various pre-Socratics perform the action of φύσεῖν, throwing out, pushing out, pushing out of themselves *beings*.

The very thought of φύσις, of φύσεῖν as something whole, as the being in its universality, is, according to Heidegger, the trace of an ontological leap: "φύσις" is the name given by the "philosophical daimon" (not man!) to *the being* as a *whole*. The *being* is thought of as rising, like the grains rising from the earth. And the *essence of being* consists in the very act of this ascent, this becoming.

In the fact that φύσις became the main word of *the first Beginning of philosophy*, according to Heidegger, lies the whole of its further message, in this its whole destiny, its Geschichte, is already laid down. In *leaping* beyond its limits, human freedom was able to justify a point from which all *being* was encompassed by a general overview, but this point dictated a name for the *being of being* that became fatal. European history at this decisive moment opted for an interpretation of *being* as φύσις. And it was irreversible. That there is *being* seems obvious. But the search for the *being of the being* or the "is" of the "is" itself was the willful decision of a thinking man, leaping in his thought above himself. *Being* is, but by defining *being* as φύσις, we imperceptibly come to the conclusion that *being is*. Thus *being* itself becomes being. Albeit the first, the *universal and the highest of things*, but still it is *being*.

Φύσις becomes for the first time not a word, but a concept, a special phenomenon, belonging already to the sphere of ontology, i.e. to the sphere of logos, and not to the sphere of mere ontic existentionation or pre-philosophical divisive thinking. And around this notion ontology as "Physics" begins to take shape⁽⁴²⁾.

The verb "φυσεῖν" ("to sprout", "to sprout", "to sprout", "to sprout"), from which the first philosophical concept "φύσις" was derived, corresponds to another verb, no less important for the history of the *first Beginning*, "λέγειν", from which comes "λόγος" - "word", "thinking", "reading". Originally "λόγος" meant nothing else than "harvest", "gathering of fruit". Λέγειν and φυσεῖν were closely related. *Being (Sein) as the essence of being produces*

"sprouts" (φύσις) and *reaps* (λέγειν) them, laying them out before the gaze of the *philosophical daimon* who passes judgment on the quality and quantity of the harvest. λόγος and φύσις are the two sides of a new philosophical ontological topicality in which a secure distance with respect to being is fought over.

In that topics, *being* (Sein, Seiende im Ganze as *being* as a *whole*, Seiendheit as the *essence of being*, as the pair λόγος / φύσις) is thought of as prior to being, distinct from it, and thus manifesting itself as both the dynamics of *sprouting* and the ordering statics of *reaping* (*being-Sein* animates and kills with the same gesture). Through the pair φυσεῖν / λέγειν (the two forms of existence of being), a new *being* emerges, *being-Sein* as *being* free from being in the concreteness of its dynamic circularity. This *being-Sein* is already clearly described in the philosophy of Parmenides, where the question of εἶναι, i.e. of *being in its disembodied form*, detached from the concrete being, is raised. *But this being-Sein is thought of precisely as being of a higher order*. This, according to Heidegger, is the problem.

Having made a *leap* towards the divine *logos-dai-mon*, towards the clarification of *the being of things* in amazement, surprise, i.e., leaving the sphere of ordinary and boundaries of (prephilosophical) thinking, the creators of the *first Beginning* slightly *under-jumped* (or over-jumped). Having broken away from the soil of existence to a critical distance, they could not give themselves up to flight and built a new floor, i.e. the same soil, only artificial, cultural-social, in no way resembling nature, but repeating in secret from themselves its structure. Flying in the abyss of heaven was replaced by walking on a high platform. And some time later, at the next stage of the first Beginning - in Plato and Aristo-

The instantaneous divine daimonic logos turned into Logic, and the infinitely powerful all-generating element *fusis* into a neatly calculated Physics.

The pre-Socratic epistemology, established by the new instance of the *daimon*, still hesitates to finally recognize *Being-Sein* as *the* supreme *being*. The whole structure of thought of Heraclitus, one of the creators of the philosophical topics, resists the betrayal of flight and its substitution by the platform. Heraclitus, by introducing λόγος and φύσις, clearly shies away from describing *being-Sein* as a hierarchical structured epistemological system. Hence his paradoxes, hence his harsh attacks against Pythagoras. More than other philosophers of the *first Beginning*, He-Raclitus carries within himself the open possibility that this *Beginning*, once begun, will become another. He does not stray too far from it, does not lose sight of it, and is all the more opposed to substituting it for other beings. In affirming the view of being from somewhere else (from being-Sein), he is extremely cautious and careful about this "somewhere else". He honors the logos and allows the gods to fly.

ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ IN THE FIRST BEGINNING

Truth in the pre-Socratics is thought of as ἀλήθεια, literally "unconcealed" (Heidegger sometimes uses the German word "Unverborgenheit" to emphasize this meaning of the pre-Socratic Greek understanding of truth, "unconcealment"⁽⁴³⁾). In the first *Beginning* we can distinguish two meanings in ἀλήθεια - in the first case it refers to the *unconcealment of being* (Sein), which comes through the "sprouting" and "reaping". And if this were to remain only so, then an organizing ontology could already in the *first Beginning* become a *fundamental-ontology*, and λόγος and φύσις would not obscure *being* (gently substituting it for itself) but would reveal its truth, and *Sein* itself would then gravitate towards *Seyn*. It is true that surprise (amazement) itself, as the main mood of philosophy, would have to gently pass into a more abrupt and traumatic, but also quite *sacred* and ecstatic property - into *sacred horror* (*Ensetzen*)⁽⁴⁴⁾.

But the fate of Western European philosophy as a philosophy of the evening was different: gently and imperceptibly "*unconcealment*" (ἀλήθεια) slips to the *unconcealment* of "*sprouting*" (φύσις) and "*reaping*" (λόγος) as a new being-though still a *being-in-itself* (*das Seiende-im-Ganze*), and even a *being* in its dynamic life-giving origins (*das Sein im Seiende*).

In this shift in the understanding of "truth" (as "unconcealedness"), Heidegger recognizes the basic Greek philosophical idea that *being-Sein* is given as *unconcealed*. He sees the idea of the truth of *being* as the *unconcealedness of being* given in the gesture of *sprouting* ("φύσις") as the epistemological code of the *first Beginning*.

Even in the philosophy of Parmenides, who speaks of the unity of thinking and being (νοεῖν and εἶναι), of the unity of being, of the ball of being, truth is thought of as unconcealed, but this time in relation to *being-Sein*. Heidegger argues vigorously against contrasting Herac-litus' dialectic with Parmenides' static ontology⁽⁴⁵⁾. We see Parmenides through the eyes of Platonism and New Age metaphysics, while he should be read in the spirit of the philosophical context to which he belonged.

Parmenides' thesis "being is, nothingness is not", for all its ontological and apparent leap towards the absolutization of being as a "second being", is not devoid of the tendency common to the Platonists to see *Sein-being through being and only through being*: Although Parmenides specifically mentions two ways of knowledge - true and false (the first recognizes the unified *Sein-being* deeper than all natural forms, things and phenomena, which is ontology, and the second - the way of opinion, "visibility", δόξα - perceives only the being in its manifestation, trusting the surface side of phenomena and not seeing into their depths, which is ontology).

The First Beginning of the pre-Socratics conceives of being through the act of *self-exposure*, of *putting*, of *becoming*, of *becoming*, of *supra-staging*, of being brought to the *visible*, to the obviousness of being. Everything here still breathes *Sein-being*, i.e. what is revealed in being: its freshness, its depth, its elusive and grandiose grandeur are felt in everything. But in this loving and passionate relationship to the being and its

truth (ἀλήθεια) is already the root of the subsequent catastrophe.

Yet still the ἀλήθεια of this cycle *can* still be interpreted as a prelude to *fundamen-tal ontology*. Without the entire subsequent history of Western European philosophy, both Thales, Heraclitus, Anaximander, and even Parmenides, in their "*leap to*" could be interpreted as those who began an ontology capable of being revealed at some point as a *fundamental ontology*. Hence the enormous importance of the thinkers of the *first Beginning* for Heidegger himself and his fundamental ontological project. In preparing the space for the discovery (truth, ἀλήθεια) of *Sein-being*, one can guess the subtle movements of thought that could lead to the illumination of the truth of *Seyn-being*.

THE CATASTROPHE OF PLATONISM (IDEA AND REPRESENTATION)

Heidegger is even more wary of what replaces the pre-Socratics, i.e. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle themselves. He calls this second period of Greek philosophy "*the beginning of the end within the first Beginning*"⁽⁴⁶⁾. The Beginning still lasts, the dawn still glows, traditional Greece still lives, but the end is already in the air. The end is near.

A parallel can be drawn with the biblical story of the serpent's appearance in the earthly paradise. It would seem that paradise is still paradise, Adam and Eve are in bliss and abundance, but even in this beautiful and fresh world the forces of the coming calamity are already making themselves known. Even before this, at the dawn of Creation, when order was just being created and all creatures were close to God, the first of the angels, beings of light, service spirits, rebelled and was cast down with his supporters into the abyss. From this abyss he will later enter the earthly paradise. And at the end of time his power will extend over the world, over the cosmos. But the devil, evil, the harbinger of the end appears already *on the first* pages of the sacred history of the universe. In the cloudless, happy paradise of his

flexible body wrapped around the forbidden tree of the knowledge of good and evil and tempted Eve to taste the fruit.

In the same way, within the first Beginning, in the situation of the highest tension of spiritual forces and the "paradisiacal" initial philosophizing, the great pre-Socratic leap, when philosophy, becoming ontology, is still hesitating about how to comprehend the *being of things*, the end is already approaching. This "first end" is the end *within the first Beginning*.

Heidegger never treated this *end* dismissively, lightly, arrogantly, contemptuously. He honored it, admired it because it was really something great. Even in error and delusion there is sometimes a magnitude and scope worthy of veneration. And for Heidegger, through the catastrophe of Socratic and Platonic thought, *true being (Seyn)* speaks, albeit in an extremely indirect way, through the forgetting of the *self (Seins-verlassenheit)*, through its concealment.

The *end* within the *first Beginning* is defined by one main name: Plato. According to Heidegger, Plato, and before him Socrates, and after them Aristotle, are the exact name and historical legalization of the greatest catastrophe.

Here the *doctrine of ideas* plays a fundamental role. Heidegger discusses the main etymological-philosophical aspects of Plato's movement of thought that lead him to the doctrine of the idea. Heidegger sees Plato's illumination of ideas, the introduction of ideas within his philosophy, as both a *greatness and a fundamental substitution*.

The greatness lies in the fact that Plato's thought, like that of all Greek philosophy at the *Beginning*, is driven by the question of the *being of being*. In other words, we are dealing with the unitive and unexpected *leap* that Greek thought takes *from the truth of being to the truth of being*. And this trajectory of thought, in all its triumph, risk, tension, in all its fatality and destiny, cannot but be seen in Plato, in the very mood of his philosophy.

The substitution, however, is as follows. Before Plato, the philosophical thought of the Greeks was still hesitating between

to consider φύσις/λόγος ("physis/logos") as the true name of being and thus to treat being as being, and thereby to move further, higher and deeper and "grasp" *being* as a unique *event* (*Ereignis*) that has nothing of being in itself, i.e., as *Seyn* (*fundamental-on-tology*). Pre-Socratic philosophy can still be interpreted in two ways. Plato, on the other hand, puts all the dots over the "i" in this question, interpreting the previous philosophical tradition as ontological and taking another crucial step in the *ontological* (and now definitely *not* fundamental-ontological) direction.

Plato's teaching is the replacement of the fluctuating pre-Socratic ontology (the manifestation of *being* - *Sein*? *Seyn*? - through *being*) by the *idea* of *being* as an *idea*. In Plato, being becomes what is placed *before* man, and this gives birth to the phenomenon of *representation*, *Vor-stellung*. Man stands before the *idea*, ideas stand before the things of the world.

The etymology of the word ἰδέα is related to visualization and originates in the ability to *see* (participle of the verb ὀρῆν⁽⁴⁷⁾). At all levels of the narrative of the "cave" in Plato's dialogue "The State"⁽⁴⁸⁾, where the doctrine of ideas is first elaborated, it is "seeing" - first of shadows, then of objects themselves, and finally of ideas. In this procedure of bringing ideas to the very center of philosophical thinking, the basic operations of knowledge are reduced to a clear vision, the identification of ideas, which are the heavenly models of things and phenomena. But contact with ideas presupposes *facing* them, which is the only way to "see" them.

This is the beginning of an era of a very specific *rule* in the movement of reason, an era of a very specific rationality, which since Plato and Aristotle has been the *destiny of Western European philosophy*, predetermining absolutely all its stages, including the Modern Age, and before that the Middle Ages, and even earlier the late Antiquity.

For Heidegger, the pre-Socratics were *in the world*, *within* it, they were *beings* among *beings*, thinking *beings* and *thinking beings* among *beings*. They were

ancient Greeks in general. In addition, philosophers, being in being and thinking about being, dared to *divine bro-*

The philosophers' *juice* (δαίμον) towards being (Sein? Seyn?), without completely severing their ties either with humanity or with "nature". And philosophizing in wonder and amazement, in a state of marvelous ecstasy in the moment of the "daimon", they allowed the logos to think *through them*, allowing *being* (Sein? Seyn?) to *happen*, to *come true through them*.

But with the advent of Plato and his doctrine of ideas, man becomes *before the world*: he is no longer *in the world*, he is *before the world*, he is *vor-gestellt*, he is *before the world*, *before* it. He is no longer able to communicate directly with being, with the things of the world. He can no longer participate in the world's "unconcealability" (i.e., in its pre-Socratic "truthfulness"). From now on, he is condemned to postulate constantly between, in front of, and above everything an *idea*, an additional instance of the visualized image.

From the dynamics of *concealment/concealment* and the constant explosion of being in being, we move to *Sein als Idea* (being as idea) and, consequently, to an additional instance, the idea, which replaces being. The worst of what Plato did was to equate the *idea* with *Sein*. The *idea* was put in the place of *Sein*.

With his "decision" Plato made *two* momentous ontological gestures for Western European philosophy: he resolved (implicitly) the hesitation in the question of the status of φύσις in favor of *being*, i.e. i.e., φύσις as the being of *essence* conceptualized unambiguously as *essence* (Seiendheit, οὐσία), and then identified *essence* with *idea* (Plato unambiguously speaks of *idea* as *essence*, οὐσία). By this double move the passage into *Seyn-existence* was irreversibly closed. And although Plato himself and the philosophers adjoining him (Aristotle in particular) constantly raise the question of the *essence of being*, i.e. they do not lose sight of being, henceforth we speak only of *Sein-existence* as a "form", an "image", a "representation" of *Seyn-existence*. The ontological visual copy is passed off as the fundamental ontological original.

From now on, everything changes in comparison with pre-Socratic philosophy. Truth appears no longer as the *unconcealedness of φύσις* (and perhaps as the unconcealedness of the concealed).

Seyn-existence - through φύσις and through λόγος), but as correspondence (referentia). And that to which the *being* corresponds is henceforth an *idea*, i.e. another *being* which is as *Sein* and which is contemplated by the mind. At this point, the open ontological (with the possibility of *being* fundamentally ontological) topicality of the first *leap of philosophy* finally closes in the upper limit, where the *idea* is located, and the first of the ideas, the *idea of the good* (τὸ ἀγαθόν).

It is from this moment, in which the thought of the *being of being* still shines, that the process of progressive oblivion of *being* (*Seinsverlassenheit*) and the formation of European nihilism begins. The passage to *Seyn-being* is irreversibly blocked, and *Sein-being* is replaced by *Sein-being as essence, idea*, and, consequently, *being* itself. Truth from now until the last end of philosophy in the twentieth century is thought of exclusively referentially, i.e. as the correspondence of one being to another (at first it is assumed to be a *higher* being, and then simply to *another* being).

Subsequent post-Socratic philosophers put different ontological constructs in place of the *idea as Sein*. Thus, Plato's disciple Aristotle chooses ἐνέργεια "energy". Later, other philosophers will prefer other candidates for the "position" of the supreme being. But this will not change the essence of the picture. After Plato, the ontological topicality is established once and for all and remains valid from the *end within the first Beginning* to the very *beginning*. the last and final *End*.

HEIDEGGER AND CHRISTIANITY (PLATONISM FOR THE MASSES)

It is worth mentioning here Heidegger's attitude to Christianity. He often repeated Nietzsche's words that "Christianity is Platonism for the masses." What did he mean by this? Where did Heidegger get such a dismissive attitude towards Christian culture, with its complex intellectual elements and constructions?

It is based on Heidegger's *linguistic-philosophical* understanding of theology⁽⁴⁹⁾. The Semitic origin of the "Bible" places it outside the realm of the Indo-

of the European context. For Heidegger, this is alien thinking, which does not occupy or impress him in any way. To think biblically, one must be a Semite. Of course, Christian philosophy has been, since apostolic times, a fundamental reworking of Semitic, Jewish religiosity and theology into Greek, Indo-European terms. However, Heidegger prefers not to go down the path of identifying non-Semitic influences in Christianity, but rather, by referring to unconditional Semitic influences, removes the problem as such. This seems somewhat facile, but our task is not to criticize Heidegger, but to understand him. In the structure of his philosophy, Semitic thinking is simply taken out of the picture.

To illustrate the epistemological "naiveté" of biblical philosophy, Heidegger literally reproduces the phrase spoken by God to Moses on Mount Sinai: "I am who I am", "I am being". Even if we are talking here about the *supreme being*, it is nevertheless the *being*, Heidegger comments. In this way, Heidegger wants to prove that Christian theology remains within the realm of being, i.e. within the realm of ontology, and dogmatically closes off the very possibility of a breakthrough to fundamental ontology⁽⁵⁰⁾.

Heidegger sees the situation with theology roughly this way. God as being is not an object of interest to the true philosopher, does not add anything to the ontological problem, but rather diminishes it, since under the guise of solving it by referring to the supreme and original being it only "mystifies" the same Platonic topics and the referential theory of truth. Scholasticism, theology in general, only confuses the problem of the relation of *being* to *being*. Instead of this relation, it is proposed simply to arrange being according to the hierarchy of its creaturely dignity, i.e., to build a ladder of ens creatum, knowingly answering, through an appeal to creationism (God's creation of beings), the question of the *existence of being that* has not yet been posed.

Heidegger is convinced that Christian philosophy is entirely trapped in Plato's doctrine of ideas and Aristotelian logic, which only serve the need to justify the Semitic religion

and do not turn to their own roots, and therefore participate in the philosophical process indirectly and inarticulately. Hence the Nietzschean: "Christianity is Platonism for the masses." For Heidegger, this is a reason to bypass this area of philosophy, to treat it in a high-handed way. The reason is twofold: because it is "for the masses" and because it is "Platonism."

Let us recall what we said about the "*philosophical daimon*". Compared to the pre-philosophical (Homeric-Hesiodic) Greeks, who lived and thought in *being* and in *myth*, philosophers opened up a realm of a different kind of wonder. This area we have called the *philosophical daimon*, i.e. the realm of the questioning of the *being of things*, or the point of observation of man (as a thinker of the thinkable) from within. This is the realm of the logos, where it highlights all *things* as *one* (ἓν), as φύσις. Ὄν (*essence*) and ἐν (*unity*) come close to and are almost identified with each other in both Parmenides and Aristotle.

This dimension - the place of the *philosophical daimon* ("god", numen) - in the pre-Socratic period deals with being as an oscillation between Sein and Seyn. After Plato, the choice is unequivocally in favor of Sein, with Sein almost openly identified with *essence* (οὐσία), with the idea and thus with *being*. Thus ontology is placed on the risky place of leaping into the abyss of questioning, established by the daimon of wonder, a special type of inner, philosophical sacrality (different from the pre-philosophical sacrality of the sacred being). This topicality, in which the exit to Seyn, blocked after Socrates and Plato by the doctrine of ideas, the universal "representation" (Vorstellung), glimmers, persists until the *End of Philosophy*.

Christian theology, according to Heidegger, is nothing new, as an episode in the consolidation of this post-Platonic topic, where the figure of the Semitic God-creator takes the place of the *philosophical daimon*, and later of the Platonic *idea*. The cycle of Christian philosophy is thus placed between two philosophical periods, Late Antiquity and the Modern Age. The *place* constituted by the philosophical daimon for the leap into Seyn-existence is preserved.

is (although the passage remains firmly blocked and becomes more and more blocked) in approximately the same way state. And when the influence of Christianity wanes ("God is dead", according to Nietzsche), the permanence of the ontological topicality becomes vividly clear: it turns out that, in the philosophical sense, Christianity did not give absolutely nothing new and only postponed for fifteen hundred years the process of explicit and consistent thinking.

The scholastic God-creator temporarily took the place of the philosophical daimon, but then left this philosophical topos again, ceding it to the "idols" of the New Age: subject, object, spirit, matter, matter, technology, values, worldviews, and so on.

That's what the expression "Platonism for the masses" means.

DESCARTES: SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS OF THE NEW AGE

Heidegger's assessment of the New Age is twofold. On the one hand, it is a very significant *turn* (Wendung), which in his eyes represents a new *turn* to pre-Christian philosophizing, in which the ontological problematic begins to be understood more clearly, rigorously, and consistently, without the apparent calm of a schematic "Platonism for the masses. Thought unfreezes and finds itself once again in the schematic topology of Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics without reference to creation and its degrees.

On the other hand, the New Age, together with Descartes, Leibniz, Kant and others, fully inherited precisely the Platonic intellectual field, in which there is nothing fundamentally "new". Moreover, the scholastic pause of a millennium and a half only aggravated *the oblivion of being* (Seinsverlassenheit), and the new editions of ontology in New Age thinking repeat Plato's schemes, only putting new "representations" in place of the *idea* - subject, apperception, energy, reality, monad, and so on. And each new entity, category or concept only aggravates the oblivion of *being*, answering the question of being more and more formally and alienatingly.

The theory of truth is a purely referential theory of truth.

When Descartes grounds the metaphysics of the New Age on the subject, whom he brings into the mainstream of Western European philosophizing, he is in a sense dealing again with the "daimon of the philosophers. But Descartes no longer finds himself in the open optics of the *first Beginning* (with the possibility of a *leap* into fundamental-ontology remaining there), or even in the two-dimensional topicality of Platonism, which is barricaded from *Seyn-being*, but still two-dimensional, where ideas still bear the trace of their original flight ("Ideas, - Plato said, "Ideas either float or die"⁽⁵¹⁾), but in the space of purely human thinking ("common sense"), where, on the same floor, the topos of philosophizing and, consequently, the point of observation of human thinking, is assigned a certain place called "subject". In this way, the *daimon* of philosophers is trapped in man, in his "inner" dimension, which only emerges in this form with Descartes. It is the subject, the "*res cogens*", who makes judgments about what is and what is not. Ultimately, metaphysics is reduced to the metaphysics of the "ego cogens" (the thinking person). The "I"), which makes a statement about *what is* real, true, etc.

In the Cartesian coordinate system, Platonism *disintegrates* to its smallest possibility, where *Sein-being* descends from the idea to the subject ("cogito ergo sum" means that being becomes a function ("ergo") of the subject's thinking activity, of his epistemology). That from which the philosophical thought of the pre-Socratics was repelled by the *daimonic worlds of the logos*, i.e. human thinking, becomes the place to which the original impulse returns in the last stage of Western European philosophy and its *Geschichte*.

Descartes, according to Heidegger, is good for his honesty, for the open insignificance of his primitive ontology, for his shriveled paucity. In this, Heidegger reads the very *fate of being*, which, having failed to concentrate on *Seyn-existence* in the *first Beginning*, could not at a certain point fail to descend to the topics of the subject. Cartesian

turn and the metaphysics of the New Age, however, is still the same metaphysics as in the age of Plato or the triumph of the scholasticism. But this time it enters a phase of active disintegration, in which its inner skeleton is exposed.

For Heidegger, the cleansing of this skeleton from pseudo-ontological postulations and empty under-philosophical and pseudo-philosophical diversions is a very important event. With Descartes, Western European philosophy takes a decisive step towards its End.

Having established the subject at the center of his ontology, Descartes places everything else in front of it, in the *realm of the represented*, but now this *being* (formerly φύσις, later ens creatum) is thought of as an *object*.

The introduction of the *subject* inevitably entails the *object* as what is before it. For Plato, ideas and things were vertically arranged, for the scholastics God was *above the* world, for Descartes subject and object appear on the same plane. Although it is the subject that is the source of ontological judgment, whichever member of the *subject-object* pair we take, we automatically get the second one immediately. By establishing the subject, we establish the sphere of the object, into which everything else falls. If we begin to think from the side of the object (as suggested by medieval nominalists, later empiricists such as Newton, later philosophers such as Locke, Hume, etc., up to materialists), we will also inevitably come to the subject as a mirror placed in front of the object.

In Russian, object is "pre-met". Slavs (first Poles - "przedmiot") scalped for themselves this word from Latin to convey "ob" ("before", "*before*") and "jectum" ("thrown"; "that which is *thrown*", from "jacere").

"to throw", "to hurl"). The subject is what is in *front of us*. The one in front of whom something is thrown is the subject. But this subject has an important distinction from a mere person or human thinking: this subject is constituted scientifically, i.e. in the course of philosophical observation of the unfolding of thought. It is the reflexive thought that underlies the modern understanding of science. The subject is the center of science and, at the same time, what creates science. This is why, in modern times, it is science that occupies the place of re-

It is now the dispositive of judgments that are recognized as true. From now on, it is the dispositive of the judgments that are recognized as true, and, moreover, it is science that takes on the function of decreeing *what* is and *what* is not real.

In the same way, with the same gesture, science constitutes the object; the object is what the subject considers and recognizes as existing. *Being being* and *being an object* merge into one, hence the synonymous use of "to exist" and "to be objective" in our everyday language. Everything that exists is objective, everything objective exists. The non-objective does not exist or exists as an error, mistake, misconception. The referential theory of truth is elevated to an epistemological absolute, but within the boundaries of New Age science, the poles of reference are the subject and the object.

Heidegger sees in this a clear sign of nihilism. Scientific thinking is one of the most extreme forms of nihilistic thinking, i.e. thinking in which the question of the *being of being* is not only not raised, but cannot be raised.

Here it is important to note the following. In the science of the Modern Age, despite the appearance of detachment from the transcendental dimension (whether Platonism or scholasticism) and the descent of attention to the concrete being, the basic laws of metaphysics, which, as far back as ancient Greece, had built an additional floor over the being, are still in full force. Science is thinking within *two entities*, exactly the same as in previous forms of idealist or religious transcendentalism. These *two entities* are the domain of the ontic and the domain of the ontological, and the place of the ontological is taken by New Age science itself. The topicality of scientific thinking is the topicality of classical metaphysics, albeit in a radically new form.

VORSETZENDE DURCHSETZUNG

Heidegger meticulously traces the line of the artificial construction of scientific and philosophical ontology of the New Age from Descartes to Kant, the German classics, and the New Classics.

of Western European philosophy and finally to Schopenhauer, Kirkegaard, and Nietzsche. Each step brings us closer to the *End of Philosophy*.

The subjective character of the ontological argument, especially after the fundamental Kantian investigations of the structures of pure reason and the discovery of the inability of reason to make a reliable judgment about the being of the thing-in-itself, leads to the conscious primacy of the will as the main mechanism of the construction of being. This is explicitly present in Schopenhauer, and finally Nietzsche elevates the will - as "the will to power" - as the highest form of identity.

Already in Kant's practical reason, the will - so far in the form of the categorical imperative - appears as the main moral principle responsible for the affirmation of the existence of object, subject and "God". This Kantian idea is further developed by the entire German classical philosophy from Fichte and Schelling to Nietzsche.

To describe the last segment of Western European philosophy, realized in the optics of Seynsgeschichte, Heidegger uses a specific expression - "*vorsetzende Durchsetzung*", which can be roughly translated as "*premeditated imposition*". It means that a person who has gone down *the path of presupposition* (*Vor-stellung* or *Vorsetzung*, which means literally

"In his neurotic dialog with this void, he began to throw, "clutter" it with certain ideas developed in the space of ontological topics. In a neurotic dialog with this emptiness, he began to "clutter" it with certain representations developed in the space of ontological topics. He turned to the realm of the "idea" (which became a concept, subject, object, category, value, etc.) and then imposed this ontological, metaphysical, later scientific constructed being directly on the surrounding being, without much regard for it and its existences. In order to deal with the being that had become an *object*, man, from a certain point onwards, was forced to "knowingly impose" something constructed on the being, to pave the void with the content of his *representing* intellect

and impose these *preconceptions* by means of the will, and then deal with it by repeating such an operation indefinitely.

For Heidegger, comprehending the attitude of "intentional self-binding" is the essence of the fundamental movement of philosophical thought in the course of its unfolding. Western European philosophy is a progressive *vorsetzende Durchsetzung*, moving from the pre-Socratic pole to the Nietzschean nihilism.

"will to power" through the alienation stages of Platonism, Scholasticism, and Cartesianism.

OBJECTIFICATION

In the course of the unfolding of the process of "*deliberate self-binding*" (*vorsetzende Durchsetzung*), *things are de-measured* (*Vergegenständlichung der Dingen*).

Here it is very important to understand what a "thing" is. In the German language, as in Russian, the word "*thing*" (German

"Ding"⁽⁵²⁾) carries a similar sacred meaning. In Russian, a *thing* is a *message*, something *real*, something that *speaks* in a world where things are honored as sacred. Things that are real are things that speak in being, but through *representation*, when they become objectified, these things *cease to speak*, lose their sacred content, become deformed, slip away or, at the very least, are brutally squeezed into human (or rather, ontological, philosophical) representations of them. But human beings are not content with merely objectifying things that already exist; they become more and more obsessed with *representation*, *Vorstellung*, and will, and begin to duplicate natural things with artificial ones, "twin things," "shadow things," creating a *man-made being* that is closer and closer to their representation. So they begin to substitute *Aufstellung*, i.e. the *natural*, *natural born something*, for *Herstellung*, the artificial product.

Man is thrown *into technics as fate* and moves backwards from being (towards *Sein as Seindheit*).

Being loses its indefinitely subtle connection with *being* (as *Sein*, perhaps, extending into *Seyn*) already in Plato, and The being is then transformed into something *produced*. In the end, because *being* is forgotten (*Seinsverlassenheit*), being becomes enslaved and is replaced by what is artificially produced. *Objects* become more and more, *things* less and less. The dictatorship of *production* (*Herstellung*) takes over.

The Russian language is a largely ontic language. When we say "produce", it means "help nature", "derive from it", "out-drive". To "produce something" means "to push something out of somewhere" (e.g., out of *being-Sein*). In Russian, there is only one word for "*Aufstel-lung*" and "*Herstellung*" - "produce". The German word "*Herstellung*" means "to put out (outward)", "to bring in front", and in an artificial, volitional way. We even think of industrial production as some kind of almost magical, mysterious action. For example, in Andrei Platonov's⁽⁵³⁾ the proletariat digs a pit, making a great national archetypal gesture. It is not clear what they are digging for - the house will not be built anyway, no one plans to build it - but everyone is digging, and with a fundamental conviction of the necessity of doing so. Platonov's other heroes talk soulfully with locomotives, engines, and machine tools, feeling industry as a giant *living* organism (albeit with somewhat infernal features). In Russians, even technical production is understood (or rather, it was understood until recently) with a certain degree of sacredness. This is why it is difficult for us to imagine a despecified thing or object in its pure form - for us, things still *speak* (although more and more quietly, it is true).

HEGEL: THE IMPULSE OF "GRAND LOGIC"

Heidegger pays much attention to Hegel's philosophy. From his point of view, Hegel tries to escape from the doomed problematics of deontologization. For the first time in the entire philosophical West European tradition, he tries to confront Aristotle's logic, which Kant

In two thousand years, no one had introduced anything new into it, and no one had been able to change, improve or propose anything new. In a brilliant impulse, Hegel tries to create his own *alternative logic*, which would refute the second law of formal logic, the *law of the excluded third*.

For Heidegger, this is an ingenious experience that represents the pinnacle of Western European philosophy. But Hegel remains in the categories of the *concept*, where *being* is enslaved to reason and is unable to free itself from "deliberate self-obsession" (*vorsetzende Durchsetzung*).

Hegel does the maximum of what could be done within the *Vorstellung*. Nothing more can be done. Until night reaches the point of midnight, morning cannot come, so poor Hegel appears to us as a kind of *morning thinker* who wakes up in the middle of the night and acts as if it were already time to exercise. Heidegger admires Hegel, but believes that this is not a *breakthrough* to fundamental-ontology, but an *impulse* towards it, since conceptual thinking envelops the movement of Hegel's spirit like a net, each time drawing it away from itself.

of an acute moment with the potential to explode.

The colossal merit of Hegel is that he moves from history to the history of philosophy, convincingly showing that the historical process is nothing but the unfolding of concepts, the work of the "world mind," which, either explicitly or implicitly, predetermines the logic of events, remaining the only content of humanity's world history, which must be enrolled as subjects only in the eschatological moment of the "end of history. Hegel, in fact, with all candor restores Platonism, which has been subjected to so many distortions for more than two thousand years. He speaks of history not only as the history of philosophical ideas, but as the history of the Idea, the Absolute Idea, whose transformations constitute the fabric of Western European historical existence (meaning its philosophical period, from the pre-Socratics to the New Age). Hegel raises the question of *being*, *nothingness*, negation, and dialectic, restoring the ontological problematic to a large extent

Greeks, but only in a final, post-Platonic, purely metaphysical context.

Hegel summarizes Western European metaphysics at its most perfect. But this whole process of redefining the question of *being* (*Sein*) not only fails to bring us to the horizon of a rethinking of ontology, but finally uproots the possibility of *conceiving* of *being* and *being* (*Sein*) outside the intellectualist context of Western European metaphysics.

Seeking to answer the difficult questions of the Kantian critique of pure reason, Hegel only exhausts the nomenclature of answers to the ontological challenges of nihilism through the formal repetition of pre-Socratic theses (Parmenides, Heraclitus) in the topics of post-Platonic philosophy. He looks back to the *first Beginning*, but repeats its problematics within the framework of the *End*.

From Hegel to Nietzsche is one step.

NIETZSCHE AND THE END OF PHILOSOPHY

Western European philosophy ends with Friedrich Nietzsche, who calls all things by their proper names. Heidegger has devoted several volumes of texts to Nietzsche's philosophy⁽⁵⁴⁾, and this thinker appears to Heidegger as the most significant and the greatest for the New Age, and even for the whole of European philosophy. This is understandable: for Heidegger, Nietzsche is the last philosopher, and as such his importance cannot be overestimated. In Nietzsche ends what began under the pre-Socratics. In terms of his weight and significance, he is a key figure, since the End of Philosophy explains or clarifies for us to a large extent its Beginning, helps us to understand what in this Beginning began and how it happened that, having begun, something came to an End, and to what End?

Nietzsche argues that there is nothing left but subjectivity; the meaning of subjectivity is will, self-imposed. Being is no longer even an idea; being is simply *value*, becoming, life, the will to power. In a word, it is the arbitrariness of the subject. It is precisely because being has become a function of values that we find ourselves in a space of

total nihilism, we have lost absolutely everything that previously connected us to being and to ourselves.

According to Heidegger, Nietzsche does not overcome Western European metaphysics in his philosophy, he prolongs it, he tries to save it. His Nietzschean critique of Plato, his appeal to the pre-Socratics, his struggle against a static ontology that closes access to the streams of the living beginning - all this does not lead him to a new turn, does not bring him closer to the real overcoming of Western European philosophy, but summarizes it, draws a grave line under it. In seeking to overcome Western European metaphysics, Nietzsche was actually trying to save it. "Reassessment of all values", "will to power", "life", "superman", The "eternal return" - all these Nietzschean proposals, according to Heidegger, represent the agony of philosophical thought, struggling in the snares of a once misplaced topicality, where the breakthrough into *being* has been irreversibly closed by its entire structure. But unlike his direct predecessors - Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer - Nietzsche truly longs to overcome all this, longs to break through to new horizons, but fatally remains within the old ones. This is the End, in its scale, in its tragedy, in its interest in the Beginning, in its riskiness comparable to the whole process of Western European sunset, evening philosophizing. Nietzsche is a worthy End.

Nietzsche is the watchman who heralds the coming of half the night. "Watchman?! What time of night is it?" - "It's soon morning, but it's still night."⁽⁵⁵⁾

Nietzsche proclaimed: the real "*lean times*" have come, "God is dead," the midnight of the world is coming. In saying that "midnight is upon us," Heidegger added in the text "What are poets to?" (whose translation we give in this book): "It's midnight, or maybe it's '*still no*', it's always '*still no*'."

We will return to this "*still not*" a little later, but for now, let us consider *why does oblivion of being occur?*

CHAPTER 6

SEYNSGESCHICHTLICHE 'mŠpnofnch' u'ideccep`.

HUMAN VINES

The question of why there is a *forgetting of being*, i.e. the question of the cause of *Seinsverlassenheit* as the main content of the historical-philosophical process, takes us to a very deep level of analysis and confronts us directly with the problem of man, with anthropology as Heidegger sees it.

In one of his 1935 works, "Introduction to Metaphysics"⁽⁵⁶⁾

Heidegger directly asks: Why is the *fate of being* turned *away from being*? Why does the *oblivion of being* occur? What is

behind the emergence of Platonic ideas and what drives philosophy towards its End? What is at the heart of the End?

And consequently, *why midnight*? When meaning is dark, philosophers often turn to poets. Poets are unlimited and always provide philosophers with what they fundamentally and vitally lack. In this case, Heidegger turns to Sophocles, to a passage in his tragedy *Antigone*⁽⁵⁷⁾, where the chorus, symbolizing the being (Seiende), sings as follows (literally translated as "Seiende")

Heidegger's text):

Chorus

Strophe I

Many things are terrible (πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ),

But there is nothing more terrible (δεινότετον) than a man, rising, does not rise.

It goes out into the sea foamy with winter or southerly winds and crosses it in violently heaving ramparts.

The highest of deities,

The earth, indestructibly unsleeping,

he constantly exhausts, coming back year after year, to plow and plow it with their horses and plow.

Antistrophe I

Flocks of lightly flying birds
 he catches in his nets,
 and hunts tribes of animals
 of wild countries, and on that which lives and acts in the
 sea, he, the man of cunning

He overpowers the beast that lodges and
 roams the hills by stratagems,
 and a horse with a thick mane,
 and to the unruly buffalo he puts a tree yoke.

Strophe II

In the sound of the word and easy omniscience,
 like the wind, he eventually finds himself also in
 the cities of his refuge.
 And he devised a way of escape there from the openness to
 storms and piercing hail.
 Gaining experience on all roads,
 He, hopelessly inexperienced, comes to nothing.
 There was only one inevitable death he
 could not escape,
 even if he managed to elude a number of serious
 illnesses with his agility.

Antistrophe II

He is a creator, because of skill (τέχνη), he has
 incomparable skill, sometimes out of this
 comes lowliness,
 and sometimes responds with something of
 great value. Between the state of the earth and
 the order prescribed by the gods,
 he follows his own path.

Head over the place, excluded from the place, such is he to
 whom always the bad (non-substantial) appears good
 (substantial) because of his impudent deeds.

May he not be welcome at my hearth,
 And may his illusions not be shared in my knowledge, O man
 who creates all these things.

In these choruses of being, Heidegger sees a summary of
 the entire historical-philosophical process, i.e. the formula of
 Western metaphysics. It is precisely because man, at least
 Greek man, *Western European* man, is as Sophocles describes
 him, that everything else arises.

Man, as an entity, falls out of the general structure of being, stands out from it, falls away from it, is something unique, special and catastrophic in itself. On the one hand, it is as "terrible" as all things. "Terrible" must be understood in its original Greek sense, Heidegger insists. This is how the Greek term "δεινόν" is translated. Heidegger interprets it as "violent," "imposing," "aggressive," "subjugating." The elements of being are also terrible: among them are storms, hail, deadly diseases, savagery, indomitability, aggression, risk, threat. But man, sharing with all things the property of *horror*, is in him superior to everything else. Many things are terrible, but man is the most terrible. This is his special position: he is the most horrible of the horrible, the most aggressive of all the aggressive, the most subjugating of all the subjugating.

Moreover, he makes of aggressiveness his destiny. According to Heidegger, man's specific δεινόν is most fully captured in "τέχνη" - "technics," the ability to create a special *being* that would serve him even more fully than the being he has subjugated, tamed, put under a counter-role.

The ability to create is itself neutral with regard to good and evil, but in all cases this ability is based on aggression, imposition and terror, because it is the qualitative center of this very beginning.

At the same time, "δεινόν" is, in a certain sense, a "δίκη", i.e., "higher law", "higher order" to which all *being* is subject. "Δίκη" is interpreted by Heidegger as "φύσις" and as "λόγος", i.e., as the *being of being*. The Δίκη imposes itself on everything on the scale of being, while man imposes himself on being through τέχνη, which leads to a fundamental opposition between man and being. Man through τέχνη as the expression of δεινόν opposes himself to δεινόν as the expression of Δίκη. This is why man becomes "more terrible" than all *things*. There is no longer a point in the *being* where the two horrors collide: the horror of *the being of the being* and the horror of the man who copies it. This point is the point of split in *being*. Man, as a *split being*, is the place where the invasion takes place.

of the terrifying power of *being* (*Sein* or *Seyn* - it is not yet clear). But manifesting itself in this way, it detaches man from the rest of *existence*.

Being supreme in being and the most important of things, standing above things, it is at the same time excluded from things, expelled from them. It is not accepted at the "hearth" of being, thrown out of that which constitutes the knowledge of being about itself.

TECHNĒ (TEXNH) AS A WESTERN EUROPEAN DESTINY

The origins of the fate of Western European philosophy are thus to be found in the roots of European Greek anthropology. Man is fundamentally such that he is condemned to conflict with being and, indirectly, with being, which is the order of being, its *logos*. But by the same token, man is doomed to conflict with himself, since he too is being and the expression of its order. But this order of being (its being) is found in man in a fundamentally different way than in the rest of existence. Heidegger comes to the point that there is "too much being" in man, and this is what manifests *itself* in the fact that *there* is too much power and terror in him, aimed at overcoming the *being*, at going beyond it. This exit is an attempt to break through to the *being of being*.

This attempt itself is the *essence of human being*.

Thinking is a property of man. It is what distinguishes-

The human being is able to distinguish one thing from another, i.e., to think ontically. Man is able to distinguish acutely one *thing* from another in *being*, i.e. to think ontically,

because he himself is distinguished from *being*, because he occupies a special position in relation to it. "The man who is supreme over place (*being*), placed outside of place" (as Heidegger translates Sophocles). Thus, already in the very fact of thinking lies the possibility of becoming a *gap* in the being. Up to a certain point, however, man does not undertake to draw all the conclusions from it. He is content

to distinguish what is around him and to consolidate his position, although he is periodically tossed from side to side in an attempt to reach the edge of the essence, *to fight it as essence.*

The *whole of it*.

At a certain point, in the course of mastering the limits of one's own freedom and one's own distance from the *The human being* discovers τέχνη, the ability to create being itself, which makes it possible to gain even greater power over it and to discern in it even more clearly and authentically. Through τέχνη, the human being reaches the last line, beyond which the horizon opens up for a *leap* beyond the human, to the place we have previously defined as the "*daimonic topos*". In this leap, the human being includes himself in the *essence*, i.e. he distances himself from himself. In this way, he does the maximum possible violence, undermining the last basis for remaining in the *being*. When it thinks of *itself as being* in the same way as it had previously thought of another *being* (in protivoposition to itself), it constitutes a *new place* which, in a sense, is no longer in *being*. This place can only be *being* - and *being as non-being* (*Seyn als Nichts*).

It is in this gesture that philosophy begins. But at the same time, τέχνη does not become a manifestation of human distance, but is conceptualized as man's destiny, as the main thing in him, as Seynsgeschichte. In the *leap into nothingness*, man himself becomes a "work", a "means", something technical. And the potential of *u-nihilation* (*Seyn = Nichts*) inherent in *being* begins its long work against *being*, including man as *being*. This is why Heidegger identifies τέχνη with fate and sees in it the manifestation of the ontological depths of man himself as a phenomenon of Seynsgeschichte.

But not every human being makes a gesture towards the full and final assumption of responsibility for the *double distancing* from both *being* and *man* as a part of *being*. Only the Greek man of the epoch of the formation of philosophy makes a choice in this direction. And from this initial moment, the *leap*, the *double topics*, the *dai-monic place* and τέχνη become his eternal destiny. Ultimately, this first gesture of recognizing himself as a *gap* within being opens the way for the gradual emergence of Western European nihilism, for the *growth of "pus tini"*.

FREEDOM AND WILL

At the heart of the catastrophe of Western European destiny lies the deepest truth of human freedom. It is that being is found in man in a completely different way than in all other things. Man lives in *being*, and his home is *being*, not *being*. As being, he is not at home among *things*, it is not his home. His real home is *being*, which is why he behaves so abominably when he is immersed only in *being*.

The *Being* that brought man into *existence*, that keeps him *in existence* until the moment of death, and that at the same time leaves him at will, resides in him in a special way. It is expressed in his special position, the *will*. Man puts himself *before the being* and imposes himself on *the being* through his *will*. In doing so, he is on his way to replacing the *real* with the created, the *technical*. This is his will. Man is a creature of will. This relation of man to *being* and *being* to man is the origin of *vorsetzende Durchsetzung* ("deliberate self-imposition").

The impulse from *being* to *being* as the origin of philosophizing is the echo of the bottomless freedom of being in the depths of man. Attacking the trace of the very possibility of this impulse, man enters the most risky zone of his essence:

he throws himself into *being*. In the first Beginning, the bottomlessness of freedom imposes the supreme risk of the prospect of flying over the abyss. Becoming a stranger in

existence and realizing this as his destiny in spite of the destiny of existence, man begins to philosophize. At the same time,

such an impulse is the realization of the highest violence over the essence and over himself: man is now irreversibly a stranger in the essence. Whether he will find his home in *being* is a big question. At this moment, for the first time, he becomes a man, because there is a *place* from which one can

say "ecce homo", "this man", pointing to himself from somewhere inside (*daimonic topos*). But at the same time, strictly at the same moment, man ceases to be *just* a man and

begins to be a *philosophical* man, a man with a destiny, correlated to *Seynsgeschichte*. And henceforth he is not free from his freedom and is condemned to philosophical

thinking.

rivers of all attempts or appetites to slip back to the "just thinking," to ontic thinking. Having recognized himself as human, as *being* in the human, man makes the *lightning of the logos* effective. In a sense, the superhuman first appears at this very moment - at the moment of the discovery of the logos. And it is not by chance that Heraclitus tells us: "If you listen not to me, but to the *Logos*, it is wise to say, abiding in it, that all things are one". "*Not to me, but to the logos.*"

Philosophy is not Heraclitus' business as a man, it is the business of the Logos, and it is only to him that one should listen, it is *he* who philosophizes, and he truly risks. And here opens the moment of the *supreme decision* - to what limit will man reach on the path of the logos? How will he dispose of his bottomless freedom, won in the ultimate concentration of the horror of being taken upon himself as its prior recipient (through death), bearer and inspirer? For everyone else (through will and might)?

Today we know the answer. The ancient Greeks, beginning to philosophize, did not know it. And moving where they did not know themselves, horrified and amazed, they created a uniquely tragic work of art - Western European history, the history of the *evening of the world*.

As we have already noted more than once, in Plato and Aristotle the oscillation between *Sein* and *Seyn* is unambiguously resolved in favor of *Sein* as *Seiende-im-Ganze*, *Seiendheit*. This means that the *flight in the leap* has been interrupted and the very element of *the leap into the abyss* has been replaced by an artificially created camp, a parking lot, set up somewhere halfway between the abandoned home of *being* (ontic thinking) and the true home of *existence* never found (*Seyn*, fundamental-ontology). But the *will* as a tragic exile from *being*, as a wandering along all roads in a deliberately wrong direction, as violence and destruction still became man's *destiny*. Always prone to rampant destruction, man put this destruction on a planned basis. Standing at an intermediate standstill, he intensified the technical destruction of *being* and its artificial counterfeiting, and at the same time continued the war with *δίκη* as the *being of being*, removing from the agenda the continuation of *the rush towards being* (*Seyn*).

Τέχνη became the double destiny of man: he began to transform by his will the *being* into the produced and, consequently, he himself (as a being) became more and more machine-like (whence Lametri with his "man-machine"); on the other hand, being became for him a question of the "technique" of thinking, by means of which he strengthened the barricades in the face of dangerous questions about death, *nothingness*, *the abyss*, and *Seyn*.

In the metaphysics of the New Age and with the introduction of the subject and object by Descartes, this process reaches its peak. Henceforth there is only the reasoning, representing and volitional, subject and before it the object, the "res extensa", the pre-met, the Ge-genstand. The *final o-pred-mechanization of things* takes place.

Heidegger calls this a special term - "Machenschaft". It is derived from the German root "Machen", "to do", whence also the concept of Macht, "power", "might", "power". In Russian, "power" and "might" are thought of as something from the realm of the "possible", the potential, which may or may not be. German words "machen", "Macht" and "Machenschaft" are connected, on the contrary, with reality, action, act, with that which not only can manifest itself or impose itself, but which already manifests and imposes itself at a given moment. This is active and acting volition, action, deed, act, action, activity. Heidegger may have been influenced in singling out this series of words by the consonance of the German root with the Greek roots μάχομαι and μηχανική; the former means "struggle", "battle", "aggression", "attack", figuratively "machination", and The second is a "mechanical invention", a "machine". Machenschaft is an absolutized τέχνη, taken not implicitly but explicitly as a positive program for man and humanity.

Heidegger sees in this lower pragmatic, pragmatic, unmeasured madness of production that overwhelmed the West of the Modern Age the same original anthropological gesture of the ancient Greek realization of a higher and unbounded freedom. Man descended into production phrenesis, into utilitarianism, pragmatism and materialism precisely because he turned in due course to the roots of his humanity (his superhumanity)

as something *distinct* from *being*, found its destiny in logos and will, and constructed a metaphysical topic of relation to the world and the referential theory of truth. Therefore, in the ultimate nihilism of the modern catastrophic state, in its complete and utter abandonment by *being* (*Seinsverlassenheit*), the profound mystery of man's relationship with *being*, the fateful history of his rise beyond being and his fall into nihilism, is revealed. But all this is not simply the accidents of someone who participates in the self-standing course of something different from himself: man himself constructs and defines himself in the face of being (*Seyn*), which never makes itself known directly, through being or death, but which may or may not happen, happen to man.

This is the fundamental relationship between being and man: being for man is something accidental, namely, something that may or may not be encountered. And at the same time, being needs man in order to instantly, accidentally, and bizarrely discover in its split, splintering, and tragic mortality itself. Man's will is thus his destiny and being itself, which is expressed in all stages of Western European history through the φύσις, ιδέα, ψυχή of subject, object, concept, value, and finally *Machenschaft*.

Why is this so? Because being is not being, and therefore it is nothing. And since in the great Beginning it was revealed as *being of being*, in the End it is revealed as *nothing of being*. Thus, man wills *nothingness* in the basis of his volition.

The sun slopes towards night not because someone or it itself has made a mistake, simply light expresses itself through light and darkness, and day passes into night in order for a new day to come. Already in the *first Beginning of* Western European philosophy, being as will manifests itself and moves Seynsgeschichte to the point of midnight.

CHAPTER 7

dprcne m`)\`ftn (DIE ANDERE ANFANG)

PREREQUISITES FOR ANOTHER BEGINNING

Thus gradually we come to the main theme of Heidegger's philosophy, which he himself called "the *other Beginning*" (or the "*second Beginning*").

Heidegger's three unpublished works, consisting of outlines for courses, lectures, and other works, deal directly with the theme of the *new Initiation*: Contributions to Philosophy (on Ereignis)⁽⁵⁸⁾, Geschichte des Seyns⁽⁵⁹⁾, and On Initiation⁽⁶⁰⁾. They were all written between 1936 and 1956, just at the time when Heidegger was thinking about the theme of *Ereignis*, which has the most direct relation to the theme of the *second Initiation*. In these loosely organized fragments, Heidegger's thought is seen much more clearly and distinctly than in stylistically refined texts. They show Heidegger's own questioning, hesitation, and the process of searching for the right words and expressions.

In all three books, the idea of the *Second Beginning* is at the center of the author's attention. It is what makes truly poignant both the themes that Heidegger dealt with earlier, before the mid-1930s (including Sein und Zeit), and the subjects (mainly language and Greek thought) that he prioritized later, after the end of the Second World War and the collapse of the Third Reich.

The Second Beginning is what Heidegger himself considered his philosophy, his thought and himself to be. It is what he fully identified his philosophical and human destiny with.

According to Heidegger, the *first Beginning*, which is the philosophy of the pre-Socratics (primarily Anaximander,

of Heraclitus and Parmenides), laying the foundations of philosophy as such and determining the fate of two thousand years of philosophy.

Western European history represents a unique transition from the *ontic* to the *ontological*, from mere human thinking to thinking of man as a special *being*, to taking full responsibility for the fate of this transition, for man, being and being, now realized in a completely different way. Before Anaximander, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, it was decided within the framework of the first Beginning: would the Seynsgeschichte of Western Europe be ontological or fundamental-ontological? Would the desperate leap of ontological thought develop into a flight to the bottomless Seyn-existence, or would it stop halfway and Seyn would be replaced by the "supreme being" ("supreme being" ὄντως ὄν)?

We know what that decision was, and we know what it was leading up to

led. The fundamental-ontological perspective was not realized, and the ontology that Western European philosophy had been demonstrating to us until its last nihilistic manifestations prevailed. And having recorded the meaning of the whole process of Seynsgeschichte, we can, with Heidegger, ask ourselves, in the same way as Heidegger, about a daring endeavor: should we not discard two and a half thousand years of the fate of Western man and his thinking and move on to a *new beginning*? Shall we not pose the question of the *being of being anew*, taking into account all the Western European philosophical experience *that is* now known, and in a very different way than was done in the *first Beginning*? How differently? Not from being, not from being, not by analogy with being, but by rushing straight into the pure element of being - through horror, through the abyss.

We have seen *how* in the first Initiation the possibility of *jumping* and *flying* to Seyn was discovered. We have also seen that it was not realized and was finally taken off the agenda by Platonism. But we have also seen how it was realized, how the logos, the place of the philosophical daimon, was revealed in the supreme leap of human thought, establishing philosophy in the place of mere thinking, ontology in the place of ontology. Yes, *in the first Initiation*, ontology and metaphysics were moved from ontology to ontology and metaphysics. But in the *Second Initiation* we should move on to fundamental ontology, realizing the very opportunity that had been missed, discarded, failed.

This is what a *new Beginning*, a *different Beginning*, consists in. We do not simply pose the question of being-Seyn with all its rigor and radicality, asking ourselves "why is there being and not nothingness?"⁽⁶¹⁾ This is a transitional question, according to Heidegger. "The leading question of philosophy" (Leitfrage) since the Greeks introduced the notion of φύσις has consisted, let me remind you, in clarifying the essence of being, i.e. what is being as being as a *whole*? This is the question of the end of the first Beginning. The transitional question (Übergangsfrage) is: "why is there being and not nothing?" And the fundamental, basic question (Grundfrage) is "what is the truth of Seyn-being?"

We know that the "leading question" was formulated incorrectly, and that the answers given to it led to catas-trophe. We also know that the "nothingness" of the transitional question is not an empty concept, but a subtle expression of the mismatch between being and being, moreover, shading the deeper meaning of Seyn-being, which is Nichts, but also the Seyn of being (Seien- den), i.e. Sein. Finally, we know that not only the referential theory of truth, but also the understanding of truth - ἀλήθεια - as the *unconcealability of being*, inherent in the pre-Socratics, is a fundamentally wrong formulation of the question: *unconcealability* must refer to Seyn-being and be derived directly from it, bypassing being, including man as *being*.

The possibility of a *new Beginning* is also provided by the following points:

- 1) the exhaustion of the historical and philosophical process of European humanity and the era of total nihilism;
- 2) by recognizing the will to power, the Machenschaft, values, worldviews, technology, and all other editions of the Platonic idea as expressions of *Seyn-being* itself, proving indirectly, through the split in being embodied in the human philosopher, its non-identity with being;
- 3) the stubborn will to philosophize and to take supreme risks in every situation as the species and seynsgeschichtliche dignity of man as the bearer of supreme freedom;
- 4) The fact of the existence of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, who concentrated in his works the fundamental ontological line of the history of philosophy and the derivation of the philosophical history of Heidegger.

The history of Western Europe in its most essential aspects.

The New Beginning will be open if we believe Heidegger, if we follow him, if we adopt a new way of thinking and philosophizing. But if we think carefully about the scale of the philosophical action that is proposed to be carried out, we become uneasy because of the fundamental nature of the task to be accomplished. To move to a new Beginning means to stop living the history of the West, the history of the evening, to collapse not only metaphysics, but also the very source, the primordial source of Greek thinking about the being, ἀλήθεια - truth and φύσις at a very deep level, under the layers of Latin, scholastic and modern philosophical concepts that continue to predetermine the root foundations of Western thinking, Western logic, Western consciousness, not to mention culture, science, education, sociality, politics and economics.

Heidegger proposes a total overcoming of the West and the the beginning of a new history, a new existence, a new humanity (a new humanism). However, he does not point backwards or look for alternatives in other cultures and other epochs. His invitation is this: it is necessary to accept the Western Seynsgeschichte as our destiny, to realize the inevitability and validity of each of its stages, to decipher them, to grasp the message of Seyn-existence, which is indirectly contained in the coming of night and the realm of total nihilism. It is necessary to concentrate especially on the primary roots of Western philosophy at the time of its first Beginning and to take a step further, a step further into the abyss, in order to instantly and radically transfer the initiative of truth to Seyn-existence itself in its purest form.

TRANSITION

Here is what Heidegger himself writes about the transition to another Beginning: "In preparing for the transition from the End of the first Beginning to another Beginning, man enters not only into a never-before-existing "period" but into an entirely new realm of history (Geschichte). The end of the first Beginning will be for a long time to come

overcome in this transition, and even in the other Beginning itself"⁽⁶²⁾.

And further: "This transition is the opening for the leap by means of which the Beginning, and to an even greater extent the other Beginning, can begin. Here, in this transition, the primordial and therefore "most historical" (*geschichtlichste*) decision is prepared - an either/or decision from which no burrows or secret places can be hidden: either to remain imprisoned by the End and its last consequences, i.e. the renewed modifications of "metaphysics". i.e. the renewed modifications of "metaphysics", which are becoming coarser and coarser, more and more meaningless (the new "Biologism", etc.), or to begin a new Beginning, i.e. to resolve to its long preparation.

And since the Beginning occurs only in a leap, this preparation for it must also be a leap, and as such it must proceed from and recoil from the confrontation with the first Beginning and its history (*Geschichte*). (...)

In the other Beginning all being will be sacrificed to Seyn-existence, and only by virtue of this will being as such receive for the first time its truth."⁽⁶³⁾.

EREIGNIS

Heidegger explicitly points to what is the main obstacle to such a transition: *human reason* (ratio). Reason in its *representational* quality is an obstacle to fundamental-ontological thinking.

Seyn-existence in the other Beginning is not physical (and is apprehended not as meta-physics). It is thought of *in* a radically different way: through the simultaneous grasping and holding of it as *being of being* and *nothingness at the same time*. In doing so, it is wrong to think of it as something that must *always* be (it is wrong to think of Seyn-being through permanence). *Seyn-being*, Heidegger clarifies, is *not being at all*, it *exists* (Seyn *west*), i.e. it *abides in essence*. This means that it is not permanent and unchanging, but, on the contrary, it is rare, it happens, it comes true, it is unique.

This is the fundamental ontological nerve of the other Initiation: it grasps Seyn-being as *Er-eignis* (literally: "event"⁽⁶⁴⁾).

To explain the term "Er-eignis"⁽⁶⁵⁾, Heidegger uses an artificial syncretism: although etymologically the term "Ereignis" is derived from "Er-augen", where the meaning of the root is "Auge" - "eye", broader, in Old German - "sight", "notice", Heidegger interprets this term as consonant with "eigene", i.e. "own", "sub-linear", "authentic" - "Er-eigene". i.e., "own," "sub-linear," "authentic,"⁽⁶⁶⁾ - "Er-eigene. Ereignis is conceived by Heidegger in two ways: as a unique one-time (seynsgeschichtliche) event in which Seyn-being instantly reveals itself in its truth, and as an instantaneous transition from a non-authentic mode of existention to an authentic one, and consequently to being (Sein) and existence in essence (Wesen).

The Seynsgeschichtliche horizon of Heidegger's philosophy is centered on Ereignis. Ereignis is the culmination of the history of being, because at this moment the whole process of Seyn- geschichte is revealed in its true dimension: as the narrative of being about itself in a reversed (reverted) form - in the form of the oblivion of the question of being (Seinsverlassenheit) and the triumph of nihilism. Ereignis is directly related to the fact that the whole cycle of Western European philosophy is at a certain point grasped in its true proportions and fundamental-ontological meanings. And this grasping, this comprehension, forms the precondition for the invasion of Seyn-being as it is - this time not through the duration in which it is hidden, but through the moment in which it is revealed.

Heidegger uses the metaphor of *maturity*, ripeness, to describe Ereignis. Seyn-being in Ereignis becomes a fruit and a gift. At the same time, Ereignis, turned to the future and having its instantaneous place there, is also present in the former insofar as the former was, i.e. correlated with being (Seyn). Ereignis thus becomes the moment that orients the unfolding of the historical (geschichtliche) process, which gives rise to the eschatology of being. Heidegger writes about this in a text on Anaximan-dru: "Being of being is gathered (λέγεσθαι, λόγος) in the last moment of its destiny (Geschick). The former existence of being collapses in its still hidden truth. The history of being is gathered in this parting. Assemblage

in this farewell - as the harvest (λόγος) of the ultimate (ἔσχατον) expression of its former existence constitutes the eschatology of being. Being as *seynsgeschichtliche* (sent) is eschatological⁽⁶⁷⁾.

Er-eignis is thus an eschatological event. In it, the evening fruit of the fatal question formulated in the first Beginning falls into the hands of the one who is ready to cross the point of the great midnight and come out on the other side, on the side of the morning. Heidegger believes that the salvation of the West, which was the first to embark on the trajectory of ontological philosophy and metaphysics, the first among all others to reach the critical point (the End of Philosophy) of cultures, must take place in the West itself and be realized by it. Having assumed the fatalism of the first choice, in the second Beginning the new philosophy must make a new choice, and, repulsed by its tragic history, concentrate on the problem of Seyn-being, preparing or expecting Er-eignis as the final fulfillment of being.

Er-eignis is the key word of the New Beginning. This is the other Beginning in its fundamental-ontological essence.

"Seyn-existence exists as an event" ("Das Seyn west als Ereignis"), writes Heidegger⁽⁶⁸⁾.

LAST GOD

The eschatology of being leads Heidegger to introduce a figure to which, to my knowledge, few have paid serious attention. He sets forth speculations about the *last God* (der letzte Gott).

Heidegger says the following about him:

"The Last God.

It is the coming in the coming that, constituted, happens as an event. Parish as the essence of being.

Ask Seyn-existence itself! And in its silence as the Beginning of the word, God will answer.

You can get around all of existence, but you will never hit the mark of God."

In German, it sounds like this:

"Der letzte Gott.

Das Kommendste in Kommen, das austragend sich als Er-
eignis ereignet.

Das Kommen als Wesen des Seyns.

Frage das Seyn! Und in dessen Stille als der Anfang des Wortes
antwortet Gott.

Alles Seiende mögt ihr durchstreifen, nirgends zeigt sich der Spur
des Gottes"⁽⁶⁹⁾.

"Frage das Seyn!" - "Turn to being, ask being (Seyn)!"

The very structure of the text makes it clear that this is a kind of prophecy, a fundamental-ontological vision by which the history of philosophy is initiated, established and postulated in a completely new cycle. It is a prophecy of a unique event that must take place strictly at the moment of the Great Midnight.

The Last God is a unique figure in Heidegger's philosophy. He appears through Ereignis, passes by people, leaving them only a *nod*, a hint (Wink). He is neither the being nor the creator of being, but he manifests himself at the moment when being as Seyn is realized in a one-time event.

Heidegger writes: "In the being of the Wink, Seyn- being itself comes to its maturity. Maturity is the readiness to become fruit and to be given. In this there is the last, which is essentially (*wesentliche*), from the Beginning revived, the End that does not happen by chance. In this the deepest finitude of Seyn-existence is revealed: in the nod of the last God"⁽⁷⁰⁾. And further: "The Last God is not the end, but another Beginning of the immeasurable possibilities of our destiny (*Geschichte*)"⁽⁷¹⁾.

The Last God is a mysterious figure. Heidegger is careful to distinguish him from the characters of all known religions. But it is not an empty individual image or metaphor. In Heidegger, who denied both religion and atheism on the grounds of their total dependence on the philosophical topics of the first Beginning, i.e. ontology and metaphysics, one can see hints of a very peculiar theory of divinity.

The last God. He does not say so directly, but we can try to reconstruct the course of his thought leading to the introduction of the existence of the last God in his eschatology.

Heidegger mainly thinks of another Initiation, which should follow a different scenario (than the first Initiation) and lead to Ereignis. The first Beginning was the Beginning of the transition from ontic to philosophical and onto- logical thinking. But the ancient Greeks who founded the first Beginning believed in gods. Heidegger is not interested in the structure of ancient Greek religion; he is interested in how the philosophical consciousness of the Greeks, making the leap into the abyss, conceived of gods and divinity. Most importantly, gods are not being, but they are not being either. Furthermore, gods are not human, not human at all. Gods, according to Heidegger, however, need Seyn-being to fix their divinity. They are neither *essence* nor *non-essence*. The main property of the gods is lightness. In addition, gods are indifferent to humans; they neither save nor punish them. The gods pass by people, but this happens only when people turn to the being of their humanity and sufficiently honor being as Seyn through it. Then people are attuned to the *sacred*. And the *sacred* gives place to the *divine*. And the divine allows the gods to gather in a tingle around the hearth of Seyn-being. People who are responsible for being must, unlike other beings, structure this responsibility faithfully and serve being. And this will enable the gods to appear. If man replaces Seyn-being with Sein-being, metaphysics, ontology, the will to power, and, finally, Machenschaft, the easy gods will easily fly away without leaving a trace, will depart, because nothing connects them to anything human. The gods flee from Platonism, theism, deism, atheism, i.e., from everything that "deliberately imposes" on the *being* knowingly and prevents Seyn-being from shining through and illuminating the being, where the gods could gather around this luminescence.

In the *first Beginning*, the Greeks thought of the gods through being. Heraclitus wrote that "ethos is the god of man"; justified to curious strangers that he was warming himself by the hearth "because the gods live there too"; saw in the *struggle* the beginning that makes gods gods and men men men.

Parmenides was dedicated by the goddess of justice, Dica. The gods and goddesses were arranged around the first honored one by philosophers of being, concealed and manifested. They were extremely important for thinking, for man, constituting his subtle and paradoxical pair at the opposite end of being. Gods and men are the two poles of the most complex, silent, poetic, thinking dialog about Seyn- being.

Thinking of being as being *as a whole*, of *essence*, of *idea* frightened the gods. There was nothing for them to do where people had made everything clear. The gods are found only in supplicatory questioning and solemn singing.

Heidegger's final God is a God who returns in the unfolding of *another Beginning*. He does not come as a savior. He walks by. But he gives a sign, a slight nod of the head, an almost invisible gesture, like that of an antique judge or basileus when deciding an important matter. The more serious the decision, the shorter, more imperceptible and more significant the gesture. That is why the last God does not come, he passes by. He gives nothing to people, he does not change anything. He assures only that the Beginning this time is indeed the Beginning or, more precisely, perhaps the Beginning. Thus the mature Ereignis receives a subtle, imperceptible and unnecessary certification. The event has come true. In the silence, the new sacredness and the reverence of the people, the place is reclaimed for the last God to pass.

Where the final God is concerned, Heidegger speaks in poetic language. He expresses himself in deliberately vague and paradoxical terms, expecting that in the realm of the ultimate penetration into the possibility of the other Beginning, the mind is attuned to grasp the subtlest hints.

"The Last God is the Beginning of the longest destiny (Geschichte) along the shortest path. Long preparation is necessary for the great moment of its passing by. For this preparation, peoples and countries are too small, closed to true growth and devoted to Machenschaft.

Only the great and hidden solitudes will prepare silence for the passing of God and prepare a silent attitude among themselves."⁽⁷²⁾

MAN IN ANOTHER BEGINNING (NEW HUMANISM)

Heidegger, following Nietzsche, calls these "great hidden solitudes" "the future" (die Künftige). Heidegger describes the fundamental-ontological understanding of man in detail in his famous letter on humanism to the French philosopher Jean Beaufre⁽⁷³⁾.

The content of this oft-quoted text will become clearer if we localize the place of the human being in the structure of Heidegger's philosophy. Heidegger rejects humanism, like other versions of Western European philosophy, because of its direct dependence on metaphysical topics. He has no interest in such humanism. He is interested in man and the human in the structure of the Beginning (both the first and the *other*).

Man is a gap in being through which being bursts in, blowing up being and man himself. This is what he is in his relation to being. Only this relation of man to being is his essence. Everything else - animalness, rationality, spirituality, soulfulness, psychology, sociality, ethnicity - is secondary for him. Man is man only in his essence, in what he is, which means that he is man through his relation (Bezug) to being.

Whoever does not think about being or thinks in the wrong way, whoever clogs the questioning with self-meaning chatter, whoever does not know how to be surprised and horrified, whoever does not feel the problems of being "abandoned" in being, whoever does not assert the highest freedom in noble thinking or quiet sacred work, renounces his humanity, loses it. Heidegger's new humanism is therefore an exceptional humanism, where human dignity is measured by the measure of complicity in a fundamental-ontological act, in the questioning of Seyn-being, in the preparation of Ereignis and the expectation of the "passing" of the last God.

Heidegger calls such a person - the future human being - "the guardian of being" (Wächter des Seins) or "the passerby of being" (Hirt des Seins). Man is intimately connected with being, but he is also independent of it. Being needs-

is in man, not in order to be (a non-human being can also be being, through which being is), but to be.

to prepare in the midst of things a place for its luminosity, for the light of its truth. Man is this place. If the place is proper, sacred, it is suitable for sacred action, for illumination, for the unconcealment (truth) of being; if it is not proper, man and humanity become the world's garbage dump (as at the end of the New Age, i.e. today).

A man worthy of being a man is a man alternative to the man we understand by that name today, a man who remains under the oppression of ontology and its nihilistic derivatives. Both Nietzsche's "last men" (the majority) and his superhuman (expressing the maximization of the will for power and domination) remain within the framework of the *old humanism*. Heidegger redraws them with fatigue and sadness. With this, there is no entrance to the "future". Man is only the bearer of the questioning of being, of its truth, of its remoteness and of the possibility of its return through the *event* and the last God. He who is not the bearer of all this is not man. At the very least, he falls outside the boundaries of Heideggerian humanism, the *humanism of the other Beginning*.

Man is defined by his relation to being. The notion that man possesses being as something permanent, guaranteed, and relates to being in general through his being as a human being is a fallacy of metaphysics that must be categorically discarded in the other Beginning. Heidegger writes: "Seyn-existence for man is an accident (Zu-Fall), the fact that man is realized in Seyn-existence does not depend on him and in no way means that Seyn-existence has any obligations towards man, as if it needed him"⁽⁷⁴⁾. And a little higher: "Seyn-existence does not exist for man, but man exists, at best, for Seyn-existence; for Seyn-existence in the sense that in this way man would win for himself his own essence"⁽⁷⁵⁾.

The fact that man is not just a *being*, but a *place where being invades*, is inherent in his capacity for speech. Speech is not

is simply one of the properties of man. It is no accident that the latter is called "ζῷον λόγον ἔχον," "an animal endowed with speech." Speech is not a property of man at all; it is a property of being. Through speech, being exists. Speech is that through which being exists as being. Therefore, in the perspective of the new humanism, man must speak differently.

He must turn to words and realize what they communicate to him. And then he must begin to think and speak with what he has realized. But in order for this new speech to be born - the speech of the other Beginning, the speech of the *future* (die *Kunftige*) - it is necessary to first organize the "destruction" of the old language, based on the rules of grammar and logic, i.e. on the rules of metaphysical thinking of the first Beginning.

The *new humanism* presupposes a new speech, because in speech, in language, lies the destiny of being, the supreme moment of Seynsge-Uh-huh.

The new man of the other Beginning will speak in a new language and new thoughts and things. Everything he will talk about will be directly related to the essence of being, i.e. to the way in which this being exists in its illumination. It will be the fundamental-ontological speech of Ereignis' anthropology. Only such a speech will be able to utter the sacred silence in which the "passing" of the last God becomes possible.

CHAPTER 8

**SEYNSGESCHICHTE h onfthŠh)eqjhe hdenftnchh uu
bej`.**

THE FUNDAMENTAL-ONTOLOGICAL METHOD AND ITS FIELD OF APPLICATION

After a general excursion into the structure of Heidegger's thinking, it is easy to understand that in Western European metaphysics he is interested only in the most fundamental things, which concentrated the relation of this metaphysics to being (Sein) as being-in-its-principle, or second-order being, and, accordingly, the progressive removal from Seyn-being, which implied, at a certain stage, the oblivion of ontological problems as such (Seinsverlassenheit). Therefore, the applied issues of this metaphysics - theology, gnoseology, humanism, axiology, epistemology, philosophy of science, philology, ethics, and even more so political philosophy - had no independent significance for Heidegger, being particular cases of the application of the basic principles of this metaphysics.

However, whenever Heidegger had to pass judgment on these private questions, he had to trace them back to metaphysical origins, and in some cases he had to outline prospects for the direction in which the relevant schools of thought and fields of culture should be interpreted in a fundamentally ontological way. This means that Heidegger, along with his critique of the particular moments of Western European metaphysics, sketched out ways of radically reinterpreting the relevant themes in the *other Beginning*.

This twofold operation of elevating a particular subject under consideration to the general context of the Western-

European ontology and the attempt to interpret it alternatively from the perspective of fundamental ontology constitute the main procedure of transition to another Beginning, and therefore the main methodological technique of Heidegger's philosophy. This methodology, in its first gesture, is "phenomenological destruction"⁽⁷⁶⁾, which Heidegger understood not negatively, in the direct sense of the word "destruction", but rather as "disassembly", "un-creation" in the opposite direction of what has been artificially "created", as the return of the statement to its original context in the structure of metaphysics. In French structuralism, Heidegger's operation of "destruction" was later renamed "deconstruction" (J. Derrida).

The second gesture of Heidegger's "phenomenological destruction" is more complex, since it consists in relating the theme elevated to a metaphysical context to the question of Seyn-existence, i.e., placing it in the Beginning (either the first or the new). This means removing the theme sought from the context of Western European philosophy and incorporating it into a radically new fundamental-ontological context. It does not appear as something that already exists, but as something that is actually created, composed in the course of the operation of relating a thing, a question, an object or a phenomenon directly to Seyn-existence. If the new basic-mental-ontological context were known, given, this operation would be only a technical problem. But it is not given, it is only set as the horizon of a possible, but not guaranteed, new Beginning. This Beginning can begin, and when it does, it will be precisely the realization of a total revision of concepts, words, themes, fields of science, disciplines, things and thoughts. However, if we grasp the essence of Heidegger's method⁽⁷⁷⁾, we will be able to carry out this operation independently and, in particular, to correctly decipher and extend even Heidegger's own indirect hints concerning certain problems that he touched upon in a cursory and ad hoc manner.

In this way we can sketch a picture of Heidegger's attitude towards modern political ideologies, which as a

However, the seynsgeschichtliche approach to this topic will clarify much about the history of the modern world and provide crucial clues to deciphering the true history of the twentieth century. However, a seynsgeschichtliche approach to this topic will clarify much about the history of the modern world and provide crucial clues to deciphering the true history of the twentieth century.

AMERICANISM AND THE PLANETARY IDIOCY OF LIBERALS

The twentieth century knew three major political ideologies: liberalism, communism, and fascism. In one way or another, Heidegger commented on each of them. These references, although fragmentary and unsystematized (Heidegger himself was never interested in the sphere of ideologies as a priority), nevertheless have a certain independent significance.

All ideologies, according to Heidegger, and this naturally follows from the preceding considerations, are manifestations of modern nihilism and express only one thing: the triumph of τέχνη ("technē"), "forgetting of being," "deliberate self-binding," "will to power," and Machenschaft. All three political ideologies are the maximum expressions of total nihilism; they are the nocturnal ideologies in which Western European thought reaches its bottom. They are not simply forms of "false consciousness," as defined by the Marx's "ideology", they express the falsity of consciousness as ontological and metaphysical consciousness. Moreover, these ideologies operate with metaphysics in the New Age edition, and, consequently, in them the most primitive and miserable idols of "subject-object" pairs are put in the place of the essence of being, being as a whole, the idea or God.

Liberalism identifies the Cartesian subject with the individual and the pragmatic calculations produced by his rationality in the realm of calculable material and non-material objects (mainly commodities). Heidegger calls this "Americanism" and understands it as the highest expression of capitalism. There is nothing more vile and despicable than this degeneration of philosophy, for here nihilism reaches such a degree of intensity that one does not even realize what nihilism is. At a certain point, night becomes so familiar that it no longer identifies itself as night.

The calculating reason that underlies liberalism and its values is the last stage in the degeneration of Western European ontology. There is nowhere lower to go.

The roots of liberalism as a fatal lethal pandemic are to be found in Europe, but this political phenomenon took its final form in the United States. While philosophically insignificant, it grows to global proportions, forming the phenomenon of the "gigantic", which becomes more and more "vast" as its meaning and significance, its ontological content, shrinks to microscopic dimensions. The planned growth of liberalism is the same as the spread of widespread dementia.

Heidegger calls this phenomenon "planetarism" (today we speak of "globalism" "mondialism"), identifying it with global "idiocy". In essence, it is nothing but the "desertification" of which Nietzsche wrote ("the desert grows, woe to him who carries the desert in himself"⁽⁷⁸⁾). Heidegger writes: "The highest unfolding of the essence of power (power in the Nietzschean sense, Macht) does not manifest itself in the form of the previously known desertification and loss of roots, but in the norm of the direct opposite of this desertification and uprooting. The historically fixed signs of the full realization of the very essence of power are embodied in two phenomena: "planetarism" ("globalism") and "idiocy". "Planetarism" ("globalism") means the extension of the essence of power (Machtwesen) to the whole earth, not as a result of expansion, but as the beginning of a special form of planetary domination. "Idiotism" (ἰδιότης⁽⁷⁹⁾) means the supremacy over everything of the egoistic principle, which expresses the extreme form of the subject-iveness"⁽⁸⁰⁾.

Reading these lines, one might think that they were written not in 1938, but in our days.

The man of the global world, the liberal who accepts and recognizes the normativity of the "American way of life" is a man who is philosophically and etymologically a patent idiot, an idiot with a document, an idiot who carries his meaninglessness above him like a banner.

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Liberalism embodies New Age metaphysics in its driest, most primitive, yet purest form. One can treat the New Age and its philosophy in different ways, even if one is inseparably and consciously associated with it. One can try to build a critical theory in an attempt to transcend the alienation inherent in it (Marxism). One can try to go deep into the roots of the problem, courageously recognizing the reality of the situation, facing nihilism head-on (German philosophy at its peak, from Hegel with his "negativity" to Nietzsche). Or one can express the basic nerve of this metaphysics with a minimum of effort, surrendering oneself to the element of alienation, naively solidarizing with it, saying a knowing and obedient "yes" to it, without even caring much about what this "yes" is saying. This last option is Anglo-Saxon liberalism and Americanism. It is the most terrible and fatal. It represents the final choice in favor of rejection of the *other Beginning*, such a degree of oblivion of *being* that even the very fact of oblivion is forgotten. It is nihilism in its highest expression, when the very realization of nihilism as nihilism becomes impossible.

The planetary power of idiocy (idiots) is not mere violence and exploitation of one people by another. It is a violence of pure nihilism, to which everyone is a victim, both those who exercise it and those who obey it. The narcissistic planetary idiots stand closer to *nothing* not when they are deprived of something or subjected to violence, but when they are in comfort, security and the illusion of complete subjective freedom. In this case, the power of the *Machenschaft* over them is absolute and their dehumanization reaches its limit. The idiot of the global market society is an ex-human who has fallen into an element of *nothingness* that he simply does not notice.

METAPHYSICS OF COMMUNISM: MACHENSCHAFT

Marxism, according to Heidegger, is more complicated. Unlike liberalism, Marxism carries with it a serious philosophical energy drawn from the German classics.

Heideggerian philosophy (in Hegelianism) and centered around the problem of alienation. It is this moment of Marxism, according to Heidegger, that made it so appealing and successful.

The discovery of the problem of alienation is the nerve of the whole process of Western European history (*Geschichte*). This history is the history of alienation. Recognizing this and focusing on it is an appeal to the *truth of Seynsgeschichte*. In this respect, Marxism is a philosophical challenge that must be taken seriously. By interpreting history as the accumulation of the qualitative properties of alienation, Marx hits the spot and touches the essence of truth. If one thinks from this point on, any judgment of the thinker takes on meaning and weight. The *Seynsgeschichte* of the *first Beginning* to the *End* is a process of alienation of thought from *Seyn-being*, of *forgetting about being* (*Seinsverlassenheit*). This is what predetermines the logic and structure of all cultural, social, political, ideological and economic processes. Marxism puts it at the center of its attention and, consequently, wins its place in the history of thought.

But here the limitations of Hegelian philosophy itself come into play. Hegel quite rightly sees history as the history of philosophy and, moreover, as the history of the Idea. But he remains entirely within the framework of the *first Initiation* and classical ontology and cannot come to a correct formulation of the question of *Seyn-being* (*Grundfrage*) precisely for these reasons. Hegel thinks within the *τέχνη* element by means of philosophical concepts and by relying on the Platonic understanding of the idea as the *essence of being*. He remains within the framework of Western European metaphysics, although he brings it closer to the End, by the scope, piercing and totality of his thought, summarizing in his doctrine all its main points.

Marx inherits this peculiarity from Hegel, while remaining faithful to the metaphysical topics of the New Age: he thinks in the categories of subject (society, class), object (matter, commodity, object), time (as an objective phenomenon), and so on. Marxism proposes to overcome the problem of alienation - *Machenschaft* - by means of *Ma*-itself.

chenschaft. Bourgeois ideology (the false consciousness of one class) is opposed to proletarian ideolo- (false consciousness of another class). The sphere of struggle is transferred to the sphere of industrial and commodity production. Thinking in the categories of the subject (this time collective, in the person of society) is completely preserved. This path, which begins with a statement of alienation, can only lead to the aggravation of alienation.

Heidegger captures this fully in Soviet Russia, where the structure of Marxist philosophy is translated into socio-economic and political practice. Industrialization, technical development, the totalitarian mobilization of Soviet communist society, the struggle for political power and geopolitical dominance are all clear signs that communism is not the overcoming of Western European metaphysics, but the last (and brightest) expression of its destiny (*Geschichte*). At the same time, communism is more faithful to the essence of *Machenschaft* than all other political ideologies. Communism is *Machenschaft* in its purest form, and is therefore the destiny of Western European philosophy and a highly eschatological phenomenon. Communism is the extreme expression of a metaphysics that affirms the total domination of *the essence of being* over *things*. And if in the Beginning this is expressed in the idea, in the End it is expressed in power, in might and in the highest and most distinct form of *Machenschaft*. *Machenschaft* is the total domination over *being* by what is thought of as its essence, which, in terms of New Age metaphysics, can be described as "the objectivity of the objective" or "the materiality of the material". Communism is not the power of some over others, whatever class they belong to, but the power of power over all. It is the highest form of the disembodied power of pure objectivity. This is why Heidegger writes that "there is nothing 'human' in communism anymore"⁽⁸¹⁾.

"The essence of communism is the pure legitimization (*Ermächtigung*) of power (*Macht*) in and through the unconditionality of the *Machenschaft*"⁽⁸²⁾.

Communism is pure New Age metaphysics in the form of its End. But recognized as metaphysics it is

can only be in the optics of *fundamental-ontology*, which captures the *seynsgeschichtliche* meaning of the phenomenon, correctly deciphers it, understands its non-randomness, predetermination, fate and fatality, and only by recognizing under this total oblivion of *being* the voice of being itself, makes known its true relation to the insufficiency of the thought of being, pushing back from being, through the ruthless and total domination of *Machenschaft* over being. To overcome and defeat communism, according to Heidegger, is possible only by understanding it.

As two extreme expressions of Western European metaphysics and two versions of the *Machenschaft*, embodying the extreme stages of nihilism and the very spirit of the End, i.e., as natural, justified, and fateful forms, Americanism (liberalism, planetary idiocy) and communism (Soviet Bolshevism) are opponents of the *fundamental-ontological* transition to another Beginning. They embody a different solution - the solution to remain faithful to Western European metaphysics not just until the End, but also after the End, when the End as such is fixed, recognized and correctly interpreted by German (Old European, not American or Soviet) New Age philosophy in its last edition. Therefore, only the return of the phenomena of the End to their end, i.e. the final destruction of liberalism and communism, will be the manifestation of the reality of humanity's *leap* into another Beginning and the dawn of the return of existence.

Heidegger is convinced that liberalism and Bolshevism cannot be defeated by purely technical means, because we are dealing with metaphysical and ontological phenomena that can be defeated in the space of metaphysics and ontology. Therefore, the main task in their destruction is to bring them to their secret essence, to their ontological roots, and thus to liberate their true nihilistic meaning. And in this respect, Heidegger utters a phrase that has become truly prophetic of the political fate of the twentieth century: "The danger lies not in 'Bolshevism' but *in ourselves*."⁽⁸³⁾

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE THIRD WAY

We have come close to the political positions of Heidegger, who understood his place in the history of thought, indeed in the *Seynsgeschichte*, as something directly linked to Germany. He understood his ethnic and cultural roots metaphysically, as belonging to the German philosophical and poetic tradition. The very *fact of thinking in German* was of the utmost importance to him, because, according to his views, *language is the house of being*, and whether this house is German, Greek, Latin, English, French, Russian, Semitic, etc. depends to a large extent on the nature of man's relationship with *being*. German philosophy is the German way to *Seyn-being*, which Heidegger often emphasized with regard to German philosophy (echoing Hegel's words that "a great nation must have a great philosophy"), German culture, and poetry (the highest expression of which he considered Hölderlin's poetry).

Germanic philosophy is linked to the *fate of Seyn-existence* as much as the Greek. But everything began with the Greeks, and everything ends with the Germans. That is why Hegel and Nietzsche, according to Heidegger, are the last philosophers who realized the End of Philosophy earlier, better and more clearly than the others. Those who realized the end opened the way to another Beginning. This is why the latter - the Germans - are so in tune with the former (the ancient Greeks and especially the pre-Socratics). The Germans - Heidegger himself and the other "future" Germans - have the mission of starting philosophy anew. For Heidegger, therefore, the fate of the West and of Europe as a whole came down to the fate of Germany. Hence Heidegger's fundamental-ontological patriotism; a patriotism that rejects nationalism, collective egoism, and other forms of superiority based on metaphysical notions of subjectivity. Heidegger sees Germany and Germans as *Seyn-existence*, the language of thought and poetry, the nation of those "few," the "rarest," who are able to question the *truth of Seyn-existence*. Heideggerian patriotism is the patriotism of the "basic question of philosophy," the patriotism of the Grundfrage. Being German, it is also European, Western, and, moreover, patriotic.

by the tism of all mankind who have entered the path of evening and reached the point of midnight.

In concrete political geography, during Heidegger's lifetime, Germany (Europe) as a center of philosophical thinking was pinched from both sides by two derivative forms of Western European metaphysics: from the West, "Americanism", more broadly Anglo-Saxon liberalism ("planetary idiocy"); from the East, Soviet Bolshevism, Marxism, *Machenschaft* in its most open and totalitarian form. Metaphysically, both corresponded to a mindset that ignored (liberalism) or misinterpreted the End discovered by German philosophy and chose to continue what had ended after that End. Europe was hit twice by the final incarnation of the first Beginning in its final form, the totalitarian and planetary pre-mineration of τέχνη.

Europe (and Germany as its philosophical eschatology) was the place where *Sein und Zeit* was written, published and read. Europe was the place where *Sein und Zeit* was written, published and read. Heidegger was therefore in the camp of those forces in Europe that thought deeply about its identity, that sought to penetrate its *Seynsgeschichte*, that wished to follow its philosophical destiny to the End, at the End, and beyond the End to *another Beginning*. Moreover, these forces, by definition, had to be immersed in the spirit of German culture and philosophy, or at least to be aware of the meaning and content of this spirit. Finally, these forces were in radical opposition to American (Anglo-Saxon) liberalism and Soviet Bolshevism, not for political but for metaphysical reasons: before moving on to the possible preparation of *another Beginning*, it was necessary to put an end to that which persisted in ignoring the fact of the consummation of the End after it had taken place. Heidegger was not only logically in the camp of these forces, but, in a certain sense, he was the philosophical pole, the center and nucleus of these forces in a fundamental-ontological and philosophical sense. Heidegger, through his thinking, constituted these forces.

On formal grounds, the political ideologies of the Third

Way are to a certain extent corresponded to this metaphysical position. They were patriotic, pro-European, anti-liberal and anti-communist. They turned to roots and origins deeper than the New Age, claiming to revitalize the European heritage. The philosophies of Hegel and Nietzsche were placed in the category of the highest achievements of thought. The absence of rigid dogmatism and systematicity allowed for a variety of epistemological and philosophical models and hypotheses to be proposed within these movements. An eschatological sense of the critical turning point of world history - with the vivid experience of World War I, a brutal awareness of the planetary advance of technology, and a keen suspicion of the proximity of the "Sunset of Europe" (Spengler) - completed the picture.

These tendencies were most fully represented in the ideological current of the "Conservative Revolution"⁽⁸⁴⁾, which included such thinkers as Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, Othmar Spann, Thomas Mann, Ernst and Friedrich Jünger, Arthur Müller van den Broek, Prince von Gleichen, Ernst Salomon, Friedrich Hilsher, Ernst Nikisch, Ludwig Klages, and hundreds of other prominent German intellectuals, thinkers, poets, and artists. Heidegger was, for all intents and purposes, an organic part of this movement, in its systems of connections and contacts, its lines of thought and political sympathies. He was a "conservative revolutionary" in the sense that, in his understanding, man was called upon to be a "guardian of being" (and in this sense a "conservative" *Seyn-being*) and at the same time to take a risky *leap into another Beginning* (a "revolutionary" moment, a future orientation).

In a sense, the Conservative Revolution in Germany and its counterparts in other European countries, in particular Italy, Spain, etc., were the ideological milieu in which the political ideologies of the Third Way - fascism and national socialism - emerged. At the same time, it can be argued that the main object of criticism by the Conservative Revolutionaries was the spirit of modernity itself and its most vivid manifestations: individualism, rationalism, and the socialist ideology of the Third Way.

nalism, utilitarianism, dogmatism, materialism, subjectivism - in a word, *nihilism* and *Machenschaft*. At the same time, the political ideology of National Socialism and Fascism, partly based on the ideas of the Conservative Revolution (anti-liberalism, anti-communism, anti-utilitarianism, etc.), carried to a great extent the features of the New World itself.), carried to a great extent the features of the same New Age against which the main criticism of the Conservative Revolution was directed: hence its political pragmatism (even opportunism), its preoccupation with practice and technology, industrialization and militarization of the economy, subjectivism (of nation or race), intellectual sluggishness, primitive racist dogmatism and many other features of typical New Age metaphysics.

The bearers of the spirit of the Conservative Revolution saw liberalism and communism (the U.S. and the USSR) as their greatest enemies, and any form of solidarity with them, even relative, was out of the question. But also the ideologies of the Third Way - in the form in which they were embodied in the German and Italian political regimes of the 1930s and 1940s - were unacceptable to them, because they contained the principles and theses, the battle against which was the essence of the Conservative Revolution.

The most astute representatives of the Conservative Revolution, such as Ernst Nikisch, saw already from the early 1930s that Hitler's party's rise to power would be a fatal disaster for Germany, not from the perspective of liberals and communists (this was of secondary importance), but from the perspective of the ideas and principles that National Socialism was supposedly committed to upholding. This was the title of Nikisch's book: "Hitler - an Evil Fate for Germany"⁽⁸⁵⁾. Many followed Nikisch, sharing his fears, and went into the anti-Hitler underground. The rest found themselves in "internal emigration". Ernst Jünger, one of the thinkers who most fully and vividly articulated the basic ideas of the "convolutional revolution," found himself in this situation, while remaining outside the Nazi Party because he refused to compromise with the vulgarity, populism, and unprincipled pragmatism of Hitler's party.

Heidegger can be fully classified as a conservative revolutionary in "internal exile", where he found himself shortly after agreeing for pragmatic reasons to become rector of the University of Freiburg and joining the National Socialist Workers' Party. His rectorship lasted only nine months, and his ideas were soon under aggressive attack by officials of Hitler's regime. But despite his open criticism of many fundamental aspects of Nazi ideology in his speeches of the 1930s and 1940s, Heidegger remained committed to his decision until 1945, continued to wear his party badge, and shared the fate of his people and the political regime they had chosen.

The whole drama, the whole depth of the paradox of the Conservative Revolution's relation to National Socialism is expressed in Heidegger's words, uttered at the very beginning of World War II, when the clash with Bolshevism became inevitable: "The danger lies not in 'Bolshevism' but *in ourselves*.⁽⁸⁶⁾ . This meant that the impending war with the USSR was, in Heidegger's eyes, not just a military competition between two powers for vital interests or access to natural resources, not just a grandiose battle for planetary power, but a clash of two beginnings, where Marxist metaphysics (Machenschaft) was to be opposed by the "quiet force of possibility" - the possibility of another beginning. But until Germany itself and National Socialism realized the fundamental-ontological significance of its own historical (seynsgeschichtliche) mission, until they themselves freed themselves from mass, from rationalism, from τέχνη, from the old metaphysics of Europe, from the same Machenschaft, this battle could not be won, because it was not the battle it should have been.

The gap between the Conservative Revolution and the political-

The nerve of twentieth-century political history, when viewed from a Heideggerian perspective, was the nerve of Third Way movements. The Third Way movements were the nerve of twentieth-century political history from a Heideggerian perspective.

In the Revolution (on being, the meaning of true history, the spiritual place of Europe and the West in the global cycle of metaphysics, etc.), National Socialism was profoundly and essentially inadequate. Heidegger saw in it the possibility of transformation, the possibility of raising the question of Seyn-existence, the possibility of another Beginning, but this possibility not only failed to materialize, but did not take place as a *possibility*, turned out to be ghostly and deceptive.

When philosophers and intellectuals asked after the war how Heidegger could have made such a mistake in his political choice, they did not take into account that the political ideologies that had won the war (liberalism and communism) had always been repugnant and alien to him, since they embodied what Heidegger had dreamed of burying, overcoming, closing as the final stage of history (Geschichte). In turn, history and the natural end of National Socialism only confirmed that in the case of this political regime, it was a question of substitution and parody (of an earlier and distorted simulation of another Beginning, of an imitation of Ereignis, etc.). It substituted profound existential questions for technical questions of power, control, domination, subjugation, subjugation and conquest, things and values that were the direct embodiment of the Western nihilism that Heidegger had always considered it his task to oppose.

CHAPTER 9

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METAPHYSICS OF DELAY

Clarifying the relation of Heidegger's philosophy to the political ideologies of the Third Way brings us to a very subtle problem, which can be called the "*problem of delay*".

After the End of Western European metaphysics was realized by German philosophy, formalized by Nietzsche, and interpreted by Heidegger, the seynsgeschichtliche localization of

of the "great midnight" has theoretically been realized. But does this mean that it has been achieved? This question, in which uncertainty and hesitation are evident, explains much of the paradoxes of the relationship between the Conservative Revolution and the history of the Third Reich. If the End had come and been realized, then, within the seynsgeschichtliche history of Germany as the center of European thinking at the epoch of the End, a transition to *another Beginning* and to Ereignis proper could and should have taken place. Hölderlin's prophetic visions and Hegel's philosophical predictions of a "nation of philosophers" were to culminate in something great and unprecedented.

And although at one point it seemed that it was "about to happen" and that what was happening was this *other Beginning*, in fact, it became clear once again that this possibility was ephemeral, which meant that the midnight point was again not reached. "It is always the 'still not'," as Heidegger says in the crucial text "To What Are Poets?".

The fate of Hitler's Germany and Heidegger's testimony in it, as well as his personal fate and the fate of his philosophy, show unequivocally that even this time "still not...", that the occasional winks were accepted

for the first distant rays of the coming morning, the darkness from them only became even deeper. And Heidegger's postwar writings are full of courageous despair. What should have happened - then and where it could only happen - did not happen. Again, "it still hasn't happened. Two ideologies centered on a blatant ontological nihilism - liberalism and communism - won not just a military but a philosophical victory, which is all the more significant because it was won not only from outside but also from within, since the political ideologies of *the Third Way* were unable to take the path of *the other Beginning* and therefore lost before the decisive battle began. Germany, divided in two, lost. Europe lost, occupied half by the USSR and half by the USA, as two forms of a single and infinite evil in its nothingness.

At one point, Heidegger's voice is tinged with hopelessness: technology, as the fate of the West, has taken its course, nuclear weapons are ready to destroy the earth, to level to *nothing* a world already steeped in nihilism; no one remembers the coming of night, since the memory of light (even if twilight and evening) is firmly and reliably erased. Man, in his "inauthenticity," is so caught up in *being* that he no longer understands what we *are* talking about.

In an interview with Spiegel published after his death, Heidegger says: "Apparently, only God can save us now. A revealing phrase for a thinker who always insisted that the last God is not called to save anyone: he simply comes and passes by, nodding to people who have found their vocation as "guardians of being". Now this coming of the last God is unbelievable. The very possibility of the "future" (*kunftige*) becoming "future" is closed by the totalitarian planetary power of the past - not what *was*, but what *has passed*, is *passing*, and *will pass* at the very moment when *it* comes. Which means there is no one else to sing peanuts to the coming God. And in the end, there is no one to save.

So where does this "still no" come from? Answering this question is tantamount to unraveling the mystery of the "still no".

seynsgeschichtliche background of the external and internal defeat of the Third Way, as well as the logic of the fate of the very

Martin Heidegger.

"Still not," as well as the expectation of a soon Ereignis, the breath of the nearness of *another Beginning*, the announcement of a course in fundamental-ontology-what is it? An inaccurate definition of a moment, a place, an instant? Is it an error in calculations, animations and localizations, or is it something else?

MAN OF THE BEGINNING

The way in which Heidegger himself asks the question about "still not" evokes the feeling that it *is about something else*. But what is it?

We can only wonder. Could it be that man in his classical status, i.e., as a *Western* man, constructed according to the molds of Western European metaphysics, is, by virtue of his identity, unable to come close to the point of the great midnight? Could it be that, in the sense in which man is man (in the sense of this metaphysics), he will be endlessly circling in the labyrinths of "not yet"? Could it be that this "still not" is one of the constitutive aspects of the human being? Then the great midnight will never come. For *man*, it will never come. Hence, it is man as a phenomenon that is the reason why "it is not yet". And it is not merely that he is not ready. Perhaps his essence is to postpone the *other Beginning* whenever his breath, his proximity, his fulfillment is felt. But in this case, the problem

"not yet" is resolved through a final decisive battle: between the *man of the End* (which includes the subhuman, the last man, and even the superhuman himself in the Heideggerian sense, as the supreme embodiment of *τεχνη* and the will to power) and the alternative man, the *man of the Beginning*.

The Man of the End strives to be infinite. And when it seems that he has only to extinguish with the light of all things, in his electronic *nothingness of "provoked life"* (G. Benn) he manages to multiply again and again the meaningless coils of his ridiculousness.

Pursuit of a return with an increasing degree of "planetary-idiotism" (liberalism), which (as we know after the experience of the 1990s) turned out to be only a more advanced stage of nihilism compared to the totalitarian-mass metaphysics of Bolshevism.

The *man of the End* is going to "not-be" forever, aggravating his "not-being". It cannot be ruled out that "still not" constitutes the last identity of man himself as a "delaying", "procrastinating", "delaying". Who, then, is the *man of the Beginning*? Who is he who is able to make *almost midnight into midnight*, to push the stagnant, the surging, the deep into time, the unwillingness to cut off the last moment?

It would be tempting to identify him with Nietzsche's superman, were it not for Heidegger's interpretation of the superman. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche is the fundamental thinker of the End, and he sees even the "future" as the maximization of the will to power that drives the world. Therefore, the superman, for all his metaphysical charm, is not suitable for the role of *the man of the Beginning*. The new man must relate to the old as a perpendicular to the horizontal: for him, the human in its vector is always "still not..." - both in the heroic brilliance of this "delay" and in the worn-out banality of petty subhuman cowardice. But such perpendicularity contrasts with the definition of man. If man is "still not," then no matter how he transforms himself in his identity, he will only flounder within that "still not...". And if we recall now the first Beginning and the abruptness of Heraclitean thinking, we see in it a clearly delineated horizon of what lies beyond the limits of man. It is the *logos* (whose voice is radically different from that of the thinker); it is the *daimon*, which is the ἦθος of man. Heidegger interprets Heraclitus' statement "ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων" as pointing to the "place" (ἦθος) where the deity (δαίμων) dwells as the true center of man. If anthropos is "still not," δαίμων is "already yes"! It cannot be ruled out that the late Heidegger's last desperate hope for salvation from "God" was turned to salvation from "man" as such, to salvation by "God" (δαίμων) and his "place"

(ἥθος) of *being* in the rays of *Seyn-existence* from the metaphysical contagion of man. Therefore, the man of the Beginning who is able to abolish the lingering man of the End, whose meaning and essence consist in this lingering, will be the "last God". And in this case, the "passing" of the last God will have a dramatic meaning: by saving being and illuminating the truth of *Seyn-existence*, the "last God" will bypass, in his "coming of the last God", the raving men of the End, who will struggle endlessly in the suffocating net of this endlessness. The *man of the New Beginning* can thus be already *here*, already arriving, already passing through - without the *man of the End* even realizing it. The worst end for the *man of the End* would be to make this end infinite.

But then fundamental-ontology must be constituted in some special, unique direction, without any correlation with anthropology *at all*, since any anthropology would immediately plunge us into the "*not yet*".

But someone has already gotten over that "*still not*". And midnight has taken place in him.

CHAPTER 10

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Returning to the beginning of this section, the vector of orientation of Heidegger's philosophy, its structure and eschatological orientation can be understood in a new way, taking into account the points made about Heidegger's philosophy, its structure and eschatological orientation. Heidegger saw himself as something analogous to a prophet or clairvoyant who, at the most dramatic moment in the history of the West, not only reveals the coming denouement, but sees the meaning and reason for its origin and the significance of the present moment. Whether or not we accept his "prophecy", whether or not we interpret it in one way or another, we must always remember that we are talking about a "prophecy" within the framework of Western European philosophy, and only there does it have content, meaning and significance. If we look at it from the outside, from the standpoint of non-Western European philosophy, religion, or any particular branch of that philosophy, not only the full poignancy of its message, but also its most direct and clear meaning will escape us. That is why understanding Heidegger requires a cardinal, radical rethinking of Western European philosophy, and if the previous rethinking was very approximate (which is the case with Russian philosophy), we should speak not of a rethinking, but of a responsible and correct rethinking *for the first time*. And this reflection can take place not *before the* acquaintance with Heidegger, but *in parallel* with the acquaintance with Heidegger, and even *through the* acquaintance with Heidegger.

Today we cannot say what Russian religious philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was, since the seynsge- schichtliche continuity has been lost. Even less clear to us is Soviet Marxist philosophy, which for so long was everything, only to become nothing overnight (having suffered the reverse fate of a messianic phenomenon in the historical arena of the proletariat). It seemed

If only in religion we can find a point of reference, but a large part of religion is a thought connected with the logos, i.e. theology. Whether our theology in its present disordered and uneasy state will stand up to the philosophical generalizations and "phenomenological destruction" of Heidegger's thought, we can say only after we have become properly acquainted with this thought. Not before.

Heidegger, with his surprising radicalism, with his dizzying abruptness in his statements and judgments, may therefore be a crucial stimulus in our rethinking of the West and of ourselves in the face of the West.

But at the same time, we must avoid the danger of absolutizing Heidegger and taking his every statement as a final axiom. The fate of the visionary is sad if he becomes an idol and a statue. The seer speaks about being, about life, about the gods and the fate of the world, about what is at the moment, and therefore was and will be. His words are living and are enlivened by the life of those who understand them, who meditate through them. Therefore, through a living understanding, these words and the one through whom they were expressed continue to live, and in some cases, they are just beginning to live truly. If we understand Heidegger, we can move from this understanding in any direction. Moreover, it makes no difference whether we confirm the main points of his philosophy or discover something else, such as what it does not contain, or even what contradicts it. He who lives in thought animates those who once thought.

Heidegger should be seen as a Wegmarke, as an *a road sign*, which is Greek for "μέθοδος", "method." We have a path and we have a sign. All we have to do is read it correctly. And then we are free to do as we please.

Notes

⁽¹⁾ *Heidegger M.* Einführung in die Metaphysik. Tübingen, 1953. S. 202. The work was first published in 1935.

⁽²⁾ *Jünger E.* Der Arbeiter. Herrschaft und Gestalt. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982.

⁽³⁾ He became a member of the NSDAP on May 1, 1933, and remained a member until 1945, despite serious complaints against him from the officialdom and his gradual marginalization within the regime.

⁽⁴⁾ *Farias V.* Heidegger and nazism. Philadelphia: Temple University press, 1989.

⁽⁵⁾ *Golovin E.* Approaching the Snow Queen. M., 2003.

⁽⁶⁾ Having long been engaged in the philosophy of traditionalism (in particular, see the books: A. Dugin "Absolute Homeland", "Philosophy of Traditionalism,

"I did not emphasize Heidegger's teachings, although they had the most direct and immediate impact on my intellectual formation. I owe Heidegger's philosophy, my worldview, only slightly less than that of Guénon. Heidegger is part of our worldview, our political theory, our philosophy, it is sine qua non. Heidegger is no less fundamental than Guénon. But he is different. The comparison between Heidegger and Guénon should not be made too hastily. It is necessary to thoroughly study Guénon separately and Heidegger separately. And then - only *then!* - think about where they overlap (and where they diverge). It is a mistake to interpret one from the other. The mistake of too hasty, superficial interpretation of Heidegger from traditionalist (generalized, Genonian) positions, in my opinion, was made by J. Evola in *Saddling the Tiger* (Moscow, 2005), where he presents Heidegger's ideas and terminology in an extremely incorrect and distorted way, and criticizes them even less reasonably, and even naively.

⁽⁷⁾ The German "Abgrund", i.e. "abyss", a term so important for Heidegger's philosophy, originally meant precisely "precipice", "sharp vertical slope", "abyss".

⁽⁸⁾ Nietzsche called one of his works "We are philologists" (*Nietzsche F.* Izbr. op. cit. in 3 vol. 3. M.: REFL-book, 1994). Reading Heidegger's philosophy is the work of "philologists" in the Nietzschean sense.

⁽⁹⁾ *Corben A.* The Light of Glory and the Holy Grail. Shia Grail Literature. Sufism and Sophia. Musical Sense of Islamic Philosophy // (<http://>

www.fatuma.net/text/corbin/corbin00.htm; *Ibid.* The Light Man in Iranian Sufism // Magic Mountain. 1998. No. 1; *He also.* History and Persian Mysticism. Profetic Philosophy and Metaphysics of Being. M., 1985.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Given that Corbyn was telling Europeans about Iranian thought and Heidegger was telling Europeans about their own tradition.

⁽¹¹⁾ Outside the Indo-European context, the philosophical terminology of the Jewish Kabbalah (which also comprehends the sounds, forms of letters, and meanings of basic roots) or Islamic esotericism, with its reliance on the Arabic language and the Koran, the holy book of Muslims, is equally well developed.

⁽¹²⁾ Such "abortive civilizations" (according to Toynbee's terminology) as Celtic, Letto-Lithuanian (including Prussian), Phrygian (including their descendants Romanians), as well as the vanished civilizations of Minoans, Pelasgians, Hittites, Tocharians, Scythians, Sarmatians, and Alans remain in the shadows as worldview and philosophical potentialities in the general fabric of Indo-European culture. Perhaps the reconstruction of their philosophical message is still waiting for its time.

⁽¹³⁾ V.V. *Kolesov* has a brilliant work on the roots and meanings of Old Russian words and their evolution (*Kolesov V.V.* Ancient Russia: Heritage in Words. St. Petersburg, 2000).

⁽¹⁴⁾ The works of R. Guénon and A. Corbin are of fundamental importance for the realization of this task; they will help us to understand methodologically what exactly we seek to discover in the common heritage of the Slavic and, later, Russian-Slavic cosmos.

⁽¹⁵⁾ *Heidegger M.* Geschichte des Seyns (1938/1940). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 69. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1998. S. 6.

⁽¹⁶⁾ *Heidegger M.* Über den Anfang. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 70. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 2005. S. 107.

⁽¹⁷⁾ And so did his teacher E. Husserl. For Husserl, the question "...whether European humanity carries in itself an absolute idea, whether it is an empirically fixable anthropological type, like the inhabitants of China or India; in this case, does not the Europeanization of other peoples represent the evidence of an absolute meaning that is part of the meaning of the world and far from historical meaninglessness? - is purely rhetorical: of course, "European mankind carries in itself an absolute idea" (*Husserl E.* The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. St. Petersburg, 2004). Heidegger thought the same way. Whether implicitly or explicitly, practically all Westerners are sure of it.

⁽¹⁸⁾ *Heidegger M.* Über den Anfang. Or. cit. S. 107.

⁽¹⁹⁾ Or "differAnce" (with an "a") in Derrida.

⁽²⁰⁾ *Diels H.* Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und deutsch. Berlin, 1903.

⁽²¹⁾ *Heidegger M.* Heraklit I. Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens (Heraklit) (1943); 2. Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos (1944). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 55. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1987.

⁽²²⁾ In order to emphasize the specificity of the Heideggerian understanding of the question of being, I propose to use the German form "fundamental-ontologische", which Heidegger himself uses (with the German softening of the "l" sound), in the Russian text, just as in some cases we use other Heideggerian terms, in particular, in the Russian text.

"Dasein", "Geviert", "Ge-Stell", "Das Man", leaving them untranslated to emphasize the unique meaning this philosopher invested in his carefully chosen words, which he elevated to the origins of philosophical-poetic and etymological meaning. "Fundamental-ontology" is not "fundamental ontology" but how Heidegger understands the deepest level of ontological consideration, but only within the framework of his unique doctrine of the nature and structure of Dasein (which is the focus of section 3 of Dasein and the second part of the book) and in the context of the New Beginning. In some instances he uses the expression "onto-ontology" to emphasize that fundamental-ontology is not another logically superstructured floor above onticism, but, on the contrary, a way of thinking about being that retains the constant freshness of direct contact with the ontic as a form of Dasein's existentialization.

⁽²³⁾ *Heidegger M. Sein und Zeit* (1927). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006.

⁽²⁴⁾ *Ibid.*

⁽²⁵⁾ This is the focus of the third section of this book.

⁽²⁶⁾ We will cover the topic of Ereignis a little later in this same section.

⁽²⁷⁾ The latter have no idea, as a rule, that they are thinking this way or that they are thinking at all.

⁽²⁸⁾ The difficulties of translating the word "Zeit" into its Russian equivalent "time" are discussed in detail in Section 3, "Dasein".

⁽²⁹⁾ *Heidegger M. Geschichte des Seyns*. Or. cit. S. 142.

⁽³⁰⁾ See: *Dugin A. Death and its aspects* // Dugin A. *Radical Subject and its Double*. M., 2009.

⁽³¹⁾ *Hegel G.V.F. Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. SPb.: Nauka, 1993.

⁽³²⁾ *Heidegger M. Geschichte des Seyns*. Or. cit. S. 26.

⁽³³⁾ This is discussed in detail in the next section.

⁽³⁴⁾ *Heidegger M. Der Spruch des Anaximander* // Heidegger M. *Holzwege*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 2003.

⁽³⁵⁾ *Heidegger M. Holzwege*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 2003.

⁽³⁶⁾ *Plato. Collected Works*: In 4 vol. T. 2. M.: Mysl, 1993, fragment 155 d: "A philosopher proper is one whose pathos (whose passion) is amazement (amazement - θαυμαζειν); philosophy has no other beginning."

⁽³⁷⁾ *Aristotle. Metaphysics*. M.: Eksmo, 2006, excerpt A 2 982 2 sq: "Through amazement, the way to philosophizing has been opened to man both before and now."

⁽³⁸⁾ See also: *Heidegger M. Was ist das - die Philosophie?* Pfullingen: Gunther Neske Verlag, 1956.

⁽³⁹⁾ See note (20).

⁽⁴⁰⁾ *Heidegger M. Der Spruch des Anaximander* // Heidegger M. *Holzwege*. Or. cit.

⁽⁴¹⁾ See note (20).

⁽⁴²⁾ *Aristotle. Physics* // *Collected Works*: In 4 vols. T. 3. M., 1981.

⁽⁴³⁾ In Old Slavonic and Church Slavonic there was such a word - "rheresness" meaning "truthfulness", "clarity", which is closest in meaning to the Greek ἀλήθεια, ἀληθής.

⁽⁴⁴⁾ "Im ersten Anfang, da die φύσις in die ἀλήθεια und als diese aufleuchtete, war das Er-staunen die Grundstimmung. Der andere Anfang, der des seynsgeschichtlichen Denkens, wird angestimmt und vo-gestimmt durch das Entzetzen". Heidegger M. Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 65. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1989. S. 483-484. Literal translation: "In the first Initiation, when nature shone in truth and as truth, surprise was the main stimulus. The other Initiation, the Initiation of seynsgeschicht-liche thinking, would be tuned and pre-prepared by horror."

⁽⁴⁵⁾ Heidegger M. Parmenides. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 54. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1982.

⁽⁴⁶⁾ Heidegger M. Geschichte des Seyns. Or. cit.; Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Or. cit.

⁽⁴⁷⁾ The Russian language retains the same Indo-European root in the verb "to see" as in Greek. So "ideas" can be thought of as "views" or "visions" - implicitly, views of original patterns, images. It is quite significant that from the same Indo-European root is formed the word "to know", "to know", whence such words as "leading", "knowledge", "tidings", "notoriety", "news," etc. In German the word Wissen, "knowledge" goes back to the same Indo-European basis.

⁽⁴⁸⁾ Plato. State // Opus. In 3 vols. T. 3. M., 1971.

⁽⁴⁹⁾ It should also be taken into account that Heidegger understood by "theology" only the Western Christian (Catholic-Protestant) branch of theology; his love for Greece did not extend to Orthodoxy.

⁽⁵⁰⁾ I realize that this sounds a bit light for people who realize the full meaning of Tradition (for example, in its Genoan interpretation). At this point, every traditionalist (even a beginner) is capable of objecting to something. But we will deliberately omit this cycle. Before we begin to compare great intellectual constructions, we must first understand each of them as it is. Let us not be in a hurry to exclaim: "Stop, I disagree here!"

⁽⁵¹⁾ Cited in: Deleuze J. The Logic of Meaning. Moscow; Ekaterinburg, 1998. C. 251.

⁽⁵²⁾ The meaning of the German word "Ding" will be discussed in more detail in the second section "Das Geviert".

⁽⁵³⁾ See the chapter "Andrei Platonov's Magical Bolshevism" in *Du-gin A.. Russian Thing*. M., 2000.

⁽⁵⁴⁾ Heidegger M. Nietzsche I. 1936-39, Nietzsche II. 1939-46. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 6. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1996; *Idem*. Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst. 1936. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 43. 1985; *Idem*. Nietzsches Metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen. 1937. GA. Bd. 44. 1986; *Idem*. Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemäße Betrachtung. 1938. Bd. 46. 1989; *Idem*. Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis. 1939. Bd. 47. 1989; *Idem*. Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus. 1940. Bd. 48. 1986; *Idem*. Nietzsches Metaphysik (1941-42). Einleitung in die Philosophie - Denken und Dichten (1944-45). Bd. 50. 1990.

⁽⁵⁵⁾ "They shout to me from Seir: Watchman! What time of night is it? Watchman! What time of night is it? The watchman answers, 'Morning is approaching, but it is still night. If you ask emphatically, turn and come' (Isaiah 21:11-12).

⁽⁵⁶⁾ Heidegger M. Einführung in die Metaphysik. Tübingen, 1953.

⁽⁶⁾ *Sophocles*. *Antigone* / Per. D.S. Merezkovsky. Rostov n/D, 1997.
D. S. Merezkovsky's translation is smooth, but very approximate.

Chorus

Strophe I

There are many great powers
in the world, But stronger than
man

There's nothing in nature. He
rides on the waves of the gray
sea, Through the roaring

hurricane. He blasts the
furrows with his plow

Together with the work-horse;
Eternally tormenting the

Foremother; Indefatigably giving
birth.

The bosom of the earth goddess.

Antistrophe I

Beasts of prey in the oak-tree; Swift
birds and fishes, free Inhabitants of
the seas;

By the power of thought
conquering. Catches him,

spreading By him an
invisible net.

Mountain beast and wild beast
he enslaves by cunning. And

to the thick-horned horse;

And on the bull of the
disobedient He lays a

yoke.

Strophe II

He created speech and possessed free
thought like the wind;

And he drew the laws;

And found shelter under the
roof From the ravages of frost;

The storms of fall and rain.

The evil ailment he
conquers And foresees

what is to come; A man of
many wits.

Only will not be
saved; Only will not

escape Death ever.

Antistrophe II

And, proud of his wit and his

knowledge. He doesn't know
how to do it.

To distinguish good
 from evil. The truth of
 man and the laws of
 heaven
 He is ready to overthrow.
 But the king is also
 invincible;
 If there be no eternal truth in him;
 He is doomed to perdition:
 I am neither feeling nor
 thinking; No fire nor roof.
 I won't share it with him!

⁽⁵⁸⁾ *Heidegger M.* Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 65. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1989.

⁽⁵⁹⁾ *Heidegger M.* Geschichte des Seyns (1938/1940). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 69. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1998.

⁽⁶⁰⁾ *Heidegger M.* Über den Anfang. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 70. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 2005.

⁽⁶¹⁾ *Heidegger M.* Einführung in die Metaphysik. Or. cit.

⁽⁶²⁾ *Heidegger M.* Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Or. cit. S. 227.

⁽⁶³⁾ *Ibid.* S. 228-229.

⁽⁶⁴⁾ The Russian word "event", tempting as it is to use it (because Heidegger puts in *Er-eignis* precisely the meaning connected with *Seyn*-existence), hardly clarifies Heidegger's thought in this case. Rather, it has the meaning of "good fortune", "happened", "happened". In Russian, "an event comes true" has a certain predetermination, fatality (expectations come true in this way). *Ereignis* is rather "falls to the share", "attacks", "lightning falls". It is a midnight thunderstorm, where lightning suddenly illuminates the black landscape with a piercing, unnaturally bright light.

⁽⁶⁵⁾ We will talk more about this in the following sections of the book.

⁽⁶⁶⁾ The terms "eigene" and "uneigene" (authentic and inauthentic) in relation to the fundamental concept of "Dasein" will be discussed in the third section.

⁽⁶⁷⁾ *Heidegger M.* Holzwege. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 2003.

S. 327.

⁽⁶⁸⁾ *Heidegger M.* Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Or. cit. S. 256.

⁽⁶⁹⁾ *Heidegger M.* Geschichte des Seyns (1938/1940). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 69. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1998. S. 105.

⁽⁷⁰⁾ *Heidegger M.* Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Or. cit. S. 410.

⁽⁷¹⁾ *Ibid.* S. 411.

⁽⁷²⁾ *Ibid.* S. 414.

⁽⁷³⁾ *Heidegger M.* Brief über den Humanismus (1946). Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1949.

⁽⁷⁴⁾ *Heidegger M.* Über den Anfang. Or. cit. S. 127.

⁽⁷⁵⁾ *Ibid.* S. 127.

⁽⁷⁶⁾ *Heidegger M.* Sein und Zeit (1927). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer verlag, 2006. S. 19-27.

⁽⁷⁷⁾ The word "method" comes from the Greek μέθοδος - μετα - "through", "by", "for" and ὁδός "path", "road" and originally means "the placing of pre-or a l indications, marks", "Wegmarken" in German.

⁽⁷⁸⁾ *Nietzsche F.* Opus: In 2 vol. T. 2. M.: Mysl, 1990.

⁽⁷⁹⁾ In Greek, ἴδιος means "private", "pertaining only to a given person and no one else". In Ancient Greece, "idiots" were people who did not represent anyone but themselves - neither the polis, nor the procession, nor the class, nor the clan.

⁽⁸⁰⁾ *Heidegger M.* Geschichte des Seyns (1938/1940). Or. cit. S. 74.

⁽⁸¹⁾ Ibid. S. 195.

⁽⁸²⁾ Ibid. S. 191.

⁽⁸³⁾ Ibid. S. 120.

⁽⁸⁴⁾ *Mohler A.* Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland, 1918-1932. Grundriss ihrer Weltanschauungen. Stuttgart: Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag, 1950.

⁽⁸⁵⁾ *Niekisch E.* Hitler - ein deutsches Verhängnis. Berlin: Widerstandsverlag, 1932.

⁽⁸⁶⁾ See note (83).

SECTION 2

DAS GEVIERT

CHAPTER 1

bbedemhe b DAS GEVIERT


THE MEANING OF THE WORD "DAS GEVIERT"

Das Geviert is German for "quadruple", "quadruple", "quaternity". The image and structure of *das Geviert* are fundamental to Heideggerian thought. Through the introduction of *das Geviert*, we will better understand the main lines of force of his philosophy: the distinction between *Seyn* and *Sein*, the *second Beginning*, *Ereignis*, the gap between ontology and fundamental-ontology, etc.

Das Geviert can be symbolically depicted as two crossing lines reminiscent of the St. Andrew's Cross.



But in some cases Heidegger himself also uses the vertical crossing of lines.



We will fix both arrangements as possible. In the first case, the relative opposition of the upper (row-positioned) ends of the cross to the lower ones is emphasized, in the second case - the superimposition of the vertical opposition on the horizontal one.

It should be kept in mind that this diagram is not a spatial representation, but a structural representation.

It is an image of philosophical and fundamental-ontological topics; it is an image that refers to Seyn-existence and to thinking about the source of Seyn-existence. It is neither a *thing* nor an image of *a thing*, but at the same time it is not a symbol pointing to something other than itself. *Das Geviert* as both word and sign is conceived by Heidegger as an expression of the method (Greek for "pointing the way") of the fundamental-ontological view of Seyn-being itself through the light of its presence. It will therefore be proper to refrain from any hasty comparisons of *das Geviert* with what we know of the meaning of the cross, the number 4, etc. Any analogies will be deceptive and inappropriate - especially at first, while the acuteness of Heideggerian thought is not clear to us. Trying to relate *das Geviert* to something we know, or to something we think we know, will be disastrous. *Das Geviert* is something we almost certainly do not know, something we have never thought about or encountered. Only then will the freshness of this phenomenon - as the phenomenon of something that has never been revealed before - be truly revealed to us.

The word "*Das Geviert*" and its schematic representations appear to Heidegger in the late 1930s in the notes to lectures and books in a cycle related to the themes of Seynsgeschichte and Ereignis⁽¹⁾. Later, in the 1950s, they are developed in an interpretation of Hölderlin's poetry⁽²⁾ and a study of the problems of language⁽³⁾. This theme is most fully developed in Heidegger's most poetic texts, such as "The Thing", "To Build, to Live, to Think", etc., included in the collection "Lectures and Articles 1936-1953"⁽⁴⁾. It is generally believed that the problematic of *das Geviert* belongs to the last period of Heidegger's work and constitutes the leitmotif of the final part of his late writings.

From the point of view of the semantic periodization of Heidegger's philosophy, we can say that the theme of "*das Geviert*" is the culmination of his reflections of the middle period (1930s-1940s) on *Ereignis* and the *other Beginning*. In essence, *das Geviert* is the flash that illuminates the last light of the whole structure (Gefuge) of Heidegger's philosophy. It is the *Lichtung* (illumination, flooding with light, illumination) of *Seyn-being*, which opens up at the peak of thinking, sopra-

perfected on *another Initiation*. The introduction of *das Geviert* is in itself *Ereignis*.

QUATERNION (GEVIERT) AND SEYN-EXISTENCE

Heidegger approaches the theme of "*das Geviert*" through the interpretation of his favorite poet Hölderlin, whose philosophical interpretation of his hymns leads Heidegger to construct a special vision of *being* - through Seyn-being. *Das Geviert* is revealed to Heidegger as the *structure* (Gefüge) of Seyn-being in its purest form. Being is *quaternary*. Nothing can be taken away from the Quaternity.

The Quaternity exists always as the Quaternity and only as such. To put it another way, we can neither cut nothing from it nor add anything to it.

we can.

Heidegger introduces *das Geviert* as a substitute for Hegel's trinitarian dialectic. If Hegel spoke of "thesis-antithesis-synthesis", Heidegger asserted: "*not three, but four*"⁽⁵⁾. And *all four at once*. In a sense, the turn to *four* was

also a critical step in relation to the Christian trinity. But it must be said at once that Heidegger saw Christianity as a model of Western Christian theology, and therefore he was interested only in the philosophical meaning of the trinity:

how this principle is included in the explanation of the *structure of being* and in the *structure of ontology*. Hegel's triad was therefore more important to him than the Christian dogma itself. The trinity expresses the topics of old metaphysics and Platonic ontology, where Sein-existence is replaced by Sein-existence as the *essence of being*, as being-in-the-whole. The referential theory of truth is anchored in this trinitarian topics, always seeking to elevate the relation of the cognizer to the cognizable to a third instance, which is the basis of metaphysics. *Fundamental-ontology* must deal with the *ontic field of being* and the thinking person standing among it (the first level of distancing) in a different way, avoiding the trap of the trinitarian principle, the meaning of which lies in the domination of *τεχνη*, which manifests itself definitively in modern Western European nihilism - the last incarnation

trinitarianism. Das Geviert is both an instrument of "phenomenological destruction" (deconstruction) of the old metaphysics and a triumphant result of its realization.

Seyn-being, revealing itself, highlighting itself (Lichtung), making itself known, *reveals itself through das Geviert*, through *the* Quadrilateral. *Being* is never alone, it is not monistic (but neither is it trinitarian, nor is it binary). It manifests *itself* cumulatively as *four*, but never one of the elements of this Quadruplet *on its own*. Seyn-being and das Geviert are almost one and the same thing, because where being does not produce (does not pro-duce - φουσεῖν) being, we cannot speak of being, and where it manifests being, it is necessarily *present*, but never fully and completely present, and always in this presence simultaneously *absent*. At the same time, always and in all circumstances, Seyn-being makes itself known (not making itself known, hiding itself) *in the Quadrilateral*.

We cannot conceive of Seyn-existence in any other way, beyond-
from the other end. One of the most erroneous attitudes towards *being* has been to think of it from the side of *being*. In this approach, no matter how much we move away from the *essence*, we will sooner or later project it into an abyss whose horror will only increase as we move away from the *essence*. Instead of flight, we will create a shore, a parking lot, a solid ground, a firmament. We will not bear the experience of heaven and will necessarily begin to think of a "heavenly earth" or an "earthly sky". The *fundamental-ontological* action will therefore be to look *not at being* from the side of *being*, but *at being* from the side of *being*. This view in its concreteness and radical inversion of all proportions is *das Geviert*.

The moment we think *Seyn-existence* correctly - through the light of its own truth, through its existence in the horror of absolute solitude, in the ultimate distance from all *things*, in the experience of the abyss - that is when we encounter the whole *Four* at once, that is when it is revealed to us.

It is of the utmost importance to realize that *das Geviert* is not an ontic perception of the world, which could be wrongly inferred from the opposition of the *Quaternion* to the world.


trinitarian ontological topics, although there is some truth in this observation. But ontic thinking, direct

The analog of which we will actually see in the *Quadrilateral* knows nothing of *being* and does not ask itself this question. It is dissolved in the *Quadrilateral*, but does not know about it. It flows out of the *Quadrilateral*, but it does not grasp it in the living moment of the fundamental event. It does not guess that *das Geviert* is *das Geviert*, it does not call it by name, it does not utter its being. And consequently, it, being in *das Geviert*, *is* lost in it, dissolves in it, is *not* in it, does not exist (in essence - *west da nicht*). Therefore, the conversation about *das Geviert* belongs to the realm of *fundamental ontology*, not ontology or old ontology. It is a conversation in the register of the *other Beginning*, and it can be conducted only if we have somehow followed Heidegger through the main stages of his consideration of *Seynsgeschichte*, the *other Beginning*, and focused on *Ereignis*.

Das Geviert is given to us as an open window into the abyss, i.e. as the ultimate gift, and it is assumed that we will be able to appreciate it.

GEVIERT'S COUNCIL OF FOUR (GEVIERT'S)

The *quaternion* is *heaven* (Himmel), the *gods* or *God* (the divine in general), *man* (mortal), and *earth*. These four figures, the four realms of the world included in *das Geviert*, remained unchanged for Heidegger. It is true that Heidegger, until the 1950s, instead of speaking of *heaven* (Himmel), spoke of the *world* (Welt), equating "world" with "heaven. Later he began to speak specifically of *heaven*. Nevertheless, the interchangeability of *heaven* and the *world* in the *Quadrilateral* must always be kept in mind. Heaven and the world are expressions of an open order.



Scheme das Geviert

The pre-Socratics used the word *cosmos* to define the *world*, which does not mean "world" as we understand it, but rather "order", "harmony", "arrangement". Cosmos is order or beautiful order, it is *beauty*, i.e. something organized into a beautiful structure. The ancients also used the synonymous term οὐρανός (sky) οὐράνιον (heavenly) because they considered the sky to be the origin of order, the essence of order, and the world as such. The *world and the sky* were identical. This is why Plato placed his ideas in the sky. This inner identity of heaven and the world is fundamental to the understanding of das Geviert. Heidegger later said that die Welt (the world) is das Geviert, but at the same time, the sky itself appears to him as an independent element of das Geviert.

GEVIERT'S WAR OF THE FOUR (GEVIERT'S).

Heidegger sees the origin of das Geviert in Heraclitus' formula about *war as the father of things*. Heraclitus says: "War is the father of all, the king of all: some it declares gods, others men, some it makes slaves, others free"⁽⁶⁾, and also: "It must be known that war is generally accepted, that enmity is the ordinary order of things (πόλεμος) and that everything arises through enmity and is mutually constitutive"⁽⁷⁾.

Thus, since for Heidegger, *being* as war, Heraclitean πόλεμος ("polemos") as a "We owe to the *pressure of war*, present at every point, in every segment of das Geviert, the fundamentally *quadripartite* being stretched out before us, above us, or around us. We are nothing but the *product of war*, because war *separated* us from the gods and made us human; on the other hand, it was war that *united* us with the gods, put us on earth and covered us with heaven.

War - πόλεμος - is the name of *being* as *Seyn*. This, according to Heidegger, is the depth of the fundamental ontology proper. The roots of the understanding of *being* as *war* are in the problem of *Nothingness*. Heidegger defines *nothingness* in the structure of fundamental ontology as "*nothingness in Seyn-being*"

(das Nichten im Seyn). To think that Seyn-existence is and always has been as something unchanging and eternal is a profound delusion.

Seyn-existence. Seyn-existence *is realized* (sich er-eignet), it is always fresh, always risky, and never a given. Moreover, in order to break the illusion of the assurance of its unchanging existentiality, it turns to being and man *with its nothingness*. In doing so, it proves the mortality of the mortal, the finitude of the finite, and the uniqueness of itself as an event (Ereignis). Being makes itself known not in peace but in war, precisely because it simultaneously introduces "yes" and "no." Here again we may recall Heraclitus, who argued: "Homer, praying that 'enmity may perish between gods and men', unknowingly brings a curse upon the birth of all."⁽⁸⁾ By separating "*nothingness*" as "nothingness", "annihilation" from *Seyn-existence*, we lose it itself, because we deprive it of the possibility to happen, and, consequently, beings to be born - to be born in struggle and to struggle. By transforming *being* into *being* as a *whole*, we miss its creative power to make being not-being to bring not-being into being, and hence substitute it for something else.

Das Geviert is precisely Seyn-existence, which, realized in Ereignis, brings war into everything, establishing the tension of the great axes of the world. The world⁽⁹⁾ is war.

SKY

Heaven is what gives order, what makes any thing what it is. It illuminates, it determines, it arranges, it supplies the world and the parts of the world, the being, with what Heidegger called "*dignity*" (Würde), ἄξιος. It makes a thing valuable precisely because it is *itself*, and determines secretly, mysteriously its intrinsic dignity. It is an ordered being, being as a whole. Heaven opens and unfolds and thus opens and unfolds. It divides and endows. Heaven is the world in its openness. It is the face of the world to *itself*, to those who look at the world. To look at the world is to look at the sky and the sky looks at itself. The sky is the realm of light, that illuminates, enlightens, reveals.

Geviert

The sky is fundamentally open. It has no limit, no boundary in itself. Therefore, Heaven is not an essence, not an object, not a phenomenon, but an orientation, an area, a boundless edge of the sacred geography of being.

SKY AND THE WORLD

We said above that in Heidegger Heaven appears as a fundamental-ontological synonym of the world⁽¹⁰⁾ (*die Welt*). The world and Heaven express something close and almost identical, hence their interchangeability in *Geviert*.

The *world* (as light and as Heaven), according to Heidegger, is an expression of openness (*Offene*), and this is its basic property. The *world* opens and illuminates, makes manifest and uncovered. *At* the same time, *being*, becoming the world, establishing itself as the world, receives the stamp of order of orderliness; each thing acquires its properties and its places.

Heidegger writes: "Together with the way the world discovers itself, all things acquire their delay and their acceleration, their distance and their nearness, their breadth and their narrowness."⁽¹¹⁾

The world is that which opens paths. It is very important to note that Heidegger understands the world (and, consequently, Heaven) as something deeply connected with the people (*Volk*). The world is people, and therefore Heaven is people. Outside the people and their language, their creativity, the world loses itself, falls apart, ceases to be a world. And vice versa, the openness of the world is directly related to the opening of paths for the people.

"Peace is the opening up of the wide openness of wide paths of simple and essential (*wesentliche*) decisions in the destiny (*ge- schick*) of the historical (*geschichtliche*) people"⁽¹²⁾. The people in its essence is the one who makes the decision; where the decision is made and how it is made. The people is the place of decision. The paths of the people in history express their attitude to the world and Heaven, manifested through fateful decisions.

It is important that it is the people, not the individual, who are being spoken of. This is due to the role Heidegger assigned to speech. Speech is the existence of *Seyn*-existence, manifested through the human being. But speech is always

based on language. And language

distinguishes nonhuman from human and nation from nation. The differences between peoples and languages constitute the riches of Seyn- being. Therefore, a people is given, together with language, a perspective on the world and Heaven. This perspective is language. Therefore, the world is revealed to the people in language, and through language the people make the decision that will be their destiny. It is not the individual who makes the decision, but the people. And this decision is always connected with language. The possibility and necessity of this decision is the world as an *open* world. The openness of the world is manifested in the decision of the people.

"The world is the illumination of the roads of essence-directing (wesent- liche Weisung), in which the whole decision is structured"⁽¹³⁾ . The decision (through speech) is made by the people, but the structure of this decision is dictated (indicated) by the world.

EARTH

Heidegger's earth is what brings everything to presence (Anwesen). Through the earth, the multitude of things, objects, sensations become present, existent, in Russian, "are at the essence". The earth is what one stands on, *stands on*, *is*, therefore, "the real thing". The earth makes the *being* real. Thanks to Heaven things are what they are, and thanks to Earth they are real, they are before the world, they are extended, they are present.

The main property of the earth, according to Heidegger, is its closedness, its sealedness. Heaven and the world open, they exist as open and opening. The earth conceals, closes, seals, hides. But at the same time it preserves. In the fundamental-ontological movement of Seyn-existence, openness neighbors and alternates with unopenness, with closure.

We said earlier that Heidegger correlates the world with the people. Less explicitly he correlates the Earth with the people. But this can only be deduced from his indirect remarks. In one place, when discussing the fundamental-ontological meaning of the war between Germans and Russians (meaning the Second World War, which Heidegger conceptualized as the confrontation of the Germanic beginning with the non-

Heidegger wrote: "Heidegger wrote that the Russian metaphysics of Western European metaphysics in the form of *Machenschaft* is the most extreme expression of Western European metaphysics:

"Every world discovers itself and remains connected to the Earth. Each world and each Earth are in general in their mutual belonging to each other a historical (*geschichtliche*) phenomenon. (...) The Earth of the future lies fallow in the still not yet liberated for itself the essence of Russianness. The history (*Geschichte*) of the world (*Welt*) is entrusted to the self-consciousness (*Besinnung*) of the Germans"⁽¹⁴⁾.

It is important here that Heidegger connects the *world* (*Welt*) and the *earth* with people and nations. This is somewhat reminiscent of the theory of the ancient Greek pre-Socratic philosopher Xenophanes of Colophon, who believed that there are different heavens and different earths in different regions of the universe, similar to each other but nevertheless different. Heidegger substantiates this hypothesis through language as the essence of humanity. Heidegger himself considers the difference in languages and dialects as a consequence of the difference in geographical landscapes reflected in speech. But since language is the mode of existence of *Sein*-being, a nation, with its Earth and its Heaven (*welt*), is always a unique relation to *Sein*-being. It is the people (*Volk*), not the individual (subject), because language is entrusted to the people as a whole.

Heidegger sees in the Germans the beginning of open paths, self-consciousness, peace, Heaven. In the Russians he sees the essence of the Earth as the preserving closedness, the guardian of the future. The battle between the Germans and the Russians becomes a cosmogonic battle that establishes a new Heaven and a new Earth, a German Heaven and a Russian Earth.

URANOGEOMACHY

There is a tension between Heaven and Earth, an axis of war. The Universe is built around this axis.

Heaven and Earth are opposite in everything. The Earth, unlike Heaven, is always closed, its back turned to the world, its face hidden. No one knows what this face looks like or if it exists at all. Heaven has no end in depth and upwards, the Earth is infinite in breadth. But at the same time, the battle

of Heaven (Peace)

153 and Earth is not a collision between two rigidly and strictly separated entities.

The world (Heaven) and the Earth are essentially distinct, but never separate. The world is based on the Earth, the Earth rises through the world. But the relationship between the world and the Earth is not dimmed in the empty unity of a contentless opposition. The world, in its resting on the Earth, seeks to elevate it, to heave it up. The world, being self-open, cannot tolerate any closedness. The earth, as all-preserving, is inclined to take the world into itself and keep it in itself.

The confrontation between the world and the Earth is a real war, a battle⁽¹⁵⁾.

This war - uranogeomachy (or cosmogeomachy) - reveals to each side its "is", its relationship to Seyn-being, which is the same for both, but relates to each in a completely different way. In Heaven (Peace), Seyn-being expresses itself as illumination, openness, unconcealment. It is ἀλήθεια, the truth of the unconcealedness of being in and through being, through the highlighted place in the middle where being makes itself known through the *open*. The earth, on the other hand, reveals a different side of Seyn-being, a "nothingness" that conceals, but also preserves, conserves, closes and shelters. In its relation to Seyn-being, the Earth is bottomless, it is Abgrund. Xenophanes of Colophon, according to some ancient authors, taught that the Earth is the main initial and that it is rooted in the abyss, eternally falling in its bottomlessness.

Uranogeomachia is the natural and only way to-
The war of Seyn-being through being, in being, through being, and against being. In this war between Heaven and Earth, where each, by fighting, rises to its essence and begins to truly be, an even more profound process manifests *itself*: the war of Seyn-being against being, which makes Seyn-being and being themselves.

GODS OF THE BEGINNING

The *divine (gods)* and *human beings* are the poles of the second axis. Heidegger is very careful in using the word

Geviert

"god", "God", although in later works he speaks more and more often of "the divine", "divinity" and "the divine". These entities are fundamentally necessary to das Geviert, but Heidegger avoids a clear and explicit definition of them.

While man as a thinking being is constantly present in das Geviert and his presence is undeniable, the gods tend to *run away*⁽¹⁶⁾, with the *divine* hiding even when they reveal themselves.

The "divine" are a special kind of being (and being at the same time), which is extremely *light and subtle*, and whose function is extremely non-utilitarian. The "Divine" seem to "cheek" the world, do not add any heavy fundamental elements to it, do not teach people anything (stealing fire and establishing crafts are the work of titans and trixters). "The divine", rather, gives to the whole of das Geviert, to the whole Quadrilateral, a kind of *transparent intoxication*⁽¹⁷⁾. The divine presence, even the traces of the deities, precede the Quadrilateral of unfolded things, objects, states and thoughts, giving them an imperceptible inner current.

Gods and humans are separated, first of all, by their relation to Seyn-existence. This is perhaps one of the most difficult aspects of Heidegger's philosophy. He states: "Gods need Seyn-existence.

And further writes: "Being does not stand 'above' the gods; but neither do they stand 'above' being. But the gods use being, and in this statement Seyn-being is conceptualized. The gods need Seyn-being in order to belong to themselves through it, which does not belong to them. Seyn-being is what the gods need, it is their need, their want; they lack it"⁽¹⁸⁾. Heidegger then clarifies the relation of the gods to philosophy: "Since Seyn-existence is the need of the gods; and at the same time it is only in contemplation of its truth, and this contemplation, in turn, is nothing but philosophy (of the other Beginning), the gods need seyns- geschichtliche thought, i.e. philosophy. The gods do not need philosophy as if they were going to philosophize about their deification, but philosophy must take place (be, become, sein) *if (wenn)* the gods are to enter once more into the element of *decision* and to produce

for Geschichte (history as destiny) the basis for its essence. By the gods *seynsgeschichtliche* thought as the thought of *Seyn-existence* will be predestined"⁽¹⁹⁾.

It is important that Heidegger thinks of "*gods*" outside of any religion. The god of religion, he argues, is nothing more than a name in a metaphysical topic, where the being is put in the place of being as the highest being, the supreme being, the first being. The gods of religion are therefore insignificant and die with the fall of metaphysics into modern nihilism. They are gods in name and in the structures of false thinking. The only divinity worthy of itself and of the gods themselves, and in the limit of one God (if the gods themselves decide that there is only one among them who is truly God), is a divinity *associated with Seyn-being*, not with the various editions of "Platonism for the masses. Deity must not be something that is present, that exists, that does not satisfy human aspirations. If it is possible, it is only on the ecstatic horizon of fundamental-ontology, balancing on the edge of the truth of *Seyn-being* as the essence of *Seyn-being*.

We can say that Heidegger's gods are the gods of fundamental ontology and are intimately connected with it, with its possibility, with the other Beginning. This is why Heidegger thinks of the last God as the "god of the Beginning.

Another important feature of Heidegger's gods. They are gods who are not essence (*sind nicht*), in the sense that they are not beings (*Seiende*). They are at a maximum distance from being. These gods do not exist. But the fact that they do not exist makes them truly alive and sacred. By their "no" they and constitute the dimension of the sacred - the Heilige. In contrast to the old ontology, which thought of being as the *most existent* of *things*, and to apophatic philosophy, which thought of *being* as *nothing*, not-being, and even more not-being than the gods, fundamental-ontology locates *Seyn-being* and its truth *between - between the gods and the existent*⁽²⁰⁾.

In a certain perspective, *Seyn-existence* itself can be thought of from the position of the gods. In this case, "*Seyn-existence* is the trembling of the gods (the echo of the gods' decision concerning their God)"⁽²¹⁾.

But at the same time, gods are neither an abstraction, nor a metaphor, nor an artificial construct of atheistic consciousness. Atheism for Heidegger is as metaphysical as theism or deism. The Gods of Initiation is the direction of the philosophical geography of that world which reveals itself in the *event* (Ereignis), in the instantaneous *illumination* (Lichtung) of the truth of being.

Gods and humans belong to the same axis, setting opposite directions in it. Gods are those who need Seyn-existence, which is their home and hearth. Humans are those who need Seyn-existence to *guard* its truth. This double need of Seyn-existence and in Seyn-existence constitutes the pair "gods-humans" in relation to itself. The indifferent, thin, light gods and the sad ones, torn out of existence by the flash of Seyn-being and thrown into the abyss.

Heaven, poor people.

GEVIERT'S PEOPLE

Das Geviert can be thought of as the geography of the other Beginning, the scheme of a fundamental-ontological topicality. Therefore, the people whom Heidegger prefers to call "mortal" in Geviert - by their main property, "being-to-death" - are people of another Beginning, people as "guardians of the truth of Seyn-existence" (Wachters der Wahrheit des Seyns). These are the people of the new fundamental-ontological humanism.

It is very important that they do not stand at the center of Geviert, but at one of its ends. The human being - even one who turns to his truth as the truth of Seyn-existence - is only one dimension of the Seyn-existence flash, along with others. Man's Geviert neighbors are fundamental, too - the gods, Heaven, Earth. Man, the guardian of the truth of Seyn-being, is co-equal with them, but is by no means exceptional among them. He differs from them just as they differ from each other, but at the same time he is inconceivable without them, unimaginable, without the other three he is not.

Geviert's man, Heidegger explains, is in no way "neither the 'subject' nor the 'object' of history, nor is he a 'thinking animal'. Moreover, he is not defined by belonging to the essence of man either.

of the human being, since it is he who, of all things, does not have this essence. In the place of this essence, which would have to be

To serve as the basis for an anthropology based on the principles of the old metaphysics, there is a gap, a hole, a window into the abyss. This abyss, which makes itself remotely known through death, terror, extreme forms of risk, the feeling of abandonment (as a fall), is the form of manifestation of Seyn-being itself, which declares itself as not coinciding with being, and even with the most substantial of all things, the most substantial. "Man is thrown by free throw into the *alien* and does not return again from the abyss, settling in the alien neighborhood of Seyn-being."⁽²²⁾

Man has no essence, and his essence does not belong to him, but to the need of being to possess the guardian. Seyn-being constitutes a fundamental-ontological place for the guard in the neighborhood of itself, and the person who occupies this place *becomes* man. By occupying this place, man as a guardian of Seyn-being finds himself in the structure of Geviert. Being is revealed to him in such an event-case from the position of proximity to Seyn-being as alien, although as being man was at home in being. Having settled close to being, he finds himself a guest in being, an exile, he finds himself "abandoned" in being. Only such a person is truly "mortal," since his being becomes "being-to-death."

WARS OF GODS AND MEN

The divine and the mortal, human beings and gods, are, according to Heidegger, within *das Geviert*, in incessant *collision* (*Entgegnung*), and collision in both senses: they collide as adversaries and collide as beings on the same axis. One can clash as two enemies, or as two neighbors in a grove or by a stream. In this clash, the gods are most often *the ones who flee*, and only the most subtle of mortals - poets and sages - flee *from them* themselves, sensing the presence of the divine, honoring its subtle nature and allowing the gods to come where they want, so that the earth and the world may be filled with the subtle light of the *sacred* (*Heilige*).

These and many more meanings are embedded in the concept of

"clashes" - clashes between men and gods. War as the father of things in Heraclitus divorces people from the gods, puts them on different sides and makes them not identical. On opposite sides of what? On opposite sides of Seyn-existence, which resides "between".

This *non-identity*, this permanent and fundamental difference *constitutes both*. This is the most correct and acute understanding of what divinity and humanity are. Humans become humans and gods become gods through the manifestation of their essence in juxtaposition (Bezug) with Seyn-existence. War (Streit, πόλεμος) is the name of Seyn-being when it constitutes Geviert as the intersection of fundamental-ontological lines of tension. With the explosion of the *event* (Ereignis), Seyn-being throws men and gods, Heaven and Earth to different points of philosophical geography, thus creating four regions, each of which stores the vibrating impulse that brought them into existence and returns it to its point of origin (Seyn-being as war).

People tend to be *too rational and utilitarian*, "technical", even in their complete and lofty theologies and theosophies, in their *treatment* of the divinity. The gods of religion become mechanisms of punishment or forgiveness, salvation or damnation. They become

"The gods do not fight with humans, and humans do not fight with them for one reason: they do not exist, they are constructed in isolation from Seyn-existence, and therefore are skillful technical devices. Such gods do not fight with people, and people do not fight with them for one reason: they do not exist, they are constructed in isolation from Seyn-existence, and consequently, skillful technical methods of dexterous people can make them do whatever people want. Such gods are tame gods, *dei ex machina*."

The real gods stand on the other side of Seyn-being from humans and look at humans through the light of war. This does not mean that they are aggressive, it means that they are gods.

The ancient Greeks intuitively grasped the nature of deities better than people of conventional institutionalized religions: they saw the gods as *play*. But play and war have the same origins: war is play, and play is always war⁽²³⁾. Presence was likened to a subtle oversight, to *naïveté*. The *divine* is almost

imperceptibly found,

This attack of the deity makes room in man for the daimon (logos in Geo-Raclitus). This attack of the deity manifests in man a place for the daimon (logos in Geo-Raclitus). The counterattack of men can drive the god from his favored place or take him captive (appropriation of the divine spark as soul, consciousness, humanization of the divine logos as his own intellect). Man wins the war (note the word "wins" - "wins" means "plays") only when the gods triumph, conquer man and take him captive. Then and only then does the truth come into play: "ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων", i.e. δαίμων becomes ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ.

In the Bible⁽²⁴⁾, in the story of the prophet Elijah, when the Lord appeared to him, it was mentioned consistently that "not in fire the Lord, not in coward the Lord, not in storm the Lord, not in stones," but very subtly, "in a cool breeze, almost soundless and insensible." In this biblical description

The "subtle coolness" contains a very subtle understanding of the Divine. This "thin chill" is the element of the divine. The essence of divinity is that it is almost non-existent, that it stands at the opposite pole from the *existent in its essential visibility*, concreteness, tangibility and grandiosity. There is no God in being, in all its enormity. And Heidegger constantly emphasizes: "You can take in all things, but nowhere will you find a trace of God"⁽²⁵⁾.

"WE'RE THINKING ABOUT THE OTHER THREE."

In his seminal, albeit small, 1951 article "To Build, to Live, to Think"⁽²⁶⁾ Heidegger defines das Geviert in this way⁽²⁷⁾: "*The earth*, the serving bearer, the blossoming giver of fruit, spread out in stones and streams, bearing sprouts and beasts. We say '*earth*' but we think of the other *three* as well, for we cannot think of the Quadrilateral in a one-sided way"⁽²⁸⁾.

In the same poetic rhythm, Heidegger writes about the sky: "The sky is the course of the sun in the clouds, the changing path of the moon, the wandering brilliance of the constellations, the seasons and their mingling, the light and twilight of the day, the darkness and transparency of the night, the weather, and the weather of the day.

and weather and clouds and the blue depths of the ether. We say

"heaven", but we also think of the other three, because we cannot think of the Quadrilateral in a one-sided way"⁽²⁹⁾ .

Now on to how Heidegger defines the Divine:

"The divine bring us the message of the winking Godhead. Out of the sacred dominion of the Godhead, God reveals his presence or withdraws into his concealment. We say

"Divine", but we think of the other three as well, since we cannot think of the Quadrilateral alone"⁽³⁰⁾ . Note,

"out of the sacred dominion of the Godhead *reveals* its present or *withdraws* into its hiding place", "out of the sacred dominion *withdraws* or *reveals*". From the point of view of

Seyns- geschichte it is always *the same* movement, difference and unity, discovery and concealment, appearance and departure, presence and absence, in Seynsgeschichtliche these things are not opposed to each other. This is the essence of Seyn-existence: discovery in it is not the antithesis of concealment, and vice versa, because otherwise we fall into the trap of the old meta-physics, where being is equated with

being (which is exactly and always there) and non-being is strictly non-existent. Divinity is never univocal: it cannot be said of it that it is (manifest) but also that it is not (hidden); it is

both at the same time. When we say das Geviert, we must simultaneously-

but to mention everyone else, despite where we're coming from.

began this incantation. And now we have reached ourselves, the mortals, die Sterbliche: "Mortals are human beings, they are called mortals because only they can die, to die means to transcend death as death"⁽³¹⁾ . Everyone (the rest, not human beings) dies, but when they die, they (the rest, not human beings) cannot die because they can never master death as death. Death is given to human beings for their personal use, death is what makes human beings human, death is being-in-death and being-in-death-the fact of being or annihilation adds nothing to death, it has nothing to do with death at all; death, thought of ontologically, fundamentally-ontologically, is the same as life. "Only man dies, dies gradually, while he remains on earth, under Heaven and before the Divine. We say 'mortal,' but we also think of the

the other three, since one cannot think of the Quadrilateral in a one-sided way"⁽³²⁾ .

And further, "Mortals live by saving the earth. Leaving it to itself.

Mortals live their lives with Heaven as Heaven. They let the luminaries take their course, they do not try to make the weather bad and vice versa, they do not turn day into night and night into day.

Mortals live to the extent that they expect the divine as divine. Hoping, they hold out to them the unfulfilled. They expect a hint of their imminent arrival and do not mistake the signs of their absence for anything. They do not make gods for themselves or substitute idols for them. In suffering and adversity they see Salvation"⁽³³⁾ .

If one cannot think of the Quadrilateral (das Geviert) one-sidedly, if one cannot think of only one thing in the Quadrilateral (das Geviert), then any mention of Earth, Heaven, Gods, or Man immediately evokes the presence (precisely "presence," "detachment from the essence," and "immersion in the essence") of all the others.

Even Heidegger says: "Mortals live insofar as they, being mortal, lead the capacity to die to a good death, not to an empty disappearance or to a meaningless delay in earthly sojourn. In the salvation of the earth, in the perception of heaven, in the expectation of the divine, and in the direction of one's life toward death, one's indwelling is fulfilled as a quadruple ornament of the Quadrilateral (das Geviert)."⁽³⁴⁾ .

STRIKE OUT SEIN

Heidegger has an interesting image in his manuscripts of the second half of the 1930s.

~~SEIN~~

or

~~SEYN~~

This means that there is no being without the Four (das Geviert), crossed out being is das Geviert. At the same time, when being reveals itself, it reveals das Geviert, which means that it cannot be written in any other way, it is never given to us separately, by itself - that is, without the Four (das Geviert) and outside of the Four (das Geviert). As soon as we fix ourselves on Seyn-being as such, das Geviert is instantly manifested. As soon as we are realized in an event (Er-eignis), das Geviert instantly sprays out of it in four directions and covers this Seyn-being with itself. *As soon as being manifests itself, it crosses itself out.* But as soon as das Geviert is removed from Seyn-being in its pure form, when it covers Seyn-being completely, it too is fractured, disappears, and Seyn-being begins to appear through it again (only in a different way - through "nothingness", "nichten").

Das Geviert and Seyn-existence are always together, always the same, but in their relations, not a constant statics, but a complex and unpredictable event-dynamics of revelations and concealments prevails.

This fundamental dynamic of Seyn-being as Ereignis also animates the relationship of the four domains of das Geviert to each other. The waves of revelation and concealment, of coming and going, of ebb and flow, of advance and retreat, of tension and tension.

The elements of war and play permeate das Geviert, dividing and uniting the orientations of philosophical geography.

There's probably nothing more fundamental than this. "St. Andrew's Cross" of Seyn-existence. Something similar should be inscribed on our philosophical banners.

Contemplating

das Geviert, we contemplate the crossed-out Seyn-existence (but with it also Nichts: because Seyn is crossed out here in every sense!) - we contemplate Heaven, Earth, Divine and Mortal at the same time.


Note the delicacy with which Heidegger portrayed the primordial das Geviert. When it comes to fundamental metaphysical prophecy, everything matters.

This spelling, name, image and graphic represent a synthesis of the deepest fundamental-ontological knowledge. Thinking about it correctly is tantamount to


Das Geviert is the fruit of illumination and, at the same time, an invitation to those who focus their vital thinking attention on it. Das Geviert is the fruit of illumination and, at the same time, an invitation to this illumination for those who focus their vital thinking attention on it.

MEN AND GODS AS NEIGHBORS

In some manuscripts⁽³⁵⁾ Heidegger depicts *das Geviert* vertically, in the form of a regular cross.



In this case, Heaven (the World) will be on top and the Earth below, which is undoubted even in the metaphysical sense (order above, chaos below; light above, darkness below; transparent above, dense and concrete below).



But in such a twist, we will see an amazing thing: humans and gods are placed next to each other on the same line - between Heaven and Earth. And this is fundamental. From the point of view of Earth and Heaven, men and gods are in one plane, in one circle, in one round dance, and strictly speaking, it is impossible to distinguish between right and left. Gods and people have gathered *around the* light of Seyn-existence and are dancing a round dance. The gods have gathered for a meeting, for a ting, around Seyn-being, and have found themselves next to people, they are neighbors in Geviert. It is this neighborhood that makes possible the games of the gods with people. Indifferent to the problems of humans, the gods sometimes

invade the sphere of people (and this invasion is blessed), visit them, find themselves in the oven, in the red corner, in the hearth, in the bread, in the wine, in the breeze, in the sacred tree. All this is possible if das Geviert is placed in this way.

Gods are *neighbors of men*; they live in the nearest grove, in the spring, in the stream, in the spring air, in the fear of night, in the heat of noon, in the ripened ears of wheat; they visit or vie for the possession of a stream, a young beauty or a masterly bowl, just as men behave toward each other and toward those they are not. In the Bible, the close contact between humans and the "sons of God" is recounted in the disturbing story of how the "sons of God" were once attracted to the beauty of the daughters of men and descended to earth. Their descendants were an ancient and vanished race of giants.

This co-existence of humans and gods in a *common* plane is one of the fundamental consequences of the rethinking of the fundamental-ontological scheme of das Geviert.

And at the same time, the position of Heaven and Earth on the vertical axis emphasizes the war they wage between them. Heaven attacks the Earth, the Earth closes itself from these attacks, defends itself, gathers into itself before the self-dispersion of the open Heaven. This is uranogeomachy - the war of Earth and Heaven (Peace). In this war Seyn-existence as the standing dynamic of life is constituted. Order is not established in Geviert once and for all. Heaven as the expression of the ordering field of fundamental ontology cannot fully impose its order on the Earth. The Earth is too big and too irregular for this, too wide, too heavy. It does not for a moment abandon its life's work, which is the expression of the ordering field of fundamental ontology.

The Earth does not let the world come true as a mere world, hiding from the rays of Heaven. However decisively Heaven acts, the Earth does not let the world come true as a mere world, hiding itself from the rays of Heaven; the Earth makes everything earthly, envelops the volition of Heaven in dense presence, and thus saves things from immobility and perfection. Earth

allows things created by Heaven to decompose and return to the Earth. This is the Earth's revenge, its counter-reaction. Whatever Heaven has produced in its creative process.


power, the Earth sooner or later dissolves this into a sacred primeval. Heaven razzes the Earth for it; the Earth suffers, endures it and shrinks back in pristine freshness after the cleaving blows of celestial thunder.

Heaven and Earth are not separate things - they are waves of Seyn-being, its mode of existence. They are areas, directions of being.

Uranogeomachia can be dramatic and violent. Sometimes the passion calms down. The battle of Heaven and Earth brings being into being. Truce extinguishes the trembling of being. Heaven is always inclined to war, Earth is always ready to make peace. In peace is the revenge of Earth, since peace is the period of decay. Peace generates nothing, everything that is generated is generated by war.

ANTHROPOTHEOMACHY AXIS

We can try to turn the cross of das Geviert in another way. Then a different vertical axis will appear, a different structure of fundamental-ontological tension will emerge. I have not found such a scheme in Heidegger, but theoretically it is possible if we proceed from the primordially of its arrangement as a "St. Andrew's cross" where one of the upper poles can be taken as the absolute vertical. In the case of the primacy of Heaven, this possibility is confirmed in Heidegger's own manuscripts. But we can try to place the Divine at the top of a vertically arranged cross.




The very symmetry of this image of das Geviert encourages us to place God at the top in the singular. Perhaps Heidegger's lack of exactly

Geviert

This is precisely because of his stubborn unwillingness to answer in any way the question of "the plurality of gods or the existence of a single God". But at the same time he clearly keeps in mind the prospect of a single God in a fundamental-ontological frame of reference, as evidenced by his use of the word "God" in the singular and, in particular, in the conjunction "the last God" (it is "God" and not "gods"). But Heidegger carefully avoids forcing any speech about God for the justified fear of falling into the old metaphysics and ontological theology, which is tantamount to a refusal to philosophize in the space of *another Beginning*. The question of the one God must be decided in the council of the gods, in their trembling, in the sacred inaccessibility of their secret gathering around the hearth of Seyn-existence. We can - and only approximately - judge only the horizon of the divine as that which is revealed within the sacred, the sacred (Heilige). But the sacred (Heilige) is another (poetic) name for Seyn-being.

"Sacral and Seyn-existence - both named the same and not the same (...). Sacral and Seyn-existence - experienced and considered - are the names of the other Beginning"⁽³⁶⁾. Each of these names belongs to a different sphere: one to poetry (the sacred, Heilige), the other to philosophy (Seyn-being). The divine, in relation to the human, resides on the other side of Seyn-being, on the other side of the zone of the sacred (Heilige). Therefore, man in his essence, as a guardian of Seyn-being, always sees the divine only as the farthest horizon and cannot make judgments about the number of gods, their plurality or the presence of only one God. It is not the business of men, it is the business of the gods to count themselves, if counting has any meaning with regard to the gods.

Therefore, it would be more correct to convey this scheme as follows:



In this turn of das Geviert, the maximum opposition and confrontation develops between gods and humans, who in the previous version of das Geviert were seen more as neighbors. Here their relations take on a more hostile character. The gods are at war with humans, attacking them, inflicting plagues and suffering on them, mocking them, despising them. Gods can kill people, mock them, make their lives hell. Sometimes people begin to storm the light, airy citadels of the gods, and sometimes they succeed in killing them ("God is dead, you killed him, you and I," Nietzsche writes). Compared to humans, the gods are immortal, but compared to Seyn-existence, they are mortal, because *Seyn-existence* is an *event* and carries in itself *nothingness* as the possibility of "nothingness,

"destroy." It happens that gods die (as they once did).

"the great Pan died"⁽³⁷⁾). We can recall the biblical story of Jacob wrestling with the angel (God) until dawn.

As we have already said, anthropotheomachy, the struggle between humans and gods, unlike ordinary wars, is ambiguous. The victory of gods over men (defeat of men) means not only the victory of gods, but the victory of men themselves. The gods, who took people as hostages, captives, slaves, liberate people from dependence on *things* and make them truly free for the first time. Related to this is such a concept as "rapture", which literally means "taking to heaven", "kidnapping", "stealing from something higher". Thus, St. Paul the Apostle was "raptured" into the third heaven. The poetic epithet "rapture" once meant the crude fact of a person being taken by the muses or spirits and taken into heavenly captivity.

And vice versa, the victory of people over the gods, the storming of Olympus, leads to the defeat of people, because by destroying, burning the distant horizon of the divine, people lose touch with Seyn-existence, drop it, lose the thread of Geviert, sink into the abyss of *nothingness*. This is not the revenge of the gods, but the self-revelation of people, their conscience, their "ethos" (as the place of the gods in Seyn-being).

It is a victory they should never have won in the first place.

Another conclusion from the contemplation of Geviert in this arrangement is that when the gods are above and men below, then *Heaven and Earth are the same*.

So this time they *have lost* their vertical opposition, they have stopped fighting, they have reconciled; so they *are now together*; so it is their turn to round dance. It means that this time they have lost their vertical opposition, they have stopped fighting, they have reconciled; it means that they are now *together*; it means that it is their turn to circle. This can be called the marriage of Heaven and Earth, their engagement.

When mortal man begins to realize himself on the same vertical axis as the deities, when the flame of anthropotheomachy flares up, then Heaven and Earth are equalized, interlocked in a chaotic coupling, and a sacred marriage takes place.

When one feels the weight of the deity not beside *oneself* (then it is not weight, but on the *contrary*, lightness), but *above oneself, against oneself*, when one is on the line of "polemos" with the gods, Earth and Heaven are equalized and the world falls into chaos (sacred or not).

SEYN-EXISTENCE AS "BETWEEN"

Here it is appropriate to ask the question, *what is* at the center of das Geviert?

In different texts and manuscripts, Heidegger places different things at the intersection of das Geviert's lines, at the center. We have seen that in Heidegger's depiction of an overdrawn Seyn-existence it can be Seyn.



Seyn-existence is between gods and men, between Heaven and Earth. *Between* (Zwischen), *between* (Inzwies- chen) is where Seyn-being is located. If it had a precise localization, we would be dealing with the Sein-being of the old metaphysics. But in fundamental-ontology, Seyn-being has no place; its place is always between places; moreover, "*between*" is the proper name of Seyn-being. But since Seyn-existence is the most basic thing, everything that has a relation to it - above all Geviert himself and his realms - also becomes "*between*", determines its position through its relation to the other.

The meaning of the abyss is that it has no bottom. It is not simply that it is too deep or terribly far away: it does not exist

at all. Thus

and "between" is not "between one and the other." On the contrary,

The "one" and the "other" are contingent directions from this "between", and the proper being of these ends is derived from the relation to this "between".

The intersection of Geviert's axes is the most important thing of all

"between," which means that Seyn-existence hides there and is revealed through that which diverges in all directions from it.


Heidegger warns that Geviert's poles and their struggle with each other cannot be understood as independent entities. "The earth is not a cut-off from the being-in-its-principle. The world is not a cut-off from the being-in-its-principle. Being is not divided into these two segments. The earth is the existence (being in essence, *Wesung*) of the being-in-itself. The world is the existence of the being-in-itself. The earth and the world belong to the Sein-existence of being-in-the-whole, so we can never understand the war between them if we imagine it as a contest or battle between different things."⁽³⁸⁾ Earth is fighting to become the world (Heaven). The world is struggling to bring order to a quiet and rebellious Earth. But both Earth and Heaven (the World) must be thought of from what is "between" them, i.e., from Seyn-being.

GEVIERT AND EREIGNIS

In other cases, Heidegger places Ereignis at the center of Geviert's Geviert. This is not a different picture, but the same picture as before, only Seyn-being is described in it as an *event*, as something singular, unique, finite. Thinking Seyn-being as Ereignis, we find ourselves in the very moment of another Beginning, we begin the Beginning with this thought.

Geviert neither is nor becomes, it happens, it is realized as an event in the dynamic explosion of Seyn-existence. This explosion is something one-time and *seynsgeschichtliche*. Until the event comes true, until another Beginning begins, Geviert is invalid, and we deal only with guesses about it. Geviert is then and to the extent that Ereignis is.

Therefore, in Heidegger we meet with such a scheme⁽³⁹⁾.



Putting Ereignis at the center of Geviert shows its seynsgeschichtliche character. Geviert is not just a being (Seiende) or a being-in-itself. It is being and being-in-its-principle when the event (Ereignis) takes place, when Seyn-being breaks in, when the coming of the last God is realized. This means that it is right to think of Geviert from the perspective of the eschatology of being.

Geviert is an effort, a fundamental ontological breakthrough in which Seyn-existence is recognized as "between" and in no other way. As long as there is no breakthrough, there is no Geviert. This is extremely important to remember in order to correctly understand the structure of Heideggerian thought.

DING.

The third contender to be placed at the center of Geviert's re-baptized fundamental-ontological orientations is the *thing*, *Ding*⁽⁴⁰⁾. Heidegger warns that one should be wary of thinking of the thing at the center of Geviert as something fifth. The intersection of the two axes of das Geviert does not constitute something new; this point has no autonomy. Outside of Geviert - as a dynamic fundamental-ontological model of interaction in living rhythm along both of these axes - it does not exist.

Any thing - for example, the tree we are looking at - *is*, *is* present. And by "being present" it is already, by virtue of this fact of presence, an obligatory *crosshair* of das Geviert. This is why one must perceive any thing correctly, fundamentally-ontologically, as a *crossroads*, testifying to those who pass through it,

axes through it. Only then, being placed in the light of Geviert, does a thing become a thing.

Here it should be remembered that Geviert is the crossroads of two axes along which anthropotheomachy unfolds and uranogeomachy, the war of men and gods, the war of Heaven and Earth. Seyn-existence itself is Heraclitus' πόλεμος ("polemos"),

"the father of things." The thing is therefore the *crossroads of two wars*, or rather a single *war* waged in perpendicular directions. This is the dynamic life

a thing that never happens by itself - it is broken up by the realms of Seyn-existence, overflowing with life or saturated with the breath of death. Therefore, the thing in its fundamental-ontological dimension is not simply there as being, but is realized, happens, expresses itself as Seyn-being, including Seyn-being.

the "nothingness" of power. The thing is therefore dangerous and risky; it is cast into the abyss of a great war. There are no inanimate things in Geviert. All things live here as in a field of continuous unpredictable battle.

The Indo-European etymology of the word "thing" is important here. Latin "res", German "Ding" and Russian "thing" all have in their roots a reference to political-legal procedures. Heidegger asks himself: what is das Ding? And he answers himself: das Ding is a thing *brought* before a thing, a tribal assembly, an agora, in order to decide on the rightness or wrongness, the usefulness or unhelpfulness of what has been brought before it. *Das Ding (the thing) is what is put on trial.* But to what kind of judgment? The judgment, which is a circle of people walking on Earth, under Heaven and in the presence of the signs of the Gods, because all sacred assemblies of the ancient peoples were held in this way. People gathered in a tinge in the presence of the Divine, this gathering of people took place on the Earth under the open sky. What is brought out and put at the center of the discussion is the Ding. Ding is not a symbol, not a sign, not a tool. Ding is the cross-section of all four dimensions of Geviert in one moment, when these dimensions come together to make a fundamental judgment.

Here it is important to turn to Russian etymology. What is the semantic basis of the Russian word "thing"? "Thing" is that

what is brought before the *veche*, what is decided upon. In the same way, the German "Ding" is what is brought to the thing. Interestingly, the Latin "res" originally meant "res". The "cause" is that which has been proposed to the public, to the assembly. Hence "res publica" (Republic). Thus, with the Latins we also find the idea of an assembly, the idea of a fundamental decision with the participation of Earth, Heaven and the Gods. This is not just a metaphor that Heidegger offers us, but an insight into how things really are in thought, in language and in history.

GEVIERT'S GIVES AND GIFTS.

Each direction of Geviert's brings something different to the thing.

Heaven brings into a thing what makes it *that* thing. *Heaven* illuminates it with a light that makes it visible as *this* thing, *such a* thing. Heaven indicates to the thing its place in the world, since Heaven and the world are synonymous in Heidegger's map of fundamental-ontology. A pine tree, for example, is a pine tree because Heaven makes it a pine tree, Heaven highlights it as a pine tree and gives it an ordered dignity.

The *Earth* makes a thing exist, it makes it present, while Heaven makes a thing "just so," a concrete thing and a thing enclosed in the general structure of all things. In the same way, the Earth unites all things because they are all made up of a base, but it also separates them by scattering them over its vastness. Earth and Heaven unite and separate things, but they do so in different ways.

The *divine* bring the *sacred* into the thing. When the gods approach a thing, that thing becomes endowed with their subtle, invisible and intangible vibrations. The thing becomes sacred. A sacred thing is a thing for the gods. The gods are the ones for whom everything is meant. Everything is a sacrifice extended to them. By accepting things, the gods make them light for themselves and weighty for others. Sacred things are the lightest and the heaviest at the same time.

Man brings a chant to a thing, brings its name to it. But the name is not in the sense of "possession," since man in the Geviert'e does not yet "eat" the thing. In Geviert, man poetically *sings the thing* and often drinks (from the sacred sacrificial cup) in order to sing along the way. This is the main point: *man relates to the thing through language*. Man *chants the thing* and *places it in language*, and language places it in *the thing*. Man speaks the thing. Man *creates the thing* in hymn, in poetry⁽⁴¹⁾. Creating means putting it where it is: between Heaven and Earth, before the Gods, and sung by himself. Therefore, from Heidegger's point of view, the essence of the human in relation to things is the singing of things, it is hymn, it is poetry.

Language is not a property of man, man is the form of the presence of language. Language is the essence of the truth of Seyn-being. This is why speech, the utterance, exhausts the highest horizon of man as the "guardian of Seyn-being". And he brings into the thing the most important thing above himself - utterance, naming as a summons to presence.

CHAPTER 2

GEVIERT j`j`j`pš` m`)`ft` h nšqšroftemh" nš mecn

THE WASTELAND IS GROWING

Das Geviert is the world as it is from the side of Seyn-being. It is a fundamentally ontologically understood world. It is therefore the world of the Beginning, that point of Beginning which is, in a certain sense, common to both the *first Beginning* and the *other Beginning*. The first Beginning, until Plato and Aristotle drew unequivocal conclusions from the philosophical revelations and insights of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides in the spirit of metaphysics and ontology (where the essence of being was identified with Sein-existence), remained quite initial, and deviation from fundamental ontology can only be recorded a posteriori. Hence Heidegger's interest in the pre-Socratics - he, a thinker of *another Beginning*, looks at the *first Beginning*, seeking to see in it what makes the Beginning a Beginning, i.e. the initial. This is why his favorite Hölderlin, the poet of the other Beginning, is so close in his worldview to the Greeks and the Greek poets of the first Beginning.

In this sense, Geviert is both the fundamental ontological perspective of the revelation of the world in an event (Ereignis), i.e. the horizon of the eschatology of being and the phenomenon of the passing of the last God, and at the same time a snapshot of the cosmos that was revealed to the first Greek thinkers in the initial movement towards philosophy and poetry.

But beyond this initial moment, Geviert can also be conceptualized, but not as an initial phenomenon and event, but as a platform for a fundamental-ontological critique of non-initial metaphysics and the metaphysics based on that metaphysics

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cosmology. Geviert is only on the side of Seyn-existence, when Seyn-existence is realized in the unique and disposable moment. But when Geviert is not, in other periods characterized by "abandonment by being" (Seinsverlassenheit), it is still, in a sense, there, but only through its reversal, just as in the "abandonment by being" and "forgetting of it" that lead to nihilism, Heidegger reads the message and message (Geschichte) of Seyn-being itself.

With the help of Geviert we can also consider non-Geviert. Or, alternatively, we can consider Geviert as a fundamental ontological map, on which we can measure the scope and characteristics of what Nietzsche called the non-primary concepts of cosmology, anthropology, physics, and theology.

"desertification" (Verwüstung). Desertification in this case would be the desertification of Geviert, the distortion of the proportions between the various "areas of the world", the change of their statuses and positions, their detachment from Seyn-existence, the breaking of the subtle initial connection between them.

The whole history of philosophy, culture and civilization can be described as a process of progressive desertification of Geviert. This would be the seynsgeschichtliche procedure for the correct analysis of history.

THE IDEA IS CLOUDING THE SKY

In the first section of our study ("Seyn und Sein") we described in the most general terms how Heidegger thought of Seynsgeschichte and its stages. Let us now project these stages onto Geviert's map in order to visualize their content more fully.

Heidegger defined the place of Platonism as the *End in the first Beginning*. Here Greek thought makes a radical transition from the very possibility of thinking of *being* (Sein) as something distinct from *being* (Seiende) and fixes the ontological problematic with the essence of being as a "second being" placed above everything else. Ontology is superimposed over ontology in such a way that it does not reveal the *being of being*, but closes it definitively.

access to it. The main instrument of this becomes the doctrine of ideas. If we project this problematic onto Geviert, then Heaven (the world) undergoes the most serious transformation here.

Heaven as the world area of the fundamental-ontological map in the initial Geviert is conceived as open. In this openness of Heaven, in the bottomlessness of its depth, the existence of Seyn-existence is manifested. Plato puts the idea in the place of Heaven. He places the idea not just in Heaven, but in the center of Heaven and, indirectly, instead of Heaven. Being the most existent among all things, the idea overshadows Heaven, replaces it. Heaven itself lies at the foundation of vision, since Heaven is the domain of light and illumination. But the natural and open light of Heaven, which elevates to Seyn-being, is transformed in Plato into the artificial and "closed" light of the idea.

The idea as an expression of the supreme being closes the fundamental-mental-ontological dimension of Heaven and transforms Heaven as a world domain into a metaphysical sphere. It is now the Heaven of metaphysics, in both philosophical and religious senses. According to Heidegger, Platonic metaphysics penetrates Hellenized Judaism through Philo of Alexandria and then through the Greek translation of the Septuagint into Christianity. The heaven of metaphysics is the plan of ontological topics, where the being takes the place of Seyn-existence. And Heaven receives its identity as a logical position, identical only to itself and not identical to anything else (primarily the Earth). The introduction of logic and its laws finally fixes Heaven in ontological statics, and all versions of subsequent metaphysics, up to the New Age and outright nihilism, do not fundamentally change anything in this matter.

Heaven is no longer an existentization of Seyn-being that struggles with another existentization of Seyn-being, the Earth, in a creative and dramatic war-play of mirrors. Heaven is essence, essence, *Seiendheit*, the supreme being, "the most existent" (ὄντως ὄν). The war with the earth continues, but it is no longer a game. It is a war of radical destruction. Hence the origin of τέχνη, *Machenschaft*, "premeditated self-imposed".

THE EARTH TURNED TO MATTER

Symmetrical to this is the transformation of the Earth. The earth in the initial Geviert's is not simply what is below, at the base of the world. It is lower and wider than that. The Earth is also fundamentally ontologically open, though closed in the face of the open Heaven. This secret openness of the Earth is the abyss (Abgrund). The Earth as Grund (foundation, ground, soil) is in its essence (Wesen) Abgrund, abyss, because it is nothing but the existence (Wesung) of Seyn- being. The earth is always lower than can be imagined, this is its life-giving power and its dark terror. When Heaven is replaced by the "idea" (in Aristotle's case, "energy" or "eidos"), the Earth becomes "matter," substance, ὕλη, "wood," the basis for the embodiment of the idea in its concrete. It is still a sacred Earth, a sacred element, but it is already closed from below, it is the bottom, not the abyss, the limit, not the dark power of birth and perdition. But in such an Earth we can already anticipate the scholastic concept of "materia signata quantitate," purely quantitative matter, and the object of New Age metaphysics, right up to the "matter" of the materialists.

In the end, the Earth transforms from a life-giving darkness into entropy, retaliating with a widespread corruption of all that is persistently and aggressively planted by the technical will to power that was once Heaven.

HUMAN BEING

But the main desertification, according to Heidegger, is in man, who begins to think differently, to realize himself differently, to lose his fundamental-mental-ontological horizon. Man, too, becomes closed, appropriates what was the horizon of Seyn-being, the domain of the gods, the speech of the sacred (Heilige). As the "guardian of Seyn-being", the horizons of speech and thought were opened to man - as forms of existence of subtle and distant carefree gods, as flashes of Seyn-being that illuminate humanity through man.

the domain of Geviert. At the end of the first Beginning, man considered it his property, constituting him as a species, although man does not exist as a species, with his particular closed and self-subsistent essence. Man is a place of language, a possible zone of invasion of light gods, a gap in the *being* through which Seyn-being expresses itself as thought. Thus in Geviert. The man of Platonism and of all subsequent Western European metaphysics is a closed man: he asserts his foundation and his self-identity without foundation, insolently appropriating for himself that which has been handed over to him to be reared, honored, and protected. The Logos was god, daimon, the origin of ethics and the horizon of true thinking, the beginning of philosophy. In Geviert, logos possesses man, not man logos. In the anthropology of the Greeks, man is transformed into "ζῷον λόγον ἔχον", "the animal possessing the logos" (note: "ἔχον" is "possessing"). In post-Socratic philosophy, this anthropology, shared only by Sophists (e.g. Protagoras with his "man is the measure of things"), becomes generally accepted. When translated into Latin, we get "animalis rationalis", which does not correspond to anything at all, since it is the same as "human being is the measure of things".

The "ratio" is not even a "logos" but a "reason" present in ordinary, non-philosophizing, non-logos-illuminated people. The same fate befalls daimon, which was Heraclitus' "ethos" of man. Man has taken away

"daimon's "ethos", appropriated it for himself, populated it with istukans, and finally, after two millennia of obsessing over it, discarded it as something empty, along with the Nietzschean analysis of the "genealogy of morality" and the proposal to stand "on the other side of good and evil. The same Nietzsche recorded and "the death of God."

The same happened with language. Instead of understanding its meaning, of deciphering the meaning of Seyn-existence in it, man took it as his own and, through the distortion of imposed logic and grammar, turned it from a place of illumination of Seyn-existence into an instrument of "will to power". Henceforth, he became convinced that thinking, language and divinity were matters entirely within his competence and dependence.

Chapter 2: Geviert as a map of Beginnings and Departures.... - 179 deriving from its own self-identical nature. This is finally established in the Cartesian conception of the self.

of the subject and the New Age metaphysics that followed it.

By asserting himself as a special being, man lost access to his essence, which is constructed through his openness to Seyn-being as something radically different, alternative to the possession of an original essence. Desertification began when man, *instead of singing the thing, began to imagine and create the thing.*

In the Beginning, man chants the *thing*, names it. In Greek it is "ποίησις", which means "creation", "making". When we enter the phase of Platonic thinking, this sacralizing creation through the singing of the thing is transformed into direct production. The "Ποεσις" then becomes not poetry but the feverish creation of a new being, an artificial being in which only man's indomitable will to power is expressed. Man begins to engage in something completely out of his nature, no longer preserving Syn-existence, no longer maintaining harmony in Geviert, but rudely *intervening* in being, cutting it up, knocking out of it what he needs, seeking to subjugate it. Here, from Heidegger's point of view, fundamental decadence begins.

And here we come to a very important feature. According to Heidegger, it is man, among all four directions of Geviert, who is entrusted with the *decision* (Entscheidung). Man is a decisive being, capable of making a choice. And Seynsgeschichte depends on this decision. Man's freedom, his openness, his groundlessness, his split and bottomlessness, his mortality, is that he can decide of his own free will on his vocation to guard Seyn-existence. He can guard it, or he can evade it and leave the guard. This decision is fundamental and is not corrected by anyone or anything the moment it is made. Here Heaven and Earth and the gods are silenced. And even Seyn-existence itself leaves man in free fall, since the freedom entrusted to him is the highlighting of Seyn-existence in that place of being called "man". Man can choose to be or not to be, to exist as a guardian

the truth of Seyn-existence or to be something else and, consequently, someone else. Man has damaged Geviert. He has paved Heaven with ideas and flattened the Earth into matter. He has dispersed, enslaved and killed the gods. He turned against being and chose to forget his mortality. And he was free to do so, because this freedom, this *decision* (Entscheidung) was his domain in Geviert.

But being fully and solely responsible for such a decision, which took shape in the course of the first Beginning and soon acquired the clear features of Platonic metaphysics, being completely free in this decision, man was not free to organize its consequences. He created ontology in the emptiness of his turbulent great will, but he had no power to predetermine the End to which the consequences of the decision led. This is Seynsgeschichte, the sending of fate as the power of Seyn-being, even more powerful than the power of the one whom Seyn-being has endowed with the power of its freedom. This is the eschatology of *being*, which, having fully accepted man's decision in the first Beginning, demonstrated the true content of this *decision* as τέχνη and placed man before the mirror of his nihilistic End. Deciding everything by himself in the total emptiness of the great Initiation, man was not free from only one thing: the End, which this Initiation contained and which became imminent and predetermined exactly at the moment when the content of the decision made in the Initiation became finally clear (although still within the framework of the Initiation).

The man messed up Geviert. And he paid for it with himself.

DISPLACED GODS

The consequences of the fall of the initial Geviert, its spoilage, inevitably touched the fourth domain, the domain of the divine. Heidegger figuratively speaks of it as a The "*flight of the gods*" (Flucht der Göttern). This can be described as a decisive and irreversible human victory in the course of anthropotheomachy.

The theme of killing or death of gods has ancient roots. Many archaic cults are based on the symbolic killing of gods - this was the fate of Dionysus, Adonis,

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Purushi of the Hindus, etc. The idea of god-killing is at the center of the Christian religion as well. Humans can kill god. God can to die.

But even easier and simpler than killing a god is chasing him away. For this purpose, it is not necessary to conduct long and costly military operations, resort to tricks, calculate resources and form detachments, think over defense and offensive strategies. It is enough to close at least one of Geviert's directions, to cut one fragment out of the general fundamental-ontological map of the world, even if it means nothing, and the gods will flee. They do not tolerate rudeness, stupidity, eloquence, lowliness, impoliteness, and, above all, they do not tolerate closed spaces, slammed doors, finished forms, ideas, thoughts, things. The gods are openness and unity. This is the case with Heraclitus' god-logos: if his whisper is not heard and no one hears the unity of being that he reveals, he immediately hides, because the parts cut off from the unity fall away from it to an infinite distance. This is the secret: what the gods fear most of all is stupidity or, what is the same, "living wisdom", "common sense", "practical reason", the Aristotelian "*φρόνησις*". Common sense, sobriety, sobriety, calculation, experience, rationality are the surest weapons against the gods. There are gods where there are wise men and madmen. People who are reasonable and trustworthy are worse than poison to the gods.

Humans won anthropotheomachy as soon as they became just people, "human, too human." This is how the world's disenchantment, its desacralization, began.

CROSSHAIRS

Now let us trace what happens to the crossing point as Geviert moves away from his initial (anfang-liche) state. The transformation of Seyn-being in Platonic and post-Platonic philosophy has already been discussed. Seyn-existence begins to be thought of as Sein-existence and as "the most being" (*ὄντως ὄν*). In the end, it is the being (Seiende), however "supreme" it may be, that is at the center of it

Geviert was. At the same time, the center of *Geviert* is autonomized. It is not thought of as the intersection of two dynam-

This autonomization creates a new map of philosophy, which ceases to be fundamental-ontological and becomes ontological. This autonomization creates a new map of philosophy, which ceases to be fundamental-ontological and becomes ontological. By fixing this point of the "essence", "essence", "essence", we can move away from *Geviert* and his world domains and build, starting from this point, other geometrical maps of thinking.

To an even greater extent, these transformations of *Geviert* affect *Ereignis*, the event, which we also located at the intersection of axes. This point is no longer thought of as *Ereignis*, the event. The singularity, the uniqueness, the rarity of *Ereignis* as the explosion of *Seyn*-being in its most direct and initial expression disappears. *Seyn*-being ceases to be an event, ceases to happen. It is henceforth thought of as something permanent, "eternal," "always present," "guaranteed," "at hand," as a secured, universal, and empty ontological apriori. Being outside the Beginning is never *Ereignis*, this is the most profound characteristic of non-beginning (old) ontology. In place of the event is its negation, something opposite to the event, something that does not come true, does not happen, but is always there. Instead of freshness, out-of-date, lightning-fastness and novelty, we are dealing with habituality, constancy, banality and a priori.

The third thing that we had previously located in the of *Geviert*'s center, is the thing, the *Ding*. From a simple and super-saturated expression of *Seyn*-existence as war (πόλεμος), from a question submitted to the assembly of Heaven, Earth, gods and men, which requires a vital decision, it has turned into something artificial, into a sign, a symbol, into a composite being divided into idea, form, essence and matter, into a substance endowed with secondary properties or qualities - accidents.

We can summarize all these transformations of *Geviert* at the End of the Great Beginning in the following diagram.

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The sky is becoming
a place where ideas flutter,
from the obscuring Seyn-existence.
The sky is closing in with ideas

The living gods are moving away,
fleeing

~~Seyn-existence is replaced by
essence (Sein als Seiendheit) The
thing becomes a symbol, unfolds
into a
mold
and Ereignis' matter
is not happening,
Seyn-existence no longer comes true,
no longer happens~~

Man imposes himself
matter and transforms into being(ὄλη) and loses its dimension
into a *representation*

The earth is thought of as
abyss

GEVIERT AND SCHOLASTICISM

In the period of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Geviert ceases to be Geviert proper, its structure falls apart, the Quadrilateral ceases to be quaternary, and we map Geviert onto the new structure of post-Platonic ontology only to trace the correspondences between the fundamental ontological proportions and relations characteristic of the Initiation and their later distortions.

Geviert deviates even more from its original structure in the period of the dominance of Christian theology and scholastic philosophy. According to Heidegger, this period does not bring anything fundamentally new to the Platonic ontology, where the idea as "essence" stands above all things, but supplements this ontology with the theological concept of one God as the highest of beings, the supreme being, who is at the same time the Creator and Maker of the rest (inferior) of beings. Heidegger believes that we are dealing with the next level of absolutization of the principle of τέχνη, when the whole of existence begins to be thought of as a counterpart of the τέχνη principle.

The demiurge, the master who creates things and objects, is recognized as the supreme being.

There is an impassable gulf between the world and its Creator, as between the potter and the pot he has made. The fundamental-ontological approaches that animated Geviert, the subtle differences, the dramatic wars and, at the same time, the inner unity of Geviert's world areas - all of this is incompatible with the creationist metaphysics of theology and scholastic philosophy. It is no accident that the Christian period of Western history is marked by Three, not Four. The ontological structure is thus further modified, and the comparison of the new theological ontology and cosmology with Geviert becomes more and more difficult. Nevertheless, some parallels can be established.

The most important thing in theology is the qualitative change in the status of the divine. Instead of gods and the open question of the possibility of a single God, strict monotheism is postulated as an absolute axiom without any doubt. God is absolute subject and absolute object. He is the supreme being, simultaneously being and creator of being (as being of the world). Between the world and God is a relationship of strict transcendence. God has no common measure with the world, he is forbidden. The world is created by him out of *nothingness* and has no prospects to qualitatively change its nature.

"insignificant" quality. The relationship between people and God becomes strictly legal and moral. God makes a covenant (a kind of contract) with people and strictly monitors its observance, penalizing violators and rewarding those who strictly adhere to its points.

The god of monotheism had nothing to do with the gods of Geviert. These gods were part of the world; their number could not be counted; they were mobile, volatile, and subtle; in regard to them it was more correct to say that they were *not essence*, but at the same time *not essence* either. The God of theology is not a part of the world, but its Creator; He is strictly one; He is immobile and eternal, always equal to Himself; He is, and what is more, He is the One who is. From the philosophical point of view it is easy to recognize in him Plato's supreme idea, furnished with additional properties and attributes. From the philosophical point of view religion is added-

Geviert *adds* very few details to its structure. The whole topicality of thought remains the same - metaphysical and ontological.

Such a view of God breaks Geviert, turns it into an asymmetrical scheme, at the head of which God stands at an absolute and immeasurable distance from everything else. On the other side of the transcendent God is the Earth. But it is certainly no longer the Earth we saw in the Beginning, nor even the *ὕλη*, substance, matter, which the Greek philosophers considered. The earth is henceforth only dust, expressing nothingness, the very nothing from which the transient, temporal and decaying world was created. In scholasticism, matter was divided into two kinds: *materia prima* and *materia secunda*. The former was something analogous to what the world was made of, and the latter was a plastic substance responsible for the bodily tangibility and concrete perception of created things. Everything that is not God became Earth.

It is indicative that Heaven was henceforth also called "firmament", i.e. soil, earth, albeit a special, heavenly earth. If we recall that in Geviert the Earth acts as the beginning of closure, closing, but also preservation, shelter, then the Earth in creationism as *materia* (*prima* and *secunda*) remains only closure, but loses the property of preservation, shelter.

Materia as an expression of *nothing* neither preserves nor shelters anything. On the contrary, it brings mortality and decay to things. The words of the Psalmist, "We are as feathers"⁽⁴²⁾ tell us only this: created from earth (feathers, clay, dust,

corruptible), man is nothing more than corruptible.

Both Heaven (the world) and man are now creatures, created entities, *ens creatum*. In a certain sense, as a given, the Earth itself is *ens creatum*. All created things are in a sense earthly. Heaven and its inhabitants (angels) are recognized as having a certain primacy within the general hierarchy of creatures, but Heaven no longer possesses any ontological particularity. Heidegger's *Seynsgeschichtliche* function of Heaven (the world) is replaced by Divine Providence, which organizes the world order according to a creative, soteriological and eschatological scenario.

The negative equalization of the three participants of Geviert in the face of the transcendent God also has a "positive" side, concentrated in soteriology, the doctrine of the salvation of the soul. Man, though created from nothing, "fingered", is able to address God directly: neither the latitude of the Earth nor the height of Heaven are barriers for him anymore. The absolute remoteness of God is apophatically revealed as his nearness. In Christianity, this is complemented by another essential doctrinal position: The Incarnation. God the Creator himself, in one of his Persons, becomes incarnate in human nature, opening to man the path of deification.

Therefore man, while remaining a creature and "earthly", "fingered", is placed above the rest of the creature, and even in some ways above Heaven. The way to Heaven is opened to him by Christ.


But for Heidegger, theological statements are only movements in the space of Platonic metaphysics, where the fundamental ontological problematic is impossible. Heidegger, therefore, does not pay much attention to the analysis of theology, viewing the Christian period in the history of Western European philosophy as a prolonged interlude between Plato and Aristotle on the one hand and the New Age on the other.

As for the point of intersection of Geviert's axes, where we located Seyn-being, Ereignis and thing, this point in theology is also transformed. Being ceases to be not only Seyn but also Sein, dividing into two parts - the being of God (as supreme being) and the being of the world as creaturely being. In such a situation, the question of being as such cannot be posed in a correct, in Heidegger's opinion, form at all. And in this he sees the sign of the "removal of being," the "abandonment by the being of the world" (Seinsverlassenheit), the "oblivion of being." Ereignis, which disappeared from the horizon of philosophy immediately after the Beginning (moreover, Heidegger tends to believe that Ereignis is not a property of any Beginning at all, but of *another Beginning*, and therefore it should be placed at the center of Geviert with this correction in mind), does not appear in the theological picture of the world either, although unlike Plato, in Christianity we encounter an event of absolute significance for the entire Christian faith. Such an event is the Pri-

Chapter 2: Geviert as a map of Initiation and Departure.... - 187 procession of Christ, God the Word (Logos). It would be quite incorrect to consider Christian cosmology as a special edition of Geviert with the event (Ereignis) of Christ's return at its center. Heidegger understands Ereignis quite differently and associates it not with soteriology but with fundamental ontology. But this parallel cannot be overlooked, although its correct interpretation would require an in-depth excursion into theology.

Finally, as for the thing, it is here transformed into a creature, ens creatum, and its ontological meaning is fully coincident with its place in the hierarchy of creation; this is what its identity is reduced to. Scholasticism generally accepts the Aristotelian theory of the thing (form and matter), but the general creationist perspective unambiguously interprets the thing as a *created* thing. While with Aristotle τέχνη is still, in a sense, man's imitation of the creative power of φύσις, with Thomas Aquinas nature itself (Natura) imitates the technical mastery of the Godhead. The proportions between nature and culture shift significantly in favor of culture, and human production, elevated to the degree of divinity, becomes the model and paradigm for understanding the processes of nature, which in turn begins to be thought of as a huge mechanism or apparatus created by the Creator. Thus, in general, the idea of the thing as ens creatum, res creata, brings us significantly closer to the subsequent triumph of what Heidegger called "Machenschaft".

We can summarize Geviert's change in scholastic theology in the following diagram.



In this scheme, attention should be paid to the fact that the very structure of Christian theology resists its representation in the quadrilateral figure, despite the fact that the figure of the Cross is the main sign of Christianity. Although many exegetical and mystical texts have been written about the meaning and symbolism of the quadripartite figure of the Cross, and the connection of this symbol with the various doctrines of the fourfold structure of the world (four seasons, four elements, four sides of the world, four evangelists, etc.) is self-evident, it has nothing to do with the essence of Christian ontology.

GEVIERT IN NEW AGE METAPHYSICS

The philosophy of the New Age is usually traced back to G. Galileo, F. Bacon, I. Newton, B. Spinoza and especially R. Descartes. After a long period dominated by theology and scholastic (selective) Aristotelianism, taken in Latin translation (which missed many important aspects of Greek thinking proper), Western Europe turned to a new style of philosophizing, which aimed to free itself from medieval dogmatism, scholastic Aristotelianism and the pressure of theological axioms. The Protestant Reformation, which challenged Catholic dogmatism and the hitherto unquestioned autonomy of the Church, created favorable conditions for this.

Heidegger, however, emphasizes that along with the really "new" (as compared to the Middle Ages) elements of this philosophy, we see in it the continuation, development and affirmation of the same Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics, the same categorical thinking with reference to ontology, the essence of being, the idea, and so on. The New Age did not overcome the old metaphysics, but only brought its premises to their logical conclusion, deduced and manifested all the corollaries embedded in it. That is why in the philosophy of the New Age we find both traces of the centuries-long work of the scholastic mode of thought and the resurfacing of deeper, Western European paradigms, which were able to manifest themselves with greater clarity, frankness, and distinctness.

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From its first manifestos and programs, the New Age revealed itself as a time of τέχνη, of technology, and from now on the main pole of technology was shifted from the medieval Creator God to man himself, who, since the Renaissance, had become the main "creator" of culture, society, the economic system, politics, etc.

We have shown that, according to Heidegger, it was man who has entrusted with the decision (Entscheidung) that predetermined the course of the formation of the first Beginning, the fate of Western European thought and, consequently, Western European history (Geschichte). It is man who is responsible for

"Gevært's spoilage". In Modern times, this circumstance, veiled in the scholastic era, is fully revealed. It reaches its culmination in the philosophy of René Descartes. Descartes calls the human ego, the thinking ego (res cogens), the main authority in making ontological judgments about being, which is expressed in his formula

"cogito ergo sum". This is the philosophical topicality of the subject ontologically constituting the object (and God in deism) by its thinking. Being a radically new movement of thought, from a formal point of view, this turn, in fact, only revealed the main message of the original Greek philosophy, where behind the great generalizations, gods, elements, ideas and cosmogonic constructions there already glimmered the premonitory shadow of the future subject, which was then called by other names - ψυχή, νοῦς etc. The Renaissance therefore rediscovered the ancient Greek authors with a new pathos, in most cases interpreting their thought incorrectly and simplistically. The philosophers of the Renaissance intuitively guessed that the coming epoch in Europe was profoundly linked to the period of the First Beginning, representing, in a sense, its mirror image. Hence the influence of Democritus' ideas on Galileo and Gassendi, of Plato on Nicholas of Cusa, of the Neoplatonic Academy in Florence (Gemistus Plethon, Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, etc.), of the surge of interest in the Miletian school, Parmenides, Epicurus, Lucretius, and so on.

The New Age was the time of *the beginning of the End*, just as Plato and Aristotle represented the age of the *End*

of the first Beginning. The Beginning was reflected in the End. This is even more evident in those Western European philosophers who summarized the metaphysics of the New Age, Hegel and Nietzsche, both of whom turn assiduously and continuously to the Greeks (especially the pre-Socratics and especially Heraclitus).

What do we get if we superimpose Geviert's topica on the philosophical scheme of the New Age?

The subject takes the place of the human being. The subject is the figure that is placed at the center of the whole ontological construction. The subject is the essence (essentia, οὐσία) of man, identical with his capacity for reasoning and rational activity. From all points of view the subject is a direct construction of the old metaphysical topics. First, it refers to *essence*, which immediately refers us to the Platonic *idea* that replaces Seyn-existence. Essentialist thinking and the essentialist interpretation of man as a *generalizing essence* (species-ἔδος) is further strengthened in Christian theology. Therefore, the subject rests on this entire metaphysical basis. Secondly, the subject is based on the definition of man as "animalis rationalis", "thinking animal". As for "animalis", this would later be taken up by Darwin and evolutionists, up to ethology (C. Lorenz), and "rationalis" will make the main property of the subject already De carte, identifying reason with the essence of man.

But at the same time, the innovation of this philosophy lies in the fact that the foregrounding of the subject frees it (as the last philosophical edition of man) from dependence on any higher ontological instances and, above all, on *being*, which henceforth becomes derived from the subject's judgment: the subject's thinking is the *proof of* its being, hence, being is a function of thinking and subjectivity. This theme will be further developed by Kant, who will further purify the philosophical topics of the New Age by formalizing the construction of "pure reason", i.e. the autonomous structure of the same rationalis.


Man as a subject transforms everything else into what he himself is not - into an object. The concept of the object is not-

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is discontinuously connected with the subject. The object is that which lies in *front of the subject*, that which precedes it (hence the German word "Geviert").

Gegen-stand, "standing opposite" or Russian "pre-met" - that which is "thrown in front of something"). Therefore, all the other members of Geviert - Earth, Heaven, God - become objects in this system of coordinates (and we are talking about God reinterpreted from the theological context, about God in the singular, although in the Renaissance there were timid attempts to turn to a peculiar version of polytheism - in B. Telesio's hylozoism, G. Bruno's pantheism, and the alchemical tradition, up to Spinoza and, later, the German Romantics). Their objectivity is different: God is the object of the highest order, the Primordial, whose existence the intellect postulates when thinking about its own origin; the Earth and Heaven together constitute the object of the lowest order, something spatial (according to Descartes), *res extensa*, "extended thing". Substantial identity of Heaven and Earth, i.e. the earthly (material, corporeal) nature of Heaven, was primarily substantiated by English empirical philosophy, first of all by I. Newton.

Thus, in the philosophy of the New Age we get the following disfiguration of Geviert.



We see that in this case the structure of Geviert was even more distorted. Heaven was merged with the Earth: the nature of heavenly bodies was recognized as strictly analogous to the nature of terrestrial bodies (which was denied by all previous philo-

The judgment of the existence of the object (both higher and lower) became a matter for the subject. The judgment of the existence of the object (both higher and lower) became the subject's business. The God of deism was gradually deprived of the properties of the subject and became a mental abstraction (it is not surprising that at the next stage the philosophy of the New Age would discard it altogether).

This philosophical topics of the New Age is fundamental, because in its basic parameters it represents a map of the End, the last stage of the decomposition of Geviert, which had previously retained some correlation with its original appearance.

GESTELL AS FATE

Here we come to the key concept of Heidegger's philosophy in the last period of his work - the concept of the "Gestell" (literally: "po-stav", but also "su-stav"). Gestell can be seen as a fundamental seynsge- schichtliche work of destruction (distortion, disintegration) of Geviert. Without considering the stages of Geviert's deformation and crushing, Gestell is incomprehensible. Gestell is Verwüstung, "desertification," an inexorably impending catastrophe, but at the same time an action through which the man of the West realizes his history (destiny, Geschichte).

Man substitutes the thing first with a symbol, then with a created thing, then with an object, a pre-measure. This is how the world is gradually being commodified. The object is no longer a thing, but a distant derivative of a thing.

When man is no longer able to constitute and sing the *thing* (Ding) in its sacredness, in its presence, in its poetry, he reproduces the *object* (Gegenstand). The subject is not just another name for *the thing*. *The subject is the end of the thing*, when instead of the intersection of the two life-giving axes of war in Geviert we are dealing with artificial, still-born constructions of the human race.

Gestell is the fundamental work of man's essence in destroying Geviert. From a poet, a man turns into "proletarian" into "producer" and at a certain stage does not want to know anything else but economics.

And it all began with poetry... Man is so disconnected from the *world* and its domains, from the free and proud *being of-*Wesung (Wesung) *of a thing*, that he deals only with artificial objects, which are entirely at his will, since he produces them himself. In this production there is no place for *Heaven, Earth, gods or God*. Man reigns here, and only man as a *subject* (economic subject, legal subject, political subject, etc.). Gradually, he begins to be irritated not just by natural things (which he tries to eradicate as a class), but by various things produced by himself. They turn out to be too "spontaneous", "original", and thus "free" and "autonomous", i.e. independent of his will. This is why man is gradually moving towards mass, serial production, "the perpetual production of the same thing" - "ewige Herstellung der Gleichen". This is the industrial-economic version of Nietzsche's "eternal return".

Gestell is a fundamental phenomenon for Heidegger. Gestell is the destiny of man. *Gestell is the essence of the human being* on the way to the unfolding of the consequences of the *decision* made in the *first Beginning*. Gestell is the direct opposite of Geviert, its alternative and the process of its distortion, destruction, overthrow⁽⁴³⁾. But at the same time, through this destruction itself, Heidegger hears the voice of Seyn-existence. This voice is silence, "abandonment by being" (Seinsverlassenheit), concealment (Verbergen), but it can and must be heard and deciphered. Gestell is the deep essence of τέχνη and Machenschaft. And as essence (Wesen) it is related to Seyn-being. Seyn-being exists (west) through this essence.

Heidegger speaks of the "war of Seyn-being with being"⁽⁴⁴⁾. This war is based on the fact that the relation between Seyn-being and being is problematic and non-obvious. It is that which more than anything else deserves to be *questioned*. If questioning is not properly constituted, if it becomes one of the questions along with others, if it is answered too hastily or incorrectly - and in all cases, the decision is made by the human being as the bearer of speech as a form of Seyn-existence.

of being, - then Seyn-existence enters into war with being. The name of this war is Gestell.

Here we approach the most important topic: *how to think nihilism and the catastrophe of the End of Philosophy in a non-dual way?*

In the dual scheme, Geviert is thought of as authentic and Gestell as inauthentic; Geviert opens the Beginning, Gestell is the work of approaching the End. But Heidegger leads us in every way to see that such dual thinking is fundamentally wrong. It can never solve a philosophical problem or even correctly pose it. *Thinking must be non-dual* and, if you will, non-logical. Opposites should not just be overcome by synthesis (as something third), they should be thought of simultaneously as opposites and non-opposites.

Geviert is a world in which Seyn-being is honored, a world seen fundamentally ontologically as it *exists* (west) *in essence* (Wesen). Gestell is a persistent, centuries-long and purposeful effort to destroy, distort and annihilate such a world, a monadic oblivion of Seyn-being, a series of foolishly formulated questions and even more foolish answers. Gestell is man's total failure, his catastrophe, his failure, his self-denial, his unfulfilled task, his never-ending end, his unconscious as such dying and killing everything around him. How do we reconcile these? How to see in both the steady and quiet voice of Seyn-being? How to recognize *fate* (Geschick - Geschichte) in this?

Gestell is the essence of the inauthentic composition of the world. It appears as the skeleton of the world when Seyn-existence is wrongly thought of as Sein-existence. Seyn-being is revealed as Ereignis in Geviert; Sein-being is revealed as routine in Gestell. But for all the fundamental - the most fundamental of all - opposites of Seyn and Sein, they are not different, but in the ultimate horizon they are one and the same.

It's not a simple thought. It is perhaps the most difficult of thoughts. But in conceptualizing this thought lies the key to the entire philosophy of Martin Heidegger.

INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE QUADRILATERAL

From a philosophical point of view, Gestell fully reveals itself in the metaphysical topicality of the New Age, together with Descartes, and here we could theoretically end the analysis of Geviert's deformation in Western European thinking. But for the sake of clarity, we can also trace the more concrete transformations that occur when the New Age is transformed from a philosophical program into political, social, ideological and economic practice. This examination provides some visual images and figures to facilitate the understanding of speculative philosophical problems.

The New Age reaches its peak with industrialization, which puts into practice the basic tendencies that had been developed with all candor in the philosophy of the Modern Age. During this period, Geviert's world domains undergo visible changes, the basic content of which, however, could be easily detected already in Descartes. But there is still a certain distance between the *beginning of the End* and the *End* itself.

The most significant change concerns God. At the End of Philosophy, "God dies." In this way, a whole area of the world, which, from Geviert to Descartes, had been present in one way or another in the philosophical topicality, collapses. Nietzsche's phrase "God is dead" means the radical removal from the ontological picture not only of the concrete figure of God, but of the entire dimension that had previously been necessarily present in the philosophical topicality, and in theology had been the basis of the entire ontological construction. "God is dead" means not merely the redrawing of the supreme being, the divine Person, but the annulment of an entire dimension, a separate world domain, which was both in Geviert and in all the major ontological maps. This is the real end of the Geviert (the Quadrilateral), so that one of the four dimensions disappears in the most radical way. This is called

"Atheism", the refusal to recognize God. Heidegger shows that atheism, while radically changing its ontological focus, still remains within the framework of Western Europeanism.

metaphysics, because the annulled dimension is replaced by another one, scalped from the previous one - it is either matter (for materialists and Marxists) or "nothingness" (for agnostics) or utility, value, accommodation (for utilitarians, liberals and philosophers of life). The empty space left where the divine used to be fulfills the same role in the metaphysics of the industrial world as the divine used to fulfill. It continues to be the source of the ultimate legitimization, the ultimate soft nod that signifies "divine" approval, acceptance, assent. It is only henceforth that the insignificance of this legitimization allows us to speak of "legitimization by nothing. *Nothing* approves or condemns the destiny of man. Those who can face the truth formulate it verbatim: "Nothing approves or condemns". Those from whom the tragedy of the situation eludes them prefer to put it this way:

"Nothing approves or condemns". The former refers to conscious nihilists (Conservative Revolution, fascism), the latter to unconscious nihilists (communism, liberalism).

Beginning with Plato, Heaven was the receptacle of ideas, and later in Christianity, Heaven became the throne of God, although Christianity recognizes it as "created". Newtonian cosmology equates Heaven with the Earth in principle, in the quality of common substance, common substance, but finally Heaven as Heaven disappears in the era of industrialization, the triumph of science and technology - through space flight and penetration into the depths of matter, quantum mechanics, relativity, field theory, etc. Heaven as Heaven no longer exists. Everywhere man encounters only terrestrial matter, matter⁽⁴⁵⁾. Satellites have paved Heaven with flashing machines, iron bodies and all-pervading radio waves, completing the desacralization that Platonic ideas began. Satellites are the *ideas* of the industrial age.

The earth has also ceased to be *earth*. Its crops are forced out of it, it is poisoned with chemicals to achieve the impossible; it is blown deep holes to reach its black oil blood, its insides are cut open to deprive it of its breathing gas. Earth

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becomes a "resource", i.e. something that must be scooped out and destroyed, reduced to "nothing", given to entropy. If earlier the Earth principle itself was a gentle female sabotage of the celestial order, today the Earth itself is dusted, mercilessly raped, ruined, devastated, poisoned, sprayed with acids and wastes of civilization, scorched and tortured.


The man of the industrial age is farther from Geviert's man than it is possible to imagine. He has inflated his subjectivity so much that he has made himself microscopic, infinitesimal, nothing. Nietzsche wrote about this when he spoke of the "last men." The last people are the people of the End. Producing mountains of garbage, they become garbage themselves.

The *thing* becomes an industrial product, a commodity, i.e. it no longer exists at a meeting, in the midst of a holy assembly, but exclusively on the *market*. Some people produce things, others resell, others consume, and all of them together create a single stream of late-human, late-historical mechanisms - production, consumption, thirst, experiences, desires.

The proletarians and the bourgeoisie are finally destroying what had been destroyed before them by the titans of Antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the heroic beginning of the New Age. Geviert has been collapsed by giants, and the "last men" are only rummaging among the ruins, scavenging what they can.

Man becomes a man of production, a man of trade, a man of consumption. Homo economicus. It is no longer man as a subject who becomes the master of the world game, but Gestell himself, who replaces being, event, thing, person, and everything else. Industrial production becomes the destiny of homo economicus and predetermines the most significant aspects of the industrial age: the hysterical accumulation of capital and the attempts to redistribute what is produced in its favor by the revolutionary proletariat.

The industrial topicality can be displayed in the following diagram.



From a formal point of view, it looks completely "new" in comparison with the Cartesian metaphysics. But from a philosophical point of view, the industrial age does not add anything fundamental - in general, philosophical terms, it was already clear from Descartes and Newton, who predetermined the New Age in its qualitative limits.

SIMULACR.

Another phase follows in Western European history. Heidegger, however, did not live to see it. We are talking about Post-modernity, where the whole topicality - once again - undergoes significant changes. In the post-industrial landscape of civilization, certain thinkers (Fukuyama) have announced the "end of history" (Geschichte), while acknowledging that the realization of this end as an ontological phenomenon will not take place, and therefore the End will be "infinite". Once it comes, it will not come, it will not take place, it will not come true, because there will no longer be a person capable of deciding that the end is the End and of taking responsibility for this profound finitude of the End. The same Nietzsche spoke about

"the last men." "His kind is as ineradicable as an earth flea; the last man lives the longest. "Happiness has been found by us," the last people say, and blink"⁽⁴⁶⁾. It is indicative that F. Fukuyama, who proclaimed "the end of history", mentioned in the title of his book "the last man" as well.

his man"⁽⁴⁷⁾.

Geviert's major world domains (Weltgegenden) can also be found in the Postmodern, but this is not a sight for the faint of heart.

Instead of Heaven, there is a huge screen of an advertising billboard, a computer, a transparent window. On it are projected the dark desires of the subject, previously squeezed under the threshold of perception by the stoic work of knowledge. This animalis, freed from rationalis, makes itself known. But is there such an animalis in being? Are animals, "living," "ζῷον," capable of doing and desiring such vile things as the last men? It is not animalis, but the mechanical perverted dream of the disembodied man that creates the images on the screen. He overthrows reason and wants to be an animal, but cannot be because he is not an animal. Who is? After all, you can't call "it" a "person" in any of the topics we know of. He is not an "animal" because he is nobody, and his goal is not to become somebody, but, without becoming nobody, to break through to Seyn-existence to give its luminescence speech. By not accomplishing this, by asserting himself as a person, man is already making an irreparable mistake. Instead of questioning his identity, he gives a hasty and deliberately wrong answer. This creates a humanity that does not exist. It is therefore not surprising that such humanity does not last long and collapses at some point (at the moment of the Postmodern) into a new chimera - the man-beast. Unable to be human (this being as a strict formula is itself a delusion), the last man in despair rushes to the figures of the Christian Apocalypse, to those places where the "beast" and its number are mentioned. Since the last man can do nothing else but count, he tries to "count the number of the beast", guessing that in this way he will find himself in the "beast". Beast-like and demon-being are the last illusions of the last man, since he is neither beast nor demon.

Man is becoming posthuman. On the one hand, he is a superhuman technician, cleverly thinking, engaged in web 2.0, capable of piling up streams of information data. On the other hand, he is a subhuman, also a variation of the posthuman: he is a consumer, a user, poking his finger and eye at the "friendly interface", pe-

It is no longer able to absorb the text. No longer able to comprehend text, he simply searches databases for what is more relevant to his concept of "now". It is a constant internalized wandering through simulated, winking objects, when, looking at the screen, it is impossible to understand whether these are screen images or whether off-line has begun, or whether he is still communicating with someone via ICQ.

But let us leave this terrible subject to the exact qualifications of our contemporaries, which Heidegger, thank God, did not live to see.

The earth disappears in the ease of communication, all places become the same, and utopia is realized. *Utopia is where there is no place*. From Heidegger's perspective, the Earth reveals itself through place. The earth is *place*, natural place. But today there are no places, today there are no distances, nothing is separated from each other, all the places, cities, points and McDonald's of the globe are exactly the same, the same people with earrings in their ears are sitting there, chatting, drinking beer, surfing the Internet, smoking light drugs.

The Earth also no longer exists, it has become a virtual space where the most *distant* is *trivial* and the *closest* simply does not exist. Everything that the Earth did at all stages of its participation in Geviert and later, in other philosophical currents, is no longer needed. The Earth is no longer a resource, but a repository of waste. It is fought for as a place to store garbage, including human garbage - the very "last people" who have "found happiness". The earth is now where waste is buried, be it radioactive waste, industrial waste, the bodies of the dead or their burnt ashes.

God becomes a joke. He returns from modernist nothingness in the form of a silly caricature. He is no longer even persecuted or killed. His death has lost all significance and is therefore forgotten. Not that he is resurrected, but he reappears, as if nothing had happened, as an independent dead man.

God can be talked about today, or it can be kept silent. No one is interested in God, and if anyone is interested, it is no more than the affairs of a popular actor or a supermodel. No, the affairs of a popular actor or a supermodel are interesting-

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are much more than God. And yet he returns, but this time as a parody, as a mockery of his death, which has been forgotten, lost all meaning. "Who-who did you say died?"

Bin Laden appears on TV screens and says to the cameras, "Allahu Akbar!" "Allah is great!" They immediately try to catch him, but they can't catch him. He is nowhere, he is elusive, he is out of place, in the utopia of the television screen. The chase becomes a detective story. Bin Laden and Allah change places, but the audience's tension does not subside.

"When will he be caught?"

Who? Allah? Bin Laden? Saddam Hussein? Mullah Omar?

Asked why he made the decision to attack Iraq, former U.S. President J. Bush Jr. proclaimed: "God told me, strike Iraq!" (We neither resent nor marvel at it anymore. We take it for granted. He is the president of the United States, the most powerful and successful democracy in the world, and he may well get a call from God himself.

If in the previous stage of *desertification* (in Modernity) someone had said that "God is not dead", he would have been put in a psychiatric hospital. But now, in the Postmodern era, whatever one says about "God" or not about "God" is accepted. From the last indifference.

Things turn into simulacra (J. Baudrillard). They become a derivative of fashion, in which, as in its latest incarnation, Gestell catches up with us and covers us with its head.

The thing ends its journey. It is now a *simulacrum*, no longer an idea, a sign, an object, or even a commodity, but a pure embodied deception. The commodity in which the thing dies still retains its connection to production, its usefulness, its last rationality. But this too comes to an end. The simulacrum, as Baudrillard defines it, is

A "copy without an original", like a photocopy of such poor quality that the imagination can guess whatever it wants - a portrait of the president, a female figure, a landscape or an artistic text. Instead of a thing, the post-modernist claims Rorschach stains, meaningless and un-

a necessary blot, useless and empty, but by virtue of the endless will to power of fashion elevated into an absolute categorical imperative.

The laws of fashion as the highest level of Postmodern Gestell proclaim:

- things live in the moment;
- things are supposed to be meaningless, that's the point;
- things have to change;
- after a thing, there's only another thing;
- identical things are different;
- the thing is everything, the rest is nothing;
- the thing doesn't die, it's thrown away;
- a larger-than-life thing.

The shorter the life of a simulacrum, the more intense it is. The right postmodern shoes are those that are worn once. This is the logic of fashion (Gestell), it's getting faster and faster. People used to wear things for several years, now it's a season or even half a season, but that's not the limit. Changing things at a breakneck speed is a factory of the death of things, their systematic and systematized genocide. Behind the entropy of things, behind the transition to the regime of total simulacra is the readiness of culture for the final destruction of Geviert.


Instead of being, we are now dealing with "virtual reality". The very notion of "reality" in New Age metaphysics is highly "virtual" in the sense that it is fictitious and ontologically unfounded. When the subject postulates what it has before it as an object, it has already performed the highly questionable operation of ontologically justifying the reality of that object. The object is objective (it is "really") because it is an object, i.e. etymologically because it is "before me" (the subject). In Descartes, Newton, Hume, and Kant, this seems serious and solemn, with that pompous pathos with which limited minds usually proclaim the next ill-conceived absurdity and nonsense. But even more limited creatures easily buy into these scholarly fairy tales of reality and wander in the maze of such categories for centuries. Transition from reality to virtuality or virtual reality

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is the transition from a joke taken seriously to a joke that should (can) be laughed at. Virtual reality simply makes the idea of the object absurd, thereby making the idea of the subject absurd. This is "grinning nothingness".

It is difficult to depict a Postmodern topicality. But it is possible to propose as a hypothesis such a (controversial) variant.

Virtual reality - screen - connectedness



The sky is like
wandering place of emitting
signals
of iron satellites (+ astronauts)

This topiary is so creepy it could be called
"post-eschatological."

CHAPTER 3

GEVIERT b dprcnl m`)'fte

GEVIERT AND THE HORIZON OF THE FUTURE

We have seen Geviert as a possibility in the *first Beginning* and as a fundamental ontological map that allows us to better understand the processes that move Western European philosophy towards its End. But in Heidegger's own mind, Geviert belongs to the realm of the "future," which is to be realized in another Beginning, at the moment of Ereignis. Although certain parallels with the first Beginning, while it had not yet reached the moment of Platonic topicality, were appropriate, Geviert itself is something that has never happened in the form in which it is to be realized in the future.

Fundamental-ontology for Heidegger is a project (Entwurf) built on the realization of the hidden message of Seyn-being through the entire history (Geschichte) of Western thought - a message consisting in the worsening *concealment of being*. And so Geviert should be thought of as a *horizon* and, in a sense, a goal.

Our time is the *time of decision* (Entscheidung), Heidegger thought. It is also a time of death, a grave hour. The essence of the decision is this: either Western humanity realizes that its history was the consequence of a choice made in the first Beginning and accepts the consequences.

"oblivion of being," recognizes the nihilism embedded in τέχνη and Gestell, or this humanity continues to pretend that "everything is going normally," that there is no nihilism and no catastrophe looming over the world. In the first case, the very fact of conceptualizing modernity as nihilism, as a "scarce times," and fixing attention on Gestell as a destiny already realized means moving on to *another*

Initiation, shifting attention solely to Seyn-existence and the preparation of Ereignis. Then Geviert will become direct and natural.

The fulfilled event will establish man as the guardian of Seyn-existence. This *event* will establish man as the guardian of Seyn-existence, reveal the order of Heaven and the world, save the Earth and restore its dignity, and allow the gods (the last God) to come. And in the center of the four axes of Geviert the sacred (telling) thing will reign again.

In the second case, if the decision is taken not to make any *decision* (this will be, in fact, the *decision*), the power of the unacknowledged Gestell, the power of the End that has come, but not recognized and not properly recognized, will lead to the final catastrophe. And then the Geviert will not take place, it will not come true, and τῆχωνη will plunge humanity and the Earth into imminent destruction.

In recent years, Heidegger was inclined to the view that humanity had already made this choice, *the second phase choice*, and that the situation could not be saved. "Only God can save us now"⁽⁴⁸⁾.

In any case, in order to understand Heidegger's philosophy correctly, *one* should refer Geviert specifically and exclusively to the *future*, which is open and depends on the realization of man's deep freedom.

GEVIERT AS A GOAL (WILL TO DECIDE)

There may be certain hesitations with regard to the choice already made. It is quite obvious that the choice in favor of *another Beginning* was not made in the twentieth century and in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, from the philosophical point of view, events unfolded with the utmost consistency and logic. At the end of the 19th century, Nietzsche, in fact, formalizes the end of Western European philosophy. This is a fundamental historical (seynsgeschichtliche) fact. In Nietzsche, philosophy has reached its "eschaton".

In the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger, more than anyone else, crystallizes the meaning of the entire philosophical process, from *Beginning* to *End*. Heidegger philosophizes over the grave, dotting all the i's, once again looking back over the entire history of philosophy and noting unconditional periods, meanings, and transformations. The twentieth century comprehended Nietzsche, but

Heidegger did it most profoundly. Heidegger, having fixed the End of the West, opened the horizons of *another Beginning*, the vector of the *leap* into Ereignis, outlined Geviert as a task. Moreover, Heidegger grandiosely juxtaposed the history of Western European philosophy and Gestell with a fundamental-ontological perspective, which made the catastrophic situation of modern humanity not an argument against Geviert, but proof of its fateful proximity.

In the twentieth century itself, Ereignis did not take place, the decision to move to another Beginning was not taken. This decision could not be taken within the framework of ideologies that openly swear to the Machenschaft (communism and liberalism), and where it could have been taken, and where certain motives gave hope for it (the ideologies of the Third Way), it was not taken either (as expressed in the gap between the ideas of the Conservative Revolution and historical national socialism). The fact that this solution was not accepted in the Germany of the 1930s and 1940s was rightly interpreted by Heidegger himself as proof of National Socialism's contamination with the spirit of Machenschaft, its inability to go beyond the Western European meta-physics (with Gestell, the subject, technology, the will to power, etc.). Heidegger himself saw his philosophy as a transition to another Beginning and, consequently, as a justification of Ereignis and an approximation of Geviert. Western European history (Geschichte) of the twentieth century did not follow Heidegger, did not find itself on his level, did not accept or absorb his message. In the same way, contemporaries neither accepted nor understood Hölderlin, Kirkegaard, nor Nietzsche in the nineteenth century.

Heidegger, who had accomplished in the twentieth century, and perhaps in the history of philosophy in general, as much as hardly anyone else had ever accomplished, had every reason to despair. The political, cultural, and social history of the twentieth century fully confirmed his assessments, and he himself was at the turning point where he needed to be heard - in Germany. He was a German, and Germans, it seemed then, were ready to take responsibility for changing the course of history (Geschichte). All the elements of destiny were coming together. Only a moment remained before Ereignis and the attainment of universal midnight.

When everything collapsed, for Heidegger it was the greatest trial. It is hard to imagine the trauma that he had been watching the events of the 1930s and 1940s, trying to participate in them. And he had every reason to believe at the end of his life that humanity was determined to end itself, the earth and the world no less radically than it had ended God.

Judging by the logic and meaning of the phenomena and transformations that humanity has undergone since Heidegger's death, there is no evidence that his fatal prediction was inaccurate. On the contrary, degeneration has gone so far in recent decades that few are able to recognize the depth and irreversibility of the tragedy.

But we can look at the situation from the other side. The twentieth century, while recognizing Heidegger as a great thinker, did not understand his thought, and even if it did, it did not accept it. Heidegger's philosophy, fragmented into fragments, has inspired hundreds of philosophers, psychologists, artists, scientists, cultural scientists, and has greatly influenced the formation of the Postmodern paradigm.

But practically no one has fully and completely embraced Heidegger's thought and followed the path leading to *another Beginning*. However, if mankind categorically does not want to recognize its accomplished End and persists in "planetary idiocy" - dying without dying, stretching the rubber band, trying to get out of the deadlock, to make it eternal - then, against its will, it leaves open the possibility of deciding for it in another way. In fact, the 21st century has not yet begun: what we have today, from a semantic point of view, is still the 20th century, which cannot end. The twenty-first century will begin when we really begin to think about Heidegger's philosophy. And then we will have the opportunity to make a different choice, a choice in favor of a transition to *another Beginning*,

in favor of Ereignis, in favor of Geviert.

Before Heidegger was the Western European philosophy concentrated in German classical philosophy and the Nietzschean peak. On its basis, pushing back from it, Heidegger made a leap into the abyss of a new freedom. Heidegger's philosophy lies before us today. It implicitly contains the entire history of phi-

Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kirkjöger, and Nietzsche. But there is much more to it - what Heidegger realized in the perspective of the future and its preparation. Heidegger's phenomenon itself can be interpreted as the dawn of Ereignis, and this interpretation can and must become the imperative of the twenty-first century. Ereignis did not take place in the twentieth century. That is a fact. But we would not be free, we would not be human beings, we would not be thinking beings, we would not be speakers of the great Indo-European languages, if we had given up in the face of the frenzy of the globalist mobs and the entertaining scattered masses of the Postmodern, slaves of totalitarian, alienating, nullifying poisonous fashions.

Therefore, the decision about Geviert's arrival remains open. And this openness is affirmed by the very existence of Heidegger's philosophy. If this philosophy has at least one adequate reader, it would be premature to give up on Ereignis. Or, on the contrary, the living breath of Ereignis will cross over the present world with a life-giving cross, giving the sphere of nothingness to his hypertrophied, inconceivably inflated work.

In this case, the image of Geviert can become a fundamental philosophical program, a goal, a banner that will gather those "units" around which, according to Nietzsche, the wheel of the universe revolves, those units that Heidegger himself speaks of as "future" (kunftige). On them depends whether *there will be a future*, whether the *Beginning will begin*, whether the *event* will come true.

In that case, Geviert's structure in *another Beginning* it's gonna be like this:



Notes

⁽¹⁾ *Heidegger M.* Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 65. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1989; *Idem.* Geschichte des Seyns (1938/1940). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 69. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1998.

⁽²⁾ *Heidegger M.* Erläuterung zur Holderlin Dichtung. Holderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 9. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1981.

⁽³⁾ *Heidegger M.* Unterwegs zur Sprache. 1950-59. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 12. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985.

⁽⁴⁾ *Vorträge und Aufsätze.* 1936-53. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 7. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 2000.

⁽⁵⁾ An example from a completely different field could be cited here, but it must be remembered that there are no direct parallels between Heidegger's philosophy and the topicality to which we are now turning, and this example leaps over the most difficult and unprecedented work of comparing the philosophies of the two major figures of twentieth-century philosophy, Heidegger and Jung. Carl Gustav Jung paid great attention to the symbolic meaning of the numbers 3 and 4. He drew on the hermetic text "Mary the Jew", which alchemically interpreted the structure of the Pythagorean tetractysis $1+2+3+4=10$ (i.e. 1 again, since the Pythagorean $10 = 1$). In this formula, Jung distinguished the first three numbers, which he interpreted as being associated with rationality, ego, and transcendence, and which make up the triad; and the fourth number, 4, which he associated with nature and the collective unconscious. Jung believed that 3 (the triad, the trinitarian principle) refers to Christianity (as a rational transcendentalist theology) and 4 to paganism. The most important difference, according to Jung, was that the pagan quadrilateral included the principle of evil (devil, shadow), which was categorically excluded from the light trinity. This is how Jung interpreted the disputes of Paracelsus's disciples (notably Adam von Bodenstein and Gerhard Dorn) concerning certain aspects of his teachings, and especially those of Paracelsus's disciples.

Geviert, especially in polemics with church critics. Although Jung's psychoanalytic reconstructions and Hermetic reasoning and Heidegger's philosophy belong to completely different levels of philosophizing, there are certain similarities, since Heidegger seems to have implicitly opposed the quaternity of the trinity in the spirit of his "Greek," "Hellenic," and somewhat "pagan" approach. See: Jung K.G. Paracelsus as a spiritual phenomenon // Jung K.G. Spirit Mercury. Moscow: Canon, 1996; *He also*. Archetype and Symbol. M., 1991.

(6) Fragments of Early Greek Philosophers. M.: Nauka, 1989. C. 202.

(7) Ibid. C. 201.

(8) Ibid. C. 202.

(9) The Russian word "world" as "universe" comes from the Old Slavic idea of three phenomena, which later received different interpretations, but in their roots developed from the same beginning. Peace as a community, peace as non-war, peaceful existence, and peace as the universe. Before the reform of the Russian language at the beginning of the twentieth century, the words "peace" (non-war) and

"In Old Slavonic they were spelled the same way, as well as in modern Russian (although in modern Russian they are treated as homonyms - words sounding and spelling the same, but denoting different things). German Welt consists, apparently, of two roots - "wer" and "alt", which, according to one etymology, is connected with the idea of antiquity, eternity, fortress, seniority. In terms of meaning, it may be close to the Old Slavonic "kin" and the Sanskrit word "rita" - "eternal unchanging order". Therefore, Russian "world" carries a whole chain of meanings different from German "Welt" or Greek "κοσμος".

(10) The Old Russian language had two words for peace - "light" and "world." It is interesting that the concept of "world" implied a *view from the earth*, and "light" *from the sky*, κοσμος, ουρανοζ. The German "Welt" and Latin "mundus", as well as the Greek "κοσμος", correspond exactly to the Old Russian word "light" - "white light".

(11) Heidegger M. Der Ursprung der Kunstwerkes // Heidegger M. Holzwege. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 5. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1994. S. 31.

(12) Ibid. S. 35.

(13) Ibid. S. 42.

(14) Heidegger M. Geschichte des Seyns (1938/1940). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 69. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1998. S. 108.

(15) Heidegger M. Der Ursprung der Kunstwerkes // Heidegger M. Holzwege. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 5. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1994. S. 35.

(16) For Heidegger, the *flight of the gods* is a recurring theme in his metaphysics. In some statements he makes it clear that in the willingness to flee and the ability to flee from human presence lies the basic property of divinity. Man, through his habitual metaphysical attitudes - in particular, through the Gestell he constantly radiates - all

time *scares* away the divine, drives it away, does not allow the quiet divine light at the center of the Quadrilateral to shine.

⁽¹⁷⁾ Ebrezza lucida - it.; Julius Evola, among others, wrote about it; cf.

Evola Y. *Saddle the Tiger*. M., 2005.

⁽¹⁸⁾ *Heidegger M.* Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 65. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1989. S. 438.

⁽¹⁹⁾ Ibid. S. 439.

⁽²⁰⁾ Ibid. S. 244.

⁽²¹⁾ Ibid. S. 239.

⁽²²⁾ Ibid. S. 492.

⁽²³⁾ *Heizinga J.* Homo ludens. M.: Progress-Tradition, 1997; *Fink E.* Spiel als Weltsymbol. Stuttgart, 1960.

⁽²⁴⁾ The Bible. Old Testament. 3 Sam. 19, 12.

⁽²⁵⁾ *Heidegger M.* Geschichte des Seyns (1938/1940). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 69. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1998. S. 211.

⁽²⁶⁾ *Heidegger M.* Vorträge und Aufsätze. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004.

⁽²⁷⁾ Here and hereafter the translation is ours.

⁽²⁸⁾ *Heidegger M.* Vorträge und Aufsätze. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004. S. 143.

⁽²⁹⁾ Ibid. S. 144.

⁽³⁰⁾ Ibid.

⁽³¹⁾ Ibid.

⁽³²⁾ Ibid.

⁽³³⁾ Ibid.

⁽³⁴⁾ Ibid. S. 145.

⁽³⁵⁾ *Heidegger M.* Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 65. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1989. S. 310.

⁽³⁶⁾ *Heidegger M.* Über den Anfang. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 70. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 2005. S. 157.

⁽³⁷⁾ In Belgian writer Jean Ray's novel *Malpertuis*, the once great Greek gods suffer a different fate: they have degenerated into a sinister family of humanoid puppets. Unable to die, they withered into pathetic effigies. See: *Ray J.* *The Exact Formula of a Nightmare*. Moscow: Languages of Russian Culture, 2000.

⁽³⁸⁾ *Heidegger M.* Geschichte des Seyns (1938/1940). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 69. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1998. S. 21.

⁽³⁹⁾ *Heidegger M.* Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 65. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1989. S. 310.

⁽⁴⁰⁾ See first of all: *Heidegger M.* Das Ding // *Heidegger M.* Vorträge und Aufsätze. 1936-53. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 7. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 2000.

⁽⁴¹⁾ In Greek ποίησις, poetry means "creation," "making," "pro-duction."

⁽⁴²⁾ Psalter. Ps. 102, 14.

⁽⁴³⁾ "Gestell is that which destroys Geviert". *Heidegger M.* Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens. St. Gallen. S. 12.

⁽⁴⁴⁾ *Heidegger M.* Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Or. cit. S. 310. In full, this statement reads as follows: "Der Streit des Seyns gegen das Sei-

ende aber ist dies *Sichverbergen* der Verhaltenheit einer ursprünglichen Zugehörigkeit" ("The war of Seyn-being against Being is the *self-hiding* of the relation of primordial mutual belonging").

⁽⁴⁵⁾ The German poet Gottfried Benn wrote about it in the poem "Gesänge" ("Singing"): "Everything is shore, forever the sea calls" ("Alles ist Ufer, ewig ruft das Meer").

⁽⁴⁶⁾ *Nietzsche F.* Thus Spoke Zarathustra // Nietzsche F. Collected Works: In 2 vols. T. 1. M.: Mysl, 1992.

⁽⁴⁷⁾ *Fukuyama F.* The End of History and the Last Man. Moscow: LLC "AST Publishing House", 2004.

⁽⁴⁸⁾ "Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten". Spiegel-Gespräch mit Martin Heidegger am 23. September 1966 // Der Spiegel. 30. Jg. N 23. 31. Mai 1976.

SECTION 3

DASEIN

CHAPTER 1

Šph }ŠŠ`o` p`gbepŠ{b`mh` thftnqnthh
l`pŠhm` u`ideccep`.

Three main stages can be distinguished in Heidegger's philosophical work.

First stage: formulation of the main problematic and introduction of the concept of Dasein. This period culminates in the writing of the major work *Sein und Zeit*⁽¹⁾

(1927). This was preceded by a reflection on Husserl's phenomenological approach⁽²⁾, and followed by a period of reflection on the grandiose perspectives outlined in this book fundamental to the entire history of philosophy. The *second phase*, 1936-1946, is the least known.

This is due to a number of reasons, primarily political. Heidegger was associated with National Socialism at this period, and even his consistent marginalization within the regime did not affect his close attention to this phenomenon, understood in a particular profound dimension, which was in general harmony with the general approach of the Conservative Revolution. This period, the peak of his creative philosophical activity, is marked by his reflection on *Seynsgeschichtliche*, *Seyn* and especially on *Ereignis*. Heidegger himself wrote in a note to the "Letter on Humanism": "Since 1936, the main theme of my reflections has been *Ereignis*"⁽³⁾.

In these years, Heidegger lives in hope of transforming National Socialism into a profoundly philosophical phenomenon that would bring about a fundamental turn in Western European civilization and world history towards *another beginning* (*die andere Anfang*), comparable to and even superior to the *first beginning* (*die erste Anfang*) when Greek philosophy emerged. In order to explore

tory prerequisites of Ereignis had taken place, Germany (and Europe in its person) had to overcome two forms of extreme nihilism (Machenschaft) - the USA (Heidegger's hated "Americanismus") and the USSR (Heidegger saw in Marxism the triumph of the technical). Heidegger himself associated the victory of Nazi Germany in the war with the realization of a *philosophical operation* - the comprehension of the essence of Machenschaft and its interpretation in the context of the history of Western metaphysics. Without this, he warned, the war would be lost⁽⁴⁾.

There was no realization, the war was lost.

This Heidegger of the "middle period" was understandably excluded from philosophical discourse after 1945 and is therefore practically unknown. Meanwhile, it is in this part that the philosopher presents his profound ideas most fully and frankly⁽⁵⁾. Heidegger's work on Nietzsche⁽⁶⁾, undoubtedly fundamental but far from exhausting the central problematics of those years, is known from this period. If we miss the content of this period, we will not be able to understand properly either the ideas of the early period formulated in *Sein und Zeit* or the later works.

The third stage includes works from the postwar years up to the philosopher's death. They represent a continuation of Heidegger's main line of philosophizing, but placed in a humanitarian context, where the themes of the second period were censored and self-censored under the influence of external factors. The collapse of National Socialism required a revision of some of the thinker's metaphysical expositions, which could not be done openly and transparently, or perhaps not at all⁽⁷⁾.

At the same time, all three periods constitute the whole of Heidegger's philosophy, which cannot be dissected without compromising the understanding of each element. In our opinion, the most correct approach would be to start the historical-philosophical study from the second period (the theme of Ereignis) of Heidegger's work as a direct and most capacious statement of the *acme* of his philosophy, only then to move on to the third period and only then to return to the themes of "Sein und Zeit" and "Dasein" of the first period.

The period, which is where most researchers usually start.

It is in the second period of the philosopher's work that the keys to Heidegger's thought as a whole are found. If we artificially put this period out of brackets, we would not be able to understand either the intentions of *Sein und Zeit* or the main vector of the last period. In this case, the first period would appear to us only as a peculiar development of the phenomenological approach (in the spirit of the original Husserlianism), and the third period would be a harmless version of European humanism, a kind of hermeneutics of European culture and pessimistic intuitions of technological and ecological catastrophe. But this is not Heidegger at all.

It is quite clear why Heidegger is known as such. Philosophers, captivated by his thought, tried to bring him into the context of world philosophy in *spite of* his political positions. This was probably justified, since preserving the grandiose ideas of this thinker in Western European culture was in itself such an important enterprise that it was worth going to great lengths to do so. However, this reduced preservation of Heidegger's legacy has led to the fact that we are most often dealing with a simulacrum of his thought rather than with it. By referring to Heidegger without taking into account the idea of *Ereignis*, we are referring to a very crude approximation, if not a caricature.

Therefore, in our consideration we have chosen to begin with Heidegger of the middle period, then in the section *Geviert* to describe the general lines of force of the late Heidegger, and only here and now come to the place where it is customary to begin - the problematics of *Dasein* and his main work in which this problematics is formulated, *Sein und Zeit*.

This book should be read only in German, and it is quite possible to learn that language in order to familiarize oneself with it. There are no adequate Russian translations of Heidegger, so for the first generation of Russian philosophers interested in Heidegger, it is necessary to learn the language in which his works are written. Only in the future, after adequate commented translations have appeared, will it be possible to talk about the next steps.

The first attempt to work with Heidegger in the 1970s in the USSR was a failure. The Soviet philosopher-enthusiasts should not be blamed for this: in that intellectual atmosphere it was impossible to understand anything in philosophy at all, let alone to understand the complex Heidegger. From the mid-1960s to the present day, Russia has been going through a philosophically "empty" time. A lot of things happen in it, but nothing happens.

In spite of everything, a new round of Russian philosophy must be prepared, and in this matter we must begin with a correct understanding of Western thought. And Western thought in its highest incarnation is the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.

CHAPTER 2

**DASEIN h hqšnph" thftnqnqnthh (nš oepbncn
m`)`ft` j j jnm0r thftnqnqnthh)**

DASEIN AS INSIGHT AND AS CONCLUSION FROM HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

The existential analytic of Dasein, according to Heidegger, is formulated as follows: "Wie ist Dasein?", "how is Dasein?". *What is important is not "what is Dasein," but "how"?*

This is why we must describe Dasein rather than define it, invite to think about it rather than unambiguously postulate its meaning.

The expression "Dasein" is fundamental to the entire history of philosophy. Formally, it means "being", "existence", "presence in the world". Before Heidegger, the notion of "Dasein" was not philosophical, was not conceived as something special and central. Of course, when speaking about world being, about space, the notion of "Dasein" was attached to the object, and when speaking about the presence of things - to the subject. However, this concept was not a key and fundamental term before Heidegger.

Dasein can hardly be derived from a philosophical or cultural context. Apparently, Heidegger experienced the illumination of Dasein. Dasein revealed itself to him as a linguistic, thought and empirical reality.

The origin of the thought of Dasein is to be recognized as a fundamental intellectual explosion, or, more precisely, implosion - an explosion turned inward. This is why we speak precisely of the "*experience of Dasein*".

Dasein is not a category (we will consider further on how a category differs from an existential). Dasein is a kind of fundamental beginning, and in a sense,

perhaps even the end of all philosophy. Heidegger's main book *Sein und Zeit* is devoted to the question of what Dasein is.

If we come close to the experience of Dasein, even if only remotely, if we manage to realize an encounter with Dasein, if we have the chance to experience Dasein, then absolutely everything will change. Dasein is what turns everything upside down. The experience of Dasein makes our being in the world before this experience like a person with a serious defect of vision - he sees everything vaguely and vaguely, does not distinguish, but guesses objects. Only Dasein brings everything back into focus, and for the first time we begin to distinguish clearly what is around us, what we are, and what we had taken the spots to be before this experience. However, the comparison with sight is limited to only one sensory organ. In order to imagine what Dasein is, one has to project the same situation onto hearing, tactile sensations, taste, and so on. Moreover, similar changes occur with consciousness and the psyche. When we encounter Dasein, we emerge from the mental coma, from the mental blurring of the senses. We *wake up*.

Heidegger himself as such can only reveal himself to us in the experience of our illumination by Dasein. This experience, this word, descended upon him as grace or inspiration descends. Dasein *appeared to* Heidegger. Of course, one could say that this was preceded by a great deal of philosophical labor, etymological studies, cultural and historical research, but all of this is typical of many other European intellectuals. Heidegger would not be Heidegger if he had not grasped the very nerve of Dasein. So we, too, will try to understand and *experience* (much more importantly) Dasein. If we succeed, we will get *inside* philosophy. If not, we will be condemned to hang around its periphery.

CONCEPTUAL PREREQUISITES FOR THE EMERGENCE OF DASEIN

If we approach Dasein externally, deductively and descriptively, we can say that it represents that which has remained *unconditional* after a colossal

critical work of Western European philosophical thought in the course of its entire history. It is the last *remnant* and Heidegger himself described this process as the *deontologization* or forgetting of *the question of being*. Heidegger himself described this process as the *deontologization* or *oblivion of the question of being*. All that remained of the colossal *nothingness* called by Nietzsche "European nihilism," of total reduction to *nothing*, of doubting, questioning, and then purging of residual ontological elements, was Dasein.

If we approach Dasein from the inside, it is an insight, a shock, a direct encounter with *presence* even before it is clear *what* this "presence" is, *who is* encountering it, and *where* it is happening.

Both approaches should be applied simultaneously. On the one hand, recognizing the fundamental process of Western European philosophy as the absolutization of nihilism ("the desert grows, woe to him who carries the desert in himself" - F. Nietzsche) leads us to a confrontation with *nothingness* (this is how we delineate the outer limits of Dasein as a phenomenon). On the other hand, by shaking off banal clichés, thoughts and feelings, we break through to the pure experience that precedes any interpretation (this experience is revealed to us, for example, when we have a strong feeling - wild love, mortal longing, dark terror, etc.), and get *inside* Dasein. Philosophy enables us to *think* about Dasein, the experience of horror enables us to *dwell* in Dasein.

Heidegger argues that we cannot understand Dasein through something else, that Dasein must be understood precisely through Dasein. In his book *Sein und Zeit* he shows *how* this happens.

HISTORICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL PROLEGOMENA TO HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY. DOSOCRATICS.

In order to trace how the concept and phenomenology of Dasein take shape, it is necessary to make a brief excursion into the history of philosophy. As already noted

Heidegger sees the origins of the ontological nihilism of the Western European philosophy of the New Age in the origins of this philosophy, in the "first Beginning" (die erste Anfang): it is there that the infinitesimal ontological *error* is laid down, which later grows to gigantic proportions and becomes the main content of philosophy.

This error consists of:

- in understanding the world around us as "nature" (φύσις), i.e., etymologically, "sprouting" (das Aufgehen);
- further conceptualizing it as "being" (ὄν, das Seiende);
- The formation of the notion of being (εἶναι) as a generalizing property of all being (das Seindheit des Seienden) - such "being" Heidegger writes through i (Sein) in contrast to the fundamental-ontological being (Seyn).

Since being is thought of as a *generalization of* being and is justified in relation to φύσις, a Parmenidean duality gradually emerges: "being is, non-being is not". Everything in this formula is perfectly correct, but something is missing nonetheless. Fundamental-ontological being is broader than the generalizing property of being (i.e., Sein als Seiendheit des Seienden) and requires a view directed somewhat differently than directly and directly at φύσις.

Of course, being is that which is common to all things. But *not only*. By forgetting this "not only", at first we remain in the fullness of the correct philosophical process. But in time, this forgetting will make itself felt. The error in the very spirit of pre-Socratic philosophy is still minimal, but it is already fatal.

PLATON

This is fully manifested in Plato⁽⁸⁾. Here ontology, built earlier on φύσις and the understanding of being as common to all things, reaches its crystallization in the doctrine of ideas. An idea is a being that is thought of as a pattern for all other beings. By

For Heidegger, this is "the end of the first Beginning. Being in the form of the idea as the supreme being has finally eclipsed being. What was at first a minor omission ("not only") is taken out of the brackets in Platonism. The ontological problematic is consolidated in the study of hierarchies of things (from thing to idea), and there is no place for *being* in its pure form.

Being substitutes for being (Seyn), and the overlooked "not only" (the original tiny gap between the "*being*" and "*general property of being*"), once it is out of the attention of ontology, begins to make itself known, constituting itself in nothingness, in the driving force of the denial of the being of being.

SCHOLASTICS.

Heidegger, following Nietzsche, believes that from a philosophical point of view "Christianity is Platonism for the masses. This means that the structure of Christian (Catholic) theology fully reproduces Platonic ontology, where the measure of being is the correspondence of a thing to its archetype, the idea as the supreme being. This ontological position is further strengthened by the theological concept of creation. The status of a thing as *ens creatum* is determined by its place in the hierarchy of creatures. Plato's idea as the *supreme being* is replaced here by God.

According to Heidegger, scholasticism brings nothing new to philosophy, it merely banalizes Platonism by transforming the hierarchy of ideas into a hierarchy of created things⁽⁹⁾.

Scholasticism formulates an ontological triangle that is inherited by New Age philosophy.


ONTOLOGICAL TRIANGLE

Let us imagine that we have a triangle with God or transcendence as its apex.

According to Augustine and the scholastics, God's being is absolute being. In other words, at the top of the triangle the question of being is solved as follows: God is absolute Being.

There are two vertices at the base of the triangle: on one of them is the subject, on the other is the object. Both ontologically conceptualized in Christian scholasticism as *created beings*, *ens creatum*. Accordingly, absolute being creates *non-absolute being*.

The non-absolute being is created, created, and that is its being. It contains the human soul, which is substantially existent (this is a very important point), and the things of the external world, which are also substantially existent. The only difference is that the former is being as subject (our "I", the human soul) and the latter as object. But they all derive their being from the absolute being of God.



The ontological triangle of theism

There is God, and He is absolute; there is the subject, and it is non-absolute; there is the object, and it too is non-absolute.


In this scheme it is enough to replace "God" with "idea" and we get the ontological model of Plato's philosophy. This is what allowed Platonism to enter Christian theology (primarily in the Eastern church fathers).

ONTOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEW AGE. CARTESIAN RATIONAL ONTOLOGY OF THE SUBJECT

The new time in the philosophy of deism (Descartes, Newton) essentially reorganizes ontological proportions in this triangle. For scholasticism (theism) the existence of God

It does not require proof ("I believe because it is absurd" Tertullian) and is based on faith. After this ontological affirmation, it is easy to move on to the existence of the two poles of creation, subject and object. Their being will then be grounded in the being of God, who brings the creature into being.

But it is precisely faith that the rationalism of New Age philosophy strikes at, calling, along with Descartes, for "doubting everything. The only thing that appears to Descartes to be beyond doubt is the cogito, from which he deduces the being of the subject. The subject, in turn, on the basis of inferences about perceptions, fixes the being of the object (res extensa), and on the basis of inferences about the cause of its own being comes to prove the being of God.



*The ontological triangle of
rationalist deism*

The being of God becomes derived from the being of the subject, which is justified by the empirical fact of thinking. Thus, the whole picture of the ontological triangle changes. The dispositif of being is found in the thinking human subject, which - as two secondary operations - justifies by means of rational operations the being of the other two vertices of the triangle - God and the object.

This ontology of deism, in which the existence of the three vertices is proved on the basis of the cogito, lies at the foundation of New Age philosophy.


According to Heidegger, this is the most important point in the history of philosophy. From the transcendent Platonic idea and from a scholastic theology with God at the head of the ontological

We move to the dual "subject-object" picture, where being begins to appear as the result of the subject's rational activity. Thus, das Seiende, *being*, is reduced to a simplified subject-object pair and ontology acquires the character of a purely rational convention.

EMPIRICAL ONTOLOGY

In the seventeenth century, a different epistemological model emerged in the English school with Newton and Francis Bacon. Whereas Descartes' ontological argument was thinking and the subject becomes the main element of ontology, in the English branch of modern philosophy, following the same path of questioning the medieval ontological picture, this argument is the external world, the *object*. This is the classical empiricist school, based on induction, experiment, experience.

God the watchmaker, the cause (causa) of the object



*The ontological triangle of
empirical deism*

Unconditional being is recognized as that which is fixed by the senses. *The object is*, and this is the main empirical statement, without which no science and philosophy can be built. But the object (the world) must have a cause. And this cause, apparently, is God. In empirical versions of deism, God is also postulated as a necessary cause of existence, but this time not from the side of the subject, but from the side of the object.

When we say the words "real", "reality", we mean "thing", "thingness". "Res" in Latin

"thing." In empirical philosophy, a thing is an object, and a thing is as an object. Hence "objectivity" as a synonym for reality. "Reality" was originally the predicate of the empiric version of deism and in its context had the meaning of an ontological argument.

LEIBNIZ MONAD

At the dawn of the New Age, Leibniz offers an original interpretation of ontological problems. His task is to justify theodicy, to realize the proof of the existence of God under radically new post-medieval conditions. He does this on the basis of reason in the same way as other New Age philosophers, but his ontology follows a different scheme.

Leibniz presents the world as a hierarchy of monads, which hierarchically distribute being into various subordinate groups. In a monad, the subject coincides with the object.

Pervomonad God



Higher monads
(sentient)



Middle monads (memory,
sensation)



Inferior monads (vague,
naked)



Leibniz's scheme of monads

The phenomena of space and matter, according to Leibniz, are due to optical illusions peculiar to the lower monads, which, being vague and obscure, give the appearance of spatial distinction and temporal sequence. The division into subject and object is also due to illusion. It is neither the subject nor the object that has being, but only the monad, and the quality of this being is the quality of the monad

increases as one moves toward the prime monad and decreases as one goes downhill.

We can consider this construction of Leibniz as a peculiar attempt to return to the Platonic and Neoplatonic worldviews after long centuries of creationist scholasticism in the context of the development of a new ontological paradigm of New Age philosophy.


The critique of Leibniz's doctrine of monads constitutes an important point in Heidegger's philosophy⁽¹⁰⁾. In describing aspects of *Dasein*, Heidegger warns that any parallels with Leibniz's monadology are erroneous, since in his philosophy, being is placed in the Primal Monad, i.e., in the highest of beings, but still being.

KANT'S ONTOLOGICAL DOUBT

The wide ontological diversity of the philosophical schools of the New Age shows the growing uncertainty about what to choose as the unconditional point of being? The dissatisfaction with the scholastic creationist prescriptions of theism leads philosophers to propose new versions of ontologies - subject (Cartesianism), object (empiricism), monadic. The multiplicity of ontological hypotheses leads to a generalization of the accumulated difficulties in ontological problems through Kant's philosophy⁽¹¹⁾. This is the most important point in the development of Western European philosophy.


Kant is influenced by the ideas of Descartes, Leibniz, and Newton, but focuses his attention on the development of a theory of knowledge, the Critique of Pure Reason. In this ontologically revolutionary work, Kant convincingly shows that all proposed versions of ontology (subject, object or God, including the monad) cannot be rigorously proved on the basis of pure reason. This is how the idea of a noumena appears, a kind of station whose existence can neither be proved nor disproved by reason. Kant does not deny the existence of subject, object or God, he simply shows that this existence belongs to the realm of the noumene, in which reason cannot draw any firm conclusions.

The ontological triangle in Kant's philosophy takes the following form.



Kant has a cogito ontology, from which, however, does not follow a Cartesian ergo sum. "I think, therefore I am" - this can be concluded. But from "thinking" in no way follows "is". The pure mind has its own structure, organizes perception (apperception) and organizes thought processes, and acts *as if* there were a subject ("I"), an object (the external world), and God. But there is no ontological argumentation that could eliminate this "as if" and translate it into strict certainty in pure reason itself.

In the face of this already purely nihilistic picture, Kant is forced to take a step back and try to justify ontology. But this justification has the character not of the fundamental conclusions of pure reason but of the moral wishes of practical reason, hence the theme of the categorical imperative. Pure reason cannot prove the existence of either subject, object, or God. But practical reason *in moral* choice asserts that they *must* nevertheless exist, and it would be good for them to exist. Ontology, on the one hand, seems to be making a comeback, but in fact, onto- logical nihilism is only progressing. Being is no longer proved by experience, reason, or Revelation, but by moral considerations: "it would be good for existence to be".



The idea of the Critique of Practical Reason, however, does not heal the trauma inflicted on philosophical ontology. The "critique of pure reason" but only exacerbates it. A morally grounded ontology is even less thorough than an ontology grounded rationally or empirically.

Nothing grows.

FICHTE AND HEGEL: OVERCOMING KANTIAN PESSIMISM

Of course, Kant's followers tried to meet this challenge. Fichte, a disciple of Kant, in response to the fact that Kant had left the world without a subject, decided that there is a subject after all, and, developing this idea, added: the subject is the only thing that is⁽¹²⁾.

Hegel also sensed that things were not right. He made a colossal effort to show that being and thought coincide. To do so, he had to construct a new logical system that significantly corrected Aristotle's traditional logic, which had guided Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. This is how it came about "The Grand Logic. In it, Hegel develops philosophical dialectics, where the second logical law, the law of the excluded third, is refuted, to which Heidegger pays close attention. Heidegger considers Hegel's formulation of the problem of nothingness, denial, and negativity correct, but at the same time he shows that Hegel remains in line with the law of the excluded third.

classical philosophy⁽¹³⁾, continues to operate with con- ceptions and to recognize a referential theory of truth. He tries to meet the challenge of deontologization posed by Kant and goes further in this direction than other thinkers. But the objective limit here is the very structure of Western European philosophy, where the ontological problem is formulated incorrectly at its very foundation, in the first Beginning, and only reveals its final consequences in the metaphysics of the New Age - and, in particular, in Kant's metaphysics.

NIETZSCHE - THE END OF PHILOSOPHY

For Heidegger, Nietzsche is the main philosopher of modernity. He had the greatest and most decisive influence on Heidegger. Heidegger dedicated many texts to Nietzsche⁽¹⁴⁾, some of them grouped in the two-volume Nietzsche.

The following philosophical points are central to Nietzsche's approach to Dasein:

- A statement of Western New Age philosophy as nihilism;
- assertion of the artificiality of cultural and metaphysical attitudes as products of alienation from life;
- A critique of Plato and the referential theory of truth;
- turning to the pre-Socratics in search of the origins of Western European thinking in its pure form, not yet "distorted" by the doctrine of ideas;
- highlighting the "will to power" as the main life motive;
- overthrowing the idols and values of the West;
- a call to find radical new ways of thinking.

For Heidegger, Nietzsche is the figure who puts the last point in the process of the formation of Western philosophy. If Plato was "the end within the first Beginning," Nietzsche is simply the end of philosophy as such. He is the last philosopher.

Nietzsche no longer believes in either the object or the subject. He proclaims the "death of God" openly and as convincingly as possible. Being at the center of European nihilism,

Nietzsche refers to the element of life. Heidegger interprets this element as being. And that which, in the period of maximum nihilism, encounters this element is, roughly, what Heidegger calls *Dasein*.

GUSSERLE.

On the other hand, parallel to Nietzsche, from a consistent and fundamentally meaningful Kantianism was born the phenomenon of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl was a real consistent Kantian, and he drew from Kantianism the conclusions that had to be drawn. Although Husserl and Kant are separated by more than a hundred years, it was he who brought to a logical conclusion the themes that flowed directly from the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Husserl's phenomenology is based on the following operations:

- putting the existence of object, subject, and God out of brackets (the principle of phenomenological reduction);
- focusing philosophical attention on the structure of human consciousness as it constructs the objects of its functioning (noemes) through intellectual operations (noesis);
- introduction of the concept of intentionality as the basic model of the relation of consciousness to the object in question (which constitutes this object to a certain extent);
- study of the phenomenological stream of consciousness in the course of observations of human behavior in the environment of the "lifeworld" (*Lebenswelt*).

Husserl's phenomenology has many different interpretations. For Heidegger, who was a student of Husserl, what is most important in phenomenology is the desire to identify the purest instance that remains in the place of the thinking person after a successive realization of the operation "epoch" in relation to the basic philosophical concepts ("subject", "object", "object"), "I", "essence", "time", etc.). In essence, Husserl follows the path of nihilism described by Nietzsche and, being on this path, tries to justify and correctly describe the

that instance which remains after the peeling away of all metaphysical overlays, including positivism, materialism and empiricism, which, according to Heidegger, are nothing but special cases of the same Western metaphysics.

Phenomenology, for its part, subtly prepared Heidegger's approach to Dasein. In a sense, Heidegger can be called a "phenomenologist" and Dasein itself a *phenomenological* phenomenon.

At the same time, for Heidegger, the concept of "phenomenon" has a special meaning. He connects it with the Greek root φαίνεσθαι, which means "to show oneself", "to manifest oneself", "to discover", and with another Greek term of great importance to Heidegger, "ἀλήθεια", truth. He interprets "truth"-*"aletheia"* as "unconcealment," and solidly renders this Greek (pre-Socratic) term by the German word "die Unverborgenheit," literally "unconcealability."

Truth as "the unconcealability of (being)" Heidegger opposes truth as the correspondence of one being to another being. Heidegger's phenomenology is therefore inextricably united with ontological problematics, while Husserl, on the contrary, seeks to isolate phenomenology from any interface with ontology, trying to justify the new philosophical school he is creating with an innovative conceptual arsenal that is entirely ad hoc, in maximum intimacy with the phenomena themselves. Following this path, Husserl arrives at moments such as "transcendence" or "noesis". This means that Heidegger associates phenomenon and the realm of the phenomenal with being, while Husserl associates it with thinking, which predetermines the difference in their philosophical attitudes.

Thus, Heidegger, while formally repeating a number of classical operations of phenomenology, realizes at the same time something quite different, since his philosophy and his history of philosophy are firmly fixed on the axis of the question of being. Heidegger distinguishes between the "leading question of philosophy" (*Leitfrage*) and the "basic question of philosophy" (*Grund- frage*). The first relates to being (*Sein der Seiendheit*),

the second - to being (Seyn). From the very beginning, Heidegger's phenomenology is placed in the context of solving the "basic question of philosophy". It is a phenomenological ontology, whereas Husserl's thought generally remains within the framework of gno-seology and theory of knowledge.

CHAPTER 3

DASEIN h ecn }jghq\$em0h`ft{

INTRODUCTION OF DASEIN

If we approach Dasein from the side of the history of philosophy, we can say that it is the last point that is fixed in the period of completion of the process of deontologization in the midnight of universal nihilism. The pre-Socratics equated *being* (Seyn) with nature, the *essence*, the universal, and lost some aspect of it that *was* at first imperceptible but essential. Plato identified *being* with one of the *essences* (the idea). The Scholastics moved further away from being by establishing a theological hierarchy of created things. Deists questioned the dogmas of faith and began to justify being on the basis of their artificial concepts, be it the rationalism of Descartes, the empiricism of Locke and Hume, or the monadology of Leibniz. Kant honestly recognized that the ontological argument had no rational basis.

Fichte's and Hegel's attempts to remove the problem refer us only to a partial conceptual correction of the situation, without touching the essence of the nihilistic catastrophe. Nietzsche calls things by their proper names and demands that we henceforth think soberly and rigidly in terms of a world abandoned by God. Husserl, in the face of the collapse of European metaphysics, introduces the phenomenological method for thinking. What is left in this situation of being, which at each stage has become more and more distant from the mainstream of philosophizing, has been drawn to Dasein.

Dasein is the last fact of being, prior to any justification, without any adequate interpretation, placed in a nihilistic desert.

Dasein is, at the same time, certainly a phenomenological presence. That is, it is a *phenomenological point*

Being, the conjugation of the historical-philosophical optics of de-ontologization, focused on the "basic question of philosophy", with a direct phenomenology of presence. This phenomenology of presence has its own properties. The book "Sein und Zeit" is mainly devoted to the elucidation of these properties, i.e. the analytical description of Dasein.

DA AND SEIN

"Dasein" is sometimes translated into Russian as "here-being". Indeed, the German word "Dasein" is composed of two parts. "Da" is "here," and "Sein" is "here-being." "being."

The *being* referred to in Dasein is *unconditional presence, manifested presence*, i.e. an unconditional phenomenological fact. Heidegger does not at all insist on introducing a metaphysical correspondence between Dasein and Sein (much less Seyn). This correspondence must crown the whole corpus of Heideggerian philosophy; it is the end of the road. Nevertheless, from the very beginning it is crucial that in Dasein we deal with "being", even if not yet metaphysically grounded. Heidegger applies to this the term "ontic", from the Greek "ὄν", "being". Dasein refers to being: it is being, but at the same time it is *not just being* like all other being, but some *special being*. The phenomenology of Dasein at the first stage of Heidegger's philosophy can be taken as ontic (but not yet ontological, since logos is not yet in question in such a statement).

The second root in the word "Dasein" is "da," "here." It is "da" indicates that being is "here" (and not elsewhere), that it is something actual and present, concrete and tangible. Dasein can therefore be perceived as a concrete lump of being, being in an ontic, almost empirical sense. Dasein can be experienced by living in the facticity of being that which is "here" - in the greatest possible detachment from what is here, *who is here, where it is here, why it is here*, etc. At the same time, the translation of the German "da" by the Russian "here" is rather incorrect. Heidegger himself mentions in one

place in "Sein und Zeit" Wilhelm von Humboldt's hypothesis⁽¹⁵⁾ concerning the origin of personal pronouns from the adverbs of place. Humboldt offers the following version: from "hier" ("here") comes "ich" ("me"), from "dort" ("there") comes from "er" ("he"), and from "da" ("here", "somewhere here"),

"not far", between "here" and "there") is "du". In German, the system of adverbs of place has a triple structure, not a double one, as in Modern Russian.

"Hier" is specifically "here", "dort" is specifically "there", "da" - it's somewhere in between.

WOTW

You can use the Russian indicative pronoun "here." "Here" does not mean "here" or "there", but somewhere concrete, not far away, to which one can point. "Da" can be translated as "here", but it can also be translated as "here". To clarify the meaning of this fundamental term, it seems more accurate to use "here-being". The Humboldt correspondence is important: the "being" that is "here" is the person who is near (not far, not

"there"), but at the same time it is not an "I" but also not a "not-I". In a sense, it is "you" because in the experience of Dasein there is a disidentification with the "I". In Dasein, the "I" is grasped as a "you," but a "you" in which there is no subjectivity but mere presence.

"Here" and "there" are a clear separation of distance, and in "here" there is no distance yet, "here" distance precedes.

"Here" is what we have pointed to, what we have fixed with our attention. "Here" and "there" appear only after "here" has been noted.

LA REALITE' HUMAINE

Henri Corbin⁽¹⁶⁾ translates into French "Dasein" by the phrase "human reality" ("réalité humaine"). Both terms are, strictly speaking, worthless. Heidegger, by the way, says throughout his book that it is neither "human" nor "real", neither "subject" nor "object", and certainly not "réalité humaine".

much less "God". "Not subject, not object, not human, not real and not divine" would be a much more accurate descriptor of Dasein than Corbyn's "réalité humaine".

However, this translation does shed light on the meaning of Dasein. In a particular lens (and Henri Corbin is a major scholar of Islamic esotericism, sacred anthropology and mystical philosophy), Dasein can be understood as "human reality" in its purest form - before man and before reality - as a structured qualitative instance that unfolds its autonomous properties, in the course of which both "man" (the subject) and "man" (the subject) emerge.

"reality" (object, world). In this sense, we should consider Corbin's own theories of the "mundus imaginalis," the "light man," and the "purple archangel" (Sohravardi)⁽¹⁷⁾, as well as Gilbert Durand's theory of *imaginaire* and *anthropological trajectory*⁽¹⁸⁾. But we will leave this as a marginal remark.

THE EXPERIENCE OF DASEIN AS A PHENOMENON OF LANGUAGE AND AS AN EXPLOSION

By introducing "Dasein", Heidegger follows not so much the logic of philosophical discourse (where ontology requires logical justifications that it cannot provide, thus creating a vicious circle and an infinity of nihilism) as the language, which - despite all the chords of deontologization - operates as if nothing had happened with such a concept as "Dasein", "Here-being". "Here is being."

"Being is this." Fixing our attention on the meaning of these words does not bring us into philosophy, but it does bring us into language. The words

"here" and "being" are trying to express something - something extremely important, but at the same time elusive, imprecise, inarticulate. This is where Heidegger proposes to make the leap, to trust in words rather than concepts, in sounds and guessed meanings rather than in rigid philosophical discourse. Philosophical knowledge and an obsessive interest in ontological issues naturally influence the choice of a verbal object to comprehend, but comprehension itself is absent at the starting point. Dasein is at once both

instantaneously, with all the contents it contains. Dasein is an axial phenomenon, a phenomenon in its own right; Dasein is that which manifests and that which is. But it is also the call of language itself.

The experience of Dasein belongs to pre-philosophy, it is extremely naive, it is connected to language directly and unmediated, unscientifically. (Perhaps the lessons of Nietzsche with his "We Philologists"⁽¹⁹⁾ and of Husserl with his "lifeworld" are reflected in this). In essence, Heidegger builds a philosophy behind the scenes. And the first sound, the first step, the first affirmation of this philosophy (he himself would later conceptualize it as "the new Beginning" - "die neue Anfang") is Dasein.

Extremely critical and super-attentive to terms, concepts, meanings of words, constantly placing them in their original context and trying to establish the correct historical-philosophical content (including nuances of translations and etymology), Heidegger proposes to make a single exception and "believe" the meaning of the word Dasein: it captures "being", not "somewhere" but "here", "here".

"Dasein" is the first, the main and, in fact, the only axiom of Heideggerian philosophy. Once we understand it, we will understand everything else. But the difficulty is that its correct understanding is impossible without fundamental ontological competence and, at the same time, without direct experience of encountering being in the actual concreteness of the "here".

Dasein is the sudden and explosive discovery of the being of the *here*. And this explosion constitutes the "*here*" itself, as well as that which discovers itself. The purity of the experience is ensured only by the fact that it takes place under conditions of total nihilism as the natural and logical conclusion of the formation of the entire process of Western European philosophy. In all other situations and contexts, this phenomenon would be impossible and would be subject to a completely different, most likely quite banal, interpretation. In order for *being* to reveal itself in an explosive and immediate way, it had to be completely and utterly *forgotten* beforehand. Otherwise there would be no explosion, no singularity, no co-existence of such a discovery. Therefore, the condition for the emergence of Dasein and

philosophy based on *Dasein* as its center is the passing of philosophy through all its stages, from the Socratics to Nietzsche. For *Dasein* to emerge, philosophy had to begin, blossom, peak, decline, and tragically end. Only after this - and to a large extent because of it - can the *here-and-now* open up as it did for Heidegger.

FROM ESSENCE TO EXISTENTIA

Heidegger himself emphasizes that a correct approach to *Dasein* and its discovery is possible not by returning to the ontological triangle that we have irretrievably lost (and such a loss had a fundamental meaning, Heidegger believes), but by courageously fixing the element of victorious nihilism. *Dasein* is that which fixes nihilism, does not coincide with it (therefore it fixes it), but does not absolve itself of responsibility for its emergence; moreover, it wants to walk the path of this responsibility to the end.

Heidegger proposes a fundamental change in the philosophical mindset by starting from *Dasein*. Throughout its history, Western philosophical thought has proceeded from the defining thought of essence, essence, οὐσία. The essence was understood either as God, or as an idea, or as a subject, or as an object, or as a monad, etc.

Heidegger believes that the essentialist approach expresses the very error that led the whole philosophical process from the "first beginning" (pre-Socratics) to the end of philosophy (Nietzsche). Starting from essence as the "general" (κοινόν), inherent in the *Seiende* (ens) as *Seiendheit* (essentia), philosophy was doomed to perpetually repeat the same metaphysical route, sooner or later leading thought to alienation, pragmatism, positivism, and thus to nihilism. The attempt to build ontology on the basis of *essence* leads to deontologization.

Instead, it is proposed that we begin to philosophize from *Dasein*, taken as *existentia* rather than essence, as something unconditionally present, but in an ontic rather than ontological sense.

"The essence (Wesen) of Dasein," Heidegger reiterates in the

"Sein und Zeit, - in existentia. Here one may be puzzled: calling to think from existentia and not from essence (essence), Heidegger himself defines Dasein (existentia) through essence (Wesen). But here the German context of the original must be taken into account. For Heidegger, "Das Wesen" is not a translation of the Greek "οὐσία" or the Latin "existentia". Moving along the lines of language rather than philosophical terminology, Heidegger gives the very word "Wesen" (suffering participle of the verb sein) a fundamental ontological meaning. Wesen is a co-participation in Seyn as being, which only has to be realized in its proper quality, while rejecting the conceptualization of the entire philosophical process from the first Beginning to the End as a wrong ontological course. Hence such Heideggerian novelties as the use of the verbal noun Wesen as a verb - ich wese, du wesest, er (sie, es) west, wir wesen, ihr weset, sie wesen. There are no such forms in German, it is another language - Heidegger's meta-language of fundamental-ontology.

Therefore, the phrase "the essence of Dasein in existentia" should be communicated in Russian in a correct meta-language:

"Dasein's Wesen in existentia". This means: Dasein *is* not by correspondence with essence as something external or other than itself, but with itself. Therefore, Wesen is not essence (οὐσία, essence) but the expression (discovery, deduction from unconcealment) of Dasein's self-existence. The word Heidegger does not translate "existentia" and its derivatives ("existential", "existentielle") into German (although he tries to translate everything into German - even the subject turns into the German "Geworfftheit", "abandonment", which corresponds to the Latin etymology: "sub" ("under", "down") and "jacere" ("to throw"). The Russian word "existence" is all the less suitable when translating "existentia" because it corresponds much more precisely to the German Wesen, and the verb "to exist" conveys what Heidegger wants to say by inventing the non-existent German form "wesen" as a verb. However, there is no direct analog to the Latin "existentia" in Greek either, and Heidegger rarely uses the word οὗτος ("that one"),

"this"), trying to find an analog of existentia, rather drawing on the etymology of the German "Dasein".

Therefore, Heidegger's axiomatic phrase "Dasein's Wesen in Existence" is, in a sense, a triple pleonasm, and its Germanic-Latin etymology is meant to overturn the fundamental axioms of all philosophy, where everything was considered not from the self but from the other (φύσις, ιδέα, οὐσία, θεός, ἐγώ, κοινόν, essentia, objectum, subjectum, res, realitas, etc.). д.). With his pleonasmic formula, Heidegger lays the foundation for a new Beginning of philosophy, where henceforth it is proposed that everything should be considered from Dasein as a factual and ontic instance to which nothing logically, chronologically, or ontologically precedes.

A significant part of *Sein und Zeit* is therefore devoted to apophatic definitions of Dasein.

Dasein is neither essence, substance, essence, "I", subject, object, world, psyche, life, being, nothingness, nothingness, nothingness, supreme being, idea, God, man, one of beings along with others, being as a whole, universal, and unity. Dasein is contiguous with Wesen and with existentia, but this amounts to Dasein being Dasein, and the form of its existentia is the possibility of being. Although the "ex" in "existentia" (in Latin, "existentia") is already contained in the "da" of Dasein, and

"Wesen" (existence) in Dasein's "Sein" (being).

To clarify this, Heidegger repeats with a refrain:

"Dasein existiert virtually", "Dasein existiert faktisch". "Actually" means "ontically", in direct, unconditioned, concrete, total perceived presence.

THREE ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS

The introduction of Dasein and the beginning of Heideggerian thinking leads us to a new formulation of the ontological problematic. Thus three ontological slices appear. The question of being can be posed:

- ontically;
- ontologically;
- fundamental-ontological.

"Ontically" means in direct and empirical relation to Dasein. In a certain sense, we can equate the ontic with the phenomenological, if only we approach phenomenology not from Husserl's position, but from Heidegger's own position, i.e. as ἀλήθεια, the unconcealability of being in the fact of Dasein's presence. In this sense, we can say that Dasein is a phenomenon, that it is given and given unconditionally, before and before any justification of who, whence, when, why, what. Givenness here excludes both the giver and the receiver, leaving only the act of giving, of giving, of being, hanging over the abyss of nothingness.

The ontic is the unconditionally present in the unconditioned givenness of Dasein. The ontic precedes any work of consciousness, representation, thinking, even perception. In the ontic there is no certainty, no truth (as correspondence), no subjectivity or objectivity. Being in the ontic appears in a kind of almost

In the "barbaric" sense, as the fact of an elastic, undifferentiated life that includes death and movement, rest and presence, disappearance and finitude.

The ontic is being *before* it is thought of, *before* it is focused on, being *before* nature, *before* φύσις, *before* idea, *before* object and subject, *before* categories and concept, *before* philosophy, *before* man, *before* the self and its predicates.

"Ontological" means making sense of being in a philosophical context. Ontology includes all shades of philosophical conceptualization of being as φύσις, as idea, as reality, as universal, as subject, as object, as subject-world, as matter, as consciousness, as cognition, as reason, as absolute, as finitude, as singularity, and as unity. But herein lies the main problem: for Heidegger, all ontology, all versions of the philosophical comprehension, description, and definition of being in Western European philosophy, from the *first Beginning* to the *End*, proceed in a deliberately false direction. In the pre-Socratics, ontology is as close as possible to onticism, but they already had a nuance of error. Further, this error grows until it reaches gigantic volumes in the philosophy of pragmatism, positivism, in the understanding of being as morality, value, ideal, worldview,

Finally, the commodity. Plato's doctrine of ideas, Aristotle's logic and metaphysics, creationist theology, essentialism, idealism, realism and nominalism of the medieval controversy, conceptual thinking, monadology, Absolute Idea, Hegel's "Science of Logic", the Nietzschean will to power - these are all varieties of the wrong thinking of a philosophy that was a magnificent, grandiose monument to the same mistake. That mistake was to ignore Dasein as the basic instance of philosophizing. But at the same time, this whole work of *ontology as delusion* prepared the ground (Grund) for the bottomless (Abgrund) conjecture about Dasein.

"Ontologically," according to Heidegger, means "philosophically," "incorrectly," "nihilistically," "Platonically," "alienated," abstracted from the ontic, with the loss of that pulse of being which constitutes the basis of the ontic.

In the doctrine of Dasein, the *ontic* and *ontological* are in such proportions. The ontic is given before the experience of thought, directly. It is given unknown by whom and to whom. One thing is clear: it is given ("it is existent in fact"). Dasein is *ontic*, it is *onticity*.

Ontology is superstructured over Dasein; it is onticity, philosophically conceptualized. This ontology in the optics of Dasein is taken as something common, but not as something common to the being (what it wants to be), but as something common to the misinterpretation of the being, which it is from the position of the transition to the new Beginning of philosophy, of which Dasein is the first step. Ontology is that which derives from Dasein, overcomes it, transcends it, surpasses it in every possible way, rises above it, but forgets it, ignores it, substitutes it with an abstract scheme. Ontology is systematized nihilism.

The origins of this nihilism lie in the identification of being and being and in the attribution of a superior normative status to any one entity.

Now, what is fundamental-ontology? It is a transition to a new Beginning. It is the construction of an ontology which, unlike mere ontology, would be built in constant and close contact with Dasein, without detachment from it, verifying every next step with the element of the ontic,

expressing the ontic, allowing it to speak of itself in the way that is most befitting of itself, without imposition.

Heidegger sometimes uses the expression *ontico-ontological* to emphasize this sense of the fundamental-ontological. To emphasize this sense of the fundamental-ontological, Heidegger sometimes uses the expression *ontic-ontological*.

Fundamental-ontology differs from the ontic in that it is a process of thinking, of comprehending being, that it ascends from the immediacy of Dasein to its mediatedness. But what distinguishes fundamental-ontology from ontology is that the ascent from Dasein remains organically connected with Dasein itself. Fundamental-ontology does not make the mistakes of all philosophical ontologies and does not put forward any additional instances (ideas, essences, creator, subject, object, etc.) *outside, above, around, under*, or even *in* Dasein. Fundamental-ontology is thinking that abides in *Dasein's being*, in its environment, without generating dualities and relations, singularities and correspondences - nothing that can be set against each other.

Fundamental-ontology is a yet-to-be-created philosophy of "futures" (*die Künftige*) that will manifest themselves (as truth-*aletheia* manifests itself, as watermarks show through paper).

Fundamental-ontology is always mindful of the distinction between being and being, and therefore sees Dasein as being, on the one hand, but also as the possibility of being (*Seyn*), which makes Dasein not only being but something else.

DASEIN AS BEING-IN-BETWEEN

It is crucial to emphasize from the outset that Dasein is neither "internal" nor "external," since these philosophical and spatial dimensions do not arise before it, but with it, in it, and through it. Moreover, their structures depend on the mode in which Dasein resides, how it deploys its "da" and its "Sein," what it emphasizes. Dasein itself is spatial, and this *spatiality* constitutes one of its properties that

does not allow you to place him in what is himself, one of his sides.

Dasein is at the same time "neither prior" (the beginning) nor "subsequent" (the result of something that would have come before it). Dasein is not a function of time, nor does time have an autonomous being in which Dasein is situated. Dasein's relationship with time is even more complex than with space, which is the subject of the second section of *Sein und Zeit*.

But the existential and factual character of Dasein makes it a very concrete presence and presence, and therefore it must have a certain localization. This empirical localization of Dasein can be the notion of "between" (*zwischen*). Earlier we spoke of the possible symmetry of the indexical pronouns in relation to the personal, emphasizing the relation of "da" to what lies *between* "I" and "he" (in particular, with "you", "du"). If we look for Dasein within the usual ontological coordinates (which will correspond this time also to the ontic, empirical approach), we have to place it *between* - between the inner and the outer, between the past and the present. Thus, Dasein is spatially boundary (it resides on the boundary *between*) and temporally instantaneous (it belongs to the moment *between* past and future). In this

The "between" manifests itself in the "da" of Dasein. Therefore, from a certain angle, we can call Dasein "being between" (*Inzwischen-Sein*).

EXISTENTIALS OF DASEIN

The realization of the transition to the New Beginning requires the development of a new meta-language in which fundamental ontology is called upon to speak. Traditional philosophical terms are, at their very core, imbued with interpretations, meanings, values, and contexts associated with the old ontology, and are therefore unsuitable. This led Heidegger to gradually add to his fundamental-mental-ontological dictionary, in which all vocabulary items were either new or old, but reinterpreted in a fundamental-ontological way.

Thus, instead of "categories," Heidegger proposes to describe

Dasein by means of its *predicates*, separating and that clarify it. Heidegger calls these predicates of Dasein "*existentials*".

That said, in "Sein und Zeit," Heidegger makes a strict distinction between the adjectives "existential" and "existentiel." The first means the thinking of Dasein in the course of the unfolding of fundamental ontology. The second is the description of the ontic side of Dasein in its immediate expression, without the movement of thought towards a new Beginning. Therefore, the "existential" of Dasein is not a mere description, but its philosophical fundamental-ontological affirmation. "Existenzial" (although Heidegger himself uses this word only as an adjective) means actual description.

Heidegger gives a brief list of Dasein's existentials. This list itself is the process of creating a new philosophy.

IN-DER-WELT-SEIN (BEING-IN-THE-WORLD)

One of the most important existentials of Dasein Heidegger calls "in-der-Welt-Sein"⁽²⁰⁾ ("being-in-the-world", "being-in-the-world"). Dasein is "In-der-Welt-sein." "'Being-in-being' is 'being-in-the-world,'" Heidegger argues.

Here it is important to understand why it is called "existential" and what the "existentiality" of such a predicate consists in. The point is that being-in-the-world, taken as existential (i.e., in the optics of fundamental-ontology), makes no judgment about *what is* in the world, nor about *what* the world is, whether it exists, or whether it has any independent being. "Being-in-the-world" does not answer the question "where"; it precedes the occurrence of such a question, makes it "possible". "Being-in-the-world" is not a category but an existential also because "the world" is constituted here not through difference, not through space, not through place (topology), but through being.

"Being-in-the-world" is first and foremost precisely *being*, and one that bears "in" and "world," and not even a "in" and "world" as two separate figures, but such a tilt-

The "in" is inseparable from the "world", and the "world" from the "in", and both of them from being. "In" is not thought of in isolation from "world" as simply "in". Similarly, "world" is not thought of as something separate. "World" from Dasein's existential is always "in-which-being," not essence.

The importance of this existential will become clear to us if we take into account what Heidegger says about the role of the concept

"φύσις" in the formation of pre-Socratic philosophy. Its introduction led gradually to a referential theory of truth. Consequently, the *new Beginning of* philosophy must initially take a different path. "Being-in-the-world" as existential is fundamental because it prevents the introduction into philosophy of "the world" as nature, object, reality, as some being strictly separate from Dasein. "Being-in-the-world" is an inoculation against the appearance of "the world" as an essence. It is therefore only the predicate (existential) of Dasein's *a* and therefore refers to being directly, without the old philosophical division between the one *who is* in the world (ψυχή, the subject) and the world itself as something else. Dasein is always being-in-the-world. When there is Dasein, there is being-in-the-world. And vice versa - being-in-the-world causes the presence of Dasein, because without Dasein as that to which the existential is applied, it is (fundamentally ontologically) inconceivable.

In some respects it is very similar to the phenomenological method, with the only fundamental difference being that for Heidegger the question of being, the direct intuition of being and language (being of language, language of being) are of great and primary importance.

In order to understand Dasein existentially more clearly, we must consistently abandon two axioms that were absorbed with classical ontology: the conviction that there is an "I" and a "world". In New Age metaphysics, however, these axioms acquired a hysterical significance under the threat of the extinguishment of consciousness. This was not always the case, but became the norm only after the fixed "death of God". For people in traditional societies, the ontological argument consisted of belief in God. The "self" and the "world" were ontological consequences and in some cases could be recognized as an illusion (like Maya in Hinduism) in the face of the "death of God".

of the Absolute. Therefore, the rejection of the "I" and the "world" was a perfectly acceptable cultural phenomenon and did not violate anything in the "Absolute".
the usual course of things.

But in the New Age ontology discarded the "God hypothesis," leaving man to ground his being either through the subject (cogito) or through the external world (empiricism, materialism). It is to such a modern man that all the poignancy of Heideggerian philosophy is addressed. It is to him that he addresses himself. And it is to him that Dasein and the notion of "being-in-the-world" as existential carry the most acute revolutionary message. The New Age man has only the "I" and the "world".

Heidegger begins by proposing to part with these unproven illusions, not in favor of some other, transcendent reality (God, the Absolute, etc.), but in favor of an actually existent, here-and-now Dasein. Heidegger does not call us back to ontology. He fully recognizes the legitimacy and legitimacy of the nihilism of Western European philosophy. He calls us forward, beyond the last limit of night and nothingness, where we will discover not something new as not having been, but as the only thing that is, was, and will be. This is Dasein and its existentials.

Dasein is, and it is in the world, but the world is a consequence of Dasein. Dasein is a sucking and striking presence that refuses to be called "I," refuses to be called "the world," and refuses to coincide with anything. As being-in-the-world, Dasein is a spatially moving being that organizes itself and everything around it. First comes the "in-der-Welt-Sein", "Dasein, and then only the world, and then only if it has a chance to justify its autonomy, which, given Heidegger's acute vigilance to prevent a repetition of the ontological errors of the first Beginning of philosophy, will not be easy. The world henceforth becomes an existential hypothesis. We know that there is being-in-the-world, but we do not know (we can only guess and speculate) about the being of the world.

"BEING-IN" AND "BEING-WITH."

Developing this crucial existential, Heidegger also formulates it somewhat differently, introducing two other parallel existentials *In-sein*⁽²¹⁾ and *Mit-sein*⁽²²⁾.

"In-sein" means "being-in." We have already mentioned that fundamental-ontology tries in every possible way to avoid essentializing the world. The existential "In-sein", "being-in" emphasizes Dasein's role in the unfolding of the world as that *in* which Dasein abides. Even before the world, he abides in something. Again, the given "in" (German "in", "in", Heidegger etymologically derives from the Gothic "innan", "to live", whence the modern German "wohnen") is revealed only through being. This being lives, it lives, it inhabits, it dwells, it "pre-exists in".

Mit-sein, being-with, should be interpreted in the same way. This existential tells us nothing about *who* pre-exists or with *whom*. But it emphasizes that Dasein is never solitary, i.e. singular, i.e. separated and basing its identity on self-identity. Fichte's formulation of the "I" equals "I", on which he bases his post-Kantian ontology, is completely unsuitable here. In Dasein there is no one who could or should remove his loneliness, no singularities of dialog, no dialog itself. Here community precedes its constituents, community - "with" ("mit") - is there, but those of whom it is composed and between whom it is established are not. In such a case, "with", "mit", becomes, as in the case of "in", a derivative of being. Being tells us that it is only "with"; without "with" there is no being. When being reveals itself, it does so as "being-with," affirming non-singularity as an inherent property of Dasein. Dasein is not alone.

CARE

Heidegger describes other existentials of Dasein. The most important among them is *die Sorge*, *care*⁽²³⁾. Dasein is preoccupied, and in this being manifests itself. Being itself represents *care*. This is an extremely important point. Dasein is not something aloof, cold, immersed.

only in itself, indifferent. Dasein is preoccupation. In principle, this existential follows from the three preceding ones - being-in-the-world, being-in, and being-with - but deciphers them. Dasein radiates *care* and is itself *care* - *care* in its purest form, without there being one who cares and is cared for. Existence is partial, interested, included in the course of existentialiation.

Through caring in the direction of the world is shaped by its

"handiness". This vector of being-in-the-world constitutes something "available" "handy" (das Vorhandene) as "handy" (das Zuhandene). *Being-in-the-world* becomes *being-at-home*, where presence is thought of as surrounded by care, constituted by care.

Care is always there, *care* is the essence of Dasein, but when *care* pushes Dasein to cross an invisible barrier (thereby establishing it), to revise something, to touch something, to eat something, care as an existential can turn the "handiness" into objectification. Thus this existential Dasein shows how the oblivion of being began in Western European philosophy. Dasein's natural preoccupation at some point turned the world in which being (being-in-the-world) manifested itself into something *extremely "handy"*. Here we can see a lead-in to the emergence of φύσις. We begin to realize that fundamental-ontology does not simply constitute a *new Beginning* in philosophy, but also shows the trajectories by which Dasein was alienated from itself in the *first Beginning*. By placing the new philosophy within itself and explaining in detail how the old metaphysics emerged, on what errors in relation to Dasein's existentials it was based, and in what way it was formed in its very foundations, Heidegger's analytics of Dasein declares its identity with fundamental-ontology.

We shall see a little later that Dasein itself can have a two basic moduses - authentic and inauthentic. And each of the existentials can also act as a manifestation of either authentic or inauthentic Dasein. In the case of the existential of *care*, this can be seen clearly, and we can already imagine how the existentials of Dasein in the

The inauthentic mode will constitute the historical-philosophical process from the first Beginning to Nietzsche.

This is the whole meaning of Heidegger. He does not simply show that what is over is over, but explains *what it is* over, when *it* began, and why it happened. In addition, Heidegger builds a bridge to a new Beginning.

DERELICTION (GEWORFENHEIT)

Another essential existential of Dasein is *abandonment* (Geworfenheit). Dasein is *abandoned*, and this is its fundamental basis, or rather the absence of a basis.

Dasein has been abandoned. It is abandoned by someone, somewhere, somewhere, somewhere, from somewhere, but this someone, somewhere, somewhere, from somewhere *outside* and *before* Dasein itself does not exist. It is abandoned in every sense, including psychological. Dasein is abandoned because there is no instance to which it can appeal with a complaint, a request, a testament or a demand. This is the meaning of the transition from essentialist thinking to existentialist thinking. Dasein is abandoned because it is left to itself in the total absence of any presence outside itself. It can be said that it is in a *rush*, it flies, because *abandonment* does not find the *bottom* (Grund), but occurs in the conditions of *the abyss* (Abgrund).

Although the concept of Geworfenheit has become common today and is actively used in philosophy and psychology, it is not difficult to recognize Heidegger's own etymological intentions. Just as "Unverborgenheit" (literally "unconcealment") has for him a meaning equivalent to "truth" (as a literal rendering of the etymology of the Greek word ἀλήθεια), so too does Heidegger's own etymological intentions.

"Geworfenheit" is nothing but a German calque from la-

Subjectum, "subjectum", from "sub" and "jacere". Subjectum, "subject", is "abandoned". In Russian, something similar is conveyed by the word "podlezhashchie" (a trace from another Latin word "substantivus" - literally: "lying", or, more precisely, "standing under").

The subject is also *abandoned*, but this is a special case of *abandonment*. Abandonment as the existential of Geworfenheit

is a primordial and fundamental concept. It is peculiar both to the old philosophy (where it gets the name of Dasein and its existentials) and to the old philosophy.

ψυχή, δαίμον, "subject", "I", etc.) and the new one, where it appears in its pure form.

Another existential is associated with the abandonment of Dasein - "*sketch*" (Entwurf) (in Russian in the word "sketch" also, as in German, has the root "sketch".

"to throw"). Being *abandoned* and in flight, Dasein itself makes a *throw*. This throw is a "throw-on" as a response to *abandonment*. Here again, we may well draw parallels with the Latin philosophical term

"proectum", "project", which etymologically means "thrown forward" - virtually the same as German

"Entwurf, or Russian for "sketch." In Latin: "subjectum, quia subiectum est, se proicit", "being abandoned, the subject creates a project".

But "subject" and "project" are not mere Latin words, but philosophical notions belonging to the conceptual topics of old philosophy and therefore to the meta-language of metaphysics. Heidegger's "abandonment" (as well as "sketch") instead of "subject" serves the following purposes:

- dismantling the metaphysical meanings of philosophical terms and returning them to the elements of language (from terms to words);
- The development of a meta-language for a new philosophy, which may be based on Germanic roots.

It should be noted that these operations should be understood in the Russian-speaking context, and then Heidegger's philosophy will become intelligible in Russian as well, and the use of Slavic etymology will only help to understand the movement of Heidegger's thought. At the same time, they can serve as a model for the development of a philosophical meta-language based on a return to the original etymologies, i.e. to the language itself, which will open up the possibility of constructing a Russian philosophy (which never existed) based on the original Slavic-Russian meanings (with the free use of comparative etymologies of other Indo-European languages).

BEFINDLICHKEIT (FINDABILITY) AND FEAR

Dasein's next existential is *findability*, Befindlichkeit⁽²⁴⁾.

Dasein's specific abandonment manifests itself in what is piercingly perceived by itself as Befindlichkeit, as "*finding*". *Dasein is found*. The ambiguity of transitivity and non-transitivity in the use of the Russian verb "to be" ("befinden", "sich befinden") comes in handy here. By using the transitive verb incorrectly, i.e. without explaining "where" one is, we convey the very essence of this existential. It is not

"where", but simply found. Violence against Russian grammar tries to find a way out in this interpretation: Dasein is found, so it has been found. And this second meaning, correct this time, from the grammatical point of view can also be accepted with the correction that no one finds Dasein, since there is nothing and no one besides it, but at the same time it does not find itself (yet), since Dasein's "self" (Selbst) constitutes another subject of its analytical description. Therefore, Dasein does not "find itself", but *is found*. This formula can be taken as a fundamental statement of the new philosophy in Russian.

The anxiety of what *Dasein finds* is expressed in the modus of this "finding", which is fear⁽²⁵⁾ (Furcht). As a consequence, it is quite correct to say that Dasein is *afraid*. It *fears* both *abandonment* (*abandonment*), *being-in*, and the *orientation to "the world"* as a place of *being*. Therefore, *fear* constitutes the most important existential of Dasein, in which the more general "finding-ness" manifests itself. Dasein is frightened and can express its fright in various ways. But even before these expressions, it is initially and fundamentally ontically permeated by fear.

VERSTEHEN

Heidegger believes that Verstehen⁽²⁶⁾ ("understanding", in translation) is also the existential of Dasein.

"To understand" in Russian etymology simply means "to take something". "Understand" comes from "yat", "nyat", i.e., "to take".

something", "to take up". That is, in Russian "*understanding*" is thought of as "appropriation", "appropriation", "capture" and "transformation into property" ("domestication", "eating", "use", "taking into custody"). If the Russian word "understanding" can be used in this case, it can only be used to describe this existential in the case of non-authentic Dasein. "Understanding" as "taking" can only be understood by the being transformed into "handy", by taking a step beyond the barrier where the sacred relation to being ends, from which - for all its domesticity - it is better not to take anything, and if one does take, to give it back promptly. "Being-in-the-world", which constitutes

The "handy" through *care* does indeed prepare this "handy" to be taken. But the true existential of Dasein clearly resists this. This means that *Verstehen* must be conceptualized in some other way than through the conventional Russian "understanding". Rather, the German root has the meaning of "to rearrange" or "to move"; in English, "to understand" has the meaning of "to put under". In French "*comprendre*" (from Latin "*comrehen- dere*"), as in Russian and unlike the Germanic languages, the root "*prendre*", i.e. "to take", "to assign", prevails. Something similar in meaning we find in the German word

"*das Vernehmung*", "*vernehmen*" ("perception", "perceiving"). Heidegger himself sometimes uses this word to convey such an important Greek term as "*νοῦς*", "*νοεῖν*" ("nous", "no- ein") - "intellect", "reason", "thinking", "to think".

Dasein's characteristic is to "rearrange" everything, to change places. Perhaps this is a manifestation of his *concern*, his participation, his involvement in being-in-the-world. By "rearranging," Dasein comprehends what it rearranges, recognizes the meaning of what it rearranges, places the distant close to itself and the too close a little farther away, thus building an intellectual order. This is "understanding" in meaning, but Russian "understanding" (as well as French "*compre- hension*") is too connected by etymology.

There is a certain linguistic problem here. If we go into all these nuances, then we will cross out the possibility of translating Heidegger into Russian and will speak of him only in German. And if, on the contrary, we try to simplify the situation and refuse-

If we abandon etymological excursions, we risk getting a complete nonsense instead of a coherent and extremely intelligible German-language philosophy.

I see the solution in the following. In the most important, nodal points of Heidegger's philosophy, especially where it concerns his creation of a *meta-language* for this philosophy, i.e. *the building of a bridge to a new Beginning*, one should keep as close as possible to *the* German original, at the risk of complicating the text, making it excessively cumbersome, but ensuring intellectual and philosophical clarity and certainty. In general exposition, however, it is possible to deviate from this rule and use some Russian words without etymological and terminological clarification, approximating. Heidegger himself also often strayed from the meta-language, moving sporadically from the ordinary, common understanding of a word or term to one that is special and specific to his philosophy, and then returning to the ordinary usage again, without warning or explanation. Or another example. In *Sein und Zeit* and other works of the first period, Heidegger uses the word "Sein" in all cases where *being is* involved. In the 1930s he begins to distinguish "Sein" (as "being in ontology") from "Seyn" (as "being in fundamental ontology") more and more carefully. In Russian and all other languages this is generally untranslatable and untranslatable, and for Heidegger's meta-language

is of fundamental and fundamental importance.

Therefore, returning to the existential *Verstehen* and explaining why it cannot be generally translated as "understanding", we can say with some stretch that *understanding* (as interpretation, deciphering, comprehending, *comprehending*, *comprehending*, *comprehending*, although none of these words gives us the etymological equivalent of *Verstehen*) is Dasein's existentiality, that Dasein is "understanding being" or, more precisely, "understanding" but not "appropriating" being (to banish the meaning of "taking").

(REDE).

"Finding" (*Befindlichkeit*) and "understanding" (i.e. *Verstehen*) of Dasein's express themselves in *speech*⁽²⁷⁾. Heidegger

Heidegger emphasizes that the ancient Greeks, in their very definition of the human being, included as a basic feature *the ability to speak* - ζῶον λόγον ἔχον, which, according to Heidegger, should be translated as "talking animal" rather than the Latin formula "animalis rationalis". (Far from always *speaking* reveals the presence of reason, but always the presence of Dasein.)

Heidegger writes: "Man exhibits himself as being through speech"⁽²⁸⁾. Here it is important that man shows himself as *being* (ontically), not as a person. Dasein itself makes itself known through speech. Therefore, speech and the language it manifests are rooted in being. It is important that it is language, and not its grammar and logic, that expresses the deep fundamental ontological stratum of Dasein. This is the most important power line of Heidegger's philosophy. Language as the ontic of Dasein should be

To "understand" (verstehen) otherwise than with a logical apparatus based on the old philosophy and, consequently, on ontology. Heidegger's entire oeuvre is based on this principle: in moving toward a *new Beginning*, he turns to language as the existential of Dasein directly and, on its basis, constructs a meta-language of fundamental ontology as radically different from the language of Western European philosophy, from the *first Beginning* (Anaximander, Parmenides, Heraclitus) to its *End* (Nietzsche).

Language is Dasein's Sein.

Heidegger emphasizes that *speech as an existential* organically includes both *listening* and *silence*. Silence, according to Heidegger, is not simply the absence of speech or its negation, but it is the source of speech, speech in its pure being. Speech as utterance conceals silence, overshadowing by its presence its omnipotent and omnipresent life-giving darkness.

Heidegger pays special attention to the process of listening, hearing. He cites the image of a sentry standing watch at night in the absolute darkness that surrounds him. The sentry listens to the surrounding silence of existence, trying to catch in the absence of sound the slightest signs of its barely discernible emergence. This silence and this listening to this silence place Dasein at the very origins of speech,

to that point in the ocean of language where the river of speech first begins.

Speech and silence can be likened to being and beingness. Being *is both* being and *not being*. So too is silence: it both calls speech into being and removes it in the all-encompassing solemnity of truth. From the point of view of Dasein's authentic existentialization, hearing speech, and even more so, listening to the life-giving silence, is more important than speech itself, than artificially cultivated human and natural sounds.

STIMMUNG

The other existential of Dasein is "Stimmung", "Stimme." It is a very interesting word. It means "voice", "melody", "mood" and "mood" at the same time. Dasein's *attunement* is also its existential, Dasein cannot be "by itself", in other words, not attuned: it will not play, sound by itself. Dasein is necessarily in one of its moods. He laughs, he cries, he is sad, he contemplates calmly, he is angry, he lounges. Without this it is inconceivable: we cannot imagine a Dasein devoid of the existential Stimmung.

In old philosophy, mood was considered an absolutely secondary property, unworthy of a philosopher. It is impossible to imagine a Stoic, a follower of Zeno of Elea, Seneca or Marcus Aurelius, who despised affect, suddenly saying, "We are sad today, but yesterday we were happy. Thinkers had to be indifferent, unfeeling, detached, they had to think of eternal and unchanging principles, to contemplate ἀρχή ("arche", "original"), to abide in ἀταραξία ("ataraxia", "indifference").

Heidegger believes that this is the thesis of a false ontology. The detachment from mood, the equation of Stimme with affect, testifies to the accomplished division of Dasein into soul (consciousness, νοῦς) and nature (φύσις), i.e., to the alienation and loss of relation to being, to the *substitution of the question of being for the question of essence and the common*.

Dasein's moods, and these Dasein's moods affect the modus operandi of philosophizing in a fundamental-ontological way key. Whereas affects in the old philosophy were considered inferior to thinking, in the *New Beginning* moods are inseparable from and included in thinking.

Heidegger's special attitude towards art (and poetry in particular) is related to this. Driven by *mood*, *Stimme*, poets and artists are capable of reaching in this direction the farthest horizons, the most inaccessible heights, which in their significance are comparable to the highest philosophical insights. Heidegger considered philosophers and artists to be two types of people who climb to the same height, but on different mountain peaks and following different paths. They come from the same Dasein but follow different trajectories. Heidegger therefore turns to the poems of Hölderlin, Novalis, Rilke, Geheime, and the paintings of Vincent van Gogh to interpret many philosophical ideas.

Stimme is undeniably a poetic existential.

CHAPTER 4

me`rŠemŠh)m{i pefhl }jghqŠhpnb`mh "DASEIN"=

DASEIN'S AUTHENTICITY AND INAUTHENTICITY.

In describing Dasein and its existentials, Heidegger introduces a crucial division in Dasein itself. He speaks of Dasein's having two opposing modes of being, "eigene" and "uneigene". This is usually translated as "*authentic*" and "*inauthentic*". "Eigene" in German means "proper", in other words, "own", "belonging only to oneself". "Uneigene" is "unowned", "unowned", "unauthentic", "alienated". The Greek word "αὐθεντικός" is formed from the root "αὐτός," i.e., "himself," "his own," which corresponds closely to the German "eigene."

The introduction of this fundamental distinction leads us to the description of two types of Dasein's existentials and, consequently, to the division of all existentials into two modus: each existential can be considered in both authentic (eigene) and in inauthentic (uneigene) editions.

Heidegger makes it clear that the "natural" (at least more common) state of Dasein is the pre-existence in the *inauthentic*. Dasein exists in the non-self, in the inauthentic. It can exist (and should exist) authentically, but most often (indeed, almost always) it does not. The inauthenticity of Dasein's existentialisation constitutes one of the fundamental properties of Dasein. It is not some kind of addition to Dasein from the outside (there is no such side), it is its inalienable and fundamental property. Inauthenticity has its deepest foundations in Dasein.

At the same time, all forms of inauthentic existentialism are rooted in the authentic structure of Dasein.

It is important to note here that Dasein manifests itself (no longer hides, reveals itself) in the authentic modus, and hides (hides, disappears) in the inauthentic modus. But both, disclosure and concealment, constitute the essence of its existence.

PERVASIVE EVERYDAY LIFE

What is the essence of the inauthentic existentialization of Dasein? Heidegger calls it "durchdringliche Alltäglichkeit"⁽²⁹⁾, which means "pervasive" or "*pervasive everydayness*". What a lightweight term "everyday life" would seem to be. But this term does not imply what happens every day, because "every day" is a variety of things that cannot serve as a predicate for such a fundamental concept as Dasein. The inauthentic register of existentiality itself generates "everydayness", establishes and constitutes it, transforms into it everything that may not be everydayness itself, and makes this everydayness "piercingly piercing". The inauthenticity of Dasein turns everything - even that which is "unique" and "unusual" - into the everyday. "Ordinariness" and

"unusualness" is predetermined by the mood of Dasein. In the non-authentic modus any, even the most extraordinary, event becomes routine, banalized, incorporated into the familiar. At the same time, the power of Dasein is so great that it is able to involve *everything* in "everyday life," keeping actions, thoughts, events, gestures, happenings, feelings in this state. No one and nothing can escape this register when it is on; the pervasive rays of inauthenticity control everything.

DISINTEGRATION

Since Dasein is existential, its existentials are not something additional to it, but express different aspects of itself. Accordingly, in the inauthentic modus, Dasein's existentials act as expressors of this inauthenticity. They do not fall under the "all-pervasive everydayness", but each in his or her own way con-

stituates it. By acting in a non-authentic mode, Dasein's existentials create everyday life.

Thus, "abandonment" (Geworfenheit) in inauthentic Dasein turns into "decay", "decomposition" (Verfallen)⁽³⁰⁾. This existentialism expresses, formalizes, moderates and emits the fundamental element in a peculiar way

"throw." Dasein falls, disintegrates, collapses. In doing so, it creates "everydayness" as dispersion, scatteredness, decay, decay, decay, confusion, multiplicity. It affects other existentials as well. For example,

"being-in-the-world" in Dasein's inauthentic existentialization becomes "fall-in-the-world," and as a result "the world" itself appears as such, detached from "being-in-the-world," alienated from this being, knowingly fallen. Every world is a fallen world, and this fallenness, this sinfulness of the world is the form of Dasein's existentialization as fall and disintegration. The world falls away from being-in-the-world and becomes a world, but in becoming a world it becomes a world of disintegration, disintegrates into multiplicity, immediately begins to smolder, to dissipate in an entropic process. But this is not a property of the world, and not even a property of the world that has fallen away from being-in-the-world, but a property of Dasein's inauthentic existentialization. The world is transformed into the everyday world through Dasein's incorporation of an inauthentic mode.

But it is not only the world that falls. Dasein itself *falls* and *falls* into everyday life. This *falling* through *falling* into everyday life becomes for Dasein its fate, its history. The history of Dasein in its inauthentic mode is the history of its *fall* (as an inauthentic expression of *abandonment*). This is why the history of Western European philosophy moves inexorably towards nihilism: it embodies the fall of Dasein.

The fall is a fall into inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit).

GOSSIP

Other properties of inauthentic Dasein are *chatter* (Gerede)⁽³¹⁾, *curiosity* (Neugierigkeit)⁽³²⁾ and *ambiguity* (Zweideutlichkeit)⁽³³⁾.

Chatter is a kind of speech (in German it is explicit: *Gerede* - *Rede*) that narrates about Dasein as it appears in its inauthentic mode. In this, chatter manifests itself in the same way as speech, and in the same way as speech is the existential of Dasein. The difference is that chatter is speech permeated by everyday life, creating this everyday life, immersing in it the one who speaks and the one who listens, as well as the one who is silent (in this case, silent). In chatter, it is impossible to distinguish clearly who is speaking, what is being said, to whom it is being said, why it is being said. It is a background muttering, a white noise, distant from the speaker and from the person to whom he or she is addressing. It is Dasein itself (albeit in a non-authentic mode); it is Dasein itself that is characterized by speech to narrate the being present in it, addressing everything and no one at the same time. Chatter translates this existential Dasein into a community of "here" (*da*) rather than "being" (*Sein*). "Behold," the chatterer (*Gerede*) sounds, "here, here, here, here." Chatter draws attention to *facticity* (which is also an existential dimension of Dasein), but it distracts from being, so that facticity becomes unimportant, insignificant.

The incessant muttering about the insignificant weaves the structure of everyday life and fills it with endless discourse,

like a kind of totalitarian radio that cannot be turned off

because it is playing in our minds. The attempt to concentrate on the meaning of an utterance fails because

Gerede moves on to the next topic at exactly the moment when the mind is trying to comprehend the previous one. The inauthentic Dasein does not tolerate silence as an aspect of- The voice of being is always silent, but in order to have any chance of hearing it at all, *Gerede* rings louder and louder.

The voice of being is always quiet, but in order to avoid any chance of hearing it at all, *Gerede* rings louder and louder.

She wants to say everything, to say nothing, but to fill the silence with a stream of everyday statements. Chattering is an inherent characteristic of many, even the most silent and sullen persons (unsociable quiet people are even more talkative inside). People constantly talk to themselves

They speak, something is constantly going on in their heads, fragments of words, thoughts, concepts, phrases are rotating. This is the existential chatter of inauthentic Dasein. It has neither beginning nor end. When a person first enters the world, he hears the creaks, clangs, rattling of medical instruments, the murmurs of nurses, the self-assured bass of doctors, the cries of women in labor, the cries of babies (including his own), then the incessant babble of father, mother, brothers, sisters, grandmothers, grandfathers, cats, television sets, later - announcers, teachers, bosses, subordinates, insurance agents, cashiers, administrators, and again at the end - nurses and doctors. To the same nonsensical and meaningless murmur of everyday phrases strung together, not endowed with a narrative of existence, one passes away.

In *chatter*, Dasein is abandoned, in *chatter* it is liquidated. When a person dies, the chatter still continues, because it is a fundamental property of inauthentic Dasein.

CURIOSITY (NEUGIERIGKEIT)

Understanding (Verstehen) turns into curiosity, into a neurotic desire to get to know more and more species, concepts, states, things, places, events without any immersion in their being. *Curiosity* is an attempt to appropriate, to take over, to privatize the world detached from its being, and curiosity only grows as it is satisfied, since it takes over the world without its being. The inauthentic Dasein gains nothing, but only loses, scattering in the fall (and *curiosity* is the fall of *understanding* - Ver- stehen) its main property - being, which is embedded in the being of the world. "here-being" (Dasein).

"Neugierigkeit" in German literally means "greed for new things." Russian "lubo-" (from "love") and "-experience" (from "torture", i.e. "to find out", "to study", "to know", "to unravel") does not carry a negative connotation this time. *Greed for the new* is a much more acute expression of the vanity of inauthentic Dasein. It pushes

Dasein to a constant sliding from one thing to another as this "one thing" becomes habitual. But "to be, habitual" does not mean to be "understood" ("verstanden"), although again the Russian word "understanding" is not at all appropriate here. The inauthentic Dasein "understands" in the sense of "picking up" something in order to discard it at the next moment, since the intension of inauthenticity is not the investigation of being in the "picked up" but the very gesture of its "imaginary" appropriation. At the same time, the Russian word "curiosity" does not etymologically mean neither an attempt at appropriation nor a transition to the new: curiosity can be a property of the inquirer of the same thing, can be caused by the same thing if Dasein likes to "torture" ("question", "ask") it about its being.

The elements reproduced by Dasein in inauthentic being become a constant and continuous prodigal, *wandering contemplation* that is drawn to nothing. Greed for the new is a form of supreme ignorance: running from one thing to another and grabbing everything in a row, only to drop it a second later, the inauthentic Dasein transforms everything *into the old*, and thus into the meaningless, uninteresting, and uninspiring. Thus Neugierigkeit becomes an escape from meaning, thought, content, and thus from being.

Heidegger argues that curiosity (Neugierigkeit) manifests the human desire to *see*. Seeing means not understanding. The very fact of seeing does not communicate anything to Dasein, does not advance it in any way in the comprehension of being. Seeing is the least ontic of all forms of perception. Everyday life replaces meaningful understanding (Verstehen) with visibility (δόξα) and immerses the inauthentic Dasein in a continuous series of visions, in sightseeing.

Thinking requires limitation of visibility, focusing on the contemplation of the same thing, so that this contemplation reveals the being of the contemplated thing or of Dasein itself. Hence the traditional practice of meditation, of concentrating on the same objects. The less one has seen, the more chances one has to realize and comprehend something. But this is authentic Dasein. In non-authentic Dasein, the opposite is true: its goal is to accumulate-

The more total the ability to observe, the more meaningless the observed pictures. The more total the ability to observe, the more meaningless are the observed pictures.

We can compare the two existentials of inauthentic Dasein - *chatter* and *curiosity*. In *chatter* (Gerede), as a rule, the same thing is repeated, and this obsessive nonsense does not stop even at night, when one closes one's eyes and looks at nothing. Curiosity, on the other hand, pushes one constantly *toward the new*, toward what one has not "seen" before. Thus, the eternal return of the same meaninglessness in the form of Gerede is supplemented by a "refreshing" stream of new meaninglessness in the form of Neugierigkeit. This is ideally handled by the television-visor, which had not yet been invented at the time of the writing of *Sein und Zeit*. Television combines a stream of half-thought-out, confusing information with a stream of images. Television is thus one of the highest embodiments of *the pervasive everyday* and, consequently, a privileged form of existentializing the inauthentic Dasein.

AMBIGUITY (ZWEIDEUTLICHKEIT)

The fact that Dasein is always *between* (zwischen) generates, in the inauthentic mode, a constant ambiguity, indeterminacy, blurriness, which continuously confuses the ontic vectors of Dasein's unfolding in the direction of spatial or temporal horizons. Unlike authentic Dasein, which grasps in *being-in-between* precisely the *being that* frees it from false identifications with *being outside* (φύσις) and *being within* (ιδέα, ψυχή), non-authentic Dasein, on the contrary, on the contrary, the inauthentic Dasein falls into a series of tosses between the external and the internal and, revolving in a cycle of increasing uncertainties like a clod, finds itself unable to concentrate and prove the ontological basis of either.

Ambiguity can be seen as the superimposition of *chatter* on the *thirst for the new*. The meaningless repetition of the same in chatter generates in the inauthentic Dasein a simulation of constancy, which creates a fictitious meaning series as a kind of babbling constancy of the pseudo-

dosmuslov. *Curiosity*, for its part, introduces the pseudo-dynamics of flickering pictures. Since both the other is the opposite of meaning, then both processes are in a desynchronized state, and the double-meaning is obtained as a superimposition of two senselessnesses (sound and visual) on each other.

FEAR AS ESCAPISM

In non-authentic existentialism, the *fear* inherent in Dasein as such pushes it to *flee*. This *flight* (or slipping away) is characterized not by *where to flee to*, but by *where from*, *what to flee to*. Non-authentic Dasein interprets *fear* as fear of being and transforms it into panic *flight from being*.

Escape from being, i.e. from that in Dasein which corresponds to Sein, can be realized in two directions: *outward and inward*. *Outward* flight means the constitution of the world as a world apart from being-in-the-world. This world as something independent becomes the result of Dasein's inauthentic existentialism, fleeing from itself, and the direction of this *escape outwardly* creates the world as that to which one flees from being. At the same time, the same world that has fallen out of being-in-the-world can also be described as the result of inauthentic abandonment. When abandonment becomes falling and disintegration, it does not first of all constitute not the one who falls, but where one falls and where one disintegrates. Where one falls is the same as where one runs.

Another form of fear can be caused by the very world that is constituted by *the detachment from being*. In this case, the flight from being becomes a flight from the world, and the inauthentic Dasein constitutes the inner dimension of the subject, which autonomizes itself in response to the fear instilled by the external. In this case, it can also be represented as *abandonment*, only not in the world, but in the opposite direction from the world, as alienation from the world, as a *turning away from being and from the being of being*. In all cases of Dasein's inauthentic existentialization, this fear that accompanies being, the fear of being and of being fear as being, becomes fear of being.

FIGURE DAS MAN

Describing the existentialization of inauthentic Dasein, Heidegger introduces the figure of "das Man"⁽³⁴⁾. In German this is a neologism. "Man", "husband" is spelled "der Mann", a masculine noun with two "n's" at the end. However, in German there are forms such as:

"man spricht", "man sieht", "man denkt", which translates as "everyone speaks", "everyone sees", "everyone thinks". In Russian there is no direct analog to this, and the corresponding forms are conveyed either by using the third person verb without a personal pronoun ("they say", "they think"), or by a return verb also without a personal pronoun in the third person singular ("it is considered", "it is sung"), or by a verb in the third person plural with the pronoun "all" ("all think", "all consider"). In French, "das Man" has a direct analog - "on", "l'on" (which is formed from French "homme", "l'homme", "man", as well as German "Man" - from "der Mann", "man", formerly also "man", "man", "man", "man", "man", "man", "man", "man", "man".

"man", in modern German "Mensch"). In English, this expression can be translated as "they think", i.e. "they think" (which is similar to the Russian "think"), but in this case the English "they" does not mean "they", but a certain indefinite, conditional subject, which is considered to be known and self-evident.

Heidegger introduces "das Man" as an expression of the inauthentic Dasein that has fallen into everyday life. *Das Man* is the "I" of inauthentic Dasein, its personified expression. *Das Man* is the answer to the question "who?" in relation to the inauthentic Dasein.

In *das Man*, the existential "being-with" (*Mit-sein*) is expressed in a non-authentically taken existential mode. Since *Dasein* is revealed as *being-with*, as *being-together*, in a non-authentic mode this means the transference of subjectivity to some indeterminate, blurred and unfixed instance, located (like Dasein itself) *between* (*zwischen*). In this case, *das Man* is not the "I" of the individual, nor is it the "I" of the individual person.

"he", and not "you", and not "all put together". *Das Man* is more of a nobody, since non-responsible statements, conclusions, actions, conclusions and projects are projected onto him,

Chapter 4. The Inauthentic Mode of Existence... - 269 but, on the contrary, the rejection of all responsibility for assertions, conclusions, actions, conclusions and projects, the escape from from them, slipping away. The density of movement away from responsibility, away from responsibility, gives rise to the existentialization of *das Man*, who becomes the referential point of reference for everything and everyone. What a man does not think about himself and what someone else, fixed and concrete next to him or even far away from him, does not think about, falls into the category of "thinking", "thinking that", "considered". As a rule, no one in particular (neither individually nor collectively) thinks as they "think" (as *das Man* thinks), but nevertheless it is precisely the absence of a position personified in anyone that gives the (unintelligible) "thoughts" of *das Man* supreme authority, unquestionable "truth", unconditional and obvious.

Das Man is constituted together with everyday life as its impersonal personification, as its center, in which nothing concrete, definite, clear and transparent can be found. *Das Man* is the center of *ambiguity* (*Zweideutlichkeit*), its "expressions" are never unambiguous or orderly, but they become more and more obligatory, pressurizing, self-referential. The more *das Man* asserts the validity of his activities and his judgments, the more ridiculous and unreasonable he becomes.

In *das Man*, Heidegger writes, "everyone is the other, and no one is himself"⁽³⁵⁾.

Das Man is the main actor and at the same time the creator of everyday life. It is the "who?" *Dasein* is in the fall, in the disintegration (*Verfallen*). *Das Man* falls without noticing it; it seems to him that he, on the contrary, "fits well".

Das Man is the one who generates an inauthentic ontology, the one who speaks of subject and object. In him, a chain of inauthentic existentials, a system of ontological judgments, concepts of subject, object, and, dreadfully to say, "God" arises and is constructed. "God" as an ontological construct of inauthentic *Dasein* is conditioned by its inability to truly address the *other*, as well as the authentic state of itself.


According to Heidegger, the man who says "I" is a ridiculous madman, since a correct philosophical understanding of the first person pronoun makes its practical use impossible in principle. When a man says "I", it is *das Man* who pushes him to say it; "I" becomes the citation of an indeterminate, reliable and unproven, at the same time, instance. By saying "I", through *das Man* man dissipates into a "falling world" filled with mirrors of *das Man*, multiple caricatures of wholeness, personality, rationality, determination.

A similar situation occurs with the expressions "objective", "real", "reality". By assuming the external to *be given*, man again operates in the dimension of *das Man'a*, who, instead of relating to the *thing* through the *questioning of its being*, accepts it as a *self-justified given*, and thus crosses out its essence and its very existence, annihilates them, and substitutes *nothingness* in their place. Reality, objectivity, and especially materiality are profoundly nihilistic concepts whose very possibility of existence is correlated with the *pervasiveness of everyday life* and the foolish wisdom of *das Man*. In modern American parlance, there is a stable expression "conventional wisdom", which means literally "wisdom that everyone agreed was wisdom" or represents "common ground". This is the mode of existence of *das Man*, the mode of his wisdom, on which everyone agrees (although no one has been specifically asked), but which can neither specify nor prove its origins and its intellectual genesis, which may well be rooted in inaccuracy, error, absurdity, or outright contrivance.

Das Man also has his "god". This "god" is calm, lazy and does not participate in the life of people in any way. The lazy, delinquent God (the "deus otiosis" of the historians of religions) is also a creation of *das Man*.

Das Man always thinks practically and therefore creates his everyday ontology, in which everything profound and problematic is questioned, but joyful and confident.

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of *das Man*.



*Scheme of ontological poles of
inauthentic Dasein*

Of course, *das Man* can do without a "god" because his firm confidence in the reliability of the erroneous and unprovable ("I" and "reality") and his doubts about everything else (sometimes much more justified and self-evident) are generally enough for him to exist. But still he reserves this higher ontological instance "just in case", where he can place - in addition to "God" - "idea", "values", "ideals", "worldview", "state", "society", etc.

In Heidegger's eyes, the picture of inauthentic existence, the picture of our habitual everyday life woven out of ourselves, becomes a process of fundamental ontological decomposition - tumultuous, active, terrifying, per second, and permanent. The world, which usually opens up in everyday life to *das Man* (and everyone else) in a comforting way, is in fact, in this lens, something terrible - a catastrophe, a crisis, a fall and a disintegration. To fall under the spell of *das Man* and his "conventional wisdom" is more terrible than to fall into the clutches of a maniac. He who falls into the clutches of a maniac may remember the true being. But he who has not fallen into the clutches of a maniac cannot remember it, although he is already in the clutches of a maniac.

a maniac, they cut him up asleep, quiet, snuggling. And if for a second the consciousness touched even a shadow of this mood, the man would awaken, because there is nothing more monstrous, violent, pathological than what happens in the *piercing everyday life*. *Das Man* dismantles being, makes things rot and decay, turns the living into the dead, and turns the saving question into a suffocating and knowingly wrong answer.

DAS MAN AS DASEIN'S EXISTENTIAL.

To understand Heidegger's thought, any hint of dualism must be carefully avoided. The inauthenticity of Dasein's existence, the transformation of its existentials:

"The centrality of the figure of *das Man*; the all-permeating everyday life - all this is not something external, alien, other than Dasein itself. It is he himself, his own choice, his own *decision* (Entscheidung). The definitions "bad"/"good", "true"/"false" are unsuitable here,

"good"/"evil", etc. In all cases and in both modes - authentic and inauthentic - we are dealing with the same thing: with Dasein and its existentialization, which, however it may exist, always expresses the existence of Dasein and only it.

Therefore, in order to avoid any hint of dualism when describing *das Man* and its characteristics, Heidegger emphasizes: "*Das Man* is existential and as an original phenomenon belongs to the positive structure of Dasein's"⁽³⁶⁾. This is an extremely important clarification. Existentially inauthentic, Dasein is still the main and only distributor of being, meaning, content, structures and orientations of processes, even if this distribution is expressed in nihilism, false ontology, alienation, meaninglessness, obscurity, confusion and decay. Inauthenticity, as well as the authenticity of existentiality, is solely and exclusively responsible for

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Dasein. It is at the center and is the existence of everything, predetermining *what* is, *how* what is, and *until when what is will be*.

The very inauthenticity of Dasein itself Heidegger urges us to think *positively*.

CHAPTER 5

ṛŠemŠh)m{i DASEIN

AUTHENTIC DASEIN AND BEING

What is *authenticity*?

Heidegger defines it as the *antithesis of inauthenticity*, described through the forms of existentialism discussed earlier.

The most important thing about *authentic (eigene) Dasein* is that it is *centered on the possibility of being*, on the Sein (being) that is (ist) here, *here-here* (da). The presence of Sein is inherent in Dasein, but Dasein itself can deal with this Sein in its ecstasy in two ways. It can distract itself from it, brush it aside, turn away from it, focus on something else (e.g., on pure Sein).

"da", i.e. on "*here*"). In the case of this decision, he enters the mode of inauthenticity and begins to exist through the deployments of "piercing everyday life", with all the versions of existentials characteristic of it - das Man's, "curiosity", "panic flight", "bol-tovnya", "ambiguity", etc.

Authentic Dasein exists in what *it is*, in the fact that *being prevails in it*, in the fact that *it exists as being*. Authenticity is found where we escape from inauthenticity, where we cope with inauthentic chatter and curiosity, as well as with the "conventional wisdom" of das Man; where we stop fleeing from being in the "being" of the "being" of the dasein.

when, while in the world or in ourselves; when, while in the world, we focus on being and through this focus we carefully and attentively come to "*where*" this being is; when we respond to the challenge of abandonment with an intense particularity.

with the knowledge of *findability*, but we don't let *findability* to appease us by *cultivating abandonment and its question-*

forcefulness. But in all these authentic existentials the main thing is the *concentration on being* in all its modes of distances and combinations. We must address it with a question about itself, and then Dasein will unfold according to its fundamental-ontological mode.

THE BEING THAT IS "HERE" AND THAT IS

What can "here-being" say about itself in its own authentic modus? It can only say the last two terrible and beautiful words: "*here-being*";

"*here is being*"; "*here, being is*". Instead of "*I*," instead of "*world*", instead of "*god*" we should say only one correct primary word "*is*". First "*is*," and then there is "what", "who", "how", "where", "when", "why", "why". But this "*is*" is increasingly falling out, being erased, sometimes disappearing. Once in the Russian language, the verb-conjunction "*to be*" in *raz-*

It was a necessary part of any affirmative sentences. Genesis was a necessary element of grammar. Now we say: "I am a child",

"she is the subject of criminal responsibility", "the man is disabled", "we are good". Where is the "*is*"? We speak of "I", "she", "man", "child", "subject of criminal responsibility", "invalid", but nowhere does it say that they *exist*, that they *refer to being*, and that *being speaks to us through them*. It may seem that all the people in question do not exist, that they are conditional signs that have been abandoned by being, or that they themselves have escaped from it, slipped away, staggered and collapsed into a

"nothing." This was not possible in Church Slavonic before; the verb "to be" was conjugated and necessarily present in such forms.

I am you
(*he, she, it* - previously not personal,
but indicative pronouns) *are*

we are you
are you are
(they are)

Therefore, the phrase "I am the child" would sound like this: "I am the child. But the child's being, its "I am", is incompatible with the "I":

"I" is something adolescent, youthful, adolescent. If we return the being to this statement, it will not be allowed to say itself. "She is a subject of criminal law" means that she is worthless, her being descends to the level of criminal law. It means that she has not only committed a crime, but her being revolves in the ontology of criminal law, and her place is in penal servitude. "This man is an invalid" means that his disability is related to his being. To recognize this is to reduce his masculinity to disability, which is contrary to masculinity. Therefore, a man, even without an arm or an eye, will always try to be something other than an invalid. He will try to be a man, but he will repress his disability, drive it away from the pure radiance of the light of existence. In this way, he will be cured. In traditional society, a warrior's wounds were either not noticed at all, or they were worn as jewelry, and any slanted glance at a veteran wounded by an enemy arrow could cost the one who threw him both eyes, or even his throat. Back then, the armless, legless and crooked were men, and they themselves and all the others *honored* in them *being* and manhood. It is the same with young men: if "we are young men", this being young men obliges us to a lot. *If we have praised ourselves through being, we have to answer to this being.* This is repeatedly played out in Russian bylines, where boasting entails black miracles - death (in the bylina about Fyodor Buslaev), resurrection of the Tatar army (in the bylina about Ilya Muromets and Batig, etc.).

Dasein's authenticity is its turn towards Sein, its desire and will to *be*, its determination to discover itself as being. Dasein is then etymologically centered on itself as being, which is not somewhere out there, not outside or inside, but "*here*", "*between*". Abandonment and findability are applied to being. "*Being-with*" becomes *being-with-being*. Being-in-the-world becomes being-in-being. Speech is about being. Fear turns into terror (Angst), which does not atomize or flee, but turns all forces only to being, which is threat and salvation, terrifying and horrifying, revealing its finitude and accepting it.

SPACE AS DASEIN'S EXISTENTIAL

The space in which Dasein exists authentically is a sacred, living, fundamentally ontological space. Space is born out of "here-being". *Spatiality*⁽³⁷⁾ (*Raumlichkeit*) is revealed as one of Dasein's existentials.

Space is the unfolding of the "here" (*da*) of Dasein. But the point from which it begins is not an arbitrary abstract point, but that to which being (*Sein*) points as its presence (Dasein). Being is then thought of not separately from "here" ("here-here"), not "there" or "somewhere there", but exactly *here-here*, and the horror that this concentration of being in Dasein's facticity inspires in Dasein itself turns into an affirmation of Dasein's selfhood (*selbst*) in authentic existentialism.

"WHO'S AUTHENTIC DASEIN."

Heidegger speaks of "who" is in authentic Dasein. The authentic Dasein answers the question *who?*⁽³⁸⁾ - authentic Dasein answers with the formula "himself", "he himself", in German *Selbst*. The *Selbst* of authentic Dasein consists in its identification with being, *Sein*. Dasein can be. It can be itself, then it is, but it can be not itself, then instead of itself (*Selbst*) it is *das Man* and other inauthentic existentials.

It is possible to approach Dasein's authentic self through the negation of *das Man*, through a decisive and conscious *turn away from piercing everyday life*, but this turn will only be valid if it is realized by Dasein itself, through its reliance on the being present in it and speaking through it.

BEING TO DEATH (SEIN ZUM TODE)

The most important property of Dasein in its authentic *existence* is the *being-to-death*⁽³⁹⁾. Everyday life does not like the subject of death, *das Man* lives always and always.

always tempts and rapes us with the idea that he and, consequently, we are immortal. As soon as Dasein is attentive to death, as soon as death reveals itself as "here and now," as soon as death is launched into Dasein without any intermediate realities, the greatest opportunity for Dasein to move into an authentic mode arises. In this mode, *fear* turns into *horror*, which stems from Dasein's lightning-fast realization of its finitude. "Being-to-death," Heidegger writes, "is essential horror, Angst. Dasein is finite, mortal, and present in the face of death. When it is turned and centered on it, it reveals itself in the intensity of absolute ultimate horror."

Terror is the opposite of fear. Fear provokes the filling of the outer world with things and the inner world with empty, usually empty, thoughts and experiences. The piling up of multiple things and ideas is an expression of Dasein's fear of its mortality and finitude. This trick works in the inauthentic Dasein, which is barricaded by the dispersed multiplicity from the simplicity and severity of the mortal moment. But this security of the multitude is the reverse of fear, it does not remove it, but exacerbates it, making it flat, shallow and pathetic. The alternative is the calm triumph of *terror* (Angst) in the face of clearly contemplated death. The encounter with death through *horror* is a necessary consequence of Dasein's primordially and ontic status. Having nothing before and after itself, as well as inside and outside itself, Dasein can only be in dialog with *nothing*. The being inherent in Dasein is too individuated to postulate something outside itself in an authentic state; authentic Dasein is assembled and consolidated, not yet dispersed in the multiplicity of being that emerges precisely through the switch to the inauthentic mode. Therefore, in its Selbst, Dasein itself can only dialog with death and with the *element of pure nothingness*. Facing this element directly is the state of horror. Horror is the priority form of existentialization of authentic Dasein. In horror, Dasein is Dasein, i.e. it is Dasein itself to the maximum extent, since it is fully concentrated on its being, which,

being being in the full sense of being (not being private, and not even being general), outside itself can only assume a nothingness, i.e., death.

Being always exists *toward death and before death*.

Where the presence of death is maximal and distinct, there reigns a deep and perfect horror. This horror is a sure sign of the presence of being, since death inspires horror only in what is and what may not be. That which does not exist does not experience any horror; that which bears it feels perfectly fine in death. It is the being that is horrified by it, which is lightning aware of what it is. Das Man tries in every possible way to shelter Dasein from encountering the horror and being in the face of death. He is incessantly talking, wondering, curious, moving, filling the world with objects and the soul with experiences for one purpose only: to escape from this horror. But one can only escape it by refusing to concentrate on being as a finality, that is, at the cost of imitating nothingness. In the inauthentic mode, Dasein *disguises itself* in such a way that it is not visible either from the side of death or from the side of being. It is as if it is there, but it is as if it is not. In this way it tries to escape from absolute horror and fake immortality.

CONSCIENCE

Heidegger describes the process of summoning Dasein to authentic being through the enactment of conscience. "Conscience," he writes, "summons the self (Selbst) of Dasein'a out of its lostness in das Man'e"⁽⁴⁰⁾.

The German word "Gewissen" means both. "conscience" and "consciousness". The Russian language has a similar etymology: "conscience" is formed from "so-" and "vesti", "vedat", "vedat", while the German "Gewissen" is formed from the generalizing prefix "ge-" and the root "wissen" ("to know", "to know"). Conscience rises from the depths of Dasein and calls it to focus on being. "Dasein is the one who calls out and the one who is called out," Heidegger writes⁽⁴¹⁾.

A quiet conscience is unknown to psychologists, usually the conscience makes itself known when it reproaches us. Gewissen -

is the constant sense of guilt experienced by Dasein. From Heidegger's point of view, Dasein is fundamentally, fundamentally *guilty*. But it is only in the inauthentic state that he tries either to justify himself or to somehow hide from condemnation, to cover up the guilt. But Dasein, listening to the voice of conscience, opens itself to *guilt*, because through *guilt*, as a fundamental reproach, its true being is revealed to it. By opening to guilt, Dasein returns to what it really is. The realization of guilt, pure guilt, guilt as such, reminds Dasein that it is in an untrue mode.

He is guilty of piercing everyday life, he is guilty of *das Man*, he is guilty of curiosity and chatter, he is guilty of fear, of postulating reality and the ego, of disintegration and decomposition, i.e. of all inclinations of untrue existentialism. Dasein's guilt is always proven and always absolute. In order to feel how infinitely and absolutely guilty he is, it is better for Dasein not to do anything reprehensible. Then there would be no possibility of escaping the realization of the supreme degree of his guilt before being. One can always pay for any particular guilt. The only guilt that cannot be atoned for is the delay in the transition from non-authentic to authentic existentialism. But in this delay, in this "noch nicht", lies the drama of the historical presence of "Dasein" as a "Sein" placed in "da".

Dasein's fault is that this "da" is not what it ought to be, and even that Dasein itself cannot change anything about it by will alone. Dasein is guilty in an absolute way, always and knowingly. And the way from "da" to "sein'y" lies not in the atonement of this guilt, but in its deep realization.

"*Noch nicht*" is not an accident or a mistake, it is a constitutional aspect of "*here-being*" that cannot be abolished or overcome, but can be realized and accepted as guilt. In this gesture of realization and acceptance, guilt becomes a *passage to the horizon of the authentic other beginning*.

POSITIVITY OF DASEIN'S ANALYTICS IN BOTH MODES

Authentic Dasein is Dasein as it is, and its existentials in the authentic mode express their ontic essence as properties of this Dasein. But non-authentic existentiation enacts not something else, but the same Dasein and its existentials. This is the main motif of "Sein und Zeit", where Heidegger tries to emphasize the main idea in a thousand ways: in both authentic and in inauthentic Dasein we deal with the same instance, with the same "here-being". The most important thing is not to condemn the inauthentic and break through to the authentic (although this is just as important), but to realize *how the* inauthentic Dasein is responsible for the unfolding process of all Western European philosophy from its Greek pre-Socratic heights to its bottomless fall into the nihilism of the New Age. And beneath the majestic and insignificant edifice of this philosophy and its consequences (culture, politics, sociality, ideology, economics, etc.), we must everywhere and everywhere recognize its protagonist, hidden beneath the gigantic pile of theories, concepts, ideas, systems, doctrines, and religious dogmas.

The positivity of analyzing Dasein in relation to the inauthentic mode is to fundamentally demystify philosophy and to reduce it to the real and central point from which it derives its origin and which is the main character of the *history of being*. By revealing Dasein where it veils itself most carefully, we win back the possibility of understanding its structure. And even if we are dealing with an inauthentic mode, it is the inauthenticity of Dasein, which can also be authentic. Without unraveling the tangle of alienating and concealing inauthenticities, we would remain in illusions about Dasein and its central role in the constitution of the world, thought, man, consciousness, space and time. But by realizing that everywhere, even when it is not obvious, it is Dasein and only Dasein, we will be able to decipher its message, the message it sends to itself.

In such an unusual way - through the inversion of one's own existentials, through self-hiding under the guise of *das Man*, through escape from oneself and renunciation of one's own being. If we focus on Dasein, its *self-hiding* will be recognized as its indirect *self-disclosure*, and hence will make it possible to prepare the grounds for its direct and complete self-disclosure in the explosion of being, which must take place in the transition to the *new Beginning of philosophy*, and the realization of Ereignis.

DASEIN AND SEYN

In "Sein und Zeit" Heidegger does not yet come to the distinction of writing Sein with an "i" and Seyn with a "y", as he does in the 1930s in his cycle of reflections on the problem of Ereignis. But it is in the early period that the basic fundamental-ontological orientations of his philosophy are laid down. To summarize the problem of being in relation to Dasein, we can project the middle and late Heidegger onto the problematics of the early one. In this case we will get the following picture.

At the heart of Heidegger's thought is the distinction between being (Seyn) and being (Seiende). This distinction is subtle, since the being (Seiende) is, and so it, being the being (Seiende), expresses being (Sein), which cannot be defined in any other way than through the being (Seiende) and what the being *is*. This is what the ancient Greeks did. Moving further along this path, they moved from the understanding of *being* as a *feature of* being to a generalization of this ontic observation and the construction of a philosophy in which being was thought of not simply as the fact that *being (Seiende) is*, but as that *general property* (κοινόν) which is inherent in all things (Seiende) as being (als Seiende). This generalization was taken as *being*, indistinguishably identical with "beingness" ("οὐσία" in Greek, "Seiendheit" in German). According to Heidegger, this is the basis of all further philosophical ontology and all Western European metaphysics, which, however it formulates the question of being and whatever ontological

arguments no matter whether accepted or rejected, has forever remained within the boundaries of the understanding of *being* through *being*.

However, it is here, according to Heidegger, that a catch is to be found. The understanding of *being* through *being* (*Seiende*) is the origin of a colossal and progressive misconception, a disease of two and a half thousand years, the name of which is "Western European philosophy". Born in the pre-Socratics, who thought of being through being (*Heraclitus*, *Anaximander*, *Parmenides*), this ontology culminates in the philosophy of Nietzsche, who convincingly demonstrates the nihilism of New Age philosophy. Heidegger would later define *being as the common of being* through *Sein*, and it is to this primary operation that he would reduce the catastrophic history of Western philosophy as a progressive oblivion of being.

Heidegger insists that *being*, which is.

The *Sein* common to being, *Sein*, is not being as such, but only one of its aspects, which, taken exclusively, closes the possibility of understanding being in the full sense as *Seyn*. The point is that, apart from the discovery of itself as the *being of being* (*Sein des Seiende*), *being* (*Seyn*) is at the same time *nothing* (*Nichts*), *not being* (*μή ὄν*), since it includes everything and excludes nothing. This explains the ultimate nihilism of Western philosophy and the emergence of *nothingness* at the end of its history, whereas at the beginning the microscopic gap between *Sein* and *Seyn* was imperceptible and seemed to be neglected.

Seyn is Sein, but there is also das Nichts (nothingness).

The second part of the previous phrase - "but there is also das Nichts (nothingness)" - made itself known through the implicit destructiveness of the work of the human logos, which increasingly alienates the being from its being and increasingly replaces it *with representations* (ideas, concepts, creaturely hierarchies, subject and object, a priori, etc.). Thus, the misunderstood *Seyn*, reduced to *Sein*, attempted to recall real proportions through the initially latent and, at the end of the New Age, explicit nihilism of human (Western European) thinking.

Since this cycle has come to an end, Heidegger proposes to move to a *new Beginning* and to think Seyn directly - *not through being (Seiende), but otherwise*. How differently?

This is served by Dasein as the fundamental basis of the new philosophy, as the starting point for the construction of a fund-mental ontology.

Dasein, on the one hand, is a *being (Seiende)*. But it is not the ordinary *being among beings*, since it is *that being* which is the *being of beings*, so the word Dasein contains Sein, not Seiende. Dasein is not Da-Seiende. The direct appeal to the word is not a philological game, but a breakthrough to fundamental-ontology, a movement toward the construction of a new language of this fundamental-ontology. And the first and main element of this language is Dasein. As an *entity*, Dasein is fundamentally different from other *entities*, since it is primary for them. Outside of Dasein, it is not possible at all to make a conclusion about the presence or absence of *being*, since it is Dasein that calls *being* as *being*, while *being as such* may not even realize that it is *being*. That is why man is an "animal with a logos", a "talking animal". By calling the *being a being*, Dasein brings *being (Sein)* into play.

Heidegger writes in one place⁽⁴²⁾ that *being (Sein)* is *engaged in a struggle with being (Seiende)*. *Dasein is that being which is on the side of being in this struggle*.

Being as Seyn in relation to *being (Seiende)* appears as *nothing*, because it does not coincide with it. Dasein through its

The "da" ("here") is the highlighting of being (Seyn), its realization. By doing so, Dasein undermines the being as perceiving its being by expressing being as common to all things, thereby Dasein "nullifies" (destroys) it. But through its authentic existention, Dasein simultaneously restores being to being (Seyn), bringing it into complicity with the event, the realization (Ereignis). This is why Heidegger writes⁽⁴³⁾ : *"First the separation (between Seyn and Seiende) must be made and clarified, and then overcome*. Both of these operations are realized through Dasein, by Dasein and in Dasein; indeed, they are the form of the existentialization of authentic Dasein.

Thus, the concept of "Dasein" introduced in "Sein und Zeit" becomes a key concept for the whole of Heidegger's philosophy and underlies fundamental-ontology and its new meta-language.

CHAPTER 6

ZEIT-bpel" h ecn cnphgmŠ{

INTRODUCTION OF THE EXPRESSION "ZEIT-TIME"

In order to at least roughly understand Heidegger's philosophical approach to the problem of time, we should start from the fact that the semantics and etymology of the German word "Zeit" is fundamentally different from the semantics and etymology of the Russian word "time". It is so fundamentally different that one has to wonder whether it is correct to translate "Sein und Zeit" into Russian as "Being and Time" at all, let alone to calcify the formations associated with the root of "Zeit" or consonant words in Heidegger's philosophy (e.g., "zeitigen"). With regard to *being*, the problem is not so acute. The fact is that in both Slavic and Germanic languages the roots associated with "being" go back in one way or another to the common Indo-European primordial roots, which have two forms - **"bhū-*" (with the original meaning "to grow") and **"es-*" (with the meaning "to be", "to be", "to have", "to have"), which have merged into a conjugation of the same verb, which has forms derived from different bases (this is the case in German and Russian).

But here with the word "Zeit" and the Latin "tempus" (whence

The French "le temps", English "time", etc.) is much more complicated. The point is that "Zeit" comes from the Indo-European root **"dá (i)"*, which means "to chop", "to divide", "to separate one thing from another", "to tear apart". The Latin base has the same meaning. The Russian word

"time" is derived from the root "to spin" and is related to "continuity", "repetition", "tying (rope) one thing to another". The Germanic "Zeit" and the Latin "tempus" "separate", "cut into moments", and the Russian "time", on the contrary, "connects", "binds", "cir-

tit," in a sense, "repeats." Hence the German "zeitigen" means literally "to predetermine the start", "to set in motion" (presumably in a disposable way), "to cause the fruit to appear" so that it can be plucked. The derivatives of Russian "time" cannot, by definition, have a similar meaning: "to temporize", "to delay" means, on the contrary, "to keep as long as possible the fruit on the branch, in connection with the tree," and also "not to hasten the flowering, ripening of the fruit," etc.

This creates serious difficulties for understanding Heidegger, whose most important task is to bring the concepts of the old philosophy to the original meaning of words and on this basis, starting from them as from Dasein's direct speech about Sein, to build a new meta-language. Zeit has a central meaning in this language, but replacing the German "Zeit" with the Russian word "time" forever blocks for us the very possibility of understanding Heidegger. Therefore, once again, it seems most correct to retain the German word "Zeit" in the Russian text. Heidegger's main book would then have the title "Being and Zeit". The sound itself sounds like the clang of a sharply sharpened knife - Zeit. In Russian, the word "time" sounds like the soft, lulling tone of a lullaby. But, as in the case of "understanding," we should still go the other way and suggest the wild-looking expression "Zeit-time," i.e., the time of the end of time, time that does not curl but is cut, time-moment, time-zipper. Hence we translate "Sein und Zeit" as "Being and Zeit-time."

FINITENESS OF ZEIT-TIME

The most important thing about Heidegger's understanding of Zeit-time is that it is neither a property of the object (as empiricists and materialists thought) nor of the subject (as Kant thought). Dasein does not exist in Zeit-time. Zeit-time is also not a modus of the subject. Zeit-time is not outside of Dasein; it is in Dasein. But Dasein has no dimensions, no space, since *space* (*Raumlichkeit*) is its existential. Zeit-time must therefore be understood as *being*. Dasein in

is in a sense Da-Zeit. Since Dasein is finite - this is its fundamental quality - then of course Zeit is time.

Heidegger disputes the infinity of Zeit-time. Zeit-time cannot be infinite, because the definition of Zeit is division, breaking, division. This division is a rupture, not a joining, a breaking, not a gluing. Being cannot be placed in Zeit-time, since it is more primary than rupture, and rather coincides with it as a fundamental finitude. Therefore, Zeit-time does not precede a priori Dasein, but coincides with Dasein if it exists authentically. As soon as Dasein ends, there is no subject, no object, and no Zeit-time. But Dasein ends when it becomes a *being towards death* (Sein zum Tode), looking it in the eye. This happens through Ereignis. But it is through Ereignis and Dasein's realization of its finitude that Zeit-time comes into operation.

It is important that, unlike space, which is Dasein's existential, Zeit-time is not an existential; it is in some sense deeper and more fundamental than even the existential, as well as more problematic than it. In Zeit-time, being itself appears as Seyn. Therefore, unlike Dasein's permanent existentials, Zeit-time is unique and disposable.

THREE ECSTASIES OF ZEIT-TIME

Heidegger interprets Seyn's *emergence* through Zeit-time as three forms of ecstasy, in Greek ἔκστασις ("ecstasis"). Zeit-time is-exceeds itself in three ecstasies. The first ecstasy of

Zeit-time has to do with the *past*, the second with the *present*, and the third with the *future*. The most important ecstasy among these three is related to the future. It is the third
ecstasy

Zeit-time.

The meaning of Dasein is an outline of the will to be and to *be able to be* (*Seinkönnen*). It is a constant concentrated project of Dasein's existentialization towards its authenticity. The ultimate horizon of this sketch is the *leap* (Sprung). *This is Dasein's leap into Sein.*

Fundamental-ontologically understood Zeit-time is Zeit-time whose tempestuousness is contained in the future. In the one to the degree in which Dasein is being, and this *being* opens into *the future*. Zeit-time becomes unfolding from the point of the future, which constructs the other horizons.

Zeit-time correlates with Dasein's question of how being (Seyn) exists. In the ecstasy of the future, *being (Seyn) will be (wird wesen)*, i.e. will be precisely as being (Seyn), not as being and the ontological constructs based on it. Therefore, Zeit-time unfolds and carries events not in itself, but it is unfolded by Dasein in its decision to authentic existentiation. This means that the future is the horizon of the *new Beginning*, the moment of Ereignis, in which being fully begins to be.

This moment of Ereignis cannot but be in the other horizons of Zeit-time (in the present and the past), because if it were not so, neither the present nor the past would exist. And since they are and *have been*, they are *in* one way or another connected to the moment of the future. What unites these three ecstasies in existentiation is Dasein itself, which, although it does not yet exist authentically (otherwise the future would become the present and the past), i.e., it *exists* inauthentically, but it does exist, and thus, albeit in a reverse way, through default and inauthenticity, participates in being, *is*. Heidegger separates the former from the past, the present from what is now, and the future from what is to come. In every ecstatic horizon of Zeit-time there is a connection with Dasein's being, which is expressed by the presence of Dasein itself, and there is a concealment of this connection. The connection as unconcealment, ἀλήθεια, the truth of being (Seyn) constitutes the ontic core of the horizons: it is the former, what is, and what will be. Only that which will be (in the future Sein = Seyn) truly is and was, but that which was and is ecstatically anticipates it, and insofar as it anticipates it, it is the truth of being (Seyn = Seyn). admiration indeed, it was and is.

All three horizons also have a non-authentic modality. Among all that is past, that belongs to the past, only *the* most important, most secret and

most unobvious, and the rest *was* merely *past*, and as such it belongs only to the past, and in a way, though it was past, it was not.

Similarly with the present: what happens in the present is a continuation of "walking" ("has passed", "has happened"), "is happening", "is coming" - "will go on"). This walking of horizons is in a complex relationship with the being of horizons. Something of the past was and something has passed, i.e. something was *former* and something is only *past*.

The same is true of the present and the future, which may be the future, or it may just be the future. This is the very nerve of Dasein.

Dasein, according to Heidegger, must make a fundamental choice between the coming and the future, i.e., the choice of authentic existention and the questioning of being (Seyn) directly. Then the *coming will* become the *future*. If he chooses in favor of non-authentic existention, then the coming will only be the coming, and thus it will not exist.

The past, the transient and the future constitute three inauthentic ecstasies of Zeit-time in three horizons. The past in this chain is completely incomprehensible for the passing, and that, in turn, for the coming. Instead of a history of being (Seinsgeschichte), the totality of the three horizons of inauthentic existences constitutes a meaningless cast of futility.

Conversely, the group of three authentic ecstasies of Zeit-time generates the line of being (Seyn) that makes all three horizons contemporary with each other. What *was in the past* cannot disappear, since Zeit-time does not precede Dasein, and what is as relating to being (Seyn) cannot not be, since it has already been. Therefore, the former is now. Heidegger described this as the instantaneity and almost simultaneity, the synchronicity of authentic thought. Each philosophical epoch had its summits, and although centuries separate one summit from another, they are separated from each other by moments, and they comprehend themselves as contemporaries, because the truly serious thought (the thought of being) of one thinker is taken up by another thinker as the most relevant in the dimension of depth.

For deep thinking is contemporary only with deep thinking, to whatever horizon it belongs, and the the most modern and profound is the future as the fulfillment of the ecstasy of Zeit-time in the form of a lightning-fast one-time and ultimate Ereignis.

What *was*, *is*. Both are preparations for what *will be*. But that which will be, to the extent that it will be, is already there and makes the past into the past and the transient into that which is.

Notes

⁽¹⁾ *Heidegger M. Sein und Zeit* (1927). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer verlag, 2006. I categorically do not recommend reading Bibikhin's Russian translation (*Heidegger M. Being and Time*. M., 1997) - a complete failure, better nothing than this. For those who do not know German but are interested in Heidegger, it is better to learn German, in the last resort you can use French or English translations. The French translation by Emmanuel Martineau (*Heidegger M. Être et temps*, traduction d'Emmanuel Martineau. Paris: Authentica, 1985) and the English translation (strangely enough, quite correct and intelligible, despite the very weak adaptability of English to serious philosophy) by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (*Heidegger M. Being and Time* // Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962). There is a good Romanian translation by Liiceanu and Choaba, an unsuccessful Spanish by José Gao-Sa, and a slightly better one by José Eduardo Rivera. There are two Turkish translations, the latter of which won translator Kaan Ökten the translation of the year award in 2008. There is a good Italian translation by Alfredo Marini. There are also Danish (*Væren og tid*) and Dutch (*Zijn en tijd*) translations. Heidegger has been translated into Finnish (*Oleminen ja aika*). In Slavic languages there is a Czech translation (*Bytí a čas*).

⁽²⁾ Early phenomenological works are collected in the following volumes of the complete works: *Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman. Bd. 1 *Frühe Schriften* (1912-16); Bd. 56/57 *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*; Bd. 58 *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (1919); Bd. 59 *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung* (1920); Bd. 60 *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*; Bd. 61 *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (1921); Bd. 62 *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik* (1922); Bd. 63 *Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität* (1923); Bd. 17 *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*; AKA *Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen Philosophie* (1923).

Texts written just before the publication of *Sein und Zeit* and developing selected themes from Heidegger's future major book: Bd. 64 *Der Begriff der Zeit* (1924); Bd. 18 *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*

(1924); Bd. 19 Platon: Sophistes (1924); Bd. 20 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (1925); Bd. 21 Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (1925); Bd. 22 Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie (1926); Bd. 23 Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas v. Aquin bis Kant (1926); Bd. 24 Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1927). Aquin bis Kant (1926); Bd. 24 Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1927).

⁽³⁾ *Heidegger M.* Brief über den Humanismus (1946). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1949.

⁽⁴⁾ *Heidegger M.* Geschichte des Seyns (1938/1940). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 69. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1998.

⁽⁵⁾ We have relied on these works in the first and partly in the second sections of this book. These are: *Heidegger M.* Einführung in die Metaphysik. Tübingen, 1953; *Idem.* Geschichte des Seyns (1938/1940). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 69. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1998; *Idem.* Über den Anfang. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 70. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 2005, and perhaps the most important work of the period: *Heidegger M.* Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 65. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1989, published, however, by the author's will not long after his death.

⁽⁶⁾ *Heidegger M.* Nietzsche I. 1936-39, Nietzsche II. 1939-46. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 6. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1996; *Idem.* Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst. 1936. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 43. 1985; *Idem.* Nietzsches Metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen. 1937. GA. Bd. 44, 1986; *Idem.* Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung. 1938. Bd. 46. 1989; *Idem.* Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis. 1939. Bd. 47. 1989; *Idem.* Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus. 1940. Bd. 48. 1986; *Idem.* Nietzsches Metaphysik (1941-42). Einleitung in die Philosophie - Denken und Dichten (1944-45). Bd. 50. 1990.

⁽⁷⁾ The major works of the late *Heidegger* from the complete works (*Heidegger M.* Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman. Bd. 8 Was heisst Denken? (1951-52); Bd. 10 Der Satz vom Grund (1955-56); Bd. 11 Identität und Differenz (1955-57); Bd. 12 Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-59); Bd. 14 Zur Sache des Denkens (1962-64); Bd. 15 Seminare (1951-73). A special book is *Holzwege* (*Heidegger M.* *Holzwege*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 2003), which contains texts on philosophy and poetry that are key to understanding Heidegger.

⁽⁸⁾ *Heidegger M.* Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet. 1931. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1988. Bd. 34.

⁽⁹⁾ *Heidegger M.* Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas v. Aquin bis Kant. Aquin bis Kant. 1926. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1993. Bd. 22.

⁽¹⁰⁾ *Heidegger M.* Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz. 1928. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1978. Bd. 26.

⁽¹¹⁾ *Heidegger M.* Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. 1929. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1991. Bd. 3; *Idem.* Phänomenologie Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1990. Bd. 25.

⁽¹²⁾ *Heidegger M.* Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart. 1929. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1997. Bd. 28.

⁽¹³⁾ *Heidegger M.* Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. 1930. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1980. Bd. 32.

⁽¹⁴⁾ See note (6).

⁽¹⁵⁾ *Heidegger M.* Sein und Zeit. Or. cit. S. 119.

⁽¹⁶⁾ Henri Corbin was a major French philosopher, historian of religion, specialist in Iranian and Islamic philosophy, mysticism, and poetry. See: *Corbin H.* Le paradoxe du monothéisme. R.: l'Herne, 1981; *Idem.* Temps cyclique et gnose ismaélienne. R., 1982; *Idem.* Face de Dieu, face de l'homme. R.: Flammarion, 1983; *Idem.* Philosophie iranienne et philosophie comparée. R.: Buchet/Chastel, 1979; *Idem.* Corps spirituel et Terre céleste: de L'Iran mazdéen à l'Iran shi'ite. R.: Buchet/Chastel, 1979; *Idem.* Histoire de la philosophie islamique. R.: Gallimard, 1964; *Idem.* L'homme de lumière dans le soufisme iranien. R.: Éditions "Présence", 1971.

⁽¹⁷⁾ *Corbin H.* L'Imagination créatrice dans le soufisme d'Ibn'Arabî. 2nd ed. R.: Flammarion, 1977.

⁽¹⁸⁾ *Durand G.* Les Structures anthropologiques de l'imaginaire. P., 1960.

⁽¹⁹⁾ *Nietzsche F.* We, philologists // Philosophy in the tragic epoch. M.: REFL-book, 1994.

⁽²⁰⁾ *Heidegger M.* Sein und Zeit. Or. cit. S. 175.

⁽²¹⁾ *Ibid.* s. 52, 130-134.

⁽²²⁾ *Ibid.*

⁽²³⁾ *Ibid.* S. 117.

⁽²⁴⁾ *Ibid.* S. 180-200.

⁽²⁵⁾ *Ibid.* S. 140.

⁽²⁶⁾ *Ibid.* S. 134.

⁽²⁷⁾ *Ibid.* S. 148.

⁽²⁸⁾ *Ibid.* S. 165.

⁽²⁹⁾ *Ibid.* S. 160.

⁽³⁰⁾ *Ibid.* S. 127.

⁽³¹⁾ *Ibid.* S. 175.

⁽³²⁾ *Ibid.* S. 167.

⁽³³⁾ *Ibid.* S. 170.

⁽³⁴⁾ *Ibid.* S. 173.

⁽³⁵⁾ *Ibid.* S. 126.

⁽³⁶⁾ *Ibid.* S. 128.

⁽³⁷⁾ *Ibid.* S. 129.

⁽³⁸⁾ *Ibid.* S. 110.

⁽³⁹⁾ *Ibid.* S. 114.

⁽⁴⁰⁾ *Ibid.* S. 231-267.

⁽⁴¹⁾ *Ibid.* S. 274.

⁽⁴²⁾ *Heidegger M.* Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 65. Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman, 1989. S. 249.

⁽⁴³⁾ *Ibid.* S. 277.

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Martin Heidegger's philosophy is a moment of thinking that we cannot avoid. Or rather, we can, but it will be to our detriment. In trying to make sense of existence, in deciphering the philosophical heritage, in understanding the temporal and spatial particularities of where we find ourselves, we can say for sure that *Heidegger is a point of reference from which we can set off thought vectors in many different directions*. It is conceivable that we might stumble upon this point without Heidegger, but in that case we would discover the same lines of force, the same subtle flashes of "lean times," the same ominous shadows of European nihilism, the same unintelligible whispers of a tired and worn-out Dasein. Heidegger is the ever-new thought in us, in ourselves. Without encountering this richness, our thinking is invalid.

But Heidegger does not give us any answers and does not show us any paths. His philosophy is something opposed to a system, a doctrine, a theory. It is rather the living flesh of thought itself, which excludes any closed and irreversible trajectory, any fixation, any structure.

At first glance, it might seem that Heidegger deliberately obscures his thought, and those who are sometimes confused by this are surprised that in some of his works he writes with surprising clarity. In fact, the opposite is true: the more obscure and vague his words, the brighter and clearer is his thought, which is a quiet, genuine fire that is elusive to the insidious strategies of icy reason. Heidegger himself wrote that the Greeks called Heraclitus "the Dark One" because in the light of his genius their own intellectual light was a wretched shadow. He burned and blinded. Plunged them into darkness. That is why he is "ὁ Σκοτεινός," "dark."

One must love Heidegger, obscure, imprecise, avoiding rigid definitions, dodging systematizations, contradictory and obscure. He said that in its squeamish desire to free itself from the irrational, Western European philosophical thought had forgotten to focus on the most important thing: the *mystery of its own emergence*, its emergence from the twilight of the pre-philosophical pre-rational epoch. But it is there, in this *semi-darkness*, where it is still unclear whether we are already dealing with thought or "not yet", "not quite", that the *currents of philosophical destiny*, the destiny of the West and, in one way or another, the destiny of mankind, connected with it, run. Heidegger, on the other hand, immersed himself in this half-light with pleasure, with awe, with terror - as if he were fulfilling his destiny.

In his zeal to explore the Beginning of thought, he discovered for himself and for us the possibility of living and thinking in the element of this Beginning. It was there that the trajectory of human history was once set. It was there that a point had to be set, a single point, in the terrifying vapor of total freedom. If this point set by the first philosophers had coincided with the invisible center of emptiness, with the pole of nothingness, the jets of Geviert's "Quaternity" would have removed the fatalism of the complex false paths of Western European metaphysics leading to the precipice of nihilism. But this point was set *somewhere close by*. Quite *close to* the pole of nothingness, but just a little, a micron, away. The tiny distance, but still its presence, made the Beginning the *first* Beginning, predetermining everything else - from Parmenides, through Plato and Aristotle to Augustine, Descartes, Hegel and Nietzsche.

Only *one* line can be drawn through two points. And in our case, only in *one* direction. In the direction of Seyn - being. In doing so, Heidegger justified the abyss of European nihilism by finding in it an unshakable foundation, a "fundamentum inconcossum". And it turned out that in Heidegger, in himself as the "prince of philosophers," philosophy *had* come *true*. The ray had reached the point from which it was henceforth to be *reflected* as from smooth, mirrored flesh.

What Heidegger did with the history of philosophy gave us *philosophy* as something that is *accomplished* and *completed*.

And at the same time, if we have followed closely the unfolding of his grandiose endeavor, we have found the *most* The *main thing*. At the cost of an initial error in setting the point of the first Beginning, tragically paid for by more than two millennia of the dramatic history of the West, we know, not guessingly and arbitrarily, but *surely and reliably*, where this point *should have been* set so that all that has happened *would* not have happened. Heidegger himself saw clearly: through its journey into the abyss, through its plunge into the element of pure nihilism with the ambiguous, pernicious hymn of Gestell and technological development, the West was the *first to reach* the lower limit of the abandonment of being and to demonstrate by its sacrifice not only where one should never go, but also *how to begin a second Beginning*, free from the inexorable abyss of the end.

Through a *retreat* from the possibility of authentic Gevierta, from the veneration of *Seyn-existence* as a creative nothingness and a nothingness of creation, Western metaphysics *has* outlined a project of how it *should be, should have been, should be, should not be* retreated from. When? *Always. Now.* The Second Beginning, although it depends on Dasein's existential choice in favor of authenticity, at the same time *does not depend on anything*. It is already outlined.

In Heidegger's philosophy, the "*not yet*" has lost the fatalism of its hypnotism thanks to a calm, passionate and joyful acceptance. We are no longer caught in its snares, no longer nervous, but accept it as it is, recognizing solemnly and gratefully in the last smoking ruins of Western culture the sign of *another Beginning*.

The grateful peoples of cultures other than the West will be able to appreciate the greatness and significance of the last thinker of the West, the last man of Europe, the one who delivered over Western metaphysics, Western history, the history of Western civilization the most beautiful, the most profound, the most vivid and the most poignant *funeral speech*.

The Other Beginning is the work of the future, of those who are to come, of whom Nietzsche dreamed. But the sun does not rise in the West. We have now grasped the meaning of the sunset, which is necessary to move up the non-bosklon on the *other side*. *Heidegger's Other Beginning cannot be addressed to the people of the West. So it is addressed to us.*

This book seems to me to be exactly *half of* what I would like to say about Martin Heidegger and the other Beginning. Having found the point of this other Beginning, we will try to move on to the *possibility of Russian philosophy*. It is quite obvious that Russian thought was steaming, filled with the bloody juices of premonitions, mumbling in its sleep, trying to say something, but fatally unable to find words, images, signs. Maybe Russian thought was *waiting*. It waited for its hour, not wanting to *participate in* the end of Western European philosophy, not being either in solidarity or vitally involved in the course of the unfolding of Western European metaphysics.

Many Russian minds wondered, "*What are we waiting for?*"

But we are always waiting for something... I venture to suggest that we have been waiting for *this very thing*. We have been waiting for the moment when the West would end, so that we could *enter into philosophy* with all our accumulated Russian power, but... only truly and truly into *a philosophy* - one that would be worthy of our silent, hidden deep inside, secret Russian dream. And this can only be the *philosophy of the other Beginning*.

This is the title of the second volume of my book dedicated to the greatest Western thinker, Martin Heidegger: *The Possibility of Russian Philosophy*.

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"...And what are poets for in lean times?" This question is asked by Hölderlin in his elegy "Bread and Wine". Today we hardly understand the meaning of this question. So how can we understand the meaning of the answer that Gölderlin gives to it?!

"...And what are poets for in lean times?" The word "times" points to the world age of which we are a part. For Hölderlin's historical experience, along with the coming and sacrifice of Christ, the end of the day of the gods began. And the evening came. After the "three real ones"-Heracles, Dionysus, and Christ-had left this world, the evening of the world epoch began to slip toward night. The night of the world spread its darkness. From-now on, the epoch is defined by the removal of god, by the "absence of god." This "absence of God", acutely experienced by Gölderlin, does not invalidate the persistence of the Christian attitude towards God in individuals and churches. Gölderlin does not devalue this relationship. The "absence of God" means that no god gathers people and things of the world clearly and transparently around him, predetermining by this reference and from this gathering, the history⁽²⁾ of the world⁽³⁾, human existence in this history. The absence of a god means something worse. Not only have god and gods disappeared, but the radiance of divinity has faded in world history. The time of the night of the world is a scarce time, and this time is becoming more and more scarce. It becomes so scarce that it cannot even perceive the absence of god as absence.

But with this lack, this deficiency, the lack of the foundation of the world itself is revealed, its solidity is lost. The word "abyss" (Abgrund) originally meant "soil" and "platform" to which what is suspended at the edge of the abyss is attached from below. But later "abyss"

has come to mean the complete absence of solid soil, a foundation. Soil is the place of roots and the support for standing. A world age that has no foundation is suspended in the abyss. We can only imagine that a turn is still possible in lean times if we assume that the world will touch the foundation again, but this means that a change of course⁽⁴⁾ is only possible by starting from the abyss. In the world age of the night of the world the night of the world must be experienced and exposed for contemplation. But this requires those who will reach the bottom of the abyss.

The turning of this world epoch cannot happen through the sudden invasion of a new god or through the return of an old one rising from his hiding place. To what will he turn in his return, if men have not first prepared a residence for him? And how can the god's abode accommodate him if the radiance of his divinity has not first flooded all that is?

The gods who "were before" will return at the "proper time", i.e. when men have prepared worthy and faithfully distributed places. This is why Hölderlin, in the unfinished hymn "Mnemosyne", which was written later than "Bread and Wine", says:

*Celestials can't do everything. Mortals, on the other
hand, are more likely to reach the abyss. They,
on the other hand.
a turn is destined. Time drags on for a long
time, but still it reaches one day true.*

Long stretches the meager time of the world's midnight. In the beginning it must slowly reach its middle. In the middle of this night, the paucity of time is at its maximum. The beggarly epoch is not even able to feel its poverty anymore. This inability, when the very scarcity of scarcity is obscured, is the extreme point of the scanty times. Scarcity is so obscured that it tries to hide its scarcity completely. We must think of the night of the world on the other side of pessimism and optimism as our destiny. Thus, it seems that the night of the world is now approaching its midnight. Perhaps the century will now become a completely and exceptionally lean time. Or maybe not yet, not yet.

now, always this "not yet," despite immeasurable need, despite all suffering, despite unimaginable poverty, despite the total lack of peace and quiet, despite the growing chaos. It is a long time, for even horror, understood as the only basis for the turn, can do nothing until mortals make the turn themselves. But they will not make the turn until they have found their own essence in the turn. And this depends on their being able to reach the bottom of the abyss faster than the celestial essences. Mortals, if we conceive of them in their own essence, are closer to *ot-presence*⁽⁵⁾, because they have emerged from the *pri-presence* called from time immemorial "*being*"⁽⁶⁾. But when presence is concealed, absence proper comes. Thus the abyss guards and marks everything. In his "Hymn to the Titans" (IV, 210), Hölderlin calls "the abyss": "that which marks all things with itself." The mortal who manages to reach the abyss faster than the others and in a different way than the others, will know the mark of the abyss, by which the abyss is marked. For the poet, these are signs, traces of the departed gods. As Hölderlin puts it, it is Dionysus, the god of wine, who leaves such a mark for mortals who have lost their gods in the middle of their night. For the god of the vine preserves in this vine and its berries the original mutual belonging of heaven and earth as the place of the marriage feast of gods and men. Only in this place of all possible places can the footprints of the gods who have fled be left to godless men.

"...And what are poets for in lean times?" Hölderlin answers timidly from the mouth of his friend the poet Heine, to whom the question was addressed:

*But they are, as you say, like sacred priests dedicated to the
god of wine,
that they wander from country to country through the holy
night.*

The poets are those mortals who, chanting the god of wine, follow the footsteps of the gods who have fled, follow their trail, outlining to other mortals, their brethren, the way to the turn. The gods are gods only in the ether, this is their divinity. The ether element, in which divinity exists⁽⁷⁾ (west), is sacred. The ether element, the sacred, is the trail of the fleeing gods by which they

to return. But who among mortals is able to trace these traces? These traces are often invisible and are always the legacy of a barely imaginable existence. To be a poet in times of scarcity is to follow the footprints of the gods who have fled by singing a song. That is why during the night of peace the poet chants⁽⁸⁾ the sacred. That is why, in Hölderlin's language, the night of peace is "sacred night".

It is to the very essence of the poet who is a true poet in this age that, by virtue of the essential poverty of the age, the poet's condition and the poet's vocation become a poetic question for him. Therefore, "poets in lean times" must express poetically the essence of poetry. Where this happens, we encounter the kind of poetry that is predestined by the very destiny of the age. We have only to learn to listen to the utterances of *such* poets, unless, of course, we succumb to the tricks of time, which conceals being by forcing us to grasp time from the side of being⁽⁹⁾, dissecting it.

The closer the night of the world approaches midnight, the more poverty rules, so that its essence remains hidden. Not only the sacred as a trace of divinity is lost, but even the traces of these lost traces are erased. The more these traces are obliterated, the less the individual mortal who reaches the abyss is able to detect any hint or indication there. The more strict is the law according to which he who goes as far as he can along the path to which he is condemned is the one who advances the farthest. The third stanza of the same elegy, which asks "and why poets in sad times?", announces the poet's situation:

One thing remains certain. Whether or not

noon

or midnight, there's always a measure;

*common to all, but awarded to each in his own way; there
goes and comes everyone wherever he can.*

In a letter to Belendorf dated December 2, 1802, Hölderlin writes: "And the philosophical light around my window is now my joy, whether I can keep in my memory how I got to this point!"

The poet thinks of that moment, which is defined by such a flash of being⁽¹⁰⁾, that in the field of completed Western metaphysics it is molded into a final formula. Hölderlin's thinking poetry has marked this area with his poetic thought. His poems abide in this domain as trustingly as any other poetry of his time. The space into which Hölderlin has entered is an opening⁽¹¹⁾ of being, belonging to the destiny of being itself and given to the poet by this destiny to comprehend.

But could it be that this openness of being within a completed metaphysics also embodies the ultimate oblivion of being? And what if it is this oblivion that is the hidden essence of the poverty of a meagre epoch? Then we have chosen the wrong moment for an aesthetic escape into Hölderlin's poetry. Then we should not make an artificial myth out of the poet's figure or distort his poetic statements in an attempt to fit them into a philosophical framework. But there is still a necessity: to experience, with sober and rigorous thought, what remains unproduced in the words of his poems. This is the way of the destiny (*Geschichte*) of being⁽¹²⁾. If we succeed on this path, it will bring our thought into a historical (*geschichtliche*) dialog with the poetic statement. For the "historicizing"⁽¹³⁾ of literary study, this would seem to be an anti-scientific violence against what it counts as known facts. For philosophy, dialog is seen as a helpless dispersion. But fate makes its way without paying attention to it.

Do we, the people of today, meet a poet on this path? Do we encounter a poet who today is still furiously striving for the closeness of thought and half-thought-out philosophy? Let us ask this question more rigorously, with all its inherent rigor.

Is Rilke a poet in lean times? How does his poetic statement relate to the poverty of the era? To what point has he plunged into the abyss? Where has he reached, since a poet must go as far as he can?

The poem by Rilke that answers this question is found in a two-volume set that includes *Duino's Elegy* and the

"Sonnets to Orpheus." The long road to these poems is poetically interrogative. Along the way, Rilke gradually recognizes more and more clearly the scarcity of time. That time is scarce not only because God is dead, but also because mortals hardly realize that they are mortal, cannot realize it. Mortals no longer possess their own essence. Death has hidden itself in the mysterious. The secret of pain is impenetrable. Humans have learned to love. But mortals are essence⁽¹⁴⁾. They are essence while there is still language⁽¹⁵⁾. The song still soars over the meager earth. The singer's word still holds a trace of the sacred. A song from the Sonnets to Orpheus (Part 1, XIX) reads:

*The world is changing fast,
Like the shapes of clouds.
Every completed thing Returns to the
bosom of the Ancient One. Above the
change and flow
It's getting wider and freer;
Your foreplay is still ringing.*

The trace of the *sacred* becomes unrecognizable. The question of whether we perceive the *sacred* as a trace of the divinity of the divine, or whether we are left with only a trace of the sacred itself, remains open. It also remains unclear what a trace of a trace is. It is also unclear how such a trace reveals itself.

Time is scarce; it has lost the unconcealed essence of pain, death and love. The scarcity is this scarcity itself, which is removed from the region of being to which pain, death and love belong. Scarcity is insofar as the region of their mutual belonging is the abyss of being. But there remains the song that names the earth. What is this song itself? How can mortals sing? From what is the song sung? To what point does it penetrate the abyss?

To find out whether Rilke is a poet in lean times, to measure to what extent he is, and to understand "what poets are to", let us try to leave some milestones on the path leading to the abyss. A few fundamental fragments from Rilke's poetic works will serve us as such milestones. These fundamental

passages can be understood only from the realm in which they were uttered. This field is truth

Rilke experienced and experienced in his own way the unconcealability of being captured by this completion. Rilke experienced and experienced in his own way the unconcealability of being captured by this completion. We will now try to see how, for Rilke, the being as such shows itself as a whole⁽¹⁶⁾. To take a look at this area, let us turn our attention to a poem that was born during the peak of Rilke's poetic creativity, or rather, chronologically a little later than the peak.

We are not ready to interpret the Elegies and Sonnets because the field from which they come, in terms of its structure and its metaphysical unity, has not yet been sufficiently thought through from the very essence of metaphysics. This area is difficult to comprehend for two reasons: firstly, because Rilke's poetic work follows Hölderlin in its historical orbit in terms of sequence and rank, and secondly, because we have little knowledge of the essence of metaphysics and remain inexperienced in the narrative of being.

We are not only unprepared for interpreting the Elegies and Sonnets, but also unauthorized, because the field of dialogue between poetry and thought is being discovered, reached and thought through extremely slowly and gradually. Who today can claim to feel equally at home in the nature of authentic poetry and in the nature of authentic thought? And even more so to expose the inner essence of poetry and thought in their radical disagreement, to come to an agreement in this way?

The poem we will try to explain was not published by Rilke himself. We find it in volume 8 of the 1954 edition of *The Complete Works* and in the 1935 collection *Late Poems*. The poem is untitled. Rilke wrote it in June 1924. In a letter from Muso of August 15, 1924 to Clara Rilke, the poet says: "Fortunately, I have not been passive in *all* directions, since Baron Lucius received his 'Malta' *before* I left in June; his letter of thanks has long since been ready to be sent to you. I have here added an impro-

vised poems which I wrote to him in the first volume of a pleasant leather-bound edition."

The improvised poems Rilke mentions, according to the publishers of these letters from Muso, are as follows:

*How nature leaves creatures to risk
their deaf desires and no one's
especially does not guard specially in furrows and
branches; so do we in the depths of our being
are not more beloved; we are at risk. Unless we are
even more than plants or animals;
We go along with this risk, desire it, and sometimes even take
more risks (and not because of interest);
than life itself, one breath more risky... This,
out of hiding;
creates us confidence, where the gravitational force
of pure forces is at work; that we are, at the end of the
after all, harbors; it
is being without shelter, and what we are in the open
sends off;
and that which we see revolving around it; to
somewhere in a still wider circle;
wherever the law touches us, to say yes to it.*

Rilke calls this poem "improvised lines". But it is precisely this contingency that gives us a perspective in which we can think more clearly about Rilke's poetry. That this poetry is also a matter of thinking, we realize only at this moment in world history. We take the poem as an experience of poetic self-reflection.

The structure of the poem is simple. All of the articulations are pro- visionary. We have four parts - verses 1-5, 5-10, 10-12, 12-16. At the beginning, "like nature" corresponds in verses 4-5

"so are we." This "we" is followed by "unless we" in line 5.

This "unless we" limits the concept of "we" by separating it from the other. Lines 5-10 clarify this. Lines 10-12 show the importance of this separation. And lines 12-16 comprehend the significance of this distinction. Through "as in nature" and "so are we", human existence becomes the main theme of the poem. The comparison allows-

It is a question of defining human existence in relation to the mere

"beings." These living beings are plants and animals. At the beginning of Elegy 8, in the same comparison, they are given a different name - "creatures" ("creatures").

Comparison places the different in the equal in order to emphasize their difference. What makes the different - plants and animals, on the one hand, and man, on the other - equal is what makes them identical. This identity is the relation of all beings to their basis. The basis of beings is nature⁽¹⁷⁾. But the foundation is given to man in a different way than to a plant or an animal. The foundation is the same there and there. It is nature as "complete nature" (Sonnets, 2nd part, XIII).

Here we must think of nature in a broad and essential sense, as Leibniz understood the capitalized word *Natura*. It means the being of being. Being is vis primitive active. It is the beginning, the gathering power that brings every being to itself. The being of being is the will⁽¹⁸⁾. The will is the all-composing gathering of every being (ens) to itself. Every being as being is in the will. It *is* willed⁽¹⁹⁾. Therefore we say: the being is not only and not primarily willed, but the being is, insofar as it *is*, itself in the form of will. As willed being is a kind of willed being in the will.

What Rilke calls nature is not called so out of opposition to history. Moreover, nature is not understood here as the subject matter of the natural sciences. Nor is nature opposed to art. It is the basis for history, art and nature in the narrow sense. In this use of the word "nature", Rilke still echoes its prototype, φύσις, which is identified with ζωή, which we are accustomed to translate as "life". However, the essence of life as it was understood at the dawn of Western thought was not biological, but embodied the meaning of φύσις as budding, sprouting (Aufgehende). In line 9 of the poem, "nature" is also called "life." Nature, life here denotes being in the sense of being as a whole. In a note from 1885-1886, Nietzsche (in *The Will to Power*, aphorism 582) wrote: "Being - we have no other

a concept of it other than 'life'. So how can something dead 'be'?"

Rilke calls nature, insofar as it is the foundation of what we are, the *Urgrund*. This indicates that human beings, more than all other creatures, are rooted in the foundation of what is⁽²⁰⁾. Since ancient times, the foundation of being has been called being. The relation of being, which grounds, to being, which grounds, is the same in man, plant, and animal. It consists in the fact that being exposes the being to the element of risk, gives it to "risk" (*Wagnis*)⁽²¹⁾. Being releases the being into risk, liberating it. This liberation that throws the being, releasing it into adventure, is risk. The being of the being is the relation of throwing to the being. The being of the being is risk. Being is risk itself by and large. It risks us, human beings. It risks living beings. Being exists insofar as it is constantly risked again and again. Being remains risky in being, that is, in risk. That is why being itself is at risk, given to risk. Being is insofar as it moves in the risk to which it is given. The being of being is risk. Risk is grounded in the will, which, following Leibniz, is more and more precisely revealed as the being of the being revealed in metaphysics. The will to be understood here is not a generalization of psychological desires. On the contrary, the human will, metaphysically understood, is nothing other than the volitional reflection of the will as the being of being. When Rilke thinks of nature as risk, he is thinking metaphysically from the essence of will. This essence is still hidden, both in the will to power (might) and in the will as risk. Will is as the will to will.

The poem says nothing directly about the foundation of being, that is, about being as risk in the first place. But since being as risk is a relation of letting go and at the same time maintaining what is risked in its letting go, the poem tells us a great deal about risk, albeit through the narrative of what is risked.

Nature risks creatures and "protects none of them in particular". In the same way, we human beings, as those who are risk-

forge, "no more dear" to the risk that risks us. Here and there, the general rule is that risk belongs to what is thrown in into the realm of the dangerous. To risk is to introduce play. Herac-litus thinks of being as the time of the world, and he understands it as the play of a child (fragment 24): *αιων παῖς εστι παιζων, περρεύων: παιδον ἢ βασιληῖη*. "The time of peace is a child playing at dice; the child's game is domination." If throwing were safe, it would contain no risk. However, the being would be beyond risk if it were secure. In German, "schützen" ("to protect," "to shelter") is cognate to "schiessen" ("to grow quickly"). "Schiessen" on the other hand means "schieben" ("to push", "to slide"), e.g.:

"sliding the latch." The roof is made before the walls. In the German villages they also say: "the peasant woman put the molded dough into the oven", meaning "pushed" it into the oven. Shelter, Schutz, is knowingly and beforehand "pushed in". It protects the one in danger from what may come upon him. The sheltered person trusts the sheltering person. Our older and richer language had other forms:

"verlaubt", "verlobt" ("betrothed") - "geliebt" ("beloved"). "Not harbored" means more "not loved",

"unloved"⁽²²⁾. Plant, animal, man, in so far as they are beings, i.e., in so far as they are risked, are equally coincident in being unprotected. But since they differ in their being, there must also be differences between them in their being without shelter.

The unprotected are the ones at risk. But that does not mean they are left to their own devices. If they were left behind, they would be risked as little as if they were protected. Being doomed to destruction, they would not lie on the scales. The word "scales" ("Wage") in the Middle Ages meant "danger" in German⁽²³⁾. It is a situation in which everything can tilt to one side or the other. Therefore, a device that acts in this way was called a "Wage".

"scales." The scales are involved in the game, play. The word "Wage," both "danger" and "instrument," comes from the verb "wägen", "wegen", "to make a way" ("Weg"), a road, "to go", "to be in motion". "Bewägen" means "to pack for the road", "to set out on a journey, in motion", and also "to weigh" ("wiegen"). Something that weighs is so called because its

weight is designed to shift the scales in one direction or another. What weighs has weight ("Gewicht"). To risk ("wagen") means: to bring into play, to put on the scales, to leave in danger. The one who is risked is without shelter, but since he is on the scales ("Wage"), he remains held by the risk ("Wagnis"). He is carried by it. It is held by risk with its foundation. Being being, what is risked (Gewagte) is willed (Gewollte). It remains, held by the will, itself in the aspect of the will and therefore risks itself, ventures. So the one who is risked may not worry about it, may be sine cura, securum, i.e., "safe." To the extent that what is risked is safe in the risk, it can follow that risk by continuing to be in the defenselessness of the risk taker. The defenselessness of the one who is risked not only does not exclude security at its foundation, but presupposes it as something necessary. The one who is risked co-moves with risk.

Being, which holds all being in the balance, constantly draws being to itself as the center. Being, as risk, contains all things as what is risked in this position. At the same time, the center of this attraction eludes all things. In this way, the center gives being to risk, makes it what is risked. In this gathering abandonment lies the metaphysical essence of the will, thought from the side of being. The center of being, being attracting and mediating everything, is the might that gives weight (i.e., gravity) to what is risked. Risk is the force of gravity. A later poem ("The Power of Gravitation") says this.

Gravitational force

*Center, you're moving away from everything,
But out of every flight you reclaim yourself again,*

center,

You become the strongest.

*Standing upright: like a gulp for the thirsty, gravity pierces
you.*

*Yet from the sleeper falls,
Like a heavy cloud, A rich
rain of heaviness.*

"Gravity" is named here, in contrast to physical gravity, which is constantly spoken of, the center of being as a whole. This is why Rilke calls it "the unheard middle" (Sonnets, 2nd part, XXVIII). It is the foundation (Grund), like the conjunction "c", which connects things to each other and gathers them in a game of risk. The unheard middle is the "eternal co-actress" in the world game of being. The same poem, in which being is sung as risk, names (in lines 11 and 12) the mediating relationship: "the gravity of pure forces". Pure gravity, the unheard center of all risk, the eternal co-actress in the game of being - this is what risk is.

To the extent that risk releases what it risks, it at the same time holds it in the balance. Risk lets go and releases the one who is risked, but in such a way that what is let go is released to be attracted to the center. The one who is risked is supplied with this attraction to the center. In this attraction, the risk picks up again and again the one who is risked. To collect something, to get it from somewhere, to take it somewhere, to make it appear somewhere - we call this "from-relationship" (es beziehen). Here is the first meaning of the term

"Bezug" - from-relationship⁽²⁴⁾. If we speak of a relation of goods, of service, of flow. The attraction that approaches the being as a risk, engages it and takes it in this rush is the meaning of relation. The word "Bezug" ("relation") is a fundamental term in Rilke's poetic work in different variations

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"pure attitude", "integral attitude", "real attitude", "clearer attitude", "different attitude" (i.e. the same attitude but from a different perspective). We will understand Rilke's term

"Bezug" only halfway,

i.e. in this case we will not understand it at all if we do not relate it to the meaning of "Beziehung" in the sense of relation. We will only add to the confusion if we understand it as the relation of the "human self" to the object. This understanding of relation is quite new in the history of language. If Rilke's term carries this meaning, it is clearly not primary, but secondary, dependent on the primary. The expression "ganze Bezug" ("whole attitude") is unthinkable if "Bezug" is understood only as "re-

The "relational", the "relational" and the "relative" in this sense⁽²⁵⁾. The gravitational force of pure forces, unheard middle, pure relation, wholesome relation, complete nature, life and risk are all the same thing.

All these names refer to being as it is as a whole.

Metaphysics, in its usual expression, calls it being. According to the poem, nature must be thought of as risk. The word "risk" here refers both to the risky base (Grund) and to the one who is risked as a whole. This ambiguity is not accidental, but it is not enough to note it. The language of metaphysics speaks clearly

in it. Everything that is risked, being individually this or that being, is bound to the whole and rests on the foundation of the whole. Being, always being being being in one way or another, *is* every time in the measure of its attraction that keeps it in attraction to the whole relation (Bezug). We can get an idea of nature when it is said *how* that which is risked is attracted to the middle.

In accordance with this, what is risked is what enters into the environment of being as a whole.

The integral attitude to which every being as that which is risked is presented, Rilke calls "open" (Offene). This word is another fundamental term in his work. In Rilke's language, "open" means that which does not lock. Does not lock because it does not restrict. Does not limit because it is free from all constraints. The open is the great whole of all that is free from constraint. It brings the beings that are risked, as attracted, into the course of pure relation (Bezug), so that they multiply on each other and, meeting no obstacle, continue to move. Thus, moving and moving again, they ascend to the infinite. They are not dissolved in the nothingness of nothingness, they are resolved in the whole open.

What Rilke calls thus in no way defines openness (Offenheit) in the sense of the uncoveredness of the being, which makes the being appear present. If we were to try to understand Rilke's open in the sense of unconcealedness and the unconcealed, we would be forced to conclude that what Rilke perceives as open is in fact closed, unconcealed, what is pro-

must move in the infinite in such a way that it cannot encounter anything unusual, or anything at all. Because that where something meets, an obstacle appears. Where there is a boundary, the limited presses itself and bends around itself. Limitation distorts, locks the relation to the open and makes it distorted. Limitation in the bosom of the limitless is established by the human concept⁽²⁶⁾. The setting of the⁽²⁷⁾ "in front of" does not allow one to be directly in the open. It excludes man from the world in a certain way and places him before the world ("world" here means being as a whole). On the contrary, the world (Weltische) is the open itself, the fullness of the unprecedented (Ungegenständliche). But the name "open" itself, as well as the word "risk", is ambiguous in its metaphysical meaning. It means both the whole of the open relation (Bezug) of the unbounded relation (Bezug) and openness in the sense of the erasure of boundaries that reigns everywhere.

The open allows entry. But to enter does not mean to give entrance and access to the closed, as if something concealed were to be revealed as unconcealed. To "let in" means to withdraw and connect with the unenlightened fullness of the attraction of pure relation (Bezug). As a specific manner of being open, letting in, by the property of attraction, is the gravitational force of pure forces. The less what is at risk is forbidden access to the pure relation (Bezug), the more it belongs to the great whole of the open. This is why Rilke calls the beings who dare to enter this greatness in the form of greatness and who are swept along by it "gross gewohnten Dinge" (Spätere Gedichte). Man alone is not one of them. The poem that celebrates this distinction between other living beings and man in relation to the open is Duino's Eighth Elegy. The distinction lies in the different levels of consciousness. Since Leibniz, the distinction of beings in this respect has been common in modern metaphysics.

What Rilke understands by the word "open" can be understood from a letter he wrote in the last year of his life (25.2.1926) to a Russian reader who asked him about

Eighth Elegy. Rilke writes: "You must understand the term 'open', which I have tried to reveal in this Elegy, as the level of consciousness of the beast places it in the world without it (like us humans) placing the world before itself at every moment; the beast is *in the world*; we are *in front of the world* because of the special specificity and the special structure of our consciousness. And Rilke continues: "By 'open' I do not mean the sky, the air or space as they are to the observer and the evaluator, i.e. not objects that are 'opaque' and covered. A beast or a flower *is* all this without realizing it and with this indescribably open freedom before and above itself, which has its counterpart (if only for a moment) in the first moment of love, when the human being discovers in the other, in the beloved, its own immensity, or in the exaltation of feeling for God.

The plant and the animal are admitted into the open. They are essence *in the world*. This "in" means: unenlightened, brought into the net of the pure attitude (Bezug). The relation to the open - if we can still speak of a relation "to" here - is the unconsciousness of the aspiring-attracting connection in the whole of being. Along with the rise of consciousness, the essence of which for modern metaphysics is representation (Vorstellen, representation), the status and pre-state of the pre-met (object) soars. The higher the knowledge, the more excluded from the world the conscious being becomes. Therefore, man in the language of this writing stands "*before the world*". He is not allowed to be open. Man stands opposite to the world. He does not live directly in the flow and wind of the integral relation (Bezug). The place in the letter emphasizes the understanding of openness all the more because Rilke explicitly denies here the understanding of openness as the openness of sky or space. The correct understanding of open would be the meaning of an essentially beginning illumination of being, outside of Rilke's poetry, which remains in the shadow of a softened Nietzscheanism.

That which belongs directly to the open is caught in the current of attraction to the middle. Therefore, of all the beings that are risked, that which belongs most to the open is that which is taken in accordance with the middle.

its own essence, while in this sub-being, the being does not strive for anything that it could be opposed. The one who is in this way is in "deaf desire".

*How nature conveys to creatures
the risk of their deaf desire to...*

The word "muffled" here means muted: that is, that which does not fall outside the flow of unlimited continuity, that which is not troubled by the constant juxtaposition of everything with everything into which conscious representation falls. "Deaf" also indicates a deep, low sound that rests in the depths and serves as a support. Deaf is used here not in a negative sense, not as something "base" and "sinful." Rilke does not conceptualize deaf desire as something low and mediocre. This desire points to the belonging of "great things" to the wholesome nature of pure attitude (Bezug). This is why, in one of his later poems, Rilke says:

"Let the being of the flower be great for us" (Late Poems). Just as in the above passage from the letter people and other living beings are thought of in terms of their different and degree-determined relationship to the revealed, so the poem defines "beings" and

"us" people in a variety of risk attitudes:

*So do we;
even more than plant or beast; move
with that risk.*

One could conclude from this that man is bound to this risk to an even greater extent than plant or beast, and that he is granted openness even more directly than all other creatures. This would be the meaning of this statement, where the emphasis would fall on the word "more", if Rilke had not italicized the preposition "**with**". The underlining of "**with**" emphasizes not so much the increase in the level of immediate co-movement. For people, this co-movement with risk is represented in a special way as something premeditated. Risk and what it risks, nature, being as a whole, the world - all of it

for the human being is put outside, taken out of the deafness of the not-restricted relation (Bezug). But where is this exposed and how? Nature is brought before man through human representation. Man puts the world as a pre-measure in its wholeness before himself and himself before the world. Man models the world for himself and produces nature for himself⁽²⁸⁾. We must conceptualize this production of nature in a broad and multidimensional sense. Man orders nature where it does not satisfy his ideas. Man produces new things where he lacks them. Man removes things where they are in his way. Man hides them and moves them where they distract him from his intentions. Man exhibits things where he values them for sale and consumption. Man exhibits them where he shows his industry and uses everything for his enterprises. In these multiple products of man's production, the world stops, is brought to a standstill. The open is transformed into a pre-met and thus turned away from the human being. Man confronts the world as pre-measure and exposes himself as the one who deliberately imposes⁽²⁹⁾ all this production.

Placing something in front of oneself means that this something, as pre-presented, predetermines all kinds of production in relation to everything and constitutes the basic property of what is called will. Thus understood, the will is production in the sense of a predetermined self-imposed determination (Vergegensta- endlichung). The plant and the beast have no will, because they, being deepened in desire, never put the open before them as an object. They cannot move "with" risk as something presented. When they are placed in the open, the pure attitude never becomes a pre-measure of something else, but always remains itself. Man moves "with" risk because he is a volitional being in the above-mentioned sense:

*So do we;
even more than plant or beast, we move with this
risk, will it.*

Here the will is a self-imposed will, the premise of which is the ready presentation of the world as a fully produced pre-metal. This will predetermines the essence of the New Age man, although he himself is not fully aware, and cannot know today, from the depths of which will, as the being of being, this will emerges. The man of the New Age exposes himself in this will as one who, in all his relations to everything that is, as well as to himself, erects himself as an imposing producer and directs this self-exertion towards an unconditioned domination. The whole of the pre-metal state, as the world turns out to be, is embedded in the imposing production, handed over to it, subject to its command. The will has in itself an order, so intentional self-imposed imposition is the form in which the state of the producer and the pre-metricity of the world are grasped in a single unconditional and complete unity. In this unifying grasping, the fetching character of the will reveals itself. At the same time, the ancient hidden essence of the will as the being of being is revealed in the course of the formation of New Age metaphysics.

Accordingly, the human will imposes itself in such a way as to squeeze everything, without first viewing it, into its own sphere. For this will, everything becomes, knowingly and without ceasing for a moment, the material of the imposed production. The earth and the atmosphere become resources. The human being becomes a human material to which predetermined goals are prescribed. The unconditional direction of the unconditioned imposition of the deliberate placing of the world in a state subject to human command is the origin from which the secret meaning of modern technology emerges. It is only in the modern era that this begins to manifest itself as the destiny of the truth of being as a whole, while earlier attempts to manifest themselves were embedded in the broader sphere of culture and civilization.

Modern science and the total State are a necessary consequence of the essence of technology and its consequences. The same is true of the means and forms of organizing world public opinion and the everyday perceptions of people. Not only is the living materialized in

The very essence of life can be explained on the basis of technical production. The very essence of life can be explained on the basis of technical production. And the fact that today, in all seriousness, some see in atomic physics the prerequisites for the justification of human freedom and the basis for a doctrine of new values, shows the dominance of a technical view whose sphere of influence has long since gone beyond private opinions and views. The essential power of technology shows itself even where, in related fields, people are trying to curb technology with the old value systems, using, however, again technical means, and the traditional systems are only external forms. The use of machinery and the creation of machines has long since ceased to be a technique, but has become a related tool for orienting its being into the subjectivity of its own materiality. The fact that man has become a subject and the world an object is a consequence of the self-directed nature of technology, not the other way around.

Since Rilke's revealed is cognized as the objectlessness of total nature, by contrast and symmetrically, the world of the willed man must be rendered as pre-meaningful. Conversely, the gaze cast upon the sacred wholeness of being from the phenomenon of advancing technology forms a sign pointing to the area from which the original formative overcoming of the technical can come.

The formless forms of technical production cover the openness of pure attitude (Bezug). Once-growing things are rapidly hidden. Because of their definition, they are no longer able to show their own essence. In a letter of November 13, 1925, Rilke writes:

"Still for our grandfathers, 'home,' 'source,' the tower entrusted to them, their own coat, their clothes, were something infinitely greater, infinitely more trustworthy. Almost every thing was a vessel in which the human was stored, the human was gathered. Now there are empty, indifferent things from America, things of appearances (Schein-dinge), *fakes of life*... The home in the American sense, the American apple, or the local one.

grapes, have *nothing* to do with the house, fruit, or berry in which the hopes and thoughts of our grandfathers" (Letters from Muso).

But this "American" is precisely the concentrated return to Europe of the collected willed essence of the New Age, which expresses the "European" itself; in Europe itself, through the completion of Nietzsche's metaphysics, at least some areas of the essential questioning of the world, in which being begins to rule as will to will, have been thought out in advance. It is not just the "American" that threatens us today, but the unrecognized essence of the technical that already threatened our forefathers and their things. The essential in Rilke's reflection does not lie in his attempt to save the things of his forefathers. We must, after reflection, realize what it is that comes into question with the substance of things. Rilke had written earlier from Duino on March 1, 1912:

"The world is being drawn in; and things, for their part, are doing the same, with their existence moving more and more into the vibration of money and there developing a kind of spirituality which already now transcends their tangible reality. In the age I am concerned with (the fourteenth century), money was still gold, metal, a fine thing, the most concrete and intelligible of all" (Letters 1907-1914).

A decade earlier, Rilke had published the following insightful poem in *The Pilgrim's Book* (1901), the second of *The Book of Hours*:

*The kings of the world are old
And they have no heirs. The sons
die in infancy, And the remaining
daughters give Power to weak
crowns.
The blackness crushes them into small
coins, The grasping lord of the world
Extends them to the fire of machines,
Which serve, murmuring, his will, But
happiness is not with them.
Metal in nostalgia. And throws
Coins and wheels,
Teaching them about their short lives.*

*And from factories and cash registers
They're back in the veins
Sprawling Mountains,
that are closing in on you.*

In place of what was once a protected world order of things, the subjectivity of technical domination of the earth is spreading faster, more desperately and more perfectly. This pre-meternity does not simply expose all things as capable of being produced in the process of production, but puts the products of production on the market. The humanity of man and the thingness of things are dissolved in the compulsive production of market value by the market, which not only encompasses the whole earth as a world market, but, as a will to will in the essence of being, begins to bargain and places all things in the hands of calculation, which is particularly adept where numbers can be dispensed with.

Rilke's poem conceptualizes the human being as a being who is risked by putting him into volition, but in such a way that he does not know in advance that it is willed by the will to volition. Thus, in the process of volition, man can "go along with the risk", exposing himself to everyone through his deeds and impulses as a self-binding, presenting himself to all that he himself does, imposing himself on everything else.

Therefore man is more at risk than a plant or a beast. And thus he is in danger in a different way from all others. Among living beings (plants and animals) no one is more sheltered than the others, all are left to the open and guarded by it. Man, as one who wills himself, is not only not sheltered by the whole of existence, but is outside of all shelter. As a presenting and producing person, he faces the open, which is locked (Als der Vor- und Her-stellende steht er vor dem verstellten Offenen). He is therefore, like everything around him, subject to the ever-increasing risk of becoming pure material, a function of despecification. The intentionality of self-imposed imposition extends the danger that man will finally lose his self in unconditioned production. The threat to the essence of man grows out of the essence itself. The essence rests in man's relation (Bezug) to being. Man in the most essential sense

is threatened by its self-will, it is constantly in need of shelter, but its essence is equally constantly robbing him of that shelter.

This "being without shelter" (*Schutzlossein*) is different from the

The "not-especially-hiddenness" of plants and animals in the same way that their "deaf desire" differs from the self-will of man. This distinction is infinite, since there is no transition from deaf desire to self-definition in self-obsession. Not only does it put man "on the other side of the shelter", but the imposition of the world's despecification is more and more decisively destroying the very possibility of shelter. By technologizing the world into a pre-metal, man consciously and definitively nails the door to the open, which was already closed to him. Whether he realizes it or not, the self-imposed man is a functionary of technology. He not only finds himself outside of the open, but through defining the world he also turns away from the possibility of "pure relation" (*Bezug*). Man is separated from pure relation (*Bezug*). The man of the technical age finally breaks with the open. This is not yet a parting with.... (*Abschied von*), but a separation against... (*Abschied gegen*).

Technics is the unconditioned direction given by the self-assertion of man, the unconditioned being without shelter, on the ground (*Grund*) of the renunciation (*Abkehr*) that dominates all subject matter, of the pure attitude (*Bezug*) that draws all pure forces to itself as the unheard middle of being. Technical production is the organization of parting. The word "parting" (*Abschied*) in its meaning described here is another important term of Rilke's poetry.

It is not the deadly machinery of the atomic bomb, of which there is so much talk today, that is the most deadly. The unconditionality of pure will in the sense of deliberate self-binding to everything is what, and has been for a long time, threatens man and the human essence itself with death. Man in his being is threatened by the willful conviction that it is enough to peacefully extract, process, accumulate and distribute natural resources in order to make human existence more bearable and generally happy. But the peace-

This happiness is nothing but an unbounded fever of self-directed, self-imposed frenzy. The very essence of the human being is also threatened by the conviction that the risk of self-imposed production can be secured if the value of other interests, such as religious beliefs, is kept aside. As if in this relation of essence (ver- haltnis), where man in technical volition opposes himself to the essence in its wholeness, there could be a related space that offers something more than ephemeral ways of escaping into self-deception, such as turning to the gods of ancient Greece. The very essence of man is also threatened by the belief that technical production is capable of ordering the world, whereas it is this "putting in order" that reduces in the uniformity of production any order (ordo), i.e. any rank, destroying the realm of possible rank and recognition that comes from being itself. It is not the totalitarian character of the will that constitutes the main danger, but the will itself in the form of self-assertion within the world, admitted only as will. The volition willed out of this will is already resolved in an unconditional command. This determination embodies volition in total organization. But above all, it is technology itself that prevents all knowledge of its essence. Because, as it unfolds, it develops a form of cognition in the field of science to which the essential sphere of the technical is forever closed, much less the possibility of rethinking it an essential origin.

The essence of technology appears very slowly in the daylight. And this day is the night of the world transmuted into the day of technology. This is the shortest day. With it we are threatened with an endless winter. Now man is not only denied shelter: the intact totality of being in its wholeness remains in twilight. The good (das Heile) is hidden. The world becomes incurable (heil-los), unblessed. Thus not only the sacred (das Heilige) as a trace leading to the Divine (Göttliche) disappears, but even the trace of the sacred, the good, is erased. Until there are only a few mortals left who can see the threat of the goodless.

datelessness as ungracefulness. And they will realize at some point what threat is hanging over man. The threat of cost- It is not a relative and transient danger, but a threat to the very essence of man in his relation (Verhältnis) to being itself. Such a threat is a threat in its own right. It is hidden in the abyss for all things. But in order to see this threat and show it to others, there must be mortals who will reach the "bottom" of the abyss farther than others.

*But where there is a threat, there also grows the
saving. (Hölderlin,
IV)*

Any other salvation that does not come from the same place where the danger is rooted remains within the realm of unhappiness (Unheil). Any means of salvation through the most well-meaning command will remain an ephemeral appearance for people throughout their destiny. True salvation must come from the place where a turning point emerges that must touch mortals down to their essence. Are there mortals who first reach the abyss of scarcity and its poverty? These most mortal of mortals will be in danger more than all others. They will risk even more than the human being who is self-imposed, though he in turn risks more than the plant or the animal.

Rilke says:

*So do we;
even more than plant or beast; move with this
risk, will it.*

And he continues in the same poem:

*... sometimes even
we risk more (and not out of interest) than life
itself in one breath
more...*

Man in his essence does not just risk more than a plant or an animal. Sometimes he risks even more, "than life itself." Life means here the being in its being, i.e. nature. Man occasionally takes risks

more than risk itself, becomes more being than the being of being. But being is the ground of being (das Sein ist der Grund des Seienden). He who risks more than the very basis (Grund) reaches a place where there is no longer any basis, i.e., the abyss (Ab-grund). However, if man is what is risked and moves with the risk, desiring it, people who risk even more must be even more volitional, desiring. But can volition rise above the unconditionality of deliberate self-obsession? No. So those who sometimes risk more can only be "willed more" in the sense that their volition is different in its essence. Willing and volition are not the same thing. Those who are more volitional, on the basis of the essence of volition, remain more conformable to the will as being of being. They are more in accord with the being that manifests itself as will. They are more volitional (wollender) insofar as they are more consonant (williger). So what are they, these more consonant ones, who risk more? The poem does not seem to answer this question directly.

In any case, lines 8-11 say something about those who risk more, but only through negation and rather vaguely. The greater risk takers do not risk because of interest, not because of their personality. They do not seek advantage or self-love. Neither can they, although they take greater risks, be considered as having simply achieved greater results. They do not risk more at all: they risk more only "for one breath...". Their

The "more" in risk is as modest as a sigh, elusive and imperceptible. But even such a hint does not allow us to understand who they are - those who risk more.

In contrast, lines 10-12 tell us what carries with it a risk that dares to go farther than the being of being:

*He's creating us, on the other side of the shelter,
safe being, where the gravitational force of pure forces is at
work.*

Like all beings, we too are beings who are risked in the risk of being. However, being willed, we go along with the risk, which means that we are risked more, and we are riskier.

are more open to danger. Insofar as man strengthens himself in deliberate self-obsession and is guided in unconditional definiteness to the separation from the open, he practices his own being without shelter.

Conversely, taking more risk creates security for us. This does not mean that it erects bastions around the uncovered, because that would mean creating a fortification where, by definition, there is no fortification. This is only possible in despecification, but it locks the open to us. Risk, more risky than risk itself, does not create shelter. It creates security for us. German "sicher," Latin "securus," "sine cura" means literally, "without care." Care means here a kind of deliberate self-binding in the ways and through unconditioned production. We become carefree only when we do not place our being exclusively in the sphere of production and consumption, of utility and security. We are carefree only when we do not consider either the absence of shelter or the presence of an artificial shelter built within volition. Security can only be found on the other side of the defining renunciation of the open, "on the other side of the shelter", on the other side of the separation from pure attitude. This is the unheard center of all attraction, which draws all things into a region without limitation and perceives them at the center. This center is "there" where the gravitational force of pure forces is at work. Security is the secret rest in the pull of pure attitude (Bezug).

The risk, more risky than the risk itself, even more influential than any self-imposed, being more consenting, "creates" security in the open. To "build up" (schaffen) means here to "draw" (schoepfen) at the source. To draw at the source is to receive what beats (from under the ground) and to transmit what is perceived in this way. The risk-taker who risks more than others the risk of a concordant will prepares nothing. Such a risk perceives and transmits what is perceived. He transmits in such a way that what is perceived unfolds in its fullness. The risk-taking risk completes (realizes) everything, but produces nothing. Only a risk that becomes more risky through consent can realize by perceiving.

Lines 12-16 define what the most risky risk is, the one that risks on the other side of all shelters and leads us there to carelessness. It does not in any way abolish the being without shelter, established by deliberate self-obsession. Insofar as human being rises into the desubstantiation of being, it remains unconcealed in the midst of being. Being uncovered in this sense, man, through the absence of shelter, is contiguous with it and thus remains within the sphere of shelter. Security lies on the other side of all relations with shelter: "on the other side" of shelter.

Consequently, it would seem that for security and its acquisition, a risk is necessary that would discard any connection with shelter or lack of shelter. But this is only imagined. In fact, when we think from the closedness of the whole relation (Bezug), we finally (i.e. initially) grasp what frees us from the preoccupation of self-obsession in the absence of shelter:

*That which ultimately protects us; It is
being without shelter.*

How can being without shelter protect us, if only the open provides protection, and being without shelter is in constant separation from the open? Being without shelter can protect us only when the abkehr is turned in the opposite direction, facing the open and itself in it. So, being without shelter, being reversed, is what gives refuge. To "take refuge" here means, on the one hand, that the reversal of the turning away from the open is security, and on the other hand, that somehow being without shelter itself is revealed as security. That which gives refuge,

*is being without shelter, and that we're so
into the open, seeing the threat looming over him.*

"And" leads to an explanation showing how this strange thing is possible-our being without shelter gives us security on the other side of any

shelter. Being without shelter, of course, does not give us shelter whenever we turn to it when we feel in danger. Being without shelter protects us only when we have already made a turn. As Rilke says: "we enter the open in this way". In this turning lies the exceptional property of the turn. In turning, being without shelter is suddenly transformed as a whole in its essence. The exclusivity of turning is that we begin to see being without shelter as a threat. Only this seeing reveals the danger. It shows that being without shelter as such threatens our essence with the loss of belonging to the open. In this seeing rests turning. Being without shelter turns "into the open". With the seeing of danger as an essential danger, we must realize a turning away from the open. This implies that the open itself must turn toward us in such a way as to allow us to turn the being without shelter toward it;

*That, somewhere on the widest circumference;
where the law touches us, to say yes to it.*

What is this wider "widest circumference"? Rilke probably means "open, seen in a special way". The widest circle encompasses everything that is. Surrounded by this circle, it connects all that exists so that in its unifying unity it is the being of being. But what is meant by "being"? The poet calls the being as a whole 'nature', 'life', 'open', 'pure relation'. And even sometimes, using the language of metaphysics, he calls this circular wholeness of being 'being'. But what the essence of this being is, this we do not recognize. But does not the fact that Rilke calls being "being" already tell us this? "risky risk"? Yes, of course. We have also tried to reinterpret what is thus named in the modern understanding of the essence of being of being as will to will. This speech alone explains everything as clearly as possible, if we try to conceive of the circle itself as being as a whole, and what is surrounded by the circle as being of being.

But as thinking beings, we must not forget that originally the being of being was thought of as that which surrounds-.

is a circle. But this sphericity of being is thought of too carelessly and always from the surface side, unless we first inquire into and recognize how in its essence there is the being of being, ὄν, the being, the being as a whole, ὄντα is called ἕν, the unifying unity. But what is this rounding unity as a fundamental feature of being? What is the meaning of being? ἕον, being, means: pri-present, present in the unconcealed. But in presence the following is hidden: the deduction before the unconcealed, which essentially allows for being present. But only the presence itself is truly present, which is always and everywhere identical in its own middle and as such is always spherical. Sphericity is not based on the surroundings that encompass something, but on the opening middle that reveals the luminous presence. The sphericity of the one and the one itself has the property of a revealing lumen whose presence can thus be present. This is why Parmenides calls (fragment VIII) εὖν, the presence of the present εὐκυκλος σφαῖρη ("sphere of the beneficent round"). This well-rounded sphere is to be thought of as the being of being in the sense of the opening-illuminating one. This all-pervading unity gives rise to the name of the shining shell, which as revealing does not encompass the interior, but releases itself, shining, into the presence. This ball of being and its sphericity should never be represented objectively. But then how? Not objectively? No. That would be an excuse. Sphericity must be conceived from the essence of original being in the sense of a revealing presence.

Is this sphericity of being meant by Rilke's words about the widest circle? We have no reason to think so, but the very definition of the being of being as risk (will) runs counter to such a hypothesis. However, Rilke himself once spoke of a "ball of being", and in a context directly related to the interpretation of the broadest circle. In a letter of January 6, 1923, Rilke wrote: "Life, like the moon, has a face that constantly turns away from us, a face that is *not* its opposite, but its complement, completing it.

perfection as the true and salvific fullness of the sphere and ball of *being*." Although one should not be too insistent On the objectified celestial body mentioned here, it is clear that Rilke does not think of sphericity as a view of being in the sense of a unifying and sanctifying presence, but as a view of being as the totality of its faces. The ball of being in question here, i.e. the whole of being, is the open as a continuum of pure forces infinitely flowing into each other and acting on each other. The widest circle is the totality of the whole relation of attraction. To this widest circle corresponds as the strongest middle "unheard-of center" of the pure gravitational force.

To turn being without shelter to the open means to affirm ("say yes") this being without shelter within a wider circle. This "saying yes" is possible only where the whole of the circle is not only completely counted, but in this process equality is established, which means that we are dealing with an antecedent, a positive (positium). This can only correspond to the operation of position, the affirmation of position, not negation (negatio). Even those aspects of life which have their backs turned to us (abgekehrt), in so far as they are (sind), must be taken positively. In the letter of November 13, 1925, already quoted, Rilke says: "Death is the *side of life* that is turned away from us, that is not illuminated by us" (Letters from Muso). Death and the realm of the dead belong to the wholeness of being as its other face. This realm is the "other relation," i.e., the other face of the holistic relation of openness. In the wider circumference of the ball of being, there are areas and places which, turned away from us, appear to us as something negative, but in fact they are not, if we reconsider them in the horizon of the wider circumference of being.

From the open, it seems that being without concealment, as a parting with pure relation, is something negative. The dissociating self-binding of despecification seeks to establish everywhere the permanence of produced objects and only they are elevated to the rank of being and positiveness.

of the real. The self-obsession of technical despecification is the constant negation of death. Through this negation, death itself becomes something negative, impermanent and insignificant. However, if we turn the being without shelter into the open, we bring it into a wider circle of being in which the being without shelter itself can only be affirmed, can only say yes to it. To turn to the open means to refuse to read anything of what is as something negative. But what is more existent or, in the language of the New Age, more "obvious" than death? The above letter of January 6, 1923, says: "One must learn to read the word 'death' *without* denial.

If we turn being without concealment as such to the open, we invert it in its essence, i.e., as an aversion from pure relation, and return it to a wider circle. And we have only to say "yes" to the inverted in this way. But this saying "yes" is not a transformation of "no" into "yes", but a perception as positive (positive) already present and present. This happens when we, within the wider circle, allow the inverted being without shelter to belong to the area where "the law touches us." Rilke does not say, "some particular law." He does not mean thereby to say "a rule." He is thinking about *what* concerns us. Who are we? We are "we are" those volitional beings who, through deliberate self-imposition, erect the world as an object. If we are touched by the wider environment, it is touched by the one who makes us us in our essence. "Touch" means: "to set in motion", "to make move". Our very essence is set in motion. In this touching, our volition is shaken to the core so that the essence of volition comes into the light and is set in motion. Only then does volition become voluntary volition.

But what directly affects us in the broader circle? What, in the ordinary volition of the world's definition, is closed by ourselves to ourselves and remains closed? Another relation: death. It is it that touches mortals in their essence, that puts them in the way of the other side of life, and that is death.

places them in the wholeness of pure relation. Death thus gathers into the wholeness of the already placed, into the positium (positiveness) of the whole relation. As such a collection of positions, death is the law (*Als diese Versammlung des Setzens ist er [der Tod] das Ge-setz*), just as a mountain range is a collection of individual mountains in their whole relation. Where this law affects us, we arrive at a point within a wider circle where we can allow an inverted being to enter without shelter into the wholeness of being. Being without shelter, inverted in this way, finally protects us, on the other side of any shelter, in the open. How is such a reversal possible, however? How can there be a reversal of the parting aversion to the open? Apparently, only if it turns us to face a wider circle and forces us in our essence to enter it. The area of safety must first be shown to us, made available to us as a free space to turn over. But what gives us a safe being, and thus a dimension of safety, is the risk that risks more than life itself.

But this risk, which risks more than others, cannot be found here and there in our being without shelter. It does not try to change one or the other aspect of the world's definition. It turns the whole of being without shelter as such. Risk, more risky than risk itself, elevates being without shelter to a realm that is its own.

What is the essence of being without shelter, if it consists in desubstantiation, which, in turn, is rooted in pre-intentional self-imposition? The subjectivity of the world becomes permanent in a pre-presentational production. It is the pre-presentation that pre-presents (puts before, makes present). But this actuality comes into being in the representation, which is calculation. This pre-presentation knows nothing figurative. The visibility of the appearance of things, the image they communicate to the immediate sensual vision, is not available to it. The calculating production of technique is "work without image" (Ninth Elegy). Before the visible image of things, the deliberate self-obsession in its

The world, when the world enters the subject matter of computed structures, it is established in the senseless and invisible. When the world enters into the subjectivity of computed structures, it is established in the insensible and invisible. The permanence of subjectivity owes its presence to the state whose activity belongs to the "thinking thing", *res cogitans*, i.e. consciousness. The sphere of subjectivity of objects remains within consciousness. The invisibility of the object belongs to the internal, to the immanence of consciousness.

However, if being without concealment is the aversion to the open, and the aversion, in turn, consists in determination, which is based in the invisible and inner sphere of consciousness and its calculations, then the essential sphere of being without concealment is the invisibility and interiority of consciousness.

Since being without concealment is a parting with the open, resting in despelling, which, in turn, belongs to the realm of invisible and inner calculating consciousness, the essential realm of being without concealment is also invisible and inner consciousness.

But to the extent that the turning of being without shelter into the open affects the essence of being without shelter, this turning of being without shelter is a turning of consciousness, and so it takes place *within the* sphere of consciousness. The sphere of the unseen and inner determines the essence of being without shelter; it also determines the nature of its overturning in a wider circle. Thus, what the essentially inner and invisible must turn toward in order to find its own being can only be more invisible than everything invisible, more internal than everything internal. In the Metaphysics of the New Age, the realm of the invisible internal is defined as the realm of the presence of calculable objects. Descartes characterizes this sphere as the consciousness of the thinking self, *ego cogito*.

Almost at the same time as Descartes, Pascal developed the logic of the heart as the antithesis of the logic of the calculating mind. The inner and invisible dimension of the heart is not only more inner than that of the calculating mind, and thus even more invisible, but it also extends further than the realm of the arbitrary mind.

wild objects. It is there, in the depths of the heart, that man is first attracted to what he truly loves: to the

To the ancestors, to the dead, to childhood, to those who will come later (Kommenden). That which belongs to a wider circle, which shows itself as the sphere of the presence of the integral salvific relation. This presence, like the presence of ordinary knowledge - the consciousness of calculating production - is immanence. But within the unusual consciousness there is an even more inner space where all things transcend the numerical calculus and, freed from constraints, spill out in all directions in the limitless wholeness of the open. This supernumerary abundance arises in the inner (Innenraum)⁽³⁰⁾ and invisible space of the heart. The last words of Rilke's Ninth Elegy, which celebrates the belonging of people to the open, are as follows:

"A supernumerary existence arises in my heart."

The broader circumference of being becomes present in the inner space of the heart. The wholeness of the world in all its relations (Bezug) reaches here an equal essential presence. In the language of metaphysics, Rilke calls this "Dasein". The integral presence of the world is, in a broad sense, "world-existence, existence" (weltischer Dasein). This is a different name for the open: different because it repels another name, which this time thinks of the open as the presenting and producing repulsion to the open is turned over in the inner space of the heart, parting with the immanence of calculating consciousness. Thus, the inner space of the heart for worldly existence is called the "inner space of the world. Peace means here the wholeness of being.

In a letter from Muso, dated August 11, 1924, Rilke wrote: "However extended the external may be, it cannot be compared - despite all the stellar distances - with the depth dimension of our inner, which, in order to be almost endless in itself, does not need the volume of the universe at all. If the dead, as well as those who are yet to come into the world, need a place to stay, *what* shelter will there be?

is more pleasant and more open to them than this imagined space? I am more and more convinced that our everyday consciousness is at the top of a pirate-mid, whose base is so wide within us (and, in a sense, beneath us) that the more we are able to reach there, the more we are connected to the space- and time-independent data of earthly existence, understood in the broadest sense as *worldly* existence.

In contrast, the subject matter of the world is calculated in a representation that refers to time and space as quanta of calculus, and we know as little about the essence of time as we do about the essence of space. Rilke does not reflect further on the spatiality of inner space. Nor does he ask whether the inner space of the world, which gives shelter to the world's presence, is not rooted in a form of temporality in which essential time forms with essential space an original unity - space-time, which is the mode of being itself.

But within the sphericity characteristic of modern metaphysics, i.e. within the sphere of subjectivity as a sphere of inner and invisible presence, Rilke tries to understand being without shelter, given together with the self-attaching essence of man in such a way that it itself, inverted, would keep us in the innermost⁽³¹⁾ and invisible of the widest inner space of the world. Being without concealment as such and as co-preserving. Its essence as inward and invisible is given a sign - a reversal of the aversion to the open. This reversal resides in the inner of the inner. The turning over of consciousness is the remembering-internalization of⁽³²⁾ the immanence of the objects of representation within the space of the heart. As long as one continues to be willfully self-imposed, not only oneself, but all things insofar as they become objects, remain without shelter. In doing so, the transformation of things into the inner and invisible takes place. This transformation replaces the decrepitude of things with the conceivable structures of calculable objects. Objects are produced in order to be used. And the more

The faster they are used, the more useful they are, and the more quickly and easily they must be replaced by new ones. The remaining existence of the objectified things is the opposite of their self-sufficiency in their own world. The permanence of artificially produced things as pure objects of use is substitution, ersatz.

Just as our era of being without shelter, in the era of the predominance of objecthood, is characterized by the weakening of things close to us, so the security of our essence requires the rescue of things from their own objecthood. This salvation consists in allowing things to rest within the wide environment of the integral relation, without limiting each other. Perhaps the revolution of our being without shelter to a world existence within the inner space of the world will cause the fragility and transitory nature of definable things to move from the inner and invisible producing consciousness to the truly inner heart space and there to be resurrected. A letter of November 13, 1925 (Letters from Muso) says: "Our task is to experience this transient and fragile earth so deeply, so painfully and so passionately that its essence is invisibly resurrected in us. *We are the bees of the invisible. We diligently collect the honey of the visible in order to store it in the golden honeycomb of the invisible.*

Recollection-internalization returns the imposingly volitional essence and its objects to the inner invisible of the heart space. Here everything must be (once again) turned inward: it is not enough to turn to the inner consciousness proper, but within this inner consciousness one must turn from one unlimitedness to another. Turning inward liberates what is open to us. Only what we have learned inwardly can we express outwardly⁽³³⁾. In this inwardness, we are free, because we are not in relationship with the objects around us, which only appear to shelter and protect us. In turning inward, the inner space of the world opens up security on the other side of the shelter⁽³⁴⁾.

But here the question arises: how can this recollection-internalization (Er-innereung) of the immanent happen?

of the object of consciousness in the interior of the heart? It concerns the inner and the invisible. So that which is remembered-remembered-introduced as that in which it is remembered-introduced is this essence. Remembering-insertion is the turning of separation to the turning to the widest circle of the open. Who among mortals is capable of this overturning remembrance?

The poem tells us that the security of our being is assured by the fact that "men risk sometimes more than life itself, more than a single breath."

But what do mortals risk when they risk more than others? The poem seems to be silent on this. That is why we will try, in thinking about it, to go towards the poem, calling on other poems for help.

Here is our question: what can be risked more than life itself, i.e., the risk itself, i.e., the being of being? In any case and in all respects, this risk must be such that it affects the whole being insofar as it is being. But only being can be such, since it is not one kind of being along with others, but a way of being (Weise) of being as such.

What can surpass being itself as the only and unique kind of being? Only it itself and only in its own being, and in such a way that it (by) returns to its own being. Being will then be that unique being which transcends itself (i.e. transcendens in preeminence). But this transcendence does not go back to the other side of itself or to something else, but to this side and to itself, back to the essence of its truth. Being measures (durchmisst) this ascent itself and is its very Dimension.

In thinking about this, we experience in being itself the experience that something "greater" than that which is its own lies within it, and thus the possibility that where being is thought of as a risk, something more risky than being itself, as we usually imagine it from the side of being, may reign. Being measures itself by its fence, which is erected (τέμνειν, *tempus*) by what happens in the word. Language is the enclosure (templum), i.e. the house of being. The essence of language is not exhausted either in designation or in the

signs and figures. Since language is the house of being, we reach being by constantly passing through this house. When we

When we go to the source, when we cross the forest, we cross always the name "source", the name "forest", even if we do not say these words or even think the words. By thinking, by retreating from the temple of being, we can anticipate what is risked by those who risk sometimes more than the being of being. They risk the fence of being. They risk language. All beings, objects of consciousness and things of the heart, imposing and risking persons, all beings as beings - each in its own way - are within the fence of language. That is why the return from the realm of objects and their representations to the inner space of the heart is accomplished *only within this enclosure*.

For Rilke's poetry, the being of being is metaphysically defined as a world presence (Präsenz) that remains always related to its representation in consciousness, whether in the form of the immanence of a calculating representation or in an inner conversion to the open, accessible only to the heart.

The whole sphere of presence (Präsenz) is present in the statement. The subjectivity of production consists in the enunciation of the calculating propositions and theorems of reason, moving from proposition to proposition. The domain of imposing being without shelter is governed by reason. Reason not only creates for the statement, for the logos (λόγος) as an explanatory predicate, a special system of rules, but the logic of reason itself is the organization of the domination of deliberate self-imposition in the sphere of the subject. In the overturning of the object representation, by contrast, the recollection-intention statement corresponds to the logic of the heart. In the two realms, each of which is metaphysically defined, it is logic that rules, since the recollection-insertion must create security, starting from the very being without shelter, on the other side of any shelter. This security affects man as a being endowed with language. He is endowed with language within a metaphysically marked being in such a way that he receives language in advance and exclusively as a property and thus as a means of representation and mode of action. This is why the logos (λόγος), which speaks out-

As an organon, metaphysics needs to be organized by means of logic. Logic exists only within metaphysics.

However, if, in the course of security, one is touched by the law of the whole inner space of the world, one is touched in one's very essence, that is, in the fact that one is an utterer as much as one is a votive. But to the extent that security flows from those who risk more than others, it is the word that they must risk. Those who risk more risk by utterance. However, if the fence that limits this risk, i.e. language, belongs to being uniquely in such a way that there can be nothing above it or outside of it, where does what the utterers have to utter have to turn? Their utterance is concerned with that remembering-governed overturning of consciousness that elevates our being without shelter into the invisible inner space of the world. Their statement speaks, when it proceeds from the overturning of consciousness, not only from the two realms, but also from their unity insofar as this unity has already been realized by their salvific union. This is why, where the being as a whole is thought of as open to the pure relation, the remembering-open-overturning must be an utterance that says what it must to a being who is already safely at the center of the wholeness of the being, having accomplished the transformation of the represented visible into the heartfelt invisible. This being is included in a pure relationship (Bezug) to both the one and the other side of the ball of being. This being, for whom there are no longer almost any boundaries and distinctions between relations, rules and manifests the unheard center of the widest circumference. In the *Elegy to Duino* this being is called Angel. This name is also a fundamental name in Rilke's poetry. It is, like "open", "relation" (Bezug), "parting", "nature", is a fundamental name, since what is expressed in it thinks the wholeness of being, repelled by being. In a letter dated November 13, 1925, Rilke writes: "The Angel of the *Elegy* is a creature in which the transformation of the visible into the invisible, which we manage with such difficulty, has already been realized. The Angel of the Ele-

hyius is a being who looks out to recognize in the invisible the highest rank of reality."

To what extent, within the realization of modern metaphysics, the relation to such a being belongs to the being of being, and to what extent the essence of Rilke's Angel, for all its substantive difference, is metaphysically the *same* as Nietzsche's image of Zarathustra, can only be discerned from the initial unfolding of the essence of subjectivity.

The poem thinks of the being of things, nature, as risk. All being is that which is risked (Wagnis) is risked (gewagt). As that which is risked (Gewagtes), it is placed on scales (Wage). This scale is the image (Weise) with which being weighs the being again and again - in the movement of risk. Every being that is risked is in danger. The realms of being are distinguished through their relationship to the scales. From the perspective of the scales, we can understand the essence of the Angel, if we assume that he occupies the highest place in the whole realm of being.

In the risk of "their deaf desires", the plant or animal is kept in the open in complete unconcern. Their physicality does not bother them. Living things enter the open, lulled by their instincts. They too are threatened by danger, but it does not extend to their essence. The plant or animal resides on the scales in such a way that they are balanced again and again in the tranquility of safety. The risk to which the plant or animal is subjected does not reach the realm of essential and therefore permanent concern. The scales with which the Angel weighs also lie outside this anxiety; not because they have not yet entered the realm of anxiety and hesitation, but because they have already left it. In accordance with the Angel's incorporeal essence, the possibility of being disturbed by the visible sensual is transformed in him into the invisible. The Angel essentially abides in the peaceful tranquility of the balanced unity of both realms within the inner space of the world.

Man as a deliberately self-imposed, in turn, is the one who is constantly at risk in his being without shelter. The scales of danger remain in the hands of man, as the one at risk, in an essentially restless state.

person who wills himself is constantly calculating things and other people as objects. What is counted becomes commodities. Everything is constantly exchanged for another in accordance with new and new orders. The separation from pure relation becomes the oscillation of a constantly weighing scale. This separation through the objectification of the world generates, contrary to intention, impermanence. At the risk of being without shelter, man moves in an environment of transaction and exchange. The man who imposes himself lives the purpose of his will. He lives at the risk of his essence, at risk within the vibration of money and the valuation of values. As a constant exchanger and mediator, man becomes a "merchant". He is constantly weighing and valuing, but at the same time he does not know the true weight of things. He does not know that weight is also inherent in himself, nor does he know what outweighs it. This is why Rilke says in one of his "Late Poems":

*Ah! Who knows what outweighs it. Mercy?
Horror? The looks, the voices, the books?*

At the same time, however, the human being can, on the other side of any shelter, draw "security" from the fact that he or she can turn the being without shelter as such into an open being, placing it in the heart space of the invisible. If this happens, the restlessness of being without shelter moves to the place where a being appears in the luminous unity of the inner space of the world, which reveals how unity unifies and thus manifests being. Then the scales of risk pass from the realm of calculating volition into the hands of the Angel. A quatrain of Rilke's late poetry survives, which seems to be the outline of a more extended poem. There is no need to preface these lines with anything. They are as follows (Complete Works. Vol. 3):

*When the Libra passes from
the hands of the merchant
To that angel in the sky,
They are soothed and calmed by the balance of the space.....*

This balancing space is the inner space of the world, as it gives place to the world wholeness of the open. In this way it provides both relations with the manifestation of their unifying unity. Like a healing ball of being, it encompasses all the pure forces of being, thereby permeating all beings, which it liberates without end. All this happens when the scales are passed. When do they pass? Who makes the scales pass from the hands of the merchant to the hands of the Angel? If this transition takes place, it takes place at the limit of the scales. The element of the scales is risk, the being of being. We have previously conceived of language as an enclosure of being.

The normal life of a modern man is the usual self-obsession in the risky swap market. Turning the scales over to Angel is, on the contrary, something unusual. It is unusual not in the sense that it is an exception to the rule, but it takes the person in his essence to the other side of the area where the rule of having or not having shelter applies. This is why transition happens "sometime". This by no means means occasionally or arbitrarily; "sometime" means rarely and at the right time, each time in a unique way and in a unique case. The transfer of the scales from the hands of the merchant to the hands of the Angel, i.e. the reversal of the parting (Abschied), takes place as a remembrance-insertion in the inner space of the world when there are mortals who "sometimes risk more, one breath more"

Since they are more risky in being itself, and thus risky in the enclosure of being, in language, they are speechmakers. But does not man, by his very nature, possess the word, and is he not thereby constantly at risk? Yes, of course. He who ordinarily embodies his volition in calculating production also runs the risk of utterance. Absolutely. In this case, those who risk more cannot simply be those who express. The utterance of those who risk more must risk the Saying. Those who risk more are themselves only when they express more.

When, in our usual representing and producing relation to things, we act as a saying-

In this case, the utterance is not volitional. The utterance remains only a way and a means. In contrast, there is an utterance that opens itself frankly to the Tale without thinking of language as an object. The entrance to the Saying marks an utterance that descends to the speaker only to be uttered. The speaker becomes the one who belongs in his essence to the fence of language. This, metaphysically speaking, is the being in its wholeness. The wholeness of the being is the wholeness of a pure relation, the aiming open insofar as it accommodates people. This is what happens in the inner space of the world. It is the space that touches the human being when he turns in his turning memory-inward to the space of the heart. Those who take greater risks turn the misery of being without shelter into the wellness of world existence (Dasein). This is the subject to be uttered. In the utterance, it turns toward people. Those who risk more are those who express more through singing: they are the singers. Their singing is closed to any deliberate imposition of self. Their singing does not crave anything. It does not want anything to be produced. In singing, the inner space of the world is contained. The song of these singers is neither a call nor a craft.

The more uttering statement of the more risk-takers is singing. But:

Singing is existence, behold-existence-

reads the third sonnet of the first part of the Sonnets to Orpheus. The word "existence", "existence" (Dasein)⁽³⁵⁾ is used here in the traditional sense of existence, in the sense of "being" (Sein). To sing, to speak clearly of the existence of the world, to speak from the goal of an integral and pure relation, and to speak only this and nothing else, is to belong to the fence of the being itself. This enclosure, as the essence of language, is being itself. To sing a song means to be present in the present itself, i.e. in existence (Dasein).

However, a more pronouncement, like "not much more risk", only happens "someday". Therefore

that it is difficult. The difficulty lies in this realization of existence, the here-being (Dasein). The difficulty lies not only in the difficulty of creating a work of words, but also in the difficulty of moving from the telling doing to the still only desired vision of things, from the doing of the face to the "doing of the heart. The difficulty of the song is that the one who sings must not be an invocation, but an existence, a here-being (Dasein). For the god Orpheus, who abides in the infinity of the open, singing is an easy thing, but not for man. That is why the last stanza of the quoted sonnet asks:

And when are we? (Wann aber sind wir?)

The emphasis is on "ism"⁽³⁶⁾, not on "we". The fact that we belong to the being and are therefore nascent is not in question. What is in question is the knowledge that we are in such a way that our being becomes a song, not a song whose sound rings out anywhere and is not addressed to something already achieved, but a singing whose sound is already spilling over into itself so that what is sung becomes essentially being. People express more when they risk more than the being itself. These more risk-takers are, according to Rilke's poem, "those who risk more in one breath". The sonnet ends like this:

To truly sing is a different breath. A breath for nothing. Breathing in God. The wind.

Herder wrote in his *Ideas for the Philosophy of Human History*: "The breath of our mouths becomes the canvas of the world, the type of our thoughts and our feelings in the soul of another. Everything that men have ever thought, wanted, done and will do on the earth of men depends on the movement of the breath, because we would still be wandering through the forests if the divine breath did not surround us with its fire and float a magic sound on our lips.

The breath of those who risk more means not only and not primarily a barely perceptible fleeting difference, but the very word and essence of language. Those who risk more in one breath expose themselves to the risk of language. Those are the essence of the utterers who utter more. Because

The breath they risk is not a mere utterance, it is a breath - a different breath, and it is a different utterance from the ordinary utterance of men. The other breath does not aim at this or that object, it is a breath for nothing. The singer's utterance expresses the healing wholeness of world existence, which is contained invisibly in the inner space of the heart. Singing is not looking for something to say. Singing is belonging to the wholeness of pure attitude. To sing is to be carried away by a gust of wind of the unheard center of total nature. Singing is the "wind".

So the poem tells us clearly and unambiguously, albeit poetically, who are those who risk more than life itself. They are those who risk "one breath more". It is not by chance that in the text of the poem the words "one breath more..." end with a triplet. It expresses what was left unsaid.

Those who take greater risks are poets - those whose song turns our being from the sheltered to the open. These poets sing because they turn the parting from the open and recall-overwhelming the inherent unhappiness (heil-lose) into a healing (heile) whole, turning unhappiness (Unheile) into healing (Heile). The recollective overturning overcomes in itself the aversion to the open. It "precedes all parting" and surpasses in the inner space of the world, where the heart dwells, all objectified things. Turning perception-inwardness is a risk that risks pushing back against the essence of man, insofar as he has speech and is the one who speaks.

But the modern man is called "he who wills". Those who risk more are those who will insofar as they will in a way other than through the deliberate self-imposed definition of the world. Their volition wills nothing of the sort. Insofar as volition is self-imposed, they volition nothing at all. They will nothing in the sense that they agree more than others. They are more in line with the will, which, like risk itself, gathers to itself all pure forces, like the pure whole attitude of the open. The volition of those who risk more is

consent of those who express more, who have resolved to cease being closed to the will as being of being.

The consenting essence of those who risk more, speaks out by saying more (according to the words of the Ninth Element):

Earth, isn't that what you want: to rise invisibly in us? - Isn't it your dream to be invisible one day? Earth!

Invisible!

What else but a transformation could your insistent errand be?

Earth, you are beloved, I want you.

In the invisible inner space of the world, whose world unity is the Angel, the grace (das Heile) of world existence becomes visible. Only in the widest circumference of goodness (Heile) can the sacred (Heiliges) appear. Poets are those who take the greatest risks, because they experience the terrible (Heillose) as terrible, following in the footsteps of the sacred (Heilige). Their song over the earth sanctifies. Their singing celebrates the intactness of the ball of being.

Unhappiness (Unheil) as misfortune (Unheil) finds us the trace of the good (Heil). The good (Heiles) gives us a hint by invoking the sacred (Heilige). The sacred (Heilige) connects with the divine (Göttliche). The divine (Göttliche) brings the divine closer to God (Gott)⁽³⁷⁾.

Those who take greater risks experience the horror of being without shelter. They carry to mortals the trace of the gods who have fled in the darkness of the night of the world. Those who risk more, who chant the good, are "poets in lean times".

What is distinctive of these poets is that the essence of poetry becomes worthy of being questioned for them when they follow in the footsteps of what is to be expressed. In following in the footsteps of the good, Rilke reaches the poetic question: when does the singing that sings in essence take place? This question is not at the beginning of his poetic journey, but when Rilke's utterance reaches his poetic vocation for a poetry that corresponds to the new age of the world. This age is neither decline nor deviation. As fate, it rests in being and absorbs people.

Hölderlin is the forerunner of all poets in lean times. That is why none of the poets of these times can surpass him. "Predecessor" does not mean that he will be gone in the future, but on the contrary, that he will come, because only in the coming of his words will the future become present. The more pure this coming is, the more essential will be the preservation of the predecessor himself. The more secretly the future is concealed in the prediction, the purer the coming will be. This is why it would be wrong to think that Hölderlin's time will come only when everyone understands his poetry. In this sense, his time will never come. Because his own poverty has made available to the age the forces that, in complete ignorance of his work, will make sure that his poetry never becomes relevant.

"Predecessor" means unsurpassed and unsurpassable, since his utterance precedes with-being (*Ge-wesenes*). The essence of advent is gathered in fate. That which never falls into the sequence of events is instantly transcended by all transience. That which is only past, already by virtue of this passing, does not belong to history. The past (*Ge-wesene*) is historical (*Geschichtliche*). The imaginary eternity hides the perishable, which is subject to the emptiness of the unlasting instant.

If Rilke "(is) a poet in lean times", then only his poetry answers the question: to what he is a poet, to what the path of his songs is directed, where is the poet's place in the destiny of the night of the world. Fate (*Geshick*) decides what is protic (*geschicklich*) in this poetry.

Notes

⁽¹⁾ Translated by A.G. Dugin from the edition: *Heidegger M. Holzwege*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 2003.

⁽²⁾ Heidegger distinguishes between the German term "Geschichte" and the French term "Geschichte" "histoire", denoting history. Heidegger interprets the German word "Geschichte" as "Geschick", literally "sent", "fated", i.e. fate. History as "Geschichte" is for Heidegger a fundamental ontological phenomenon (in some works he uses the expression "seynge-schichtliche" - from "Seyn", being in Old German, being as such and "Geschichte", which means "pertaining to the fate of being").

⁽³⁾ The concept of "Welt", "world" for Heidegger means the totality of being (Seiende).

⁽⁴⁾ "Wende" - "turn", "change of course" (and derivatives of this word) - is a fundamental concept in Heidegger's philosophy, signifying a radical change of course in Western European philosophy from the oppressive neglect of being to a new placing of being at the center of philosophical attention.

⁽⁵⁾ The Russian word "ot-presence", i.e. "detachment from the essence", corresponds exactly to the German Ab-wesen, where "ab-" is "from-" and "Wesen" is the past participle form of the verb "sein", "to be", usually meaning "essence", "essence". Also the Greek "ousia" is the passive participle of the verb "einai", "to be". Also the term an-presence (An-wesen).

⁽⁶⁾ The German "Sein", Russian "being", Greek "εἶναι" is a fundamental concept in Heidegger's philosophy. Heidegger considers the question of "being" to be fundamental to the whole process of philosophizing.

⁽⁷⁾ "West" is 3rd person singular from a verb that doesn't exist. The Russian verb "to exist" has no analog in German, since it means etymologically exactly what Heidegger seeks to say with the artificial "wesen". The Russian verb "to exist" has no analog in German, since it means etymologically exactly what Heidegger is trying to say with the artificial "wesen". It is common to translate the Latin term "ex-istentia", literally "standing outside," or the German term "Da-sein," literally "tute-being," by the verb "to exist." But the Russian verb "to exist" in no way carries either a reference to the "outside" or an indication of "here", "here", "here", "now" inherent in the German "da". Therefore, the Russian language has naturally both of the most important "here" and "there".

For Heidegger, the forms of expression of the mode of "being" - "to be" ("sein") and the

"to exist" ("wesen"). The term analogous to Latin "existential" and German "da-sein". "Da-sein", on the contrary, is absent in the Russian lexicon and in a strict sense should be conveyed by new-formations, for example, ex-istentia - "out-existence", and "Da-sein" - "tute-existence". It may sound aurally like this.

"wild", but a number of Heidegger's technical artificially created philosophical terms sound rather unfamiliar and strange in German as well.

(8) In Old Russian and Church Slavonic, the verb "to say" was used in the present tense and had the meaning of a transitive verb (to say whom, that). Later it came to be used only in the future and past tenses and lost its transitivity. We thought it appropriate to use the verb in its archaic form to convey Heidegger's thought more accurately. Poets "tell the sacred," not in the sense that they "speak of the sacred," nor in the sense that they express something "in a sacred way. In Heidegger's thought, language is the "house of being" (see below), hence what is expressed in language, especially in the language of poetry and philosophy, enters into being, begins to *be* in the most direct (fundamentally ontological) way. By "saying the sacred," poets bring the sacred into being, make the sacred exist, revealing or putting forth being.

(9) The "Being" in German "Seiende", in Greek "ὄν" is the most important category in Heidegger's philosophy. "Being" is that which is manifest in the world, all that is manifested, imposed, present. The relation of "being" ("Seiende") to "being" ("Sein") is, for Heidegger, the basis of philosophy. "To grasp", to "understand" something from the side of "being", according to Heidegger, means "to relate to something 'from outside'".

(10) "Sein, "being", is the main concept in Heidegger's philosophy. The basic idea of this philosophy is that Western European thought, beginning with Plato, begins to substitute "being" for one or another variety of "being" (e.g., "idea," later "God" as the "supreme being," i.e., still "being," "Seiende"). In parallel, "being" itself is increasingly replaced by "representation" ("Vor-stellen"). Western philosophy as metaphysics goes through the path of "oblivion of being" to the end, and this process culminates in "nihilism", which is most vividly, fully and deeply revealed in Nietzsche's philosophy. In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger distinguishes between three possible understandings of "being": 1) "ontic", from the Greek "onta", "being", i.e. the view of what is, from the side of being and only; 2) "ontological", from the Greek "onta", "being" and "logos", "word", "reason", i.e. The "ontological" - from the Greek "onta" "being" and "logos", "word", "reason", i.e., looking at "being" from the side of the hierarchy of *beings*, up to singling out the "first being" from "being" ("God" in scholastic philosophy, Plato's "idea of the good", etc.); 3) the "fundamental-ontological", which puts the question of being of the being in the center of attention and considers being from the side of being, penetrating to being through being. According to Heidegger, this approach was characteristic of the pre-Socratic philosophers (especially Parmenides and Heraclitus), and Heidegger did not call his own philosophy "existentialism" but an attempt to construct a "fundamental ontology. To emphasize that it is about being in itself, about being as such, Heidegger sometimes used

the old German spelling of "Seyn" with "y" instead of "i". In this case he distinguishes being as such (Seyn) from being of being (Sein) - see note (2).

⁽¹¹⁾ "Openness", "Offenheit", "open", "Offene" is a fundamental term in Heidegger's late philosophy and Rilke's poetry. Heidegger understands by it the being in its direct relation to being, to the extent that this being reveals being (because, on the other hand, being, being different from being, can also conceal it). As "openness" ("the permeation of being through being") or "unconcealment" (i.e., "focusing on that side of being which exposes, rather than obscures, being by its existence" - although in other cases it exactly "observes," "hides" it, makes it

"forget" it) Heidegger interprets the pre-Socratic Greek understanding of "istina" as "ἀλήθεια," meaning originally literally "not-forgetting," "n o t - s o - h i d d e n" ("a-," the negation particle, "λήθη" - "forgetting," "hidden").

⁽¹²⁾ See note (2). By the expression "the fate of being" we translate "Geschichte des Seins", literally "the history of being", but in the Heideggerian sense "seynsgeschichtliche".

⁽¹³⁾ Here we can see the distinction Heidegger makes between "geschichtliche" - in the previous sentence - and "historische".

⁽¹⁴⁾ We use the Old Slavonic and Church Slavonic conjugation of the verb "to be" in the transitive and non-transitive sense, as in Modern German. Ich bin, du bist, er (sie, es) ist, wir sind, ihr seid, sie sind. This corresponds to: "I am, you are, he (she, it) is, we are, you are, you are, they are". Transitivity presupposes constructions like: "I am a person", "they are people", and the non-transitive "I am", "they are"; t h e latter emphasizes that someone ("I", "they", etc.) are "beings".

⁽¹⁵⁾ See note (8).

⁽¹⁶⁾ "Being as a whole" - "Seiende im Ganzen" for Heidegger means "world".

⁽¹⁷⁾ The term "nature" in Heidegger's philosophy is taken in a different way than is customary in Western philosophy. He emphasizes that nature should be understood as the "fusus" of the pre-Socratic philosophers, not as something "co-created".

"Fusus" is not opposed to "god," "man," "culture," or the neither "history" nor "reason". Fusis is logos, this being that brings being into existence, extending outward and "collecting" (legein) the meaning of what is unfolded (see above).

⁽¹⁸⁾ Heidegger took Nietzsche's philosophy and the fundamental meaning of the *will* in it as the most important discovery of the Metaphysics of the New Age, summarizing the logic of the development of Western philosophical thought. Will as

The "will to power" for Heidegger, following Nietzsche, is the being of being.

⁽¹⁹⁾ We use here and hereafter the conjugated archaic verb "t o w i l l" to convey all forms derived from the German common verb "wollen", "to want", "to desire", whence "Wille" is "will".

⁽²⁰⁾ The peculiarity of man's relation to being in early Heidegger ("Being and Time") was emphasized by the exclusivity of "Da-sein". Only man of all beings (Seiende) possesses "here-being" (Da-Sein).

⁽²¹⁾ Wagnis, "risk," wagen, "to risk," wagende, "one who risks," wagen- dere, "more risky, most risky," Gewagtes, "that which is risked," are the fundamental concepts of this Heideggerian text. This state describes the relation of being to being and, in particular, to the human being ("human being

is the one who risks more"). The German "wagen" is etymologically close to the Russian "ot-vaga", but no word in the Russian language has received the corresponding meaning, as in the German "wagen", and we have to translate it with the French words "risk", "risk", which are more familiar to the ear.

⁽²²⁾ The whole play of German words from "schützen" to "geliebt" has no analogues in Russian at all, because the corresponding concepts and associations are expressed by completely different roots and are connected with completely different series of word-formation. This fragment is a "footnote" of the German text. It is about the play of meanings in action verbs that cannot be translated.

⁽²³⁾ See note (21). Here Heidegger develops a series of etymological correspondences related to the root "wag". The Old Russian word "vaga" means "scales", whence "importance" ("great weight") and "ot-vaga" [see note (21)]. [see note (21)]. German "wege", "way" is cognate with Russian "vesati". This group of Old Slavonic words is considered to be an ancient loanword from Lower German. There is no possibility to find direct correspondences in Russian to this German etymological and semantic chain.

⁽²⁴⁾ The German word Bezug, which is of fundamental importance in Rilke's poetry and in Heidegger's analysis, has no correspondence at all in Russian. It is derived from the verb "ziehen" (and the verbal noun Zug), which describes a "forced movement" - a "forced movement".

"to pull," "to drag," "to take out." The noun "Zug" roughly means "pull", "movement", "procession", "crossing". Beziehen with particle "be-", corresponding to the Russian particle "o-", "po-", "na-", expresses different actions depending on the context - "to tighten", "to stretch", "to receive", "to ride out", etc. "Bezug", on the other hand, means "relation" as a "reference", as a speculative "thread" stretched (bezogen) between something one thing and something else. This understanding of "relation" is far from the Latin meaning of the word "relatio", which implies comparison, literally

"Heidegger's French translators came up with the idea of rendering the word as "perception", i.e. "perception". The impossibility of finding an exact analog for this term led Heidegger's French translators to the idea of rendering the word as "perception", i.e. "perception". Heidegger and Rilke's thought is easier to understand if we perceive (percepire) it directly - "Bezug" is "gathering something", "taking something from somewhere", "taking it somewhere", "forcibly appearing somewhere". Here and hereafter we will recall this sense of the word "relationship" by putting the German word in brackets. In order not to confuse it with the translation of another German word "Verhältnis", which also means "relation", but more in the sense of "comparison", "correspondence" and "comparison", which will be given without brackets.

⁽²⁵⁾ See note (24).

⁽²⁶⁾ "Representation" - "Vor-stellen" is the fundamental term of Heidegger's entire philosophy. The semantics of the Russian and German word coincide, as the Russian word is a direct calque from the German. "To imagine-stellen" means "to put before oneself." This action expresses the essence of human reasoning. Beginning with Plato, this essence begins to assert itself as the main instance of testimony about things,

world and being. The discovery of the essence of reason as a fundamental quality that is the essence of man himself is, according to Heidegger, the content of the path of development of Western philosophy. But to think through representation, according to

For Heidegger, it means to forget the being of the being, to substitute it for the being, and then to substitute the being itself for the "representation" of it, which ultimately leads to the substitution of the being for the manufactured object.

⁽²⁷⁾ The Russian word "pre-met" is a rather late artificial calque from the Latin "ob-jectum" ("ob-", "before" and "jectum-", "thrown").

"Pre-met is that which is 'thrown before'." The German "Gegen-stand", "pre-met," is of the same origin and means "in front of, opposite to, placed in front of. According to Heidegger, a thing becomes a pre-subject, an object, through the operation of representation, which expresses the essence of human reasoning. So far, there is no German or Russian term paired with the Latin term "origin".

"sub-jectum" (from "sub-", "under" and "jectum", "thrown") was not formed. Purely theoretically, it would have to sound barbaric: "The subject is a 'sub-met'."

⁽²⁸⁾ The German word for "produce" is "herstellen", literally "to put outside", "to exhibit". Hence the semantic connection between "vor- stellen", "to represent", as the main property of the human intellect, and "herstellen", as the main property of the human intellect.

"her-stellen", "to produce", as the main property of human culture and especially of "technique" (according to Heidegger, it is in technique, as in the process of the artificial production of objects, that the essence of man is expressed). The Russian word "produce" has a completely different meaning and indicates not the artificial creation of a new being absent in nature (as the totality of things), but rather creative collaboration with nature (as the totality of things) in bringing hidden being into the open. Such a "work" corresponds to the original meaning of the Greek term *ποίησις*, whence "poet", "poetry". *Herstellen* is the action of a culture already carrying the technical; "produce" is the action of a culture turned toward a poetic return to ontology, an action not of being, but *toward* being, because the semantic stress falls on "of" rather than on "from".

"of", and this "of" points to "being" itself. The work is the produced living thing, the being, not the object and dead thing that replaces the living thing.

⁽²⁹⁾ We translate the German expressions "vorsetzende Durchsetzung" and "vorsetzende Sichdurchsetzung" as "deliberately impose", "deliberate imposition" and "deliberate self-imposed".

"Vor-setzen" literally means "to set before", but in contrast to the philosophical term "presuppose" it carries a more physical meaning. In this case, we translate "vorsetzende" as "premeditated" to emphasize the inherent character of "imposition" as something pre-established and systemic, rather than affective or accidental. The "intentionality" of imposition (self-imposed) expresses the very fundamental attitude of the human intellect and the human will, always acting in concert if they are directed against the open, driven by the impulse of being away from itself. We translate "Durchsetzen" as "impose", although semantically it would be more accurate to use the word "insist". But as a verbal noun, "impose", although somewhat clumsily, conveys the meaning of "Durchsetzung" much better,

than "persistence", which speaks not of the direction of the action, which in this case is "durch", literally "through", "through", "on", but of the nature of its accomplishment.

⁽³⁰⁾ We use the artificial word "inner", inadmissible in Russian as the superlative of the adjective "inner", to emphasize the distinction between "inner" as the "realm of thought" and the even "more inner" "inner space of the heart" - in German

"Innerraum des Herzes."

⁽³¹⁾ Here Heidegger uses the superlative degrees of the adjectives "inner" and "invisible" - "das Innerste" and "das Unsichtbarste" - which are not acceptable in ordinary German grammar and which we have rendered by the corresponding neologisms in Russian. See note (30).

⁽³²⁾ The German "Er-innerung", written by Heidegger with a hyphen, prefixes the word "Er-innerung", from "inner", "inner". Although the etymology of "erinnern," "to remember," hardly has anything to do with "inner," we use the heavy-handed and lexically incorrect combination of "remembering-innerung" to convey Heidegger's hint in hyphenating "Er-innerung."

⁽³³⁾ The phrase is a play on words. "Heidegger brackets "inwardly" with the French "par coeur" - literally "heart" in the sense of "to learn by heart," but "by heart" corresponds to the German "auswendig" - literally "outwardly. There is nothing like it in Russian, where "by heart" emphasizes not the inner, not the outer, not the external, not the "heart", but only that something is internalized in such a way that it can be spoken "with the mouth" (apparently without reliance on a written text).

⁽³⁴⁾ A play on words: "sicher" - "safe" Heidegger elevates to "sich" - "myself," "myself."

⁽³⁵⁾ Here Heidegger understands Rilke's term "Dasein" not in the specific sense of his own philosophy, as in *Being and Time*, which refers to the specifically human "here-being", but in the broad sense of "existence", without specifically emphasizing the relation to "essence", which comes to the fore in the Russian word. See note (7).

⁽³⁶⁾ See note (14).

⁽³⁷⁾ This formula contains the meaning of the entire philosophy of the late Heidegger. "Unheil als Unheil spürt uns das Heile. Heiles erwinkt rufend das Heilige. Heiliges bindet das Goettliche. Goettliches naehert den Gott."

jp`šjhi cftnqqq`phi thftnqntqjni ftejghj
u`ideccep`.

Russian words and expressions conveying the meanings of Heidegger's philosophical messages

Americanism is the ultimate expression of the metaphysics of the subject in the form of individualism, the triumph of technology, consumerism, calculation, acquisitiveness; the last expression of Western European metaphysics in the form of pure *Gestell* and capitalist market *Machenschaft*; the ultimate form of degeneration of mankind; aggressive liberalism; the choice in favor of *an* infinite *End* instead of *another Beginning* (*Anfang*); the same as *planetary idiocy*.

Authentic (Eigene) - proper, genuine, corresponding to the *essence (Wesen)* as a direct *relation (Bezug)* to *Seyn-existence*.

Abyss (Abgrund) is the side of *Seyn-existence* expressed in the "nothingness" (*Nichten*); the *openness of man, Dasein*, being; the absence of reliable grounds for being (contrary to the topicality of Platonic metaphysics); the risk inherent in freedom; the trace of *Seyn-existence* in being, addressed primarily to *Dasein*.

Divine, God, gods (Göttlichkeit, Gott, Göttern) - one of the "world realms" (*Weltgegende*); one of the *four* constituents of the *Quadrilateral (Geviert)*; gods cannot be said to be either *sind* or *nicht* (*sind nicht*); "gods need *Seyn-existence*"; gods are light and tend to run away; gods wage war with humans (see also *The Last God*).

God - in Western European theology and scholasticism - the *supreme being*, the Creator of the world, a religious figure put in place of the *idea of good* (truth, goodness and beauty) in Plato; in New Age deism - the first cause, *causa sui*.

Chatter (see *Gerede*) is the *existential of inauthentic Dasein*; the incessant stream of consciousness of the ordinary human *being*.

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Vocabulary; uttering (aloud or to oneself) words and phrases, the meaning of which one does not fully realize or is not particularly-

knows at all; the analog of this *existential in authentic Dasein* is *speech (Rede)*.

Being (cf. *Being* (see also *Seyn*, *Seyn-being* and *Sein*, *Sein-being*) is the general name of that which makes being (that which is) to be; the vector of *thinking that* makes *thinking philosophy*; the horizon of the deepest and truest understanding of *being*; Heidegger interprets it in two main perspectives - in the perspective of old (Platonic and post-Platonic) *metaphysics* and in the perspective of *fundamental ontology*. In the first case, being is thought of as the *essence of being*, the *supreme being*, as idea, ego, subject, object, will, power, representation, as well as technique, Gestell, and is spelled with the

"In the second case, as *not being*, as that which *makes being exist* but *does not become being* itself, and is spelled with "y" ("Seyn"); this rule is not strictly observed in all Heidegger's texts, and for a correct understanding it is always necessary to clarify what is meant where the word "Sein" is used without qualification - Seyn or Sein?

Being-in (see *Insein*) is the neutral existential of *Dasein*, and can be interpreted in *non-authentic* (dispersion in *Being*) and in *authentic* (complicity in the *Quaternary - Geviert*) modus.

Being-in-the-world (see *In-der-Welt-sein*) is the most important and fundamental existential of *Dasein*, characterizing its basic property; see *World*.

Being-s (cf. *Mit-Sein*), the neutral existential of *Dasein*, signifies *Dasein's neighborhood with being* as a plural, *παντα*, or *being*.

Being-to-death (see *Sein zum Tode*) is the existential of authentic *Dasein*, the fundamental property of man, the only *being* capable of facing death; man is "mortal" (*Sterbliche*) by definition; only man can die, the rest of existence perishes.

To be (see *sein*, *εἶναι*) is the central concept of Heidegger's philosophy; in the ontic sense it means to be *being*, to be as being; in the *ontological and theological* sense: to be is a

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355 *to be the essence of being, the supreme being; in a fundamentally ontological sense: to be is to exist* (wesen), "to be in essence," i.e., *to be contiguous to Seyn-being*.

The leading question of philosophy (Leitfrage) is what is the essence of being? What is being as a whole?

The *thing* - originally existing in its relation to *Seyn-being*, something *real*, sacred, sacred (*Heilige*), is located at the center of *Geviert*; in Western European metaphysics it is gradually transformed into an *object* (*objectum*), a *subject* (*Gegenstand*), something technical, produced or used for production (resource).

The *will to power* (*Wille zur Macht*) is the deep content of Platonic ontology and old metaphysics, which finally revealed itself in the modern world and was seen and generalized by Friedrich Nietzsche; domination, "deliberate self-obsession" (*Vorsetzende Durchsetzung*), nihilism; the same as *Gestell*, τέχνη, *Machenschaft*.

War is the name of *being* in Heraclitus; "father and king of all things", the relation of polar "world realms" (*Weltgegend*) in *Geviert*.

This is the side of *Dasein* in which *being* (not as *being*, but as *being*) can be revealed and manifested as it exists (west) directly, not in a mediated way through *being*; the moment of the fundamental-ontological fixation of attention.

Dasein is the center of *thinking*, which makes a judgment about *being* and, in some cases, about *being of being*; *being*, which has a special relation to *Seyn-being*; unconditional presence, which makes the *ontic ontic*, and the *world* (*Welt*) - the *world* (*Welt*); the place of *Seyn-being* in *being*; having the *abyss* (*Abgrund*) as its *foundation* (*Grund*); the moment of *illumination* (*Lichtung*) of *being* by *Seyn-being* (like lightning); something determined by *existentials*; that which is localized in the "world domain" (*Weltgegend*) of *Geviert* in *the* direction of *man*; that which is *existent in fact*; the main word in Heidegger's *philosophy*.

Ambiguity (see *Zweideutlichkeit*) is the *existential of non-authentic Dasein*, the indeterminacy of everyday thinking, going back to an extremely simplified topicality

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Heidegger's referential theory of *truth*; the limit of vulgarization of Platonism.

Destruktion, *phenomenological destruktion* (*Destruktion*, *phänomenologische Destruktion*) - bringing a statement into context in the space of *metaphysical* topics; the same as what was later called "deconstruction" in structuralism (Lacan, Derrida).

The Other Beginning (*andere Anfang*) is Heidegger's philosophy itself, inviting us to *fundamental-ontology*, to prepare *Ereignis*, to bury Western European *metaphysics*, and to make a radical leap into *Geviert*.

European nihilism - the last phase of "*oblivion of being*" (*Seinsvergessenheit*), "*abandonment by being*" (*Seinsverlassenheit*), the *End* of Western European *philosophy*, the collapse of metaphysical topics, the discovery of τέχνη, *Machenschaft'a*, *Gestell'a*, and the "will to power" as the main power line of this philosophy; Nietzsche's discovery of the real state of Western European history.

Neglect of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) - refusal to place the *question of being* at the center of the philosophical process; aggravated gradually from Plato's theory of *ideas* to modern pragmatism, technocracy, Marxism (*Machenschaft*), and "Americanism" (*planetary idiocy*).

Care (*Sorge*) - the most important *existential of Dasein*, in *authentic* mode means *Dasein's* turning to *being*, in *inauthentic* mode - to *being*.

Abandonment is the most important *existential of Dasein*, related to *Dasein's* lack of an obvious cause in the *being*; *Dasein's* problematic nature, its otherness in relation to the *being*, its "homelessness"; an allusion to the etymology of the word "homelessness".

"*subject*" (literally: "thrown under").

Earth (*Erde*) - the world domain (*Weltgegend*) of *Geviert*; the beginning of concealment, substance, givenness, presence; an *entity* reaching out to become the *world*; the cover of the abyss; is at war with *Heaven* (the *world*).

Idea is the visual image of Plato's philosophy, the basis for the creation of the metaphysical topics and classical *ontology*; Plato's doctrine of ideas predetermined the fate of Western European *philosophy* and, consequently, the course of Western European history; idea is *being*, but the *highest being*,

the essence of being (ὄντως ὄν), the essence of being (οὐσία, *Seiendheit*), the being-in-itself (*Seiend-im-Ganze*); later, in this topics, without changing its two-level (referential) structure, *form, energy, God, subject, ratio, object, will to power, values, worldview, τέχνη* were put in place of Plato's *idea* at different stages; the *idea* in itself is the pure embodiment of *Gestell*; the doctrine of ideas enshrines the principle of understanding *being* as *Sein-being*, which was valid until the end of Western European *metaphysics*; Plato's doctrine of *truth* as the discovery of the correspondence of things to ideas (Plato, "The State") underlies the Western European theory of knowledge (epistemology).

Truth (see *Unverborgenheit, ἀλήθεια*) - *unconcealment* (*Unverborgenheit*), can mean: 1) *unconcealment of Seyn-being* (*fundamental-ontology*), 2) *unconcealment of being* (*philosophy of the first Beginning*), 3) *correspondence of one being (thing) to another being* (*higher being - idea, place in creation, concept, etc.*) - hence the referential theory of truth.

End - within the framework of the *first Beginning*, the formation of Platonic *ontology*, Aristotelian logic, physics and meta-physics; within the framework of all Western *European philosophy*, Nietzsche's discovery of *European nihilism* as the main feature of modernity and the *will to power* as the driving force of Western *European philosophy* and history.

Who (Wer) is a question regarding who is the "I" for *Dasein*; can be *authentic* (*Selbst, Seinkönnen*) and *inauthentic* (*das Man*).

Curiosity (see *Neugierigkeit*) - *existential of non-authentic Dasein*; *inability to concentrate thinking on things in order to comprehend their meaning, their connections with other things and structures of thinking*; expression of everyday idiocy; aspiration to obtain "new" information without correct comprehension of "old" information.

Between (see *Zwischen*) - *the location of Seyn-existence in Geviert* (between humans and gods, Heaven and Earth); the finding of *Dasein* - between inner and outer, between past and future, between *ontic* and *ontological*.

Metaphysics is a philosophical topicality based on a system of doubling of *being* through the postulation of a "higher" plane

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vocabulary (idea, thought, God, value, representation, subject, object, will, etc.); the fate of Western European man-

The *overcoming of metaphysics* is a necessary action to prepare the *transition* (Übergang) to *another Initiation and fundamental ontology*.

Thinking - 1) *ontic thinking* - consideration of *being* in the separate and aggregate, comparison of separate parts of being with each other; a property of man; 2) *philosophical thinking* - raising a *question about being* and its relation to *being*; a property of a philosopher.

The *world* (Welt, κόσμος) - order, openness; *being* permeated by the rays of light, *logos*, *lightning*, *fire* in Heraclitus; *being-in-general* as the "world domain" (Weltgegend) of *Geviert*; the same as *Heaven*; that in which and how *Dasein* is found (see *Being-in-the-world*).

The *world domain* (Weltgegend) is one of the *four* components of the *Quadrilateral* (Geviert): *Heaven* (world), *Earth*, *gods and men*, inconceivable separately from the others.

Lightning (κεραυνός) is in Heraclitus the name of *being*, along with the names of the

"war" (πόλεμος), "fire" (πῦρ), "one" (ἓν).

The *Supreme, supreme being* (ὄντως ὄν) is the basic element of Plato's *philosophy* and the subsequent *metaphysical* topics of Western European *philosophy*; the same as *idea*, *essence* (Seiendheit), *Sein-being*; in Western Christian theology, God.

The *people* (Volk) are those entrusted with *language* as the utterance of *Seyn-being* about itself.

Stimmen (Stimmen, πάθος) is the *existential of Dasein*, which determines its positioning in relation to *being and being*. The *beginning* is the transition from *simple thinking* (*ontic thinking*) to *philosophical thinking*, posing the *question of being* in its purest form, until the final answer is obtained, i.e., before the construction of a complete *ontology*; see *First Beginning, Another Beginning*.

Findability (Befindlichkeit) is the *neutral existential of Dasein*, the fact of *Dasein's* discovery of itself.

Unauthentic (Uneigene) - Unsubjective, not genuine, turned away from the essence, from the self (*Selbst*), distorting the relation to *being* or forgetting it.

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359 *Heaven (Himmel)* is the world domain (*Weltgegend*), one of the four components of the *Quadrilateral (Geviert)* along with the *Earth*, *gods and people*; embodies the principle of light, heavenliness, openness, manifestation, unconcealedness; in some cases Heidegger identifies it with the world (*in Geviert*).

Nihilism - see *European Nihilism*.

Nothingness (Nichts) - 1) in *Seyn-existence* the side that does not coincide with the generating power, the killing beginning; the same as "nothingness"; 2) *Seyn-existence* as *non-existence*, as different from being; 3) simply *non-existence*, without explaining whether it is related to *Seyn-existence* or not; 4) the *essence of the destiny of Western European philosophy and history* as *Gestell'a*;

5) in some cases the same as *abyss. Nihilize, nothingness (nichten, Nichten)* is a property of *Seyn-of being in relation to being; the war of Seyn-existence vs. of being.*

The object (objectum) - in New Age metaphysics, that which is in front of the subject.

Ontics, ontic - a form of thinking that stays within the realm of the existent and does not raise the question of the existence of the existent, non-philosophical thinking.

Ontology, ontological - 1) thinking that poses a question about the being of things and gives a definite answer to it; 2) the question about the being of things not correctly formulated in the first Element and the metaphysical and philosophical topics built on its basis; in this meaning it is opposite to *fundamental-ontology*.

Onto-ontology is the same as *fundamental-ontology. Illumination (Lichtung)* - philosophical reference to *Seyn-Being* and its result for *Dasein* and being.

The basic question of philosophy (*Grundfrage*) - what is the truth of *Seyn-existence*? How does *Seyn-being* exist (west)? Addressing *Seyn-being* not as being and not from the side of being; a leap into the abyss.

The abandonment of being (*Seinsverlassenheit*) - the refusal of *Seyn-being* to remind of itself in a situation of wrong questioning of it and receiving an even more wrong answer; the ignoring of *Seyn-being* by Western European philosophy and history; the essence of Western European philosophy and history; the meaning and inner content of European nihilism.

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Openness (*Offene*) - unconcealedness; see *Illumination*.

Transition (*Übergang*) - a transition from the *End of Philosophy* to another

Nachalu, the same as *jump* (*Sprung*).

Transitional question (*Übergangsfrage*) - why is there something (*being*) and not *nothing*? (Leibniz); a *question* intermediate between the "*leading question*" of old *metaphysics* ("what is the *essence of being*?", "what is *being-in-itself*?") and the *basic question of fundamental-ontology* ("what is the *truth of Seyn-being*?").

The *First Beginning* (*erste Anfang*) is the transition from *thinking* to *philosophy*, realized in ancient Greece by the pre-Socratics and ended with Plato.

Planetary idiocy - projection of the *metaphysics* of the subject onto the individual in modern Anglo-Saxon (American) technical, liberal, capitalist culture, spreading globally; translation of the whole problematic into the sphere of satisfaction of private interests of the individual; the ultimate form of "*abandonment of being*" (*Seinsverlassenheit*), *nihilism* and degeneration; maximization of the *will to power* in the field of utilitarian and unheroic philistinism; the same as *Americanism*.

The Last God (*letzte Gott*) is the figure of *God* from the *Quadrilateral* (*Geviert'a*), unfolding in another *Initiation* at the moment of *Ereignis*; an eschatological figure crowning the realization of *Seyn-existence* with his arrival; the last horizon of *fundamental-mental-ontology*; see *Divine, gods, God*.

Object (*Gegenstand*) - in New Age culture, an *object* produced or used in the process of production.

Overcoming metaphysics is a necessary action to realize the fatal inadequacy of the *formulation of the question of being* and its answer in Western European *metaphysics* (Plato, Aristotle, Scholasticism, New Age); the discovery of

The "*abandonment of being*" (*Seinsverlassenheit*) and the correct deciphering of its meaning; the understanding of *technique* (*τέχνη*) and *Gestell* as *fate* (*Geschick, Schicksal*); the operation of "*femomenological destruction*" (*Destruktion*), i.e., the placing of any *philosophical statement* in the original tone of *metaphysics*.

Spatiality (Raumlichkeit) is Dasein's existential.

Jump (Sprung) - turning to Seyn-existence, bypassing being; the same as transition (Übergang).

Desert, desertification (Wüste, Verwüstung) - expansion of the zone of nothingness (Nichts); the result of replacing the natural being with an artificial, desubstantiated, technical being; festering "abandonment of being" (Seinsverlassenheit); the same as "lean times" (dürftige Zeit).

Difference, ontological difference (Differenz, ontologische Differenz) - the basis of philosophy, the ability to distinguish between being and being and to answer the question: what is being?

Decay (Verfallen) - the inauthentic existential of Dasein, the fall of Dasein into being, the alienation of Dasein from itself. self (Selbst).

Decision (Entscheidung) is the ontological and philosophical choice of fate as an answer to the question of the being of being; in a narrow sense, the turning decision of modern humanity to recognize or not to recognize European nihilism, Gestell and τέχνη as Western European ended fate (Geschick) and, accordingly, to pass or not to pass to another Beginning.

Sacred, sacred (Heilige) is the name of Seyn-existence in poetry (Hölderlin).

The lean times are the period of desertification (Verwüstung), the oblivion of being (Seinsvergessenheit), and the triumph of European nihilism.

Event (Ereignis) - Seyn-being in another Beginning; how Seyn-being in fundamental-ontology comes true; a key word in Heidegger's philosophy.

Conscience (Gewissen) is the existential of Dasein, which means the correlation of Dasein in the depth of its findability (Befind-lichkeit) with itself, with its Selbst (as Seinkönnen).

The Guardian of Being is man in the other Element, in Geviert, deployed by Ereignis.

Subject (subject) - in New Age metaphysics, the bearer of the rational beginning and the instance that makes the main ontological judgment (Descartes' cogito) about the being of things.

Fate (Geschick, Geschichte) is the premise of Seyn-existence, embedded at the heart of the philosophical process of the West.

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Vocabulary *Essence (Wesen)* - everything directly and immediately related to-

to *Seyn-existence*.

The Being (Seiende) is the things that are around; that which is perceived by *ontic thinking* as what is.

Being-in-thing (Seiende-im-Ganze) - an answer (especially in Plato and Aristotle) to the ontological question of *what* distinguishes *being* from *being* in the spirit of early *metaphysics*; the same as *Sein-being*.

Existence (Wesung) - existence in correlation with the *essence*, i.e. with *Seyn-existence*.

Essence (Seindheit, οὐσία) - the answer to the ontological question of what distinguishes *being* from *being* in the spirit of early *metaphysics*; in Plato, an *idea*; the basis of the two-dimensional philosophical topics and referential theory of *truth*; the same as *Sein-being*.

Theology, theologia - Christian religious *philosophy* of Western Europe, built on the foundation of Platonic and Aristotelian *metaphysics*; the view of the most existent, supreme *being* as a personified *Creator God*.

Surprise is the attitude (*Stimmen, πάθος*) that leads (according to Plato and Aristotle) to philosophizing in the first *Beginning*.

Terror (Angst) is the existential of *Dasein*, arising from its groundlessness, *abandonment*, and distance from all *things*; the experience of contact with *Seyn-being* as a "nothingness" of power; a *leap* into the *abyss*; the manifestation of *Sein* opening up, *coming to light in da (here, here)*; the basic mood (*Stimmen, πάθος*) of *thinking* in another *Initiation*, in contrast to the first *Initiation*, where this mood was *surprise*.

Philosophy is *thinking* that poses the question of the *being* of *things* and unfolds in a topicality grounded in the answer to that question.

Fundamental-ontology (fundamental-ontological) - philosophical *thinking* that puts *Seyn-existence* at the center of attention; thinks of *it* directly and directly not from the side of *being*, but from *itself*; rejects the double topics of the old *metaphysics* and builds *philosophy* without detachment from *ontic* (non-philosophical) *thinking* and its obviousness; the same as *onto-ontology*.

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363 *Man* - a being distinguished from all other beings by the peculiarity of its relation to *Seyn-being*; that through which *Seyn-being* is expressed; the approximate location of the *Dasein*; a being without essence, whose essence leads to the abyss; in old metaphysics, one of the names of the subject, "the animal possessing the word-mind" (ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, *animalis rationalis*); in the philosophy of the other Element, "the guardian of being".

The quaternion (Geviert) is a figure of the fundamental ontological understanding of existence through *Seyn-being*; it represents the intersection of the two axes of Heaven-world (*Himmel, Welt*) - Earth (*Erde*) and gods (*Gottern*) - people (*Menschen*); each of the *Geviert* axes (gods-people, Heaven-Earth) represents a line of war (*Streit*); in the center at the crossroads of the axes are *Seyn-existence, Ereignis* and thing (*Ding*).

Existence - a statement of (non-philosophical) thinking about the fact of *ontic* existence of this or that being.

Existential is one of the substantial aspects of *Dasein's* phenomenological *existential*.

Ecstasy is a transcendence, a form of existence and existence in *Zeit-time*.

Language (speech, Rede) is the utterance of *Seyn-being* about itself through the authentic existentialization of *Dasein*; it is entrusted to the people (*Volk*), from which it is drawn by thinking and philosophical units.

German words and expressions used by Heidegger in a specific sense

Abschied - goodbye. *Als* -

as.

Abendland - West; literally, "evening country."

Abgrund is the abyss.

Abkehr - aversion, "turning from".

Alltglichkeit, drchdringliche Alltglichkeit - everydayness, all-pervasive everydayness.

Anfang, anfngliche - Beginning, initial. *Angst* - terror, fear.

Anwesen - presence, presence.

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Vocabulary *Aufgehen* - ascent, sprouting, prostration, the act of *φύσειν*, whence

φύσις.

Aufstellung - to place on, over; to erect. *Befinden*, sich *befinden* - to be.

Befindlichkeit - findability.

Besinnung - comprehension, thinking, deliberation. *Bezug* - attitude.

da - here, here.

Dasein - here-being; in the ordinary sense, existence, being.

Destruktion (*phänomenologische Destruktion*) - destruction, phenomenological destruction.

Differenz (*ontologische Differenz*) - difference, ontological difference.

Ding is a thing.

durftige Zeit - scarce time. *Dort* - there.

Du is you.

Eigene - own, authentic. *Entscheidung* - decision.

Entwurf - draft, outline.

Er - him.

Erignis, *Er-Eignis* - event; Heidegger's syncrета, artificially approximating the meaning of the word with *eigene* (own, authentic).

Er-Innerung is recollection (as *ovntering*); Heidegger's is a syncrета, artificially bringing the word closer to the root "inner", inner.

Ermächtigung - legitimization.

Erstaunen - surprise.

Entsetzen is a horror.

Existential - existential (refers to the fundamental-ontological analysis of *Dasein*).

Existentiell - existential (refers to the ontic description of *Dasein*).

Ewige - eternal.

Furcht - fear.

Gefüge - structure, framework.

Gegenstand - object.

Gerede - chatter.

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Geschichte - history; with Heidegger, the *fate* of Western European philosophy, embedded in its ontological structure and related to this structure and its topics.

Geschick - fate, message.

Gestell - that which is *placed* (as a shelf or skeleton), a joint; the most important word in Heidegger's philosophy, signifying the relation to *being on* the part of a *metaphysically* conceptualized *being* and, consequently, of a person acting in the topicality of this *ontology*.

Gewicht - weight.

Gewissen is conscience, the existential of Dasein.

Geworfenheit - abandonment, existential Dasein'a. *Gleiche*, *ewige*

Wiederkehr des Gleichens - one and the same, equal;
the eternal return of the same (Nietzsche).

Grund - foundation.

Heilige - sacred, sacred, sacred.

Herstellung - production.

Hier is here.

Holzwege - forest paths in the sense of "whether it is a path or whether it is a forest".

Ich - me.

Insein is "being-with," the existential of Dasein.

Inzwischen-Sein - being-in-between.

kommen, das Kommendste - to come, the most coming (in reference to the *last God*).

können, sein können - to be able, to be; the main property of authentic *Dasein*.

Künftige - future; those who belong to the *other Beginning*, and *Ereignis*.

Lichtung - lighting.

Machen - to make.

Machenschaft - machinations, the technical productive relation to being and beingness; a basic property of Marxism and capitalism; the essence of *Machenschaft* is *Gestell*; close to τέχνη.

Macht - might, power; from *machen*.

Man, das Man - "who" of inauthentic Dasein. Mit-

Sein - "being-with", existential Dasein'a.

Neugierigkeit - curiosity, Dasein's existential. *Nichten* - nothingness.

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vocabulary *Nichts* - nothingness.

Offene is open.

Raumlichkeit - spatiality, Dasein's existential. *Rede* - speech.

Schützen, Schutz, Schutzlosigkeit - to lean on, support, lack of support.

Seiende - being.

Seiende-im-Ganze - being-in-itself. *Seiende*

ist - the being is.

Seiendheit - essence.

Sein, Sein-being - being in ontology.

Seinsvergessenheit - oblivion of being.

Seinsverlassenheit - abandonment of being.

Selbst - the self, the self, *who of* authentic Dasein.

Seyn, Seyn-existence - being in fundamental-ontology.

Seyn west - being exists.

Seynsgeschichte, seynsgeschichtliche - *Seyn's* fate connected with *Seyn-being, Seyn's message* through the structure and history of Western European *philosophy* about itself by means of gradual self-disappearance and self-hiding in the course of the unfolding of the *first Initial* (up to the triumph of nihilism and *Machenschaft*) and self-discovery in another *Initial* (*Ereignis*); the most important word in Heidegger's philosophy.

Sorge - care, Dasein's existential. *Sprung* - jump.

Sterbliche - mortal.

Stimmen - mood, voice, mood; Dasein's existential. *Streit* - war, battle.

Tod, zum Tode sein - death, being-to-death; the existential of authentic Dasein.

Übergang - transition.

Übergangsfrage is a transitional issue.

uneigene, Uneigentlichkeit - inauthentic, inauthenticity. *Unheil* - unhappiness.

Verbergen - to conceal, hide, keep.

Verfallen - decay, decay, desolation; the existential of non-authentic Dasein.

Vernehmen - to perceive.

Vernehmung - perception.

Verstehen - to understand, comprehend; Dasein's existential.

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Verstellen - to conceal, to deceive, to force one thing upon another.
Verweigerung - refusal, renunciation.
Verwüstung - desertification.
Volk - the people.
Vorhandene - present.
Vorstellung - representation; specificity of thinking within Western European metaphysics, goes back to Plato's doctrine of ideas.
Vorstzende Durchsetzung - deliberate self-binding. *Wächterschaft* - guarding, guarding.
Wage - scales.
Wagnis - risk, danger.
Wahrheit - truth.
Weg is a path.
Weltgegend - world domain.
Weisung - instruction, dictate, direction. *Wendung* - turn.
Wesen is the essence.
Wesen als Verb (*ich wese, du wesest, er, sie, es west, wir wesen, ihr weset, sie wesen*) - to exist (even more accurate in Russian would be "sutvovat", but it sounds too creepy).
Wesentliche - that which is essentially.
Wesung - existence.
Wille zur Macht - the will to power.
Wink - a nod, a sign, a wink. *Wohnen* - to live.
Zeit, Zeit-time - time in the Germanic sense - as that which separates (as opposed to the Slavic root "time" - as that which binds, connects).
Zufall - chance, literally "something that falls out".
Zuhandene - handy tool.
Zukunft - the coming.
Zweideutlichkeit - ambiguity, Dasein's existential.

Greek philosophical terms and expressions

αἰὼν παῖς ἐστὶ παίζων, περρεύων: παιδός ἡ βασιλείη - "time is a dice-playing child; his game is kingship" (Herac-lit).

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ἀγαθόν - good, favorable.

ἀλήθεια is truth.

αὐθεντικός - own, genuine, authentic.

γένεσις - origin.

δαίμον is a god, a minor deity.

δεινόν - terror, something inspiring fear.

δίκη - justice.

δόξα - visibility, appearance.

εγώ - I.

εἶδος is a species, an *eidōs*.

εἶναι - to be.

ὓν is one.

ἐνέργεια - action, energy.

εἶον, ἔοντα - being (archaic present active participle of εἶναι).

ἐκστάσις - ecstasy, going out of oneself.

ἔσχατον is the end.

εὐκυκλος σφαῖρη is "a well-rounded sphere" (Parmenides).

ἦθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων - "ethos is to man a god" (Heraclitus).

ζωή - life.

ζῶον λόγον ἔχον is an animal possessing *logos* (speech, thinking).

θαυμάζειν - to wonder.

θεός is a god.

ἰδέα is an idea.

ἴδιος is proper, belonging to me alone.

κεραυνός is lightning.

κοινόν - general

λέγειν - to speak, to think; originally, to reap. λόγος - word, thought, speech; originally, reap. μάχομαι - to fight, battle.

μέθοδος - method, indicating the

way. μηχανική - mechanics,

machine. νοεῖν - to think.

νοῦς is thinking.

ὄν is the existent.

ὄντως ὄν is the most existent, the supreme being.

Οὐκ ἔμεῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογέειν σοφόν ἐστὶ, ἐν πάντα εἶναι. - If you listen not to me, but to the *logos*, wisely

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369 will, abiding in it, say: all is one (Heraclitus of Ephesus).

οὐράνιον - heaven.

οὐρανός - heaven.

οὐσία - essence. οὗτος

- himself.

πάθος - condition, impression, pathos.

πάντα is the whole being.

ποιεῖν - to create.

ποίησις - creation, work.

πόλεμος - war, battle.

πῦρ is fire.

σφαῖρη, εὐκυκλος σφαῖρη is a sphere, a ball, a "well-rounded orb"
(Par- menides).

τέμνειν - to divide.

τέχνη - technique, craft, skill.

ὕλη - matter, substance; originally, wood.

φαίνεσθαι - to appear.

φθορά - ruin, destruction, death. φυσεῖν -

to bring forth, to give rise to sprouts.

φύσις - nature.

ψυχή - soul.

Latin philosophical terms and expressions

animalis rationalis - the rational animal.

causa sui - the cause of itself.

cogito ergo sum - "I think, therefore I am (I am)" (R. Descartes).

creare - to make, to create.

ens - being.

ens creatum - creaturely being.

esse - to be.

essentia - essence.

existentia - existentia; literally: "standing outside". *fundamentum*

inconcossum - unshakable foundation. *homo economicus* -

economic man. *jacere* - to throw, throw, throw.

mundus imaginalis - the imaginary world.

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vocabulary *negatio* - negation.

objectum - object, subject; literally, "thrown *before*".

ordo - order.

positum - positive, posited, affirmed.

ratio - reason, intellect.

res is a thing.

res cogens - the thinking beginning.

res creata - a created thing, a created thing.

res extensa - extent.

subjectum - subject; literally: "that which is thrown down, under.

Substantia - Substantia; literally: "standing under".

Templum - temple.

Tempus - time as "separated", closer to the German word
"Zeit" than to the Russian "time".

Transcendens - transcendent, being on the other side of the border.

vis primitiva activa - primordial active force (Leibniz).

ahafthncp`th"

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SUMMARY

The book proposes the survey of Martin Heidegger's conception of history of philosophy, based essentially on studying of his less known works of his middle period (1936-1945). The importance of the concept of "the other Beginning" for main bulk of Heidegger's philosophical views is especially stressed. The question of identification of the role of Heidegger himself in the structure of the process of history of philosophy is explored. The central problem of the *authentic being* (Seyn) and the possibility of the seizure of its truth is elaborated under different aspects. The theme of the *destiny of being* (Seyns-gechichte) is examined in the general context of Heidegger's philosophy. The topic and the term "event" (Ereignis) is discussed, taken into the consideration as the theoretical instance, where the theory of Heidegger achieves its teleological heights.

In the paper the main force-lines of Heidegger's thinking are examined: the *Dasein-analysis*, the problem of the *temporality*, the *structure of the existentials*, the approaches to the *fundamental-ontology*, the *figure of the Fourness* (Geviert), the *critics of Western metaphysics and platonism*, the question of *nothingness* and its connections with the *being*. Each topic is regarded in the context of its position in the general history of philosophy suggested by Heidegger.

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