



ALFRED BÄUMLER

THE PROBLEM OF IRRATIONALITY

IN THE AESTHETICS AND LOGIC
OF THE 18TH CENTURY

BERSERKER BOOKS



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TO THE MEMORY

Preface

The first studies for the present work date back to 1912. The thoughts that gradually formed on the subject of "Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology" first found expression in a manuscript from which I took my dissertation in 1914 - an attempt, still dependent with regard to the main philosophical point, to master the difficulties of the third critique. When I returned from the field in the spring of 1919, I took up the work again from a new perspective. By 1920, the contents of the present volume and part of the second had been drafted. Personal circumstances and new plans interfered with its completion; it was not until the spring of 1923 that the final editing of the first volume could take place. I hope to be able to present the second volume shortly under the title: "The systematic solution of the irrationality problem in critical philosophy".

The fate of a book does not generally belong before the public. However, in the case of a work whose development spans more than a decade, I felt obliged to make a personal statement.

Finding a title for what this book is ultimately about was no easy task. That the whole thing was finally named after the Critique of Judgment is an act of gratitude to the work to which I owe my philosophical education. I see in the Third Critique the most profound and, from a philosophical point of view, decisive testimony of a spirit which, for want of another equally comprehensive term, may be called the classical. We are not dealing here with a historical ideal of art, nor even with an aesthetic coinage. The classical is understood here to mean that,

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what is otherwise expressed by the word "humanity": a lifestyle, a character. The aesthetic is not its essence, but only its precondition, in the same way, for example, that artistry does not constitute Goethe's essence, but only forms the basis of his personality, which rises far above the type of the artist. The classical character is, in its conception, most closely connected with organism and beauty; but it is neither absorbed in a particular aesthetic form nor in the organically natural appearance. Goethe's immediate feeling for life is rooted in the sensation of organic growth; his world view, however, only comes to rest in the veneration of the inscrutable.

What is special about the present attempt is that access to the classical world is sought here via Kant. We are accustomed to accepting the territories of Kant and Goethe as antipodal continents of our intellectual globe. There is in fact no mediation between the morality of Kant and the morality of Goethe; the Critique of Practical Reason is (among other things) the most powerful invective ever written against Goethe's attitude. For the poet of *Wilhelm Meister*, nothing was further away than the pathos of freedom, which Kant pressed with critical renunciation into the concepts of autonomy and duty. Kant can never be understood from Goethe. But Goethe can be understood from Kant. Kant knew nothing of Goethe personally and existentially, but he thought of him. This thinking of Goethe through Kant is perhaps the greatest and most significant event in German intellectual history. Following the path taken by Fichte, Kant has hitherto been seen all too one-sidedly as a thinker of identity. He is just as much a thinker of totality. Not only the concept of theoretical and practical law, but also the concept of purpose (system) received its deepest logical clarification through him. Only the overwhelming impression of a personality whose strictly regulated way of life wants nothing to do with the risks associated with the idea of an immanent purpose in life could have created the image of the critical

Philosophy, which Kant and Goethe only show in contrast to each other, is preserved in existence. Mistrustful of the "heart", hostile to "feeling", full of contempt for the poets of the time - that is the existential Kant. The same Kant, however, writes the book that legitimizes the concept of feeling, gives the deepest definition of genius, and unfolds the concept of the system in its applications. The old Kant, the very man whose hauntingly austere countenance confronts us when we pronounce his name, thought what we cannot express historically in any other way than by "Goethe": the purposive unity of individuality, i.e. the unity of individuality based on itself in the manner of the organism, which is completed in its own destiny. The Critique of Judgment and Goethe - that is the thought and its existential expression. Equally significant in their separation and their union, Kant and Goethe confront us as symbols of our historical existence. We must never lose the moralist Kant. But we must also not forget that the categorical imperative was not the last word of the German spirit.

The unity of German classical culture does not become visible without the greater unity in which it stands being revealed at the same time: the coherence of German intellectual life, which extends from Leibniz to Hegel. The problem of Kant and Goethe is only a concentrated excerpt of this more comprehensive problem of our historical knowledge. A clear idea of the development of feeling and thought in the period from about 1670 to 1830 is not only a demand arising from the current state of research in the humanities, but also a need that is vividly felt in the life of the individual. It is the epoch from which the greater part of our education originates - an education which is fairly fully described by the names Bach, Leibniz, Mozart, Haydn, Lessing, Kant, Beethoven, Schiller, Winckelmann, Humboldt, Goethe, Fichte, Schelling, Hölderlin, Schleiermacher, Novalis and Hegel. The intellectual complex that the names of these men denote is in danger today. Young people are turning away from it as a whole.

It prefers to seek its leaders in Russia rather than in Königsberg and Weimar; the precious possession of German idealism is in danger of becoming a more or less reverently regarded inventory piece of a bygone ("bourgeois") epoch. In this situation, we only have the choice of either reacquiring the content of humanity contained in this legacy of German education or perhaps losing it forever.

The present work is an attempt to understand the whole of the epoch just described from the point of view of the unity of Kant and Goethe. We are accustomed to judging the 18th century all too one-sidedly according to its great phenomena. In particular, the first half of this century, which lacks great new names in the field of poetry and philosophy, suffers from a certain lack of attention. It usually seems as if Lessing was the first to bring spirit and substance to the era. In research into the history of philosophy, this attitude manifests itself in a disconcerting lack of source works on Wolff's time. One of the most influential thinkers of this period, A. G. Baumgarten, has not yet been recognized for his great historical significance. To put it bluntly, too little has been given to Wolff and his school in order to give too much to Lessing. However, the 18th century is a historical organism of such a fine and rich structure that it will be hard to find it again. One does not even understand the terminology of the classical period if one does not begin with Leibniz, Wolff and Gottsched. But if one does so, if one does not take Kant as an isolated thinker, but rather grasps him in the context of his century, one is necessarily led to the Critique of Judgment and thus to the cosmos of Goethe.

My work is philosophical. It therefore has to do with the whole only insofar as it is reflected in the development of philosophical concepts. The concepts on which the following historical investigation proceeds are taste, feeling and genius. I take taste in its broadest sense:

as the individuality in its sensual (aesthetic) appearance. Accordingly, the "judgment of taste" is to be understood as the judgment of individuality or as the judgment of value. The concept of genius is opposed to that of taste. It illuminates the basic problem from a new angle, just as in the logical sphere the concept of the contemplative mind repeats and concludes that of the reflective power of judgment. It actually characterizes the third critique that it begins at the foot of the mountain with the "judgment of taste" and concludes with the concept of the "contemplative understanding" at the highest peak.

How necessary it is to look at the 18th century from the perspective of the critique of judgment can be seen from any glance at more recent works that touch on this area. Appearances as far apart as Cassirer's historical investigations and Schmalenbach's depiction of Leibniz, which aim at roughly the opposite, still have this in common, that they misjudge the course of the development of thought in the 18th century in a decisive section. The tradition of the "school" (Wolff's), which includes Baumgarten's aesthetics, is like a philosopher of importance who tends to be forgotten among Kant's predecessors. Cassirer is well aware of the importance of aesthetic problems and interests for 18th century psychology. The far-reaching significance of school aesthetics, however, remains hidden from him due to the abstractness of his systematic approach to the basic critical problem. In Schmalenbach, Lessing again appears as the one who first represented "the right of colorful sensuality". However, Wolff's school, which produced aesthetics, is not spared the old accusation that it only allowed art to be used to teach people out of necessity. - Troeltsch's attempts to understand the emergence and nature of historicism also reveal a lack of insight into the significance of aesthetics for the emergence of the historical world view. While the idea of dynamism, which is contained in the theory of the monad, really only became effective with Lessing and Herder, it is nevertheless

Leibniz had long before awakened to new life in the "school", and the new love for the individual, which found its first, shy expression in Baumgarten's aesthetics, is one of the most important prerequisites for the development of the historical sense. - Even with that researcher of the recent past who perhaps had the finest and deepest understanding of the 18th century, one encounters the same barrier. Dilthey finds the cause of the dissolution of the "natural system" (i.e. the great age of rationalism) in the "analytical spirit" of the 18th century emanating from England. However, this dissolution by no means proceeded in a linear fashion from England via France to Germany. This "analytical spirit" is a common European phenomenon and is closely related to the emergence of the individualism of taste. It is also questionable whether "analytical" is the right word for this spirit. If one starts from England, as Dilthey does, certainly. However, if we look not at Locke and Hume, but at the deep European cultural movement that culminated in the invention of "aesthetics", the new spirit appears to be dissolving, but at the same time as something more. The principle according to which the dissolution takes place, at least in Germany, contains the seed of a new, deeper synthesis. For it is the principle of individuality, not that of random, sensual, irresponsible subjectivity. -

Finally, it remains for me to express my gratitude to the Society for the Promotion of German Science, Art and Literature in Bohemia for their support, which made it possible for me to continue my work.

Seebruck on Lake Chiemsee 1923

Alfred Bäumler

Introduction

The emergence of modern aesthetics is an event of comprehensive historical significance. What began in Spain, Italy, France and Germany at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries and culminated in Kant's "Critique of Judgement" was by no means the creation of a new specialized science. The emergence of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline is only a secondary result of one of the most important upheavals within European self-consciousness in general. The new science denotes a new attitude to life; it is the first solid manifestation of an event whose after-effects we are still experiencing today. Only the apparent subordination of the sphere in which this event takes place has so far been able to conceal the decisive importance of the process. It is not easy to credit the aesthetic sphere with heralding world-historical changes. But it is the revolutions that have the deepest and most lasting impact that are preparing themselves in inconspicuous silence.

The event that is accompanied by the emergence of the newer aesthetics is the irruption of individualism into the occidental world. This event is usually dated earlier; it is believed to have occurred with the Renaissance. Individuality was experienced in the Renaissance, but it has not yet come to consciousness. Man unfolds in all his natural freedom and fullness; reflection on himself, which is part of individualism, is missing. It is only in the age of aesthetics that this reflection occurs, and with it appear entanglements and conflicts of whose existence the Renaissance men, living unquestioningly under the protection of their authorities, have as yet no inkling. What was a mere fact around 1500 becomes a problem after 1700. Thus the modern soul with its infinite inner conflict was born.

Nevertheless, the Renaissance is historically closely linked to the era of aesthetics. The connection between the times becomes clear when one considers the spheres within which the new attitude to life reaches its purest expression. It is the aesthetic sphere. In this respect, the 18th century is a mere continuation of the 16th and 17th centuries. The personality of the Renaissance is the artist. The concept of genius is the actual creation of this great epoch; the man of action also has an aesthetic character in it. Behind the concept of the artist, however, lies that of the creative person in general. From then on, this concept played a previously unknown role in the intellectual life of the West. The era of aesthetics added the corresponding concept of the receptive aesthetic subject. At the same time, it conceived what the Renaissance experienced as genius. The age of genius individuality is followed by the age of the realization of individuality; the age of aesthetics contains the self-reflection on the age of genius.

It is a very inconspicuous term whose appearance indicates the beginning of a new attitude to life. The aesthetics of modern times can be separated from all earlier attempts of a similar kind most precisely by defining it as a doctrine of taste. The Greeks and the Middle Ages knew of approaches to the science of art and the technology of the arts, attempts at a psychology and metaphysics of beauty, but no aesthetics in the modern sense. All of these approaches lack a certain prerequisite: the prerequisite of a specifically aesthetic subject. Merely thinking about beauty does not create aesthetics. Only where an absolutely independent aesthetic subject is presupposed can the idea of aesthetics be conceived as a science in its own right. There is therefore only a science of aesthetics from the point at which the experience and concept of taste enters the consciousness of European humanity. The experience of taste constitutes the aesthetic subject. This subject poses a new and difficult problem for thinking, the most difficult that can be posed to it. Ultimately, it is the problem of the

living and concrete human beings in general. It seems strange that this problem had to wait for its discovery in the 18th century. Man is apparently the closest object to thinking man. But it is only in the aesthetic sphere that man is recognized as a human being, and therefore living individuality could only become an object of thought within the epoch of taste. As the subject of religion, man is bound to an objective reality and eludes all conceptual cognition. As the subject of science, he is no longer a living, concrete human being, but only a theoretical being. As a natural creature, he is subject to the general laws of the physical world; anthropology is therefore not a fundamentally new science. Only ethics seems to take account of man in all his concreteness - but ethics in particular is always in danger of placing an individuality-erasing norm in the foreground and losing the idea of the concrete human being above that of an unconditional law or a social subject. In contrast, the genius and the aesthetic observer appear before us as concrete, individual subjects. Both are interwoven into the entire breadth of natural and historical existence. Nothing stands between thinking directed towards the concrete and its object. A science of the aesthetically creative and enjoyable subject promises to lead directly to man in the richness of his appearance. However, at the same moment that one believes one has found the path to knowledge of the concrete human being, the entire difficulty of the problem is revealed. The aesthetic human being is an ultimate given, an irreducible fact before which, it seems, thinking must capitulate. Taste announces the subject in its incomprehensible irresponsibility, its profound inner freedom. All foreign standards fall to the ground before feeling. When taste comes into play, all objective support disappears, man faces only himself, and at the decisive moment when he invokes his feeling, he becomes aware of his uniqueness. Everywhere else he acts according to norms or

surrenders to an objective. Here the objective is only an occasion to become completely aware of oneself as this individual. Before the individual, however, the concept fails, which only ever gets as far as the penultimate, never as far as the *infima species*. The individual is wordless, conceptless, alogical; *individuum est ineffabile*. Feeling is never able to make itself heard. The living human being in particular therefore remains unexplored.

This clear insight into the essence of individuality, which is beyond all logical transparency, is called irrationalism. Irrationalist currents, however, are thought to have existed in the West long before the epoch of taste. In particular, the mysticism of the Middle Ages is believed to be irrationalism in this sense. One cannot be too wary of historical constructions of this kind. There is a deep gulf between medieval mysticism on the one hand and the emotional philosophy of the epoch of taste on the other. We should not speak of the irrationalism of the Middle Ages at all. As long as a culture is dominated by the idea of an absolute spiritual authority, there is no irrationality problem for it. Mystical theology, too, places itself under divine authority; but this authority is *pro ratione*, it always has the validity of a reason *vis-à-vis* the individual. The rationalism of the Renaissance transferred the absolute power that religious authority had in the Middle Ages to the concept. This makes the impossibility of any irrationalism within a system of authority completely clear: with the same right as Meister Eckehart, one could also call Descartes an irrationalist. Neither of them are, because both have an ultimate meaningful authority above them. Real irrationalism only begins in the occidental intellectual world that renounces the absolute authority of theology and mathematical reason, i.e. in the epoch of taste. This epoch marks the historical point at which irrationalism broke into the consciousness of the Western soul. Therein lies its world-historical significance.

Not only against a falsely so-called irrationalism of the Middle Ages, but also against irrationalism

The irrationalist current that gave rise to the Age of Taste must be distinguished from the latest era. In the 18th century, the irrational was perceived as a philosophical problem. However, we can only speak of a problem of the irrational where the ratio is still somehow valid. Unconsciousness is not yet irrationalism. The 19th century no longer knows irrationalism because it is purely irrationalist.¹ The 17th century does not yet know it; it is purely rationalist. An irrational problem only exists where the possibility of its solution is still in sight. In this respect, the 18th century is the classical period of irrationalism: it not only has the experience of the individual, but also the courage to relate it to the ratio. The entire philosophical fruitfulness of the 18th century is based on the fact that in it the opposing principles unfolded simultaneously; rationalism maintained its unbroken strength while irrationalism rose: German classical philosophy emerged from the conflict and reconciliation of these principles.

It is therefore not rationalism, but the problem of the irrational, seen from the ground of rationalism, that is characteristic of the 18th century in philosophical terms. This overall disposition of the epoch finds its first monumental expression in Leibniz. The ideas of the monad and pre-stabilized harmony force irrationalism and rationalism together in a great metaphysical conception: the *Individuality* is invested with its irrevocable dignity, but at the same time is suspended in the system of the world designed by a higher reason. From Leibniz, the task of reconciling the problem of individuality with rationalism passed to the school for whose second generation, if Wolff and the first Wolffians are understood as the first, it stands at the center of philosophizing. It finds its final formulation

¹ The 19th century is not rationalistic, but *intellectualistic*. Rationalism is based on the belief in a recognizable absolute value. The 19th century lacked this belief. Its mechanizing intellectualism is only the flip side of its despair of goal-setting reason.

by the completer of the Leibniz school, the greatest thinker of the epoch and summarizer of Western thought since Descartes: Kant. As important as Descartes and Newton may be for Kant, they only form the background from which critical philosophy detaches itself. The immediate basis from which it emerges is the problem situation just described, not the rationalism of the 17th century. Between Kant and rationalism stands the epoch of taste. The enterprise of criticism emerged from the spirit that found its first expression in the emergence of aesthetics. Above the continuity of the development of mathematical-rational thought, which leads from Descartes via Newton and Euler to the Critique of Pure Reason, we must not forget the novelty that emerges in the 18th century. Kant is not only the perfecter of the rational tradition, but also a child of the new age. He lived through the epoch of taste and received important stimuli from it. Just how strong these stimuli were is shown by the concept he adopted from it, which was decisive for his philosophy: the concept of criticism.

The problem of criticism is born at the same time as that of taste. Taste is only the subjective expression of the same fact of which criticism is the objective expression. The prerequisite of the critical spirit is the independence and freedom of the subject. As long as one recognizes absolute standards, there is no criticism; just as little, however, is criticism possible where one sees an ultimate criterion in individual experience. Where standards apply, criticism is not yet needed; where experience alone is revered, it is no longer needed. The relationship is easy to see in the aesthetic sphere: if there are aesthetic concepts in the sense of norms, there is no need for either taste or criticism, only a mere application of the rules. If, on the other hand, everyone's taste is unconditional, then all objectivity has disappeared, experience and the collection of voices prevail. Then aesthetics is no longer a philosophical discipline, but is reduced to statistics. Only if the individual reaction to beauty is recognized as the final instance, as experience, can a critical decision be made.

There must be a dispute about beauty. But only if experience is not the sole authority is a decision on this dispute conceivable. This decision would have to be objective without being rational. The problem of aesthetic taste thus points to a new, peculiar kind of "validity", "concept" or "object", to a new method of recognizing objectively. (For Kant, the word "recognize" always has a judicial connotation - deciding, judging). We are looking here at a cognition that has no reasons (rationes) and yet is more than mute contemplation. Without all reasons there is no knowledge; but if the reasons were to be formulated, the judgment of beauty would not be a judgment of taste. There would not be a critique of taste but a doctrine of beauty. This opposition of objective doctrine on the one hand and unconditionally recognizing all subjectively "given" empiricism on the other corresponds exactly to that which Kant devoted his life's work to overcoming: the opposition of rationalism and empiricism. The problem of aesthetic criticism is the archetype of the critical problem in general. Just as the young aesthetics frees itself from the guardianship of rules, so Kant frees himself from the rule of the pure concept of metaphysics. Here, as there, the "doctrine" is overcome and criticism, which includes experience, is put in its place. The aesthetic critique provides the example of a method which, without abandoning principles altogether, is nevertheless in opposition to the dogmatics of rules; which recognizes the subjective instance, the right of experience, without being merely empirical. The title "Critique of Pure Reason" expresses Kant's gratitude to the epoch of taste.¹ Just as aesthetics led rationalism out to sensual appearance, Kant critically leads metaphysics back to the boundaries of reality. The science of pure concepts is replaced by a science of b e -

¹That the use of the word critique in this most general sense is not foreign to Kant is shown by the sentence of the Critique of Pure Reason (Preface to the 1st ed.). "Our age is the real age of criticism" (B VI).

B with a number always means: 2nd edition of the Critique of Pure Reason and the page number of the cited passage.

The drawing of concepts on experience is replaced. To act according to the critical method means to measure experience against something that is above experience; but it also means asking the concept how it is realized. Hovering between the poles of the concept and experience, the general and the particular, is the essence of all criticism. Critical cognition, in contrast to purely rational cognition, is not concerned with the lawful, but with the concrete. The era of aesthetics not only discovered the aesthetic subject, but also laid the foundations for a new method.

This view of the historical and systematic significance of aesthetics contradicts the ideas held about the 18th century in general and the development of Kant's philosophy in particular. The opinion usually held of Kant and the 18th century is an instructive example of how the historical knowledge of an epoch and the systematic presentation of it by the thinker who summarizes it are mutually dependent. Today we believe that we have come to the end of the possibilities of interpreting Kant because we do not yet know the 18th century completely; and we do not know the 18th century sufficiently because we do not yet see Kant's work in all its depth. The development of the neo-Kantian movement shows this mutual conditionality of historical and systematic insight very clearly. As long as the rationalism of the 18th century was looked down upon with greater or lesser contempt, attempts were made to relate critical philosophy to the English philosophy of experience and to derive it historically above all from the impulses that Kant received from Hume. The German philosophical tradition since Leibniz played a minor role in this construction of Kant's system and its development, as it was essentially metaphysical and rational in character. By contrast, when Cohen systematically pushed the rational side of the critique of reason to the fore and taught Kant's philosophy from the perspective of the modern concept of science, a good part of the German 18th century was also won back for the historical understanding of Kant. Especially before the essential

However, Cohen and his school stopped short of the German tradition. It is deeply connected with this aversion to the specific speculation of the 18th century that Cohen also systematically eliminated transcendental aesthetics from Kant's philosophy. It is through transcendental aesthetics that the Critique of Pure Reason is most intimately connected with the intellectual life of the 18th century. The ideas of the dissertation of 1770, which it continues, are not Kant's subjective ideas, but the result of a rich development that leads from Wolff via Baumgarten's "Aesthetica" and its popularizer Meier directly to Kant. The dissertation *de mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis* is as much a conclusion as a beginning. It represents the culmination of the development of thought in the pre-critical 18th century. If one traces the threads that converge here backwards, a substantially modified picture of critical philosophy emerges. It becomes apparent that transcendental aesthetics is not only related to the epoch of aesthetics in name, but also in substance: namely in the common interest in the individual, to which not the concept but the view corresponds. If we pursue this further, we come across a layer of thought that runs through the whole of Kant's work and is dedicated to the problem of the individual. The transcendental deduction, the chapter on schematism, the section on the third transcendental idea and the appendix on the transcendental dialectic take on new light and peculiar significance. An analysis of these thoughts, which are, as it were, overshadowed by the overall disposition of the critique of reason, makes it clear that the attitude towards the modern concept of science is not the main systematic tendency of critical philosophy. This has often been said. However, it has usually been sought in ethics that the one-sided preference for the Newtonian concept of nature is overridden and supplemented. At the point where Kant allows the free, autonomous personality to break through the causal connection, it was believed that the path to overcoming the abstract mechanism of

"nature" and to have found access to people. But that was a deception. For personality is not the focus of Kantian ethics at all. Rather, it is "the intelligible, i.e. moral world", the regnum gratiae, which Kant also calls "a corpus mysticum of rational beings". (B 836; 843). In more recent philosophy, the regnum gratiae has been transformed into a "realm of values". Thus the approach to a purely spiritualistic metaphysics contained in Kant's Ethics was completed with Fichte's help. But precisely what was intended was not achieved. The concrete remains below the non-sensuous realm of values. The final concept of form is an infinite ought, whose abstractness betrays its inner affinity with the only seemingly remote concept of law.

The idea of an unconditional, never-to-be-realized ultimate value was Kant's own creation. His ethics was a personal act, which as such had an extraordinarily great impact on German culture. Philosophically, however, it was much less fruitful than is generally assumed. Fichte's appearance proved that the only way to reach unsolvable antinomies was via Kantian ethics. The irrationalist philosophy of life, which began with Schopenhauer and is inherent in the voluntarism of Kant-Fichte's ethics, is the philosophical setback to thinking that becomes entangled in insolubility. Kant, it was now concluded, could no longer be anything to us in what we have to achieve as heirs to this philosophy of life. At best, his point of view is sufficient for a scientific world view - and even for this no longer, since the eternal validity of Newtonian principles has been called into question by modern physics. However, we must be careful not to draw conclusions about Kant too quickly from what happened after him. We know critical philosophy less well than we think. It is our foremost duty to first learn to understand Kant in his totality. The natural way to do this, however, is through the 18th, not the 19th century. Of course, a purely historical study cannot bear any philosophical fruit. The adoption

of concepts from the past does not help in the present. The study of the past by the living generation only promises a return if the problems have something in common. But this common ground does exist. The problem of the irrational is less alien to Kant than one might think. However, the Kant that the research of the last decades has revealed to us can no longer help in view of the complex problem situation that the 19th century has left us. If this were the whole of Kant, then there would be good reason for the increasingly negative attitude of German intellectuals towards critical philosophy. But the Kant that is rightly considered to have been overcome is that of the supposedly "rationalist" 18th century. Once one has seen that this century was by no means only rationalist, but that the irrationalist tendency that emerged nakedly in the 19th century developed and grew within it, the situation looks quite different. What previously seemed to be mutually exclusive opposites reveals itself in a surprising continuity: the irrationalist philosophy of life presents itself as a continuation of the philosophy of life of the 18th century, only under a different sign. A solution to its problems from the spirit of the 18th century no longer seems unthinkable. If the irrationalism of the 19th century is not without historical connection to the past, then neither do the attempts to resolve it philosophically. It is only a matter of uncovering the point where the irrationalism of the 18th century found its most fruitful expression. Once the historical middle link has been discovered and understood, this must also have an effect on systematics. There is no genuine historical insight in philosophy that is not also systematically fruitful, and vice versa. The reason of systems and the reason of history is only one. All the great philosophers of modern times have thought historically. Since Leibniz, the great problems can no longer be solved by merely being lifted by the wave of the present. We are heirs and have the responsibility of heirs. Without a living knowledge of what man has been at the height of his historical development, there can be no

systematic philosophy any more. The organ for the self-understanding of the West is history.

The historical middle link between the rationalism (or irrationalism) of the 18th century and the irrationalist philosophy of life of the 19th century is Kant's philosophy, seen from the point of view of "aesthetics". This word is to be taken here in its broadest sense. "From the point of view of aesthetics" means: seen from the problem of individual reality entering into sensory appearance. The parts of critical philosophy that thus become the focus of consideration are the aforementioned parts of the Critique of Pure Reason (transcendental aesthetics, transcendental deduction, schematism, third transcendental idea, appendix to the dialectic) and the Critique of Judgment. The Critique of Judgment should be seen as the starting point. It is here that what is only subterranean in the critique of reason comes to light: the problem of the concrete. Of course, the Third Critique is as little an absolutely new work as the Critique of Practical Reason. Everything essential is already contained in the Critique of Pure Reason; but the main tendencies united in it diverge, as it were, in the following critiques, gain independence, and only become visible as a result. Kant's moral philosophy repeats in a new sphere the theme of the law that the transcendental analytic - more precisely: the system of all principles of pure reason - unfolds in the theoretical sphere. The Critique of Judgment allows those motifs of thought to develop that remain stunted in the one-sided attitude of the critique of reason to the concept of law in natural science. Transcendental aesthetics, deduction and dialectics justify much more than the world view of abstract "nature" as the existence of things under laws. However, this more is only clearly expressed in the third critique.

The Critique of Judgment is the fateful book of Kant's philosophy as well as its interpretation (while the Critique of Pure Reason is its basic book). A philosopher's relationship to the entirety of Kant's philosophy can be seen in his position on the third critique.

sophie. It is to Windelband's credit that he has kept alive this awareness of the crucial importance of the Critique of Judgment. The tendency of the critique of reason, which culminates in the transcendental analytic, and the other, which leads to the critique of judgment, are not of equal value for the systematic understanding of the whole of critical philosophy. As a totality, critical philosophy can only be interpreted from the transcendental dialectic, or from the critique of the power of judgment. Only here do the principles come into play. The interpretation of critical philosophy from the point of view of the law is only a necessary preliminary stage.

The problem of the Critique of Judgment is in every respect a late problem. Just as aesthetics presupposes the concept of science of the more recent period and develops in conscious opposition to it, so the work with which Kant ends his "critical business" presupposes that the standpoint of transcendental analysis has been overcome. The opposition of critical philosophy and abstract rationalism (dogmatism) is to a certain extent repeated within the critical sphere itself. The final and deepest tendency of the critical enterprise only comes to light in the Critique of Judgment. Only from here does one learn to read the "basic book of method", which the Critique of Pure Reason always remains, correctly; only here does the fascination that metaphysics, the doctrine, exerted on Kant become ineffective. Starting from the problem of taste, the third critique finds the concept of an object that is no longer subject to any doctrine, i.e. abstract lawfulness that can be formulated a priori. Here, as it says at the end of the preface to the Critique of Judgment, "criticism serves instead of theory". In place of the pure concept, the theory associated with the idea of the unconditionally valid law, pure criticism appears. The critique of taste (as the Critique of Judgment was originally to be called) is the "critique of critique". Rationalism has thus reached its end. By freeing himself from the doctrinal concept of law, Kant becomes

first completely critical philosopher. The third critique is only a critique, no longer a mere critical preparation for a doctrine: there is no longer a theory of its object in the sense that there was still a theory of the objects of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason (in the form of a metaphysics of nature and morals).

Of course, it would be a mistake to see the difference between the other two critiques and the Critique of Judgment as progress. Kant's mature period is no longer dynamic. Here everything is together; the temporal development only allows this or that side of the enormous complex of ideas to emerge more clearly. In the Critique of Judgment, what Kant most deeply associates with the 18th century emerges and is the factual as well as the historical basic motif of his thought. Nevertheless, the historical Kant remains the author of the Critique of Pure Reason with its narrowing down to the problem of the knowledge of law to the very end. Even within the third critique, the consideration of theory has not disappeared throughout. The concept of validity developed in the Critique of Judgment bears the name of the regulative. Regulative is a term that only becomes comprehensible in relation to the concept of the constitutive. Doctrine corresponds to constitutive validity. By means of the term regulative, the third critique is thus moved into the shadow of "theory": its highest concept has "only" regulative validity. - This restriction does not change the significance of the third critique. The critique of judgment is nevertheless the overcoming of theory. The sign that the historical Kant placed in front of the whole takes nothing away from the factual value of the new deep insights.

From a formal point of view, the novelty of the Critique of Judgment lies in the synthesis of existing approaches into a unified train of thought. In addition, there is now a material novelty: the concepts only generally indicated in the appendix to the transcendental dialectic are applied to an area that is completely foreign to the sphere of the Critique of Pure Reason. The actual act of the third critique is the practical sub-

The new objects are brought under the method of critical philosophy. A tremendous prospect opens up. The problems of the beautiful and the organic, which the third critique really deals with, are only special cases of a final comprehensive object. If the union of a critique of taste with an epistemology of biology (as one might translate "critique of teleological judgment") into one book is to be more than the quirk of an old man or a means of information for a systematist anxious for closure, then the real meaning of the last critique must be sought neither in aesthetics nor in the doctrine of the organic, but in that generic concept which unites the objects of aesthetic and teleological judgment under itself. This generic concept is individuality. Neither the beautiful object nor the living body can be grasped by the general of the law. Like everything individual that has its life in itself, they elude theory. However, it is possible to dispense with doctrine without having to dispense with all understanding knowledge. Historical knowledge of the individual is possible. But the methodological means that leads to this knowledge is criticism. Kant says: of the living there is only criticism, no theory. We, on the other hand, naturally have no theory of the living, but a critique. We also regard the understanding of what is as knowledge. The *cognitio histo- rica*, initially recognized by the 18th century only as second-rate knowledge, was elevated to a genuine science in the course of the 19th century. Modern historiography is a child of the individualistic spirit of modern times and, insofar as it is rooted in the 18th century, a descendant of the epoch of taste. The object to which the new methodological concept of the critique of judgment ultimately applies is therefore history. Aesthetics is the precursor of historiography. By teaching us to understand individuality in general, it also revealed the individual world of history and the problem of its cognition. The 18th century is the cradle of the historical sense because it is the home of aesthetics.

Finally, the reference to the connection between aesthetics and the historical view of the world makes it clear to what extent the consideration of Kant's philosophy from the point of view of the Critique of Judgment must become important for the understanding of Hegel. The contrast between Kant and Hegel appears less profound and insurmountable as soon as one takes the world view of the Critique of Judgment ■ as a basis instead of that of the transcendental analytic. The stream of tradition that leads from Newton via Euler to Kant ends before Fichte and Schelling. Hegel is already separated from him by a distance that seems incomprehensible to us. Fries and Apelt have continued this tradition efficiently and solidly in detail, but unfruitfully as a whole. The philosophical development went beyond the thinkers who remained cautiously in league with mathematical natural science. The spirit of the time demanded concepts that allowed us to understand the historical world. Hegel's philosophy satisfied this need. However, Hegel's system is taken to be historically shallower than it is if one considers only Fichte and Schelling to be its essential sources. To a greater extent than Fichte, who carried the specifically Kantian, i.e. moralistic motif to its conclusion, and to a greater extent than Schelling, who reached for Spinoza with the instinct of the artist more than that of the philosopher, Hegel has a connection to the tradition of the 18th century. But it is not the European tradition, Descartes, Newton, Euler, Kant, but the German tradition: Leibniz - aesthetics - Kant, which he follows. Hegel's relationship to critical philosophy, if one sees the latter in the context of the 18th century, is much more intimate than that of Fichte. It is carried by the current of concrete historical continuity; Fichte's is personal, deep and intense, but abstract. Kierkegaard saw very deeply when he subsumed Hegel's system of "aesthetics". The tendency towards sensually appearing individuality, towards the concrete, towards history, is ultimately an aesthetic one - both historically and objectively. Hegel is the perfecter of the epoch of "aesthetics" inaugurated by Leibniz. Between Hegel and Leibniz, however, stands critical philosophy, seen from the standpoint of the critique of judgment.

The development beyond Kant indicated here is no longer within the scope of this work. The presentation is limited to the development of concepts within the epoch of aesthetics in the narrower sense. This development is supported by a unified attitude towards life and is a closed historical whole. The closer unity of the problem context is already given by the constancy of the terminology. Throughout the entire epoch of aesthetics, right up to the Critique of Judgment, the interest in the irrational is heralded by the terms taste, feeling, judgment, genius, spirit, and so on. With the exception of the concept of spirit, Hegel's attitude towards these is negative. As deeply and inwardly connected as his philosophy is with the epoch that coined these terms, the change in terminology points to a new attitude to life. The problems remain the same, but the spirit in which they are solved is different, even if it still comes from the 18th century. The new attitude to life creates a new language. Where Hegel uses those old terms again, he does so purely historically. An account of the irrationality problem in the 18th century that strives for accuracy will do well to stick first to the era of aesthetics in the narrower sense, which is clearly delineated by the terminology used throughout. However, if our historical attitude is correct, this must be expressed in the systematic and historical consequences: the presentation of the Critique of Judgment will lead directly to Hegel's philosophy in terms of the content of the concepts.

I. Part

A. Aesthetics

Chapter 1: Le goût and le sentiment

a. First appearance of the concept of taste

As the Germanist Hildebrand says, the appearance of the word taste "marks a point of outstanding importance in our development".¹ The term emerged in Spain around the middle of the 17th century. It is so peculiar that Gracian's concept of man, whose core is taste or tact, is seen as a "break with the Renaissance".² At the same time as the concept of taste, a new ideal of education emerged. Gracian replaces the ideal of knowledge and artificial-artistic education with an ideal of man acting in the world. Practical knowledge of human nature is preferred to theory, tact over knowledge. Male, scholarly humanism was replaced by the era of salon education, which easily degenerated into femininity. Thoroughness is now quickly regarded as "school foxery". The common view of the value of things (the common judgment, iudi- cium commune)³ is more important than scholarly judgment. However, the common judgment is not as comfortable as it looks. The general judgment of value is constantly shifting; things change in price; you are "always hovering at the top of the moment"/

¹ Rudolf Hildebrand, Beiträge zum deutschen Unterricht. 1897: "Taste in application to the beautiful." S. 314.

² K. Borinski, Baltasar Gracian und die Hofliteratur in Deutschland. 1894. S. 25.

³ Borinski, Gracian p. 26, note; p. 40 f.

⁴ Borinski, Gracian, p. 41.

you have no one to teach you what the thing is. Only one guide does not leave you: you yourself, your taste. This word refers to the mysterious ability that no one can teach us to always make the right choice.¹ Taste is not an incidental human quality of merely psychological significance; it is the driving force and root of all culture.²

Gracian's concept of taste does not yet show any direct relationship to the aesthetic problem. It belongs more to ethics and politics than to aesthetics. The man of taste is the consummate man of the world. In this respect, Gracian's *discreto* can be compared with the *cortegiano* of B. Castiglione.³ In the perfect man of the Renaissance, however, there is an ease and security that the more vulnerable, subjective and unstable *discreto* no longer possesses. The former is the child of a closed culture; the latter faces a hostile world, advised only by his instinct. The ties that bind man to others within a traditional context have been torn apart. The *discreto* is a lonely man.⁴ - From the

¹ Gracian's maxim, which Chr. Thomasius (translated into French) prefaces his program of imitation of the French, contains the definition, "le gout universel d'autrui, qui est la vrai methode de choisir."

² Borinski, Gracian, p. 43.

³ But it is precisely the decisive difference between the two that Castiglione has no idea of the importance of taste. The word *gustus* may already be used by the ancient rhetors and consequently also occasionally in Renaissance literature (the *cortegiano* does not have it): it depends on the meaning that is given to it. In his review of Borinski's book on Gracian (Zeitschrift f. vergl. Lit.-Gesch. N. F. 9. Bd. 1896), Farinelli is certainly correct in his assertion that Gracian was not the inventor of the concept of taste (p. 401 f.). Historical incisions of such depth are never made by individuals (cf. Farinelli p. 397 f.). Nevertheless, the Spaniard's books remain the most important symptom of the new attitude.

⁴ This attitude to life contains the reason for the attraction that Gracian exerted on Schopenhauer. Gracian's catechism of wisdom, the hand oracle, is known to have been translated by Schopenhauer.

The success of Gracian's concepts can be seen from the fact that they gave expression to a widespread mood. Gracian had the greatest impact in France. While Cartesian philosophy was still at its height and Boileau was casting the aesthetics of classicism into irreproachable verse, Gracian's spirit, which was opposed to rationalism, penetrated Paris. At the same time as the aesthetics of classicism, we thus obtain a new, more advanced one, which consists in the application of Gracian concepts to the sphere of art appreciation. This new aesthetic of "delicatesse" and "je ne sais quoi" in contrast to "verite" and "raison" immediately precedes the introduction of the concept of taste into aesthetic theory.¹ Here we have before us a strange combination of Cartesian spirit and Gracian attitude to life, in whose poetic taste a little of the late Renaissance of Marinism is still alive. Of course, the aesthetics of delicacy did not arrive at an actual theory of taste. The new is hinted at more with delicacy than conceptually grasped and developed. Although the word *gout* is already used by La Rochefoucauld, Pascal and Boileau, it was not the French but the Italians who began with the theory of taste. They are to be regarded as the actual originators of this term in an aesthetic-philosophical sense (*buon gusto*). B. Croce calls the word taste in the meaning of pleasure, delight, as well as in metaphorical use for "judgment" ancient in Italy, and cites the names Ariosto, Varchi, Dolce, Michelangelo and Tasso as evidence.² However, the term only came to life under Spanish influence. Trevisano, who wrote the first treatise on good taste (according to Croce Est. p. 217, had a precursor in Camillo Ettori, *Il buon gusto ne' compo- nimenti rettorici*. Bologna 1696) already introduces the word *buon gusto* as generally known, but at the same time emphasizes its Spanish origin.

¹It is to the credit of H. v. Stein (Die Entstehung der neueren Ästhetik 1886) that this irrationalist offshoot of French classicism has once again been recognized.

² *Filosofia dello spirito. 1 Estetica*, 5th ed. 1909, p. 515.

¹ He wants to treat it theoretically, because not everyone is likely to know its full force and appreciate the circumstances it presupposes. The theory itself is set in a framework of theological metaphysics and Aristotelian psychology, as in Muratori. In practical terms, Trevisano knows nothing about taste, and his theory remains in psychological generality. - Another Italian, Salvini, calls *buon gusto* an indeterminate word that has arisen in our times and still has no secure place.² The supra-aesthetic meaning that the word taste has in Gracian has not yet completely disappeared among the Italians either. Even the title of Muratori's great work applies the term to the arts and sciences: *Delle riflessioni sopra il buon gusto nelle scienze e nell' arti*.³ But in the main Muratori deals with literary taste.

Three cultural nations have taken it in turn to form the new term: the Spanish, the French and the Italians. The Germans stood aside and initially merely adopted the term. Harsdörffer seems to have been the first to use the word *taste*, following the Spanish example.⁴ Gracian was introduced by Chr. Thomasius via the French. Here the *discreto* becomes the "politicus", the man who knows how to behave in a courtly manner, who can cope with any situation.

¹ Bernardo Trevisano, *Introduzione all' opera del Pritanio cioe la teoria del buon gusto*. Contained in Lamindo Pritanio (pseudonym for Ludovico Muratori), *Delle riflessioni sopra il buon gusto nelle scienze e nell' arti*. 1708, quoted from the 1744 edition, Venezia. P. 60-97. - "ma gli spajgnuoli piu d'ogni altro nella metafora perspicaci, l'espessero con questo laconismo facondo, *buon gusto*" (ib. p. 63).

² "un npme vagante, e ehe non abbia certa e determinata sede..." Lodov. Ant. Muratori, *Della perfetta poesia italiana*. 1706, quoted from the 1748 edition (Venezia). Con le annotazioni critiche dell' Abbate A. M. Salvini. T. II. P. 208, note.

³ *Riflessioni* I. pp. 108, 133, 137; II. pp. 27 f, 33, 40, 304. In detail in the *perfetta poesia*.

⁴ K. Borinski. *Die Poetik der Renaissance und die Anfänge der literarischen Kritik in Deutschland*. 1886. p. 308, note 5; cf. p. 368.

¹ What taste practically means, the fine way of living, is still so foreign in Germany that Thomasius did not dare to translate the word in 1687.² The first German treatise on taste is based entirely on French aesthetics⁽³⁾ At the same time as König's treatise, which together with Bodmer's "Briefwechsel" is the best aesthetic work before Baumgarten, the writings of the Swiss appear: "Von dem Einfluß und Gebrauch der Einbildungskraft" (1727, dedicated to Wolff) and "Anklagung des verderbten Geschmacks" (1728, dedicated to Wolff) and "Anklagung des verderbten Geschmacks" (1728).⁴ The new concept thus arrived in Germany very late and from the outset was laden with all the superiority of Romance culture.⁵ The fact that it was so quickly Germanized in literature is to the credit of J. U. König, Gottsched and the Swiss; that it was able to become so is to the credit of Leibnizian and Wolffian philosophy. The independent spirit with which, despite all dependence on details, the concept of taste was immediately established in Germany.

¹ Christian Thomasius: Welcher Gestalt man den Frantzosen in gemeinem Leben und Wandel nachahmen solle ? ein Collegium über des Gratians Grund-Reguln, vernünftig, klugig und artig zu leben. 1687 German literary monuments. N. 51. - Cf. M. Dessoir, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie. I. 2nd ed. 1902. p. 55 f.

² Cited by Joh. U. König as a curiosity in the treatise to be quoted immediately. He adds that many today still want gout or gusto to sound better. (p. 386 f.)

³ Joh. Ulrich König: Untersuchung von dem guten Geschmack in der Dicht- und Redekunst. Appendix to Canitz' poems. 1727 (Used after the 2nd ed. 1734).

⁴ "Die Discourse der Mahlern" (1721), which perhaps have the word "taste" first - they want to introduce "virtue and taste" (the entire 18th century lies in this compilation!) into their mountains - belong less to aesthetics than to cultural history. They reflect the mood of life that accompanied the spread of the concept of taste, which the young Bodmer may have encountered on his trip to Italy. Despite the decisive influence of Muratori, Addison and the French (Dubos), I consider the Swiss to belong to the historical whole of Germany, because they only adopted the mood and individual concepts from Italy, France and England, but the philosophical framework of their thinking originated from Leibniz and Wolff.

⁵ Perhaps the impression that buon gusto made back then is the reason why people still speak of "gusto" in many parts of Germany today.

did not come from the environment in which it had originated in the novels: the life of educated society, but from the realm of thought. Wolff's first national ¹ philosophy, which arose from the power that Leibniz gave to German intellectual life, strengthened the men who founded the aesthetic culture of the 18th century in Germany in their struggle against the desolate uneducation of the time. From the thought work of Wolff, Gottsched and the Swiss (Leibniz always stands tall, towering over the generations, in the background) emerges the development that reaches its end with the "Critique of Judgment". German thought, which finally took up work on the concept of taste, deepened it in an undreamt-of way over a period of around 60 years (1727-1790) and at the same time gave it a philosophical foundation that solved a problem of everlasting importance.

b. Boileau

Renaissance poetics deliberately eclipses the passages of rhetoric that point to taste,² which Muratori and Dubos later cite with devotion. The unrestricted reign of antiquity made taste superfluous. One was allowed to speak of Aristotle, Horace and Vitruvius, "only not of oneself, to put forward endless conditions, examples and comparisons, only not the short conclusion: I like that."³ R. Hildebrand has given us a nice description of the mood that is now setting in. "One must," he says,⁴ "first completely rid oneself of the habituation to the figurative use of the word that has become established, in order to feel, that is, to understand what it meant, how at first one (perhaps at first a woman)⁵ could refer to a poem admired by others on its spirit."

¹i.e. popular; Leibniz is still European.

²Cicero: *de orat.* cap. 50 Quintilian, *inst. or.* VI, 5.

³Borinski, *Poet.* the Ren. S. 308.

⁴Contributions to German teaching. p. 320 f.

⁵How correct this assumption is is shown by Borinski, *Poet. d. Ren.* p. 307, note 3: "The sigh of Mad. de Longueville at the reading of Chapelain's sensational epic "la pucelle" (Oui; cela est parfaitement beau, mais il me fait bâillir) vzar the death sentence of the poet."

taste, as if he made his tongue the measure of beauty: but I don't like the taste! For it was in this negating form, I think, that he first arose . . ." What was the peculiar value of the find? It was the discovery of the subject of feeling, after Descartes had placed man as the subject of thought at the center of modern humanity's self-consciousness. This made possible a new personal kind of criticism, the "current", as Borinski calls it in contrast to the "historical-encyclopaedic" of the Renaissance.¹ This criticism, which developed in Paris around the middle of the 17th century, presupposes Descartes' declaration of the maturity of the modern mind. The criticism exercised by feeling was preceded by the criticism of thinking man against an overpowering tradition, which still makes Descartes' "Treatise on Method" seem so modern to us today.

The beginnings of modern criticism bear witness to a very problematic cultural state. The unbroken naivety of the Middle Ages, which knew no criticism or disputes of taste in the enjoyment of national poetry ², was lost. The necessity of reflection when the immediacy of feeling is disturbed is shown by the example of Dürer, whose pondering over the problem of representation clearly expresses the feeling of insecurity that this great artist had at the crossroads of two ages. The Renaissance replaced the lost unity and certainty of medieval world-consciousness with the unity of an ideal. The ideal of antiquity, which was to replace the real cultural unity of the preceding period, was conceived as having undoubtedly once existed in historical reality. The art of the Greeks and Romans was a concrete example.

¹ Poet. d. Scaliger's pasquillante manner does not yet make Renaissance criticism "personal" in the modern sense. The idea of personal criticism, which is based on the awareness of the inner standard (be it bon sens or taste), is still completely lacking.

²If, of all the arts, poetry is mainly considered in the following, this is due to the fact that modern aesthetics emerged from poetics, not from the theory of painting or music.

game of all creation and thought, beyond which it seemed pointless to ask. What the ancients made was beautiful. The historical-encyclopaedic criticism of Renaissance poetics does not recognize the ideal goal that points to the future. It has no idea of the task that gives the critique of the new age its world-historical significance: to keep alive the consciousness of a cultural unity that has been lost forever, at least in the form of a goal.

Descartes is the first critic who does not rest until he has found the ground of all certainty in himself. But he has not yet penetrated as far as pure subjectivity. For him, the self is a thinking self, i.e. a self bound to the authority of clear and distinct knowledge. Descartes replaced the concrete historical authority of the Renaissance, of antiquity, with an abstract authority, reason. The emotional connection between these two authorities can be seen in the aesthetic theory that grew out of the Cartesian age: Boileau's poetics. It was the precondition of Boileau's tremendous impact that he was able to unite the main tendency of the modern age (criticism) with the Renaissance's reverence for antiquity. His sober ideal of reason stood in stark contrast to the Renaissance ideal of fantasy and passion. We would have been faced with chaos if modern criticism had destroyed the poetic-historical ideal of the Renaissance along with its poetic-psychological ideal. An immovable pattern was needed in the confusion of the day. In this Boileau, who was after all an artist and felt the distress of the times first hand, saw deeper than the merely modernists such as Perrault and Fontenelle. The antiquity of the Renaissance had to be replaced by a newly conceived antiquity. This is why Boileau also recommends the ancients - but with a new meaning. For the Renaissance, the invocation of antiquity was the self-evident reference to an unsurpassable historical model. For Boileau, antiquity is the fulfillment of a norm rooted in the nature of the human spirit. The ancients are not imitated because they are the ancients, but because they most purely fulfill the timelessly valid demands of reason. One is, in principle, also towards the ancients

critically, i.e. you measure them by a standard that you carry within yourself, you just (accidentally) find nothing wrong with them. So there is something else about Horace and Virgil: that is the *bon sens*, the reason, which these artists purely embody. The ancients are justified before the highest authority of the new age, the ratio, even before they become patterns. The "historical" standpoint of the Renaissance vis-à-vis antiquity is thus fundamentally overcome. If it used to be said: Reason and Aristotle are my two guides, it is now said not only that Aristotle is reason, but that this reason is not something empirical and individual (historical) at all, but something absolutely general. The work of the new philosophy is thus the "rationalization and universalization of rules".¹ The rules become laws. Only on the background of this universalization of rules does the problem of the particular become possible. What would otherwise only have been a historical contradiction against a historical authority, the judgment of taste, now becomes a rebellion against the law.

In Boileau, modern man is indeed powerfully opposed to tradition, but the most characteristic feature of the new age is still missing: the emphasis on the emotional-irrational side of the subject. The charm of the polyphonic piece lies precisely in the counterpointing of the theme of reason (which forms the *basso continuo*) with the theme of feeling (taste), which gives us the best of philosophy from Leibniz to Kant in its aesthetic section. Boileau's "*bon sens*" is reason come alive (actualized).

The author of the *art poetique* does not belong intellectually to the type of revolutionary, but to that of the dogmatist.² He dogmatizes Descartes in the artistic field. The new things that emerged alongside him remained alien to him. The last preface to his poetic works speaks for itself. (1701) As a true critic, he cannot do otherwise

Spin?arn: History of literary criticism in the renaissance. New York. 1899. p. 249.

² Boileau only dared to call boring what innumerable had already found so, says Borinski strikingly. (Poet. d. Ren. p. 319.)

than to deal with the new concepts of the time. So he speaks of feeling (sentir), of *je ne sais quoi* and of "interesting ideas"? But the answer he gives contains only the old concepts of classicism. The *je ne sais quoi* consists in presenting the reader only with true thoughts and the expression appropriate to them. (". . . des pensees vraies et des expressions justes.") Anger could not fail to recognize the new concept. However, in order to do Boileau justice, one must not view his statement solely from the perspective of his time. The author of *art poetique* not only represents the rationalism of the French mind, but also a way of thinking that is oriented towards eternal norms in the face of the fluctuations of taste and the times, which can be called classical in a higher sense than the historical (as Taine, for example, understands it). It was this side of Boileau that later seized Gottsched with a genuine national instinct, because he, who was to become the first pioneer of the German classical language and poetry, recognized the normative nature of the *art poetique* as that which the Germans initially needed most. If Boileau is therefore viewed in a historical context, he is far more than the reactionary he easily appears to be alongside Bouhour; just as rationalism in general, wherever it appears, even if it must temporarily succumb to contemporary currents in the interest of progress, always proves to be the stronger force within a larger historical context.

Boileau's contemporary antipode is Pascal. In the "Pensees", the tremendous experience of the irrational wrestles against Cartesian rationalism. The man for whom the relationship of the irrational to reason had become questionable with such force also takes a deeper look at the aesthetic problem. He sees the abyss over which Boileau's certainty glides unsuspectingly. The mind has its order, Pascal knows, the heart has another.² In this expression "heart" everything is too

¹ "Qu'est-ce qu'une pensee neuve, brillante, extraordinaire?" It is the "thought" that Bouhours had called *delicat* or *ingenieux*.

² *Pensees*. Edited by E. Havet. Art. VII, 19.

¹There is a limit at which proving reason must stop: one does not prove that one must be loved.² Love does not obey reason, its "ground" is not reason (what one knows), but a *je ne sais quoi*.³ It is no coincidence that the contrast between the judgment of feeling (*juger par le sentiment*) and the judgment of reason (*raisonner par principes*) in the aesthetic sense, which was so fatal for the following period, first appears in the philosopher who lived through the problem of the irrational within the philosophy of reason like no other.⁴ Pascal, who not only sees nature acting mathematically, but is also aware of the contradiction against the rule in it,⁵ also knows that beauty is not a creature of truth, as Boileau believed, but of imagination.⁶ The philosopher of rationality out of reason⁷ does not belong to the aesthetics of classicism, but, if it is permissible to call the religious seeker of truth together with the elegant heroes of the aesthetic salons, to the aesthetics of delicacy.

c. Bouhours

The fashionable philosopher who thought the new things that penetrated Cartesianism and made Pascal sore,

¹ The word is fast becoming fashionable. *Coeur et esprit*, says Eudoxe in Bouhours' "paniere de bien penser dans les ouvrages d'esprit" (1787; quoted from the 1719 edition. Amsterdam.), are now very much in vogue; one speaks of nothing else in fine entertainments (p. 49). - The word *esprit* brings to mind Malebranche, the representative thinker of the time. He, too, regards *esprit* as irrational, compared with reason, because it forms that part of the soul which is subject to the influence of the extra-rational body.

- Pensees, Art. VII. 19.

³ Pensees. Art. VI. 43. Pascal points to Corneille as the origin of the phrase. Corneille repeatedly speaks of the "je ne sais quoi qu'on ne peut exprimer" (e.g. *Medee* II. 6. cf. note 4 of L. Havet. Pensees. p. 195.). In the midst of the poetry of classicism, which knew how to express everything so well, the awareness of what cannot be expressed arises: the feeling.

⁴ Pensees. Art. VII. 33.

⁵ Pensees. Art. III. 16.

⁶ Pensees. Art. III. 3.

⁷ cf. Ernst Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem* I. 2nd ed. p. 520.

The most effective speaker is Father Bouhours. The aesthetics that he presents to us in his books (he is the type of *beï esprit* who has read his Gracian) is based on the recognition of the heart and of feeling. For Boileau, good taste, being identical with the sense of truth, is immutable and inviolable like truth itself.¹ Bouhours, on the other hand, introduces his work ("La maniere de bien penser") with a mention of the logic of Port Royal (already implied in the title), but in the preface he expressly refuses to prescribe rules. He writes a salon logic² without thorns, neither dry nor abstract. Examples, not rules, should be given; the characters in the dialog are not infallible, they can make mistakes ("Avertissement"). - The new educational ideal can be seen in every sentence of this short, flirtatious preface, which carries with it the scent of a soft salon culture, as in the entire work. It is astonishing, and can only be explained by the combined influence of Gracian and the social culture that has been at home in France since the "Hotel", how far the Cartesianism of taste has already been overcome here. In the beginning of his *Reflections* (1719), Dubos refers inwardly to this preface⁽³⁾.

The concept around which the new is gathered is that of *delicatesse*. It encompasses the terms *je ne sais quoi*, *esprit*, *sentiment* and *genie*.

It is highly significant that Bouhours cannot give an explanation of delicacy (the word is untranslatable; "delicacy" would not exhaust the historical sense).⁴ A better definition would not be possible

¹ See Mme. Dacier: *Des causes de la corruption du goût*. 1715. The conservative, learned woman equates good taste in the sense of Boileau with reason, bad taste with ignorance. (p. 6f.)

² G. F. Meier later wanted to give something similar.

³ *Reflexions critiques sur la poesie et sur la peinture*. (The 1732 edition is used, Utrecht.) I. p. 3.

⁴ "je ne sais où prendre des termes pour l'exprimer..." (p. 120.) There is delicacy in the phrase: for, after all, he does know. (p. 121.) Gottsched, quite significantly, reproaches him with this: Bouhour's "the judicious Criticus in France," in his *Maniere de bien penser*, had indeed remarked a great many erroneous passages, and ver-

had been. The inexpressible, relational, surprising aspect of an idea was precisely what the new term was intended to denote. Boileau never thought of acknowledging things "that are difficult to see at a glance and so subtle that they escape us when we think we can grasp them."¹ His art consists in expressing simply and clearly thoughts that could have occurred to anyone. Bouhours contrasts Boileau's "simple thought" ("la pensee naturelle") with the "surprising idea" ("la pensee delicate" or "ingenieuse"). The former seems to have already occurred to you before you read it. It stems less from the mind (esprit) of the thinker than from the thing itself. The "simple thoughts" are drawn from the ground of things; there is nothing foreign in them.² In such words, the ideal of that objectivity (justesse) is described which was Boileau's whole artistic secret. The true, well (i.e. simply) expressed³ - that is classical art. As clothes fit the body, so thoughts must fit things, words must fit thoughts⁽⁴⁾.

"De toute fiction l'adroite faussete
Ne tend qu'à faire aux yeux briller la verite."

(Ep. IX.)

I.e.: through the poetic expression you can see to the bottom of the truth. Taste the phrase "skillful falsity" properly. The poetic dress (we may think above all of the metaphor), the image, is understood in a genuinely Cartesian way, parallel to the rejection of the imaginary, as falsity, albeit a "skillful" one. The figurative expression is measured against the "truth" - beside which it remains false. Against

but "could seldom indicate the causes and rules of his judgments. (Krit. Dichtk. 2nd ed. p. 338.) But Bouhours was not Boileau; he did not want to give any rules.

¹"Ce sont des choses qu'il est difficile de voir d'un coup d'oeil, et qui à force d'être subtiles nous échappent lorsque nous pensons les tenir." (S. 120.)

²Bouhours p. 167 f.

³"Le vrai quand il est bien énoncé..." Preface from 1701.

⁴cf. Bouhours p. 31.

This way of looking at things, which too thoroughly removed the beautiful appearance of metaphors, in which the Renaissance indulged, from poetic expression, the aesthetics of delicacy poses the sentence: "Thoughts that are too true are sometimes trivial."¹ The true is not enough for beautiful ideas. Bouhour's examples make it clear what "the extraordinary that attracts attention"² is that constitutes the delicacy of an idea. It is the new "twist",³ the pointed expression, the eloquent antithesis, the bold image and, above all, the metaphor. In the metaphor there remains a residue incomprehensible to the mind; it is this residue that is seized by the new organ, the delicacy. How is it possible that something quite different from the actual thought can nevertheless make this thought clear? What a strange coincidence that things rhyme with each other in this way When Salvini carefully took the concept of taste between his fingers, he traced it back to a "non so ehe, a una fortuno, a un accerto d' ingegno".⁴ This definition is not without historical charm. In the Renaissance, the poetic image lacked the charm of the accidental; even the epithet and the metaphor became a matter of scholarship and the dictionary. Chance has no place in classical philosophy or classical aesthetics. Boileau's aesthetics is a doctrine of the art of proper (juste, naturelle, vrai) expression, just as Descartes' philosophy is the doctrine of mathematically regulated nature. The aesthetics of delicacy, on the other hand, is an art theory of bold, seemingly accidental metaphor.⁵ Perhaps nothing flatters the mind more

¹ "Les pensees à force d'être vraies sont quelque fois triviales ..." (p. 55.)

² "quelque chose d'extraordinaire qui frappe l'esprit". (p. 58-)

³ Bouhours p. 58: "Un tour nouveau, que Ton donne aux choses."

⁴ Muratori, *Della perfetta poesia italiana*. 1748. II. (S. 208.)

⁵ I am not saying that Boileau did not use metaphors. His language is as full of them as that of all poets. But the starting point of his theory of art is not the poetic image, but actual expression. - Boileau's passion for appropriate expression is best seen in his satire on the equivoque. (XII.) The fate of mankind appears here to be linked to the sharpness and clarity of expression.

than the representation of an object under an image foreign to it, says Bouhours.¹ The "surprising idea" depends as much on the image as on the object. It makes us sit up and take notice, because it is not drawn from things familiar to all, but has its origin in the subjective mind that sees the disparate as one. That is why it never seems as if we could have found it ourselves: the beautiful idea is just as individual as the spirit from which it springs.

Delicacy is the sense for shading, for the not so easily visible, for the half-tones and hints. The beautiful idea does not simply present itself. It has to be sought out, guessed at; it only allows itself to be half seen (*entre- voir*) in order to give us the pleasure of discovering it.²

The subjective-objective character of delicacy (it denotes a property of thoughts as well as of human beings) is also precisely associated with *je n e s a i s quoi*, which means something in the thought (or behavior) that cannot be grasped with concepts, and at the same time the subjective correlate corresponding to this fact in the mind of the perceiver. The subjective correlate of the "surprising idea" is the earliest expression for what later plays such an important role in aesthetics under the name of feeling.

The aesthetics of delicacy prepared the principle of "unity in diversity". The principles of classical art theory: unity, simplicity to the point of sobriety, naturalness, appropriateness, were not conducive to color, richness and variety of expression. The Renaissance had loved the "Romanesque *varietas*"⁽³⁾ too much. The strict unity was a penance for this. A part of the Renaissance lives on in the "modern" demand for "delicacy": the qualities of *varietas*, fullness and change. The formula "unity in diversity" thus represents

¹ Rien ne Hatte peut-etre plus l'esprit que la representation d'un objet sous une image etrange - p. 108.

Bouhours p. 121 - Repeated verbatim by Voltaire in the *Dictionnaire philosophique* (Art. *Esprit*).

³ Borinski, Poet. d. Ren., p. 69.

two ages; the demand for unity goes back to Cartesian rationalism, that for multiplicity to the Renaissance. The embodiment of the new formula, as it were, is the metaphor,¹ which in its unification of foreign things and words satisfies the demand for multiplicity, but through its appropriateness to the thing satisfies the demand for unity⁽²⁾

The fact that the formula "unity in diversity" expresses the new awareness of European culture in general, not just French culture, can be inferred from its agreement with the Italian aesthetics of the time. Muratori (1706) turns against Cardinal Sforza-Pallavicino, who, despite his accusations against Marino, pays too much homage to the pictorial joy of the Renaissance in theory. According to Pallavicino, poetry does not seek the true, but marvelous images; whether true or false is indifferent⁽³⁾ Muratori, on the other hand, demands that the images also appear true. The new and the marvelous are identical with "multiplicity".⁴ Truth, however, is obviously closely related to unity. Truth and unity are the great principles of classical, rationalist aesthetics. Even the homeland of the Renaissance cannot resist the demand of the time that limits diversity and colorfulness. The same rationalism that turns the *varietas* of the Renaissance into a unity in diversity transforms the demand for "apprenzioni sontuose, nuove, mirabili, splen-

¹ The metaphor is the soul of the precious Marinism that prevailed before Boileau. The innovation of delicacy did not lie in the poetic form itself, but in the changed conception of metaphor as a product of individual "esprit".

² The demand for unity is also understood as the unity of the poetic image. Bouhours is sensitive to the fact that Dacier calls taste a harmony between esprit and raison, i.e. that it falls from one image into another. (p. 290.) Such things Leibniz rejected as exaggerated. (Cf. *Nouv. ess. H. chap. II. § 2.*)

³ Muratori: *Della perf. poesia. I.* p. 74 f.

⁴ Muratori speaks of "favole diverse, dissimili, o contraire". *Perf. poes. I.* 77.

dide" of Pallavicino¹ in the "ammanto sensibile di qualche verita" of Muratori⁽²⁾.

The actual expression (the justesse) corresponds to the *raison*, which is the same for everyone; the figurative expression corresponds to the individual *esprit*, which creates surprising sparks from the things it compares. No one knows how these luminous images come about. They are ideas that emerge from the irrational sphere of the subject. This new evaluation of the irrational, the sensual, the imaginative is, of course, only hinted at. Malebranche's "Recherche' de la verite" (1687) proves how strongly the turn it represented was nevertheless felt in Cartesianism. As in the theory of delicacy the first theory of taste, in *je ne sais quoi* the earliest hint of feeling, so in the concept of *esprit* we have the first trace of genius.³ The source of the theory of genius is obviously the moment of the inventive, which is already contained in the concept of delicacy. Renaissance art theory taught imitation, not invention. Lists of decorative epithets used by great poets were compiled. Only ornament, splendor, magnificence and abundance mattered; novelty was not valued as such. The concept of *pensee delicate*, on the other hand, contains a reference to the new and personal, which becomes important in the concept of genius.

¹ Muratori, Perf. poes. I. p. 74. Cf. Croce, Estetica, p. 219 - The word *sontuoso* (cf. Salvini's note on this I. p. 100) is very characteristic. One could translate it as "overloaded splendidly".

Della perf. poes. I. p. 159 - Muratori's sentiment towards metaphor corresponds exactly to Bouhours'. One could devote a whole volume to it, he said, and he calls it "anima d'in- finiti sentimenti." (I., P. 248.)

³ We have already encountered the root of the word in the phrase *pensee ingenieuse*. (Bouhours p. 58; cf. 120.) Furthermore: "Le coeur est plus ingenieux que 1 esprit." (p. 49, cited by Bouhours as a buzzword.) This sentence very clearly shows the direction towards the irrational, which is already indicated in "esprit". The heart is even more inventive than wit. Boileau's verse shows how close coeur and esprit are in meaning: "1'esprit n'est point **emu** de ce quil ne croit pas." (Art poetique, chap. III.)

One sign of the consolidation of the concept of taste over time is the word *sentirment*, which is becoming ever more vivid and slowly acquiring an aesthetic meaning. (We will follow the emergence of the word from Cartesianism in Crousaz). "Sen- tir" does not mean to feel. It denotes the immediate consciousness one has of inner processes.¹ Sentiment is in later aesthetics (Dubos) what *bon sens* is in Boileau. It can often be rendered by instinct.² "An indistinct and almost purely emotional judgment" says La Motte of taste.³ Instead, one could also say: an instinctive judgment. H. v. Stein rightly warns us to put into the word *sentiment* something of the "force and intimacy" that we associate with the word *feeling*.⁴ For the time being, *sentirment* is still (with Dubos it becomes somewhat different) the lowest degree of *jugement confus*. It is only admitted, as it were, as a borderline concept of rationality. This is an opportunity to point to the latent rationalism of the epoch in whose consciousness the irrational enters under the forms of delicacy, taste, genius. The historical significance of this development lies in the fact that the irrational is maintained in constant relation to the ratio. In this connection was contained the call to resolve the opposition, together with the means to do so.⁵

¹ Truth can also be *senti*. "Mais la nature est vraie, et d'abord on la sent -" says Boileau. (Ep. IX.) For him, nature is as much as reason. Thus reason is meant as the immediate consciousness of life.

² cf. La Rochefoucauld: "Il y en a qui, par une sorte d'instinct dont ils ignorent la cause, décident de ce qui se présente à eux, et prennent toujours le bon parti. (Reflexions divers: Des Goûts.)

³ "Un jugement confus et presque de simple *sentirment*." According to H. v. Stein: Die Entstehung der neueren Aesthetik. 1886. S. 94.

⁴ Dism. d. n. Aesth. p. 93.

⁵ The, despite everything, still classical attitude of Bouhours' aesthetics is expressed in the beautiful sentence "that poets must never destroy the essence of things in order to enhance and embellish them". ("... que les poëtes ne doivent jamais détruire l'essence des choses en voulant les éléver et les embellir. S. 10.)

Is sentiment most often translated as opinion? Opinion is to knowledge as esprit is to reason. But just as the bon goût can approach reason, so too can a mere opinion coincide with reasoned knowledge. Strict Cartesianism emphasized the possibility of error in all knowledge. Now the possibility of grasping the true through mere opinion is emphasized. The overall view remains; but the evaluation has changed. Whereas previously people said: ... but one can be mistaken!, one now says: one can also arrive at the truth. This change in attitude towards logical probability corresponds exactly to the change in attitude towards the aesthetically probable. Boileau measured the poetic image against the truth and found it "false". Now it is "images are not false, and metaphor has its truth just as well as fiction"? This expresses a new attitude of mind. Even the Cartesian (Malebranche) must now take an interest in probability, even if he rejects it - he must at least criticize in detail the dubious certainty of the senses and the imagination. The ambiguity of the expression sentiment indicates that the new aesthetics comes from a depth³ where everything is still together; the thoughts grouped around taste, sentiment, etc., form only the vanguard of a whole army. In the two-sided character of sentiment (aesthetic - instinct, feeling; logical- epistemological - opinion) the parallel development of aesthetics and logic is indicated, which we can follow up to Kant, and which finally culminates in the logical-aesthetic concept of the reflective- epistemological concept.

¹ Leibniz, too, always uses it in this sense. The Italian sentimento also means "opinion", see Muratori, Della peri. poes. I. 295 "in sentimento proprio"; also 300, 305, 329, 379 and so on.

² Je ßg'ure ^{nest} pas faux, et la metaphore a sa v[^]rit[^] aussi bien que la[^]fiction. (Bouhours, p. 12.) - This is the attitude from which Dubos' definition of art as an appearance that can never be refuted ("vraisemblance jamais dementie") emerges. (Reflexions, II, p. 3.)

³This is said purely historically about the development as a whole and does not refer to the individuals. The word depth would fit Bouhours and La Motte very poorly.

culminating in the power of judgment. For this development to become possible, however, a genius was needed to provide a philosophical foundation for the new ideas that were emerging at the time. Cartesianism was not enough. Even such great thinkers as Malebranche and Geulinx were unable to satisfy the times with Descartes' intellectual means.¹ Spinoza's philosophy had no place for the problem of the irrational. The question of the relationship between the general and the particular, in which it is logically clothed, was decided by metaphysics; it could offer no occasion for searching. What was needed at this moment was a man who possessed the ability to take up the general European problem that had been looming since Gracian, but at the same time had enough rationalism, i.e. systematic talent, not to capitulate to this problem.² This man of destiny was Leibniz. What separates him most profoundly from the older rationalism is that he recognized as a problem the irrational, chance? evil, that which eludes comprehension by the thinking soul. By incorporating this idea, which has not yet been fully mastered today, into philosophy, Leibniz separates himself from Descartes and Spinoza in a completely different way than the years express. He is a modern rationalist, i.e. a thinker of the irrational. Up to now, Leibniz has been seen as too close to the older rationalism out of an understandable optical illusion. If one moves from aesthetics to Leibniz, he shows a surprising modernity.³ Malebranche absorbs the new to a certain extent, but in a Cartesian spirit. There is nothing more of this spirit in Leibniz than the general rational attitude. He is a son not of the classical, but of the post-classical⁴

¹ Again, this is meant historically, i.e. not the consciousness of contemporaries, but objectively, the problem of the time.

² What is usually called "irrationalism" is nothing other than the capitulation of the insufficient reason (rationis insufficientis) to feeling, experience, reality, or whatever one may call it.

³ In a double sense: he was then and still is today.

⁴ Not used in the temporal sense. Bouhours dies before Boileau. (1702.)

mood. This is clearly evident in his relationship to contemporary aesthetics.

d. Leibniz

Leibniz's philosophy leads us into a new world. It is no longer the Renaissance, nor the rational Renaissance of Descartes, but the Baroque. Things look different. If we look for what the new thoughts have in common, we find that a certain inexpressible is made expressible by these concepts, that, in a word, the irrational is to be grasped by thought. Through the concept of the "imperceptible imagination", psychology is given the opportunity to include the individually imperceptible in its calculation and thus to deepen its concept of the soul. In contrast to antiquity and the prevailing theories, Descartes had conceived of the soul as pure spirit. Infinity was thus gained; but the soul had become a transparent *res cogitans* in which there was no longer any twilight, no mystery, no secret. For this reason Cartesian psychology had to fail before the phenomenon of taste. Here was something half-dark, half-thought and half-felt, where did it belong? Leibniz gives the answer. He does not return to the old vitalistic theory of the soul. The soul remains spiritual. But it is no longer a mere thought. There is room in it for the semi-conscious and the unconscious - thus also room for taste and feeling. An aesthetic element has always been recognized in his creation of thought. (Leibniz is not the favorite philosopher of the "aesthetic" 18th century for nothing). The basic idea of theodicy can be illustrated vividly: one must look at the universe from the right "point of view" in order to recognize its beauty.¹ God is the great artist who turns all the faults of the small worlds into the greatest adornment of his one great world.² This aesthetic moment is more than an anecdote within Leibniz's philosophy. It is no coincidence,

¹Theod. II. § 147.

■ "Dieu, par un art merveilleux, tourne tous les défauts de ces petits mondes au plus grand ornement de son grand monde." (Theod. II. § 147.)

that the person who grasped the idea of theodicy had something of the artist in him.

Leibniz's position on aesthetics is quite different from that of rigid mathematical rationalism, as can be seen from a comparison of his opinion and that of Descartes on dreams. For Descartes, the dream is an obscuration of thought, a negation as it were, "an incomprehensible mode of the soul".¹ Leibniz, on the other hand, speaks of the wonders of dreams, where the soul becomes effortlessly inventive² and we form images that we would only have found with effort when awake.³ Even in this recognition of the creative, dark underground of the soul,⁴ the dream fantasy, the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious, the irrational and the rational is not completely resolved. The law of continuity also prevails here: we would have found such images while awake, even if only with difficulty. But Leibniz recognized the genius and inventiveness of dreams as something positive. It was incorporated into his psychology. Later, when the Swiss incorporated the creative imagination into their rights, they knew that this corresponded to the spirit of their master's philosophy.

Leibniz's direct relationship to contemporary French aesthetics is evidenced by the *Nou-veaux Essais*. Bouhours is quoted here. In the preface, Leibniz traces the main concepts of the new aesthetics back to the imperceptible ideas.⁵ "The imperceptible ideas are more effective than one might think. It is they who create the *je ne sais quoi*, these sensations of taste, these images of sensory qualities, clear in their union, but confused in their parts,

¹"Un mode inintelligible de Tarne." Emile Krantz: *Essai sur l'esthétique de Descartes*. Paris 1882. p. 88.

²Principles of nature and grace. § 14. "des merveilles des songes, où nous inventons sans peine, mais aussi sans en avoir la volonté, des choses auxquelles il faudrait penser longtemps pour les trouver quand on veille..."

³Erdm. S. 170.

⁴Baumgarten later spoke of a "fundus animae". (Met. § 51L)

⁵II. 11 § 2. Erdm. 236.

form . . ."¹ The *je ne sais quoi* is also mentioned elsewhere. The painter often misses an *I know not what* ("nescio quid") in what he does not like.² In a German treatise it says: the perfection of pleasant things, which is not felt by our mind, but by our spirit, we call an "*I know not what*".³ The emphasis on the "spirit" as distinct from the mind corresponds to the emphasis on the unconscious as opposed to Cartesian psychology. The suggestion of a theory of the aesthetic state is contained in the subtle remark. - Leibniz approaches the aesthetic problem from yet another angle, the theory of the feeling of pleasure. According to Descartes, pleasure is based on the awareness of our own perfection. We will see later how dangerous this definition of aesthetics could become. Leibniz, who first adopted it,⁴ immediately transforms it by separating "joy" and "pleasure".⁵ Pleasure is not only a sensation in itself, but in something outside it: understanding, bravery and "peculiar beauty" of another human being or animal, indeed of an inanimate creature, painting or work of art.⁶ The objective direction of the definition is important (compared to the Cartesian one). Leibniz recognizes the *pulchrorum contemplatio*, which is pleasurable (*iucunda*) and overcomes the sensible in front of paintings; it is related to love and, if the

¹ "These petites perceptions are therefore de plus grande efficace qu'on ne pense. Ce sont eiles, qui forment ce *je ne sais quoi*, ces goûts, ces images des qualités des sens, claires dans l'assemblage, mais confuses dans les parties . . ." (Erdm. p. 197.) - A strange passage reminiscent of Leibniz is the sentence in Boileau (Preface of 1701): "L'esprit de l'homme est naturellement plein d'un nombre infini d'idées confuses du vrai, que souvent il n'entrevoit qu'à demi . . ." - But Boileau goes on to say that nothing is more pleasant than to bring such ideas into bright light.

² "Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis." Erdm. 79.

³ Guhrauer: Leibniz's German writings. I, P. 421.

⁴ *De vita beata*. Erdm. 74.

⁵ German writings. I, P. 420.

⁶ Leibniz understands a work of art to be what we today call a product of art (work of the human hand).

object itself is capable of sensation, into love⁽¹⁾.

The connection that exists between Leibniz and the aesthetics of delicacy was first seen by H. v. Stein.² It is unnecessary to assume a dependence between the concept of delicacy and the idea of petites perceptions, as H. v. Stein tends to do. H. v. Stein was able to arrive at this assumption because he saw the relationship between Leibniz and French aesthetics as an isolated historical fact. If one sees French aesthetics and Leibniz in a larger context, it becomes clear that it is much more than a matter of "influence". A European problem is under discussion. Leibniz may have drawn inspiration from French aesthetics, equipped as he was with an irritable organ for the moods of the times. But it is wrong to attribute such an important idea as that of petites perceptions to this, because one could not stop at this attribution: one would logically also have to attribute the idea of the differential and ultimately Leibniz's entire system to the stimulus of the aesthetics of delicacy. The idea of the irrational not only dominates Leibniz's psychology, but also extends to the center of his metaphysics. The concept of the monad as the individual substance is the characteristic idea of modern philosophy. The concept of individuality was thus incorporated into Western metaphysical thought. Of equal importance was Leibniz's return to the concept of purpose in the metaphysical and epistemological sphere. From then on, the idea of purpose, banished by rationalism, was the constant companion of the problem of the irrational, until Kant succeeded in finding a clear, unambiguous relationship between the problem of individuality and teleology in the Critique of Judgment.

The real place where a thinker of secular significance can express spiritual upheavals is the

* Gerhardt HL p. 387.

² Die Entst. d. neueren Aesth. p. 102.

is logic. If Leibniz is supposed to have felt the problem of the irrational in all its force, then this must have been felt above all in his logical designs. Of course, Leibniz did not succeed in achieving the logical reformation he had planned. He only left the beginnings. As he never tired of pointing out, the logic he had developed so far was inadequate. It only moves in the sphere of the past, but it fails before the future. The immense realm of the probable remains closed to it,¹ it has no organon for invention, i.e. for the search for new truths. The contrast between Leibniz's planned logic and the rationalist logic is the same as that between pensee vraie and pensee ingenieuse. What matters is invention, not just correctness. Of course, as soon as one enters the realm of invention, the standards of rational rules disappear, and the logic of invention is therefore identical with a logic of the merely probable.² Again and again in the *Nouveaux Essais*, thought returns to the logic of the probable.³ This logic is Leibniz's unhappy love: he feels the need to write the logic of the irrational without being able to satisfy it. The tenaciously pursued plan of an *ars combinatoria* contains the exaggeration of the idea of the *ars inveniendi*; Leibniz thus paid his tribute to the rationalism of his mathematical century. The idea of this *ars combinatoria* contains a tremendous concept. Nothing less is intended than a rationalization of the divine mind. In possession of the art of combination, we would dominate the whole of reality; there would be no more chance, nothing unknown and surprising: the perfect logic of invention would make all invention superfluous.⁴ There must still be undiscovered truth where there is to be talk of invention, just as there is only truth in relation to a realm of un-

¹Theodicy I, § 28. Erdm. S. 488.

²Theodicy, I, § 31.

³Nouv. Ess. II, 21, § 66, Erdm. 266; IV, 2, § 14, Erdm. 344; IV, 17, § 5, Erdm. 397 f.

-See W. Windelband, *Gesch. d. neueren Philos.* 5th ed. I. P. 465.

of discovered values still makes sense to talk about genius. The *ars combinatoria* presents the irrational as overcome. If one adopts this point of view, the principe de contradiction and the principe du meilleur, necessary and accidental truths, coincide. This is possible for the eye of God, not for human eyes. The 18th century dropped the idea of *ars combinatoria* with right instinct and adhered to the logic of probability and invention in general. At the same time, moving further and further away from Wolff's idolatry of the principe de contradiction, it moved ever closer to the idea of the principe du meilleur. This development reaches its climax in Kant's Critique of Judgment. The teleological principle corresponds to the principe du meilleur; in the idea of a contemplative understanding, however, a memory of the *ars combinatoria* resonates.

e. Crousaz

H. v. Stein has established the historical proportion: Leibniz relates to Descartes like the aesthetics of delicacy to Malherbe and Boileau. Like Descartes to the views of classicism, Leibniz gives metaphysical support to the aesthetic formula of Bouhours, La Motte, etc.¹ The proportion is correct down to the last detail. Boileau's and Bouhours' aesthetics relate to each other like Decartes' *res cogitans* to Leibniz's monad, or "soul". The formula that most effectively expresses the contrast to classicism: unity in multiplicity, arises from the spirit of Leibniz's system.² Crousaz, who was probably the first to use the formula "variete reduite à quelque unite"³ in an aesthetic context, is a Cartesian who has read Leibniz. The fact that he is more inclined towards Descartes than Leibniz makes his witty aesthetic treatise even more historically valuable.

¹ Entst. d. neueren Aesth. p. 108.

² Monadology § 13. Letter to Wagner, 4. VI. 1710. Erdm. S. 466.

³ Traite du beau. 1715. p. 50.

We see the power with which the new initially asserts itself even in a conservative thinker.

Crousaz has the Cartesian position towards "passion" and "coeur". Nevertheless, he is unable to prevent the penetration of "feeling" into his philosophy. It is already an approximation to the educational ideal of delicacy when he applies the requirement of multiplicity to man: whoever is only a mathematician, painter, judge, lacks multiplicity, i.e. a main condition of beauty.¹ The reproach of "school foxery" is thus metaphysically justified! - The problem that makes Crousaz's writing so historically interesting is the following. Beauty cannot be abandoned to passion without descending to a mere whim. Rather it is made the object of a judgment of "cold blood".² For beauty is not a mere *je ne sais quoi* or a caprice, taste is not a mere whim (*fantaisie*).³ Crousaz obviously feels, however, that the judgment of cold blood does not answer the question. He seems to seek a middle ground between passion and reason when he says that there are abstract men (*speculatifs*) who respect feeling for nothing, and others again who abandon themselves entirely to feelings. Sentiment would be suitable for this middle ground. But this seems to have to be counted as passion, and is therefore to be kept apart from beauty. This is how I explain to myself that Crousaz sometimes allows beauty to be judged by "cold blood",⁴ - when he counts sentiment as part of passion, sometimes separates beauty and beauty, pleasure and pleasure, when he admits a "passion" of a new, nobler kind, i.e. sentiment.⁵ The characteristic of sentiment for Crousaz (as for Bouhour's characteristic of the "surprising idea") is that it is difficult to describe.

¹ *Traite*, p. 19.

⁵,³ y a donc une beaute independante de sentiment, et notre esprit renferme des principes speculatifs qui nous apprennent à décider, de sang froid, si un objet est beau, ou ne l'est pas." (*Traite* p. II.)

³ *Traitö*, p. 10.

⁴ *TraitS*, p. 3, II.

⁵ *Traite*, p. 10.

¹ It is the old criterion of rationalism: what is true must also be expressible in words. Tschirnhausen supplements Descartes' criterion of truth with this thought.² The latter did not take into account that we possess an *imaginatio* which can also bring falsehood to our inner evidence. How are we to distinguish the truth of reason from the error of imagination? The answer is: what is "comprehended" by reason can be expressed and taught; the impressions of the *imaginatio* cannot be put into words. The philosophy of reason defines sensory imagination, like feeling, by "what cannot be said"; it becomes aware of its limits at the same time as the limits of linguistic expression.³ Is it a coincidental coincidence that the theory of taste is born at the moment when rationalism begins to pay attention to the inexpressible of the *imaginatio* (Malebranche, Tschirnhausen)? It is the same problem: one can only argue about taste because the aesthetic impression cannot be put into words, cannot be "grasped". The great historical achievement of the theory of taste is to have resolutely taken up the problem of the inexpressible (the alogical) at a time when epistemology just barely conceded the usability of the imagination under the strict guidance of reason. It was an act within the rationalist tradition that Tschirnhausen conceded "how more than one is inclined to believe, a well-guided imagination can provide excellent help to the intellect in the search for truth."⁴ From here to the moment when, in A. G. Baumgarten developed the idea of a science of sensory cognition independent of logic (parallel to it, not "guided" by it) - is a long way. It would probably never have been pursued had it not been for the question of

¹ *Traite*, p. 8.

² cf. J. Verweyen: E. W. von Tschirnhausen als Philosoph. Diss. Bonn. 1905. S. 68.

³ The word alogical clearly expresses the identity of the boundaries of language and reason.

⁴ "quam insigne, et plus quam credi potest utile, *imaginatio* bene gubernata intellectui in indaganda veritate adferat adiumentum." (*Medicina mentis*. 2nd ed. 1695. p. 185.)

sensory (i.e. non-rational) cognition, which logic and epistemology so timidly took up, would have been dealt with again and again by a new science: aesthetics. The close connection between logical and aesthetic interests, which is characteristic of nascent aesthetics, has its deepest reason in the fact that the theory of taste takes up a problem whose solution would actually have fallen to logic. On the other hand, it is no coincidence that it was precisely aesthetics that took up the emerging problem of the "unspeakable". Perhaps the time sensed that artistic form was a means of grasping the unspeakable, of capturing it, that it was by reflecting on this new language that the mystery of the irrational could best be tracked down.

For the people of the Renaissance, the work of art was a quantity firmly defined and precisely measured by the rules of the ancients. The emergence of the concept of taste indicates a more personal way of experiencing the works of poetry and painting. One senses that, beyond all norms and the fulfillment of standards, there is something hidden in the beautiful image that perhaps constitutes its best. The delicate (surprising), the *je ne sais quoi*, that which can only be grasped through sentiment - what do these expressions mean other than a reference to the inexhaustible individuality of the artistic image. This (objective) individuality cannot be discovered without also discovering the inexpressible in the subjective experience of it. However, the *je ne sais quoi* of one's own experience is not - and this gives meaning to the whole event - accepted as something insurmountably factual, but one tries to make the silent experience speak. In this way, the individual experience of art, unknown to the Renaissance, which, although different for each person, nevertheless seems to have a law and a rule, generates the theory of taste in the midst of rationalism, and with it modern criticism. For communicability is the criterion of comprehensibility. The *je ne sais quoi* has such great historical significance because, in an age that values the conceptual above all else, it declares the incomprehensible. It forms the antithesis to the

concept and was thus suitable for prompting an examination of the foundations of the theory of the concept.

C r o u s a z still equates the *je ne sais quoi* with a mere caprice.¹ He does not fall for the idea that the sentiment, which he admits alongside passion, is this *je ne sais quoi*. That would be too much for a Cartesian. Nothing is more instructive than to see how sentiment nevertheless springs, as it were against his will, from his Cartesian thoughts. Since the nature of the human mind, he concludes, consists in thinking, we are made to think.² "Et puisque la pensee est un acte qui se sent, il est encore manifeste que nous sommes nes pour vivre penetres de sentiments."³ This *salto mortale* of the Cartesian is no mere individual event. We will see that Wolff progresses from the Cartesian definition of pleasure to a radical emotional subjectivism. There was an interesting psychology hidden in Descartes' epistemology. One only needed to emphasize the act "*qui se sent*" in the "*cogitatio*" - and one was in the midst of the realm of the experiences of subjective consciousness.⁴

But a Cartesian could also find his way to a theory of sentiment from Leibnizian inspiration.

¹Traite du beau. S. 10.

²I must give the continuation in the original, because the peculiar phrase cannot be translated.

³Traite p. 73. In the same place we find the idea that Dubos later helped to make effective: that boredom is the most unbearable of all states and that we work hard to escape it. However, Crousaz still excludes the painful sensations that Dubos (pleasure in cruel games, in tragedy) incorporates with deeper psychology. According to Crousaz, greatness, novelty and difference are above all what give us vivid feelings (sentiments vifs). (S.74.)

⁴In his logic, too, Crousaz slips unexpectedly into psychology. He traces clarity back to being conscious, the clarity of ideas to being conscious of them. The peculiar thing is that clarity is based on lucidity. For the most vivid idea ("*qui se fait le mieux sentir*") is both the clearest and the most distinct, because that which vividly imposes itself on the inner consciousness is more easily grasped by the attention. Clarity and distinctness are thus always united. (La Logique ou Systeme de reflexions, qui peuvent contribuer à la nettete, et à l'etendue de nos connaissances. III. 3rd ed. Amsterdam 1725. p. 37.)

The theory underlying Crousaz's aesthetic views, which we will now discuss, is obviously based on the principle of continuity in cognition. The train of thought can be imagined as follows: the confused idea contains, confused into one, what the intellect has set apart in the clear idea; it is a preliminary stage of the clear idea. The state in which we have a confused idea is that of sentiment. The feeling, the mere opinion, is therefore a precursor of the well-founded view. The two cannot come into conflict. "Good taste makes us immediately appreciate through feeling what reason would have approved if it had taken time to examine it sufficiently to judge it according to exact concepts."¹ Thus feeling is, as it were, an analogon rationis. Only now does the Cartesian have the courage to entrust the beautiful to feeling. "Beauty precedes our considerations; our heart pays homage to it without questioning the concepts of the mind."² This is the most beautiful sentence in Crousaz's treatise; it did not fail to have an effect on J. U. König either. Sentiment is recognized, even if only as a precursor of reason. If reason were to examine the judgment of sentiment, it would have to come to the same conclusion. In sentiment we do not depart entirely from reason; the way back to it always remains open.³ Untangle the confused, and one will arrive at clear ideas. It is enough that rationalism does not completely reject confusion and the multiplicity that lies within it in favor of the unity of reason. The confusion is no longer felt to be entirely unpleasant; it has a certain charm, if one only retains the certainty that it will finally resolve itself into clarity. -

¹ "Le bon goüt nous fait d'abord d'estimer par sentiment ce que la raison aurait approuve, apres qu'eile se serait donne le temps de l'examiner assez pour en juger sur - de justes idees." (Traite du beau. p. 68.)

² "La beaute previent nos r^flexions; notre coeur lui rend hommage sans consulter les idees de notre esprit . . ." (Traite du beau p. 63.)

³ Likewise Trevisano. He speaks of a sentimento "ehe sempre goda di conformarsi, a quanto la ragione acconsente." (Trevisano p. 63.)

According to Crousaz¹, good taste can be innate, but it is usually acquired (improved). One learns from a master to compare the features of the picture with the object, one reflects, and only then does one feel. Habit causes these feelings to arise more and more rapidly; finally they come before our reflection, and from then on we judge by taste.² This theory intensifies the general rationalism of Crousazian aesthetics by several degrees. Taste is (in most cases) a consideration that has become a "skill". In German Enlightenment philosophy, "skill" (to which taste and virtue were primarily attributed) played a major role. However, the term probably did not originate from Crousaz's concept of taste, but from Wolff's *Psychologia empirica* (*habitus*). - Trevisano already speaks of "quel abito, ehe noi diciamo buon gusto." (p. 76, cf. 65.) Gottsched also calls practiced taste a "skill" (*in den vernünftigen Tad-lerinnen*, 1725, 5th part); also Bodmer in the writing on the power of imagination (1727) in the dedication letter to Wolff.

f. Dubos

Only four years separate Crousaz' *Traite* from Dubos' reflections; but we believe we are in a different century. Feeling, as an analogon rationis just barely allowed, pushes reason into a defensive position with one blow. How can this be explained? - If the new ideas were already capable of influencing a Cartesian as strongly as we observe in Crousaz, how powerful they had to become in a mind far removed from the strict school I Dubos was inspired by Addison (and Shaftesbury?); the aesthetics of delicacy could unfold unhindered in him. We get an aesthetic of the sentiment that has shed the last glimmer of rationalism. For Crousaz, beauty ultimately coincided with expediency.

¹ The theory of confused sensations just developed refers to this case.

² "... ils precedent enfin des reflexions, et des lors on juge par goüt." (S. 68.)

It revealed a pre-established harmony between the nature of things and their impressions on us, between these impressions and the feelings that accompany them.⁽¹⁾ His taste is classical. He rejects figurative expression (*le style figure*) in almost crude terms: To imagine one thing under the image of another is good for those who have a bad cause to champion. Metaphorical expressions should be transformed into simple ones.³ How far Dubos is from this metaphysics of beauty and this taste! His book is the revolt of common sense not only against metaphysics, but also against logic. Crousaz wanted to shade the speculative type; Dubos rejects it. The judgment *par voye d'analyse* is far inferior in value to the judgment *par voye de sentiment*.⁴ The purpose of art is to move us; a poem or painting that does not move me is not good. But it is feeling, not reason, that tells me what moves me. Therefore, it is feeling that tells us whether a work achieves its purpose, not reason, which calculates its perfections and shortcomings. The path of discussion and dissection (analysis) is good for finding the cause of pleasure; but it can never decide the question of whether something pleases or displeases. Here reason (*le raisonnement*) must submit to the judgment of feeling/⁵ Dubos explicitly compares the judgment of art to the tongue's judgment of a ragout. At the same time, however, he gives the judgment of taste a brief but deeply penetrating characterization (which, historically speaking, forms the middle link between Gracian and König-Baumgarten). Feeling is a sense that judges the value of works of art⁶; it is the eye when it comes to paintings, the ear when it comes to words or song.

¹ "convenance des choses." (S. 125.)

² p. 64 ff.

³ Logique. III. p. 94 ff.

⁴ *Reflexions critiques sur la poesie et sur la peinture*. 1719. II, p. 208
(quoted from the Utrecht edition of 1732)

⁵ *Reflexions* II, p. 177 f.

⁶ "Il est en nous un sens destine pour juger du merite de ces ouvrages . . ." etc. (*Reflexions critiques*, II, p. 178.)

acts. This judging sense (*iudicium sensuum*, says Baumgarten later) is a part of us and speaks "without rule or compass". Unfortunately, Dubos once used the word "sixth sense"¹; the polemic against this term was thought to have deprived us of any further investigation of the fruitful idea of a "judgmental" sense.

Dubos' connection between judgment and emotion is nothing new. Pascal puts judgment and feeling together in the same way as science and spirit.² And Muratori has already explained everything Dubos says in more detail. (The main passage on judgment is the 10th chapter of *Perf. poesia I.* 2nd book). The power of judgment (*il giudizio*) is a main component of good taste. It consists in knowing and distinguishing the value of all truths, sciences and arts.³ It is a faculty of discernment and choice - "un discernimento dell' ottimo."⁴ Giudicare and gustare are used synonymously.⁵ The power of judgment is king in us, "as it were judge of all our actions and thoughts."⁶ It is a rare virtue. A mediocre knowledge, combined with great judgment, is better than a wonderful knowledge with an extraordinary mind (*ingegno*), but without judgment. The power of judgment must therefore be distinguished from intellect (*intelletto*) and spirit (*ingegno*). Muratori refers to Quintilian. He who lacks the *iudicium*, says the latter, is deceived by the appearance of goodness.⁷ Obviously, there is an error in the

¹ *Reflexions II*, 179.

² "Car le jugement est celui à qui appartient le sentiment, comme les Sciences appartiennent à l'esprit." (*Pensees. Art. VII. 34.*)

³ "Consiste ancora il ben conoscere e distinguere il merito e il prezzo di tutte le verità, ehe si possone acquistare, e il valore di tutte l'arti e scienze . ." (Delle riflessioni sopra il buon gusto. I. p. 134.) The task of good taste is "rintracciare e sapere quanto vaglia ogni arte o scienza." (S. 137.)

⁴ *Rifless. II. P. 24; 27.*

⁵ Della perf. poesia. I. p. 4; 282. giudizio for intelletto is probably also written in between. (ib. I. p. 180 f.)

⁶ "abitando esso in noi come re, come giudice di tutte le azioni, e dei ragionamenti nostri ." (I, 370.)

⁷ *Rifless. I, 371.*

value judgment is meant. The iudicium is thus above all the ability to correctly assess the value of things. Since this value cannot be determined intellectually, but depends on the subjects and circumstances (on sentimento, opinion, feeling), it is understandable that iudicium is related to taste. Sentiment and judgement, buon gusto and giudizio denote the same thing: the unfounded, unteachable¹ reaction of the subject taking a stand on the impressions. He who immediately judges correctly what has value for him is called wise, he has a sound mind.² He who knows how to evaluate things correctly in art and science possesses "good taste".

Although theory is otherwise not his concern, Muratori also mentions a philosophically more far-reaching characteristic of the power of judgment that is of particular interest to us. The conception of the judgment of taste as a judgment of value is of Gracian origin. Muratori adds the definition: the power of judgment is a faculty that is based on the "contemplation of individuals and individual things; and since these are, so to speak, innumerable, the laws and rules of the power of judgment are also innumerable".³ The mind (ingegno) and the imagination tolerate rules and follow general laws. The power of judgment measures its pronouncements according to individuals and circumstances. It constantly needs new laws; considerations that fit one case but not another.⁴ Thus it is the faculty that decides when something is appropriate. It is concerned with the appropriateness of the words to the object, of the means to the end,⁵

¹ Quintilian's "nec magis arte traditur, quam gustus aut odor." (Inst or. VI, 6) is quoted with preference.

² Muratori therefore also calls the giudizio prudenza and diritta ragione. (I, 371.)

³⁾ giudizio e una vertu, ehe si fonda sulla considerazione de gl'individui, e delle cose particolari; e perche queste son per cosi dire innumerabili, perciö innumerabili ancor sono le leggi, e le regole del giudizio." (I, 371.)

* "misure le sue sentenze seconda la disposizione de gli individui, delle circostanze, e particolarità, usando continuamente nuove leggi, riflessioni, applicabili ad una, e non alle altre occasioni." (I, 372.)

⁶ "Tra le infinite immagini, ehe potran pararsi davanti alla fantasia... dovrä il guidizo, ben considerando il fine di chi scrive, le circostanze, il decoro, e le qualità della materia ..." (I, 372.)

and chooses what suits itself.¹ In short, it is the capacity of poetic economy (l'economia poetica).

But it is not only the definition of the power of judgment as a mediator between the spirit and particular things, as a faculty of applying the rules of beauty to individual cases² that anticipates ideas from Kant's "Critique of Judgment". Muratori also attributes to the giudizio a property that plays a major role in the preliminary stage to the Critique of Judgment, the "Critique of Taste" under the name of reflection.³ The power of judgment, he says, causes me to put myself in the place of another and to ask: how would I express it if I were Petrarch? If I found this image in another's work, how would I like it?⁴ This may sound a little like the poetic recipe book: there is something peculiar in the connection of thought with the concept of judgment. Putting oneself in the place of another is a significant process for aesthetics (also for the psychological justification of aesthetic criticism), and the connection of this process with a certain logical-psychological term is not a merit to be underestimated⁽⁵⁾

Dubos is not only influential and significant because of his aesthetic theory. In addition to the first aesthetics of sentimentalism⁶, his reflections also contain a new view of man: the historical view. The emergence of the historical view of life in the 18th century is linked to the emergence of the more recent

¹ "insegna fuggire tutto cio, ehe disconviene . . . all' argomento da noi impreso, e a scegliere ciö, ehe gli si conviene." (I, 372.)

² "il buon uso del giudizio . . . consiste nel saper ben'applicare a i differenti casi, o oggetti le regole del bello.". (I, 392.)

³ The word riflessioni is particularly emphasized by Muratori as an expression little known to the ancients. In its sense it is related by him to considerations of poetic probability. (Perf. poes. I, 265.)

⁴ "fingendo d'essere un altro, interroga se stesso, e dice: s'io fosse Petrarca" etc. (I, p. 373.)

⁵ Muratori is here perhaps dependent on Scaliger. Scaliger also distinguishes a judgment of choice and a judgment from a quasi-foreign point of view. (Poetices libri septem. 1561. Lib. V, 1. p. 214.)

⁶ The word understood as a parallel formation to "rationalism".

aesthetics are inextricably linked. The "new" science was the first expression of the transformation of the feeling for life that took place between the beginning and end of the 18th century. What does not find a place in traditional science takes refuge in aesthetics. Dubos was not the first aesthetician to give concepts to the historical mood of life. Muratori preceded him here too; Gianbattista Vico, who devoted his life's work to the "new science" (scienza nuova, i.e. aesthetics), was also the first great philosopher of history of the new age.¹ The fact that the aesthetes first noticed the conditionality of man by country, environment and time is connected with their attention to the differences in the tastes of nations and times. Boileau was the first to call the taste of the Renaissance "Gothic". This is meant purely as a condemnatory word, as much as overloaded, unclear. But how characteristic the historical cladding of the value judgment! The change of times is no clearer to anyone than to the critic who fights for the taste of the new generation. Criticism and historical consciousness are to a certain extent connected. Thus it happens that even the rationalist, if he is only at the same time a judge of taste, clothes his value judgment in historical form.

Muratori contrasts the improved taste of the present with the depraved taste of the previous epoch⁽²⁾ But something quite different from this awareness of changing tastes urges a relativizing view of people. The awakening of taste and aesthetic criticism is accompanied by a strengthening of national consciousness. The French and Italians became acutely aware of their own peculiarity.³ Boileau had already characterized the Italians with a

¹ On Vico, see B. Croce's *Estetica*, pp. Croce's *Estetica*, pp. 249-265 - I have treated Muratori in this context, not Vico, because the latter had an influence on German aesthetics (through the Swiss), while the latter did not.

² *Perf. poes.* I, p. 453. "il purgato gusto moderno." According to Muratori, Marino's taste prevailed from about 1620-1680. II. Salvini betrays the same awareness of the times. "La delicatezza del secolo." Note to I, p. 109.

³The process is the historical confirmation of W. v. Humboldt's idea that the progressive education of peoples is not

Bouhours treats Spaniards, Italians and Germans with the same presumptuousness. Muratori's thick book, whose very title is a declaration of war (*Della perfetta poesia itala*), is in large part a justification of Italian poetry against the attacks of the French.² Art, the language of individuality, makes modern civilized peoples aware of their national individuality. It is easy to see that this reflection on national individuality could influence the formation of a historical self-consciousness.

With Dubos, the historical sentiment achieves a sharper profile because it asserts itself against a radical rationalism. It is a consequence of his sentimentalism that Dubos replaces Descartes' reasoning, abstract, timeless *res cogitans* with the individual, concrete human being, Boileau's audience incarnating reason with the real "parterre".³ Dubos refers to the audience in a completely different sense than Boileau. A work that does not appeal to the public is no good, they both agree.⁴ But Boileau continues: people can take the false for the true for a while and admire bad things; but it is impossible that they should not like a good thing in the long run. (Preface of 1701.) Something absolute expresses itself through the audience. For Dubos, on the other hand, the real audience, i.e. a certain historical state of society, is the highest authority. There is nothing above it that justifies its taste. Just as beauty is what moves the individual, beauty is what really pleases the majority. Boileau's audience represents reason; Dubos' equalizes, but on the contrary, allows their differences to stand out more and more, because all education aims to bring out individuality.

¹ "... Laissons à l'Italie - De tous ces faux brillans l'éclatante folie." (art. poétique, ch. I.)

² I, p. 25 ff and more often. Not only poetry, but also language is attacked and defended.

³ *Reflexions* II, p. 182.

* "un ouvrage qui n'est point goûte du public est un très méchant ouvrage." (Boileau, Preface, 1701.)

Parterre is a person who no longer "represents" something, but simply is.

Dubos completes Gracian; however, the type he opposes is no longer that of the humanist, but that of the Cartesian. The timeless, isolated, rational being is replaced by the national, temporal and climatic human being living in society. Disdain for reason, praise of chance and experience, recognition of exceptions¹ are the intellectual preconditions from which Dubos' historical view of life emerges. Not only Voltaire, but also Montesquieu had a predecessor in Dubos from whom there was much to learn. (The 14th section of Part 2 of the *Reflections*, for example, deals with the physical causes of the fate of the famous centuries, the 15th with the character of nations).

In our context, Dubos' significant motif lies in the emphasis on the exception and chance. In terms of the history of philosophy, the most important task of nascent aesthetics is to keep alive the idea of the accidental, the accidentally rhyming, and the significance of the exception, which had atrophied in rationalism. The value of the happy coincidence, which does not find its condition in any rule, first becomes clear to the rationalist age in the aesthetic field, in the work of the artist. "It is impossible to weigh up exactly what must spring from the poet's happy independence."² By taking sides with sentiment, Dubos is on the side of individuality. His problem belongs to Leibniz's circle of thought. But he only agrees with Leibniz on the problem, not on the solution. This is where the German and French development of philosophy diverge - and not only for the 18th century. Dubos is the opposite of Descartes; he denies the value of *raison* in favor of sentiment. Rationalism has turned into sentimentalism. It is the

¹ II, 191, 199, 247.

² "Il est donc comme impossible d'évaluer au juste ce qui doit resulter des irregularités heureuses d'un poète . . ." (Refl. crit. II 192.)

This process was characteristic of the entire subsequent development in France. Since French rationalism did not offer the means of thought to overcome the claims contained in the problem of the individual and the accidental, this problem repeatedly had to overthrow rationalism. French thought could not come to rest because it lacked a Leibniz. In Germany, irrationalism could never become dangerous because Leibniz had incorporated it into his thinking from the outset and provided his successors with rational means of overcoming it⁽¹⁾.

It is this point of view that saves German philosophy from relapsing into irrationalism. Its role in the history of philosophy is so easily overlooked only because Wolff's philosophy, through its excessive and pedantic use, has caused a kind of purposeful horror among historians. However, one must not allow Wolff's justification of daylight (that it is useful to us for reading) to prevent us from recognizing the deeper philosophical function of the concept of purpose. Purpose is the rational answer to the problem of the irrational. What did not find a place within the mechanical regularity of the modern scientific world view could find a rational justification within Leibnizian philosophy through the concept of purpose. Within Cartesianism, on the other hand, the only option was to deny the irrational - or to throw oneself into the arms of irrationalism.

¹ One could argue that in Germany, alongside Leibnizian and Wolffian philosophy, there was always a counter-current (Thomasius, Budde, Rüdiger and their students), which also amounted to a kind of sentimentalism. On the other hand, there were enough rationalists in France alongside Dubos. - This secondary current is present in Germany, but it is not decisive for the development. Leibniz's school is the driving force behind this development. We therefore have a right to neglect this secondary current in the overall assessment. On the other hand, Dubos is certainly not characteristic of 1719, but in the context of French intellectual development, his appearance nevertheless seems epoch-making, because he shows for the first time the reversal that would recur from then on. It is therefore justified to contrast only Leibniz (and his school) and Dubos, even though there were other ideas besides them. What was going on at that time is not to be learned from the individual phenomena, but, as always, from the context of history.

This oscillation between *raison* and *sentiment*, which the German development put an end to with the *Critique of Judgement*, gave the French aesthetics of the 18th century its character. To put it in terms of two key names, it oscillated between Crousaz and Dubos.

On the whole, the rational direction is victorious. But it is repeatedly made uncertain by the sentimental. Mme. Dacier, Andre, Voltaire and Batteux represent the strictly rational aesthetic.¹ Voltaire distinguishes between sensual taste and artistic taste. "Et comme les arts ont des beautes reelles, il y a un bon goüt qui les discerne, et un mauvais goüt qui les ignore"² But he also writes: "the feeling of beauties and faults in all the arts is an immediate distinction like that of the tongue and the palate; like the latter, it comes before reflection. Batteux also calls taste a knowledge of the rules through feeling and considers this way of recognizing much finer and more certain than that of the mind.⁴ Diderot expressly rejects the idea that beauty is more a matter of feeling than of reason. Feeling only grasps the relatively beautiful. The intellect pronounces that the object is beautiful.⁵ The explanation of taste, on the other hand, sounds quite different: it is an acquired ability to recognize the true or the good.

¹ Andre: "I call beau ... ce qui a droit de plaire à la raison et à la reflexion par son excellence propre, par sa propre lumiere ou par sa justesse et si Fon me permet le terme, par son agrement intrinseque. '(E. Krantz, *L'esth. de Desc.* p. 327.)

² Article "Goüt in the *Dictionnaire philosophique*. Oeuvres complets. 1875. vol. 40. p. 485.) Batteux: 'J1 ne peut y avoir de bonheur pour l'homme qu'autant que ses goüts sont conformes à sa raison." (After M. Schenker, Ch. Batteux and his theory of imitation in Germany. 1909. S. 11.)

"le sentiment des beautes et des defauts dans tous les arts: c'est un discernement prompt comme celui de la langue et du palais* et qui Previent comme lui la reflexion ..." (Encyclopedie Tome VTL Art. "Goüt .)

* Le goüt is a connaissance des regles par le sentiment. Cette maniere de les connaitre est beaucoup plus fine et plus sûre que celle de l'esprit ..." (Schenker, ib. p. 19.)

⁵ Encyclopedia, Art. "Beau." Tome II. P. 170.

to seize it, with the relationships that make it beautiful; and to be immediately and vividly moved by it.¹ Montesquieu follows Dubos' sentimentalism. What we have in his article "Goüt" in the Encyclopaedia is a continuation of Dubos' aesthetics. Natural taste is an "immediate subtlety in the application of rules, even those that are unknown."² D'Alembert, who completes Montesquieu's article, re-establishes the predominance of rationalism. He wants to decide the often debated question: "whether feeling is preferable to intellectual reasoning in the judgment of an aesthetic work?". From an idea that both parties recognize, he wants to convey: taste is not arbitrary. The immediate impression (l'impression) is the natural judge of the first moment, the intellectual discussion that of the second. - The juxtaposition of the two theories is of course not a solution. Certainly, taste is not a matter of arbitrariness. Is it true, then, that the first impression always coincides with subsequent reflection? By simply making this assertion, d'Alembert avoids the difficulty. The goal that d'Alembert sets for aesthetics shows that the rationalism that he obviously wants to save from Montesquieu is not more deeply founded. For "tracing the principles of our aesthetic and pleasurable feelings back to a small number of unassailable observations about our way of feeling" is the task of psychological aesthetics⁽⁸⁾ There is no standard of beauty (which is d'Alembert's main concern) in this way. For d'Alembert, the rationalism of taste is a matter of will and tradition, not of principles. His principles are

¹"Une facilite acquise par les experiences reiterees, à saisir le vrai ou le bon, avec la circonference qui le rend beau, et d'en etre promptement et vivement touche." (Essai sur la peinture, chap. VII...)

²"une application prompte et exquise des regles meme que Ton ne connaît pas." The general definition of taste is: "ce qui nous attache à une chose par le sentirnent."

³"reduire les principes de nos plaisirs en matiere de goüt à un petit nombre d'observations incontestables sur notre maniere de sentir." (Encyclop. Art. "Goüt".)

Locke's; the tradition is Boileau's. D'Alembert does not seem to be aware of the resulting philosophical anarchy. The words: "Thus in aesthetics half a philosophy leads away from the true, and a whole one back to it"¹ are very good. But d'Alembert has not shown the path that leads to the true.

g. France and Germany

The development was different in Germany because Locke could not achieve the influence here that he had in Cartesian France. Only alongside Wolff's school did Locke win over German thought; this school itself remained free of him to a surprising degree.² Leibniz blocked Locke's path. But another circumstance, not philosophical but cultural-historical, prevents the penetration of sentimentalism. France still upheld aesthetic rationalism out of artistic tact, as it were, when the principles had long since abandoned it. But it could at least have given in to its strong inclination towards Dubos' sentimentalism. It had a mature, educated society whose tastes had long been fixed. It was possible to leave sentiment to its own devices: it would only ever teach what corresponded to everyone's opinion. Thus there was no thinker in France around the middle of the century who, despite all rationalism, did not completely trust instinctive taste. German thinkers, on the other hand, did not have a classical literature behind them, but in front of them. They wanted to create a society united by a uniform taste. It is difficult for us today to imagine the desolation of taste that surrounds them. Dubos' parterre listened to Racine's verses; Gottsched's audience roared over the pickled herring. The French theory of taste could dispense with *raison* without danger; the aesthetics of the

¹ "Ainsi dans les matières de goût, une demie philosophie nous écarte du vrai, et une philosophie mieux étendue nous y ramène." (Art. "Goût".)

²cf. Wolff's rejection of the critique of the concept of substance in *Ontologia*. § 773, nota.

Germans initially had to mistrust feeling. The fact that the German theorists, who were so far below Dubos in terms of experience and taste, did not follow him is to be understood teleologically, as it were. German aesthetics paved the way for German classical poetry. Gottsched's and the Swiss' theory of taste is to be understood and evaluated in terms of this goal, not through an arbitrary comparison with contemporary phenomena in other countries.¹ One must not compare Gottsched with Dubos, but one must compare the entire German aesthetics of the 18th century with the entire French aesthetics of the 18th century. Only in the context does each individual phenomenon receive its relief. As long as it is only taken by itself, we do not know what is inherent in it. In the historical context, however, Gottsched and Bodmer are as much superior to Dubos as the German aesthetics of the end of the century are superior to the French aesthetics of the same period. Neither of them can be excluded from the development that they help to shape; each of them (from a historical point of view) does not receive its value through itself, but through what it contributes to the common development. From this point of view, Gottsched and Bodmer, who naturally lose out in a direct comparison with the knowledgeable and tasteful Dubos, stand very high. They gave what the moment demanded - a moment that already carried the "Critique of Judgment" in its bosom. We owe a considerable part of the educational basis on which our philosophy and literature have developed to the clear feeling and sharp eye of these much-maligned "rationalists". At first, this meant a step backwards to Boileau. But without norms, progress for the better was not possible. Where norms are established, says H. v. Stein, there the creation of a classical aesthetics is undertaken.¹ Admittedly, those men in practice

¹ The treatment of the subject in Braitmaier's book ("Geschichte der poetischen Theorie und Kritik von den Diskursen der Maler bis auf Lessing", 1889) lacks even the faintest trace of historical attitude.

¹ Origin of modern aesthetics. S. 272.

often went too far, would have liked to regulate taste. This does not erase their deeper intention. History is fairer than men; it also reckons with what is wanted. What König, Gottsched and Bodmer wanted has never been lost to German aesthetics, despite the fact that they soon fought against it.

Explanations based on the historical situation, as we have just attempted, usually lead to the erroneous opinion that the culturally and historically inferior part is also the weaker one in theory. Not only would Dubos' France be superior to Wolff's Germany in terms of culture, but Dubos' theory would also have to be called more fruitful than the rationalistic Gottsched and the Swiss within the timeless thought context of aesthetics. Dubos' emphasis on the emotional moment is undoubtedly a great merit. The problem was thereby intensified, the solution became more urgent. But one must never forget that it was only the question that was formulated here. Dubos had not provided a solution. The judgment of sentiment, which he considered a solution, is only a starting point for deeper investigation, not an end point. If we look at what Dubos and the German theorists contributed to the eventual solution, we can see that the scales are roughly equal. In Dubos we find the approach to a treatment of the judgment of feeling as a judgment of value. We will discover something similar in Gottsched, only here the starting point is not feeling but reason. As far apart as these poles are, the direction towards the rational solution is the same. The thought leading to the solution, however germinal it may be, is ultimately what matters in historical evaluation.

In their rejection of sentimentalism, Gottsched and Bodmer are guided by an insight into the main weakness of Dubos' aesthetic. If what pleases the public is beautiful, where is the beauty? Dubos assures us that for him the word audience only includes people of understanding.¹ But how does one acquire the

¹ *Reflexions II*, p. 163.

Taste of comparison,¹ which constitutes understanding? Who tells us that this taste is the right one? Or, as Crousaz has expressed the problem, whether what they like is worthy of this liking.² The rationalist's question shows that Dubos has decided nothing; sentimentalism knows no answer to it. In turning back to Boileau was the correct thought that the path of sentimentalism ends the moment it begins. The path that Dubos had pointed out with his reference to the investigation of the causes of pleasure was followed by the English. Although it did not lead to a classical aesthetic, it did lead to a theory of art and a psychological analysis of aesthetic phenomena.

The question of "sentimentalism or rationalism" was a question of fate at the beginning of the 18th century. There were only two possibilities for an epoch that did not want to abandon either one or the other, but also did not want to surrender to either of them: rationalism could take sentiment under control, or sentimentalism had to use reason as a means to its ends. The first option was realized in Germany, the second in France. Until Rousseau, the two currents coexisted here. Around the middle of the century, the turnaround took place, sentimentalism became the victor, the pathos of the sentimental subject took reason into its service and ultimately brought about the revolution. This is the practical-political solution to the problem of individuality: the subject tears itself away from its ties, but at the same time - and therein lies the peculiarity of the French synthesis of sentimentalism and rationalism - invokes the eternally valid norms of "human rights". The synthesis was revolutionary, i.e. without substance, because there is no objective principle in sentimentalism per se, and the mere amalgamation with reason, which is supposed to replace this deficiency, is not a fixed principle.

¹ "gout de comparaison." (Refl. II, p. 184.)

² "que ce qui leur a plu étoit effectivement bien digne de plaisir. (Crousaz, Traité du beau. p. 81.)

can result. It was and is France's fate not to find the mediation between sentiment and *raison*. In Germany, on the other hand, the entire 18th century was spent seeking nothing other than this mediation. The ultimate result of this endeavor is the educational ideal of Goethe, Humboldt, Schiller and Hegel's philosophy of history. The development is purely internal - but it has a lasting intellectual result.

Chapter 2: Taste

Nothing is more damaging to the historical understanding of the 18th century than the buzzword "rationalism". Certainly that period, especially the first half, was rationalistic. But this rationalism is a goal, not a fact. People were as little "rationalist" back then as they are today. What Wolff, Gottsched and many others taught, and from which we today get to know that time in a very one-sided way, once sounded young and new, even revolutionary. It asserted itself by fighting against what was outdated and against what was always opposed to reason. The first aesthetic writings in Germany were pamphlets, battle cries. The "good taste", education, philosophy turned against taste. We learn from Joh. Ulrich König's, Gottsched's and Bodmer's caveats against "obstinacy", against aesthetic arbitrariness and the saying "everyone has his own taste" (or *de gustibus non est disputandum*) that the appeal to subjective "taste" very quickly became popular.¹ It will have been no less popular then than it is today. It would be a mistake to regard these writings as simple reflections of the times. In any case, what Gottsched and Bodmer originally had in mind was the opposite of the school foxery for which it is generally taken. They rescued the dignity of beauty, which was threatened by the new attitude of "taste". At the time of Gottsched's first appearance, it took more intellectual courage to recognize standards in an area that seemed liberated from the rule of scholarly pedantry and abandoned to individual arbitrariness than it takes today to reject all standards.

¹ Even Wolff quotes the "suum cuique pulchrum". (Ps. emp. § 543 nota.)

The rationalism of German aesthetics around 1730 was undoubtedly a reaction. The problem of individuality, which had announced itself so promisingly, has disappeared. Boileau's abstract *raison* reappeared. This relapse to the aesthetics of "truth" and "unity" corresponds to Wolff's partial relapse from Leibniz to Descartes. Nevertheless, Wolff, the intellectual backer of Gottsched and the Swiss, is the worthy grandfather of German aesthetics. With him, philosophy became a matter of German education. A nation beginning its ascent to education could not begin with Leibniz, who represented the European culture of his time. The strict school of Wolffian "reason" had to be passed through before the great problems of Leibnizian philosophy could be tackled by the less bold. The mixture of Descartes and Leibniz (and a good bit of scholasticism) that Wolff offered was the right one. It maintained the link with the great philosophical tradition and at the same time made up for what France had already gone through in Cartesianism over half a century earlier. When Wolff's school liberated the minds in Germany, the problem that had dominated Leibniz's field of vision also reappeared. The second generation of the Wolffian school turned its attention back to the problem of individuality. By the middle of the century, all the deeper minds of the nation were already working on its solution.

The attempts to solve the problem of taste undertaken in Germany around 1730 can be divided into two groups. Joh. U. König wrote his "Untersuchung von dem guten Geschmack in der Dicht- und Redekunst" (1727) with precise knowledge of the entire French aesthetic literature published up to 1726 and in close connection with Crousaz. The mood of Bodmer's and Gottsched's aesthetic writings from the period after 1727 is markedly different from this. The common difference between the two in relation to J. U. König lies in their fight against the *Emotion*.¹ Bodmer fights without mentioning the name of the opponent¹Used mixed with "feeling" in accordance with the usage of the time.

against Dubos. Gottsched openly joins Boileau in a bitter attack on the doctrine of taste of sentimentalism. The point is the same. In the decisive point, in the theory of taste, Gottsched and Bodmer are completely united. The theoretical differences lay elsewhere; the main difference, however, was not theoretical but practical⁽¹⁾.

In the third decade of the 18th century, there is a party of taste and a party of the gayest in Germany. One is the party of reason, the modern French, and Canitz; the other is the Renaissance party², the party of excessive metaphor, Lohenstein's for short. In the German mirror, this opposition throws back the great historical opposition between the Renaissance and Descartes-Boileau. But there is a moment that complicates the historical situation. The opposition to the Silesian party is not initially based on the concept of reason, but on the concept of taste. This becomes clear not only from the discourses of the painters, but above all from Gottsched's moral weekly, the "Vernünftige Tadlerinnen" (1725 and 1726). It was not until around 1730 that Gottsched and Bodmer took a firm stand against taste. In the dedicatory letter to Wolff, which precedes the treatise on the power of imagination, the subject of the correspondence is touched on³, but an actual combat position against sensation and mere taste is not to be found.

¹ The "Kritische Versuche zur Aufnahme der deutschen Sprache" (Greifswald. 1742. 4. Stück), in a discussion of the 3rd edition of Gottsched's critical poetry, rightly says that there is no difference between Gottsched and Bodmer (in the "Briefwechsel von der Natur des poet Geschmacks"), except that Gottsched does not want to use the name of taste to describe beauty "furnished" according to the rules of art - whereby the speaker applauds him. (p. 431 f.) - Of course, the acceptance or rejection of the word taste is not entirely indifferent. It must be admitted that Gottsched is more alienated from the new by Boileau than the Swiss are by their association with Muratori and the English.

² the late renaissance of Maurism.

³ Taste is not "a mechanical force that is born with us", but a "skill".

not yet to be noticed. The taste of the tongue, like the metaphorical (i.e. aesthetic) taste, is given equally to all men (for what is natural is universal). Only teachers and books spoil it. It is also characteristic of Gottsched's first weekly that no opposition is yet made to taste. The problem of feeling is not yet there. The fifth piece of the "Vernünftige Tadlerinnen" (1725) deals with taste without polemics. This "figure of speech" (meaning the metaphorical expression "taste") is already in use "among all the clever peoples of Europe". One is quite justified in using this image, for it is enough that something can be found in the one (taste of the tongue) that can also be said of the other (aesthetic taste).¹ Until the end of the 3rd decade, "taste" prevailed undisputedly (apart from the opposition of the Lohenstein party, of course). Towards 1730, reason suddenly took the place of taste. What brought about this change? I suspect the influence of Dubos. The theory of extreme sentimentalism was too strange in Germany not to arouse opposition. This contradiction sharpened the awareness of the rational character of aesthetic judgment. Furthermore, "taste", which had initially been a useful weapon against the metaphorical tide, soon showed a dangerous side. It threatened to deprive poetry of any strict judgment at all. This practical moment was probably decisive for Gottsched; Dubos' theory was for Bodmer, and the endeavor to mediate between Crousaz and Dubos may have been J. U. König's motivation for distrusting sentiment without rejecting it.

That which pleases or displeases, König quotes the above passage from Crousaz, "always comes before our consideration or investigation, our soul finds a liking or disliking in the process, without the distinct be-

¹1. p. 33; here is also a passage which recurs almost verbatim in J. U. König's treatise. (On spoiled taste.)

¹ Nevertheless, general good taste (which König distinguishes from particular good taste) is based on reason. It teaches us to appreciate through sensation that which it would infallibly have approved if it had had time to investigate.² Taste is a "finished sensation" or "finished investigation", in contrast to judgment as a "thoughtful investigation".³ A perfect taste is possessed by "one who perceives like a rational, though unlearned man, and afterwards judges it like a learned man".⁴ The sensation of beauty, as we might translate it into our language, is not rational, but rationalizable.⁵

This both-and is characteristic of König's terminology. Sensation and understanding should be given equal weight. Similar to Muratori, who speaks of the pleasure of the understanding,⁶ König forms expressions such as "inner sensation of the understanding" or "taste of the understanding", which he calls a word "of a new concept". To see in this vacillation a deficiency or even merely a regrettable dependence on Wolff is naïve. When König considers both "finished sensation" and thoughtful investigation to be necessary for perfect taste, and calls each "deceitful leaders" on their own,⁸ he is speaking in all honesty the mood of a man

¹ Unders. S. 402.

² Unters. Nevertheless, sensation is sharply distinguished from judgment, linking, separating, and reasoning. (S. 420.)

³ S. 421, 423.

⁴ Under. S. 425.

⁵ König's Solomonic decision between learned and unlearned claims a certain cultural-historical interest. The era of "taste" has put an end to learned poetry. But enough of it still lives on in the "higher" poetry. König, the Saxon court poet, finds in Crousaz's aesthetics a justification of his own existence, which also wanted to mediate between intellect and "taste", learned and unlearned, court and nation.

⁶ Perf. poesia I, 53; 159.

⁷ Subs. pp. 394, 402 f, 438.

⁸ Subs. p. 424 f.

who sees a problem that he can neither solve nor wants to cover up. There is a certain wisdom in holding on to the contrast (which can also be recognized elsewhere in König's essay). He seeks a middle ground, something new, without finding it. His groping points to the future. It was Kant who first precisely defined the concept of the middle ground that König missed; one must not demand that what only more than half a century of development could produce under the most favorable circumstances be recognized at the very beginning.

König goes very far in recognizing the particular good taste, i.e. the possible and permissible deviations.¹ A difference of taste must be recognized. The very demand, says König very nicely, that one should submit to our taste would be contrary to the rules of good taste.² Roman taste is different from Venetian taste. But the difference has its limits. The proverb *de gustibus* should not be used in defense of bad taste. Although there are several ways of inventing beauty, they all come together in the end.³ Taste requires experience and practice; it can be perfected. Its rules are not arbitrarily "devised from the brain".⁴ König does not provide a real solution, even if he offers as much as d'Alembert did 30 years later. We also look in vain for a solution in Gottsched. Nevertheless, the philosophical education of this student of Wolff advances the problem of taste. It must be regarded as a historical achievement.

¹General good taste is based on reason, it is not bound to the change of time and place, nor to the difference of peoples and customs. The particular good taste varies according to nations, tempers, etc. (The opposing moments are simply placed side by side in recognition. It is quite the manner of an unphilosophical head; G. F. Meier's "solutions" are exemplified here.

²Subs. p. 446 f.

³Subs. S. 447, 469.

⁴Subs. pp. 460, 411 ff, 459.

see that critical poetry has devoted a separate main section to taste. (III. Hauptstück: Vom guten Geschmacke eines Poeten.) The author knows what is necessary. The "figure of speech" (of taste) is "now to be taken for a well-known and fully established one." It is now a matter of using it in the right sense.¹ Gottsched also seeks a word from a new concept. Good taste is "the understanding that judges correctly of the beauty of a thing according to mere sensation, in matters of which one has no clear and thorough knowledge". It belongs as a faculty to the intellect, because neither wit, nor imagination, nor reason and the senses have a right to it. "I count taste first of all as a faculty of the intellect, because I can bring it to no other faculty of the mind." "But I say that it is a judging intellect: because those who really use it to distinguish things, either externally or internally, say that this is beautiful and that is not..."²

Under the impression of König's treatise, the concentrated result of the aesthetic thinking of the French, Gottsched's theory turned out milder than could be expected from his practice. Sensation is given its due, admittedly only in the definition.³ For in practice, Gottsched had no faith in taste. The rules, not taste, were the final authority. Nevertheless, the definition should not be underestimated. As the "critical art of poetry" is the most widely read aesthetic work of the first half of the century, it has not only

¹ Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst für die Deutschen. 1730. quoted from the 2nd edition, 1737. p. 114.

² Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst. 2nd ed. 1737. p. 119. - Even the S'ne have no right to it "one would have to want to make a sixth sense of it", (ib.) The 4th edition equates this sixth sense (Dubos) with the *sensus communis* and this in turn with the understanding.

³ "I further hold that this judgment is founded on mere sensation; and understand the inward sensation of a thing which either really exists apart from us, or has been produced by our own imagination." (Krit. Dichtk. 2nd ed. p. 1191.)

generations,¹ but is also not meaningless from a factual point of view. The allusion to the "inner expression" contains an approach to a theory of the aesthetic state. And the emphasis on the judging mind proves that Gottsched did not lack a certain feel for the deeper aspects of the theory of taste of his time. With this expression we must forget the modern use of language that identifies reason and judgment. In Gottsched's time, understanding was the faculty of clear conceptions, not at all a faculty of judgment.² The expression "judging understanding" sounded new at the time; it was concise, whereas today it seems tautological to us. According to Pascal, judgment is a matter of feeling, not of understanding.³ The moment of taking a stand, which lies in judgment, makes it a subjective opinion, not a clear theory. The judging mind is therefore not the theoretical faculty at all. It is a new faculty; Gottsched just does not yet have the inner clarity to express it.⁴ The epithet "judging" is basically the same as the reference to sensation, which Gottsched repeats several times.³ The "Wörterbuch der schönen Wissenschaften" (1760) also still defines taste using the words feeling and judging. It is "the ability to judge the beauty of a poem, thought or expression.

¹ Still Goethe makes honorable mention of Gottsched's work in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. (Book VII.)

² Hildebrand (Beitr. p. 328 note) suggests for König's expression "feeling of the mind", feeling of the spirit. He remarks that the word spirit was not yet developed at that time, while on the other hand understanding was "not yet sharpened to the one-sidedness" as it is today.

³ cf. p. 51 above.

⁴ E. Reichel has correctly seen that this judging intellect, the sound reason, is not the same as the so-called common sense or even the sober dry intellect, but represents a peculiar mental faculty. (Gottsched. 1908. p. 364.) The "sound mind", on the other hand, which later plays a role in Kant's terminology, is historically related to this.

⁵ "I further hold that this judgment is based only on mere perception." Crit. Poetry, 2nd ed. Cf. also p. 114: "the sensing and judging mind..."

which for the most part have only been clearly perceived, but not tested according to the rules themselves."¹

Gottsched recognized the right of sensation in theory. That he nevertheless thinks differently from König on the question of taste is shown by his strong emphasis on the one good taste. He speaks with contempt of the stubborn people, who judge things without reason and without rules, and whose taste is the most fickle in the world. This negative statement against the individual and the actual "taste" immediately leads to an unhistorical approach. It turns out that the turn to Boileau is actually about the angel of sensation: everything else follows from the relationship to it. With feeling, the individual is discarded; with the sense of the individual, the sense of the historical justification of changing times and tastes also falls. König, who preserves the right of sentiment, also gives broad scope to individually determined ("particular") good taste. Gottsched, for whom Boileau's rules are paramount, falls back into the timeless and spaceless approach of classicism. The change in taste is based solely on the "frivolity of human minds."² This is a strong case under Dubos-König; it is the consequence of the changed basic attitude towards sensation.

Gottsched's polemic against the arbitrariness of taste cannot be denied a certain force. Here he shows the temperament of the born national pedagogue. The rules "have their reason in the unchanging nature of things themselves".³ The classical objectivism of these words deserves attention. The new theory of taste had placed the value of the beautiful thought precisely in the newness that the subjective spirit (*esprit*) finds in things. In contrast, Gottsched (following Shaftesbury) thinks that natural things are beautiful in themselves,

¹ Lexikon oder kurzgefaßtes Wörterbuch der schönen Wissenschaften und freyen Künste. 1760. article "Taste".

² Crit. Dichtk. 2nd ed. S. 92.

³ Krit. Dichtk. 2nd ed. 118 f. The following passage is on p. 127.

and if art wants to produce something beautiful, it must imitate the pattern of nature. - Here lies the philosophical justification of the theory of imitation. This theory is inseparable from all classicism, for classicism is objectivism.¹ Imitation does not necessarily have to be understood as flat duplication. Rather, the theory of imitation springs from the genuine artistic intuition that beauty has its foundation in things themselves, not in the "empty conceit" (as Gottsched says) of human beings. Goethe's basic aesthetic-philosophical creed is no different from Gottsched's on this point. One must be clear about the fact that a classical literature can only be prepared by people with a classical attitude. Gottsched's basic objectivist view, however, is genuine classicism.² "The exact proportion, the order and correct measurement of all the parts of which a thing consists is the source of all beauty."³ In order to achieve this beauty, the artist can do no better than to "imitate" the things that God has created according to number, measure and weight. The basis of both Goethean and Gottschedean classicism is a metaphysical-objectivist view of the harmony of nature.

The theory of imitation⁴ is the antithesis of the theory of taste. The reference to nature should serve as a remedy against the threat of subjectivism. Gottsched's hatred of the subjectivism of taste even makes him clairvoyant. As he cannot get rid of the "taste" that is fashionable, he seeks to

¹ If the theory of imitation were so entirely without deeper meaning, its long reign in a century as artistically gifted as the 18th could hardly be explained.

² I have already drawn Bouhours' attention to the proposition that the artist must not embellish nature. Even within the new aesthetics, objectivism persists (at least in the artistic attitude). The "embellir, enjoliver", which heralds the rococo mood opposed to classicism, is first found in Dubos. (I, 191.)

³ Crit. Dichtk. 2nd ed. S. 127.

⁴ Critical Poetry boasts in its title that it shows "everywhere" that "the inner essence of poetry consists in an imitation of nature".

at least render it harmless by distinguishing it as clearly as possible from the purely subjective reaction of the tongue. This is why he includes the following stipulation in his doctrine: "the ability of the tongue to feel is only something suffering"; taste, however, insofar as it is in the soul, is a power of the mind, i.e. something active.¹ This solid psychological foundation lends emphasis and strength to Gottsched's attacks on the individualism of taste.

The negative attitude towards sentiment, which is characteristic of Gottsched (as for Bodmer), should not be seen as a historical regression. However, the enamel that lay on Dubos' sentiment is stripped away a little too thoroughly. There is no longer any mention of the "inner tremor", the *je ne sais quoi* and the "secret magic" into which the "fine thought" had been transformed by the more psychologically oriented Dubos.² And when Gottsched calls the sixth sense (taste for beauty) understanding, this seems diametrically opposed to Dubos, who had called it sentiment. However, the corrections that Gottsched made to the concept of understanding in order to make it aesthetically useful saved precisely the most important thing: the concept of value judgment, which was inherent in "sentiment". Indeed, by calling the faculty of judgment understanding, Gottsched takes a not insignificant step forward. He transfers "judgment" to a higher faculty. This prevents a relapse into sentimentalism and yet preserves the philosophical depth of the concept of sentiment. Gottsched has thus taken the direction of the critique of judgment, which justifies taste as a higher faculty without mixing it with understanding. However, the psychological side of the concept of sentiment is neglected in favor of the logical one. It was Kant who first succeeded in separating the two elements contained in "sentiment", the

¹ Krit. Dichtk. 2nd ed.], p. 115. The idea is probably Bodmer's. See below p.

² "un freissement Interieur" . . . "un charme secret nous attache sur les imitations . . ." (Refl. I, 2.)

to understand aesthetic reaction as emotional behavior and yet to allow the "judging mind" to come into its own.

Gottsched's position in the development of German aesthetics is not described by the conventional judgments about his "rationalism" and his theory of imitation. Bodmer possessed more artistic sense; his importance for the development of thought in German aesthetics, however, is by no means greater than that of Gottsched. The strong influence of Swiss aesthetics on all the fresher minds around the middle of the century obscured the fact that Gottsched's achievement was the precondition for Bodmer's and Breitinger's deeper impact. The core of his aesthetics remained effective even after 1740, when he had lost his best followers to the Swiss. However, the immediate stimulating power of his ideas had died out by 1740. The Swiss inherited his legacy until the next generation (Nicolai and Lessing) had both Gottsched and the Swiss resign. Ideas that have long since ceased to have any promotional power for their time, however, often continue to have an effect in silence and suddenly lead to seemingly unprepared surprising achievements. The Swiss replaced Gottsched as cultural powers around 1740. The new literature was born in the air of Zurich, not Leipzig. But if one looks at the development of thought, detached from the cultural context, one realizes that the Swiss did not bring much that was new, and that the development could also lead directly from Gottsched to Baumgarten and Meier. Swiss aesthetics is only an episode in philosophical development, whereas it is an epoch in cultural development. Bodmer's philosophical talent was not great, but neither was Gottsched's. If Gottsched nevertheless has more significance for the development of philosophical thought than Bodmer, this is explained by his closer connection to Wolff's philosophy. It is true that Bodmer does not deny Wolff's influence. But he is by no means as schooled as the professor of logic and metaphysics in Leipzig. From a purely cultural-historical point of view, the assertion

The claim that Wolff's philosophy secured Gottsched's historical superiority over the Swiss could never be understood. It must be emphasized that this assertion applies to the philosophical-historical context.

At the same time as König's treatise, Bodmer and Breitinger's treatise *On the Influence and Use of the Imagination* (1727) was published. This treatise contains the first draft of a philosophical theory of taste and art, which is not only written in German, but is also of German origin in the decisive (i.e. philosophical) part. This is because Wolff's philosophy inspired his Zurich friends with the generous plan for a five-volume *Poetics and Rhetoric*. (The work is dedicated to Wolff in a detailed letter.) The division of the whole is based on the various powers of the soul according to Wolff's psychology. The first three volumes are devoted to imagination, wit, the power of poetry and taste.¹ Bodmer's "Briefwechsel von der Natur des poetischen Geschmackes" (correspondence on the nature of poetic taste) (actually conducted in 1729 with the Italian Count Conti, published in 1736) can be regarded as a substitute for the volume devoted to "Taste".² The central point of Bodmer's dispute with his Italian correspondent is the value of sensation for aesthetic perception. In the *Discourses of the Painters* it is only said that a beautiful figure also requires a beautiful mind (Disc. 111, 25). The polemic against the subjective judgment of sensation, which Gottsched continues in his critical poetry, now begins in the dedication of the work on the imagination. The correspondence on

¹ Volumes 4 and 5 were to deal with the special genres of poetry and the sublime. The later writings of the Swiss are to be regarded as fragments of this grand plan, which was never realized. The overall title was: "Reasonable thoughts and judgments on eloquence." (Based on Wolff's title.)

² The booklet shows how fruitful a quiet discussion could be in those aesthetically highly attuned times. This quiet correspondence is the antithesis of the unfortunate literary quarrel between Zurich and Leipzig that broke out shortly after its publication.

The discussion of the problem of taste in this earliest stage of German aesthetics is at its peak, but only on the psychological side. Bodmer's analysis of the judgment of taste probably goes deeper psychologically than Gottsched - but Bodmer nevertheless does not succeed in such an important philosophical formulation as that of the judging mind and the power of judgment (see the following chapter). In those places where the expression "Urteil" (of the soul), prepared by Muratori, Dubos and König and adopted with good instinct by Gottsched, is called for, Bodmer uses logically more vague, albeit psychologically expressive expressions ("Verrichtung" or "Tun" der Seele, Betrachtung, Überlegung).¹

For Bodmer, it all comes down to the distinction between the "mechanical" impression of an external object, whereby the sensory instrument behaves in a suffering manner (as with the taste of the tongue) and the active faculty of the mind (which comes into play with beauty).² The concealed addressee of his polemic is Dubos. Muratori already has the image of the judge.³ Dubos continues: the decision as to whether something is pleasing or not does not belong before the mind. Rather, the mind must submit to the judgment of feeling. Feeling is the competent judge.⁴ Only in the case of sensual taste, Bodmer objects, is sensation like a judge who decides according to his own feelings, and the soul is like a court attendant who has nothing else to do than to pronounce the judgment that has already been passed.⁵

¹ Correspondence 1736. pp. 50, 52, 60, 68. One exception (p. 48) will be quoted below. This passing by of the fruitful expression is all the more striking as the words "judgment" and "Urteil" occur more frequently. (Einbildungskraft p. 30; 116.) Cf. also "Anklagung des verderbten Geschmacks" (Preface; pp. 6, 70). Here the lack of "school" takes its revenge.

² Correspondence. P. 12 f.

³ the power of judgment (giudizio) is "il supremo tribunale, e giudice del bello, e decoro". (Perf. Poesia I, 382.)

⁴ "La decision de la question n'est point du ressort du raisonnement. Il doit se soumettre au jugement que le sentiment prononce. C'est le juge competent de la question." (Refl. II, p. 178.)

⁵ Correspondence p. 42.

This perception is deceitful ("foolish and ambiguous" is its name)¹, it judges sometimes one way, sometimes another. If one nevertheless wanted to consider it infallible, the same work would have to be good and bad at the same time - which is "inconsistent". But if one admits that one's feelings can be mistaken, how can this "deception" be discovered? The unanimous agreement of the larger party is no proof, for error is often more common than truth. If the first perception is to be corrected by a later one, how do we know that the latter is not also erroneous? So in the end we will have to come to "reason and investigation". Thus sentiment is deprived of its judicial power and called before the judgment seat of reason.² - This critique of sentimentalism, which is still alive today (the best-arranged thought context that Bodmer ever wrote), leads us back to the point of view before Dubos. But not completely. The judgment of taste about beauty is very decisively separated from mere sensual perception, and with less certainty, but still perceptibly, also from the theoretical activity of the mind. It should be noted that Bodmer only uses expressions that suggest an intellectualist view of the aesthetic process where he opposes the one good taste to the arbitrariness of individuals. Sensation is "actual" (i.e. individual), reason is no more than one.³ Criticism is therefore infallible, for "from a cautious distrust of deceitful sensation and unsatisfactory experience, it accepts nothing as beautiful for which it cannot give adequate reasons".⁴ This view is general at the time. The individual judgments of sensation, the "majority", do not decide what is beautiful. We do not need to know what every reader thinks of the book, says Breitinger,

¹ Correspondence p. 52.

² Briefwechsel p. 45 f. - The 'tracing back' to the law of contradiction is very characteristic of Wolff's mood.

³ Correspondence p. 13 and preface.

⁴ From Bodmer's preface to Breitinger's "Kritische Dichtkunst". 1740.

but which judgment is founded in truth.¹ On calm examination, the contrast between sensation and understanding becomes less harshly emphasized; indeed, it begins to merge into a higher unity. The question is still posed by Bodmer entirely in the sense of Crousaz and Dubos: "whether the pleasure that follows sensual sensation derives directly from sensation or arises indirectly from reasoning?"² The answer, however, brings a new thought to French aesthetics. Supplementation does not derive directly from sensation, but from reflection, of which sensation is a mere consequence.³ Here sensation is no longer denied: it is transformed. The problem is solved by the assumption of a nobler sensation, which no longer springs from the mechanical, passive impression, but from the activity of reflection and comparison⁽⁴⁾. Only that a higher intellectual process (such as comparison) must precede the judgment of the beautiful is what the "systema intellectuale" he sets up wants to say.⁵ Bodmer, like many others, has only thrown the thought out there. A more systematic mind could have found a complete theory of aesthetic behavior from here. That Bodmer is actually aiming at something new is shown by the expression "contemplation" (opposed to "sensation").⁶ Mostly, of course, Bodmer still says understanding and reason. But even here there is no lack of references to a conception of reason not as a theoretical faculty, but as a higher capacity for life in general.⁷

¹ In the preface to Bodmer's "critical reflections on the poetic paintings of the poets". 1741 - It is not applause that makes a thing beautiful, wrote Gottsched, but true beauty acquires applause from all who understand it. (Crit. Poetry, p. 133.)

² Correspondence p. 57.

³ Correspondence p. 50.

* namely the comparison of image (imitation) and archetype. (Correspondence p. 52.)

⁵ Correspondence p. 53.

⁸ Correspondence p. 68; cf. p. 36.

⁷ Poetic taste distinguishes and judges (the new expression taste, as can be seen, even in Bodmer's work brings ge~

Finally, Bodmer knows how to give his opposition to Dubos a surprising general twist. For the Frenchman, the sensation of taste is an immediate response to the object; it occurs mechanically in response to the stimulus.¹ Bodmer calls a theory that traces the judgment of taste back to the mere mechanical impression (the "physical impression"), a pure causal theory, as it were, without regard to the peculiar active faculty of the mind, a "mechanical system of taste."² This mechanical hypothesis, he continues, has received support from Descartes' philosophy. "Only the great philosopher of Germany, Mr. Leibnitz, by inventing his *systema harmoniae praestabilitae*, has dealt a fatal blow to sensation; he has deprived it of the office of judge, which it has so long exercised against right, and has made it solely a *causa ministrante* and *occasionali* of the judgment of the soul."³ The understanding of this enigmatic sentence offers a kind of sample of the relationship between German and French philosophy that we established in the first chapter. At first, one does not know what to make of this outrageous conflation of Descartes and Dubos (for it is the sentient that is the target of "Empfindung"). Descartes' "Systema" supports sentimentalism - it could make you dizzy, just as H. v. Stein confesses that he felt the ground shake under his feet when he first read the sentence. And yet, the sentence makes good sense. It is perhaps the most eloquent testimony to the factually so closely connected concept of judgment with itself) the characteristics of speech "according to its own nature, according to certain basic rules established by reason." (Epist. p. 15.)

¹The excitement at the sight of danger and misfortune of others, according to Dubos the main source of pleasure in tragic objects, is an "emotion naturelle qui s'excite en nous machinale- ment." (Reff. I, p. 7.)

² Briefwechsel p. 48 - System in the 18th century means any hypothesis. (Cf. W. Arnsperger: Chr. Wolffs Verhältnis zu Leibniz. 1897. p. 43.) Here are just two examples: Leibniz (Gerhardt VII, 313) uses system and hypothesis synonymously. Voltaire, Philos. Dictionary, article "System": "Nous entendons par Systeme une suppo- sition ..."

³ Correspondence p. 48.

for the powerful impression that Leibniz's philosophy could make on aesthetically receptive contemporaries. In the face of the new possible solutions of Leibniz's philosophy, it is justified to summarize the French thought work as Bodmer does here - since it as a whole remains outside this possibility. Descartes and Dubos - we have just touched on this idea - belong together. A philosophy that only recognizes demonstration finds its necessary complement in a philosophy that distrusts reason and takes refuge in feeling (experience). The problems that cannot be solved with mathematical methodology do not disappear before the mere will to solve them; if the ratio does not provide the means to solve them, then its claim to unconditionality is called into question under the pressure of the new problems. The country in which one had never surrendered to the "mechanical system" of mathematical reason, devoid of the concept of purpose, which, when it awoke to self-consciousness, found Leibniz's psychology and metaphysics, was protected against sentimentalism. Leibniz's philosophy was free and deep enough to recognize the problem of the probable, the emotional, that which is beyond mathematical regularity. The concept of purpose, identical with that of harmony, is the summarizing expression for everything in Leibniz's philosophy that points beyond Cartesianism. Bodmer therefore quite rightly opposes the systema of pre-stabilized harmony to Descartes and Dubo. Seen from his height, even these opposites lie in the same plane. The peculiar proposition from which we started is a prediction of the victory of German (Kantian) philosophy, continuing Leibniz's work of mediation, over French philosophy. But even before Kant, Lessing had already shown the superiority of German thought, strengthened by Leibniz, over Cartesian classicism and thus (very reluctantly) made Bodmer his prophet.

Chapter 3: Assessment power

Joh. U. König also adopts the word "judgment" for taste from Dubos. However, he does not apply the new term consistently. Taste is a power of the mind to feel and judge what is pleasing or displeasing, decent or indecent. Sensation, judgment, choice, liking or disliking, etc. constitute taste.¹ The emphasis on "liking or disliking" and "choice" shows that judgment is to be understood as a judgmental, evaluative behavior. Such an interpretation is also supported by the phrase that the taste of the intellect immediately perceives what is perfect in a verse or in a speech.² Perfection is nothing other than an epitome of values. We can take it as confirmation when König translates Dubos' phrase (which already appears almost literally in Muratori): 'le sentiment juge du merite d'un poeme' as 'the taste judges the value of any thing'⁽⁴⁾.

The general meaning of the word that has belonged to taste since Gracian, which is then preserved in the concept of "criticism" in Baumgarten and Meier, is not missing in König either. "The general good taste is a skill of the mind, produced by sound wit and keen judgment, to perceive the true, good and beautiful correctly, and to resist the false, bad

¹ "Investigation-" p. 430; 470; 394; 438.

² "Unters." Muratori, Riflessioni. I, 108 "Noi per buon g-usto intendiamo il conoscere ed il poter giudicare ciò, ehe sia difettoso, o imperfetto, o mediocre nelle scienze e nell' arti."

³ Dubos, Refl. II, 198. He immediately speaks of "connaitre le merite."

⁴ "Unters. p. 397 - In the Swiss writing on the imagination it is promised that the "defense of our poets and orators" will be determined by thought. (End of the dedication to Wolff.)

and ugly ones."¹ The concept of taste originally has the same generality in Gottsched.² The moments of choice (Ausschlag) and the opinion on a value or disvalue are clearly recognizable in his work.³ The concept of criticism is paraphrased by the definition that the judging power of the mind knows, when it is in the right state, "how to distinguish the beautiful from the ugly, the pleasant from the dismal".⁴ Gottsched's love of this word was undoubtedly decisive for Baumgarten and Meier's adoption of the term Beurteilungskraft. Gottsched thus played a not insignificant part in Kant's aesthetics, which must perhaps be valued more highly than anything Kant received from English empirical aesthetics.

Wolff knows judgment only as the act of the mind by which we attribute or deny something to a thing, or connect or separate two concepts.⁵ Judgment is thus an act of the soul. What we now call judgment in logic was at the time called Wolff's proposition.⁶ Wolff may occasionally say judgment and proposition, where the latter would suffice/ but the constant and proper expression for what we now understand by "judgment" is

¹ Unters. In another place König says "power of judgment" instead of "power of judgment". (S. 394.)

² The tongue has a natural faculty of perceiving the manifold qualities of food and of making a judgment as to which is the best. The mind, however, has the power and ability to judge the value and unworthiness of all things. (Reason. Tadlerinnen. I, p. 33.)

³ Nor is the reference to perfection lacking: the judge has no clear conception of the perfections of such writings. (Tadlerinnen, II, 156.) Good taste and rules of perfection (Krit. Dichtk. 2nd ed. p. 120).

⁴ Tadlerinnen, I, 34.

⁵ "Atque actus iste mentis, quo aliquid a re quadam diversum eidem tribuimus vel ab ea removemus, iudicium appellatur." (Philos, rat. sive Logica. 1728. § 39.) "Dum igitur mens iudicat, notiones duas vel conjungit, vel separat." (Log. § 40.)

⁶ propositio or enunciatio. (Log. § 42.)

⁷ "Iudicii et propositionis singularis definitio (Log. § 241 ff; § 278; § 320). Once (§ 506 f) he even speaks of a "vera propositio" in the text and gives "vera iudicia" as examples in the nota.

¹ The word *propositio* dominates in the *Logica*.² When Gottsched says judgment, he does not mean *iudicium* in the logical sense, but a term that is ultimately taken from the language of judgment.³ The term is of popular, not scholarly origin. At the same time, however, it fits into the historical context of the development of the concept of sentiment, which is so far removed from logic. When Gottsched says: "Your writings so far have been read by the attentive world with various judgments,⁴ - here "judgments" sounds as if translated from sentiments. And likewise: "Who can demand that all the world should judge in the same way?"⁵ (should have the same sentiments about a thing). Since Gottsched is keen to avoid foreign words, we may indeed assume that "Urteil" is intended to replace the very common "sentiment". This explains the frequent occurrence of the word.⁶ It is likely that Gottsched made it native to us,

¹ Accordingly, he does not say *discursus* or *ratiocinium* for conclusion (which means the act of reasoning), but always syllogism, which is the definite expression of reasoning. ("Syllogismus est oratio, qua ratiocinium seu discursus distincte proponitur." Log. § 332.)

² Martin Knutzen's logic is characteristic of the advance of the word *iudicium*, in which *propositio* and *iudicium* are no longer used together occasionally, as in Wolff, but consistently. (Connected by *et* or *vel*, often with *iudicium* in brackets.) *Elementa philosophiae rationalis seu Logicae. Reg. et Lipsiae. 1747. p. 95. § 124; pp. 102, 119, etc.* The Logic of Port Royal equates judgement and proposition (edition of 1668. p. 134); but it always speaks only of proposition.

³ Clearly echoed in: *beuiteilen ob recht oder unrecht* (*Tadlerinnen* II, 21), impartial judgment (II, 161).

⁴ *Tadlerinnen*, Aug. 30, 1726.

⁵ *Tadlerinnen* II, 82.

⁶ I have found "judgment" and "assessment" about 30 times in the first volume of the "Tadlerinnen" alone. The *Spectator* also has judgement in the sense of sentiment. (No. 160: "your judgement upon this method", No. 62 "judgement of so great a man"). In the "Discourses of the Mahlers" judgment and judging are quite frequent. In the preface, they submit their words to the judgment of the listener. It is always used in this sense: to pass judgment. The power of judgment does not yet occur. Bodmer had not yet read Wolff. On the other hand, it is used several times in Gottsched's first critical organ. (*Tadlerinnen*. I, 5; 33; 190 f; II, 60.)

who thus not only translated "sentient", but also added something of his own by elevating "judgment" to the sphere of the higher faculty of cognition. It is also he in whom the word "power of judgment" apparently appears first.¹ Finally, he clearly expressed what König only hinted at and Baumgarten completed: the equation of taste and the power of judgment.² Still missing, however, is the clear insight that the "power of judgment" is a faculty completely distinct from the intellect, and the classification of the new soul power in the psychological system of the school. By including the iudicium in the table of the faculties of the soul in passing, so to speak, Baumgarten completes the work of Dubos, Königs and Gottsched and presents the result to the one who brings the meaning of the whole development to light: Kant.

In the consciousness of the time, the Gottsched-Swiss theory of art and taste was only replaced by Baumgarten's aesthetics around the middle of the century. In fact, however, Gottsched and Bodmer were already overcome in Baumgarten's first work ("Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus"), i.e. in 1735. With the first sentence that Baumgarten writes, he is a generation ahead of the Swiss like Gottsched. The fate of German aesthetics was not decided by the loud dispute between Leipzig and Zurich, but rested in the hands of the quiet professor of metaphysics and logic in Halle (later Frankfurt a. O.), who, despite his sympathy for the Swiss, kept his distance from the quarrel. The finely conceived, not

¹The HI. main section of the "Vemunftlehre" in the "Erste Gründe der gesamten Weltweisheit" (1732) is entitled "Von der Urteilskraft". - Leibniz uses "judge" as the opposite of "invent". (An Gabriel 1696. Erdm. p. 419 f.) In Thomasius' "Vernunftlehre" the expression is "Beurteilung von der Wahrheit oder dem Irrthumb". (2nd ed. 1699. p. 236; cf. p. 231.)

²"This power of the soul to judge before a clearly perceived perfection or imperfection is called taste." (Erste Gründe d. ges. Weltw. 3rd ed. 1739. I. § 929.) In critical poetry, the power of judgment appears as the ability to apply what is appropriate, and of self-control. (2nd ed. p. 104 f.) The Wörterbuch der schönen Wissenschaften (1760) assigns taste to the liberal arts and the power of judgment to the sciences. (Article: Taste.)

easy-to-read *Meditationes* remained ineffective, however. Five years after their publication, the main works of the Swiss were published, which secured them intellectual dominance in the aesthetic field for a decade. It was not until 1748 that Baumgarten's *Kollegheft über die Ästhetik* (edited by Meier) was published under the title: *Anfangsgründe aller schönen Künste und Wissenschaften*. (I.) Swiss aesthetics thus became superfluous and left the scene. Its artistic spirit was preserved in Baumgarten-Meier's aesthetics. At the same time, however, something new had been added: a philosophical overall view. The two parts of Baumgarten's "Aesthetica" (1750 and 1758), written in a Latin that constructs long periods, do not change the external development. This is determined by Meier's editing of Baumgarten's *Aesthetics College*. Of greater historical significance than the year 1750 is 1739, when Baumgarten's "Metaphysica" appeared for the first time. The *Metaphysica* contains only one paragraph on beauty, but a very effective one; it also became important for aesthetics through its excellent summary of Wolff's empirical psychology.

Baumgarten did not show much interest in the problem of taste in the narrower sense. If he nevertheless succeeds in giving the theory of taste a forward-looking turn, this is probably due less to conscious intention than to a certain philosophical tact that allows him to develop fruitful approaches half unconsciously. Baumgarten is characterized by an infallible instinct for the logical value of a thought. We have found in Muratori and Dubos the equation of sentiment, taste and judgment, already expressed by Pascal, further developed.¹ Baumgarten and Meier now make a certain decision here by creating a certain terminology (which is never indifferent in science). The term taste is replaced by the term power of judgment.

¹ La Motte speaks of a "jugement c o n f u s". Helvetius says: "Juger est sentir." (De l'esprit. 1759. p. 9.)

The *Meditations* already contain, in a short, precise sentence (reminiscent of Dubos' emphasis on the sense), the definition of the judgment of the senses as a confused judgment on the perfection of the perceptible. Baumgarten adds that one may thus express *le goüt, buon gusto*.¹ In the "Metaphysics" the systematic treatment of the new concept indicated here is completed. To judge means to perceive the perfection and imperfection of things.² There is a "sensual" and an "intellectual" *facultas diiudicandi*. The sensual faculty is taste in a broader sense.³ The faculty of judgment (*iudicium*)⁴ has its own short section in the "Psychologia empirica" (sectio IX, § 606-609), after the *facultas fingendi*, between *praevisio* and *praesagitio*. Its importance is based on the fact that it is the psychological prerequisite of criticism.⁵ Logical criticism is to be distinguished from aesthetic criticism. (*Critica logica* and *aesthetica*.) The latter kind of criticism is a part of aesthetics. It prevents arguments from arising in the judgment of beauty on the basis of mere taste.⁶ The moment of weighing, of estimating, of choosing, of taking a stand,

¹ *Meditationes*. § 92: "Judicium de perfectione sensorum con- fusum dicitur iudicium sensuum ..."

² "Perfectionem imperfectionemque rerum percipio, i. e. diudi- co." (§ 606. Met.)

³ "Lex diiudicandi est: perceptis rei variis aut consentientibus, aut dissentientibus, eius aut perfectio aut imperfectio percipitur. Quod cum fiat vel distincte, vel indistincte, *facultas diiudicandi*, hinc et *iudicium* erunt vel sensitiva, vel intellectualia. *Judicium sensitivum* est *gustus significatu latiori* (*sapor, palatum, nasus*)" (§ 607. Met.)

⁴ Cf. § 808: "iudicii eclipses missteps of the judging power", "iudicii maturitas the maturity of the judging power" etc.

⁵ "Critica significatu generali est scientia regularum de perfectione vel imperfectione distincte iudicandi." (§ 607.)

⁶ *Aesthetica* § 5: "... nisi velit in diiudicandis pulcre cogitatis, dictis, scriptis disputare de meris gustibus." Since taste in the broader sense is identical with the *facultas diiudicandi*, *gustus* here can only refer to sensual taste. The passage thus only opposes aesthetic taste to sensual taste, but does not deny taste as a faculty of judgment.

The use of the word *diividicare* makes it understandable that the word *diividicare* tends to precede preference and judgment⁽¹⁾.

From Baumgarten's Latin terminology it can be seen that for the development of the concept of judgment, which we have followed so far, Cicero is also important in addition to the sentiment concept and the legal secondary meaning.² Dubos quotes the beautiful passage from *de oratore* (which König repeats in his treatise, which was read by everyone at the time): "Omnis tacito quodam sensu sine ulla arte aut ratione quae sint in artibus ac rationibus recta ac prava diividicant/" (III. c. 50.)³ The sense which the judgment of taste has as an unfounded judgment of value is here perfectly expressed. Gottsched and Baumgarten sink below Cicero insofar as they do not ascribe aesthetic judgment to a *tacitus sensus*⁴, but think of it as taking place according to the "rules of perfection". However, the main point, the character as a value judgment, remains intact⁽⁵⁾.

¹ In the sense of appreciate: "in diividicanda generis cogitationum poetici verisimilitudine." (Aesth. § 590.) - "In diividicanda magnitudine ac dignitate materiarum..." (Aesth. § 197.)

² Quintilian, of course, also had an influence. Cf. E.g. Inst, or. VI, 3, "quod sentitur latente iudicio, velut palato."

³ Cited by Gottsched as a defense of the "great multitude" praising or censuring "according to a deceitful perception of his fickle taste". (Krit. Dichtk. 2nd ed., p. 93.)

⁴ It is the precursor of Kant's *sensus communis aestheticus*. Baumgarten mentions the *sensus communis* only occasionally. (Aesth. § 457; § 481.) Meier calls it the attention to external sensations ("Anfangsgründe" § 333) and emphasizes its difference from the understanding. ("Beurteilung der Gottschedischen Dichtkunst." 1747. 2. Stück. p. 75.)

⁵ Wolff uses the usual *aestimare* for valuing, making a value judgment. ("homines in aestimanda perfectione saepius confundere quod apparet cum eo, quod est." Ps. emp. § 511 nota.) The same word is used to designate the theoretical-judgmental behavior that distinguishes between probable and improbable. ("aestimandam probabilitatem". Phil, rat § 593. Cf. Leibniz: *de incerti aestimatione*). The connection of topics and dialectic with judgment, which we shall find in Baumgarten, is hinted at in Leibniz, inasmuch as he defines it as "art d estimer les degrés des probations" - Gerh. III, 193 f. - but elsewhere speaks of "j u g e r des raisons vraisemblables" - (Theod. I. § 28.) In relation to the senses, the word *diividicare* appears in Wolff as "to distinguish": cold and warm, *quam differentiam*

Baumgarten did not make much of the "iudicium".¹ Only his pupil Meier gave the term a practical and aesthetic meaning, and in this case (it is perhaps Meier's greatest deed in the history of philosophy) the memory of Gottsched, who was the patron of his first literary utterance, certainly played a part. In the spirit of König, Meier explains that perfections and imperfections can be found in all earthly things, so the "art of judgment" extends to everything, even to crinolines and wigs.³ The term is treated in the most detailed and probably decisive way for Kant in the second volume of the "Anfangsgründe der schönen Wissenschaften". In the section entitled "On Taste" (§ 466 to § 479), only the power of judgment is mentioned. "The judgment of a thing (dijudicatio) consists in the recognition of its perfections and imperfections." The faculty of judging things is the power of judgment, which is divided into an upper and a sensuous one. (§ 467.) The former recognizes the perfections and imperfections of things clearly and sensibly; the latter only indistinctly, and can be explained by the faculty of recognizing the beauties and uglinesses of things, i.e. is one with taste.³

tactu diiudicamus." (Ontol. § 773.) Wolff uses the German "Beurteilen" in several senses. It denotes the criticism of found truths, of books ("Vernünftige Ged. v. d. Kräften des menschl. Verstandes." 9. chapter heading), the distinction between true goods and sham goods ("Remarks on the Reasonable Thoughts of God" etc. § 8; § 139), and the judgment of probability. ("Remarks" § 127.) I have only once found the use in King's sense: "Judgment of imperfection." ("Remarks." § 138.)

¹ Even his admirer Herder does not call the concept of taste the most fruitful concept of aesthetics. (4. krit. Wäldchen. 1764. Werke, Suphan. IV. p. 54.) That Herder nevertheless (as we also found in Bodmer) cannot avoid the expression judgment is not surprising. ("On the Causes of the Decreased Taste among the Different Peoples since it flourished." 1775 Works, Suphan. V. P. 606.)

"Illustration of an art judge." 1745. p. 7. Cf. also the preface to the "Gedanken von Scherzen." 1744.

^{(3)ib.} - cf. Metaphysics § 617: "The faculty of judgment." § 619: "Taste judges the perfections and imperfections of all things ..."

The significance of the term "power of judgment", which Baumgarten and Meier made the property of philosophical thought, lies above all in the fact that the assessment of value is thus conceived as a purely mental (even if not intellectual) process, i.e. without reference to the will. Perfection and imperfection are metaphysical concepts. Expressed in our language: the "judgment" is not based on arbitrary but on absolute values. It relates man to the metaphysical value character of things. This is one of the advantages of the concept of judgment. The other is the specific relationship of this concept to aesthetic problems. In this way, any enthusiasm is prevented. The new concept has a specific field of application. Metaphysics becomes scientifically fruitful.

Within the development of aesthetic thought from Gottsched to Kant, the inclusion of the word "power of judgment" marks the end of the aesthetic use of the word "understanding".¹ An understanding that judges according to mere sensation, Meier argues against critical poetry, is something contradictory. But if it is to be understood as the faculty of cognition in general, the explanation is too general. In any case, Meier concludes in a schoolmasterly tone, Gottsched departed from Wolff's meaning without need.² This criticism is not historically fair. When Meier, following Baumgarten, demands that a special faculty be made of the power of judgment, as of the power of imagination, he forgets that it was not least Gottsched's feeling and judging "intellect" that had conveyed the important idea to Baumgarten. Meier is actually only boasting about the improved terminology (not by him).³

¹ In 1758, when discussing the 2nd volume of the *Aesthetica*, Mendelssohn once again uses the expressions "aesthetic understanding" and "beautiful understanding" to clarify the word *analogon rationis*. (Biblioth. d. schönen Wiss. 4th vol. I. Stück. p. 377; 386.)

² Assessment of the Gottschedische poetry. 1747. 2nd piece. P. 70 f.

³ Gottsched (like König) quoted a passage from Leibnizens *Anzeige der Schriften Shaftesburs* that was famous in the 18th century

The difficulty associated with the new concept of the power of judgment was twofold. Although much was gained by concentrating the problem on the concept of *iudicium*, the merely terminological unification of sensation and judgment still left the problem unsolved from a philosophical point of view. For in the separation of a "sensual" from an "intellectual" power of judgment, the old opposition between sensation and understanding, mere judgment by taste and cool reasoning, was suddenly revived. Furthermore, although the faculty of judgment was now independent, nothing had yet been decided about the position of the new faculty within the faculties of the soul. Baumgarten listed the *iudicium* only as one of the numerous lower faculties of cognition among others. The first of these problems can actually be called that of criticism. It is the problem of balancing the claims of sensation and reason, the sensual and the rational. This problem was all the more difficult to solve on aesthetic ground because it was associated with all the prejudices that the 18th century harbored about the "beautiful sciences". According to the definition, aesthetics was also the science of the perfection of sensual knowledge. It should not only be a theory of beauty, but should also lead to beauty.¹ A science practised by tasteful people is probably capable of leading to beauty.

quoted. (Krit. Dichtk. 2nd ed. p. 119.) "Le goût distingue de l'en- tendement consiste dans les perceptions confuses, dont on ne saurait assez rendre raison. C'est quelque chose d'approchant de l'instinct." (Recueil de diverses pieces sur la philosophie etc. Ed. by Des Maiseaux, Amsterdam. 1719. II. P. 285.) Meier actually does nothing more than emphasize the "different from the mind". In the different emphasis lies the whole difference of the times.

¹ Aesthetica § 10. cf. the textbook of the beautiful sciences by Kant's colleague Joh. Gotthelf Lindner (Professor of Poetry at Königsberg), III. Main section. "On Aesthetics." It is a doctrine of taste and instructs us to find, conceive and judge beautiful thoughts..." Ant. Friedr. Büsching is more cautious: a general theory of the fine arts and sciences would show how the concepts of beauty and ugliness of the soul arise. Perhaps it would also be able to identify general principles and rules. (Aesthetic theorems and rules. 2nd ed. 1776. p. 4.)

Criticism, but not the science of aesthetics. Since no attention was paid to the boundaries between criticism and aesthetic science, criticism, which has the individual as its object, was attributed that apodictic certainty which only theory directed towards the general can have, or attacked the rules (as is still done today) where the critic had sinned. Only Herder saw through the error.¹ Aesthetics should not be called *ars pulcre cogitandi* (Baumgarten-Meier), but *scientia de pulcro et pulcris philosophice cogitans*.² It is not the work of the one who feels, but of another: namely the philosopher who thinks about feeling. "Our aesthetics is science, and nothing less than people of genius and taste; it wants to educate nothing but philosophers . . ."³ However, the 18th century was too lively to be satisfied with a mere aesthetic theory. The "philosophical" solution to the problem could not be separated from the practical one. This made the process of finding a solution more difficult, but also promised a result that was in turn capable of transcending the sphere of mere theory.

The other problem, the position of the power of judgment in the overall system of the soul's capacity, is the main problem of 18th century psychology. In so far as it is connected with the further development of views on feeling, we shall have to consider it in another chapter. This is the historically more important line of problem development. However, there is also a connection between the middle of the century and Kant along the Baumgartenian line. Mendelssohn, who possessed a certain organ for the problems in the air, was thinking entirely along Baumgarten's lines when he (in a 1776 essay) placed a "faculty of feeling" between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire, through which we feel pleasure or displeasure in a thing, approve of it, approve of it.

¹ However, the fourth critical wood (1769) remained unpublished.

² Works, Suphan IV. Fourth critical forest. S. 23.

³ Works, IV. p. 25.

¹ In the "Morgenstunden" (1785) this idea is given the form: between recognition and desire lies approval, applause, the pleasure of the soul. The faculty of approval forms, as it were, the transition from the one to the other faculty.² The naming refers back to Baumgarten (*facultas diiudicandi*) in both form and content; the author of the *Aesthetica* was ready for nothing more quickly than the creation of a new name. - The difference between the two versions of Mendelssohn's idea is not without historical interest. In the 1776 note, the moment of feeling comes first; the moment of taking a stand follows. The later version, on the other hand, gives precedence to evaluative behavior. There the lower, here the upper *facultas diiudicandi* prevails: the faculty of feeling corresponds to the sensual, the faculty of approval to the intellectual power of judgment. A. Palme³ has correctly recognized that the faculty of approbation cannot be identified with the faculty of feeling. His characterization that it is more an active than a passive psychic function is also apt. What makes the "faculty of approval" appear so appealing from a historical point of view is precisely its ambiguity. It contains (quite germane) that which in the *Critique of Judgment* is separated as "feeling" and "principle a priori". The concept of the faculty of approbation is the synthesis of the same historical elements in Mendelssohn's mind whose combination in Kant's genius led to the third critique.

The lasting benefit of the transformation of the concept of taste into that of the power of judgement was the associated logization of the problem of taste. One can only see an "intellectualization" of taste in the new term if one ignores the linguistic usage of the 18th century; intellectualistic terms were chosen with preference for the irrational. ("idea" or "one

¹ *Ges. Schriften*, IV, 1. p. 122.

² *Ges. Schriften*, I. p. 294 f.

³ Sulzer's psychology diss. Berlin. 1905. S. 55.

On the other hand, logization brought with it the great advantage that the aesthetic investigations now touched on a very definite point with the logical ones, and the indeterminate concept of taste was given a "fixed seat" (Salvini). Kant's idea of treating the problem of taste as a logical problem has its historical origin here.² The Kantian expression "judgement of taste" is the result of Gottsched-Baumgarten's logization; it is the synthesis of the emotional moment, which Gottsched omitted, with the "power of judgement". The idea of applying a different approach to the problem of taste than the psychological one is perhaps the most important suggestion that Kant took from Baumgarten and Meier in the aesthetic field. - With the attainment of the word power of judgment, the first epoch of critical aesthetics, which began with Gracian, comes to an end. At the same time, it opens up the prospect of its second.

¹ Cf. Reimarus, *Vemunftlehre*, § 33; § 61.

² Also the more logical than logical classification of the judgment of taste according to the "moments" of quantity, quality, relation and modality. Meier already pedantically implements his teacher's idea of treating logic and aesthetics according to the same aspects (richness, clarity, truth, etc.).

Chapter 4: Criticism

The problem of taste as that of "balancing the demands of sensation and reason" merges directly into the problem of criticism. The 18th century saw the two together from the very beginning. It turned to the idea of the ideal critic or, as it was called at the time, the "perfect judge of art" with the same interest as the concept of taste.

Unlike in Germany, the conviction of English aesthetics of an archetype and canon of taste, a "standard of taste", stems from Shaftesbury's refined spirit, not from the rationalistic basic direction of her philosophy. For Shaftesbury, the belief in the one beauty is a matter of the artistic-religious attitude to life. No thinker of the 18th century (up to Herder and Goethe) is so related to Leibniz in his basic mood as the Englishman, whose favorite word was "the whole".¹ The extent of Shaftesbury's influence in Germany in the 18th century corresponds exactly to his kinship with Leibniz.

Shaftesbury's basic view is classical. The necessity of right and wrong taste is founded in the nature of things themselves.² The J like! J fancy! J admire! does not belong before beauty. "J 1 e a r n to fancy, to admire, to please, as the subjects

¹ I am speaking only of the mood, between Leibniz's and Shaftesbury's philosophy stands mathematics.

² The words were obviously Gottsched's model. It is evident "that in the very nature of things there must of necessity be the, foundation of a right and wrong taste, as well in respect of action . (Soliloquy. p. 336. Quoted from Characteristicks of men, manners, opinions, times. 1727. I.)

themselves are deserving, and can bear me out."¹ Reading should serve the improvement of our inner state (humor) and the formation of a taste.² One must have fought against the powerful seducers of habit and fashion in order to attain that correctness of taste which he must have who pretends to follow nature.³ For Shaftesbury, "nature" is the epitome of all values. His doctrine of criticism corresponds to this objectivism. Taste and judgment are equated.⁴ Right taste cannot arise without the labor and trouble of criticism. Shaftesbury declares war on all those who make their mood (whim, humour) alone the rule of what is beautiful and pleasant, and reject the art of criticizing and testing, which reveals the true beauty and value of every thing.⁵

When Gottsched published his *Poetics* in 1730 under the name of a critical art of poetry, he seems to be looking mainly to Shaftesbury. At least he refers to the word *Kritikus* in the *Soliloquy*? A deeper understanding of the actual problem of criticism can be expected neither from Gottsched nor from the Swiss.

¹ *Soliloquy*. Bodmer, evidently following this passage, makes fun of feeling, sensing, being moved, affected, moved, astonished. (*Briefwechsel von der Natur des poet. Geschmacks*. p. 16.)

² *Soliloquy*. S. 341.

³ *Soliloquy*. S. 355.

⁴ "Taste or judgment." (*Miscellaneous reflexions*. III. p. 164.) ⁵ "... reject the criticizing or examining art, by which alone they are able to discover the true beauty and worth of every object." (*Mise. refl.* III. p. 165.)

"Critical Poetry, 2nd ed. The words criticks and criticism play a major role in Shaftesbury's *Soliloquy*. - Joh. Ulr. König does not yet use the word "critique", although it was on the title of Dubos's work. ("Reflexions critiques.") Gottsched, on the other hand, already used it in the *Tadlerinnen*. In the discourses of the painters, *criticus* and *critiq* occur. (1st and 23rd discourse.) This points to French influence (cf. also *discernement* for judgment in the 1st discourse), but can hardly be regarded as exemplary. A detailed quotation from Shaftesbury (against the appeal to humor, in favor of criticism) can still be found in Gottsched's *Krit. Dichtk.* 2nd ed. p. 210 ff. - On "Criticus" see also the preface to *Krit. Poetry*.

expect. The term, which the noble Shaftesbury handled with fine humanity, became a rod of discipline for poetic sinners in Leipzig and Zurich. The bourgeois practitioners exercise the "penal office of a Critici"¹ with the utmost severity. Being able to criticize means knowing how to apply the rules. The beautiful thing is the case of a law that can be clearly seen. He who knows where it comes from that this is beautiful and that is ugly is called a Kritikus.² Gottsched is not happy that he once let slip the sentence in the "Tadlerinnen": I can "in certain cases" say which thought is meaningful or not, but give no description of it.³ Here the office of criticism is recognized to work by example, by pointing to the "certain case" under the influence of the *je ne sais quoi* mood. Bodmer did not let it pass; he attacked the word vigorously:⁴ The author presumptuously condemns, he says, one passage as ridiculous, and canonizes another as unfounded. "It is indeed folly to hope that such writers of criticism will improve taste . . ." Later, there was no longer any difference between the Swiss and Gottsched. Breitinger admits that the intellect can be commanded just as little as taste, but his opinion is ultimately Bodmer's, that criticism is as much as philosophical investigation, and that "out of a cautious mistrust of feeling" it may only consider beautiful that for which it can give adequate reasons.⁵ The *je ne sais quoi* is thoroughly exorcized. What cannot be based on a reason, a rule

"The expression is by Breitinger. (Preface to Bodmer's *Poetische Gemälden der Dichter*. 1740. This preface deals with the ideal of the righteous Critici, i.e. Bodmer).

² Gottsched, *Critical Poetry*. 2nd ed. S. 93.

³ *Tadlerinnen*. I. P. 269.

* He did it twice: in the "Anklagung" p. 68 f.) and in the writing on the imagination (end of the letter to Wolff).

⁵ From Bodmer's preface to Breitinger's *Critical Poetry* 1740 - Meier speaks of a "reasonable distrust", which the art judge places in his judgments. (Illustration of an art judge. 1745. p. 105 f.)

is condemned. A merciless mood against the individual!

The entire later 18th century is "critical". The Swiss wrote the word on every treatise, Pope wrote an Essay on Criticism, Home called his empirical aesthetics Elements of criticism. Everything speaks of criticism. While this was usually understood to mean only the tangible application of rules, there are signs that the mere use of rules was no longer considered sufficient everywhere, but that people gradually became aware of the tension between the work of art and the law, the individual and the general. The insight is not yet there, but it is preparing itself that it is the peculiarity of aesthetic observation to relate the particular to a general as a judgment of taste and as a work of art, irrespective of its individual uniqueness. Every critical statement is a practical solution to the task of determining this relationship between the particular and the general. But there were no real critics in Germany at that time. The problem had to be realized in practice before it could be solved by theory. It consisted in discovering the relationship of the particular to the general which preserved it as particular without leaving it in its mute particularity. The critical value judgment must allow the *je ne sais quoi*, it must not want to decide everything. But it must also not dissolve everything into an "I don't know what". It is a value judgment and therefore subjective; but it should be an objective value judgment.

In a small work devoted to the problem of the perfect critic, which is the parallel treatise of Baumgarten's circle to the works of the Swiss on criticism, Meier struggled mightily to bring about a boundary adjustment between the subjective and the objective moment, the sensual and the intellectual faculty of judgment.

¹ Illustration of an art judge. 1745. p. 92 ff.

² Illustration of an art judge. S. 118.

would only judge according to mere taste, he can judge just as correctly as erroneously. A "rich store of clear general knowledge" is needed to guide taste.¹ Dubos' and Bodmer's legal image reappears: one's own taste is not the highest authority. We must bring taste before the judgment seat of reason.² If taste contradicts the higher power of judgment, we must seek to settle this dispute through a new philosophical and rational investigation. Taste is not always wrong, just as little as it is always right. "Only reason can give a thorough decision."³ "Taste is not an arbitrary legislator, and although one cannot prove the individual judgments of taste, one must be able to give a sufficient reason for the rightness of taste in general."⁴ One must not criticize the emphasis on reason. It had the function of protecting against psychological relativism, which was already looming menacingly close. A thing can be beautiful and ugly at the same time, says the "rationalist" Meier in his distress.⁵ This purely psychological stance towards the problem of beauty shifts the point of contention: the debate had

¹ Initial grounds. II. § 473.

² Initial grounds. II. § 473. I. § 3.

³ Initial reasons. II. § 478 - When taste and the higher power of judgment are in conflict, the judge of art must always be inclined to give more weight to the higher power of judgment than to taste. "But it may also happen that taste is right, and the higher power of judgment wrong." (Image of an Artist, p. 146 f.)

⁴ Initial grounds. II. § 474. See also I. § 16.

⁵ Image of an art judge. p. 148 f.; Assessment of the Götsch. Dichtk. 2. Stück. The idea also appears once in an unpublished manuscript by Mendelssohn. "The most extravagant taste has some reason in the subject. Things have different sides from which they can be viewed." Significantly, this individualism of taste is again associated with the historical attitude, the consideration of time, space, climate, education, food, religion and form of government. (Ges. Schriften. IV, I. p. 49.) Dubos' reading was the inspiration.

did not begin in the psychological field; by playing over into psychology, Meier achieves a false victory over Gottsched. Objectively, he slips back to the point of view that Gottsched had fought against all his life with profound historical justification. Neither classical literature nor classical aesthetics can be founded on psychological theories and psychologicist attitudes.

The problem of criticism becomes agonizingly clear in the eternal vacillation between the recognition of "taste" and the appeal to "reason".

The necessity of a general rule for taste and the work of art is undisputed. But we can see that there is a gulf between this rule and concrete reality. The judgments of taste do not obey the rule (there are cases where the lower and higher powers of judgment conflict with each other), and the general system of rules does not suffice for all art. A softening is more apparent in the mood than in the concepts themselves. The rigidity begins to loosen, one at least allows the particular to draw breath - but the fundamental stance of the philosophy of reason is not abandoned. Meier's standpoint is that of a tasteful and reasonable critic: he accepts the rules, but he also knows that not everything can be measured by them, that an ultimate, inexpressible element remains in every work of art as in every aesthetic judgment. The difference between his attitude and Gottsched's is not expressed in the strict words of the theory. After all, in both cases it is reason that decides what is beautiful, and Gottsched never taught that a poem could be made according to rules.¹ The true contrast between Meier and Gottsched only emerges in the actual

¹ This view was formed according to his practice, not his theory. Poets are not made, but born, quotes the critical poetry. (4th ed. p. 101.) A poet must possess a strong imagination, much sagacity, and great wit by nature. (4th ed. p. 103.) In the language of Baumgarten-Meier, this means that one must have a beautiful mind to think beautifully. (Beginning Reasons, I, § 213.)

Meier was one of the first to write enthusiastically about Klopstock's "Messiah". He occasionally gives the individual a surprising amount of leeway. The reason he gives, for example, for his rejection of the word "girl" for a certain passage in the Messiah (it refers to Mary) is nothing other than an appeal to individual feeling. He feels an aversion, he says, as often as he reads the passage. "But I am not aware of all the reasons why I don't like this word here ... It depends on the feeling. My readers may judge it."² Here we have the *je ne sais quoi* practically applied, which consists in not being able to say the reasons (*rationes*). The admission of the irrational is immediately expressed in an appreciation of individuality: the taste of others also has a certain right. The decision is a matter for the individual, the rule can make no difference... This kind of criticism, which takes individuality into account, indicates that we are in a new mood of thought. It is no longer Descartes', Wolff's, Boileau's and Gottsched's, but Leibniz's again. - Around the middle of the century, the word "aesthetic" is added to "critical"; the whole of Germany echoes with these expressions. The bearers of the new (i.e. "aesthetic") criticism were the young Berliners. They were coolly opposed to both old hostile parties. The time of criticism in the style of Gottsched and Bodmer is over. But not yet the time of their theory. The young Nicolai is far removed from the critical practice of Leipzig and Zurich; but one believes to hear König speak as soon as he becomes theoretical. The author, it says in the preface to the "Letters", chooses sentiment as his guide; but sentiment needs a means to ensure that it does not judge wrongly. *T h e v e r -*

¹ From a cultural-historical point of view, Meier's work bears many similarities to that of Gottsched. Meier is actually the Gottsched of the new generation. Like Wolff, he lives from Baumgarten. The urge for cultural influence is the same in both. Of course, Meier lacks Gottsched's tenacious universality, even though he wrote about countless things.

² Evaluation of the heroic poem the Messiah. 2nd ed. 1752. S. 95.

must be asked for advice. Two guides are better than one.¹ - The intellectual backing of the new critical generation is Baumgarten-Meier's aesthetics.² Just as in Wolff's time Gottsched and the Swiss spoke only of understanding and reason, so now the critical theorists speak only of perfection, sensuality and aesthetics. The historical curiosity lies in the fact that the sober, sensible Wolff stimulated an at least respectable theory of art and taste, while the subtle, poetically gifted Baumgarten had to give the signal for that endless aesthetic wash, from which all deeper minds soon turned away in disgust. "Around here," Lambert wrote to Kant from Berlin on November 13, 1765, "one philosophizes only about the so-called fine sciences," and he does not give a favorable picture of this critical activity. (Kant's correspondence. Ac. ed. I. p. 48.) Five years later he expresses the hope that the fine sciences will pass by and that one will return to more thorough sciences. (I, p. 99.) - Lambert did not see the new and good that this fashion brought with it from his mathematician's cell. One of the signs of true genius is historical justice. Lambert certainly had no idea that the addressee of his letter was destined to systematically justify aesthetics and thus do justice to the unpleasant epoch. For without the "aesthetic" mood of the second half of the century, the Critique of Judgment would probably never have been written. What Baumgarten's "Aesthetica" made an impression on the time was what Meier, for example, understood by aesthetics: the emphasis on sensuality, the practical

¹ Letters on the current state of the fine sciences in Germany. 1755: Following Shaftesbury, like Gottsched, the 17th letter defends the cause of accurate and healthy criticism. - The preliminary message announcing the founding of the Berlin critical organ (the Library of Fine Sciences and Liberal Arts) (1757) repeats the position of the letters. (I. 1. p. 2 f.)

² One cannot, says Mendelssohn, be sufficiently indebted to Baumgarten for having introduced the philosophical and systematic spirit into a science in which one had been accustomed only to prate. (Bibl. d. schönen Wiss. 1758. III. 1. p. 132.)

Recognition of beauty as something intrinsic alongside the true, etc. However, if this was not combined with Baumgarten's restraint and logical sensitivity, it could easily appear as directionless chatter. The loquacious overzealousness of the first student of aesthetics became decisive for further development. Baumgarten's best thoughts remained in the paragraphs of the unread "Aesthetica". The Berlin critics, who thought they possessed the latest weapon of the spirit in aesthetics, had no idea that they had returned to Wolff with Meier and had left the new, deeper, more physical aspects of Baumgarten unused. The lack of a new theoretical foundation is only a symptom of the fact that the young critical-aesthetic generation has nothing to throw into its shell apart from a strong self-confidence. The Enlightenment is dogmatic because it adds nothing fundamentally new to Wolffianism. For a thought becomes dogmatic as soon as it is no longer productive. The men of progress of 1755 had long been reactionaries in 1765, because they were only hiding the old Wolffianism and Gottschedianism under the aesthetic terminology. Only one knew the signs of the times: Lessing. With the instinct of genius, he turned to Leibniz. His Leibnizian mindset set him apart from the Enlightenment philosophers, who remained eternally Wolffian. Lessing does in critical practice what Baumgarten had already done in logical theory: he gives vent to the individual. He is the critic of the practice of this critical age, just as Kant is his critic in theory.

Practically speaking, like Lessing, Winckelmann also showed the deepest insight into the significance of the particular. For the retrospective author of the History of the Art of Antiquity, the "great general truths" were "lost in empty considerations".¹ Nevertheless, Winckelmann does not know how to give the idea of beauty in any other way than Baumgarten, to whose aesthetics this statement may be aimed. Like Baumgarten, Winckelmann does not seek to teach beauty; he seeks to show by example what is beautiful. The

¹ Gesch. d. Kunst d. Altertums. Book 4, chap. 2, § 6.

The poet's method of giving examples had been developed into a method by Baumgarten. Winckelmann adopted it and developed it by virtue of his innate artistic sense. The individual real beauty of a breast, a back, a knee or a foot is what interests him first, not beauty in general.¹ In practical terms, Winckelmann is definitely on the side of the empiricists and individualists. He knows how to differentiate. It is an individualism of objectively evaluating good taste. The problem of taste is practically solved by the genius of the judge. The theoretical resolution of it remains the task of further philosophical development.

It shows the power of the concept of taste over his century that the first historian of ancient art, who was purely objectively oriented, nevertheless could not avoid a doctrine of taste. The circumstances of the time mean that the great archaeologist's undertaking appears from the outset from the point of view of taste, namely good, classical taste, as distinct from bad modern taste. "Good taste, which is spreading more and more through the world, first began to form under the Greek sky", begin the thoughts on imitation. (1755.) Winckelmann then developed his views on taste in detail in his History of Ancient Art. Beauty is one of the great mysteries of nature, "whose effects we see and all feel, but of whose essence a general clear concept belongs among the undiscovered truths." We should therefore not be surprised that the concepts of beauty among us are very different from those of the Chinese and Indians. Nevertheless, those who have chosen beauty as a worthy object of their contemplation "cannot be of two minds about the true beauty, since it is only one and not manifold". Beauty is indeed "perceived" by the (changing) sense, but "recognized" by the (always the same) intellect

¹ Cf. Gesch. d. Kunst d. Altertums. Book 5, chap. 1, § II.

² Gesch. d. K. Book 4, Ch. 2, § 9.

and understood". Most and the most civilized peoples in Europe as well as in Asia and Africa agree "in the general form". The concepts of these are therefore not to be considered arbitrarily assumed, "even if we cannot give a reason for all of them".¹ - Winckelmann's theory thus moves in line with the aesthetics of the century between "sensation" and "understanding", favoring the latter. What distinguishes the great historian of art is his tact towards the incomprehensible nature of beauty. It is easier to say of it what it is not than what it is.² (Here the *je ne sais quoi* clearly resonates.) Clumsy rationalistic grasping remains alien to him. But the basic idea of rationalism, that there is only one beauty, is retained. Winckelmann's success in his century was based on his respect for the irrational, combined with his belief in the universal.

Just how deeply the author of the "History of Art" delved into the philosophical problem of taste is shown by his opposition of aesthetics and geometry. Gottsched already opposes taste to mathematics because of its undemonstrative nature. "I have never heard talk of taste in arithmetic and geometry, or in other sciences, where one is able to make the most rigorous demonstrations from clearly recognized fundamental truths." Taste always refers to something that is "still uncertain". "As soon as a thing receives general applause and is taken for something demonstrated, one also ceases to draw it to taste."³ If the concept of beauty were "geometrically clear", says Winckelmann, people's judgment of beauty would not differ, and the conviction of true beauty would be easy.⁴ Winckelmann is at the height of the thinking of his time when he expands on this thought: we cannot, in the contemplation of beauty, as in philosophy

¹ *Gesch. d. K.* Book 4, Ch. 2, § 18.

² *Gesch. d. K.* Book 4, Ch. 2, § 8.

= *Krit. Dichtk.* 2nd ed. p. 116 f.

⁴ *Gesch. d. Kunst d. A.* Book 4, Chap. 2, § 9.

"proceed in the manner of geometry, which proceeds and infers from the general to the particular and individual, and from the essence of things to their properties, but we must content ourselves with drawing probable conclusions from nothing but individual pieces".¹ Here Winckelmann is directly close to Baumgarten's basic idea: beauty is not a matter of deduction, one could freely render this sentence, but of induction. Induction, however, is the fundamental problem of the "Aesthetica". And like Baumgarten, Winckelmann does not understand it to be an arbitrary collection of details, but rather a unification of the individual under the guidance of a conceptually unrecognized general. In Winckelmann's language, this general is called the ideal. For the ideal is not a "metaphysical", i.e. abstract concept. Its "generality" is of a special kind. It is concrete, it arises from the "choice of the most beautiful parts and their harmonious combination in a figure"⁽²⁾.

Nowhere is the unity of the intellectual problem and education of the 18th century clearer than here. The best minds of the epoch: Baumgarten, Lambert, Winckelmann, Kant meet on the ground of the decisive question of the relationship between the general and the particular. Even the seemingly remote concept of the ideal is ultimately a genuine product of the age of criticism.

¹ Gesch. d. Kunst d. A. Book 4, Chap. 2, § 20.

² Gesch. d. Kunst d. A. Book 4, Chap. 2, § 35.

Chapter 5: Perfection and feeling.

We have traced the logical moment of the "sentiment" concept, the "judgment", through two epochs: the Gottschian and the Baumgartenian. The same should now be done with the other aspect of the concept, the sentiment. Here, a \\ olffian epoch is separated from a Sulzerian epoch.

Wolff's theory of pleasure (*voluptas*), like Crousaz's theory of sentiment, is based on Descartes. All our pleasure consists only in the awareness of our own (subjective) perfection? Is pleasure, as Wolff puts it, a contemplation of perfection? The train of thought is the same in Crousaz and Wolff. The former concludes from the Cartesian proposition that we are thinking beings: that we must live permeated by acts of consciousness. All thinking. Thinking, doubting, etc. is accompanied by a certain inner evidence. It is "an act that feels itself". The act of consciousness becomes subjective feeling. Wolff begins with perfection (nothing sounds more "rationalistic"); but at the bottom of the definition lies the same subjectivism. To recognize something visually means to recognize it directly, without mediation by signs. (Wolff calls the latter cognition "symbolic".) To recognize a perfection visually means to become directly aware of it. We are only directly aware of the acts of our own consciousness. Pleasure therefore consists in becoming conscious of the psychic acts, as distinct from being conscious of what they contain. Perfection, however, means either that all psychic events, if they possess only a perceptible degree, are pleasurable (pleasure

[^]ota nostra voluptas posita est tantum in perfectionis ab'cuius nostrae conscientia. Wolff, *Psycholopa entpirica* (1752) § 5H. After Descartes.

[?]Reasonable Thoughts of God, etc. 1720. ^ 404.

would then be all the greater, the higher the degree, i.e. the awareness of the reality set in the psychic act); or it is based on a certain constitution of the acts, e.g. on an average strength, on their relationships among themselves (harmony), on the uninhibited course of the inner events, etc. The first assumption leads to an unrestricted subjectivism; the second allows for the consideration of objective causes.

Wolff's favorite example of the pleasure theory is the pleasure of a painting. Similarity between the picture and the thing depicted is a perfection. Pleasure in a painting is therefore based on perfection, since it is pleasure in similarity⁽¹⁾ That sounds quite objectivist. But the example by no means covers the definition.² The distraction already begins when it says: enough that the appearance of perfection is there. The pleasure is then changeable, whereas it is unchangeable if it is based on a true perfection³ - but it is still a true pleasure, and the definition must also fit it. But if the mere appearance of perfection suffices, then it is obviously only the acts occurring in the subject that matter, not what is presented. The explanation is thus only apparently objectivist. The direction towards a theory of subjective feeling becomes even clearer from the sentence: it is not enough to find a perfection in the thing; we must feel it.⁴ Wolff expresses this subjective feeling in terms of the subjective feeling.

¹ Of God, etc. § 404.

² In the "Notes on the Reasonable Thoughts of God" etc. (1724), Wolff defends the example against the objection that we often experience pleasure where we do not even think of perfection. We must distinguish between the general explanation and the particular cases. The special case is, for example, similarity. In it, however, the general concept is included. (§ 129.)

³ Of God, etc. § 405 to § 407.

⁴ Of God, etc. § For this "feeling" Wolff elsewhere says "being conscious". "Neque enim nos movet perfectio rei, nisi eius nobis consci simus. (In the essay "De voluptate ex cognitione veritatis percipienda". Horae subsecivae Marburgenses. 1729. § 2.) Think of Crousaz' "qui se sent". Sensation = consciousness = act. - Otherwise, for Wolff, sensation is a change in the soul that comes from a present object (sensatio). On this: "Anmerkungen zu den vern. Ged." etc. § 65.

vity in this way: for a vivid knowledge of perfection he presupposes judgment about the perfection of a thing (iudicium de perfectione rei. Ps. emp. § 517). This "judgment" again amounts to being conscious (feeling).¹ Pleasure depends on the act of judgment.² Not the (objective) perfection of things, but our opinion (opinio) about them is the cause of pleasure, not the thing, but the state connected with its conception.³

Wolff now turns away from this theory of subjective feeling because it does not allow a criterion for the greater and unchanging pleasure. But this, not a psychology of feeling, is what matters to him. The inconstancy of feeling is an offense to the rationalist.⁴ It can only be avoided if one knows how to indicate certain characteristics of the cause of an unchangeable pleasure. Thus Wolff again arrives at an objectivist turn. The more certain the judgment of perfection is or appears, the greater the pleasure.⁵ This is obviously only assumed in order to be able to justify an unchangeable pleasure. The pleasure of the architect (here Wolff's connection with Gottsched and Bodmer becomes quite clear) in a building outweighs that of the ignorant, because it is based on a certain knowledge of the rules.⁶ He has his pleasure in power.⁷ The theory of Gottsched and the Swiss

"Voluptas enim non oritur, quod rei, quam percipimus, insit perfectio et quod hanc quoque percipiamus; sed quod eius tarn quam inexistens nobis conscientia sumus, adeoque eam inesse iudicemus..." (Ps. emp. § 516. nota. cf. § 517.)

² "... quoniam igitur voluptas ab actu iudicandi pendet." (Ps. emp. § 516. nota.)

³ "Sensationes adeo non per se voluptatem pariunt, sed quatenus adhaeret de perfectione Status opinio." Hence the difference in judgments. (Ps. emp. § 550, nota) - This "opinio" corresponds exactly to the sense that "sentiment" usually has.

* König also quoted the "trahit sua quemque voluptas". (Unters. p. 448.) It also appears frequently elsewhere in the 18th century.

⁵ Ps. emp. § 517.

⁸ Ps. emp. § 517. "Reasonable thoughts from God..." § 411.

⁷ From God. § He who relies on mere sensation is dependent on something that is outside him, not in him.

has a psychological motivation here: the awareness of the rules makes beauty certain and thereby increases pleasure. Awareness of the rules is therefore essential for pleasure.

This justification of an unchanging pleasure makes an objectivist theory of beauty possible for Wolff, regardless of the subjectivist basis of his explanation of pleasure. What we perceive with pleasure is pleasing. We call what pleases beautiful, what displeases ugly (*deforme*). Beauty is therefore the capacity of a thing to evoke in us a feeling of pleasure; it is a perceptible perfection.¹ This definition shows, says Wolff, that beauty does not stand on a weak foundation, as is usually believed, nor is it dependent solely on the arbitrariness (*arbitrium*) of men and their changing opinions.² Wolff arrived at this conclusion only by subterfuge. *Anschauung der Vollkommenheit* means the awareness of a subjective perfection. The expression *observabilitas perfectionis*, however, leads directly to the concept of objective perfection. In the essay "On the Pleasure of Knowing the Truth" (*Horae subsecivae* 1729), Wolff defined this new perfection in more detail. What delights us at the sight of a building is order (§5). However, perfection is inherent in every order. He did not prove this to the ontology "brevitati studens", but it follows from other principles (§4). Since perfection is *consensus in varietate*,³ the metaphysical-objective character of the deceived

is power. Cf. what Descartes says of sensations, inner states, etc.: "experiebar enim illos absque ullo meo consensu mihi advenire..." *Medit. VI.* (First ed. 1641. p. 93.)

¹ Ps. emp. § 542 f. - "Hinc definiri potest pulcritudo, quod sit rei aptitudo producendi in nobis voluptatem, vel, quod sit *observabilitas perfectionis*: etenim in haec *observabilitate* aptitudo ista consistit." (Ps. emp. § 545.)

⁵ Ps. emp. § 544, nota. Wolff, like Lotze later, declares beauty to be a genus that includes many species. "Vocabulum pulcritudinis generale est, quod varias admodum sub se species comprehendit pro diversitate rerum, quibus tribuitur.

' (Ps. emp. § 543, nota.)

³ *Ontologia*, § 503.

definition of beauty. It no longer goes back to Descartes' epistemological psychology, but to Leibniz's metaphysics. We are in a completely different sphere from the starting point (the definition of *voluptas*); only the identity of the word perfection conceals the transition.

Wolff did not arbitrarily adopt Leibniz's concept of perfection. The aesthetic point of view, which for him entailed a strict objectivism, necessarily displaced psycho-logism, which had to follow the Cartesian definition of pleasure. The result was the separation of pleasure theory and the theory of beauty, which should actually be connected. It was of decisive importance for the development of German aesthetics. Basing beauty on order, on metaphysical perfection, not only freed aesthetics from a dangerous psychology, because it was subjectivizing, but also made it possible for aesthetics to become independent in the first place. If the connection between the theory of pleasure and the theory of beauty had remained intact, beauty would have become dependent on the will. The definition of pleasure merges imperceptibly into that of the good: what makes our state more perfect is good.¹ The *lex continui* demands a connection between the ability to recognize and the ability to desire. The feeling of pleasure establishes the connection. Pleasure is preceded by conception, desire by pleasure.² The feeling of pleasure has its natural place before desire; the theory of pleasure therefore belongs to the theory of the faculty of desire. Under these circumstances, if it had remained with the connection between beauty and pleasure, it could have taken a long time for aesthetics to detach itself from the dualism of the faculties of Wolffian psychology. The introduction

¹ Of God, § 422 f. Ps. emp., § 554.

² Wolff explains "judgment" (Ausführliche Nachricht von seinen eigenen Schriften. 1726. § 94) in this context as the middle link between pleasure and desire. The meaning of judgment = value judgment thus becomes very clear. In judgment we become aware that something is pleasurable for us; this idea of value (for us) awakens the desire for it.

of the metaphysical concept of perfection showed a new path. It is to Baumgarten's credit that he recognized and followed this path⁽¹⁾.

Baumgarten is usually regarded as the creator of the definition: beauty is the sensual appearance of perfection. This is a mistake. This definition can be found not only in Wolff, but also in Gottsched⁽²⁾.

In the "Metaphysica", Baumgarten subscribed to Wolff's definition of beauty. By understanding perfection in the Leibnizian sense as unity in diversity, he steered decisively in the objectivist, metaphysical direction. The definition of pleasure sounded metaphysical, but led to psychology and threatened beauty with dependence on desire; the definition of beauty as

¹E. Bergmann (Die Begründung der deutschen Ästhetik. I91L p. 166 f.) finds that Baumgarten has taken the worst possible path. He could have saved his meritorious work from this unhistorical judgment if he had not become so dependent on Braitmaier's value judgments.

² What Wolff calls "observabilitas perfectionis", Baumgarten calls "perfectio phaenomenon". There is also a reference to the source. "Perfectio phaenomenon, s. gustui latius dicto obser- vabilis, est pulcritudo." (Metaph. § 662.) Gottsched says: "When such a perfection (i.e. a conformity of the manifold) falls upon the senses, and, without being clearly perceived, is clearly felt, it is called a beauty." (First Reasons. I. § 256.) His version even has the advantage over the one used by Meier and Mendelssohn (indistinctly or confusedly imagined perfection is beauty). The expression that does not contain the negative relation to clear knowledge (klar) is obviously better in the aesthetic context than the one that defines beauty as a limitation. - Incidentally, Gottsched already bears witness to the confusion caused by Wolff's mixing of the Cartesian and Leibnizian concepts of perfection. (We will get to know Meier as its victim.) Under the heading "Von der sinnlichen Begierde und den Affecten" Gottsched repeats the definition of beauty, only distorted by the relationship to the feeling of pleasure and the good: "If we perceive the perfection of a thing, although only confused, so that we call it beautiful or yet good: then we have a desire, or a pleasure in it. (This is followed by a reference to Cartesius. I. § 95L) - In these definitions of Gottsched, one must of course never forget that the "clearly perceived perfection is for him only a preliminary stage of clear and rational judgment.

The unity appearing in the manifold was metaphysical, but nevertheless had a relationship to the beautiful things; observation had led to them. In contrast to the threat of externalization posed by the pleasure theory, the metaphysical theory also had the great advantage of giving the beautiful an independent inner core. Here again we see metaphysics gaining greater importance for the final solution than that which at first glance seems to offer the natural starting point for the solution: psychology. At first glance, the solution to the aesthetic problem via empirical psychology promises more than that via metaphysics. However, Baumgarten prefers to leave the path of pleasure theory unused. He had already made it clear in the *Meditations* that he was interested neither in psychology nor in metaphysics, but in a principle of knowledge and judgment of beautiful things. The metaphysical definition still left the path to a principle open, a psychological one would have cut it off forever. It only required a slight twist to transform the unity in the manifold from a transcendental content entering into appearance into a form concerning the perception of sensual appearance. The rigid being of perfection only needed to be transformed into a function¹ - thus the path to an aesthetics that was neither psychologically relativistic nor metaphysically dogmatic was found. For a purer understanding of Baumgarten, who was the first to tread this path, it is essential to first eliminate deeply rooted prejudices. The aforementioned explanation of beauty is the main obstacle. But how could the misconception arise that the Wolffian definition of beauty as apparent perfection originated with Baumgarten? - In the *Metaphysics* Baumgarten gave a system of Wolffian philosophy that was condensed with a sure hand and improved in many details. One of these improvements was also the purification and terminological sharpening of the doctrine of beauty. In a style that still paid little attention to originality

¹As already indicated by the word *perfectio* = perfection, but also perfection.

It is no wonder that from the very beginning Baumgarten was regarded as the creator of the definition. Nevertheless, even in the days of the ageing Kant, it was not unknown who first applied the explanation of pleasure as a vividly grasped perfection, as can be seen from Reinhold's letter to Kant of 19 January 1788.¹ Abroad, Wolff is regarded as the originator of the explanation of beauty as an apparent perfection.⁽²⁾ It is strange that no one noticed the lack of connection between this definition and Baumgarten's actual aesthetics. But even this phenomenon is not inexplicable. It has already been pointed out that, before Baumgarten's main work appeared, Meier's popular presentation of the new science was widespread. In this Meier, who did not have the elaborated work and who was also otherwise little suited to peeling Baumgarten's new thought out of its shell, had given the definition of beauty according to Baumgarten's metaphysics.⁽³⁾ When Baumgarten's "Aesthetica" appeared two years later with its completely different definition (which, however, was similar), the Wolff-Meier formula, which had first made Baumgarten's linguistic power effective, was already firmly established in everyone's minds. In his sketch of Baumgarten's Aesthetica, Abbt says that none of his writings had been read less and criticized more.⁴ The few who picked up the book only heard Meier speak. Meier and Mendelssohn, or at most the short explanation of the "Metaphysica" (§ 662), have been met when refuting Baumgarten, not him. The true content of the Aesthetica has not become known to many; nor is it accessible without hard work. Kant, too, has hardly read the Aesthetica.

¹ Correspondence. I, 498.

² Diderot: Article "Beau" (Encyclopaedia Vol. II) in the historical sketch at the beginning.

³ Meier therefore acts as if this explanation has long been known. "That beauty in general is a perfection, in so far as it is recognized indistinctly or sensually, is, among all thorough connoisseurs of beauty, nowadays a foregone conclusion..." (Initial Reasons § 23.)

⁴ Works. Suphan. IV. 1780. P. 228.

but instead followed the "Metaphysica" and Meier. Among the renowned philosophers he cites in § 14 of the Critique of Judgment as representatives of the rationalist theory of beauty, he certainly understood not only Mendelssohn and Meier, but also Baumgarten. But the solution to the great philosophical problems is not dependent on coincidences. Even without knowing the "Aesthetica", Kant was familiar with Baumgarten's world of thought. The problem in question lay in the line of development. He could not ignore it. Without knowing it, he ultimately took up the same task in the Critique of Judgment, whose first ingeniously prescient attempt at a solution was contained in Baumgarten's *Aesthetica*.

The development that actually followed the formula "beauty is an indistinctly recognized perfection" shows all the symptoms of dissolution. This would not have been possible if the functional-logical definition of "Aesthetica" had formed the starting point. The dogmatic ossification is not yet so quickly apparent in Baumgarten's first pupil, because although Meier starts from the metaphysical definition, he by no means spurns the other, deeper thoughts of his role model. His eloquence, which was not interested in contradiction, knew how to connect everything. The great danger that lay in the metaphysical formula was first brought to light by Mendelssohn, whose thoughts were no longer protected from decomposition by the salt of "Aesthetica". From Wolff-Meier's formula¹, Mendelssohn concludes (logically and rightly) that the indistinct (or sensual) idea of perfection is only a worse idea of perfection than the clear one. The aesthetic intoxication is followed by disillusionment. Mendelssohn warns against placing beauty too high. Only our weakness makes the dark sensation a necessary companion of pleasure.² Feelings in general arise only occasionally from the impressions accumulated in a moment, which are then transformed by a single moment.

¹"indistinct conception of a perfection". (On the sensations. Ges. Schriften. I. p. 114.)

²"Cheerfulness" says Mendelssohn. (I, P. 120.)

cannot be distinguished (made clear) from one another. They would disappear with the confrontation of the crowded one. They are therefore only a testimony to the weakness of our mind, which cannot follow many impressions presented at once with dissection. Since beauty is only in feeling, it would have to disappear with the perfection of our spirit. The perfect spirit therefore knows no beauty.

This train of thought, which has probably even been taken for a "consequence" of Baumgarten's point of view, seems very strange if one really chooses the "Aesthetica" as a yardstick. In Baumgarten's theory there was no mention of feeling at all; in Mendelssohn's it occupies the most important position. The purpose of the "Aesthetica" was to place sensory cognition (almost) on a par with clear cognition; for Mendelssohn it is again only imperfection. The "Schrift über die Empfindungen" is therefore not a continuation of Baumgarten's aesthetics, but stands in contrast to it. Philosophical education was not very high at that time; otherwise it would not have been possible to continually confuse Meier and Baumgarten. Consonance of definition was sufficient. The disdain for sensory knowledge was already inherent in Meier's formula. Nevertheless, it would probably not have been possible to turn the meaning of "aesthetics" into its opposite so quickly without an impulse from another sphere. I am looking for this impetus in the psychology of Dubos and Sulzer. (Wolff's Cartesian theory of pleasure, also based on "perfection", works in the background). Sulzer had published an investigation into the origin of pleasant and unpleasant sensations in 1752. Here beauty was characterized¹ by the pleasure it arouses, not, as in Baumgarten, by knowledge. The period had a strong inclination towards psychology (which in the sixties led to an unrestrained devotion to English empirical philosophy).² On the part of the

¹J. G. Sulzer: *Vermischte philos. Writings*. I. 1773. P. 25.

²The main features of the development in Germany, says Dessoir in his history of psychology of this period, are without

Pietism to this psychological mood of the time, Joh. Joach. Spalding's "Gedanken über den Wert der Gefühle im Christentum" (1761), in which he wisely and prudently objected to the excess of religious introspection and the psychologization of Christianity⁽¹⁾. Aesthetics had to be seized by this mood first. Current critical debates stimulated an inner reckoning. Baumgarten, who could have worked against this mood, was not read; Meier, however, had nothing to counter it. As aesthetics passed from the hands of logic (Baumgarten) to those of popular metaphysics (Meier-Mendelssohn), it also fell victim to psychological dissolution. Sommer blamed Mendelssohn for this dissolution of the originally metaphysical definition of beauty and attributed it to the influence of Leibnizian psychology⁽²⁾. It is probably true that Mendelssohn was the first to announce this dissolution. However, the transformation of dogmatic metaphysics into psychologism is (quite apart from the other tendencies of the time that pushed towards it) a necessary historical process, not an individual event. Mendelssohn knew very little of Leibniz (around 1755). Like all the "men of perfection"³, he is a Wolffian (which means Leibniz divided by Descartes). Sommer has oversimplified the development. There is no mention of a lawful unfolding of the germs⁴ given in Leibniz's psychology. Around the middle of the century, the German

This is understandable, "and one cannot even always make out in detail whether, for example, an empiricist direction goes back more to Pietism or to Locke." (I. 2nd ed. p. 116; cf. p. 134.) - Likewise R. Sommer (Grundzüge einer Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie und Ästhetik. 1892. preface p. VI; p. 65): From English and French thought only that is extracted which has the greatest affinity to the development of thought arising from its own sources (Leibniz). Hence the marvelous speed with which English thought was absorbed.

¹ "Experiential Christianity" says Spalding. What is meant is inner experience. (S. 180.)

² Basic features, p. 114; 134 f.

³ Schiller to Körner, Jan. 25, 1793.

⁴ Main features. Preface, p. VI.

Psychology (apart from Sulzer) is still based on Wolff's *Psychologie empirica*, i.e. on a foundation strongly permeated by pre-Lebnizian elements⁽¹⁾.

The idea in which the psychologization of the concept of beauty has proved most fruitful is this: what wants to appear perfect in the view must constitute a whole flavoured with diversity⁽²⁾. The objective demand of wholeness necessarily becomes subjective in this epoch. Perfection must, says Mendelssohn, fall without effort into the senses.³ Only a well-ordered whole of definite extent is still effortlessly apprehended and liked, because it sets the perceptive faculty into easy and pleasant activity.

It was probably the concept of activity that led Sommer to assume Leibniz's influence. There is, however, a reminder of Leibniz in it. The direct source, however, is Dubos, who declared every kind of excitement to be pleasurable because it eliminates boredom. The adoption of Dubos' idea is in turn well prepared by Wolff's theory of pleasure, which is also entirely subjectivist and only takes into account the consciousness of the experiencer. This historical fact, which in itself is not easy to understand, is further complicated by the fact that the Lebnizian concept of perfection (unity in the manifold) comes into play. Two rationalistic explanations of the feeling of pleasure now exist side by side. The older (Cartesian) one places pleasure in every increase of our self-consciousness through heightened psychic activity. (This is linked to Dubos' theory of inner activity.) The reason for going beyond this theory was the difficulties that arose as soon as one tried to determine the specific difference between feelings of pleasure and displeasure. According to the theory, every arousal was

¹ See K. J. Grau: *Die Entwicklung des Bewußtseinsbegriffs im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert*. 1916. p. 183 f.

² assaisonne says Diderot, referring to Crousaz. (Encycl. Art. Beau.)

³I, 123 The immeasurable universe is not a beautiful object for us, because as a whole it eludes sensory perception. (S. 116.)

The more the number of touched nerves increased, the more pleasurable it became.¹ This meant that any distinction between pleasant and unpleasant sensations had disappeared.² The doctrine should have led to a glorification of the grossest sensual pleasure, as it is a pure quantity theory. But it was precisely the explanation of the finer, spiritual pleasures that was important. What could be more obvious than to justify the finer, aesthetic feelings with the newer concept of perfection, to attribute them to a certain harmony and order in diversity? Without any attempt at mediation, indeed without even noticing the difference, Sulzer places both explanations side by side.³ The unity in diversity establishes an "intellectual beauty", which also includes the beauty of mathematical theorems. The pleasure is no longer based on the mere stimulation of the nerves, but on the "blissful harmony" in which even the fibers of the mathematician's brain move when he surveys them as a whole at the end of his calculation.⁴ The theory of quantity has been transformed into a theory of qualities. What matters is not the number of nerves moved, but that the order of the object gives the soul a free course, and that everything goes as it wishes.⁵ The efficacy of the object is now no longer based on the fact that it sets our soul forces in motion at all, but on the fact that it brings them into a free, easy, harmonious play. But not every object does this. Only those objects are pleasing whose

¹Sulzer. I, P. 71.

² cf. Mendelssohn, I, 137 f. - Crousaz already felt this difficulty. The more lively our "sentimens" (acts of consciousness) are, he says, the more perfect is our state, and the more suitable to fulfill our destiny (to live imbued with sentimens) - "pourvu qu'ils ne soient pas douloureux". (Traité du beau. p. 73.) The addition, of course, cancels everything out; for what is the difference between painful and pleasurable acts of consciousness? This is the first question to be answered in a theory of aesthetic feeling.

³I, 25 ff; 71.

⁴Mendelssohn. I, 153 f.

⁵Sulzer. I, 20 f.

developed multiplicity can in turn be easily united in a central point.¹ This introduces a qualitative element that makes the theory aesthetically fruitful. Mendelssohn's theory of conception, not without significance for the development, is the first fruit of the Leibnizian element that penetrated via Sulzer. Leibnizian's weak suggestion does not have a "dissolving" effect, but a highly positive one, in that ultimately the only thing of value in the general dissolution, the specifically aesthetic psychology, went back to it.

In terms of epistemology, both the Descartes-Wolffian and Leibnizian perfection formulas (as interpreted by Sulzer) lead to the same subjectivism. Eberhard justifies the subjectivity and diversity of taste through Mendel-Sohn's theory of perception: in perception, sensory judgment is based on the limitations of the subject. Depending on the soul's ability to perceive more or less at once, its judgment will be different. For the easy contemplation of the manifold by means of the unification into a total conception is the source of all pleasure.⁽²⁾ Historically speaking, Kant's Critique of Judgment was directed against the aesthetic subjectivism advocated by Eberhard (to which his phenomenism corresponds epistemologically). His aesthetics was a restorative act; it found the connection to the classical tradition that had been lost after Meier, without once again falling into Wolffianism. The metaphysical definition of beauty had led to the degradation of apparent perfection compared to clearly recognized perfection; since there was only a difference in degree between clear and unclear knowledge, the demand to approach the highest degree could not be stopped. Beauty must always strive to become clear cognition, i.e. to abolish itself as beauty. Kant had therefore initially tree

¹ Sulzer. I, P. 40.

² Joh. Aug'. Eberhard: Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens. 1776. 2nd ed. 1786. p. 92 f.; p. 76.

garten's achievement: to give sensuality an absolute position vis-à-vis the intellect. This was achieved in theoretical philosophy through transcendental aesthetics. The analogous act for the theory of taste was the recognition of the faculty of feeling. The connection between the development of the basic aesthetic problem and that of epistemological questions is thus obvious. Kant's reformation was directed against the phenomenism and subjectivism of the last Leibnizians, which was completely inorganically linked to a metaphysical objectivism. In epistemology, he overcame phenomenism by "critically" securing his method of scientific cognition through the recognition of "sensuality", a groundless and bottomless metaphysical speculation. In aesthetics, he saved the objectivity of beauty by recognizing "feeling" through a "critique of taste".

Chapter 6: Emotional capacity and contemplation

Reference has already been made to the danger posed by the position of Wolff's theory of pleasure within the theory of the faculty of desire. No theory of beauty could emerge from the murky environment of a theory of desire and affects. Despite Baumgarten's caution, the danger was realized by Meier - whereby, in addition to Wolffian psychology, another extraneous circumstance probably played a role: the appreciation of rhetoric. From Muratori to Baumgarten, Cicero and Quintilian were the inspiration for the creation of the new aesthetics. There is a good deal of psychology in school rhetoric (as early as Aristotle). The speaker wants to direct the will via the emotions, the affect. The old connection between the doctrine of the passions and the doctrine of the will is generally connected with the prevalence of a way of thinking focused on rhetoric.

In one example¹, Wolff explains "living knowledge" as knowledge that goes into will. Baumgarten and Meier use this expression to describe the effect of the beautiful thinking of poets and orators on the whole person, i.e. not only on the sphere of knowledge, but also on the sphere of passions and the life of the will.² Baumgarten's "Aesthetica" is structured according to six points of view (which also apply to logic). These are: ubertas aesthetica (to distinguish it from ubertas logica), magnitudo aesthetica, veritas aesthetica, lux aesthetica, certitudo aesthetica, vita cognitionis aesthetica.³ In the middle of the treatment of certitudo

¹ the "thoughts of the powers of the human mind". (§ 15)

² Living cognition (vita cognitionis) is to be distinguished from vivid (vividus). (The third chapter of section B below deals with this far more significant term).

³ According to the translation in the *Nachschrift des Aestheticakollegs* (published by B. Poppe. Diss. Münster. 1907. § 22): ästhet.

(persuasio) aesthetica breaks off the work. For the aesthetic vitality (Meier says: the sensual life of thought) we are dependent on Meier's execution. We do not know how Baumgarten would have executed this section. Perhaps it was not only illness that prevented Baumgarten from continuing. Did he lose interest in the work, which became increasingly lost in Quintilian? In any case, it remains to be admired how well he understood how to extract something from the rhetorical rubrics that was related to his basic logical idea by focusing on the question of the certainty of (rhetorical) truth.¹ But no matter how far Baumgarten would have gone in his dependence on rhetoric, his justification of beauty in terms of the capacity for knowledge remained decisive. Baumgarten's historical achievement lies in this isolation of beauty from the contagion² of desire without intellectualization. Rhetoric has thus been overcome at its core, and it is not surprising that aesthetics remained completely dependent on rhetoric in its technical aspects.

Meier's first major philosophical work was a theory of the emotions based on Wolff.³ Meier never got rid of this early Wolffianism. It was something different to join Wolffian philosophy in 1724 (or even 1734) than in 1744. The new was just around the corner; but it was not there yet. If Meier had been born seven years later, he would have joined Sulzer. But as it was, he came between the generations and mediated

Wealth, est. nobility, est. Truth, aest. Light, aest. Thoroughness, aest. life. - Instead of certitudo aesth. the synopsis of the 2nd volume of the Aesthetica has "persuasio aesth.". It is clear that the last two moments of rhetoric are taken up with love.

¹ In the *Mediations* it says: "affectus movere est poeticum". (§ 25.) Here too, however, the reasoning goes beyond rhetoric.

² Kant later said "Contagium" about the relationship between sensuality and understanding in Wolffian philosophy.

³ Theoretical doctrine of the emotions in general. 1744. 2nd ed. 1759.

Baumgarten with Wolff. For Baumgarten is characterized by the fact that, despite his Wolffian "Metaphysica", he already belongs historically to the intellectual mood of the more Leibnizian second half of the century.¹ Meier's relationship to Baumgarten is similar to that of Wolff to Leibniz: as the latter to Descartes, so Meier falls back to Wolff. The fact that this reaction is at the same time associated with progress towards Locke is extremely expressive. The inner bypassing of Leibniz takes its revenge. He who spurns the means of thought that lead to the solution of the problem of individuality is overwhelmed by this problem and surrenders himself to the philosophy of insufficient reason (sensualism or some philosophy of experience). - Meier is the continuator of Wolff's work in the era of aesthetics. However commendable his work may have been from the point of view of cultural history and practice, the historical value of his rationalism is far less than that of Wolff's. Formally speaking, the first German rationalist is just as dogmatic as the last. In terms of his personal attitude to life, however, Wolff was much less of a dogmatist than a fighter. Meier also argued a lot. But Wolffianism, once a strong wind, was in its time a gentle breeze in which one could comfortably smoke a pipe. Wolff triumphs over a powerful opponent (theology) through the power of thought by defending himself. Meier attacks his adversary, idolizes him, laughs, jeers; but it is not all so serious. After all, they are all good Wolffians. Rationalism is no longer a weapon, but common ground on which to fight. After the strong awareness of the high goal has faded (after all, they had won; Wolff was master in Germany), dogmatic rationalism only becomes truly dogmatic. It is now only a possession, no longer a goal. At the same moment, Locke, who had not yet been able to gain power over Wolff, invaded the school. The age of eclecticism, which characterizes the real Enlightenment, begins. For the reasons described above, Meier is the school's first Enlightenment thinker,

¹ Just as Herder speaks with warmth of Baumgarten, but not of Meier.

because he is the worst Leibnizian. His successors are Mendelssohn and Nicolai. Baumgarten's successors, on the other hand, are Lessing, Reimarus and Herder.

The philosophical barrenness of the Enlightenment (in this narrower sense), even in its own aesthetic field, has its deeper cause in the connection with Wolff. The Enlightenment, which also lives on in the history of thought, began with Leibniz. It is his failure in the face of Leibniz's world of thought that condemns Meier to insignificance in the field of aesthetic thought as well, in spite of his agitation for aesthetics. -

Meier calls a cognition (i.e. a thought, an expression) alive "when it causes pleasure and annoyance, desire and loathing, through the contemplation of a perfection or imperfection".¹ The close connection to Wolff's *Psychologia empirica* is just as clear here as the relationship to rhetoric. It would be completely unphilosophical and unhistorical to look for an overcoming of Baumgarten's "intellectualism" in the expression "life". In terms of cultural history, the emphasis on liveliness, the gripping, the gripping was certainly a merit at a time when the rationality of victorious Wolffianism threatened to suffocate everything else. But Meier only continued what the Swiss had already begun, and so precisely that he did not even go beyond the confused aesthetics of the Swiss, who likewise confused poetry and rhetoric, in philosophy (which was certainly embarrassing for him as a professor of philosophy). Baumgarten had recognized beauty as something independent and unique by basing it on the lower faculty of cognition. This philosophical achievement was called into question as soon as beauty was once again reduced to a means of arousing emotions. The definition of beauty in the "Aesthetica" was aimed at inner perfection. The "life" of beautiful knowledge, on the other hand, arose through its relationship to something outside: to the listener's capacity for desire. Fortunately, Meier lacked consistency;

¹ Initial grounds. § 35.

He did not allow himself to be disturbed in his other thoughts by "living knowledge", which he should actually have placed at the highest level, since it occupies not only half the soul (the power of knowledge), but the whole soul (the power of desire as well)⁽¹⁾.

Baumgarten liberated the doctrine of beauty (in the *Meditations* and the *Aesthetica*) from Wolffianism. However, his work does not fit into the immediate context of development. But it was strong enough, even in the confused form in which it was presented by Meier, to give a powerful impetus to aesthetic thought. In the great, ideal history of thought, the "*Aesthetica*" takes its place immediately before the "*Critique of Judgment*". In the real historical development, on the other hand, it does make an epoch; in what this epoch itself wants and thinks, however, it is no longer alive. The interest of the time belongs to psychology, not to logic, from which the "*Aesthetica*" is inseparable. The character and tendency of Baumgarten's aesthetics are unpsychological. Although it overcomes Wolffianism, it does not replace it with what historically represents its positive opposite (the theory of feeling), but with something of its own: a logic of individuality. The time was not yet ripe for this. The problem of the individual first had to be developed in psychology. The eminent historical significance of the *Critique of Judgment* is based on the fact that Kant was able to follow the psychological development that began immediately after Baumgarten, which was based on the

¹Initial grounds. § 35.

²The demand for an aesthetic pathology remains. (An-fangsgründe. § 178. Cf. § 182; § 193.) Bergmann (Die Begründung- der deutschen Ästhetik, p. 171 note) has sought in this aesthetic pathology the first germ of the aesthetic theory of feeling. That is to confuse a regression with progress. One should give up trying to find an approach for the development of the theory of feeling detached from desire within the philosophy that is somehow dependent on Wolff's *Psychologia empirica*. (Bergmann, p. 20.) Mendelssohn, who in a 1770 essay makes an attempt to recognize feeling (as a spiritual judgment of the soul) (Ges. Schriften. IV. 1, p. 113), cannot help but discover the germ of desire even in the calm pleasure in beauty, which he bases on the faculty of approval. (Ges. Schriften. II, 294 f.)

The development of the faculty of feeling and at the same time solves the logical problem of aesthetics on a higher (critical) level.

The deeper reason why Baumgarten's *Aesthetica* remained outside the realm of development is the fact that it was a doctrine of artistic creation, not of enjoyment. A theory of feeling cannot develop as easily from a doctrine of representation as from a doctrine of perception. Baumgarten deals mainly with the *pulcre cogitaturus*, i.e. the speaker and poet. The influence of ancient poetics and rhetoric cannot be denied in the objectivist character of his work. However, I cannot see in this fact a historical limitation in the sense that Baumgarten had not yet reached the standpoint of the modern subjectivist (i.e. psychological) aesthetics of the English, because this objective-systematic tendency is nothing isolated and accidental. It is a consequence of the basic tendency of the entire work.¹

The real successor to Baumgarten in the history of aesthetics is not Meier or Mendelssohn (who play no role in the development), but Sulzer, although (or because) he spoke very little of perfection (which was only a misunderstanding). Sulzer is the opposite of Baumgarten in everything. He is a psychologist; he has very little inclination or aptitude for logic. Not artistic creation but enjoyment is at the center of his theoretical interest. Even where he speaks of the artist, he takes the standpoint of the connoisseur. The fact that he was nonetheless able to replace Baumgarten historically, and that the

¹ To call Baumgarten's work a continuation of Latin poetics and rhetoric (because it is written in Latin, takes its examples not from national but from classical poetry, and also aims to instruct poetry-making) is only possible if one has an idea of philosophy like Braitmaier, who dares to play off the "shallow Wolff against the "original thinker Mendelssohn". With such foundations, it is no ^{WTM der} if Baumgarten's ingenious thought - assigning beauty to the lower faculty of cognition - is called the cardinal error of Baumgarten's aesthetics. (Gesch. d. poet. Theorie und Kritik von den Diskursen der Maler bis auf Lessing. 1889. II, 18; 142; 26.) Knowledge of the sources is not yet historical knowledge.

The fact that the theory was able to drive development (seen from a higher perspective) in the direction in which it had to go presupposes a certain commonality in its foundations. It consists in independence from Wolff. Sulzer begins his analysis of sensations with the same impartiality with which Baumgarten grasps the idea of beauty consisting only of sensual ideas, which is so contrary to the Wolffian epoch. His merit is parallel to Baumgarten's. Like Baumgarten's aesthetics, Sulzer detaches psychology from the Cartesianism of Wolff's *psychologia empirica*. Neither Wolff nor Cartesius, he declares right at the beginning, would do him justice in the theory of pleasure.¹ Where Sulzer got the courage for this new development can be guessed. The impartiality with which he approaches the subject is reminiscent of Dubos. He does not want to engage in metaphysical investigations (this is Dubos' aversion to *raison* and the *specu- latifs*), but bases everything on experience.² But in no way do we get a merely descriptive psychology or sentimentalism in the manner of Dubos. Rather, Sulzer derives all pleasures from a single principle, from the power to think, from the soul's endeavor to produce ideas.³ Through Dubos, he has become neither an empiricist nor a sensualist; he has only changed his rationalist master. He replaced Wolff and Descartes with Leibniz.
⁽⁴⁾ I am not in a position to decide whether Wolff's model for this change was the *Psychologia rationalis*, which, in contrast to the *Psychologia empirica*, is based on the concept of simple imaginative substance and tends more towards Leibniz.

Sulzer did not provide an actual theory of feeling, because we cannot yet speak of an independence of the emotional faculty in his work. His merit lies in having drawn attention to something new, even if he did not yet have a clear understanding of it.

¹ *Verm. philos. Schriften*. I, P. 1L

² I, P. 5; P. 7.

³ I, P. 14.

⁴ Dubos' psychology provided the impetus for this. It, too, traced everything back to the activity (excitation) of the soul. Only the idealistic moment was missing.

New has not yet seen quite clearly. He distinguishes between two faculties: cognition (imagining something) and sensation (being moved in a pleasant or unpleasant way).¹ Sensation has nothing in common with the object. One does not feel the object, but oneself. The soul is merely occupied with itself; it has no regard for the object that causes its state.² Sulzer is aware of the value of this discovery. He calls it an important observation that can shed a bright light on the most important questions of the doctrine of the soul. His prophecy was fulfilled. Not yet thirty years later, feeling was placed alongside cognition and desire as an independent faculty. Sulzer's description of feeling, however, contains the first approach to this final overcoming of Wolff's *Psychologia empirica*.

"Sensation is directly concerned with our inner state; for with every new sensation we are aware of a change in ourselves, recognition is concerned with something that we regard as separate from ourselves. In recognizing we are spectators of what is happening; in sensing we ourselves are the thing with which something changeable is happening . . ."³ Sulzer later formulated his thought with such certainty. The problem,

¹ "Remarks on the different states in which the soul finds itself when exercising its principal faculties, namely, the faculty of imagining and the faculty of feeling." 1763. I, p. 225 - The treatise begins quite Wolffian: "I call every conception sensation, inasmuch as it is pleasant or unpleasant, or inasmuch as it produces desire or disgust." (I, 229 f.) But the word order already heralds an important change. Wolff says: "affectus iucundi sunt, qui in appetendo consistunt, seu cum magno voluptatis gradu coniunguntur". (Ps. emp. § 608.) If we omit the "or" added by Sulzer, we obtain a reference to the feeling (= pleasant or unpleasant sensation). What is added is an explanatory hypothesis. In Wolff's case, the omission of what is added by "or" eliminates the emotional element. What remains is what matters to Wolff: the derivation from desire.

² *Verm. philos. Schriften*. I, 229 f., 233.

³ General theory of the fine arts. New ed. 1786. article "Sinnlich".

which this implied for aesthetics, he nevertheless did not see clearly. It is true that he says in the same passage that the sciences work for cognition, the fine arts for sensation; in the article "Schön" ("Beautiful") of his dictionary he also deals at length with the pleasure of sensation. But although the Baumgartenian basis has been abandoned, Sulzer cannot get away from the formula of perfection. The mood of the times demands it; with beauty one must speak of perfection.¹ Once pleasure is chosen as the starting point,² but pleasure is a sensation that tells us nothing about the object, then the question arises as to whether this does not mean that the beautiful merges completely with the pleasant. - Sulzer's theory of contemplation can be seen as a means of preventing this confusion.

Wolff distinguished between an appetitus sensitivus and an appetitus rationalis.³ Baumgarten also divided voluptas and taedium into sensitiva and rationalis (tellec-tualis).⁴ Maupertuis was the first to pay particular attention to the difference. He defends the right to compare the "plaisirs des sens" with the "plaisirs les plus intellectuels". There are not noble and less noble (noble) pleasures. The noblest are those that are the strongest (grand).⁵ By his impartial consideration of the two types of pleasures, Maupertuis gave the impetus for an unbiased examination. His influence on the doctrine of the emotions goes no further.⁶ The pleasures of the soul last; they, growing

¹ Winckelmann and A. R. Mengs are no different. (Cf. H. v. Stein, Entsteh. d. neueren Ästh. p. 360 f.) Sulzer takes the peculiar route of referring the formula of perfection only to human, the highest beauty. He therefore also distinguishes between mere "pleasure" and "inner voluptuousness" (which corresponds to the highest beauty). His entire speculative incapacity is expressed here.

² Verm. philos. Schriften. I. p. 25 f.; General Theory Art. "Schön".

³ Ps. emp. § 580; § 880.

⁴ Met. § 656.

⁵ Essai de philosophie morale. Oeuvres. Lyons. 1753. II. S. 243.

⁶ He names as "plaisirs de fame" only those that are owed to the realization (pratique) of justice and the seeing of truth. Aesthetic interest is alien to him. Against his

through repetition. The pleasures of the body diminish with repetition, while the torments increase.¹ Sulzer calls sensual and intellectual pleasures equally noble; but the intellectual ones confer greater advantages.² There is no longer any sign of the rationalist opposition to sensuality.

The demarcation of a class of finer feelings from the merely sensual is the prerequisite for any theory of the aesthetic state. However, Sulzer only approaches such a theory in his treatise of 1763. Between the state of contemplation and the state of feeling lies an intermediate state, which Sulzer calls the state of contemplation.⁸ In the article "Beautiful" of the General Theory, he distinguishes the pleasant stimulus, whereby we love the effect of the object without occupying ourselves with it, from the pleasure we take in a machine, for example, through clear perception. Between the two there is a pleasure which we have before we know what things are supposed to be. This is the pleasure in the beautiful, - Sulzer's great psychological talent can be recognized from the summary of his entire investigation in the beautiful sentence: there is a state "in which man sees very clearly and feels nothing; another in which he feels strongly and sees nothing; and a third in which he sees and feels clearly enough to be able to describe that which is outside him and within him" ("Festimation des moments heureux ou malheureux, est le produit de l'intensité du plaisir, ou de la peine, par la durée." II, 233) Mendelssohn protested effectively. (Rhapsody. Phil. Writings. I, 255.)

¹ Maupertuis. II, 249.

² Sulzer: Verm. phil. writings. I. 24; 77.

⁸ He has something of both. Sulzer supposes that rapid alternation between them produces the middle state. (Verm. philos. Schriften. I, 236.) Bodmer has already described the aesthetic state in the same way. The cause of the pleasure of tragedy consists in a contemplation which the mind makes in the midst of the deepest sorrow. (Correspondence p. 86.) The deception (i.e. the illusion) alternates with the thought of its dissolution. This alternation brings about the sweet sorrow which we feel in the tragedy. (S. 88.)

memorize".¹ The three-measure sound heard here emerges powerfully from Kant's and Schiller's aesthetic investigations. It is heard first in Sulzer's work.

Sulzer gave the most detailed description of contemplation in a treatise from 1765: "Von der Kraft (Energie) in den Werken der schönen Künste". He calls it a "state which pleases and in which one would like to remain".² The characterization of contemplation later given by Kant is similar, albeit more profound. Here, in the elaboration of a specific state of contemplation, is what Sulzer contributed to the solution of the problem of taste. "Contemplation" at least provides a psychological explanation for the objectivity of beauty, which Sulzer otherwise only asserts, not substantiates. (Philos. Schriften, p. 24; 46 ff.; 329.) The fact that he did not arrive at a relativization of beauty like Eberhard, despite his psychological research direction, is probably due to his strong aesthetic interest in addition to Bodmer's strong influence (whereas Eberhard was primarily a psychologist and only incidentally an aesthetician). Sulzer's contribution to aesthetics, however, was definitely based on his psychology. His theory of beauty oscillates between Dubos and rationalism: "We call all objects beautiful that directly appeal to the imagination or the intellect.³ Immediately afterwards, beauty is explained in terms of unity in diversity. The unification of the two definitions, the empirical and the rational, occurs through the consideration that unity and multiplicity make an object pleasant because they set the power of the soul into activity. Sulzer then confirms this theory by citing what happens in us when we see a beautiful object.

¹ Verm. philos. Schriften. I. 238.

² Verm. philos. Schriften. II, 127 f. Wolff's Ps. emp. already contains an allusion to this "remaining": "Si qua ex re voluptatem percipimus in eam fertur appetitus, seu eam appetimus, quamdiu in notione boni confusa acquiescimus." (§ 591.)

³ Verm. philos. Schriften. I, 25, where one recognizes his teacher Bodmer.

(Phil. Schriften. I, 25 f., 37 f., 39.) Here we already have quite that eclecticism (still without Locke's influence) which later characterizes the popular philosophers. The starting point is empirical; but the rational formulas are not yet rejected, one seeks to adapt them. (Sulzer even mentions the Wolff-Gottschean formula again. "The good, in so far as it is clearly evident to the observing cognition", is called "also" beautiful. General theory. Art. Taste)

The difficulty lies in the fact that Sulzer wants to retain the perceptual basis of beauty without abandoning the old rationalist attitude towards beauty. He is actually already faced with Kant's problem: how can the general validity of beauty be reconciled with the subjectivity of feeling? The problem of taste, pushed back for a moment by Baumgarten, emerges with renewed vigor. The *je ne sais quoi* reasserts itself. What is beautiful is what pleases, even if one does not know what it is, nor what it is supposed to serve.¹ Sulzer did not feel the full force of the problem. But his achievement is significant enough, even if one does not already look for the beginnings of the later emotional theory in him.² His merit is not to be sought in theory at all. He was an observer. The explanation is rationalistic: sensation remains dependent on confused ideas. The more confused the idea, the stronger the sensation. The ideas of the lower senses are more confused than those of the upper senses, while feeling and taste also accompany stronger sensations. - The valuable novelty lies in the description. Sulzer overcomes rationalistic psychology not through a theory, but through a phenomenology of feeling. The solid wall of theory still stands. But the air that it

¹ General theory. Article Taste. - Meier has mentioned *je ne sais quoi* only once as a fashionable word. (Illustration of an art judge. p. 94.)

² This has been done by A. Palme (Sulzer's Psychology. Diss. Berlin. 1905.). I seem to lack evidence for his assertion that Sulzer at least sometimes regarded feeling as a faculty in its own right.

is a different one than before. To pay attention to something that is neither knowledge nor desire, as Sulzer does, requires the inner overcoming of the rationalist mood.

The dogmatist of Sulzer's discovery is Eberhard.¹ He seeks to explain the fact that in the state of feeling we recognize nothing of the object. In the state of feeling, the quantity and strength of the ideas that crowd together in a feeling do not leave us the time and freedom to distinguish. Therefore I cannot distinguish myself from the ideas.² A sign that the

"The extent to which aesthetic investigations were in the air at the time can be seen from the fact that philosophers such as Reimarus and Lambert also occasionally make remarks on aesthetics. Thus Reimarus separates sensual pleasure from the pleasure of the mind (Allg. Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Tiere. 3rd ed. 1773. § 45) and, like Sulzer, contrasts the pleasure of sensual things with the pleasures of the mind in the beauties of nature and art, in truth, science and so on. (The noblest truths of natural religion. 2nd ed. 1755. p. 495 ff.) Lambert gives, in an appendix (of the I. vol. of the Architektonik. 1771), although as a mathematician he is unfamiliar with the subject, the outline of an aesthetics. Sulzer's distinction between state and object shines through when he says that the words pleasant, lovely, charming, delightful refer more to the sensation than to the thing; the word beautiful, on the other hand, refers to the thing itself, although it always also has a relationship to a thinking being. (I, 369.) Although Lambert mentions beauty from the point of view of sensation (taste), Sulzer's problem is alien to him. The mathematician found no entry into the circle of thought of *je ne sais quoi*. His aesthetics knows nothing irrational. The simple beauties, e.g. the prismatic colors, must indeed be felt par excellence; but human nature is not so "degenerate" that one should not be able to decide by the majority of votes. The composite beauties are capable of a theory because they permit a dissection. This theory, i.e. reason, determines the simplest relations. Number and measure, i.e. mathematics, is the foundation of the arts. (p. 374 f.) - This purely formalistic aesthetics could not have had an effect on Kant because it ignores the main problem, that of taste. Kant's so-called formalism is separated from Lambert's by the dissertation of 1770: it is based on the relations of pure perception, whereas Lambert means the relations of understanding

² General theory of thought and feeling. 1776. new ed. 1786. p. 45 - Leibnizens Nouveaux Essais were published in 1765. This perhaps explains the fact that Leibnizens influence

Eberhard's desire for a new expression that allows a distinction, such as the French have in sensation and sentiment, is clearly recognized in the first place. He himself wants to adopt the term Empfindnis, but does not remain consistent with the terminology⁽¹⁾.

The reason why no agreement has yet been reached on the process of the development of the faculty of feeling seems to me to lie in a lack of differentiation. It is necessary to distinguish between: 1. the knowledge of feeling and its description, 2. the theory of feeling and its classification and 3. the knowledge of special types of feeling, such as aesthetic feeling. We do not find a decisive classification of feeling as a separate faculty of the soul until Kant. The description of feeling, on the other hand, was begun by Sulzer and continued by Tetens. Sulzer, Tetens and K. Ph. Moritz make attempts at a description of the aesthetic state. Mendelssohn is the first to hint at the idea of a tripartite division of faculties and mediation. However, the faculty of approval is to be regarded as the least powerful stimulus of the faculty of feeling, since the moment of feeling was only weakly emphasized in it and the mediation in Mendelssohn's work was also reminiscent of Wolff's psychology ("germ of desire"). Mendelssohn makes no mention of the emotional faculty becoming independent. Tetens' approach to this is much stronger; but even Tetens ultimately sticks to the dichotomy (receptivity - spontaneity). Kant should no longer be denied the credit of having brought about the decision on this question.²

appears stronger in Eberhard. However, the influence of Reimarus and Lessing could also explain this fact. Eberhard declares right at the beginning that Leibniz had taken psychology further than Locke. (p. 9. Exactly the same in Tetens: *Über die allgemeine spekulativische Philosophie*. 1775. p. 91.) Sommer (*Grundzüge einer Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie und Ästhetik*. 1892) gives a good account of this period, which was dominated by Leibniz's peculiarly advanced psychology.

⁽¹⁾General theory. S. 167; 169.

² The "third faculty" was, as it were, in the air, as can be seen from the passage in a letter from L. H. Jakob (Halle) to Kant"

According to Sulzer, Tetens had done the most important preliminary work for the faculty of feeling. Only one step was missing to finally achieve the third faculty⁽¹⁾ In any case, it is too much to say that through Kant's mediation Sulzer's concept of feeling had the civil right in science.² Tetens completed the phenomenology of feeling in such a way that we must speak of a Sulzer-Tetens concept of feeling before Kant. - Tetens³ distinguishes between indifferent or merely instructive feelings and those that do something to us or move us. The latter are the effects of the former on us. Tetens calls them "sensations" insofar as they are pleasant or unpleasant.⁴ The "emotion" is merely a feeling of a change in me, "something of which I know nothing" other than that it is pleasant or unpleasant for me.⁵ Feeling, according to Tetens, refers more to the act of feeling; sensing points to an object.[®] But just as everything is closely connected in psychological reality, so everything in Tetens' terminology merges into one another. He speaks of the "feeling of pleasure and displeasure" where, according to his intention, he should actually say the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Jacob finds "that the feelings require a peculiar faculty, which must be separated from the faculty of perception and the faculty of understanding and the faculty of desire..." (Kant's Correspondence. Ac. ed. II, p. 5.) This was written shortly before the appearance of the Critique of Judgment. (Feb. 28, 1789.)

¹ Cf. Dessoir, Gesch. der neueren deutschen Psychologie. I. 2nd ed. p. 344. Tetens probably speaks of Empfindungen, Vorstellungen - Gedanken (Phil. Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung. 1777. I, p. 7), also of the "three fundamental faculties of the soul": Feeling, understanding, will (I, 625. 620). However, "feeling" does not mean the same thing for him as it does for Kant.

² Palme, Sulzer's Psychology. S. 57.

³ He once says: It does not depend on the names; a certain vagueness in the meaning of the words may even have its pleasant side. (I, 168.)

⁴ Phil. Vers. I, 184 f.; 186.

⁶ Phil. Vers. I, 215 The allusion to *je ne sais quoi* is clear.

⁰ 1, 167 f. "Gefühl" thus corresponds to sentiment in Crousaz's sense: act of consciousness.

much like Kant later on.¹ He finally loses his head over all his distinctions. If he had been more resolute, his book would certainly have made a greater impression on his contemporaries.

Tetens expressly emphasized that the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is to be separated from all desire, and thus clearly drew the line between the new doctrine and Wolff's psychology. Striving and interest are effects of the faculty of desire and are not attributed to "beautiful and pleasant objects, in so far as they are mere sensations".² He also clearly emphasized the inconsistency of sensations with sensations. The serene sky appears blue to me whether I am morose or happy. On the other hand, the impressions on our sensibility change;³ what is pleasant to me now may cause me disgust an hour later. The judgments about colors and figures are more consistent than those about the moral and aesthetic qualities of things.⁴ Tetens does occasionally refer to the aesthetic problem, but his research only pursues purely descriptive-psychological goals. The connoisseur's being moved by the finer beauties of a poem, a statue, a painting is for him merely suffering and feeling.⁵ Yet he also gives a description of contemplation (in a non-aesthetic context). Contemplation and attention are found in every awareness. The former is a continuation of feeling, the latter a continuation of imagination, "which dwells on the object".⁶ Both are a processing of the inner impression; something that comes from within, an activity. - One could think of "reflection". Tetens did not pursue this idea any further.

In hints that betray a man who is intimately familiar with aesthetic experience, K. P h M o r i t z

¹1, 189.

²I, 188 f.

³The "trahit sua quemque voluptas".

H, 554.

⁴I, 626.

*1, 289; cf. above p. 133 (Sulzer).

spoke of the aesthetic state (similar to Winckelmann). Like Schopenhauer later on, he contrasts the "restless activity" with the moments of quiet contemplation, the "undisturbed calm of quiet contemplation". (On the visual imitation of the beautiful. Deutsche Lit. Denkm. Bd. 31. p. 20; 28.) Of course, these few words do not contain a new contribution to phenomenology.

The approach to overcoming subjectivism, which lies in these attempts to characterize the specifically aesthetic state, was too weak to effectively put a stop to Eberhard's psychologism; it is also not sufficient to explain Kant's masterful description of the aesthetic state. Kant's second, more important source is the term reflective judgment. It is the concept of reflection already discussed by Wolff.

In Wolff's psychology, attention and reflection are the lower faculties of the upper part of the cognitive faculty. The acquisition of concepts begins with them.¹ Reflection is a continued attention to one part (sc. of the thing) after another.² The successive aspect is to be emphasized.³ The most important achievement of reflection is comparison (because through it we acquire the concepts of genera and species).⁴ Baumgarten makes a seemingly insignificant but important change: For him, to compare means only to direct attention to the total conception, after (successive) reconsideration has preceded it.⁵ In this emphasis on the total conception lies a logically as well as aesthetically important moment. The aesthetic significance becomes clear when one considers that "comparing" here means resting, lingering in relation to "reflecting".

¹Ps. emp.: "de attentione et reflexione". (§ 234-§ 265.)

²Of God, etc. § 272.

³Ps. emp. § 257. "Attentionis successiva directio ad ea, quae in re percepta insunt, dicitur reflexio."

⁴Ps. emp. § 259 f.; § 268.

⁵Metaph. § 626. "Attentio in totius perceptionis partes successive directa est reflexio. Attentio ad totam perceptionem post reflexionem est comparatio."

appears. I no longer grasp details, parts, but allow the whole to affect me and weigh the parts within the whole against each other. Meier says of reflection (*Nachdenken*) that it refers to the relationship of the parts to the whole, and calls comparison (*Überlegung*) the holding together of thoughts in order to clearly present the whole with all its parts at the same time.¹ The word "at the same time" clearly indicates where Baumgarten's slight change was aimed: at the transformation of successive reflection into simultaneous reflection.

As the beginning of conceptualization, reflection is a kind of intermediate state between confused and clear imagination. The idea of making it fruitful for the aesthetic problem was an obvious one. Since Joh. U. König, we have seen the search for a middle ground everywhere in German aesthetics. However, the concept of reflection only became fruitful, and not only in the aesthetic field, through Kant.

¹ Initial grounds. II. § 308-§ 310.

Chapter 7: Imagination, wit, genius

There were two reasons why Wolff could be useful to the emerging German aesthetics. As theologically bound as his philosophy may seem to us today, it had an enlightening effect on the universities of the time. In terms of mood, this brought it close to the young science, which also wanted to lift the wigs and countered school foxery with the education of taste. Wolff cannot be said to have any relationship to art. The affinity is exclusively that of two historical powers pursuing the same goal: The education of the German people. Secondly, however, Wolff added something special to the beginning of aesthetics: this was his psychology. The two sections of *The Reasonable Thoughts on God* ("On the soul in general, namely what we perceive of it", later *Psychologia empirica*, and "On the nature of the soul and of a spirit in general", later *Psychologia rationalis*) had a powerful effect on the aesthetically receptive minds of the time. Here, in a pedantic outward form (which was still imitated by J. E. Schlegel in 1742), but in a new language, was a theory of the soul that did justice to concepts such as imagination, wit, the power to invent, and gave new impulses by incorporating reflection (overthinking), the rational and the art of invention. The most important thing was that these concepts were accepted in a positive sense and were given a firm place ("una certa e determinata sede" - Salvini). This gave the time the courage to make use of them. The enthusiasm of the Swiss for Wolffian philosophy can certainly be understood historically.

¹ Only ignorance of Wolff makes it possible to understand the widespread opposition in principle between Gottsched, the teacher of Wolffian philosophy, and the Swiss (of whom the saga has not yet ceased despite Danzel). If one starts from the intellectual center of the time (and that is Wolff), there is not much evidence of a principled opposition between the two parties.

The historically most important concepts of this psychology are imagination and wit. The literary parties are divided between the two with a peculiar determination: the Swiss lay claim to imagination, Gottsched to wit. If Wolffian philosophy were not so deeply despised, it would not have escaped literary history that the Swiss owe the concept of imagination not only to the Spectator, and that Gottsched has something to oppose to this concept that likewise derives from Wolff's psychology and should not be underestimated. It is not only German philosophy that has been neglected in favour of the English - the influence of Muratori has also not been sufficiently taken into account.¹ Once one has noticed that Swiss aesthetics has no trait that is not also found in Muratori's poetics (apart from its Wolffian element), one not only recognizes the Spectator mainly only as a stimulus to the mood, but also appreciates the larger historical context in which Bodmer's and Breitinger's aesthetics are placed.

In the land of the rinascimento, the newer, rational philosophy had triumphed, just as it had in the other civilized countries. But the rinascimento had remained more powerful. Muratori demands truth and probability from the poet - this distinguishes him from Cardinal Pallavicino's purely pictorial and imaginative aesthetics - but he does not make poetry critical and sober like Boileau. The purpose of poetry is to delight through imitation. What pleases, however, is the marvelous, because through it we experience something that was previously unknown. The more new, unexpected and unknown things are, the more they move us. The surest way for the poet is therefore to depict the marvelous and the new, for he knows that novelty is the mother of the marvelous, which is the mother of delight.² "This new,

¹The Swiss preference for Milton has also made the historical assessment of the sources of their aesthetics one-sided

²"... dilettar coli imitazione ..." "... ben sapendo, ehe la novita e madre della meraviglia, e questa del diletto." (Della perf. poesia. I, p. 56.) Addison's most important aesthetic demand: "greatness, novelty, beauty" (The spectator, no. 412) is historically nothing else

The marvelous is a sweet light which, perceived by our intellect and especially by our imagination, delights and enraptures us."¹ The poet must therefore have two qualities: he must invent new things and truths, and paint vividly ("ben dipingere con vivace colori"). He must put up pictures, but they must be true.² Muratori often praises Marino's happy imagination; but he lacks the purified power of judgment.³ - We see the same elements mixed here as in the aesthetics of delicacy. The new, surprising, but nevertheless justifiable by reason, image is the center. Above all, again, the metaphor.⁴ In Muratori, it is even clearer than in Bouhours that the demand for a unified, objective metaphor represents, as it were, the synthesis of Renaissance and more recent (Cartesian) philosophy in poetics.⁵

The miraculous in objects and actions, the invention, the happy fantasy is particularly emphasized by Breitinger⁶.

as a renaissance. Variety is the word most frequently used in the aesthetic sections of the Spectator. Variety is only the more general term for greatness (i.e. fullness and breadth) and novelty, and imagination (or fancy) is the mental faculty belonging to variety. - As I conclude from the very honorable mention of Bouhours (Spect No. 62 "Bouhours, whom I look upon to be the most penetrating of all the French Critics ..."), apart from the national talent ("the English are naturally fanciful", Spect No. 419), the aesthetics of delicacy may be regarded as the stimulus. The Spectator deals with idealization in the spirit of the Renaissance. The poet enhances the beauty of the landscape ("heightens its beauty"), gives a higher nature ("seems to get the better of nature"). No. 416.

¹ "Questa novità, questo meraviglioso e un dolcissimo lume, il quale appreso dall' intelletto nostro, e specialmente dalla fantasia, può dilettarci, e rapirci." (Della perf. poesia. I, 58.)

²1, 75.

³I, 133; 282; 358.

⁴1, 160; 248; 280.

⁵ Wolff gives a paraphrase of "unity in multiplicity" when he says: "Patet adeo usum imaginationis rectificari per connubium imaginationis cum ratione. (Ps. emp. § 150, nota.)

"I do not want to deny the direct influence of Leibniz's idea of "possible worlds" on the aesthetics of the Swiss (which Cassirer rightly emphasized strongly); but it is

position is illuminated by the relationship between the Swiss and the German Marino. Banishing Lohenstein is good, says Breitinger, but we must not forget how to fly completely. That is why he wants to encourage the use of figures, metaphors and similes again. This is Muratori's position on Marino in reverse. The Swiss did not adopt this position from the outset. They begin, as champions of taste, with a warning against the obscuring of speech by the too frequent use of metaphors.¹ If the Swiss nevertheless again penetrate to the recommendation of the poetic image,² it happens under the guidance of the principle "ut pictura poesis",³ which up to now has been judged far too much from the problem of Laocoon. The doctrine of poetic painting has only had the secondary effect of mixing the arts. Its actual meaning lies in a different direction. The emphasis on painting means first of all a victory over the tendency towards the intellectual, because it means concreteness that is due. Furthermore, "painting" aims at the real main means of poetry, the metaphor.⁴ If the Swiss did theoretical justice to the importance of metaphor (and simile) by recognizing the "power of imagination", this is due to the principle of "ut pictura poesis".

to point out that Muratori already mentions something related. The poet, he says, invents what nature could or ought to do, but does not, or only rarely, do. (Perf. Poes. I, 88.) It is a Renaissance idea. In Scaliger, *imitatio* means a representation of things as they should be, not as they are. (Brinkschulte, Scaliger's Theory of Art. 1914. p. 25; 27.) Aristotle may also be recalled. (Poet. c. 9.)

¹ Your example is Postel's "Wittekind". Imagination p. 40 ff. The "sharp judgment" teaches to use the metaphors in a description "moderately and skillfully". (Einb. p. 25.) Since in another passage (p. 55) darkness is associated with depraved taste through "extravagant metaphors", it is clear that "judgment" is identical with taste in the sense of the word.

² It is their main advantage over Gottsched that they arrive at this. In their critical-poetic practice, the two parties relate to each other like *inventio* and *iudicium*.

³ Writing on the Imagination, p. 10.

⁴ Descriptions are nothing other than portraits and paintings of things, which are characterized by their similarity to the original image.

to be attributed. However, the future has shown that this justification was dangerous and by no means able to replace Gottsched's reliance on wit. The connection between "painting" and metaphor was not an inner necessity, not a conceptual requirement. It was possible that "painting" would eventually degenerate into a dead, inartistic repainting (which always presupposes an excess of epithets). The concept of humor was threatened by the danger of wordplay, but never that of imitation and the mixing of the arts. Imagination, on the other hand, as a faculty of images, could be dangerous to theory. For the Swiss, the word "painter" is synonymous with poet, because the poet's main faculty, the imagination, is derived from the face.¹ The enthusiastic approval of the Swiss for Wolffian philosophy is due not least to the fact that they discovered a theory of their central concept in Wolff's psychology.²

According to Wolff, the imagination imagines things that are not present. But Wolff has also remarked that figures (i.e. outlines), size and positions can be better re-imagined than colors; these remain almost entirely absent in the imagination.³ The abstracting moment that has thus entered into the concept of imagination leads to an extension of the definition. Since the imagination already proceeds arbitrarily in the reproduction of the real, retains outlines, discards colors,

funny. (Einbildungskraft p. 10.) The term in this, which enables us to refer "description" chiefly to metaphor, is that of resemblance. - The Discourses (I, 19th Disc.) translate the poet's "painting" as "gracefully, delicately, highly writing".

"The word "imagination" was quite properly understood by Addison, who declared the sense of sight to be the noblest (Spect. No. 411 "Our sight is the most perfect and most delightful of all our senses"), as the faculty of imagines. The "pleasures of imagination" come from visible objects. The word "picture" thus imposes itself quite naturally ("all the varieties of picture and vision that are most agreeable to imagination." No. 411.)

² In the painters' discourses I have found the word imagination only once (II, 16). Mostly it stands for imagination. The writing of 1727 is a testimony to the Wolffian spirit in its very title.

³ Of God, etc. § 235; § 232; § 236.

it is no longer surprising that it is able to combine arbitrarily at all. This is why Wolff says that the imagination also goes to things that we have never felt before.¹ He gives the example of a crooked line that we have never seen before and only come to feel by drawing it on paper.²

There are two ways of imagining what has not yet been perceived. We divide things we have actually seen according to our liking and reassemble the parts according to our liking. This is how the ideas of angels, pagan gods and the Melusine are created. (Wolff calls the ability to do this the "power to compose".)³ In the other "manner" we make use of the proposition of the sufficient ground and produce something real, such as the sculptor who unites everything beautiful "in the human species" in a statue, or the master builder who creates a new one from many cracks.⁴

No one will deny that such explanations, inserted into a strict system written according to the "mathematical method", could have made an impression. They did not fail to have an effect. The Swiss find in it the justification of their love of the imagination; Gottsched also demands a strong imagination from the poet.⁵ But this quality does not, as with them, become the center of theory, the soul of the poet. He also leaves reason its right, the "judging mind" and wit.

According to Wolff, wit (i n g e n i u m) is the ease of perceiving similarities (of different things). On the other hand, the ability to distinguish much in one thing is called wit.

¹Of God. § 241 - Here the new and wonderful is thus attached to a basic psychological ability.

²Wolff thus conceives of the imagination here as pure imagination, as the creator of mathematical constructions. In fact, what we have here is Kant's "productive imagination".

³Of God. § 422; broadly elaborated in Ps. emp. § 144-150.

⁴From God. §245f.

⁶Crit. Poetry. 4th ed. S. 103.

acumen (acumen).¹ Wolff immediately recognizes wit as significant for art. In- geniosi, he says, are called poets, orators and actors. Poets and orators receive the name because of the tropes, allegories and metaphors that are based on the similarity of things. An imaginatio viva together with the ingenium gives the poetic vein (facilitas fingendi).²

A happy, cheerful head ("how one speaks in general") or a lively wit ("how a worldly wise man would like to speak") make the divine in poetry - the divine.

¹ Ps. emp.: § 476; § 332. Of God: § 366; § 858; § 860. - Since these two definitions are of the greatest historical importance up to Kant, it is appropriate to indicate their sources. B a c o distinguishes between "ingenia Constantia et acuta" and "ingenia sublimia et discur- siva". "Maximum et velut radicale discrimen ingeniorum, quoad philo- sophiam et scientias, illud est; quod alia ingenia sint fortiora et aptiora ad notandas rerum differentias; alia, ad notandas rerum similitudines." (Nov. org. sc. I, c. 55.) H o b b e s formulates the same contrast as the difference between "bonum ingenium (bona phantasia)" and "bonum iudicium". He adds: "poetis in uno quoque genere operis tum iudicium tum phantasia requiritur." (de homine. c. 8.) Here, then, is still together what in Wolff appears to be separate: ingenium and phantasia. - Locke has elegantly reproduced and further elaborated this in the Treatise on the Human Mind (II, II. chap. § 2). Wit and judgment are oppositely directed. The power of judgment insists on exact differentiation; wit seeks similarities in order to put together pretty fantasy images. The power of judgment ensures that one is not deceived by wit and takes one thing for another. Wolff has only transformed the purpose of judgment: to perceive the differences of thoughts and things, into: to distinguish much in one. The Hobbesian contrast of ingenium and iudicium repeats the contrast of inventio and iudicium common in rhetoric. (Cf. esp. Quint, inst. or. III, 3.) Scaliger also contrasted inventire and iudicium. (Poetices Lib. V, 2. p. 214). - As to wit, I gather from Spingarn's book on the literary criticism of the Renaissance, that in Hobbes's time the term "imagination" is narrowed to "wit. With Dryden it is again imagination, more often fancy. It is regarded as the "essence of the poetic art". (Spingarn p. 259.) Gottsched expressed the contrast (with remarkable freedom from Wolffian terminology) in the "Tad- lerinnen" as follows: "Just as the power of judgment without the spirit is cold and dull, so the spirit without the power of judgment is extravagant and blind." (II, 61). "Spirit" here corresponds to inventio, to wit; "power of judgment" to the restraining iudicium.

² Ps. emp. § 477; § 479.

is this how Gottsched introduces the meaningful concept into his critical poetry with a silent reference to Wolff (the "wise man of the world")? "This wit is a power of the mind that can easily perceive the similarities of things and thus make a comparison between them. It is based on perspicacity, which indicates a capacity of the soul to perceive much in a thing that another, who has a dull or stupid mind, as it were, would not have observed." - Wit is mainly manifested in the happy invention of "fanciful figures of speech" (i.e. metaphors), to which we are led by the similarity of things to one another; for the metaphor is only "a short simile"? The psychological basis of the poet's most important skill is thus found in wit; all poetry actually depends on metaphor and simile.

The moment that is rightly valued as the most important in the concept of imagination, the creative moment, was at least as strongly emphasized in the concept of wit. Wit discovers new things by detecting similarities between things. Comparison is an activity of the soul. Similarities must first be found; they are not obvious to everyone. Basically, wit is the term that better describes the creative. In the first half of the 18th century, it meant the same as spirit (for which the French say *esprit*)? The latter is to be distinguished from reason. As Hildebrand (Grimm's dictionary, article "Geist") says, reason is reserved for "school-bound thinking", to which

¹Crit. Poetry 2nd ed. The verses of Horace aimed at the poet: "Ingenium cui sit, cui mens divinior, atque os Magna sonaturum, des nominis huius honorem". (Sat. I, 4) Gottsched renders: "A poet must therefore have a great wit, a divine spirit and a sublime expression, if he is to be honored with this name." (Krit. Dichtk. p. 246.)

²Crit. Dichtk. 2nd ed. S. 246, 247.

³Bodmer adds "*esprit*" in brackets to the Wolffian term *wit*. (Anklagung p. 44.) The term "spirit" is already frequent in the Discourses. (Dedication of Part I, etc.) Meier calls Batteux a "witty" (i.e. witty) Frenchman. (Reflections on the first principle of all fine arts and knowledge).

Spirit, however, a "freely roaming and creative" (ib. 24, d). There is thus no difference between spirit, wit and imagination; only the (not insignificant) difference that the definition of wit indicated a certain method of creation, while the concept of imagination remained at the definition of the arbitrary creative connection in general.

Throughout the 18th century, the objective product of wit was called a "meaningful expression". Sinnreich is a translation of *ingenieux*; "meaningful expression" faithfully reproduces the phrase: *pensee ingenieuse*. The dependence of German aesthetics on French aesthetics can thus be seen in one of the most important aesthetic terms. Up to now, the influence of England has been emphasized far too strongly. It was not the *Spectator*, *Home* and *Gerard* (Burke's influence was significant, but went in a different direction), but the French who were the inspiration for the development of German aesthetics - just as J. U. König's treatise makes clear. The underestimation of Gottschede's aesthetics, the overestimation of Bodmer's aesthetics, which we have had to point out several times, is closely connected with the erroneous assessment of England's historical role in the history of the development of modern aesthetics.

In the 37th part of the "Vernünftige Tadlerinnen" (1725), Gottsched gives a treatise on the "meaningful". He uses examples to illustrate the difference between simple and "meaningful" expression. His merit lies in the practical: he shows what is meaningful. The definition, on the other hand, is, as Bodmer correctly objects, tautological.¹ A meaningful expression must be full of wit and rich in thought, so that it offers a reader much

schatten. 1757, p. 10.) In this sense, witty is still in use in classical and romantic philosophy and poetry. - What we call wit today was called "joke" in the first half of the 18th century. (Cf. Meier's "Gedanken von Scherzen." 1744, which today we would have to call "Theory of Wit"). In the initial reasons Meier translates *ingenium et caput aestheticum venustum, elegans* as: "aesthetic and witty head". (§ 217.)

¹Indictment. S. 57.

¹ This explanation says nothing, since, according to Wolff's explanation, he who has wit is called rich in meaning.² But Gottsched recognized the poetic function of the "rich in meaning": "florid similes" (i.e. metaphors) are what is important in the "rich in meaning type of writing" (for which we could say "witty, witty or figurative expression").

Bodmer takes a step beyond Gottsched in his theory of meaningfulness insofar as he makes better use of Wolff's explanation of wit and ingenuity³. He emphatically emphasizes the logical basis of meaningful expression (similarity).⁴ However, Bodmer has not penetrated to clarity either. Otherwise he should have noticed that an opposition of meaningful and perceptive (if the similarity in the comparisons is too far removed, he calls the passage meaningful but not perceptive)⁵ contradicts the Wolffian definition (according to which perceptiveness was only an intensification of wit) and that perceptiveness rather coincided with "judgment" (Schrift über die Einb. p. 25). It would have come to the old opposition of inventio and iudicium, which Wolff later summarized in the terms ingenium and acumen; the same that Gottsched expressed in the Tadlerinnen (II, 61) by spirit and power of judgment.⁶

The fact that the Swiss missed out on the merits of the term "joke" is not only due to Bodmer's somewhat erratic temperament (after he had

¹ Tadlerinnen. I, 293.

² Wolff, Reasonable Thoughts of God. § 366; Bodmer, An- klagung p. 44.

³ according to the rational thoughts about God, where perspicacity is the ability to perceive similarities that not everyone sees in the same way (i.e. a higher degree of wit).

* Indictment p. 46; 48 f.; 58; 69.

⁵ Indictment. S. 54.

⁸ Gottsched is no stranger to the word wit in the Tadlerinnen either. But he does not use it concisely, i.e. not in connection with the concept of similarity. "Verstand und Witz" (I, 403), "Witz und Lebhaftigkeit" (II, 64), "Witz und gute Einfälle" (II, 226), the "herrliche Witz der Poeten". (II, 197.)

has effectively played off the concept of wit against Gottsched, he makes no further mention of it). They probably only turned to the concept of fantasy because it was common in their ideal country, England (although Muratori speaks at least as much of fantasia as the Spectator does of imagination).¹

Addison well recognized the aesthetic significance of the concept of wit. (No. 62 of the Spectator is devoted to the passage from Locke's *Essay on Wit and Judgment* quoted below.)² He lists metaphors, similes and allegories first among the "species of wit". Indeed, in the following sentence he seems clearly to allude to the contrast between mere coloring by epithets and a witty description by metaphors: "For this reason, the similitudes in heroick poets, who endeavour rather to fill the mind with great con- ceptions, then to divert it with such as are new and surprizing, have seldom any thing in them, that can be called wit." (N. 62.) Nevertheless, Addison makes no attempt to relate the concept of wit to the theory of metaphor and thus to give poetics a philosophical foundation. The concept of wit remains aesthetically unfruitful

¹ The turning away from the concept of wit is perhaps connected with the fact that Bodmer later moved away from Wolffianism. I infer this from the fact that Wolff, who is quoted with the highest praise in the work on the power of education even outside the dedicatory letter (Einb. p. 183 f.), and whom the "Anklagung" (Indictment) mentions at length as the "great teacher of Germany" (Anklagung pp. 43-46), is no longer mentioned in the later writings. However, the preface to Bodmer's critical treatise *von dem Wunderbaren* (1740) speaks of the Germans' inclination towards philosophical sciences and deduced truths, which for some time has made them so sensible and closed-minded that they have become dull and dry at the same time. This can only go back to the Wolff school. (Gottsched responded in the *Krit. Beitr.* 1740. 24. p. 660 f.) Bodmer probably saw that he could not exist on the ground of Wolffian philosophy alongside the professor of logic and metaphysics in Leipzig, and therefore left Wolff to Gottscheden. In the preface to Breitinger's *Critical Poetry*, he expected the breakthrough of good taste not from Wolff's teaching, but from Leibniz's philosophy.

² In No. 416 Addison contrasts "warm fancy" and "discerning judgment". Here the term fancy has obviously been substituted for wit. (Cf. above p. 147 note).

bar, the metaphor an arbitrary piece of jewelry. Thanks to wit, it would have been so easy to make a precise conceptual distinction between the "great conceptions" and the "new and surprising" idea. But by stopping at the "fancy", Addison made it possible for the Swiss to fall back on the great conceptions ("power words"). The concept of fantasy has no necessary connection with the theory of metaphor, but the concept of joke (similarity) does. Just as the metaphor as a means of art is superior to the mere decorative epithet, so an aesthetic theory based on the metaphor is superior to one based on the epithet. For the epithets stand only side by side, the terms of the metaphor form a peculiar whole. The fact that Addison does not know what to do with the concept of joke or metaphor is perhaps due to the basic character of English thought. England is the home of associative psychology; the epithet connection, however, is based on association. The connection that takes place in the metaphor, on the other hand, can no longer be explained by association. It transcends the mere mechanism of imagination. With the epithet connection it is sufficient that the words somehow belong to the thing and are therefore associatively awakened by its imagination. The idea of hero awakens in me the associations "brave, strong, clever". There is an easily manageable addition. The idea of "roses of the cheeks", on the other hand, presupposes a similarity (unity) between roses and cheeks, which is no longer a mere unit of association, but has something mysterious about it. This mysterious unity is well felt by Addison (as the sentence quoted above proves); but his theory is not sufficient to help it to speak, although the term which could give it expression was on his lips. By following Addison, the Swiss miss out on what could have been the support and center of their poetic theory: the theory of simile, metaphor, wit. In practice, they advocate the simile, but their theory lacks the redeeming word for what they want with their hearts. The irony of history has it that Gottsched, the enemy of imagery, with

The Swiss "painters" did a great deal of cultural and historical good with the concept of imagination, but theoretically remained at the level of Addison and Muratori. The Swiss owe their fame to their better use of the term imagination. If one looks not at the cultural-historical effect (on people), but at the development of thought that took place in silent depth, then the concept of wit traces a good part of the fame of the Swiss back to Gottsched. Gottsched failed in history not as a thinker, but as a man. He did not know what to do with the precious commodity entrusted to him because he lacked a sense of the "marvelous".

Should it be a coincidence that the aesthetic theory which the Swiss (and with them, of course, Gottsched) overcame in its most important doctrine (imitation, illusion) was developed in Gottsched's vicinity? J. Elias Schlegel's essays on imitation¹ are based on the concept of resemblance. Until now, this concept has been accepted as an invention of Schlegel's without considering the historical context. The concept (in Schlegel's sense) is foreign to the mature aesthetics of Bodmer and Breitinger. But not Gottsched's, whose definition of wit contained it.

Despite their reverence for the power of imagination, Bodmer and Breitinger had stuck to the ordinary theory of imitation.⁽²⁾ The closer the resemblance, the greater the pleasure.³ This whole doctrine is now uprooted by Schlegel by the proposition that the resemblance is a correspondence of the pieces which the

They appeared in the journals published by Gottsched: "Beiträge zur krit. Historie" etc. and the "Beiträge zum Vergnügen des Verstandes und des Witzes 1740-1745. New edition by Joh. v. Antoniewicz in the German literary monuments of the 18th century, no. 26.

²The "Discourse of the Mahlers" already alludes to the Zeuxis anecdote. (III, 21.)

³ Einbildungskraft, p. 29. The Swiss adhered to this principle even later.

¹ The meaning of Riese's theorem is: only a correspondence of the pieces that make up the essence of the thing (are therefore determinant). It was the connection to this mathematical-philosophical concept of similarity that made the great achievement of the treatise on imitation, which is readily recognized by literary history, possible in the first place. The Swiss also speak of similarity. But they mean the popular concept, according to which similarity is an incomplete, inferior likeness. The philosophical concept of similarity, however, excludes equality. For the identity of the determinant of two things does not yet mean identity in the accidental determinants. Rather, it is self-evident that they do not coincide in the qualities lying outside the "determinant" properties (because there is no reason for them to coincide). Schlegel therefore means something quite different from the Swiss by "similarity". From the Swiss concept of similarity follows the demand that the afterimage should be as similar as possible to the original image. From the philosophical concept of similarity, on the other hand, it follows that a description need not imitate all relationships of all parts. It is enough if those relations are given which contain the others. Those parts which are not expressed are included in those which are imagined; the imagination nevertheless imagines the picture to be complete.² The really deceptive aspect of Schlegel's treatise is its title. The assertion that imitation may be dissimilar does not so much focus on the object (the thing) as on the image of it. Which "image" can only be meant by this is clear from the emphasis on dissimilarity: it is the metaphor that expresses something through something else that is completely different from it (dissimilar), or, in Schlegel's language, imitates it.³ What is meant by this?

¹ Abhandlung v. d. Nachahmung, p. 5. reprint, p. 114; 116. - Wolff, Ontol., § 217: "Nascitur adeo similitudo entium ex identitate determinationis."

² Treatise on imitation, § 5.

³ Schlegel calls the thing, that which one wants to express, model, the expression itself imitation. In Haller's verse: "Soon

However, Schlegel's decision to retain the cumbersome term imitation in his fine investigation was probably not only out of consideration for the "school". In the word imitation lies a clue to the matter. The demand for dissimilarity brought the danger of arbitrariness, of irrelevance close. To a certain extent, the concept of imitation serves as a yardstick for judgment. In the 18th century, the commandment of imitation had the general purpose of wresting art from arbitrariness and granting it the status of lawful creation⁽¹⁾.

It is not unimportant to recognize that Schlegel's treatise is actually an investigation into metaphor. The dispute between Leipzig and Zurich was in large part a dispute about the correctness of metaphors and similes. It brought this artistic device to the forefront of general interest.² We will have to recognize an echo of this metaphorical mood from the first half of the century in the importance given to the theory of metaphor in Kant's Aesthetics.

The significance it has for the theory of metaphor is not the only thing that makes the concept of similarity (subjectively: of wit) historically valuable. The concept of the soul-power of wit (ingenium) contains the germ of the most significant aesthetic concept of the 18th century, the concept of genius⁽³⁾.

when the dull autumn plucks the fall leaves", he calls the falling of the leaves in autumn a model. The "imitation" is the verse. If one now compares, he says, example and imitation, one finds that the word plucking does not correctly represent the falling off in the example. There is a gentle detachment, here violence. (Treatise, § 14. Reprint, p. 127 f.)

¹ Cf. H. Cohen, Kant's Justification of Aesthetics. 1889. S. 92.

² J. E. Schlegel is the real mediator between the parties. He unites both advantages: the better philosophy of Gottsched with the poetic feeling of the Swiss (in which he, as a real poet, far surpassed them).

³ The connection between the concept of genius and the theory of metaphor is already clearly recognizable in Muratori. Ingegno (spirit, genius), in contrast to imagination (which he characteristically calls a magazine of images - guardarobe), is "that active force through which the higher faculty collects, unites and finds the similarities, relationships and reasons of things". ("quella virtù

Wit, metaphor and genius belong together for the 18th century sensibility.¹ The connecting factor lies in the moment of invention. As an objective poetic form, metaphor is the same as genius is subjectively: a source of relationships, surprises, images and invigorating ideas. The "meaningful expression" that brings things together in such a way that they illuminate each other, as it were, is the work of a mind that discovers "similarities" everywhere. Du's genius lives in a world of relationships of meaning between things that are only accessible to him. The metaphor is only the most poetically important case of the representation of the context of meaning in which the genius lives.

e forza attiva, con cui l'intelletto raccoglie, unisce, e ritroova le simiglianze, le relazioni, e le ragioni delle cose." Perf. poes. I, 235; 264). Wit, as we can also render ingegno, operates in two ways: in penetrating things to the bottom, and in collecting similarities from a thousand different things. The former belongs to the "ingegno penetrante ed acuto", the latter to the "ingegno vasto". (From the reference to the "seminar of good taste", which in Muratori's opinion Baco's works contain - *Riflessioni sopra il buon gusto*. II, p. 34 - I gather that Baco served as a model for the distinction between the two types of ingegno). Both actions produce ("come due richissimi fonti") the most beautiful images and noble poetic ideas ("concetti bellissimi, e nobili sentimenti per adornare la poesia"). - Immediately afterwards, Muratori traces the term ingegno back to Cardinal Pallavicino, who learned from Aristotle that the sign of a great mind is to discover beautiful and new similarities and comparisons, i.e. to collect the similarities of things. (Perf. poesia I, 237; probably referring to Arist. Rhet. III; 10,4.) Muratori calls the collected similarities "witty images" (immagini intellettuali, o ingegnose) in distinction from the images of the imagination, which stand side by side without relationship. (One could clarify the difference by that of metaphor and a mere series of decorative epithets). The characteristic of wit is now to find noble and never before discovered relationships ("legami nobilissimi, e non mai osservati per altro intelletto", I. p. 255 f.). "Una pronta, chiara, e feconda fantasia, un acuto e vivace ingegno" make the good poet. (I, 352; "sublime ingegno" it says I, 370.) - Trevisano ascribes to the ingegno the ability to explore the "analogie men palesi" of things. (*Riflessioni*, p. 75.)

¹ "Rich in meaning" (cf. p. 149 above) applied to persons thus means as much as ingenious. In this sense Kant speaks of the "sensuous Baco of Verulam". (B XII.)

The mood of genius, which only came to historical fruition in Germany during the Sturm und Drang period, has an important history in the field of philosophy. According to Wolff, ingenium is one of the natural "skills" of the mind¹ and consists of the ability to perceive the similarities of things. Baumgarten defines ingenium somewhat differently and introduces the concept of proportion.² A certain proportion of the powers of cognition constitutes genius in the broader sense, i.e. a certain disposition towards something.³ The word "genius" therefore does not have the limited meaning of a certain disposition; the term "proportion of the powers of cognition" contains something greater. The "Aesthetica", which devotes an entire section to the *felix aestheticus* (i.e. the artist) (§ 28 - § 46), requires of the beautiful genius (*ingenium venustum*) a certain disposition of the whole soul.⁴ The most important thing is the concord (*consensus*) of the upper and lower cognitive faculties (for which *harmonia* also stands).⁵ Here we see the formal moment (*consensus, harmonia*)

¹ It is treated in the section: "de dispositionibus naturalibus et habitibus intellectus" The acumen, on the other hand, in the preceding section: "de tribus intellectus operationibus in specie". Baumgarten brings the two together under the heading "perspicacia" as manifestations of a single faculty, thus continuing Locke, who was the first to emphasize the relationship between the two. (Metaph. § 572 ff.)

² "Habitus identitates rerum observandi est ingenium strictius dictum." (Metaph. § 572.) He understands by identity only a commonality of the denoting characteristics taken to the highest degree, i.e. a high degree of similarity. (Metaph. § 174.) Proportion means the equality of reasons: "aequalitates rationum sunt proportiones." (Metaph. § 572.)

³ "Determinata facultatum cognoscitivarum proportio inter se in aliquo, est ingenium eius latius dictum." (Met. § 648.) There is an *ingenium tardum* and an *ingenium vegetum*. After all, people are called *ingeniosi, acuti, memoriosi, iudiciosi* etc. according to their *ingenium*.

⁴ "Ad characterem felicis aestheticici generalem requiritur... dispositio naturalis animae totius ad pulcre cogitandum, quacum nascitur." (§ 28.)

⁵ § 38; § 573: "per harmoniam facultatum cognoscitivarum in- feriorum et superiorum."

The development of the term from the meaning of "head" to that of "genius" (in today's sense) cannot be overlooked. The formal moment of harmony relating to the totality of the soul's faculties forms the constant.

Meier treats the concept of wit in a similar way to taste and the power of judgment: he makes more of it than his teacher.² He wants to "open up a wider career" for wit. All correspondences of things, all similarities, equalities, proportions should be the object of his preoccupation.³ Baumgarten already spoke of the games of wit.⁴ Meier lists them: Confusions of terms, aesthetic arguments, figures of speech. Metaphor is dealt with in detail in the section entitled "Von dem Witze" (§ 409; § 411 f.). "As often as we think a beautiful metaphor, so often do we think two similar things, together with their corresponding elements, simultaneously and at once. Consequently, many things are compressed into one concept at once, and it becomes emphatic as a result."⁵

¹ *Ingenium venustum* means something quite different from *ingenium acutum*, e.g. beauty is not a special faculty of the soul, like astuteness. The *ingenium venustum* is not so called because a *facultas venusta* "reliquis maior est" (§ 648 Metaph.), but because the total ratio of the faculties of a certain person enables him to produce beautiful thoughts.

² I have already pointed out that an after-effect of Gottsched cannot be ruled out. The fact that the process is repeated in the joke reinforces the reasons for this assumption.

³ Initial grounds. II. § 400. i.e.: Meier merges Wolff's and Baumgarten's definition and thus expands the concept of wit. The metaphysics also shows a good will to give meaning to wit, where Meier devotes a chapter to genius under the title "Von der Gemütsfähigkeit" ("On the capacity of the mind"), albeit without any content at all. The faculty of mind (or "Gemütsgestalt") is the "head", what the French call *genius*. (§ 643.)

⁴ Metaph. § 576 "ingenii (foetus) lusus, i. e. cogitationes ab in- genio dependentes, et subtilitates, cogitationes ab acumine depen- dentes" .. Probably according to Baco: poetry is to be held more pro lusu ingenii than a science (de augm. V. c. 1.) cf. p. 153: *Einfälle* - "playworks of the mind". Discourse: "Imaginationsspiele des Hoffmannswaldau". (II, 21) Rüdiger, de sensu veri et falsi, 2nd ed. p. 453: "lusus ingenii".

⁶ Initial reasons. § 412 - Baumgarten Metaph. § 517 "per- ceptiones praegnantes. The vividness of the

In Kant, wit is found again as a faculty of aesthetic ideas (i.e. metaphors). However, in accordance with the change in meaning of the word wit, Kant expresses ingenium by spirit.¹ The Critique of Judgment explains genius as a "union in certain proportions" (i.e. proportion) of imagination and understanding (lower and upper cognitive faculties).²

thought, the aesthetic light (perspicuitas et lux aesthetica). The emphatic, "grainy", as it were "pregnant" concepts are also called "illuminating arguments". (Init. Gr. § 125). They present much at once and therefore give us a broad view. (The same turn of phrase - Crit. d. U. § 49, p. 195.) These emphatic notions (Anfang-sgründe § 126) are another expression of the "much in one" of Leibniz's monas. Breiting-er's concept of "power words" has nothing in common with Baumg-arten-Meier's turn. Bodmer expressly distinguishes the perceptive form of writing from the strong and emphatic one. (Anklag-ung-. p. 56.) Only the former is based on the similarities, while the latter awakens us to 'Jebhafte und hohe Begriffe'. The "much in one" is only possible if the parts are similar. Therefore, only the "astute" way of writing may be brought together with the equally pregnant (praegnantes) concepts; the "emphatic" one does not justify this. The whole difference between Wolffian (Gottsched-Baumgartenian) and Swiss aesthetics becomes clear from this. The Swiss, unclear, driven to aesthetics more by mood than by philosophy, sometimes use this, sometimes that expression to describe the power of speech. Wolff's students are more steady, more definite; the objective content of the concepts ensures that their connection to philosophy does not remain fruitless.

¹ Critique of the power of judgment. § 49 Cf. Reflections on Anthrop. Ac. Ausg. XV, N. 944 "The French have the word genius, because the word spirit (esprit) means wit with them."

² Kant considers imagination, understanding, wit and taste to be necessary for "fine art". (Urteilskraft § 50.) Gottsched demanded of the poet: a strong imagination, much perspicacity, wit and erudition (Kr. Dichtk. 4th ed. p. 103.) Gottsched has given the most beautiful description of a righteous poet in the Tadlerinnen. (II, 61.) There he demands "a peculiar disposition" (i. e. individuality), understanding, a terrible, lively and loud imagination, which is a gift from heaven, and a great power of judgment, "which imagines everything reasonably, that is, according to truth and nature." Since the power of judgment develops from "perspicacity", wit equals spirit, and we may say understanding for erudition, it follows that Kant's definition of genius actually "only" raised the explanation of critical poetry to the level of the end of the century. Context and distance become equally clear here.

The famous definition of genius in the third critique: "Genius is the talent (natural gift) that gives art its rules"¹ has its historical prelude in Bodmer's preface to Breitinger's critical poetry. The expression that the great works were not created by the rules in no way implies that the rules are a mere fruit of stubbornness or blind chance. "It is true that nature was before art ... But this does not mean that the writings in question (Homer's, etc.) were written without rules... Rather, these excellent poets and orators were the only ones who found art in nature and provided us with the rules of their found art in the works and their execution."² What is not yet contained in these sentences was expressed by Joh. Adolf Schlegel (1758) in the preface to the first edition of his Batteux translation. The works, he says, are not invented according to "pre-discovered principles", but the principles are deduced afterwards from existing works.³ And in a note to the text: The matter of taste is only to feel and approve the beautiful, not to produce it itself/ Sulzer writes in 1757 a "development of the concept of genius", which counts attention, reflection, imagination, wit, memory and judgment as the main qualities, and genius is expressly not a separate, distinct quality from the others.

¹ Critique of the power of judgment. § 46.

² If Bodmer, for fear of "obstinacy," calls the effects of the old orators and poets "precalculated," I do not yet see in this, like Braitmaier, a reason for contemptuously setting aside the beautiful passage. (History of Aesthetic Theory. I, 158.)

³ S. XII.

⁴ p. 72. At the end of the development, the concepts of genius and taste converge again. K. Ph. Moritz calls taste something that "comes as close as possible to the producing force without being itself." (On the pict. Imitation of the Beautiful. German literary monuments of the 17th and 18th centuries. No. 31. p. 20.) Here, however, the approximation only serves to raise the enjoyable imitation of the work of art to the highest level, and can be ventured because no one could emphasize the boundary between enjoyment and production more sharply than K. Ph. Moritz. Kant, on the other hand, who was far removed from Moritz's aesthetic refinement, followed the line of tradition that went hand in hand with systematic interest.

of the soul. The more physiological explanation given in the article *Genius* in the "General Theory" is completely free of Baumgarten's influence, but falls outside the Kantian circle of thought⁽¹⁾.

Schlapp has claimed that both the beginnings of the cult of genius and Kant's most strictly conceptual formulation of the theory of genius can be traced back to direct English inspiration.² This would stand in strange contrast to what we know of the development of thought in German aesthetics in the 18th century. As far as philosophy is concerned, Schlapp's assertion cannot be upheld. Schlapp reproduces Gerard's teaching with the words that genius is not an isolated ability; it all depends on a proper proportion between imagination and judgment.³ Gerard, however, teaches the opposite. Although genius receives support from all the powers of the soul, it is nevertheless one of the intellectual powers, distinct from the others. Gerard rejects the very definition that genius consists in the union of imagination and judgment, and regards it as a modification of the imagination.⁴ The main idea,

¹ We "must not be afraid", it says, to seek out the disposition to genius in animal nature. It consists in an exquisite sensitivity, greatness of spirit, irritability of the senses and the nervous system. - Muratori already demanded an "ingegno filosofico" from the poet. (Perf. poes. I, 352.) Gottsched explains that philosophy is very necessary for the poet. (Krit. Dichtk. 4th ed. p. 108.) Sulzer demands that the great artist, besides the genius peculiar to his art, should possess a great philosophical genius, i. e. remain a genius, even if he had not had the spirit of his art. (Art. Genius.) Philosophical genius is therefore a general ability that is independent of particular artistic skill. Lessing also coined the term Raphael without hands.

² O. Schlapp: *Kants Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung der Kritik der Urteilskraft*. 1901. p. 447 - Schlapp attributed great importance to Alex. Gerard's "Essay on genius" (1774) to be of great importance for Kant.

³ Kant's doctrine of genius p. 442; 447.

⁴ *Essay on genius*. P. 6: "It receives assistance from them all. But genius is notwithstanding one of the intellectual powers, and distinguishable from the rest." p. 385: "Genius has been defined by some to consist in the union of a fine imagination etc. . . . But genius ought notwithstanding to be considered as a modification of the imagination."

which Kant borrowed from Baumgarten, is therefore absent in Gerard's work.¹ All the essential features of Kant's theory of genius are to be understood from the German development. Gerard's beautiful study was read by Kant; it had nothing decisive to say to him. The ability to invent, which Gerard attributes to genius⁽²⁾ is also nothing new to the concept of genius. Dubos already says that one must be born with genius in order to invent.³ This definition probably goes back to Baco.⁽⁴⁾

The concept of genius was popular within Wolff's school long before the English influence became more deeply felt in Germany. If foreign influence played a part in this, it came from France, not England. Helvetius' book "De l'esprit" (1759) was one of the most widely read and quoted works of the second half of the century. Here we find the definition: "the mind is the capacity for the creative production of our thoughts" and the sentence: "Genius always presupposes invention."⁵ In the "History of the Human Mind

⁽¹⁾ I consider only an indirect influence of Gerard on Kant possible: in Garve's beautiful translation, which appeared in 1776, judgement is always rendered as "power of judgment". Perhaps this influenced Kant's choice of the word Urteilskraft (instead of Beurteilungskraft).

² "Genius is properly the faculty of invention." (S. 8.)

³ Refl. II, P. 3.

⁴ Baco is also mentioned by Gerard with the highest admiration. (Essay. p. 15 f.)

L'esprit: "la faculte productrice de nos pensees." It is an effect of sensibilite et memoire. (De l'esprit. Paris. 1759. p. 32.) - Le genie "suppose toujours invention." (In section IV, I. p. 356, entitled "du genie", where it is derived from gigno, j'enfante, je produis). The historical connection between the doctrine of esprit and the aesthetics of delicacy can be seen in the words with which Helvetius characterizes the work of genius: "une nouvelle combinaison, un rapport nouveau aperfu entre certains objets ou certaines idees." (ib. p. 356.) Helvetius explicitly emphasizes the role of chance in this. - There are geniuses of various kinds; the writer is a genie d'expression. (ib. p. 361). Helvetius does not arrive at a more precise definition of what the essence of the genial assemblage or combinaison of ideas actually consists in; it remains with the definition: l'esprit n'est autre chose qu'un assemblage d'idees et de combinaisons nouvelles." (Ib. p. 375.) - The deficiency of French thought, which lacked the Leibnizian concept of harmony, will become immediately apparent in a comparison with Baumgarten's aesthetics.

Standes", which the Baumgarten pupil C. F. Flögel published anonymously in 1765, and in which the second section is entitled "Vom Genie", it is stated right at the beginning that it cannot be denied that the French first put us on the track of thinking more carefully about this concept, which the ancients did not yet have.¹ Flögel cites in turn the definitions of Dubos, Haller, Helvetius, Sulzer, Wieland and Resewitz.² The explanation on which Flögel himself promises to build is that of Baumgarten: genius is the definite relation of the cognitive faculties to one another in a human being. Nowhere is the German origin of Kant's theory of genius clearer than at this historically interesting point in Flögel's book. The explanation originating in German metaphysics falls completely out of the context of the others - and it is precisely this explanation that returns in the Critique of Judgment.

It is a sign of the fruitfulness of Baumgarten's aesthetics that it was able to inspire two treatises on genius. Like Resewitz, Flögel places genius in the cognitive faculty in the broadest sense. He describes invention as the noblest characteristic of genius. Genius "abandons the common ideas, seeks new prospects, and breaks new ground where no one had dared or thought of going before."⁵

¹ C. F. Flögel, History of the Human Mind. Breslau. 1765. p. 10.

² The latter is called here, since his "Versuch über das Genie", like Flögel's book itself, appeared anonymously, "ein ungenannter neuerer Schriftsteller". (Gesch. d. m. Verst. p. 13.) - Resewitz's attempt on genius will only be referred to in the logical section, as it is more important for the problem of the concrete than for the definition of genius. Resewitz's definition: to have genius means to possess a contemplative knowledge of things, can be seen as an anticipation of the idea of the "contemplative mind", which is treated at the same time as the concept of genius in the Critique of Judgment. (Similarly, Schopenhauer later defined genius as the ability "to behave in a purely contemplative way". W. a. W. u. V. HI, § 36.)

³ Gesch. d. menschl. Verst. p. 27, taken from Eberhard and further elaborated. "His power penetrates to the unknown depths, makes easy, light-filled paths in the pathless deserts of an unknown world, and opens up new prospects of benefit and pleasure to those who walk behind him. (General Theory of Thought and Feeling. 2nd ed. 1786. p. 213.)

Enthusiasm leads the genius down untrodden paths. "This glowing imagination creates new worlds, worlds full of beauty and harmony, where a small mind might never have seen a flower sprout."¹ It is very fine, even if it stems more from Baumgarten's good training than from his own intuition, when genius is set against the system: The system "seems to put fetters on the mind; but genius is a fire that rages without order, not a quiet spring, but a torrent."² A hymn "made according to a logical correctness or according to a topic" would be ridiculous. But that does not make the irregular beautiful. The presence of the spirit, which is indispensable to a genius, must keep the imagination in check. Finally, Flögel, supported by tradition, goes far beyond the scope of his own abilities when he hints at the bold idea of an irrational system in this context. "Sensations certainly also have their system and their order; and we are often too hasty to believe that everything is disorderly that does not correspond to it. For the disorder in the ode is a mere appearance of disorder. It is like the leaps in algebra; like a chain, most of whose links are invisible."³

The inadequacy of the system becomes most apparent as soon as it comes to the "execution" of the general rules. According to the system, it is possible to formulate a plan; "but as far as the execution is concerned, genius must replace by its own strength and ingenuity what could not be determined in the general rules of the system. It must bring its object as much as possible to individuation if it is to bring it honor and not belong among the common lot. This the system cannot possibly teach. Thus the system is out of fault, and the bad application of it is merely the cause that it hinders genius."⁴ Abstraction is within its bounds

¹ Gesch. d. menschl. Verst. S. 38.

² Gesch. d. menschl. Verst. S. 42.

³ Gesch. d. menschl. Verst. S. 44.

⁴ Gesch. d. menschl. Verst. p. 45 f.

recognized. The problem of realizing and concretizing the rules requires the recognition of a completely different ability than the mind is. It takes genius to realize, to "execute" the general. The concept of genius emerges from the age of understanding, mediated by aesthetics, which pushes for sensual representation.

Flögel's "History of the Human Mind" is also characteristic of the tendency towards the concrete. The work is an exact parallel to Kant's observations on the feeling of beauty and the sublime (1764). It is a document of the school's new interest in the individual and national characteristics of life. The chapters are entitled Genius, Climate, Age, Body, Language, Needs, State, Education. All possible names of peoples up to the Hottentots are mentioned. Man in his particularities is the subject of the book, just like Kant, who at the beginning promises to let his eye wander over "the field of the peculiarities of human nature". From this, the deeper intellectual-historical meaning of the theory of genius becomes clear: the interest in genius is the interest in man in general, in his individual form and vitality. Aesthetics, which begins with opposition to the abstract erudition of the "school", finds its fulfillment in an attitude of loving attention to the historical peculiarities of human individuality. An age earlier, Flögel would have had his book published under the title "Improvement of the Human Mind". Now the empirical, historical point of view prevails. Flögel's zeal against the "despotism" of those who impose an "indecent yoke" on nature through "arbitrary laws" by attempting to derive understanding (i.e. the entire cognitive faculty) from a single root is internally related to his interest in the concept of genius. This despotism can never be accepted "in philosophy and in history, where it depends on events". "One should derive theory from events and not, conversely, events from speculation.

The development of the theory of genius and the insight into the inadequacy of "theory" go hand in hand. It is no wonder that Kant's last critique, which overcomes "theory", i.e. the concept of law, is also the critique of genius.

¹ Gesch. d. menschl. Verst. S. 5.

B. Logic

The mood that accompanies the emergence of modern aesthetics can be strangely compared to the way in which traditional logic was replaced by a new one (or the demand for a new one) during the Renaissance. What turns against scholasticism in logic is first of all a certain mood, or more precisely: a new educational ideal.¹ It begins with style. It should not be a mere accessory, but should express individuality. Rhetoric, Cicero and Quintilian, are played off against syllogistics. According to Lorenzo Valla, Cicero overestimated philosophy.² At the same time, there is a return to natural psychological thinking, a reference to experience. In Petrus Ramus, the judgment comes to the fore. Zabarella writes his book on method, which seeks to shake the dominance of deductive syllogism by introducing the "resolutive" method, the return from effects to causes (a kind of induction).³

We find all these moments again in the foundation of the newer aesthetics. The difference lies in the fact that it is not scholasticism, but mainly the mathematized philosophy of Descartes, against which the new rebels. As a Cartesian and Scholastic, Wolff is hostile to the young science. But he is also a Leibnizian. And as a Leibnizian, he must promote it. Thus it is that aesthetics was both inhibited and developed by Wolff. The endeavors of the second generation of his students and their successors are not only in opposition to Wolff's philosophy; they also continue in part what Wolff wanted. It is that for which Leibniz gave him the

¹ E. Cassirer: *Das Erkenntnisproblem*. 2nd ed. I, 121 ff.

² Cassirer. I, P. 123.

³ Cassirer. I, P. 137.

Baumgarten's inspiration came from the desire for a new logic, which was closely linked to the emergence of young aesthetics. Baumgarten wanted to give much more than a doctrine of beauty, of rhetorical figures and tricks. According to her program, the "Aesthetica" should also be a logic of research, an "ars inveni endi". Although the actual "problem of induction plays no role in the philosophy of the time, one can rightly say that, in addition to the theory of beauty, the "Aesthetica" drafts the plan of a logic of induction.¹ In addition to the logic of induction, however, judgment also emerges. And finally, rhetoric becomes almost dominant again: the new aesthetics is largely poetics; poetics is largely rhetoric. Cicero and Quintilian are much loved by the age of "taste". The style of scholarly works is again respected, the individual is emphasized. Such similarities indicate a certain affinity in the cultural mood of the times. Renaissance culture arose from a new attitude of the West towards the literature of antiquity: an aesthetic one. The first humanists were not grammarians, but artists moved by the beauty and perfection of the ancients.² The emergence of the new science was accompanied by an aesthetic mood, the emergence of modern aesthetics by intensive logical endeavor. Halle-Frankfurt aesthetics is a small German scholarly renaissance based on Wolffian philosophy. Originally a matter for the school,

¹The German critics, says B. Croce, agree that Baumgarten should actually have given an inductive logic. The Italian aesthete wishes to clear Baumgarten of this reproach. (Estetica. p. 242 f.) - Apart from Ritter and Zimmermann (followed by J. Schmidt), whom Croce quotes, I can discover no one who has expressed this opinion, and with them it is an assertion thrown down without any further justification. (H. Ritter. History of Christian Philosophy. 8th part. 1853. p. 557. R. Zimmermann: Ästhetik. I. 1858. p. 169. J. Schmidt: Leibniz und Baumgarten. 1875. p. 48.) Our intention is the very opposite of the purification which Croce wishes to undertake.

² K. Vossler: Poetische Theorien in der italienischen Fjüh- renaissance. 1900. S. 73.

it quickly became a cultural factor of high standing. This was possible because its problem was a general one. In a nutshell, it was: what is sensuality (the lower faculty of knowledge) worth? This question marked the beginning of a new era in German philosophy.

Chapter 1: The logic of invention

In addition to Leibniz, Baco, Malebranche and Tschirnhausen were in the immediate circle of the epoch between 1720 (the year of the publication of Wolff's Reasonable Thoughts on God) and 1770 (Kant's dissertation). Descartes is hardly read any more; he is replaced by Wolff. Locke's influence only became more powerful around the middle of the century; it was not noticeable in the development of great ideas because he did not win over the strong minds. The eclectic direction of Budde, Rüdiger, which goes back to Thomasius and accepts more from Locke, becomes significant in Crusius, but has also recognized the strength of Wolff (to whom Crusius is closer than he believes).

Baco is one of the forefathers of modern aesthetics.⁽¹⁾ The inventor of this science certainly did not just repeat his praise to tradition. There was something in Baco's logic that must have appealed to Baumgarten. Inventio, iudicium, memoria, elocutio² - in this classification not only the lower faculty is taken into account, there is also the hint of rhetoric in it. Here lies the relatedness. The idea of "improving the lower faculty of cognition" contains a new take on Baco's idea of induction. At a single point, a direct relationship can even be established. Baco explained the emblem as something that makes the thought sensual.³ What Baco described as an aid to memory

¹ Muratori's judgment has already been mentioned. *Delle riflessioni* II, p. 34: Baco's works will always remain "un seminario di ottimi legge par raggiungere l'ottimo gusto". Baumgarten's philosophical letters of Aleotheophilus (1741) call him the "Great" (2nd letter), and Logic the "illustrem Baconem". (*Acroasis logica*. 1761. § 417, nota.)

² *de augm. v. c.* 1st ed. of 1652. (Lugd. Bat.), p. 319.

³ "Emblema vero deducit intellectuale ad sensibile; sensibile autem semper fortius percudit memoriam, atque in ea facilius im- primitur, quam intellectuale". (*de augm. V. c. 5.* 1652. p. 374.)

Baumgarten has given detailed reasons for the sake of it: it is the basic idea of the "Aesthetica" that art has to make everything sensible, to individualize it (deducere intellectuale ad sensibile). The idea of "improving" memory is only extended by Baumgarten to the lower powers of cognition in general.

Baco's call for a new logic is only one suggestion alongside those that came from other (rationalist) sources. At that time, the expansion of logic was not expected from Baco's induction, but from the mathematical *ars inveniendi* of Descartes and Leibniz. In the secondary line (Budde), however, Baco became a direct model, but only through the psychological element of his classification of logic. Baco's *artes inquisitionis* (*inventionis*), *examinis* (*iudicii*), *custodiae* (*memoriae*) and *elocutionis* (*traditionis*) become the threefold division in Budde: *ingenium* (corresponding to *inventio*), *iudicium*, *memoria*.¹ The historically important aspect lies in the psychological twist. The *ars inveniendi*, in Leibniz the product of mathematical pure reason, appears here in a human environment (*ingenium*). Rüdiger calls for an "*ars ingenii*",² i.e. an art of invention. For him, the *ingenium* is the source of "possibilities", of hypotheses. The power of judgment (*iudicium*) applies the possibilities to determine true realities.³ The relationship of the *ingenium* to the art of poetry is explicitly emphasized. The significance that *ingenium* (the actual contrast to the ability to infer, which is otherwise at the center of logic) acquires here is one of the prerequisites for the young aesthetics also finding *ingenium* among the cognitive faculties. This concept thus arrives not only via Baco-Hobbes-Locke (wit), but also via Baco-Budde (classification of cognitive faculties) into time.

¹cf. G. Zart: Einfluß der englischen Philosophie seit Bacon auf die deutsche des 18. Jahrhunderts. 1887. p. 41 f.

²cf. Baco, de augm. 1652. p. 329 f.: "ars iudicii et directionis."

³ De sensu veri et falsi. 1722. lib. I. cap. 2. p. 46. Logic is the "ars iudicii". *Artes memoriae* exist everywhere; "ars ingenii adhuc desideratur".

The turn to psychology, which we observed in Thomasius,¹ Budde, Rüdiger, makes Malebranche's book (*Recherche de la verite.* 1675) so impressive for this epoch. One admires the detailed critique of the senses, the descent into the lower spheres of knowledge. In this way Malebranche was perhaps as much a guide to the century as Baco and Locke. The fact that he only treated the senses and the imagination in order to expose them as deceivers did not detract from this. It was the direction of his investigation that made an impression; the sign of the value could change and did indeed change. The senses deceive, one assumes with Descartes. But all experience also begins with the senses⁽²⁾ Error and the progression to new truths (invention) are thus in direct proximity. Wherever one speaks of experience and invention, the warnings against the error of "deception" and "idols" immediately appear. Don't smile at these seemingly childish para-

¹ "Christian Thomasens Einleitung zu der Vemunfft-Lehre. Wherein, by an easy manner, and intelligible to all reasonable men, whatever their rank or sex, the way is shown, without the syllogistica, to distinguish the true, probable, and false from each other, and to invent new truths." Other edition. Halle. 1699 - This title contains the program of the new logic. The syllogism is "not a means of inventing truth, but only a method of putting the invented truth in order or decorating it..." (p. 168.) But it is the invention that counts. Of course, it remains an intention. The warning against "prejudices" is already the main part of the section on invention and error. Thomasius' point of view is a bad empiricism. (71 f.) But the aversion to the syllogistic nature arises from the insight into new tasks; it has generated a will for new methods that does not yet know how to help itself. But this will should not be underestimated.

² Wolff, *Philos, rationalis s. Logica.* 1728. disc, prael. § Wolff's uncertainty with regard to the question of the value of the senses for experience may be inferred from the contradiction in which he involves himself (*Remarks on the rational thoughts of God, etc.* 1724. § 92; § 93; § 220) with Descartes. Sometimes he praises him for having brought philosophy to the right state by rejecting the imagination; sometimes he calls the way to truth through the senses easier than the way through reason, and concludes that one must try both ways.

graphs in which Wolff, Knutzen, Reimarus, Rüdiger and Crusius treat the "art of experience". Their content consists of warnings; everything positive is missing. But there is something important and significant in the inclusion of these *ars experiendi*, *experimentandi*, etc. A problem that lies outside of conventional formalism, outside of demonstrability in general, was thus recognized. The "logica probabilitum", repeatedly demanded but never successfully attempted, forms the antithesis of the official logic of demonstration. It belongs intellectually to the developing aesthetics. Aesthetics, too, had as its hidden motor the problem of the undemonstratable, of *je ne sais quoi*, of feeling and taste.

Tschirnhausen's focus on the psychological and his interest in the logic of invention made his logic¹ attractive to Wolff's school. Tschirnhausen transforms *conceptus* into *concipere*, the objective concept into subjective apprehension. The real process of apprehension in us² forms the cornerstone of his epistemology. Psychological experience becomes the supreme criterion of knowledge. Linked to this is an interest in the lower cognitive faculty (the *imaginatio*). It is a source of errors, but "well guided" of the greatest benefit.³ Of course, Tschirnhausen does not forget for a moment the fundamental difference between the *imaginatio* and the *intellectus* (sc. *purus*). The latter is the same in all men, while the latter is not the same in all; a blind man, for example, cannot judge about colors.⁴ Tschirnhausen divides the *operationes intellectus* (here: cognitive faculty in general) into three (following Descartes and Spinoza): *imaginatio activa*, *ratio* (*res abstracte concipere*), *purus intellectus*.⁵ For Wolff, sensation corresponds to *imaginatio activa*, attention and reflection (conceptualization) to *ratio*, and *ratio* to *intellectus purus*.

¹ Medicina mentis sive artis inveniendi praecepta generalia. 1687. ed. nova. Leipzig 1695.

² "effectus in nobis realis" (Medicina mentis. p. 59.)

³ cf. above ch. 1, p. 45 *.

⁴ Medicina mentis. S. 59; 63; 62.

⁵ Medicina mentis. S. 80.

The most important inspiration in logic also came from Leibniz. The *ars inveniendi* was one of the great endeavors of his life. Leibniz lent force and emphasis to the Cartesian idea.¹ The logic of invention was to become a matter of calculation. However, this actual mathematical intention was historically less effective than the direction of Leibniz's thought in general towards a new logic of the probable. The calculation of probability becomes necessary when the conditions that are given for the solution of the problem are not sufficient to determine it as a necessary consequence of those conditions.² This is related to the Baconian mood of the epoch. Something similar is also the case with induction; here, too, the individual is not sufficient to allow an absolutely necessary conclusion to be drawn about the general. (Induction and probability are already connected in Aristotle's work). Leibniz paid no further attention to induction because he considered it to be only a psychological process ("expectation of similar cases"). Insofar as we are only empiricists, i.e. we combine impressions associatively in the manner of animals, we do not arrive at necessary and general truths.³ Once, however, Leibnitz breaks through to a higher estimation of induction; it is characteristic that at this point he immediately relates it to metaphysics. Induction is based on analogy, i.e. on the law of

¹The logic of Port Royal (*La logique ou l'art de penser; contenant, outre les regles communes, plusieurs observations nou**⁰ *veiles, propres à former le jugement.* 1662. 3⁰ ed. 1668.) in the then modern section "de la methode" probably contrasts analysis and synthesis, "methode de resolution (d'invention)" and "methode de composition (de doctrine)" (IV. partie, chap. II. p. 391), but it does not concern itself further with the methode d'invention.

²L. Couturat: *La logique de Leibniz.* 1901. S. 250.

³ Nouv. ess. Avant-propos. "Les consecutions des betes sont purement comme celles des simples empiriques, qui pretendent, que ce, qui est arrive quelque fois arrivera encore dans un cas, où ce, qui les frappe, est pareil, sans etre pour cela capables de juger, si les memes raisons suhsistent." (Cf. also Gerh. VII, 331, 464, 553.)

Continuity; the justification is not psychological, but metaphysical⁽¹⁾.

It would be unfair to pass judgment on the general psychologization that logic underwent around this time. It was something that worked against conventional formalism, which had not been overcome despite Ramus and Descartes, and was able to stimulate new ideas by broadening the scope of vision. Joh. Ed. Erdmann blamed Wolff for the "displacement of logic with psychological elements".² But Wolff was still moderate. He retained the objective-logical division into concept, judgment and conclusion and only interpreted it psychologically.³ The others go much further in this respect. Crusius identifies four main powers of the intellect (the cognitive faculty): Power of sensation, memory, power of judgment (iudicium), and power of invention (ingenium). The power of imagination and the power of reasoning are only "derived powers".⁽⁴⁾ Wolff's importance lies precisely in the fact that he was able to combine the new psychological endeavors in logic with tradition. It is no coincidence that the historical progress of thought came from Wolff's school, not from that of the violent innovators; Wolff was the richer.⁽⁵⁾

¹ Couturat, p. 263 f.

² Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. 1842. II. Vol. 2. dept. p. 283.

³ especially in the *Psychologia empirica*.

⁴ The way to the certainty and reliability of human knowledge. 1747. pp. 111, 159, 164, 172, 176 - This psychological division, which goes back to Rüdiger, does not, however, prevent him from dealing first with the concepts and then with the propositions and conclusions.

⁵ In his moderation is the spirit of Leibniz. "I do not praise the new logics that rebuke and do not improve the old ones." (Leibniz to Gabriel Wagner. 1696. Erdm. p. 425.) In the "ausführliche Nachricht" (1726) Wolff openly admits his psychological view of logic: "I have imagined the true nature of judgment from the nature of the soul... (S. 64). When Lambert, on the occasion of Feder's "Institutiones logicae" (1777), sharply criticized the direction, whose beginnings we see in Thomasius and Budde, at its peak (it is becoming fashionable, he says, to mix logic with the consideration of the powers of cognition; to the doctrine of reason itself serve divisions such as sensation, imagination, memory, understanding, wit, etc.), Wolff admits his psychological view.

The psychological school recognizes through the term *ingenium*, the power of invention,¹ the same thing that Leibniz expressed through the repeated demand for *ars in-veniendi*. The person gifted with *ingenium* invents hypotheses.² Hypotheses are a means of discovering new truths. Wolff's position here is again mediating. He adopts from Leibniz the requirement of *ars inveniendi*, a logic of the probable, but he does not reject psychological concepts (*ingenium*, wit). One only gets the full picture of Wolff's logic if one also takes the *Psychologia empirica* into account. Contemporaries were not only affected by what was achieved, but also by what was intended. Among these intentions, however, the *ars inveniendi* (*logica probabilium*) played the most important role.

Wolff's age is not productive, it has been said, and this unproductive character is reflected in the syllogistic mode of presentation.³ This is probably correct. But even in unproductive eras, concepts continue to develop quietly, and even endeavors that are initially unsuccessful can become important for development. The never-forgotten task of an *ars inveniendi*, which Wolff has vividly in mind, brings a touch of restlessness and longing into the picture of a (not the least), he was historically and objectively in the right. (Joh. H. Lambert's logical and philosophical treatises. Edited by J. Bernoulli. II. 1787. p. 263 f.) However, he overlooked what this development had achieved. The stream not only carried with it valuable psychological goods (*ingenium* - *genius*), but also fertilized logic.

¹ Also called wit, says Crusius. It is the faculty of falling from one idea to another, which is in accordance with it, without getting it out of it by dissection, and without it being a mere association. (*Path to Certainty*. p. 172.) The relation to "ideas," tropes, and similes is not lacking. It is remarkable that Crusius also ascribes to *ingenium* the invention of possible ends and means, possible causes and effects. (p. 173.) The motif of the heuristic, which appears in *ingenium* in a psychologically disguised form, is thus already linked here, as in the *Critique of Judgment*, with the idea of purpose.

² Leibniz: "unde homo aliquis ingenio praeditus aliquam struat hypothesis." (Couturat. p. 263. Note 1. cf. above p. 171 Rüdiger.)

³B. Erdmann: *M. Knutzen and his time*. 1876. S. 127.

Time, which incidentally seems philistine enough? As much as the problem of a new logic preoccupied Wolff and his time, the joy of intellectual possession was much stronger.² In practice, the cognitive mood of the art of invention only emerged after the middle of the century - at the same time as the turn to the problem of the individual. Its most famous expression is Lessing's statement that he preferred the search for truth to its possession. This is not an isolated statement. Syllogistic knowledge, organizing truths according to their factual dependence, was already much less valued at this time than in Wolff's time. Readers wanted to participate in the gradual discovery of truth, as it were. (Lessing's often admired style reflects this new attitude.) "One complains," writes Lambert, "that the inventors do not present the truths they have arrived at in the way they arrived at them."³ This is the practice of the *ingenium* concept, the theory of which already began at the end of the 17th century. The subjective moment has made its breakthrough. The new mood is merely a deepening and broadening of long latent interests.⁴ The nascent Kant also takes part in it. One

¹ Compare the impressive discussion of doubt and ugliness in Brockes, *Irdisches Vergnügen in Gott*: "Das durch die Betrachtung der Größe Gottes verherrlichte Nichts der Menschen."

² One breathes a sigh of relief when, while reading Woffisch's writings, one finally comes across the recognition of a problem. ("Ausführliche Nachricht" § 185, occasionally the origin of the "Samentierlein.") Otherwise it always looks as if the world has no more riddles.

³ Log. u. philos. Writings. I. 1782. p. 471 - Compare with this the mood of the aesthetics of delicacy. Bouhours places the aesthetic value not in the truth, but in the guessing of the truth. Poetic expression is like a "transparent veil" (un crepe transparent) that shows what it conceals.

⁴ Flögel's "Art of Invention" appeared in 1760. It contains nothing but divisions in the manner of Baumgarten; any thought is missing. The desire for such a book must have been strong, however, if a man like Flögel was able to squeeze an entire book out of it. (C. Fr. Flögel: *Introduction to the Art of Invention*. Breslau and Leipzig. 1760.)

do not expect, he says in the first section of his greatest pre-critical writing of metaphysical content,¹ that I will begin with a "formal explanation" (i.e. definition). "I shall proceed thus as one who seeks definition . . .

Like Thomasius, Wolff first rejected syllogism because it was not a means of inventing truth.² The use of logic is not enough for invention; other rules are needed.³ The loci topici, which are taught as medium inveniendi, only tell us what we already know.⁴ Wolff was "burning" with desire for the principles of ars inveniendi and demonstrandi when he came to mathematics. Here he found the art of invention in algebra and the art of proof in geometry. Up to now, only the influence of geometry has been considered in Wolff's philosophy, but we must not overlook the impression that algebra made on him. It is the model for the future logic of invention.⁵ Leibnizian influence can be heard in this estimation. Rüdiger took pride in declaring that algebra provided no help whatsoever in the invention and evaluation of philosophical truths.⁶ Did

¹"The only possible ground of proof for a demonstration of the existence of God." (1763.) Thus only a ground of proof, not a demonstration I This title corresponds not only to Kant's personal distrust of dogmatic metaphysics with its "addiction to method", but also to the taste of the time, which was fed up with Wolff's imitation of geometry. (Reason for proof, Ac. ed. II, 66; 71.)

²Ratio praelectionum. § 6 - § 10.

³Detailed Message. § 66.

⁴Ratio praelectionum. § II.

⁵Philos, rat. (Disc, prael.) § 74. ps. emp. § 470; § 454. The "Anfangsgründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften" (1710) explain the art of arithmetic in general as a special part of the art of invention. (I, p. 33.) Algebra can never be praised too much, for it is the art by which one can invent the mathematical truths of oneself. (IV, Preface.)

⁶de sensu veri et falsi. p. 445 f. - In the logic of Port Royal there is already a hint of algebra as the actual methode d'inventer, since the methode de composition is specifically associated with the geometrical one. "De la methode de composition, et particulierement de celle qu'observent les Geometres." (S. 402.)

Even if algebra did not directly benefit logic, the comparison of the invention with the method of progression from the known to the unknown¹ followed by mathematicians undoubtedly had a stimulating and at the same time disciplining effect. Here, too, Wolff is superior to the eclectic and anti-mathematical Thomasius school.

If the reference to algebra was methodologically valuable, it also had its disadvantages. How could algebra be used to make discoveries in nature? Other sources of invention² had to be tapped for concrete research work. Wolff also recognized such sources in logic proper (i.e. in syllogistics).³ One of the most important principles of invention is derived from the thinking habits of mathematicians: one "inverts" the unknown into something known, and thereby finds a new truth.⁴ However, in order to be able to trace the unknown back to the known, we must discover a similarity between them. This discovery is a matter of "wit". This is why Wolff says: inventors need wit.⁵ Wit is therefore the essential element of inventive art.

¹) This process, which "discovers" new unknown quantities from given known quantities, can be compared to that of genius. This relationship between the new logic and the concept of genius can be seen very clearly in a passage in Flögel's book on understanding. "Our intellect", it says there, "is so limited (in contrast to that of God) that it must always have something known if it is to discover something unknown from it. Thus the words of language are also to be regarded as "known grounds" on which the genius builds, "and which serve him as a guide to enter unknown paths and to discover new vistas." (Gesch. d. menschl. Verstandes. 1765. p. 160.)

²) "inventionum fontes". Tschirnhausen, Medicina mentis. S. 29.

³) He did so in response to an objection by Leibniz, who added to the sentence "Syllogismum non esse medium inveniendi": "non dixerim". (Ratio prael. § 9; Of God. § 363; Of the powers of the human mind. 4. cap. § 24.)

⁴) "Reason for the reversal." (Of God. § 367; 364 f.) - Ps. emp. § 472, this principle ("principium reductionis") is called maximi usus in the ars inveniendi. The reduction of the circle to a polygon for the purpose of calculating the content serves as an example.

⁵) "Inventores ingenio opus habent." (Ps. emp. § 48L) The use of "wit" for inventiveness is general. Cf.

The most important of these is the principle of inversion (principium reductionis)⁽¹⁾.

It would have been only one more step to recognize the most important "medium inveniendi" in the analogon rationis, i.e. in the expectation of similar cases, in which the "third operation of the mind" (the conclusion) is hidden,² and thus to put induction in its rightful place. (The principle of inversion is the germ of the inference from analogy.) But Wolff does not yet recognize the relations between inductive inference, analogon rationis, principium reductionis and ingenium. His doctrine of induction remains outside the new; it is traditionally poor.³

Against the Newtonians, Wolff asserts the admissibility of hypotheses in philosophy. This puts the idea of "artifica heuristica" on a broader footing.¹ But Wolff has an even greater idea. There are certain guiding concepts (notiones directrices),⁵ which Brockes calls "the wit by which it (the soul) discovers many an art" (Irdisches Vergnügen in Gott. Von dem Nichts der Menschen. 7th ed. p. 446.) But wit also stands for reason in general.

¹Of God. § But inferences are also a means of inventing truths. (§ 363.) In the German Logic ("Von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes") Wolff rejects the scorers of formal inferences, (cap. 4. § 24.) Two kinds of rules belong to invention: Inferences (derived from the understanding) and "artifices", e.g. the principle of reduction (derived from wit). On the "artifices" see Ps. emp. § 469: "artifica heuristica dicuntur regulae quibus mens apta efficitur per principia ipsi per-specta veritatem incognitam eruendi, quam solo ratiocinandi habitu adjuta per ea eruere non poterat."

² "in expectatione casum similium tertia latet mentis operatio, seu ratiocinium confusum in ea continetur." (Ps. emp. § 505.)

³ Logica. § 477 -§481.

⁴ Log. Disc, prael. § 126 - § 129. better formulated in the essay: "de hypothesibus philosophicis," Horae subsecivae. 1729. § 1. - "Hypothesibus philosophicis in philosophia locus con- cedendus, quatenus ad veritatem liquidam inveniendam viam ster- nunt." (Disc, prael. § 127.) The treatise in the "Horae subsecivae" declares the use of hypotheses not only innocent (innocens), but even useful. Copernicus is cited as an example. (§ 10.) - Knutzen followed Wolff in this defense of hypotheses. (Logica. § 49.)

⁵ Although Wolff did not give them a place in the Logic, he dealt with them in detail in the "Horae".

originate neither from psychology nor from mathematical thinking, but from metaphysics. The concepts of the entire ontology can be applied to the invention of new truths, i.e. every ontological concept is at the same time a *notio directrix*.¹ Concepts such as that of the impossible or that of the sufficient reason show us, as it were, the path we have to take. They are therefore called *notiones directrices*, because they show us where we have to direct our thinking in order to find what we are looking for.² Insofar as the rules of the *ars inveniendi* depend on things, they are identical with the guiding concepts of ontology. Insofar as they depend on human nature, they are contained in psychology.³ If one takes into account that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is actually a critical ontology, and if one pays attention to Kant's tendency to use the concepts of transcendental analytic regulatively (as *notiones directrices*, *ideas*),⁴ then one will find in Wolff's thought that the basic concepts of metaphysics

¹ Horae subsecivae. 1729. "De notionibus directricibus et genuino usu philosophiae primae." § 2. *philosophia prima* has a unique use that no other science knows: the *principia ontologica* "dirigunt intellectum in veritate cognoscenda, sive ea a nobis investigari, sive ab aliis investigata diiudicari debet."

² "Per *notiones directrices* intelligo eas, per quos appareat, quo cogitationes sint dirigendae, ut reperiatur, quod quaeritur. *Notiones* adeo *directrices* viam quasi monstrant, qua sit eundem, ne ad devia deflectamus, vel lucem affundunt, ut via illa appareat, quae absque illis minime conspicitur." Horae. § 3.

³ Horae. § 5 In the preface to *Ontology* (1729), Wolff explains that the example of the mathematicians gave him the idea of deriving the "praecepta artis inveniendi generalia" from ontological concepts. At the same time, he promises to give an *ars inveniendi* "suo tempore". The *logica probabilium* desired by Leibniz was also not possible without ontological concepts. His decision to improve ontology was due to his desire for this logic. The preface to the "Cosmologia generalis" also mentions the importance of ontology for natural philosophy ("Cosmologia igitur *notiones directrices* suppeditat de ipsis naturalibus recte philosophandi. ...") and the preface to the "Psychologie rationalis" calls ontology "notionum directricum conditrix".

⁴ see the difference between the mathematical and the dynamic categories!

as "guiding concepts" must be seen as an ingenious and historically interesting idea. What is essential here is that metaphysics is understood in a functional way, as it were. It is clear that the Critique of Judgment has done nothing other than to apply this idea consistently to the main concept of rationalist metaphysics, that of purpose⁽¹⁾.

The *ars inveniendi* and the *logica probabilium* occupied minds throughout the century.² But the problem was only slowly clarified, and by the time the far-reaching expectations of Kant's concept of judgment were fulfilled (more modestly, of course, than had been thought), interest in the question had waned.

The young Baumgarten was one of those who waited for Mr. Wolff's art of invention as for a special logical revelation. He holds higher analysis up to the logicians as a model and, in conjunction with the *ars characteristica combinatoria*, drafts a logical sign language that is also intended to serve invention.³ In Meier's formulation of the principle of the "expectation of similar cases", the hidden conclusion (which points to induction) emerges clearly.⁴ In terms of content, we already have the principle of induction before us here. The "principium reductionis" is formulated as a conclusion by analogy: one discovers many similarities between two different things and concludes from one to the other, insofar as they are similar to each other.⁶

¹ Wolff's idea seems to have been completely ineffective in its development. I only find an occasional mention of the "notio directrix" in Tetens. (Philos. Versuche. I, p. 144.)

² In the chapter on Wolff's promised writings, Ludovici states that the "theory of reason of the probable" is awaited with "great impatience". It is the only fault of Wolff's Logic that this subject is touched upon in it "only at the top" (C. G. Ludovici: *Ausführlicher Entwurf einer vollständigen Historie der Wolffischen Philosophie*. 1737. II, p. 179 f.)

³ Philosophical Letters of Aleotheophilus. 1741. 8th letter. - Lambert later attempted the same.

-In anticipation of similar cases, we conclude: "Where there are one kind of causes, there must also be one kind of consequences." (Theoretical Doctrine of the Emotions. 1744. p. 153.)

⁸ Movements of the mind. § Both principles are in great agreement with each other. We do not learn more. These principles are not dealt with in Meier's "Vernunftlehre".

We find greater clarity and decisiveness in Reimarus.¹ Following Wolff's example, he traces the inventive power in the arts and sciences uniformly back to wit and distinguishes between invention by analogy, expectation of similar cases, and reduction.² He emphasizes the difference between these logical elements and the logic of demonstration. It is not reflection and inference that lead to invention, but the expectation of similar cases and chance experience.³ - Lambert's expression "idea" is also a reference to chance. Artifices, he says, are opposed to the general rules and serve where these are either too extensive, or useless, or not yet known. They have a kinship with reduction, clever detours and lucky ideas.⁴ The accidental idea, which is given civil rights here in logic, is reminiscent of the pensee delicat, which could almost be rendered by "surprising idea". The *je ne sais quoi* is echoed when Reimarus says of the idea: one does not know how one comes up with the thought. Wit is a perception of hidden similarities.⁵

¹ Knutzen contents himself with repeatedly pointing out the "desideratum" of the *ars inveniendi* and a *logica probabilitum*. (*Logicae prol.* § 20, p. 48. *Log.* § 337.)

² *Vernunftlehre*. 2nd ed. 1758. § 264. Reimarus, too, does not deny the function of wit in the "kind comparisons" of poets and orators. He calls hypotheses "inventions of wit". (§ 294.)

³ General observations on the instincts of animals. 3rd ed. 1773, § 25.

⁴ *Log.* and *philos.* *Abh.* II, 166. A happy idea, he says elsewhere, is an approximate convergence of such thoughts as bring us advantage. (II, 98.) However much we may endeavor to make the art of invention methodical, happy ideas will nevertheless remain necessary. The idea, however, originates "in the dark region of the soul". (I, 457.) Even the mathematician recognizes the irrational here. It was this "dark region of the soul" to which Baumgarten's aesthetics directed attention.

⁵ *AUG.* Considerations. § 26 Reason examines the ideas of wit "only afterward. Thus, in Crousaz, reason examines the judgment of sentiment.

Following Leibniz, Reimarus goes two steps further. First, he explicitly mentions the rule of continuity (*lex continuitatis*), which had been diligently applied before him, but had hardly ever been used as a heuristic principle, as a means of discovering unknown truths.¹ In addition, he also knows how to deal with the concept of purpose more vividly than Wolff. Viewed in terms of a general cause, he says, nothing "healthy" can be brought out of the artificial drives of animals. But if one takes the concept of purpose as a basis, everything becomes understandable as a means for the preservation and welfare of living beings and necessary for every animal according to the rules of wisdom and goodness.² The "final causes", which Reimarus also defends in other respects,³ shed light on the connection in nature, they make the existence and constitution of things completely comprehensible and therefore belong to the "philosophical knowledge of physics".⁴ This is a decisive step beyond Wolff: the concept of purpose is grasped as *notio directrix*, i.e. functionally, as a means of knowledge. Newton is supplemented by Leibniz. We are now on the eve of the Critique of Judgment.

Leibniz's law of continuity is also effective in Tetens' formulation of the principle of analogical inference. It is assumed "that nature is uniform and internally similar, of which we know at the same time that it loves variety and diversity to infinity".⁵ Moreover, Tetens still deplores the lack of a logical art of conjecture and is convinced that maxims could be drawn from the application of the principle of analogy that would make "an excellent piece" of this art.® He describes induction as "generalization".

¹ "The noblest truths of natural religion". 2nd ed. 1755. The rule of consistency is cited as a "rule of wisdom" after the "argumentum analogiae". (p. 268 ff.)

² General considerations. §150.

³ Truths. p. 279 f.

⁴ General considerations. § 151-.

⁵ Philos. Experiments. Int. p. XXIV. According to J. St. Mill, the principle of all induction.

"Philos. Experiments. Einl. XXII.

Tetens considered the "determination of the particular propositions of experience drawn from individual cases" to be one of the most important operations of the observational method.¹ This is a little short for a man who wanted to supplement Leibniz with a method of observation.² But Tetens was not a logician and did not want to be one. - Mendelssohn also commented on the great problem of time. It had long been recognized, he wrote in his essay on probability,³ that the general doctrines of worldly wisdom and mathematics are all too far removed from the occurrences in nature. If their deduced conclusions are to be applied to individual cases, a step must often be taken in which the rules of the "common art of reason" leave us. It requires "other fundamental maxims, another kind of propositions". Mendelssohn is so much a Wolffian of the school that he refers to Wolff without thinking of the valuable idea of the *notio directrix*, which the school had left behind. And yet he was on the right track with his demand for a "different kind of propositions": Kant's "idea n" is nothing other than what Mendelssohn forebodingly touches on here.

What Reimarus only said in passing is consciously brought to the fore in Lambert's "Cosmological Letters", which appeared a year before the reflections on the artificial instincts of animals. He takes the logical theory of the probable in research seriously. Most of what he says has only a certain degree of probability, it says in the preface. But it demands to be examined "with the utmost rigor". For teleology⁴ must not only prove to us the generality of the laws of nature in the doctrine of nature,⁵ but "especially also

¹ Einl. p. XIX.

² On general speculative philosophy. 1775, p. 91 f. ³ Ges. Schriften. I, p. 351 f.

⁴ Lambert does not explain why he only uses the concept of purpose for the logic of the probable. It should be remembered in passing that the word teleology is coined in Wolff's Logic. (Disc, prael. § 85.)

⁵ Leibniz's thought that the "principles themselves" depend on metaphysical "raisons". - Perhaps an allusion to

serve to invent them"? The application of teleology as a means of invention to nature is the genuinely Leibnizian act of Lambert. From the principle of theodicy: all disorder is only apparent and nothing but hidden harmony,² the idea of the greatest possible perfection and order of the world,³ he derives very specific hypotheses about the nature of the world structure and fills in the gaps of observation with the help of a teleological maxim of research. He concludes, for example, that millions of comets are possible without them interfering with each other. Therefore, since the perfection of the world demands the greatest possible diversity, there must exist not only the few observed comets, but also millions of unknown ones. Even if this assumption is only probable, the advantage of it is that one will now be more and more anxious to "let no comet pass unobserved"⁽⁴⁾.

The great idea is only generalized by Lambert in hints, not fully exploited. In the "New Organon" (1764), Lambert justifies the "teleological inferences" as a reason to seek out experiences that might not have occurred to us without such inferences.⁵ In the "Appendix to Architectonics"

Maupertuis, *Essai de cosmologie*. (Oeuvres. 1753. p. 33.) "Ce n'est donc point dans la mecanique que je vais chercher ces loix; c'est dans la sagesse de l'Etre Supreme." Maupertuis traces the laws of mechanism back to the principle of the smallest force in order to be able to prove them from the wisdom of God. Despite his reference to Maupertuis, Lambert knows how to separate mechanical and teleological principles. The law of gravity, he says, gives reasons which conclude in a much more necessary way than teleological reasons. (Preface. p. XIII.)

¹ Cosmological letters on the construction of the world. Augsburg. 1761. preface. P. V f., VIII. Leibniz had already remarked on the latter use and sought to give an example in the proof of the law of the calculation of rays. But the apprehension of "exceptions" detracts from the generality of the teleological propositions.

² Cosmol. Letters. S. 116.

³ Cosmol. Letters. P. 62 f.

⁴ Cosmol. Letters. P. 08 f.

⁵ Phenomenology. § 232.

(1771) he treats at length of analogy, which he calls the guiding principle.¹ Now, the possibility of making found individual concepts and propositions more general by induction, of inferring from some to whole species, presupposes the principle of the state of persistence.² This is: "What has been constant, continues to be, and how remote."³ Lambert adds that this proposition extends very far in teleology and physics. Its teleological nature is evident from its relationship to the concept of perfection.⁴

U. § 145.

² Phenomenology. § 252.

³ Phenomenology. § It is nothing other than the principle of uniformity later formulated by Tetens.

⁴ "In teleology one should be able to deduce the real from the possible, according to the laws of perfection and the state of persistence." (Log. u. philos. Schriften. II, p. 198.)

Chapter 2: The analogon rationis

Whichever way we approach it, from psychology or logic, in the 18th century every path leads to the critique of judgment.

The way animals and mere empiricists recognize connections, the "consecutiones empiricae", as Leibniz calls them,¹ is not rational. They do not recognize a necessary connection. But it only takes a small shift in the estimation of the verites de fait, and the attempts will begin to gain something from the means of cognition that animals already have. The new estimate of the verites de fait is already held by Wolff, who admits a historical, i.e. factual, knowledge as equal to philosophical, i.e. general and necessary knowledge. We recognize the "empiricus" again when Wolff speaks of "common knowledge". The common sense, however, is nothing other than the preliminary form of the critical "power of judgment".

Even if Leibniz does not think of an epistemological utilization of the "consecutiones empiricae", he nevertheless gives Wolff the most important impetus for the further development of the problem contained in this concept through a few words (as elsewhere). The sensio, which animals also have, stands in the middle between the perceptio and the cogitatio.² It is a "perceptio, quae aliquid distincte involvit, et cum attentione et memoria

¹ Gerh. VII, 331.

² The active form (sensio instead of sensus) is reminiscent of Tschiihausen's "imaginatio activa". The same word is used by Rüdiger, who prefers "sensus" because it does not also denote an organ, but only an ability and an act, (de sensu veri et falsi. 2nd ed. p. 59.) The sensio is passively intellectus (cf. Thomasius, Vernunftlehre, p. 38: "The thoughts of man are either suffering or active (passiones vel actiones)."). Rüdiger prefers Locke's term reflexion to "sensio interna"; reflection only follows sensio. (de sensu veri et falsi. p. 64.) The term reflection is therefore not sensual enough for Rüdiger.

coniuncta est."¹ This sentence contains the germ of that part of Wolff's *Psychologie empirica* from which Baumgarten's theory of the lower faculty of cognition grows. Wolff has broadly elaborated the suggestion given here of an area of mental life that lies between mere sensuality and actual thinking. This is his most important direct preparatory work for the emergence of German aesthetics.

The knowledge resulting from attention and memory, which animals and the "empirici" have, is called by Leibniz an "imitation of reason", "something similar to reason".² Related to reason is the connection that memory establishes. Reason has a connection based on reasons, an understood connection. Memory establishes a merely factual connection. However, insofar as this is a connection, it deserves the name of something similar to reason.³ This transfer of the name reason (reason is also a concept of value) to a lower faculty prepares Baumgarten's appreciation of sensory cognition.

Wolff replaces the "consecutiones empiricae" with an "expectation of similar cases", which is based on the faculties of the senses, imagination and memory.⁴ The "reason-like" thus consists of three faculties. This is significant because it creates a unity in the area of the lower faculty of cognition that is clearly distinct - a precursor to Baumgarten's independence of the lower faculty of cognition. Wolff does not recognize any other

¹ Gerh. vn, 330.

² "La memoire fournit une espece de consecution aux âmes, qui imite la raison..." (Monad. § 26.) "Il y a une liaison dans les perceptions des animaux, qiri a quelque ressemblance avec la raison, mais eile n'est fondee que dans la memoire des faits ou effets et nullement dans la connaissance des causes." ("Principes de la nature et de la grace." § 5.) cf. also Theod. I, § 65. In these passages appears the example of the dog fleeing from the raised stick, which Wolff has adopted. (Thoughts of God. § 870.)

³ Wolff, Von Gott. § 377; § 872.

⁴ Of God. § 872.

independent *facultas cognoscitiva* inferior, but only a *facultas cognoscitiva* whose parts are the upper and the lower faculties of cognition.¹ Baumgarten still shares this emphasis on the unity of the power of cognition when he already appreciates the lower faculty according to its value.² In the "Metaphysica", however, it already says *facultas cognoscitiva* inferior (or superior): the two faculties stand for themselves. - Wolff also prepares Baumgarten's action by not exaggerating the danger of error, which lies in the expectation of similar cases, but by turning it into a positive: the more necessary it is to bring the "art of experience" into a good state.³ The demand of the "emendatio intellectus" (Spinoza), the "conduct of understanding" (Locke), the "improvement of the understanding" is here transferred to the lower faculty (probably after Tschirnhausen's process: "imaginatione bene gubernata"). Baumgarten's undertaking thus joins, through Tschirnhausen's and Wolff's mediation, the great movement of the time. The description of aesthetics as the younger sister⁴ of logic has been passed over too quickly. It is more than just an idea. The idea of inventing aesthetics as a parallel science to logic is very much in the spirit of Wolff's time.⁵ Bülfinger is not the only one to anticipate Baumgarten's idea.⁶

¹ Ps. emp. "De facultatis cognitionis parte inferiori (resp. superiori)" are the headings.

² *Meditationes*. § 3: "facultatis cognoscitivae pars inferior."

³ From God. § 331 f.

⁴ Lotze, *Geschichte der Ästhetik in Deutschland*. P. 9 f. Cf. the same expression in Baumgarten's *Kollegnachschrift*, published by Poppe 1907. § 13.

⁵ Of God. § 329 The art of experience and experimentation could be made a special part of the sciences. Among the astronomers we already have "marvelous samples of experiences and experiments".

⁶ "Veilem, existerent (sc. praecepta), qui circa facultatem sensi- tiendi, imaginandi, attendendi, abstrahendi, et memoriam praestarent, quod bonus ille Aristoteles... praestitit circa intellectum: hoc est, ut in artis formam redigerent, quicquid ad illas in suo usu dirigendas, et iuvandas pertinet et conducit . . ." (G. B. Bülfinger: "Dilucidationes philosophicae de deo, anima humana, mundo et generalibus rerum affectionibus." Tbingae. 1725. § 268.) Here

Martin Knutzen also outlined Baumgarten's program shortly before the publication of the *Aesthetica*. In addition to the *ars inveniendi rationalis*¹, he recognizes a sensual art of invention.² The plan of the "Aesthetica" also includes the sensual art of invention, the art of experience, the art of observation and the art of experimentation (Knutzen's own translations). *Aesthetics* is actually a sensual (aesthetic) art of experience, an "aesthetic empiricism, or the art of improving one's experience".³ The classification of the science of improving sensual knowledge flows naturally from the various faculties that we have to count among the lower cognitive power of the soul. It begins with the "art of attention."⁴ Like Reimarus, Lambert and Mendelssohn later on, Baumgarten already sees the main problem of the new logic in how to mediate between the general rules of logic and the particular cases. It is a question of the application of logic. Nothing is more characteristic of Kant's concept of the power of judgment than the word "use". It is the understanding that has become practical; thus aesthetics is logic that has become practical, i.e. the logic of experience, the logic of the lower faculties, through which we are thus called for an *ars sentiendi*, *imaginandi*, etc., parallel to the *ars cogitandi*, the logic. Cf. Baumgarten's Med. § 115: "Cum psychologia det firma principia, nulli dubitamus scientiam darf posse facultatem cognoscitivam inferiorem, quae dirigat, aut scientiam sensitive quod cognoscendi."

¹"habitus novas s. incognitas veritates rationis ope s. per demonstrationem inveniendi." (Log. § 582.)

² "Ars inveniendi sensualis s. experiendi est ars, sensuum ope, novas detegendi veritates." It includes an *ars observandi* and *experimentandi*. Both belong to Leibniz's *ars interrogandi* naturam. (Log. § 573.)

³Philos. Letters (Baumgarten). 2. writing. - This "aesthetic empiricism" is of course not empirical aesthetics

⁴ In practical terms, Baumgarten does not know much more than Thomasius, who declared the invention of new truths in all disciplines to be "easy" if one only cleanses one's mind of prejudices. (Ausübung der Vernunftlehre. Andere Aufl. 1699. Vorrede.) In Baumgarten's time, the error of subterfuge (vitium subreptio- nis) took the place of the frightening image of "praeiudicia", which must be used wherever the new art of experience is to demonstrate its content. (Philos. Letters. 2. Letter.)

experience. Whoever has read Muschenbroek, Boyle, Malebranche and Baco, says Baumgarten, will not find it impossible to establish some common laws of mere sensory experience⁽¹⁾

A new logic, a logic of induction, is thus contained in aesthetics, for which it is characteristic that it remains entirely outside the actual "doctrine of reason. Already in Wolff, the *ars inveniendi* is not treated in logic, but in psychology.² Meier, whose theory of reason is constructed purely according to the concept, judgment, conclusion scheme, also contains a sketch of the logic of experience, of aesthetic empiricism, in the "Anfangsgründe der schönen Wissenschaften" (in the second volume).³ Meier not only gives rules here that concern the improvement of the senses, of attention and abstraction, but also a doctrine of observation and experiment. This is the best way to see what the "aesthetics" of this period was: a repository for all methodological ideas that could not be accommodated within the framework of traditional logic. The second volume of Meier's Aesthetics is also the second volume of his Logic.⁴ The endeavours alongside logic are summarized by the expression "analogon rationis", which is just another word for the cognitive function of the lower faculties. The "Aesthetica" is the logic of the analogon rationis,⁶ just as the theory of reason of the time is the logic of syllogism (the demonstrative ratio).

¹ Philos. Letters. 2. writing.

² The corresponding chapter of *Philos. rationalis* (Pars II. Sectio II. "de usu logicae in veritate investiganda") is quite meaningless.

³ In this factually completely senseless separation, the habit of thought of the time, which cannot get rid of the contrast between the lower and the upper wealth, is expressed in an almost monumental way.

⁴ In this state of things one is not surprised when one reads: that part of aesthetics which deals with the improvement of the sensuous faculty of knowledge is, since sensuous knowledge constitutes the greater part of our whole knowledge, even more necessary and useful than the doctrine of reason. (Grundgründe. II, § 253.) Aesthetics is thus placed above logic! (Cf. on this below p. 242.)

⁶ It calls itself "Ars analogi rationis". (Aesth. § I.)

Like all empiricism in German philosophy, the strong sensualist trait in Meier has been attributed to Locke. However, Meier's empiricism is not something isolated, penetrated from outside, but merely the consequence of Wolffianism. The eclectic philosophy of the Enlightenment does not decompose Wolff's philosophy, but is the end of the decomposition process of this philosophy itself. The value that Meier places on sensory knowledge is nothing more than a slight exaggeration of the value that Wolff already placed on "historical knowledge". Or more correctly: this appreciation is already present in Wolff's philosophy; it only emerges more clearly when the overvaluation of rational cognition ceases. Locke's concepts only give language to what was already expressed without Locke. Rightly understood, Wolff is not too much, but too little of a rationalist.¹ It is the cardinal error of his method and signifies the actual apostasy from Leibniz that Wolff allows historical and philosophical knowledge (sensual and rational) to exist side by side on an equal footing. What is established by experience (aposte- riori) can also be proven by reason (apriori): this is the eternal melody in Wolff's writings. Alongside an empirical demonstration comes a rational one, alongside the *psychologia empirica* a *psychologia rationalis*.² It is here, not in the belief in ratio, that dogmatism is rooted. Historical knowledge is of "the most extensive use".³ Even the proposition of contradiction, the foundation stone of the whole edifice of ontology, is an experience of the nature of our mind.⁴ Wolff, the "rationalist", did not see that without "ratio" there is not even the simplest "historical"

¹ H. Ritter has rightly drawn attention to the "modesty" of his rationalism, which draws help everywhere from experience. (Geschichte der christl. Philosophie. 8. Teil. 1853. p. 522 ff.)

² On the dangers of this procedure for psychology, see Dessoir, Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie. I. 2nd ed. p. 67 f.

³ Philos, rationalis. (Disc, prael. § 12.) "cognitionis historicae amplissimus usus."

⁴ Ont. § 27.

Experience shows that even the factual is already theory, as the natural scientist Goethe put it. Wolff's rationalism is more a rationalism of attitude than of method. Methodological rationalism begins where Wolff ends: where one asks about the foundations of historical knowledge. Wolff's true rationalism is contained in his metaphysics.¹ Despite the weakness of his basic epistemological position, Wolff's metaphysics rescues a deeper conception of cognition. Here, where the concept of ratio, i.e. the connection of general truths,² is at the center, any sensualist conception is far removed. Wolff's genuine rationalism springs not from the theory of knowledge and the doctrine of concept formation (of the understanding), but from the doctrine of inference⁽³⁾. Here are the sources of its power. Kant's first task was to critically interpret this metaphysical rationalism based on the concept of the "nexus veritatum".

Viewed in the context of Wolff's theory of knowledge, Baumgarten's undertaking loses all that is striking: it is only natural that in a philosophy that grants so much to sensory (historical) knowledge, one should also take on the lower faculty. Baumgarten's success can only be explained by the fact that he did something that many had already thought of.

We now consider the structure of the "lower cognitive faculty", which is the carrier of the proud structure of the

¹It is putting too much into Wolff when Pichler (Christian Wolffs Ontologie. 1911. p. 17) renders the term "connubium experientiae et rationis" in this way: Wolff "expressly" teaches the connection of deductive and inductive method. This connection probably has a different meaning than what Wolff understands by it: a double way of proving. (Vg-1. Meier, Vernunftlehre. § 235: The combination of evidence from reason and from experience is called the agreement of reason with experience).

² Ps. emp. § 483. "Ratio est facultas nexus veritatum universalia intuendi seu perspiciendi." Vg-1. Meier, Vernunftlehre. § 588.

³The ratio is, as the faculty of linking truths, at the same time the faculty of reasoning, since in reasoning a linking of propositions takes place.

is aesthetics. Wolff's *Psychologia empirica* already treats the lower powers of cognition in detail.¹ The lower part of the cognitive faculty includes: Senses (*sensus*), imagination (*imaginatio*), poetic power (*facultas fingendi*) and memory (*memoria*). To the upper one: Attention and reflection (plus the *facultas abstrahendi*), which make up the intellect, as well as acumen and ingenium (which Wolff separates by a somewhat confused division).² Baumgarten says "phantasia"³ instead of *imaginatio*, introduces *iudicium* (taste) into the lower faculties and places acumen and ingenium together. The intellect (*intellectus*), whose main faculties are attention, reflection, comparison and abstraction, stands between the lower faculty of cognition and the ratio. The reason why these activities are separated from the related powers of imagination and poetry is to be found in the fact that the intellect is regarded as a faculty of clear ideas. The concept of clarity, however, separates the upper and lower faculties. The lower faculty is ex definitione the faculty of indistinct ideas. Objectively, the faculties counted as intellect belong between the lower faculty of cognition and the ratio, for it is only through attention, abstraction, etc. that we arrive at concepts. The boundary between the lower and upper faculties is therefore fluid.⁴

Baumgarten's most important innovation is that he combines all of the lower assets into one total asset, the *analogon ratio*-

*§ 29-§ 233.

- The third section ("de tribus intellectus operationibus in specie", § 325 - § 424) deals with concept, judgment, conclusion. The section on the concept, however, is actually already the previous one on the intellect in general. The ingenium is placed in the fourth section ("de dispositionibus naturalibus et habitibus intellectus"), which deals with the *ars inveniendi*.

³ *Metaphysica*. § 557.

⁴ This state of affairs finds expression in Meier's "Psychology" (*Metaphysik. III. 1757.*) in the fact that Meier does not quite know where to place attention and the faculty of abstraction, and therefore sends them before the lower faculties of cognition under the heading "Of the faculty of cognition in general".

Only through this summary does the lower cognitive faculty become a unity. The whole of aesthetics is based on this. The analogon rationis is "sensuality", the "perfection" of which is taught in the "Aesthetica".² The powers of sensuality form the complex of those faculties of the soul that indistinctly imagine a connection.³

The "expectation of similar cases", to which Wolff's most important lower faculties worked together, Baumgarten assigns to a separate faculty (praesagito sensitiva), which is identical with that of the association of ideas.⁴ The significance that Baumgarten attaches to this concept by placing the analogon rationis at the center of his aesthetics stems from its relationship to the problem of the irrational, the probable, everything that lies outside of what can be demonstrated. It was the most important matter of the time to find a center for everything that was not reason but claimed to be valid (beauty took first place among these). Baumgarten discovered it in the "similarity of reason" and made the doctrine of beauty the most important area of its application. He moves from logic to aesthetics⁽⁵⁾ Bodmer and Breitinger occasionally move from aesthetics to logic. The accusation of a literary

¹ Metaphysica. § 640.

² The sensations do not belong to it (against Zeller, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. p. 235). For Baumgarten, sensuality means the totality of the upper powers of the facultas cognos- citiva inferior: ingenium sensitivum, acumen sensitivum, memoria sensitiva, facultas fingendi, facultas diiudicandi, expectatio casuum similium, facultas characteristicā sensitiva.

³ Metaphysica. § 640. "complexum facultatum animae nexum confuse repraesentantium." The corresponding upper powers (ingenium et acumen intellectuale, memoria intellectualis, s. persona- litas, facultas distincte diiudicandi, praesagito intellectualis, facultas characteristicā intellectualis form the ratio. (Metaphysics. § 641.) - The division of the powers of the soul into a lower and an upper one according to Wolff's example of memoria sensitiva and rationalis. (Psych. rationalis. § 279.)

⁴ Metaphysica. § 612.

⁵This is meant objectively, insofar as Baumgarten was first and foremost a philosopher. Subjectively, Baumgarten's strong interest in poetry (he wrote poetry himself when he was young) was the first decisive factor in the "invention" of aesthetics.

The historian's claim that Breitinger shows the limits of his grasp of the concept of the creative artist (by including the "vacillating rationalist concept of probability")¹ overlooks the historical significance of the concept as well as its systematic meaning (in contrast to demonstration).² Baumgarten's aesthetics does not claim to be new. But one may claim the honor for her that she has found the redeeming terms for what was moving in the depths of time.

¹ O. Walzel: The Prometheus symbol. N. Jahrb. für das klassische Altert. 1910. S. 61.

² The idea of probability among the Swiss has (apart from the direct influence of Muratori, *Perf. Poesia. I*, 71 ff) three different sources. Firstly, as Cassirer has shown, Leibniz's concept of possible worlds continues to have an effect. The poet is not bound to the one, real world. Secondly, the *logica probabilitum* is important. And thirdly, rhetoric has an effect. (The section "verisimilitudo" - *Aesthetica*, § 478 to § 504 - is based on Cicero). The parallels can be explained by this common basic mood. Breitinger throws out the idea of a logic of the "imagination", thus precisely characterizing Baumgarten's undertaking. (Von den Gleichnissen der Dichter. 1741. p. 8f.) His concept of "abstractio imaginationis" also belongs in this circle of thought. Bodmer speaks of the "rules of the probable" (Gemälde der Dichter. p. 16; 58; Muratori: "le regole del verisimile", *perf. poes. I* 84) and finds the poetically true, not without a certain reason and order; it has its sufficient reason for the imagination and the senses. (Abh. von dem Wunderbaren. 1740. p. 47.)

Chapter 3: Wolff's abstracting conceptualization

The analogon rationis has brought us directly to the most important achievement of the epoch after Wolff. However, before we present Baumgarten's aesthetics itself, we must take a look at Wolff's logic, from whose formulations the material for the new aesthetics is taken. Wolff's main source, in turn, is the *Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis*, based on Cartesian ideas, which Leibniz published in 1684 in the *Leipzig Acta eruditorum*. The language of the *Critique of Pure Reason* cannot be understood without knowledge of Wolffian logic. Our presentation formally follows Baumgarten, whose elaboration and summary of what has been handed down presents itself as a model of clarity and precision.

The most important part of this logic is the doctrine of the concept. The concept of the senses that can be distinguished from others (such as red from blue, cold from warm) is called clear.¹ If one distinguishes individual characteristics within it, the clear concept becomes clear; otherwise it remains confused (*confusus*). By distinguishing the characteristics of the characteristics and so on, one arrives at an ever higher degree of clarity. Since it is attention that lifts one thing after another out of a composite perception,² attention is the most important faculty for the formation of concepts, for the concept is a clear idea. As the first activity of the intellect, attention is therefore of fundamental importance. It is the power of "enlightenment". There are no limits to it. Through sufficiently long treatment

¹ What lies below the clear conceptions, the "fundus animae" of the dark perceptions, is out of the question for logic.

² Psych. emp. § 237.

even the most confused impression can be traced back to clear elements⁽¹⁾.

Baumgarten places abstraction alongside attention.² The emphasis of one characteristic makes the other recede into the background. I "abstract" from them. The *facultas abstrahendi* follows the *facultas attendendi* like its shadow.³ Abstraction impoverishes the imagination; it loses in fullness what it gains in clarity. This process forms the starting point of Baumgarten's fundamental consideration. The proportion: the greater the extent, the smaller the content, is not definitely stated, but is in principle presupposed everywhere.

The more characteristics an idea has, the clearer (not clearer!) it is. The idea with six clear

¹ In the 18th century, logic, aesthetics and ethics were thought to be largely dependent on attention. Sulzer naively expressed the belief of the century. One only ever works on the memory, he says, "the attention, the exact observation, the reflection, the judgment of the true and finally the perception of the beautiful and the good, are left almost untrained and unworked". (Preliminary Exercises for the Awakening of Attention and Reflection. IV. Part. 1782. p. If.)

² Met § 625.

³ Met. § 529. "Quod aliis clarius percipio attendo, quod aliis obscurius, abstraho ab eo." According to Wolff, the characteristics are abstracted; according to Baumgarten, the characteristics are abstracted from. These are two very different concepts. Baumgarten's "abstraction" is an obscuration, a reticle. Wolff's "abstraction" is a separation of the characteristic from the thing and an isolated consideration of the characteristic. (Philos. rat. § 110; Ps. emp. § 281.) - Baumgarten's doctrine of abstraction is probably connected with Wolff's law that the stronger (clearer) conception suppresses the weaker, but it is nevertheless to be well distinguished from it. It is not true that Wolff already relates the faculty of attention and the faculty of abstraction to the basic gradations of clarity and distinctness of ideas (as Grau, Geschichte des Bewußtseinsbegriffs, p. 195; 204 f.). - Kant adopted what is natural in the second half of the century/Baumgarten's use of language. (Logic. § 6. Note 2.) The reproach of Überweg (Logic, 5th ed. § 51), which is based on a statement by Lambert, that Kant unnecessarily deviated from the linguistic usage of the time, is without justification. Lambert's use of language can ultimately be regarded as the language of the time. Lambert was a mathematician philosophizing on his own initiative, not a philosopher of the school.

characteristics is "clearer" than the one with three equally clear characteristics. The former is, according to Baumgarten's expression, extensively clearer.¹ The clarity that arises from the clarity of the characteristics, on the other hand, is called intensive.² In the case of extensive clarity, I proceed from characteristic to characteristic of the thing; in the case of intensive clarity, I follow a single characteristic further into its characteristics. Wolff's explanation, from which Baumgarten's concept of extensive clarity develops, shows what it aims at: complete determination. What is determined in such a way that it can be distinguished from everything else is an *Individualum*.³ Since extensive clarity in its increase becomes vividness (*vividitas*), "vividness" means the highest individual determination.⁴ Vivid cognition is a cognition of individuals.

The conception that has more and more vivid features than others is called extensively definite; the one that has intensely clearer features is called purer⁽⁵⁾ The perfect constitution of the mind to form intensely definite features is called depth, to a greater degree purity; the perfect constitution of the same, extensively definite, is called purity.

¹Met. § 531. "multitudine notarum augetur claritas." Wolff: a clear concept is detailed (*completa*) when the characteristics are sufficient to recognize the thing at any time and to distinguish it from all others. (Von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes. § 15.)- Wolff added this definition, as he himself tells us, to the Leibnizian distinctions. (Detailed note. § 58.)

²ib. "claritas claritate notarum maior, intensive dici potest." In Wolff: a clear concept is complete (*adaequata*) if we also have clear and distinct concepts of the characteristics from which the thing is recognized. (Powers of the human intellect. § 16.)

³"Omnimode determinatum" (Wolff, Philos, rat. § 74.) Baumgarten, Met. § 148: "ens ... omnimode determinatum ... est sin" gulare (individuum)".

⁴"Living" knowledge, on the other hand, means a knowledge that "causes pleasure and annoyance, desire and abhorrence through the contemplation of perfection or imperfection." (Meier, Anfangsgründe. I. § 35.) We have already traced the development that leads to this perfection. Now we are concerned with the perfection of "vivid" cognition. That is Wolffian; this is peculiarly Baumgartenian.

⁵Metaphysica. § 634.

It follows from this that the formation of ideas of extensive clarity belongs to the artist, that of intensive clarity (depth and purity) to the scholar. The former leads to aesthetic, the latter to scientific cognition.

The doctrine of confused and clear concepts is the decisive part of dogmatic epistemology. All knowledge is given to us; the share of the intellect is limited to extracting that which is already "thought" in a confused way in the sensory impression. This doctrine does not recognize a fundamental difference between "imagining" and thinking.² For those who, like Kant, did not have their own thoughts to add, the "further development" of the contrast between confused and clear ideas to Locke's simple and composite ideas was obvious.³ But the reverse solution was also possible: the confused, much-containing ideas are the composite ones; the "clear" ones are the complexes of ideas reduced to their simplest sensory elements. But whether one takes this or that path, the sensualist basis of the theory is always evident. The understanding (*intellectus*), the faculty of clear ideas, cannot be compared with reason (*ratio*), which is the faculty of the coherence of truths. This is, as it were, autonomous; the intellect receives its material from the senses. Nevertheless, this theory contains an idea that enables a transition from the concept of understanding to that of reason. The deep (pure) understanding is that which recognizes the characteristics of a feature, the characteristics

¹ Metaphysica. § 637. "Perfectio intellectus notas intensive distinctas formandi est profunditas, et maior profunditas puritas. Perfectio eiusdem notas extensive distinctas formandi est intellectus pulcritudo."

² Thomasius already used the term "thoughts" for ideas (see above). Meier declares: there is no error to be concerned about if we consider the conception of a thing and the knowledge of it to be one and the same. (Vernunftlehre. 1752. § 25.)

³ The equation in Knutzen, Log. § Gottsched was quite right when he found that Knutzen "conceded a little too much to Locke". (B. Erdmann, M. Knutzen und seine Zeit. p. 112.) With this equation, all deeper possibilities of development were cut off.

in turn of these characteristics, etc. Obviously he follows a connection: characteristic b of characteristic a, characteristic c of characteristic b, etc. Thus, if we emphasize the function of reason, not the quality of the ideas (which become increasingly clear¹), we arrive at the function of reason, which consists in linking. - The list of characteristics that lead to extensive clarity lacks this linking moment insofar as there seems to be no law of progression. When "intensive clarity" is increased, I progress from characteristic b of characteristic a to characteristic c of characteristic b. The series is determined. The series is determined. The increase of extensive distinctness, on the other hand, depends on something apparently quite indeterminable, the individual. There is no logical principle of progression; the characteristics simply come together according to my knowledge of the object.

In the writings before the "Aesthetica" I have found no indication that anyone had become aware of the impoverishing tendency of this kind of conceptualization. The "Aesthetica", on the other hand, contains the monumental exclamation: "What is abstraction but a loss?"² What value should a conceptualization have that seeks to reach the highest certainty of knowledge by refraining, forgetting, i.e. by mere negation? We only arrive at clear concepts through abstraction - but what use are the clearest concepts to us if they are only gained by refraining from the fullness and color of existence?³

The problematic character of the "concepts" becomes clearest when one considers the process of conceptualization.

¹ The often-used image of becoming the master of ideas is of no use here. It has only pedagogical value. (Already rejected by Tetens, *Phil. Versuche*. 1.101 f.) One can either look at the number - so they become more composite, or at the nature, so they become simpler, more elementary.

² § 560. "quid enim est abstractio, si iactura non est?"

³ In an essay in the *acta eruditorum* (1707, p. 507 ff.), Wolff distinguished between concepts "per abstractionem" and concepts *per arbitrariam combinationem* (in which the soul "imagines many kinds of relations"). (*Kleine Schriften*, II "Auf-

Education according to the Wolff-Baumgarten doctrine. Wolff calls the way to arrive at certain concepts that of reflection.¹ Reflection (Überdenken) means the successive directing of attention to that which contains a concept.² Reflection is by its very nature comparison. By comparison we notice the similarity and difference of things.³ But since the similarity of individuals constitutes the species, that of species the genus,⁴ attentio and reflexio lead to concepts.⁵ Now the noticing of similarities and differences is a matter of ingenium or acumen. The formation of concepts is thus based on a prior activity of "wit". It thus turns out that wit is connected with logic and ontology via the concept of similarity. Here is the historical seed for that peculiar combination of psychology, logic, aesthetics and metaphysics that makes the Critique of Judgment such a difficult work. J. E. Schlegel already noted the peculiar quality of the concept of humor, "art and philosophy-some difficulties about the origin of our concepts." (§ 4.) Meier calls the arbitrary connection of concepts the "reversed separation". Otherwise there is not much talk of arbitria combinatio. Meier makes an approach to overcoming the abstracting theory of concepts in connection with Wolff's concept of the poetic faculty. He turns it (which was obvious, since the joke also has a logical function) into the logical: we invent abstract ideas of a genus or kind of things that we have never seen or felt. (Metaphys. III. Psych. § 507.) The fruitful germ here lies in the idea of independence from the sensed. Cf. Wolff. Philos. rat. § 77; § 105 ff.; § 716. Ratio prael. § 34.

¹reflexio: "modus pervenienti ad perceptiones rerum distinctas". (Ps. emp. § 267 nota.)

²"Attentionis successiva directio ad ea, quae in re percepta insunt dicitur reflexio." (Ps. emp. § 257.)

³Ps. emp. § 258 ff. *Ontologia. § 233 f. ⁵"Convenit adeo in formandis notionibus generum et specierum sensu "dici attentio, reflexio, abstractio praeter imaginationem atque memoriam. (Ps. emp. § 283 nota.) According to this, the formation of concepts (for the concepts of species and genera are the concepts for Wolff) is the work of the most important "lower faculties of cognition in conjunction with the higher faculties of attention and reflection (abstraction) constituting the intellectum, to which we have already conceded a certain dual position.

to link the two. He who imitates must have clear concepts of his model. Hence the peculiar benefit of poetry, that it helps philosophy to become adept at acquiring clear concepts.¹ This is the first hint of the connection between logic and aesthetics, which in the Critique of Judgment was thought to be a peculiar idea on Kant's part.

Reimarus recognizes the connection between "wit" and the formation of concepts. Wit is the ability to recognize the hidden similarity of different things. It is usually found in poets and orators; but it can also serve the truth.² Sulzer, who characterizes the process of abstraction as a straightforward "forgetting" of differences,³ describes wit as an offspring of reflection, by means of which one develops ideas in order to make them clear and distinct, and of the imagination, through which one remembers the similar and dissimilar and the relationships of things.⁴

The problematic aspect of this theory of the formation of our concepts could not remain hidden. We already see the doctrine in complete disintegration in Meier. We "human beings" cannot recognize anything completely; there is still much confusion and darkness in all our clear ideas.⁶ Wolff would never have made such a confession. His mood was too victoriously rationalistic for that. But Meier only develops what was already contained in Wolff's theory of knowledge.⁸ A generality that is only due to separation, i.e. to oblivion, does not have the strength to support the edifice of knowledge. The further the concept of "ratio" recedes and that of "intellectus"

¹ Treatise on imitation. Reprint. S. 125.

² Doctrine of reason. § 267; on similarity as the basis of concepts vg! § 54; §

56.

³ Philosophical writings. I. P. 271.

⁴ "Development of the concept of genius." 1757 Ges. Philosophische Schriften. I. p. 321 f.

⁵ Doctrine of reason. § 179; § 175.

⁶ Meier already marks the end of Wolfianism in every respect. The philosophy of the Enlightenment is only a popular aftermath of the version that the Wolfian doctrine gained with Meier. The turn to Locke is not a cause, but a symptom.

the more strongly the inadequacy of the doctrine of the abstract-general had to be felt. Reason is no longer a power for Meier: but he must despair of understanding (the capacity of clear concepts). His point of view is therefore an epistemological sensualism and nihilism, combined with an arbitrary metaphysical dogmatism. When he is supposed to enumerate the advantages of "general knowledge", which he traditionally praises, he actually only knows how to name one: we can always deduce with certainty from a higher concept the lower ones contained in it.¹ Wolff had rendered the weakness of his epistemology harmless by believing in the autonomous ratio. In Meier, this weakness emerges nakedly. He gives an account of the end of Wolff's theory of knowledge that is remarkable for its consistency in "Betrachtungen über die Schranken der menschlichen Erkenntnis". (1755.)² "General knowledge" is here called, in a certain sense, "a mere work of illusion". It is accused of not being able to provide us with "a single correct concept of a single thing".³ Meier thus plays off the single thing, the individual, against the general. This is the bankruptcy of knowledge unless a way is shown at the same time to grasp this individual rationally.⁽⁴⁾

¹ Doctrine of reason. § 296 f.

² According to the mood - at the same time what an improbable title!

³ S. 17; 22.

⁴ Meier's theory of concept formation reflects the same Bankerott mood. Attention is called the "noblest faculty of cognition". (Anfangsgründe. II, § 283.) But if we elevate attention so high, we must necessarily feel all the more keenly the deficiency that lies in abstraction. This is consequently called a "necessary exception" in the perfection of our soul, the shadow. (It is in itself "something evil", and one must "choose wisely" and not "abstract from the whole world". (This humorous turn of phrase, in all naivety, clearly exposes the problem of abstracting concept formation; it shows where the whole procedure, dogmatically applied, leads: to nothing. - Meier develops the theory of concept formation not in logic but in aesthetics. Wolff had given it in empirical psychology.

Baumgarten's aesthetics emerged from this problematic situation. His new science is the antithesis, the remedy for Wolff's pure logic of abstraction. In ideal concentration, its basic idea could be presented as follows: The abstracting formation of concepts, viewed in an upward direction, towards the general concepts, leads to an absolute emptiness of content. The concept of *summum genus*, of being, is indeed opposed to nothingness,¹ but it is just as empty of content as the latter. Whoever wants to grasp being through abstraction keeps nothingness in his hands. Viewed in its direction, towards being (metaphysically that is), the abstracting conceptualization leads to epistemological nihilism. But does the abstracting formation of concepts have to be viewed in a single-minded way? Can it not be understood as a process that runs forwards and backwards? Then the purpose would not be the substance, but the determination. The upward direction would be no more meaningful than the downward direction. Both are the same function. Only on the background of the general do I recognize the individual; only from the individual do I gain the general. There is a constant, reciprocal relationship. Nevertheless, one direction has the advantage: downwards. Upwards the path leads into emptiness; downwards into the concrete. Abstraction is only a means, the determination of the concrete is the end. But it is not surprising that the individual can only be determined by way of the general: thinking is dialectical by nature.

This turn of events makes Baumgarten's theory, which leads to the collapse of his successors, highly positive. A theory of individualizing concept formation emerges from observations on the dangers of abstracting concept formation in conjunction with the ideas of contemporaneous aesthetics aimed at individual vitality (*ut pictura poesis*).

¹ "The most abstract concept is that which has nothing in common with anything different from it, that is, the concept of something; for that which is different from it is nothing and has nothing in common with the something." (Kant, *Reflections on Logic*. Ac. edition. vol. XVI. no. 2870.)

Chapter 4: Baumgarten's individualizing conceptualization

"The philosopher is a man among men"¹ - it is the attitude of this sentence, fundamentally different from Wolff's, that precedes the emergence of the new aesthetics. Reading Baumgarten's "Philosophical Letters of Aleotheo- philus" (1741), one gains a vivid impression of the humanly tasteful manner, wit and whimsy with which the young generation could treat even difficult school subjects.² The letters were to become a kind of philosophical weekly, also readable for ladies.³ Baumgarten wanted to bring philosophy to life. It is much more to him than dead doctrine. But despite the subtlety and agility of his mind, he did not succeed in captivating his audience. Meier then realized Baumgarten's ideas in his own way. Baumgarten himself confined himself to academic activity.

The emphasis on the human in Baumgarten's and Meier's aesthetics corresponds historically to exactly what Thomasius wanted. Wolff's neo-Scholasticism gave rise to the new Thomasius Baumgarten (who was admittedly equipped with a better logical schoolbag than the old one). In many ways, the aesthetic age is similar to the "gallant, political and curious" age. Above all: the consideration for the ladies. "By the women of his collegis or of metaphysics

¹ "philosophus homo inter homines, neque bene tantam humanae cognitionis partem alienam a se putat." (Aesthet. § 6.)

² If Baumgarten here makes fun of the then modern, mathematical method of paragraph division, this is not a dull joke by a dilettante, but the superiority of the master, who rises above a stylistic device that he himself handled with perfection.

³ They are entirely in the style of the "Discourse der Mahlern" and the "Tadlerinnen". However, the idea of a specifically philosophical weekly is probably Baumgarten's own.

"schwatzten" was a popular accusation in rococo comedy.¹ Compare Meier on the school fox: "He will be a pure metaphysics, a mere bourgeois right, a corporeal medicine..."² ... "With a woman he talks of monads, clystires, quasi-contracts..." - In 1682 Weise complains that the short cloak of the word "political" must cover all weaknesses.³ The same could have been said of the word "aesthetic" around 1760.

Education of the whole person is the basic idea of "Aesthetica". The doctrine of "sensuality to be improved" aims to complete the educational ideal of erudition. The idea of man as an *ens ratiocinans* is replaced by the idea of the all-round developed personality. The demand to cultivate sensuality is only a symbol of this more general tendency. The pre-classical epoch of the 18th century is divided into two large sections: in the first, Wolff, the abstraction, prevails, in the second, Baumgarten, the tendency towards the individual.⁴ The discovery of sensuality (and thus of the individual) occurred - I cannot prove this idea, but I consider it to be undoubtedly certain - under the guidance of the idea of theodicy. The new science is a justification of sensuality.⁵ The principle of continuity made it possible to satisfy the claim of theodicy to justify everything that exists. Only by cultivating the lower cognitive faculty can the upper, and ultimately the whole, be brought into "good" order.

¹ Borinski, Poet. d. Ren. S. 307

² Initial grounds. I, § 236.

³ Borinski, Poet. d. Ren. p. 330, note 5.

'Lambert once characterized the epochs excellently. Every inventor has a different point of view, he says, his "favorite guide". "Wolff liked to abstract. Baumgarten sought to apply abstract concepts to species in order to find new species." (Log. u. philos. Unters. I, p. 406 f.) The contrast of the ages is perfectly clear in this personal characterization. Wolff proceeds to the more abstract, Baumgarten to the more concrete concept. The former to learned (i.e. general) knowledge, the latter to the individual (to art).

⁶ Aesthetic theodicy - the expression was forced upon Zimmermann against his will, as it were. (Aesthetics. 1858. I, p. 167.)

Stand", as Wolff said. From the night (of dark perceptions) through the dawn (of improved sensuality) to midday (of clear knowledge).¹

The popular disseminator of the new attitude to life is G. F. Meier, whose influence on German culture can hardly be overestimated. It was through him that the generally comprehensible aspects of Baumgarten's great achievement became widely known. The little we know of the young and maturing Kant shows the traits of the "aesthetic" age. More than once we are reminded of Meier's ideal of the perfect worldly sage. The young Kant is the opposite of the "school fox" that Meier cannot mock enough. He is more like the "aestheticus": human, and always pleasing.⁽²⁾ One should go along with fashions, writes Meier.³ Baumgarten already lists the finery of a woman's room among the things where reason does not want to decide anything.⁴ The fair sex possesses the finest taste (Meier).⁵ Kant's aesthetics begins with the same remarks, as we shall see. Above all, the relationship to sociability is important. The "school fox" is ridiculous in company. The "aestheticus" (as a true successor to the "politicus") is a tactful man who knows how to adapt to his fellow speakers and takes the audience into consideration in his lecture. In practice, for Baumgarten and Meier, "aesthetic" mainly means a way of presenting "extracted" truths. It means presenting abstract material in an appealing, comprehensible and concrete way, thereby making it memorable. Kant writes somewhat bitterly about this method: "Aesthetics is only a means of accustoming people of too great tenderness to the rigor of proofs and explanations.

¹ To the objection "confusio mater erroris" (therefore no cultivation of confused knowledge) Bamgarten replies: "sed conditio, sine qua non, inveniendae veritatis, ubi natura non facit saltum ex obscuritate in distinctionem. Ex nocte per auroram meridies." (Aesth. § 7.) The "morning gate of the beautiful" was later said by Schiller in the Artists. Cf. Herder, III. collection of fragments. II, I.

² Initial reasons. I, § 5.

³ Initial grounds. II, § 475.

⁴ Kollegnachschrift, edited by Poppe. 1907. § 35.

⁵ Initial grounds. I, § 17.

Just as children are smeared with honey on the rim of the jar."¹

Of course, all of this would only have cultural-historical, not philosophical significance if it had not been able to crystallize into a specific philosophical thought. This thought, however - a unique feature in the history of modern philosophy - has remained completely unknown. Kant had not the slightest awareness of the fact that the problem which he fixed forever through the concept of "power of judgment" (the relationship between the general and the particular) was at the heart of the "Aesthetica" of his famous "author" Baumgarten.

In order to find an approach to Baumgarten's achievement, we must take up rhetoric. The harmful effect of rhetorical theory has already been mentioned. It consists in the incorporation of an external purpose into the aesthetic doctrine (the arousal of passions and the resulting determination of the will in the listener). However, rhetoric is also based on a less dangerous idea, which was quite capable of fertilizing aesthetic theory. The speaker wants to be understood, he wants to be understood. But nothing is more easily understood than the concrete case, the example. Examples are the most important vehicle of communication - especially for those who have to present abstract subjects, such as the academic teacher. Baumgarten's interest in the example is therefore understandable. The only thing that is completely original is how he grasps the deeper thought motif at work in the example. It is no coincidence that aesthetics can be developed from a theory of example. The problem of "communicability" (enuntiatio) is truly at the center. To make communicable what cannot be communicated through the "concept" - that is the task of art. Baumgarten's "Aesthetics" answers the question of how a thought can be expressed that transcends the reach of the concept.

The example has always been taken into account in the theory of oratory (while logic has little

Reflections on logic. Ac. According to Adickes, this transcript dates from the mid-1950s. (Preface to vol. XVI.)

wanted to know about him). Rhetoric took its thoughts on this from Aristotle. According to him, the example is a kind of induction. The only difference here is that a general proposition is not inferred from a collection of particulars, but from the similarity of the sub-concept (i.e. the present case) with a third, similar one. Induction proves the highest term for the middle term from all the individuals together; the example is an induction from a single individual: it shows the validity of the higher term for the particular case by the analogy of the latter with a third term for which the higher term is assumed to be valid.¹ Trendelenburg has described the logical movement of the analogical inference (nothing else is the inference from the example) as follows: that which is similar (analogous) to the particular case for which something is to be inferred causes us to devise a general superordinate proposition. The general thus obtained is now related to the case at hand, and a conclusion of the first figure draws from it the inference that is intended.² The concrete, the particular case, is thus the goal; the "designed" general serves only to determine it. On the other hand, however, the concrete also "determines" the general; the law, the generally valid proposition, is given color, life, and vision through the example.³ There is a back and forth play between the concrete and the abstract that is clearly different from the single-minded direction of induction.

Illustration is the point of the example. Trendelenburg points out very finely that the fable

¹ Aristotle, *An. pr.* 24.

² Ad. Trendelenburg-, *Erläuterung-en zu den Elementen der aristotelischen Log-ik.* 3rd ed. 1876. p. 82.

³ For example, I want to prove (rhetorically) that today's high culture worsens morals. I will show that in ancient Greece the refinement of the state of culture was connected with the decline of morals. Then draft the general proposition: culture corrupts morals and then conclude: therefore culture is also to blame for today's moral degradation. This concrete proposition is the aim of the whole movement. Its purpose, however, is to deprive the present state of its contingency, to present it as somehow necessarily conditioned, to assign it a fixed place, as it were. This is done by a detour via the general proposition, which I arrived at through the analogy of the example.

¹ Now the fable, which shows the same relationship between the moral (general) theorem and the concrete process as the example and its supersentence, is at the center of Gottsched's poetics. The Swiss insist on vividness ("painting"); Baumgarten only gives the logical essence of all this when he makes a logic of example the core of his aesthetics. *Aesthetica*, as a logic of induction and analogy, is a logic of the individual; Baumgarten is concerned not with the formation of concepts ascending to the highest generic concept, but with the formation of concepts descending to the lowest species concept. He has found the "way back", as Lambert says.² The general is not reviled by him, but understood functionally: as a means of logically determining the particular. The functional meaning of the general is unknown to Meier, for whom, as a true Wolffian, the problem of the particular remains alien. Aesthetics leads him all the more quickly into the abyss of epistemological nihilism. Baumgarten discovers the narrow path to a way out. Instead of despising the general because (misunderstood) it does not accomplish what fools expect of it (namely to be the particular at the same time), he uses it to logically generate the particular, i.e. to determine the individual. The general (of the concept of genus and species) becomes the principle of cognition of the particular. For - this is the unspoken presupposition - only in relation to a general can the particular become logically comprehensible (and thus also communicable). "From the outset, the example (the analogy) is not actually aimed at forming a general as such for cognition, but at recognizing an individual through a general."³ This experience

¹ Explanatory notes. S. 83.

² Lambert calls it a "way back" when, instead of abstracting, one searches for specific concepts or propositions in relation to a general one. These are then examples of the general one. (Neues Org. Dianoiologie. § 508.) Cf. the contrast in Meier: the doctrine of reason is concerned with the greater clarity of a few characteristics; aesthetics with the clarity which arises from the quantity of characteristics. (Vernunftlehre. § 166.)

³ Trendelenburg, Erläuterungen. S. 82.

Baumgarten exploited the cognitive function of the general in relation to the individual. He reverses Wolff's generalizing conceptualization: instead of intensive clarity, he aims for extensive logical movement. Instead of the genus *summum*, his conceptualization progresses to the *infima species*.

This logical core of Baumgarten's aesthetics is already contained in his earliest writing, the "Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus". (1735.)¹ This small but substantial work has been unjustly neglected by historians.² The high praise that Herder bestowed on this little work hardly seems exaggerated to me. The *Meditations* are not only the most important aesthetic work in pre-Lessingian and pre-Winkelmannian Germany, but also the most independent philosophical achievement within Wolff's school. The "Aesthetica" is merely an unfolding of the germs contained in the *Meditations*.³

"A perfect sensual speech is a poem",⁴ is the basic definition, often quoted but never interpreted out of context, with which German philosophical aesthetics actually begins. By usually quoting with the sentence inverted (*poema est...*), one gives the impression that

¹ The 'assertion' is of historical interest because it establishes Baumgarten's inner independence from the Swiss. The main writings of the Swiss appeared in 1740-41. We have already seen what was available to Baumgarten: apart from Gottsched's critical poetry and König's treatise on taste, there is only Bodmer and Breitinger's work on the imagination

² B. Croce has arranged for a reprint (Napoli. 1900), which I have not seen. The assessment of Baumgarten in Croce's *Aesthetics* unfortunately shows the same prejudices that have always stood in the way of a just appreciation of pre-Kantian philosophy.

³ Herder did not understand Baumgarten's logical merit; but he nevertheless finely sensed the peculiar originality of the little work. (Werke, Suphan. 32. vol. pp. 178-192; cf. also vol. 4, pp. 15 f.; 132 f.) He was particularly attracted by the bold psychological apercu of basing poetry on sensuality. (vol. 32, p. 185.)

⁴ "Oratio sensitiva perfecta est poema." (Med. § 9.)

the expression *oratio sensitiva perfecta* is a sufficient explanation in itself. In truth, this expression concludes an elaborate development of thought about the *oratio sensitiva*, and the term *poema* is added, as a matter of course, but nevertheless from outside; but conversely, this explanation is not added to the term *poema* from somewhere. What an *oratio sensitiva perfecta* is can be known neither from the mind nor from § 9. One must know the language of the Wolff school and read paragraphs 1-9 very carefully in order not to miss the meaning that the young Baumgarten has put into his journeyman's play⁽¹⁾.

"The ideas that are acquired through the lower part of the cognitive faculty should be called *sensuous*."² In strict accordance with the terminology of the school, a significant change has been made here to the school's concept of the clear idea. The expressions *clara* et *confusa* *repraesentatio* are not sufficient for Baumgarten. He wants a less loaded, fresher expression, and chooses *sensual*.³ It was probably above all important to him to replace the negative expression with a positive one. "Clear" was probably too polished and inexpressive for him. The new concept he had of "only" clear knowledge demanded a new word. The word "*sensitivus*" is used for the first time as a term within the school in this sentence. The concept of sensibility, which plays its role in Kant's dissertation of 1770, begins its philosophical career here. The event is more important than one might think. Not only had a new word been found here: sensitive does not mean sensual.⁴ Sensuality was not yet to be discovered, but the faculty that Kant later called that of pure sensuality was.

¹ The writing serves as a habilitation.

² "Repraesentationes per partem facultatis cognoscitivae inferiorem comparatae sint sensitivae." Baumgarten justifies this innovation, which hardly moves us today but was highly conspicuous at the time, by referring to Wolff's expression "*appetitus sensitivus*".

³ Cf. met. § 521. "Repraesentatio non distincta sensitiva vocatur."

⁴ Cf. p. 196² above.

Baumgarten's distinction between sensual and sensitive is the first terminological step in this direction.

The explanations that are decisive for the definition of the poem begin with § 5: "From a sensuous speech [according to the previous explanations] a series of connected ideas is to be recognized."¹ § 7 places particular emphasis on this cognizability: "a sensually perfect speech is one whose manifold strives for the cognition of sensuous ideas."² What does this repeated reference to *cognitio* mean? Cognition only exists where a connection can be established. In the word *cognitio* we will therefore have to look for a hint in the same direction as in the equally often repeated *connexae*. What matters in *oratio*, which is a connection of ideas, is the connection, the unity of sensory ideas. A connection of sensuous ideas is sensuous speech.³ Sensuous speech becomes perfect when, in addition to unity and connection, it exhibits the greatest possible variety.⁴ Speech that is perfect in the senses is thus a recognizable connection of the greatest possible number of sensuous ideas.

¹ "Ex oratione sensitiva repraesentationes sensitivae connexae cognoscendae sunt."

² "Oratio sensitiva perfecta est, cuius varia tendunt ad *cognitio*' nem repraesentationum sensitivarum."

³ Almost no speech is so scientific and intellectual, 'ut ne una quidem occurat per omnem nexum sensitiva idea.' (§ 4.) The expression *idea* is striking. It is rare at this time. In the *Psychologia empirica* Wolff defines: "repraesentatio rei dicitur *idea*, quatenus rem quandam refert, seu quatenus objective consideratur." (§ 48.) The following § speaks of the "ideis rerum singularium" in contrast to *notio* ("repraesentatio rerum in universalis s. generum et specierum"). *Idea* thus means not only the content of the conception as distinct from the act (*perceptio*. § 48, *nota*), but also the individual conception as opposed to the general one. Thus Baumgarten uses the expression in his "Acroasis logica": *conceptus singularis vel individui est idea.*" (§ 44.) The *Aesthetica* (§ 575) also opposes *idea* and *notio* in this sense.

⁴ "Quo plura varia in oratione sensitiva facient ad exitandos repraesentationes sensitivas, eo erit illa perfectior." (Med. § 8.)

loitering. In short: a poem is a unity of sensual ideas.¹

The concept of *cognitio* (unity) contains the best refutation of the objection against which Baumgarten must now immediately defend himself. One could say: therefore he is most poetic who speaks most darkly (most sensually). Baumgarten's answer does not directly address the concept of unity, but it is aimed at it. Clear ideas, he says, are more poetic than dark ones because they do not contain enough characteristics to distinguish them from others. *Plura varia* exists only in the clear ones.² (The dark ones form an indiscriminate mass.) Now he has enumerated as *varia* of sensuous speech: sensuous ideas, their connection (*nexus*) and their sounds (*voces*).³ Where there is no unity, there is no diversity, and certainly no perfection, i.e. unity in diversity. Darkness is not poetic in itself. Unity, linkage in sensual ideas is poetic.

The objection of darkness, which Baumgarten refutes here,⁴ reveals the connection that exists between the new aesthetics and the idea of "delicatesse". The epoch of aesthetics can almost be understood as a renewed adoption of the idea of *delicatesse*. (Baumgarten is thus to Wolff as Bouhours is to Boileau.) Baumgarten also directs the gaze to something in the poem that is alien to the intellect. Bouhours insists on a certain *je ne sais quoi*, a mysterious charm in the expression, which is not achieved by the mere designation of the thing. Baumgarten defends the pictorial expression, the fullness. To describe means to distinguish, i.e. to present clearly (*distincte*); accordingly, all descriptions should be banned from poetry. Baumgarten objects to this scruple

¹ Baumgarten's emphasis is undoubtedly more on the sensual. This was the new thing he had to say. He did not need to emphasize unity, coherence and recognizability. That happened back then anyway. I have emphasized these terms more strongly in order to make clear the meaning that is almost lost to us.

² Med. § 13.

³ Med. § 6.

⁴ He has since been widely criticized by the opponents of aesthetics.

in: The description puts several B, C, D in the place of the one A. The poem can thus become more complete without thereby removing the possibility of further analysis of the A. (§55). (§55.) Fullness of expression is achieved, after all, by using several for one term.¹ Now two cases are obviously possible: the characteristics B, C, D can be added to the A - then we would have pure description. Or the features B, C, D take the place of A; then we have a metaphor. The same applies to both: they make the speech sensual, vivid, "colorful" (as H. v. Stein has excellently translated this side of "sensitive"). But an excess would confuse speech. Hence the demand for coherence, unity and recognizability.² Understanding the matter must not be made more difficult by the abundance of characteristics. This abundance has a similar function to the "mysterious I don't know what, which always gives something to guess."³ Because of this demand for sensual abundance, aesthetics has been accused of "darkness". Something similar was perhaps once also accused of "fine thought". For Eudoxe says in Bouhours (with real "delicacy"): "Yes, there must be something mysterious in a surprising idea; but one must never make a secret of one's ideas."⁴ Baumgarten struggles to express what he says in Gallic. Translated into school language, the argument would read something like this: a poem must contain many unclear (sensual) thoughts; but the

¹ Nothing else is meant by *ut pictura poesis* (cited by Baumgarten as: "poema et pictura similia" (§ 39). Poetic images unite more diverse things into one. Therefore a poem is more perfect than a picture. (§ 40.)

² Corresponds to "justesse".

³ "Dans je ne sais quoi de mysterieux qui laissait toujours quelque chose à deviner." (Bouhours. *La maniere de bien penser*. p. 282.)

⁴ "Oui, il doit y avoir un peu de mystère dans une pensée delicate; mais on ne doit jamais faire un mystère de ses pensées." (Bouhours. p. 282.) - More generally, one must always have something to guess at, but it must not be a mystery. - Incidentally, J. El. Schlegel's "dissimilarity" aims at something related. The dissimilarity to the model also brings with it a certain obscurity and delicacy.

Thought must therefore not be unclear. Meier has expressed what is at stake in this way: not the whole poem must be a confused idea; it must rather be clear "because it is an epitome of many clear and vivid sensual concepts" ... ¹ What elevates Baumgarten's theory far above that of his French predecessors is its philosophical content. Wolff's pupil brought the concept of unity with him as if of his own accord. The philosophical superiority of the German aesthetics of delicacy is based on it. In the idea of a unity in sensual abundance and colorfulness, the decisive idea of German philosophy in general is laid out: the idea of a unity other than the logical-rational one.

The main requirements of poetic speech are the most sensual description or metaphorical expression possible. This is the practical result of the meditations. Baumgarten was not saying anything new. The Swiss were thinking the same thing at the same time. What is new in Baumgarten's little treatise is the deepening of a contemporary thought into a philosophical principle. Description and metaphor are poetic because they individualize what is depicted. With this single concept, the world of thought of contemporary aesthetics and Renaissance poetics² has been overcome in principle. A new point of view, a genuinely philosophical one, is gained for the treatment of the aesthetic problem. Baumgarten was hardly aware that he was repeating the question of taste at a higher level. After all, the discovery of "taste" had thrown nothing other than the problem of individuality into the aesthetic discussion.

¹ "Considerations on the first principle of all fine arts and sciences." 1757 Among the most renowned aestheticians that Meier mentions at the beginning of his main work is Bouhours. (Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Longin, Bouhours, Boileau, Pope, König, Crousaz, Breitinger, Bodmer. Initial reasons. S. 10.)

² the offshoot of which Vossius is respectfully cited. (Med. § 9.)

"Determining the things to be depicted in the poem as much as possible is poetic. Individuals are determined on all sides; therefore individual ideas are very poetic."¹ These brief sentences do more for aesthetic theory than Bodmer's and Breitinger's verbose books of 1740, on which Baumgarten's aesthetics are usually allowed to depend in ignorance of the "Meditations". The concept of the individual not only provides a philosophical principle, not only establishes a link between logic and aesthetics ("repraesentatio singularis"), but also suffices as a general justification for the most important poetic artistic devices. From the principle that the individual is above all poetic⁽²⁾ it follows that in the poem the individual is to be preferred to the species, but the species to the genre.³ The metaphor, which almost always replaces the more concrete with the more abstract, is thus philosophically justified. Place and time are recognized as auxiliary sources for individualization.⁴ Proper names are very poetic because they denote individuals.⁵ When Baumgarten finally calls allegory very poetic, this does not arise from any "intellectualism", but expresses the healthy thought that poetry must be as concrete as possible. For him, allegory is only a context of metaphors.⁶

"To represent things as much as possible in a completely individualized way is poetic" ...⁷ It is natural that

¹ "In poemate res repraesentandas quantum pote determinari poeticum. (Med. § 18.) "Individua sunt omnimQde determinata, ergo repraesentationes singuläres sunt admodum poeticae." (ib. § 19.)

² In § 24 ff. Baumgarten reverts to rhetoric and also calls the "affectus movere poeticum". He does his utmost to incorporate this strange element into his train of thought. Thus he conceives the ideas of the good and the bad (aims of desires and abhorrences) as one more idea, as a kind of enrichment. (§ 26.) As if the idea would thus become extensively clearer if these ideas were added. The principle of fullness is thus saved.

³ "Generis inferioris et speciei repraesentationes magis poeticae, quam generis, aut generis superioris." Palma pro praemio, Lybicae areae pro terris frugiferis. (§ 20.) § 79 ff. deals with the tropics.

⁴ Med. § 32.

⁵ Med. § 89.

⁶ Med. § 85.

⁷ "res, quantum pote, determinatissimas repraesentari poeticum" ... This is followed by the reference to locus et tempus. (§ 32.)

the logical value of the example does not escape this attitude. "The example is an idea of the more individually determined to explain the idea of a less individually determined/¹ If one wants to present philosophica vel universalia poetically, one must determine them as precisely as possible by means of examples, in terms of place and time.² Baumgarten's thinking was attached to this relationship between abstract truth and aesthetic concrete case. Here the peculiarity of the new science is particularly well expressed: its kinship as well as its opposition to its older sister, logic, must become clearest where general truths are to be represented aesthetically, i.e. concretely. The basic idea of Baumgarten's entire aesthetics radiates from his theory of comparison as if from a minimizing mirror.

This theory is connected to the logic of the example through a moment that is decisive for the whole of aesthetics. The Aristotelian-rhetorical logic of induction and analogy presupposes the logic of abstraction of the concept of genus. Baumgarten's theory of individualization is therefore based on this logic. There is an "ascending" and a "descending" comparison. In the former, for example, the concept of species or genus is used instead of the individual concept;³ in the latter, vice versa: the whole is "illustrated" (point by point reversing what was said for the former) by a part, the genus (species) by a lower (per inferiora) concept contained beneath it.⁴ If it is only a

¹ "Exemplum est repraesentatio magis determinati ad declarandum repraesentationem minus determinati suppeditata." (§ 21.) In § 22 (nota) Baumgarten refers to Leibniz, from whose Theodicy he quotes the sentence: "Le but principal de la poesie doit etre d'enseigner la prudence et la vertu par des exemples."

² Med. § 58.

³ "comparatio adscendens"- femina instead of Dido. (Aesth. § 744.) ⁴ Because of this old rhetorical expression (illustrare), Baumgarten deals with the basic theory of comparison in the section "lux aesthetica", which is far behind. Understanding the "Aesthetica" has mostly failed due to the confusing disposition, which does not bring out the best ideas. The section on comparison (§ 742-779) is the most brilliant of the entire book. One senses the power of the philosopher's inner involvement.

such a concept, the comparison coincides with the example; if there are several, we obtain the aesthetic division (divisio), which can become the aesthetic induction.¹ The actual definition of the example is contained in the section on the fable (in the chapter "veritas aesthetica"). "A lower concept that makes its higher one clearer is an example."² In "Philosophia practica universalis" (Part II. 1739), Wolff dealt with the fable following the theory of the example. His theory takes no account of aesthetic meaning. Example and fable are merely means of making moral knowledge "alive".³ Nevertheless, it could easily be made aesthetically fruitful - so that Lessing could accuse Breitinger in 1759 of not having taken Wolff into account in his theory of the fable. Lessing's theory, although well Wolffian, fits in perfectly with Baumgarten's ideas. The "Treatises on the Fable" seem like an application of the principles of the

¹ Aesthetica. § 749.

² "Conceptus inferior suum superiorem, sub quo continetur, declarans, s. clariorem reddens, est exemplum." (§ 526.) Meier (Anfangsgründe, p. 108.): "An example (exemplum) is a concept which belongs under another as its kind or genus, and which is introduced in order to make the other clearer." - A "dogma practicum aesthetice cogitatum" is called sententia. Hence the definition of fable: "exemplum sententiae stricte dictum est fabula." (Aesth. § 526.)

³ Philos, pract. § 250 - § 301: example; § 302 - § 323: Fable. "Exempla dicuntur singularia sub notionibus universalibus comprehensa, quatenus iisdem universalia insunt, seu quatenus ea, quae notioni universalis insunt intuenda exhibent." (§ 250) There is no mention of a logical appreciation of the singularia. The fable makes a moral proposition even more vivid than the example (§ 317 nota), i.e. leads us to a living insight into a truth, ("si vera esse agnoscamus, quae cognoscimus, cognitio viva est." § 245.) - The correspondence of a cognition with an example brings Wolff to the idea of the "concordance of the senses and imagination with the understanding. ("Si quae in disciplinis demonstrata cognoscimus exemplis confirmantur; sensus atque imaginatio ad consensum cum intellectu reducitur." § 299.) A curious echo of the concept of the "concord of the faculties of cognition", which passed through Baumgarten to Kant.

"Aesthetica".¹ Baumgarten, like the Swiss, is only interested in illustrating clearly, vividly and impressively. Lessing means the same with the individual "fall", which brings with it a "more lively conviction". The "ascending" comparison, which moves away from the concrete, is a secondary matter.²

The rule that the "Aesthetica" follows on every page is "scholastically expressed" ("regula illa, terminis in schola receptis expressa"): In logical and scientific thought, even individuals are considered in abstracto; aesthetic thought, on the other hand, does not consider its object solely in concreto, but as individualized as is ever possible.³ As individually determined as possible (determinatissimus) - this significant expression of the *Meditations* also recurs elsewhere in the

¹ It is Wolffian when Lessing says that the fable allows us to recognize a truth by looking at it. In close connection with Wolff is also the definition: "the universal proposition is reduced by the fable to a single case" ("fabula invenitur, si Casus quidam verus veritatis cuiusdam universalis reducitur ad alium fictum, qui notionem istius veritatis cum eo communem habet"). (§ 310.) The individual case, that is Lessing's thought, must be imagined as real. Reality comes only to the individual, the individual, etc. "A particular, in so far as we recognize the universal in it by looking at it, is called an example." Suffice it to point out the connection between these thoughts and Baumgarten's problem. - Lessing seems to have known only Wolff. The allusions to "our worldly wisdom" together with his aesthetic-critical talent were enough to give his fable theory philosophical content. (Cf. A. Fischer: Critical exposition of Lessing's doctrine of the fable. Diss. Halle. 1891.)

² It is not difficult to see why Baumgarten nevertheless recognized a "comparatio adscendens". The descending and ascending movements cannot be separated. The logician could not ignore this double direction, however much the aesthetician was only interested in the descending movement. The ascending movement is the prerequisite for the descending movement. Baumgarten may have had an instinctive awareness of the functional relationship between the two movements.

³ "Si genus cogitandi logicum et scientificum objecta sua pri- maria, ne exceptis ipsis quidem individuis, ubi caetera paria sint, lubentius in abstracto considerat: pulcre cogitaturus analogo rationis suas materias praecipuas non in concreto solum, sed etiam in de- terminatissimis, in quibus potest, hinc in singularibus, suppositis, personis, factis, quoties datur, lubentissime contempletur". (Aesth. § 752).

Aesthetica again.¹ Examples which illustrate a higher genus by a lower one are good; by species, are better; by individuals are the best.² The descending comparison, with a barbarous school word (*ut barbare loquar*), is most concerned with individuality.³ The descending comparison, however, is for Baumgarten the core of all poetry. Determination is the poet's activity. The eternal task of art is thus clearly and sharply described with a logical formula.

The problem of individuality is not only the focus of consideration in the sections on comparison. It reappears in the chapter on aesthetic truth.⁴ Here it enters into a relationship with the metaphysical foundations.⁵ Baumgarten distinguishes between a formal and a material truth. The formal truth grows with richness, nobility, precision, clarity and distinctness, certainty and vividness of ideas.⁶ These are the points of view of logic. Formal truth is therefore logical truth.⁷ Metaphysical truth, on the other hand, is the order of many things in one.⁸ It is all the greater the more that comes together in one, and the stronger the rules become effective as a result,⁹ which is why metaphysical truth can also be defined as the "conformity of a thing to the most general rules".¹⁰ Now man cannot strive for formal truth without striving for material (metaphysical) truth.

¹ Aesth. § 559; § 561; § 563; § 756 and others.

² Aesth. § 756.

³ It is: "haecceitatis apprime studiosa." (§ 755.) On haecceitas cf. met. § 151.

"The aesthetic presentation of abstract truths ("genus cognitandi generalia sed eleganter exprimens") - aesthetico-dogmaticus is what Baumgarten calls the procedure (§ 566) - is a key issue here.

⁵ In § 440 the aesthetic categories (as we would say today) truth, wealth (*ubertas*), nobility (*magnitudo*) are subordinated to the general principle of individualization insofar as they are all in the council of the Determination Convention.

⁶ Aesth. § 556.

⁷ Aesth. § 423.

⁸ Met. § 89.

⁸ "Quo ergo plura in ente, quo maiora, secundum quo plures, quo fortiores regulas coniuncta sunt, hoc maior est in illo veritas... (Met. § 184.)

⁹ Aesth. § 423.

and vice versa.¹ You can only form a sphere from a block of marble by losing a lot of material.² The loss of material perfection is at the same time a loss of metaphysical truth. Baumgarten describes in detail what is lost through abstraction.³ To lose as little as possible of material perfection must, however, be the artist's concern.⁴ It is no coincidence that in this context Baumgarten gives a complete outline of his aesthetics in the form of a standardization of the artistic process.⁵ Like abstracting, determining is also an activity of the mind. Baumgarten's aesthetics must therefore have an active, more artistic than "aesthetic" character.

The expression "venusta plenitudo", in which Baumgarten once summarized his tendency with his own distinctive power,⁶ could be translated as follows: Individuality, presented in all its fullness, is beautiful. Baumgarten's aesthetics should be characterized by this formula, not by the easily misunderstood definition with which his main work begins ("Aesthetica ... est scientia cognitionis sensitivae" -).

"Aesthetics" has been accused of nothing more often than intellectualizing beauty. No accusation is more unfair. Only the shell is rationalistic. Kern is the first and deepest protest against abstract rationalism that has been raised on a rationalist basis in the history of philosophy (Leibniz excepted). It only sounds

¹ "Hinc humanum veritatis Studium nunc formalem potissimum intendit, quod fieri non potest sine dispendio materialis, nunc materialem potissimum amplectitur, neque potest idem, nisi cum de- trimento formalis." (Aesth. § 558.) Cf. above p. 227 note 4.

² Aesth. § 560.

³ Aesth. § 559.

⁴ Aesth. § 565.

⁶ "Sumat itaque pulcre cogitaturus sibi materiam vel determinatiorem, unam ex generibus inferioribus aut omnino speciebus rerum, vel si altius videatur in genera superiora adscendere, teneatur tamen eadem vestire multis, quos omittit purior scientia, notis et characteribus, vel tandem singularia sibi legit themata, in quibus regnet perfectio veritatis materialis." Etc. (Aesth. § 565.)

⁸ Aesth. § 585.

rationalistic when Baumgarten says "the beautiful thinker" for the artist, when he uses "concepts" instead of ideas. But: the artistic formation of concepts (the connection of ideas, the creation of objects) as a reversal of the logical - is that not intellectualism? - Not at all. How could Baumgarten have expressed the bold idea of individualizing object formation in any other way than by following the logical method? Incidentally, he did everything he could to avoid mixing the aesthetic with the logical. Many objects are common to the logical and the aesthetic "horizon". Through "lively and beautiful thinking" (i.e. through aesthetic representation) can everything be included in the aesthetic horizon? Logical truth and aesthetic truth are different. Logical truth is not directly pursued by the "aestheticus". If it coincides with aesthetic truth, so much the better. It is not to be sought.² Aesthetic truth is therefore autonomous, not dependent on intellectual truth. In addition to philosophical and mathematical truth, historical, rhetorical and poetic truth is of a "different kind".³ "Aesthetic truth... i.e. the truth insofar as it can be recognized by the senses." ("quatenus sensitive cognoscenda est.")⁴ Aesthetic truth is therefore that which is understood as true by the senses or the imagination.⁵ The

¹ Aesth. § 119; § 123.

² "Hoc unum observamus, veritatem ab aesthetico, quatenus in* tellectualis est, non directo intendi, si per indirectum ex veritatibus aestheticis pluribus una prodeat, aut cum aestheticē vero coincidat, de illo sibi gratulari aestheticum rationalem, neque tarnen illud esse, quod nunc potissimum quaerebatur." (Aesth. § 428.)

³ "Est sua philosophis, est mathematicis soliditas, sed est etiam, aliis quidem generis, sicuti veritas proponenda, historicis, oratoribus, poetis ... certitudo ..." (Aesth. § 842.)

⁴ Aesth. § 423.

⁵ "Strictissime verorum eatenus est veritas aesthetica, quatenus ea sensitive percipiuntur vera, sensationibus vel imaginationibus... (§ 444.) This proposition is explained by Meier by the example of the setting sun, taken from Bodmer's treatise on the marvelous (also in Breitinger, Kritische Dichtkunst. I, p. 301). (Anfangsgründe. I, p. 188.) That the sun sets behind the

analogon rationis, not ratio, is the point of origin of aesthetic truth.¹ The significance of this concept for Baumgarten's aesthetics has never been appreciated, even though the first definition of the main work equates the *ars pulcre cogitandi* with an *ars analogi rationis*.² The analogon rationis expresses a peculiar middle position of beauty. Through the analogon rationis the beautiful is close to the senses;³ we do not proceed by means of it to the first causes, but remain stuck with the appearing effects ("effectis phaenomenis").⁴ It is the analogon rationis that makes the conception in determinatissimis possible.⁵ On the other hand, it establishes a connection (nexus) between things insofar as they are recognizable by the senses.⁶ It constitutes the "aesthetic horizon".⁷ This connection brings the sensual but beautiful appearance closer to reason, whose essence is the connection of truths. Beauty is an analogon rationis (the word is not from Baumgarten, but in his sense), meaning: a sequence of sensual ideas is beautiful when it shows a connection similar to reason, when it reveals a certain unity. We have already seen the *cog-noscere* emerge in the first definition. In the *Aesthetica*, the

falling down a mountain is "metaphysically" untrue, but in common speech it is not a mistake, says Bodmer. (p. 48.) The example has passed through Meier to Kant. (See the collegiate transcripts in Schlapp, *Kants Lehre vom Genie*, p. 101.): "That the sun dives into the ocean is true according to the laws of sensibility and appearance, but not logically, not objectively." (Cf. ib. p. 227 f.)

¹ Aesth. § 424.

² "Aesthetica (theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, *ars pulcre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis*) est scientia cognitionis sensi-tivae." (Aesth. § 1.)

³ "sensibus et analogo rationis" is a frequent phrase. (Aesth. § 426; § 431; § 470 and others).

⁴ Aesth. § 588.

⁵ Aesth. § 752.

⁸ "Veritas aesthetica requirit obiectorum pulcre cogitandorum nexum cum rationibus et rationatis quatenus ille sensitive cognos* cendus est per analogon rationis." (Aesth. § 437.)

⁷ Aesth. § 119.

Truth the speech "quatenus sensitive cognoscenda est". In other words: insofar as a connection can be found in sensory phenomena? Baumgarten goes on to speak of unity insofar as it appears to the senses ("unitas, quatenus phaenomenon sit") and explains that aesthetic truth demands unity in the ideas insofar as they can be grasped by the senses? The expression of the famous § 14 is just another way of expressing unity, insofar as it can be grasped by the senses: beauty is "perfectio cognitionis sensitivae". The cognition points to unity; the sensivus to fullness (diversity, material richness), and the perfectio means nothing but the intensification of both? The expression has an active sense; it points to the higher degree of sensory cognition, in short, to perfection. Perfection of sensory cognition as such - this does not mean a rationalistic-metaphysical theory, but simply: sensory cognition possesses its own perfection. The ideas of the imagination and the senses are capable of their own coherence, their own unity. This explanation is a generalization of the definition of the poem in the *Meditations*. How many who smiled at the "rationalist" Baumgarten have given far more intellectualistic definitions of beauty than this explanation, which is perceived from the soul of art!⁴

¹ Aesth. § 423.

² "Hinc et veritas aesthetica utramque poscit unitatem (sc. absorptionem et hypotheticam) in cogitandis suis, quatenus sensitive deprehendi potest" ... (§ 439) cf. § 18: "Pulcritudo cognitionis sensitivae erit universalis consensus cogitationum, quatenus adhuc ab earum ordine et signis abstrahimus, inter se ad unum, qui phaenomenon sit." Schiller's explanation of beauty as the "analogy of an object with the form of examining reason" (An Körner 8. II. 1793. Jonas. III, p. 245) and as "freedom in appearance" repeats in Kantian formulas this thought of Baumgarten (whom Schiller did not know; Baumgarten was as important to him as Mendelssohn).

³ "Aesthetica finis est perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis. Haec autem est pulcritudo." (§ 14.) - The expressive "qua talis" was first pointed out by Danzel (Gottsched und seine Zeit. 2nd ed. 1855. p. 219).

⁴ I have only found a trace of Baumgarten's genuine explanation of beauty in Eberhard. (Meier is completely lost in the

The factual and historical significance of Baumgarten's theory of beauty is due in no small part to its non-psychological character. It is an aesthetics of the more objective work, not an aesthetics of effect. This makes the *Aesthetica* the successor to Gottsched's critical poetry, and not to the writings of the Swiss.¹ The Swiss had always been more critics than poeticians. This contributed to their great success in the "critical century". But it had its disadvantages in the way Bodmer and Breitinger practiced criticism. The rhetoric, in which the structure of the work is lost in the attention to the effect on the listener, was its danger. The effect is something external and leads from the intrinsic value of the beautiful object into more distant, psychological realms. When Gottsched reproached Breitinger's critical poetry for not teaching us how to write an ode and therefore warned us against buying it, we find it just as ridiculous today as Lessing did then. But even this statement is only the expression of a deeper contrast, in which Gottsched in any case does not determine the weaker definition of "Metaphysica"). Joh. Aug. Eberhard, the dogmatic owl in the daylight of critical philosophy, peacefully united the opposing doctrines of beauty like a painter unites colors on a palette. The Cartesian source gushes forth when he says: "the perfection of a work cannot give us pleasure in any other way than by looking at our perfection". (*Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften*. 3rd ed. 1790. p. 12.) This is consistently followed by the doctrine of "liveliness" (Meier): the noblest perfection of a beautiful work is its power to arouse passions. (p. 85.) Alongside this subjectivist explanation, Eberhard calmly leaves the other, according to which the sensual conception of perfection is the highest law of all fine arts. (p. 7.) Finally, there is also the actual Baumgartenian explanation: "The essence of the fine arts and sciences is the artificial sensual-perfect imagination." (p. 7, cf. p. 10 "sensually imagined harmonization of the parts into a whole"). Eberhard's psychology provides a key to this rarities cabinet of definitions. Our feeling of perfection grows the more diversity is set in the object, because this simultaneously increases the activity of the soul. The difference between subjectivist and objectivist explanations is thus abolished. Baumgarten's actual definition cannot, of course, be dissolved into this psychology.

¹ In this respect, she also became a successor to Renaissance poetics.

¹ Gottsched's objective intention was based on something higher, even if the Swiss were able to achieve more with their confused psychology. Baumgarten's work shows what the Gottschedian "sect" had ahead of it: a focus on the aesthetic object. According to its general tendency, the "Aesthetica" belongs to Gottsched's circle, not to that of the Swiss; with its deeper content, it is equally close or distant to both parties.

The definition of beauty as appearing perfection (*perfectio phaenomenon*) was metaphysically objective. Its metaphysical objectivism is the prerequisite for the logical objectivism of the definition of "Aesthetica". For "*perfectio cognitionis sensi- tivae*" means a direction, a path. The path of determination that leads to the individual, i.e. the path to the aesthetic object. This object is conceived from within, not from the outside, from the effect. And at the same time, the way to reach it is shown. For Baumgarten, aesthetics is neither a mere objective theory of form, nor a dissection of mental processes, nor a metaphysics of beauty, but something new: a philosophical discipline of the aesthetic object in general. After all, it was a bold move to place aesthetics so close to the most respected and oldest philosophical discipline, logic. Baumgarten was a quiet revolutionary. It is an omission that he has not yet been given the place he deserves: next to Lessing. Of course, aesthetics should also be a theory of beautiful thinking insofar as it teaches us to think beautifully.² But the functional meaning of *perfectio* (perfection) is not exhausted in this sense. The

¹ Goethe praised Gottsched's critical poetry in exactly the same way that its author did in his much ridiculed attack on the Swiss competition. "Historical knowledge" of the types of poetry and the movements of rhythm, he said. In other words, the objective. Breitinger's work is a "tedious maze" for Goethe. (Goethe. Poetry and Truth. Book 7.)

² Hence *ars*. Cf. Aesth. § 10.

Logic is called an "art"¹ Although it simultaneously "improves" the upper cognitive faculty, it is also a theory - a theory of the logical function, i.e. the acquisition of concepts. Thus the "Aesthetica" is also a theory of the aesthetic function, the acquisition of aesthetic concepts, i.e. the setting of aesthetic objects. However, Baumgarten recognized the meaning of this function in the tendency towards individualization. The determinacy of poetic ideas corresponds to a determining conceptualization that accumulates "characteristics". This theory undoubtedly emerged from poetics: Words, concepts are, after all, the material of poetry. Baumgarten was reproached early on for having given only a poetics and rhetoric, but not an aesthetics.² But if we apply H. v. Stein's principle as a yardstick - a principle is aesthetic if it can be applied to more than one art³ - who doubts that the principle discovered by Baumgarten is a genuinely aesthetic one? The "unity" of sensual ideas is different in every art. But every work of art exhibits unity, individuality, wholeness. This is a condition of its essence. Justifying aesthetics and establishing aesthetic principles are not the same thing. Baumgarten only described aesthetic principles (apart from the general section on "light" and "shadow", for example) for the art of poetry. But his basic principle is general and valid for all art. And the justifying force of this principle lies in its relationship to the fundamental question of all philosophy, the question of the object.

Baumgarten had two major ideas. Firstly: the aesthetic object is individual (like "taste"). This means that the task of science, which is distinct from (generalizing) science

Wgl. the definition of logic. "Logica (dialectica, ars rationis, analytica, sensus veri et falsi, medicina mentis, organon) artificalis est philosophia cognitionis intellectualis perficiendae." (Baumgarten, *Acroasis Logica*. 1761. § 9.)

² Mendelssohn, *Bibl. der schönen Wissenschaften*. 1758. HI P. 133.

³ The emergence of modern aesthetics. p. 60 f.

Art clearly recognized, a major problem. Secondly, in the solution to his problem Baumgarten indicated the only way in which it is possible: in a way analogous to science. The aesthetic object, we can make this thought clear, is not a scientific object; but it is an object nonetheless. It is not left to the subject's discretion, but is to be determined in a way analogous to reason. - Both together: the aesthetic object unites individuality with legality. This is what the formula means: Beauty is the perfection of sensual cognition.

The splendor of the early days lies on Baumgarten's aesthetics. It is the same brilliance that rests on Lessing's and Winckelmann's first works. The floating quality of his famous definition is an advantage, not a flaw. Its germinal quality is its charm. It has been tried in vain to determine whether it is meant "subjectively" or "objectively".¹ Baumgarten does not recognize this contradiction. The definition is both at the same time. The dogmatic theory of knowledge is its precondition. However, the emphasis on sensuality already indicated the way in which this epistemology was overcome, and at the end of which the fundamental problem of "aesthetica" was taken up again with more mature means and its solution was found.

¹H. v. Stein, p. 358; Bergmann, die Begründung d. d. Aesth. p. 150. Poppe: A. G. Baumgarten. 1907. p. 46. The definition is subjective, because Baumgarten defines by cognition, not by properties of the object. But this cognition grasps an object. The definition is therefore also objective. Cf. Herder's two-page sentence: "Sensual beauty never lies in our judgment alone, but partly in the object, partly in our judgment..." (Werke, Suphan. 8, p. 108.) It is, as it were, Baumgarten's epistemological double meaning translated into the psychological).

Chapter 5: The general and the particular

The opposition of reason and sensation, rule and emotional judgment was the problem of "criticism". The aesthetic theory of the 18th century was unable to find a way out of this. In contrast, the problem found a surprisingly clear and sharp formulation in the logical sphere. This dissolution of the problem of taste into the logical, into the question of the relationship between the general and the particular, opened up a new way to solve the aesthetic problem as well. The new formulation not only detached the opposition from the practical problem of criticism, but also had the advantage of replacing the psychological-metaphysical opposition (sensation - reason) with a logical one (particular - general). The former threatened to freeze into a dead dogmatism; the latter stimulated further thought and a solution by bringing the poles into a living relationship instead of merely juxtaposing them.

Joh. Ulr. König's opposition of a general and a particular good taste¹ says nothing about this relationship. Breitinger's insight that good taste cannot be taught and presented by rules that constitute a complete system of art, because its judgments refer to particular places that must be judged according to particular intentions and the nature of particular things,² remains an occasional apercu without further consequences. In Meier's juxtaposition of the "individual judgments of taste" and the "correctness of taste in general"³ one might rather find a hint of the problem of the general and the particular on aesthetic ground. But this passage is also isolated and therefore without weight. The impetus for solving

¹ See above p. 70.

² Breitinger, Kritische Dichtkunst. 1740. I, P. 430.

³ See p. 100 above.

The solution came from another side. It has already been noted that around the middle of the century the spell that Wolff's abstracting, disregard for the particular had cast over German philosophy began to lift. The first thinker of the particular, Baumgarten, was followed, in part independently of him, by Lessing, Reimarus, Herder, Lambert, Tetens - all better Leibnizians than Wolffians, and in this respect not to be confused with the Enlightenment thinkers, as Wolff's school in the narrower sense. After Baumgarten, Reimarus must be mentioned first as a representative thinker of this new mood towards the particular. Already in the "Vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion" (1754), published four years after the first volume of the "Aesthetica", that love of the individual and the most individual is evident which makes the "Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Tiere" (General Observations on Animal Instincts), which followed eight years later, so attractive. Reimarus shows more clearly than Baumgarten to whom the reaction against the abstracting Wolffianism can be traced back. The move towards the organism is genuinely Leibnizian. Reimarus' thinking revolves around the concept of life. Baumgarten grasps the problem of the individual logically; Reimarus in concrete vitality. His eye rests on the diversity of the animal kingdom. That concept ("manifoldness"), which emerged so strongly in Leibniz's metaphysics and had received a final logical formulation in Baumgarten's "extensive clarity", only now really comes to life.¹ With astonishing empathy, love and patience, Reimarus immerses himself in the drives, movements and pleasures of the individual living being.² The "determinatissimus" becomes immediately vivid. Thus, with a delay of more than a generation, what Brockes and Haller had striven for in poetry has penetrated into philosophy.

¹ Meier also shows traits of the new age, which could easily be combined with his sensualism. H. v. Stein not unjustly contrasts the Cartesian: "la nature agit en tout mathématiquement" with Meier's sentence: "nature loves diversity and variety in all her works". (Entst. d. neueren Ästh. p. 363.) This attitude is, of course, in sharp contrast to Meier's Wolffianism.

² Also already in the "Wahrheiten der nat. Rei." p. 587 f.

Baumgarten's and Reimarus' continuator is Herder. His love of individuality, the deep foundation of his view of history, has an organic coloring in common with Reimarus'. He shares a love of aesthetic individuality with Baumgarten. It is clear from Kant's superior review of Herder's main work on the philosophy of history that he, who was a student of Baumgarten and Reimarus, did not have much new to say. The focus on the individual is older than Herder, even if the latter gave it the most attractive form (Kant the most profound).

Meier's example already showed that popular philosophy would not escape the new mood. One of the most tasteful Enlightenment philosophers, the fine stylist Garve, played off the real world against the imaginary ("a poor enclosure") because the latter was richer and more individual. It is the "individual natures" that matter, he says, the human being. "The individual, the particular, is in and of itself, if all else is equal, always more interesting than the general."¹ With the Enlightenment philosophers, however, this is merely a yielding to the increasingly powerful mood of the times, to which they respond because the sensualist elements of their philosophy allow it. Unlike Baumgarten, Reimarus, Lessing and Herder, theirs is not a victory of Leibniz over Wolff. Rather, one must marvel at how strongly Mendelssohn and Eberhard, despite Locke and Leibniz, remain under the spell of the Wolff-Meier tradition. All the more surprising is the treatise on "genius" published in 1760 by a man otherwise far removed from philosophy (Resewitz). Resewitz (he was a theologian) is the only independent student Baumgarten had. (Herder and Kant can only be called Baumgarten's pupils in a broader sense). Resewitz resolutely takes up the problem where a further development of Baumgarten's ideas was in fact most necessary: in the relationship between the general and the particular. The "Kritik der Urteilskraft" (Critique of the Power of Judgement) has solved this royal problem of philosophy in the opposition of a discursive and an intuitive understanding.

¹ Ch. Garve: Sammlung einiger Abhandlungen. 1779. p. 279 f.; 303.

The concept of genius was elevated to its historically purest formulation. Resewitz's concept of genius anticipates Kant's concept of intuitive understanding phenomenologically, so to speak (not according to its epistemological meaning, of course).

According to Resewitz, having genius means possessing visual knowledge of things.¹ This kind of knowledge is easy in mathematics, because this science presents the truths "in concreto and in individual cases". It is difficult in metaphysics, where we have to do not with the things themselves, but with arbitrary signs.⁽²⁾ Resewitz calls a knowledge that presents the thing itself to us "by means of which we see it in concreto, with its effects, contingencies and changes that tend to arise in it from its relationship with others".³ Thus, visual is not the indistinct knowledge obtained through the senses or through immediate self-consciousness, but the knowledge of a thing in concreto or in individuo. This cognition includes above all the insight into the contingencies of appearance.⁴ For singular cognition, or the cognition

¹ Collection of mixed writings for the advancement of the fine sciences and liberal arts. Volume 3, 1st part. Berlin 1760: "Versuch über das Genie." II. and III. section. S. 9.

⁽²⁾ ib. p. 7 f. It is the same contradiction as in Kant's *Preisschrift* (written in 1762) I, § 2. - The criticism that Wolff made of Tschirnhausen already contains a hint of the problem at hand. Wolff reproaches Tschirnhausen with the fact that according to his method (the genetic definition) one will not find "explanations of the matter" (this is Wolff's translation of the term "genetic definition") except in geometry. (Explanatory note, § 62.) - The objection is apt. Tschirnhausen wants to explain natural phenomena; but his theory of knowledge is only abstracted from mathematics. What I produce, I control. The mathematician also has the most individual aspects of his construction in his hands. But not the natural philosopher, because he does not construct nature in the same way as the geometer constructs his figures.

⁽³⁾ ib. p. 8. Cf. p. 38.

◆ He who thinks in abstracto, says Resewitz, imagines only the general concept of the thing; but he who thinks in concreto, sees it in certain relations, turns, and individual contingencies, in which another does not just as well see it. (S. 28.)

Knowledge of the individual¹ is thus a knowledge of the accidental.² Meier once understood Baumgarten well when he wrote: "The aesthetic richness of a thing rests primarily on its accidental qualities and relationships/³ Knowledge in concreto, knowledge of a thing with all its accidents, means, however, the abolition of all accidents as such. For what I have recognized as a contingency is thereby placed in a context and is therefore no longer contingent. The mathematical view does not know chance, because it already designs its objects in determinatissimis. The "contemplative cognition" that Resewitz ascribes to genius incorporates the accidental into the object, analogous to mathematics.⁴

The difference that exists between these two "admissions" of the individual into knowledge is, of course, a problem that goes beyond Resewitz's horizon.

Resewitz's description of visual cognition is genuinely Baumgartenian. The mind must always return from the contemplation of individual images to separation (abstraction). But each time it can "turn around" and survey the manifold series of images presented to it by the senses and imagination with an inquiring gaze. This reversed direction of vision (to the individual and the particular instead of the general) is now a kind of "contemplative" cognition, for as long as the intellect "rests, as it were, above this view", it recognizes the particular and the general at the same time, the particular in the general (like the mathematician).⁵ The contemplative

¹ "Veritas individui seu singularis, aestheticologica est perceptio maxima, qua genus, veritatis metaphysicae." (Aesthetica. § 441.)

² "Veritas singularis vel est internorum entis optimi maximi, vel absolute contingentium." (Aesth. § 441.)

³ Initial grounds. § 51.

⁴ If the author has "looked at the object according to its individuality and according to the individuality of its object", he has recognized it by looking at it. The opposite is the case when one describes the raging of the sea from books "and not from its individual sight". (p. 56.) This contrast between "books" and "individual sight" is entirely Herderian. "Full of things, not words" is the mood of the young Herder.

⁵ Bis "rests" in close connection with Resewitz. (ib. p. 43.)

Knowledge now is the divine.¹ The perception of genius is therefore - Resewitz does not say it, but it is written between the lines - an analog of the divine. The separation is a "silent confession of the weakness of our natural powers, that we are not able to overlook an image in its entirety".² But because we can only ever overlook parts and can never arrive at a complete induction, i.e. a complete knowledge of the individual in general, should we no longer make any induction at all? No, concludes Resewitz (positively like Baumgarten, not negatively like Meier): the richer the view, the induction, the closer one approaches the view of the general in all individual cases.³ Induction experiences - and this is only the logical consequence of Baumgarten's entire undertaking - the highest transfiguration. We should learn to realize that induction, however imperfect it must always remain in man, makes our understanding similar to the highest understanding of God.⁴

Such an evaluation of induction could not remain without contradiction at the time. In Resewitz's treatise, a certain mistrust of abstraction and the school made itself felt, despite careful caution. (The same, coarsened, can then be found in Herder.) It was Mendelssohn who once again rescued the school's point of view. He could not grasp the idea that ever more complete induction would bring our knowledge closer to divine knowledge. The most complete induction, he says, cannot make us do without separation. "We can distinguish nothing without the help of separation, and thus learn nothing from an induction, however complete it may be."⁵ Resewitz had

⁽¹⁾ ib. p. 40 "Who has a greater understanding? He who clearly grasps a general truth, or he who sees it just as clearly in a thousand connections, in a thousand different individuis, and sees it as it were vivid and effective?" - "Vivid and effective" will probably have originated from Baumgarten's "vividus".

² p. 43. Resewitz does not yet have the word "discursive mind". It is paraphrased in these words.

⁽³⁾ ib. S. 44.

* ib. S. 45.

⁵ Letters concerning the latest literature. (208th to 216th letter.) Ges. Schriften IV, 2, p. 346.

emphasized the "downward direction" too strongly. The necessary relationship between abstraction and induction was not emphasized clearly enough. Mendelssohn corrects this error; but he immediately shoots out into the metaphysical again when he continues: the necessity of abstraction proves that we are "dust". As justified as his objection is from a logical point of view, it becomes worthless for epistemology if it only serves to belittle our intellect in comparison to the divine one.

The logical motive behind Mendelssohn's objection emerges clearly in Reimarus. Without abstraction, without concepts - this is Mendelssohn's thought apart from his metaphysics - all induction and observation are of no use to us; for we can distinguish nothing, determine nothing. ("Views without concepts are blind", said Kant later.) Even the most complete induction without the concept would only be a meaningless heap of facts from which we learn nothing. There is therefore a functional connection between the general and the particular, the "concept" and induction. The dubious nature of the abstraction method is not hidden from Reimarus. The method of abstraction is "not the best"; the omission is only an "invention, which we humans, according to our way of thinking, need". It can - and now comes a surprising twist - "discover something essential, but not the essence itself".¹ The surprise lies in the fact that Reimarus, for all his love of the individual, does not overlook the functional value of abstraction. It discovers something essential; of course, the essence itself, i.e. the individual, remains outside its direct achievement. However, he has clearly stated that knowledge of the individual is not possible without abstraction. Sensation is not yet a concept of the thing, he says.² Clear and distinct impressions in healthy and sensual tools are not enough. Rather, we only have concepts of individual things when we have grasped the general

¹ Shoots of animals. § 165.

² Instincts of animals. §122. p. 267 ff.

have recognized the similarity and difference of things through separate comparison. Where this ability of separation is lacking, there is also no concept of an individual thing. In short: "if one makes a judgment of an individual thing, this cannot be done without having separate general concepts". This prudent evaluation of abstraction, equally far removed from underestimation and overestimation, is only possible for a thinker who combines a love of sensory diversity and individuality with a clear insight into the inadequacy of all epistemological sensualism.

Lambert approaches the problem of the general and the particular from completely different premises, but with a similar tendency. The mathematician easily sees through the shortcomings of merely abstract conceptualization. In everything that is called method, says Lambert, mathematicians set a good example to philosophers. They do not generalize in such a way that they leave out everything in abstraction, but rather add more circumstances. This makes their general formulas look so much more composite.¹ In mathematics, one does not abstract from all circumstances and quantities, but includes them in the calculation. One does not lose sight of the indeterminate in the concepts and can therefore determine it each time as required and as desired.² In philosophical abstraction, on the other hand, the more general one makes the more specialized concepts are omitted. For the philosopher, therefore, abstraction is very easy; for the mathematician, generalization costs much effort and care. For the philosopher, however, "determining the special from the general is all the more difficult". For it is no longer possible to find the omitted "special".⁵ Even if the concepts of species and genera were made "more extensive and more complete", they would always be "more general".

¹ Architektonik. I, § 193 - Cf. above p. 107 the juxtaposition of geometry and aesthetics in Winckelmann.

² New Organon. Dianoiology. § 110.

³ Architectonics. I, § 194. The "way back" via the example is an exception.

nor from the "mathematical general concepts and formulae", since the more general they become, the more cases they extend to (i.e. contain within themselves).¹ - Lambert has thought a great deal about this difference between mathematics and ontology, without coming to a decision. For the sentence: "The ordinary way of dividing concepts into species and genera is therefore very inadequate. But because it is set up according to our way of conceiving things, we can stick to it" is not enough. Nevertheless, abstraction is evaluated positively: it serves to "bring our concepts into order"; but we must not regard it as the only, necessary, essential way of forming concepts⁽²⁾.

Lambert insists on the concrete just as much as Reimarus and is just as clearly aware of the necessity of a logical means for its determination. But the problem is sharpened for him insofar as he, who is used to the mathematical determinacy of the relationship between the general and the particular, is not satisfied with the general reference to the necessity of abstraction. There is still something missing in this thought. There is a lack of a firm ground for the "ontological" formation of concepts in general. Only when this ground is there can the relationship of the philosophical general to the particular be determined. Perhaps nowhere did Lambert come as close to Kant as in his thoughts on the relationship between the general and the particular: for nowhere is the need for a reform of logic clearer than when reading the thoughts cited from his two main philosophical works.

In the period between Lambert's new Organon and Tetens' main writings, Kant's incisive criticism of Wolff's theory of concepts appears in his dissertation of 1770. Since we will consider this criticism in the context of Kant's thoughts, I will immediately turn to Tetens, whose contribution

¹ Architectonics. I. § 196.

² Log. and philos. Abhandl. I. p. 75 f.; 200 f.

on the problem is not as fundamental as Lambert's, but still deserves attention.

From the perceived similarity of the ideas of individual things, "sensual abstracts, general images" emerge. Reflection turns them into "deduced general concepts". Most of the general concepts are of this kind.¹ The second kind are the "self-made concepts",² or the "self-conceived general ideas".³ The "geometrical notions" also belong to them.⁴ Tetens now asks, with exact reference to Lambert⁽⁵⁾ on what our good confidence in the general concepts or the "general notions" is based. There is no answer; presumably because Tetens did not know one. (For the reference to the "formative power of poetry", which produces many "metaphysical notions" or "general concepts of the understanding", is no answer.)⁶ The criticism which Tetens makes of the traditional doctrine of distinct and indistinct ideas⁷ is directed more against the form of expression than against the matter. He does see the difference between these ideas and those of ideal extension, which we can modify into arbitrary figures (because we have the idea of extension "in our power")⁸ - but his logical interest is too weak to follow these traces. The contrast between the "separation and drawing out of ideas" (i.e. the formation of concepts through abstraction and attention) and the "completely different" "thought of relation", the "ability to think relations", to which Tetens refers the

¹ On the speculat. Philos. S. 66.

² Wolff's terms through "arbitraria compositio".

³ Vg! Meier's concepts of genre generated by the "power to write poetry".
(Met. § 587.)

* Spec. Philos. 67 f. Philos. Vers. I. 132.

⁵ Spec. Philos. 70 f. Comparison of "Geometer" and "Philosopher".

⁶ Philos. Vers. I. 135.

⁷ Philos. Vers. I. 101 ff. To clarify is to argue, to develop, not always to "make bright". (Vg!. above p. 202¹.)

⁸ Philos. Vers. I. 135.

form of thought,¹ is a mere fancy. Despite these distinctions, Tetens sticks to Wolff's theory of concepts.² One finally recognizes the influence of Baumgarten's version of the concept of reflection in the remarkable passage where he contrasts "raisonnement cognition" with cognition "without a noticeable development of concepts". Raisonnement cognition provides only "one-sided views"; cognition without raisonnement unites them "constantly with the contemplation of the whole object."³ Like Resewitz, Tetens here paraphrases the concept of discursive understanding, which runs from detail to detail without ever grasping the whole. The mind divides and separates. In the clear imagination, however, everything is still together. It floats as a whole, undivided, in the soul. In this reference to "cognition" without a noticeable "development of concepts", the same evaluation of perception is expressed as in Resewitz's treatise on genius. The contemplation of the whole imposes itself as a separate form of perception alongside the discursive form of understanding. The dark, sensual cognition, still regarded as inferior before Baumgarten, becomes the measure of the performance of the intellect. Its form (Anschauung) is played off against the discursive form of the intellect. Tetens was as unable to fully appreciate Kant's dissertation as Lambert. The problem we have pursued here shows that he has penetrated, if only occasionally, to the gateway of critical philosophy.

The value of the view of the whole could never have been played off so quickly against the one-sided intellectual view if this kind of knowledge had not always already been imagined in the concept of the divine mind. Wolff had emphatically repeated the ancient idea in his *Theologia naturalis* (1.1736). "God recognizes everything by looking at it."⁴ The main

¹ *Philos. Vers. I.* 290 ff; 336.

² *Philos. Vers. I.* 299 f; 340 f.

³ *Philos. Vers. I.* 526. According to Baumgarten, reflection (or comparison) is a comparison of the parts with each other and with the whole. (Cf. above p. 139f.)

⁴ Wolff, *Theol. nat.* "Deus omnia intuitive cognoscit." (I. § 207; cf. § 269.)

The characteristic of contemplative cognition is simultaneity. "Divine perception is the clear and simultaneous representation of all the possible singularities and universals."¹ Divine perception, as different as it may otherwise be (it is "clear"), has one thing in common with sensory perception: it is not *discursiva*.² In it everything is together, just as in confused perception the characteristics (parts) are still all together. This analogy with divine perception threatens to dangerously degrade intellectual knowledge (as "one-sided", limited, arbitrary). Kant's dissertation provides a decision here that does justice to the new idea as well as to the old, rational evaluation of understanding.

¹ Theol. nat. II. § 115 Cf. Meier's Metaphys. IV. The natural divine mind. § The divine mind does not reflect on any matter, nor does it ponder it as we do, "but with an eternal, unchanging gaze, it looks through and sees through all possible things, in such a way that it recognizes all the characteristics, parts, and determinations of all possible things at once with the greatest clarity . . ."

² She has no need to search and discover "by and by," says Meier. (Met. IV. § 893.)

Chapter 6: The individual whole

The problem of the discursive mind, to which the question of the relationship between the particular and the general ultimately leads back, is the flip side of the problem of undivided perception, which grasps the general and the particular at once. The questions of complete induction, of generalization without loss of the particular, of the contemplative and simultaneous cognition of that which "our" limited understanding is only able to grasp successively, piecemeal, converge in a cardinal problem. The concept of the simultaneously conceived whole now has the greatest significance for the aesthetic problem. We are thus led back in an unexpected way to the center of Baumgarten's logic of sensuality. The "aesthetic" logic could be called a logical theory of example. Aristotle already explained that syllogism is based on the relation of the whole to the part.¹ The principle from which deductive inference is made would therefore be the relation of the whole to the part, that of inductive inference the relation of the part to the whole.² In the analogical inference (of the example), Aristotle already noted, the relation of the part to the part occurs under a whole that concerns it. This view, of course, presupposes the logic and metaphysics of the generic concept; but it is precisely the ground on which the development of the thoughts to be pursued here takes place.⁴ The analogous cases stand under a general concept (the whole) that deals with them as sub-concepts (parts) of equal rank. This juxtaposition expresses something that neither the deductive nor the inductive

¹ An. pr. I. 41.

² cf. H. Maier, *Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles*. II, 2. 1900. p. 154: 160 f.

³ An. pr. II, 24. cf. Rhet. I. 2, 19.

⁴ To equate *divisio* with *partitio*, and *species* = *pars* is rhetorical usage. (K. Prantl, *Gesch. d. Log.* I. 1855. p. 689.) Cf. Cicero, *de or.* I, 42; *de inv.* I, 22.

syllogism: a freer relationship emerges, a more liberal one, as it were, alongside that of subordination (to the common comprehensive whole): the relationship of coordination. It is, so to speak, already an aesthetic moment in the analogy. This emerges very well in Trendelenburg's description (which is not at all concerned with this). "The double movement from the similar individual to the general, and again from the general to the present individual, gives a peculiar satisfaction to the mind, which does not pursue a one-sided direction in it, but completes a whole, which is still increased by the automatic production of the general and by the accompanying contemplation of the similar case."¹ This "peculiar satisfaction" has something of the character of aesthetic pleasure in itself. But there is also a relationship to the aesthetic. The completion of the whole, which Trendelenburg emphasizes, is an outstandingly aesthetic act. Nowhere does the concept of the whole play a greater role than in art. No wonder - it is basically identical with individuality. Where there is individual wholeness, there is an artistic spirit. The fine Shaftesbury could not do without the concept of the whole; even with the greatest aesthetic genius of the 18th century, Winckelmann, this concept necessarily arises where there is talk of the ideal. "This choice of the most beautiful parts and their harmonious combination in a figure gave rise to ideal beauty, which is therefore not a metaphysical concept, so that the ideal does not take place in all parts of the human figure in particular, but can only be said of the whole of the figure alone."² The idea of individual wholeness fulfills the need of those who seek an objective in the field of beauty.

¹ Explanations of the elements of Aristotelian logic, p. 82 f.

² Gesch. d. Kunst d. A. Buch 4. Kap. 2. § 35. - The concept of the whole is generally familiar to the 18th century. Meier demands of the critic that he must always "first and most carefully judge the whole". For the perfections of the whole are always greater than the perfections of a part. (Illustration of an art judge. 1745. p. 75.)

and generality without finding satisfaction in the objectivity and generality of the rules. This desire for objectivity in the aesthetic sphere separates the last epoch of the 18th century, which was directly related to the Critique of Judgment, from the subjectivist-oriented Enlightenment. The aesthetics of the Enlightenment had lapsed into a soft eudaemonism. The principle that art should serve pleasure was almost unreservedly accepted. Dubos,¹ the Swiss, Joh. El. Schlegel, Eberhard are its respected representatives. The descriptive aesthetics of the English were unable to counteract the psychological flattening; it was itself a dissolving moment. A counter-effect could come from the Baumgartenian spirit of the Wolffian school or from the circle of art. It came from both sides. Two years before the "Critique of Judgment", Moritz's short essay appeared, which opposes Eberhard's subjectivism with the same determination as Kant - albeit using different means. Kant had achieved what Lambert and Tetens had wanted but not accomplished: to overcome the phenomenism and subjectivism in which the century threatened to end. His act, like Wolff's, is both a reaction and a restoration: a reaction to psychologism, a restoration of rationalism. K. Ph. Moritz's aesthetics are similarly "reactionary" (always measured against the progressiveness of psychologism at the time). Only its immediate roots are the aesthetic experiences of Goethe's admirer and Roman friend; its historical roots reach back to Wolff's metaphysics. With a metaphysics of art, the finely sensitive Moritz rescues himself from the externalization of Enlightenment aesthetics. No other rescue was open to him. It took a philosopher of Kant's secular range to find a critical way out here.²

¹The "Reflections" begin: "On éprouve tous les jours que les vers et les tableaux causent un plaisir sensible . ." (I. S. I.)

²The "reaction" also begins in literature. Kant relates to Eberhard and Feder in the same way that Schiller relates to phenomena such as Bürger and Heinse. The artistic dissolution into sensual

The artist, not the thinker Goethe, collaborated on Moritz's writing;¹ and yet its result is also close to the thinker Goethe. Moritz gave the most personal experience² and yet at the same time expressed not only the soul of Goethe's work of art, but also the basic idea of the best 18th century. The inner perfection of resting individuality that shone out to Moritz from Goethe's works was the magic formula that Meier-Mendelssohn's Enlightenment aesthetics lacked. That inner perfection, i.e. unity in the diversity of appearance, which Baumgarten had meant, had been replaced by a perfection external to the work of art, that of the effect on the viewer. Psychology had won, aesthetics and art theory had lost. The short essay in which Moritz expresses his basic idea for the first time³ is addressed to Mendelssohn, to Mendelssohn who, continuing Meier's work of destruction, transformed the unity of sensual knowledge into a comprehensibility through the grasping subject and thus, against his will, broke the path of the eudaemonism of the aesthetics of his time. Without any awareness of the historical context, Moritz re-establishes Baumgarten's concept of beauty in metaphysical formulas.

The beautiful is not a means of arousing and satisfying a subject, but is there because of its "own inner perfection".⁴ It is something completed in itself through its inner purpose.⁵ Moritz wants to make this concept of what is complete in itself the highest concept of aesthetics. The effect of the latter's art, description and psychology is countered in the classics by the demand for deeper truth.

¹ Cf. the introduction to the reprint, Deutsche Lit. Denkm. No. 31, p. XII (S. Auerbach.)

² It means: the real artist never starts from the idea of the effect. See "Anton Reiser".

³ "Versuch einer Vereinigung aller schönen Künste und Wissenschaften unter dem Begriff des in sich selbst Vollendeten." (Berlinische Monatsschrift. Vol. 5. 1785.)

⁴ On the visual imitation of beauty. 1788. reprint. German Lit. Denkm. Vol. 31. 1888. p. 40.

⁽⁵⁾ ib. S. 42.

Beauty, pleasure, is something secondary. "The line of bliss only runs parallel to the line of perfection; as soon as the latter is made the goal, the line of perfection must become all crooked."¹ Beauty can only be what is determined from within, not by an external purpose, what constitutes a "harmonious whole"⁽²⁾. We can only take possession of this whole by selflessly losing and forgetting ourselves. While the beautiful draws our contemplation entirely to itself, we sacrifice our individual existence to a kind of higher existence.³ With the same reasoning as Bodmer (but with what a different artistic attitude!) Moritz rejects the judgment of the public, even that of the "noblest". Perfection ("perfectio qua talis", one would have to translate Baumgartensch), not the pleasure of the spectator, is the aim of the artist.

Baumgarten's aim as an artist was perfect individuality. As we have already seen with the concept of reflection, Meier has reproduced his master very faithfully in details. Thus he also says: if perfection is recognized by the intellect, then one recognizes what each thing contributes to bring about the purpose. "Only in the case of beauty does one imagine all this at once and only as a whole, without distinguishing one from the other."⁴ This whole imagined at once is the individual appearance grasped with all its fullness of characteristics at once.⁵ But Baumgarten has defined individuality as the goal of an activity related to logical activity. The completed whole that Moritz has in mind, on the other hand, floats in a metaphysically absolute space. It is curious to see how Moritz, apart from the "school", has

⁽¹⁾ib. S. 44.

⁽²⁾ib. S. 44.

⁽³⁾ib. S. 41.

⁴ Initial grounds. § 24.

⁵ Moritz even uses the word "focal point" again (p. 43), which Meier already uses in the sense of "determinant of beauty". (Anfangsgründe. § 24.) One only needed to say "innerer Bestimmungsgrund" in order to obtain an explanation entirely in keeping with Moritz.

Wolff's metaphysics aesthetically fruitful. Like a hidden stream coming to light, school metaphysics suddenly appears in the middle of the completely personal treatise. Moritz has contrasted the beautiful with the useful as its pole. By utility, he says, we think of the relation of a thing considered as a part to a context of things that we think of as a whole.¹ Everything that is a part falls under the concept of purpose to something, of utility. It does not rest in itself. Only a whole can no longer be useful. The more definite concept, therefore, which is to take the place of the beautiful, which is opposed to the useful, is that of the whole. "With the concept of the beautiful, the concept of a whole existing for itself is inseparably linked."² The only true whole is the coherence of the whole of nature, the "great coherence of things".³ It would be the highest beauty if our senses and imagination did not set us limits.⁴ Thus the beautiful is only "akin to that great whole in our imagination".⁵ It is, we can say, an analogue of the world whole, which "rests on its center from all sides, and rests on its own existence".⁶ Moritz gives expression to the Winckelmannian-Plotinian, occasionally perfected.⁷ It is a true artist's metaphysics. The work of art is "similar to nature itself", that is: an "autonomously existing whole for itself".⁸ The after-pleasure is only the

¹ Image. After. p. 11 f.

⁽²⁾ ib. S. 12.

⁽³⁾ ib. S. 14.

⁴ Only that which falls into our senses or can be grasped by the imagination can be beautiful. (12 f.) - Moritz adopts Mendelssohn's idea, but gives it a new twist.

⁵ Image. After. S. 14.

⁸ Lessing once put forward a similar idea. The work of art is a "silhouette" of the "whole of the eternal Creator"; the poet should make a whole that is completely rounded. (Dramat. 79. Stück.) Cf. lit. letters (No. 16): the individual beauties must make up a beautiful whole.

⁷ Image. After. p. 14; cf. p. 27: the highest work of art is "the first impression of the highest beauty, but always only an impression .

⁸ Image. After. S. 16.

¹ And in the midst of this genuinely Goethean speculation are now thoughts of the Leibniz-Wolffian school: the concept of spontaneity ("active power" Tetens), of the power of sensation and thought (Sulzer), of the monad,² and finally of the *ens realissimum*. "Insofar as the beautiful excludes all that is deficient from itself, it also comprehends all that is real within itself...."³ This corresponds to the doctrine of metaphysics, according to which all negations are to be kept away from the concept of the most real (or most perfect) being, because it is the epitome of affirmations.⁴

But the main concept of Moritz's theory of art also has its model in school metaphysics. The beautiful is a purposeless whole, i.e. no longer a part. "The world is a series (set, a whole) of finite realities that is not part of another,"⁵ says metaphysics. Moritz's aesthetics is therefore nothing other than a transfer of the world concept of the metaphysics of his time into the aesthetic sphere.

Finally, the familiarity of the concept of the whole with the aesthetic investigations of this period is briefly demonstrated by the "Versuch über den Geschmack" (Essay on Taste) written by Kant's pupil Markus Herz.

The concept that Herz places at the center of his treatise, giving it a broader meaning than it has in Sulzer, is that of attitude.⁶ By "attitude" Herz means the appropriateness of all parts to the overall effect, the requirement that each part plays a part in the effect.

⁽¹⁾ ib. S. 19.

² The active force carries "of all the concepts we can ever have, the first causes, always spinning them out of itself, within itself". (S. 24.)

³ Image. After. S. 33.

⁴ Baumgarten, Metaph. p. 808. "Posita realitate tollitur negatio. Iam in ente perfectissimo ponendae realitates omnes. Ergo tollendae omnes negationes."

⁵ "Mundus (universum, Kav) est series (multitudo, totum) actu- alium finitorum, quae non est pars alterius." (Baumgarten. Met. § 354.)

⁶ Markus Herz: Versuch über den Geschmack und die Ursachen seiner Verschiedenheit. (I. ed. 1776. 2nd revised ed. 1790. p. 36 ff.)

have an appropriate part. In the case of "pure perfection", reason recognizes the inner value of the part according to an objective rule; in the case of beauty, it is feeling that decides.¹ Herz thus describes the relationship of the part to the whole as a value relationship: the degree of harmony with the whole decides the value of the individual part. In the aesthetic whole, feeling has the last word on the degree of coherence. Judgment and feeling flow together. "The liking and disliking of an object constitutes its value/² With Moritz, liking was non-essential; the psychological - irrational was eradicated.³ Herz includes the subjective-irrational moment and combines it with the theory of the whole, which thus becomes a doctrine of attitude (one could even call it feeling for the whole).⁴ Nevertheless, Herz makes a sharp distinction between the feeling and the judgment of the thing. The sensation is always correct, but not the judgment about its cause. The Hottentot says: I like that. "He speaks of his feeling, and we must believe him." But he does not say that he likes the beauty. "He is then no longer the Hottentot who tells of his feelings, but the Hottentot who reasoned." Explaining the cause of his feelings is not his business. The researchers of the soul will find quite different causes in it: namely desire.⁵ - This ingenious attempt to get around the deeper problem of taste clearly shows how necessary a new justification of aesthetics had become.

¹ Experiment, p. 51 f.

² Experiment, p. 12 f.

³ Moritz does say: "the beautiful cannot be recognized, it must be produced - or felt." (p. 20.) But Moritz does not start from perception. He thinks only of creation (forming), metaphysically-objectively, not psychologically-subjectively (quite in contrast to his later empirical-psychological direction).

⁴ Cf. p. 68: the perfection of the "attitude feeling" is the most difficult thing in taste and so on. A quite correct observation.

⁵ Trial, p. 236 ff.

Part II

Throughout the 18th century, as we have seen, efforts to develop a new logic run parallel to aesthetics. The Critique of Judgment is nothing but a purified reflection of its century when it unites a critique of aesthetic judgment with a critique of teleological judgment. General opinion has long and tenaciously clung to the view, suggested by externalities, that the third critique as a whole was only invented for the sake of systematics. Goethe's approval of the overall concept, the unification of organic nature and art under the same principle, did not fit in well with this. If, on the other hand, one sees the historical course of events as it is, then nothing seems more self-evident than Goethe's appreciation of the Critique of Judgment. Goethe, himself an ideal concentration of the 18th century, found himself confirmed here in his innermost being. The Critique of Judgment gave him the certainty that philosophy could have no other result than what he had believed to be true all his life.

Once we have opened our eyes to the 18th century, it becomes clear that no work of Kant's grew more naturally or was produced in a less "systematizing" way than the Critique of Judgment. It has long been established that the principles of Kant's moral philosophy are by no means the result of a mere transfer of the theoretical concept of law to the real world.

¹They have grown organically; and Kant's Aesthetics and Critique of Judgment have grown just as organically. Until now, it has been difficult to come to this conclusion because it does not seem to be compatible with Kant's basic non-artistic nature. But in Kant's Critique of Judgment, the aesthetic 18th century thinks its favorite concepts through to the end. In no other work did tradition stand more to Kant's side than in this one. In the light of such knowledge, one will have to admire Kant as a "historical" man even more than before, but one will no longer find anything wonderful in the emergence of the third Critique.

Very few examples give such a clear picture of the fruitfulness of the question as the "Critique of Judgment". How people lived during the Renaissance in the enjoyment of statues, buildings, paintings and poems, and how little they doubted that the judgments of connoisseurs on the masterpieces of Raphael would be valid for all time. Art judgments were made daily, but no one saw the problem contained in each one. It is an irony of history that a Nordic philosopher saw it for the first time, who spent his life in a monotonous day's work in a provincial Prussian town, who had never seen a classical statue, never seen a painting by Raphael. "Porcelain boxes and figurines, cane buttons, lace, wallpaper patterns and such things"² were the objects from which Kant abstracted his theory of taste. One thinks of Winckelmann, who, in front of the Dresden casts, puts the most wonderful thoughts about antiquity on paper. The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" does not hide its origins in Frederick's Prussia. Although its style is not dry (as one sometimes hears from people who cannot even write in a dry style), it is

¹ Alfred Hegeler: Die Psychologie in Kants Ethik. 1891. p. 318, 324 - Cf. P. Menzer: Der Entwicklungsgang der Kantischen Ethik in den Jahren 1760-1785. Kant-Studien, III. Jahrgang, p. 75: The ethical ideal was already fixed for Kant at a very early stage. Only the solution of the problem of how the self-legislation of freedom could become a universal one depends on the solution of the problem of theoretical philosophy.

² Schlapp, Kant's Doctrine of Genius, p. 181, note 5.

more clear, witty and sharp than beautiful and brilliant.¹ Her artistic examples only elicit a smile from us. And yet, in principle, a richer appreciation of art could hardly have added anything to the work. The prodigious reader Kant possessed an astonishing gift for extracting the essential from literature; but the experience of art could not be learned from aesthetic literature either. If his aesthetics grew so much more than that of Herder, who was experienced in art, it is because two favorable circumstances came together here in a systematic spirit: a real problem and a rich tradition. The third, artistic talent, which was the main thing in Herder's work and which could be considered the main thing in aesthetics, was completely absent.² Although this entailed shortcomings, it could not cancel out the depth of the basic conception. In Herder, on the other hand, all the spirit, all the artistic talent and the finest feeling for beauty could not compensate for the lack of systematic thinking.

It is not only the disproportion of its author to art that makes Kantian aesthetics strange. Emotion in general had something problematic for Kant. Emotional natures like Herder repelled him. It is all the more puzzling that he came to assign a "principle a priori", the highest thing he had, to the realm of feeling, whose most magnificent formations he did not know. If the roots of his aesthetics did not reach back to very early times, their origin would no longer be comprehensible in the spirit of the old Kant. The interest of the young man in the phenomena of taste still saved the old man from one-sidedness. Consideration of the cultural field of art was not decisive in the foundation of Kant's aesthetics. Cohen's systematically justified thought that the idea of aesthetic objectivity is derived from the consciousness of the

¹ Only the composition reveals its age. Everything individual is clear and sharp; the whole, on the other hand, has something indeterminate about it.

²Very characteristically for the philosophical point of view in general, Kant says in a reflection (Ac. ed. XV. N. 852): "He who can himself produce beautiful products does better by applying for them than by philosophizing about them. This he leaves to the thinker!"

Letting art proceed is not to be turned into the genetic. The "factum" for the Critique of Judgment is not the work of art, just as the "factum" of the Critique of Pure Reason was the "experience of the natural sciences with which Kant was well acquainted. For Kant, the aesthetic-artistic is only a special case of far more general experiences. These are experiences that he summarizes under the name of taste. The third critique is not a product of systematics, but the product of a lifetime of reflection on the problem of taste, written down from the point of view of the system, in conjunction with a broad knowledge of the rich aesthetic literature of the century. It is not necessary to assume that Kant had read the writings of Dubos, the Swiss and so on. He knew them even without that; the atmosphere of the whole century was filled with them.

The problem of taste is the part of the overall aesthetic phenomenon that was accessible to Kant. Taste is not something specifically artistic, but it is linked to the most important philosophical aspect of the aesthetic phenomenon: the problem of the irrational. Without any basis of experience, Kant would not have persevered for decades with something that was fundamentally alien to him. However, the phenomenon of taste, which interested him for general reasons and which had enticed him into the problem area of aesthetics, kept him there until the moment of solution had arrived.

A. Aesthetics

a. The young Kant

Contemporaries unanimously report on the unusual delicacy of heart that Kant displayed in social intercourse. He is praised for the "tasteful lightness" and "sociable flexibility" of his behavior, which always knew how to adapt to the tone of the respective society.¹ He valued sociability; its importance for society is the best thing he can praise the "women's rooms" for. In his dis- putatory he once surprised his listeners by the delicacy with which he treated the subject that the intercourse of students must be connected with "grace".² The politeness of heart with which he thanked people who had copied the best of his works for the instruction of their writings still moves us today. His fine tongue was feared by the housewives of Königsberg,³ at table he "gave honor to the body".⁴ He attached importance to form and respected social convention. "It is better to be a fool in fashion than a fool out of fashion" was one of his favorite sayings.⁵ He liked to deal with fashion, which is so closely linked to taste in the social sense, and for all his criticism did not deny its justification. The depth of Kant's understanding of these "outward appearances" is poignantly illustrated by the little incident reported by Wasianski: the old man holds himself upright with the greatest effort in order to comply with the law of

¹ For the following, see above all Jachmann's biography, in A. Hoffmann's reprint 1902. p. 91 ff. esp. p. 97.

² Borowski's biography. Hoffmann. S. 222.

³ Jachmann. S. H5 f.

⁴ Borowski. S. 213.

⁵ Jachmann. p. 75; cf. Borowski p. 215 Reff. z. Anthropol. XV. n. 1517. anthropology in pragm. Respect. p. 245 (Ac. ed.)

politeness to let the guest sit down first, not to hurt him, and finally says, when he has succeeded, "with forced strength": the feeling of humanity has not yet left me.¹ The term "humanity", so significant for his aesthetics, is not too strong here. The forms of sociability that arise from the "expanded way of thinking", i.e. the maxim "to think in the place of everyone else",² to "make oneself comfortable with the concepts of others", are something very valuable. They point beyond the inner limitations of man to participation and "urbanity", the preconditions of genuine humanity. It is characteristic that Borowski refers to the "Critique of Judgement" and not to ethics to explain the concept of humanity.³ Sociability belongs to man as a creature destined for society, i.e. to humanity.⁴ It consists of a sense of participation in connection with the ability "to communicate intimately and generally". With its help, the "animal limitation" is overcome.⁵ Kant already hints at the idea that Schiller expounds so magnificently in the Aesthetic Letters after reading the Critique of Judgment: the "drive to legal sociability, by which a people constitutes a permanent common being" (i.e. a state), is connected with the "drive to socialize". (i.e. a state), is necessarily connected with the "art of mutual communication".⁶ For taste is a "general human sense" and can only be explained by the instinct for sociability.⁷ On their own, no one would adorn themselves. Only in company does the "fine man" (the beginning of civilization) emerge, i.e. one "whom an object does not satisfy if he does not feel pleasure in it in community with others".

¹ X²asianski's biography. Hoffmann. S. 417.

² Critique of Judgment, 3rd ed. p. 158; Anthropology. S. 228.

³ Borowski, in Hoffmann. p. 242 f.

⁴ 162. Page number without further specification means from now on: Critique of Judgment, 3rd edition.

⁶ 262.

⁶ 262 f.

⁷ Cf. Anthrop. Ac. Ausg. p. 240 f.

can."¹ There is always something in taste that points beyond the individual. It is the maxim of the power of judgment "to set aside the subjective private conditions of judgment, between which so many others are bracketed, and to reflect on one's own judgment from a general point of view". This general standpoint is reached by placing oneself in the standpoint of others.²

One would block the way to any further investigation if one were to pass over this sociological starting point of Kant's aesthetics with the objection that Kant does not know "the solitary immersion in the work of art".³ The work of art is precisely not his starting point. The peculiarity of this aesthetic consists precisely in the fact that, although it does not abstract from artistic experiences, it nevertheless coincides in the core of its questioning with the most essential problem of the philosophy of art, the problem of the objectivity of the subjective. The relationship to sociability may be alien to the innermost essence of the pure work of art (it is very essential to certain arts), but this does not disprove that one can arrive at insights from taste experiences in Kant's sense that are of significance for aesthetic theory in general, and thus also for art. - The relationship of taste to sociability, which is only mentioned in passing in the Critique of Judgment as an empirical-psychological moment, is of the greatest importance for the assessment of the natural genesis of the work. We do not wish to relegate these thoughts, which are, as it were, pushed into the shadows in the finished work, to the middle ground.

¹163.

²159 - Unfortunately, Kant also allows his judgment of the value of the arts to be determined by consideration of "urbanity". He rebukes music because it imposes itself on everyone, even those who do not demand to hear it, whereas with the arts "that speak to the eyes" one need only look away if one does not want to let the impression in. With regard to "culture", music, which is in second place (behind poetry) in terms of "stimulus and movement of the mind", is in the lowest place. (218 and 220 ff.)

³E. Adickes: Kant as an aesthetician. Jahrbuch des Hochstifts Frankfurt, a. M. p. 326 f.

point. But as sources of Kantian aesthetics and remnants of the "Critique of Taste", they should not be overlooked. Kantian aesthetics has its origins in the time when Mr. Magister, "most dainty down to his clothes, used the epithet "fine" as the third word in his mouth. ¹ At this time Kant felt at one with the 'aesthetic' generation, the rejuvenators of the strict school. In the famous image of his teacher, Herder portrays the ideal of the aesthetic worldly wise man, the ideal of the entire epoch. "The most thoughtful speech flowed from his lips; jest and wit and whimsy were at his command, and his teaching discourse was the most entertaining company."² Presenting philosophical ideas in a popular way was one of the main purposes of aesthetics. "Beautiful thinking" is generally understandable, sociable thinking.³ No one understood this form of humanity better than the young Kant, whose emotional expansion we have in Herder's writings, whose mature intellectual development we have in the Critique of Judgment, Herder could never forgive his teacher for not stopping at Baumgarten. He did not realize that Kant was continuing Baumgarten's thoughts, while he himself was only turning the mood of aesthetics into the universal.

In the decade between 1760 and 1770, Kant

¹ B. Erdmann: *Reflections of Kant*. Baumgarten has not forgotten to mention the gustus (sapor) delicatus (Met. § 608). The word is always heard with some overtones from the time of "delicacy". The word "fine" is only a translation of "delicat". - In the "Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime", fine, delicacy etc. appears on almost every page. In two places, the term "delicat" has also been preserved. (Observations, Ac. ed. p. 238; 241.)

² Letters on the Advancement of Humanity. 1795 (29th letter).

³ In the writings of the 1960s, Kant often criticized metaphysics because it began with the most abstract and difficult things. It is Kant's intention to organize public instruction "according to nature", i.e. to begin with the empirical and with observation. Thus he introduces metaphysics through empirical psychology. (Ac. ed. II, 289; 305 f; 309.) In the opposition of "school" and "life" Kant takes a firm stand in favor of man during this period. (II, 306, 309.) The instruction of women should be done with taste: "Never a cold and speculative teaching, always sensations... I" (Observations. II, 231.)

had risen powerfully above Halle and Frankfurt aesthetics. When he published the last and most important document of his engagement with it in 1770, he was already so far removed from it that he did not even notice how closely the dissertation, which pointed to the future, was linked to the past. One tends to speak least of that which is most self-evident. The fact that Kant said much about Hume and little about Baumgarten made Baumgarten's influence seem smaller and Hume's greater than it was. But Kant spoke so little of Baumgarten's influence, not because it was less, but because it was much more extensive and deeper (for Baumgarten included Wolff) than that of Hume. What the latter was to the analytic (causal problem), the former was to the aesthetics of the Critique of Pure Reason.

We know very little about Kant's Aesthetics before 1770. From the notes Kant made on Meier's Theory of Reason¹, we can see that from the very beginning he took from "Aesthetics" what would later be of the greatest interest to him: the definition of taste. "A sensual judgment of perfection is called taste."² "A cognition that is recognized as perfect by the sensual power of judgment is called aesthetic."³ If, as we may conclude from these allusions, Kant dealt primarily with taste and "aesthetic" perfection in the beginning, then in this he was determined by Meier. The sixties clearly stand out from this epoch. Here, the focus is less on taste than on feeling.

¹ More precisely: to the "excerpt" from it, which was published at the same time as the full work. (1752.)

² Ac. Ausg. XVI, N. 1748; N. 1774 he speaks of "good sensible and sensual power of judgment". (According to Adickes - in the preface to this volume - both notes date from the mid-fifties). But even later, Kant speaks of the "dijudicatio aesthetica secundum sensum communem. (Vol. XVI, N. 1860.)

³ N. 1748. The majority of the extant notes (N. 1752; 1753; 1755; 1758; 1770 of the same volume and the same time) deal with aesthetic "perfection" because Meier (§ 22) deals with it. Kant drew on taste. Meier's Theory of Reason does not mention it.

Speech.¹ In the Treatise on the Negative Greats (1763), "inner sensation" is cited as an example of the importance of the concept of negative greatness. Unpleasure is not merely the absence of pleasure, but "negative pleasure", just as ugliness is negative beauty, not merely the absence of beauty.² - The mention of Hutcheson's "moral feeling"³ tells us that the change of terminology indicates the influence of the English psychologists. But the fact that Kant speaks for a time of feeling instead of taste and the power of sensual judgment is merely a matter of mood and fashion. Objectively, he remains entirely bound to Wolffian psychology.⁴ The new term does not bring Kant any closer to solving the aesthetic problem. The reference to the irrational already lay in the term "sensual power of judgment". Order, beauty, perfection still belong together.⁵ The lecture program of 1765 clearly shows how close the connection with Baumgarten-Meier's aesthetics remained. Meier's logic, says Kant, will give him cause to also treat the formation of the healthy (common) sense, whereby the close relationship of the subjects also gives him a few glimpses of the "Critique of the Common Sense".

¹ Inquiry¹ into the clearness of the principles of natural theology and morals (Preisschrift). 1765. I, § 3. "Feeling of the sublime and the beautiful." - "Observations on the feeling of the sublime and the beautiful." (1766.) The use of the word "feeling" in this epoch is the same as later in the Critique of Judgment, after Kant usually said "sensation" in between. (Cf. Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen. III, 4. "Feeling of displeasure." Treatise IV, § 2. "Feeling of pleasure"). French sentimentalism, which reached its peak around this time through Rousseau, who was so impressive for Kant, certainly played a role in the turn to the word "feeling".

²I, 2 - Wolff had already distinguished between cheerfulness (hilaritas) from the abolition of an evil, and positive pleasure (voluptas).

³ Preisschrift IV, § 2; cf. "Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen" 1765-66. n. 3.

* As can be seen from the position of the feeling of pleasure in relation to desire (Preisschrift II; IV, § 2; also: Der einzige mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes. 1763. I. Einl.).

⁵ Evidence IV, 1. - Likewise, of course, with Hutcheson.

The impression might be given that Kant lagged behind his actual thought development in the lectures.² It may also be that in the sixties there was a certain tension between what Kant published³ and what he presented on the catheder. His aesthetic views were still in the making. They are so closely connected with logical, ethical, psychological and anthropological trains of thought that it is not yet possible to speak of an "aesthetics". The mature form of Kant's aesthetics teaches us that what he thought following the "school" was the lasting and leading to the solution. The waving away remark in the Critique of Judgment about Burke is the last ebbing wave of Kant's interest in English psychological aesthetics⁽⁴⁾

Kant is the first German philosopher after Meier to devote special attention to the concept of taste again.⁵ Meier's emphasis on the "power of judgment" certainly has the strongest share in this (this is the point where Kant and Gottsched meet); but without some personal contribution, the preference for this most difficult of aesthetic concepts could not be explained. Meier did not even go so far as to equate aesthetics with the theory of taste. The expression "critique of taste" is also new. The use of the word "aesthetics" for the theory of taste is remarkable.⁶ A few years

¹ Message etc. 1765-66. n. 2.

² Which would be sufficiently explained by the proper connection to the "author".

³ "Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime" - a very "English" title!

From the outset, Kant was less captivated by Homes' more objectivist approach than by Burke's psychological-physiological dissections.

⁵ Baumgarten had only touched on it. - At the same time, the French philosophers dealt with the subject: Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, d'Alembert.

⁶ 'Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen. 1765. ac. ed. II. N. 2. P. 311.

later "aesthetics" means something new. We will have to show that there is an inner connection between the old and the new meaning.

The only pre-critical writing that at least in its title promises to deal with aesthetic questions (the "Observations") leads us to the second, next to Meier's theory of reason, most important stimulus for canonical aesthetics. This is Wolff's *Psychologia empirica* contained in Baumgarten's "Metaphysica". Alongside the remarks on Meier's logic, those on Baumgarten's psychology are the main sources for the reconstruction of the "Critique of Taste". Wolff-Baumgarten's empirical psychology is the main historical source of Kant's anthropology.¹ The first sketch of this anthropology contains Kant's only aesthetic writing (according to the title) before the Critique of Judgment, namely the "Observations". Here, as in the later Anthropology, it deals with empirical man in general, with temperaments, sexes and national characters. The graceful, witty writing is very characteristic of the mood accompanying the "Critique of Taste". It is less productive for the development of the aesthetic problem itself. Sulzer or Mendelssohn could also have given the explanation of taste as a "feeling of a finer kind", which can be enjoyed for longer without satiation and exhaustion and which makes one adept at virtuous impulses⁽²⁾.

b. The judgment of taste

We will now attempt to summarize the main ideas of the Critique of Taste, i.e. Kant's aesthetic speculation between the Dissertation of 1770 and the Critique of the

Accordingly, we have two auxiliary sources for the "Critique of Taste": in the Logic (published by Jäsche in 1800) and in the "Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht" in 1798. The former, thanks to Jäsche's conservatism, has preserved the essential features of the Critique of Taste (Jäsche's publication is essentially based on the same material that Adickes published in full and B. Erdmann published in excerpt earlier). In "Anthropology" only what belongs to the empirical phenomena of taste has remained.

²Observations, Ac. Iss. p. 203.

power of judgment. The delimitation of chronological phases within this section has been dispensed with. An exact chronological stratification of the material, if it is possible at all, can only be successfully undertaken by those who are able to date these countless notes from Kant's handwriting and according to visual indications⁽¹⁾.

"Taste is social", "the judgment of taste is a social judgment."² "One has taste when what one likes pleases everyone."³ "We are more moved by everything we feel in company. We also feel, so to speak, for the others . . . We are ashamed and afraid of those who speak in public . . . The whole of life expands in good company."⁴ The lack of taste can already be seen in the way we dress, the way we dine, the way we eat, etc.⁵ Kant, who has often been accused of failing to recognize the "empirical", writes: "One must provide for sensation as well as for taste. To this belongs the sensation of actual pleasure: the meal . . . It is well worth cultivating a pleasure that can be enjoyed daily."⁶ Kantian aesthetics does not begin too high up, as was previously assumed (in systematics or in the library), but rather too low down (in the kitchen). The critique of taste is not in the least rooted in experiences at the table:

¹ The writing on Kant as an aesthetician announced by Adickes will hopefully give us an account of this epoch. Our account is not intended to be an aesthetic history of Kant's development. The point here is to establish the connection between Kant's aesthetic speculation before the Critique of Judgment and the "Aesthetics" and the great general problem of taste.

² Ac. Exh. XV. n. 702, 743; cf. 767, 806, p. 352; 880, 1503, p. 805; 1860.

³ Logik-Kolleg (Pöllitz), Schlapp p. 231.

⁴ XV, N. 763.

⁵ XV, N. 1512. P. 838.

⁶ XV, N. 436.

⁷ "We do not eat merely to be satisfied." (XVI. N. 1771.) A note from the mid-fifties - the first we know of Kant's aesthetics. In the Anthropology, Kant raises the

to make fun of this origin, it is better to consider what a huge increase lies between the beginning and the end.

He who wants to satisfy his hunger gobbles down without comparing. The comparison of sensual sensations is an elevation above mere "sensation". It is no longer a purely material attitude towards things.¹ A judgment of taste can arise from "compared sensations"⁽²⁾. The sensation of the pleasant can never be "wrong"² or "mistaken"⁴ - "but the judgment of taste can be, to put it before others".⁵ Thus the problem begins with the judgment, the leaving of the subjective sphere. Enjoyment itself has not changed, it has remained sensual. But by turning to the qualities of sensation in order to compare them with one another, this enjoyment is ennobled; for in so doing

The question arises as to how it may have come about that modern languages have named the aesthetic faculty of judgment taste. He answers it from personal experience: at a meal in good company, the host demonstrates taste in his ability to make universal choices. (Ac. Ex. p. 242; cf. the detailed treatment of the *Gastmahl*, p. 278 ff.) Kant's starting point repeats the historical beginnings of the speculation on taste. Gracian's 67th maxim from the *Oracule*, which Thomasius placed before his program of 1687, contains (in Thomasius' version), among other things, the sentences: "Qu'ils etudient tous a rencontrer le gout universel d'autrui, qui est la vrai methode de choisir. Car il en est comme d'un festin, ou les viandes ne s'apprentent pas du gout des cuisiniers, mais à celuy des conviez." This is exactly Kant's thought. Even the definitions of taste ("la vrai methode de choisir" - "the ability to choose") are similar. Among the reflections there is also the note: "malim convivis quam placuisse cocis." (N. 2040.) The pentameter comes (note by Adickes, vol. XVI, p. 209) from Martial. It will probably also have been Gracian's source. (Cf. *Kritik der Urteilstkraft* p. 178.)

¹ Cf. n. 876: "examining and tasting sensation".

² XV. N. 624. XVI. N. 1871.

³ XV. N. 268; 1512. P. 837.

⁴ XV. n. 736. Cf. Hume: Of the Standard of taste: "Every feeling is right, because feelings stand in relation to nothing outside them . . . no feeling represents anything that is really present in the object."

⁵ XV. N. 1512. P. 837.

the activity of covering begins. We allow the impressions a certain independence and dignity. For Kant, however, the actual ennoblement of sensual pleasure lies only in the accompanying thought that pleasure is general. Taste does not consist in enjoyment itself, "but in the attunement of our sensibility with others of theirs".¹ It does not refer to pleasure, but to "applause on account of generality".² From this arises the fundamental definition: "Taste is the capacity to choose universally."³

In order to move from the taste of the pleasant to that of the beautiful, we must rise from the kitchen air of these examples. The year 1770 is also decisive for aesthetics. By recognizing space and time as pure views, the "Dissertation" makes it possible to separate what is merely general in the sensation of sensual pleasure from what is pleasing in appearance. Sensation can indeed be "cultivated", but it always remains subjective, insofar as it relates to the sense, not to the object.⁴ In beauty, however, it is the appearance that pleases⁽⁵⁾ i.e. the universality of the appearance, which is contained in the relationship of the sensations ordered by pure perception.⁶ The relationships of space and time apply to everyone, whatever sensations one may have. Accordingly, in all phenomena, the form that is recognized according to common rules of coordination is universally valid.⁷ "The conditions of the beautiful form of objects are representations according to relations of space and time."⁸ As in the corresponding passage of the transcendental aesthetics, the concept of

¹XV. N. 721.

²XV. N. 710.

= XVI. n. 1850 et al. cf. anthrop. S. 169.

*XV. N. 658.

⁵XV. N. 698.

"XV. N. 653.

■ XV. N. 672, 822, et al.

⁸XVI. N. 1791.

¹ Regularity and proportion follow.² The separation of form and matter finally leads Kant to the clear separation of a subjective and an objective pleasure, to the separation of *voluntas* and taste/pleasure and liking⁽⁴⁾

Basing the universality of taste on the forms of sensuality is characteristic of the era to which the "Critique of Taste" belongs. The idea of adding an aesthetics (theory of taste) to metaphysics and morals seems to have suggested itself to Kant as a direct consequence of the results of the dissertation.⁶ The "Logic" informs us of the main features of the planned section on taste.⁶ The most important difference from later (apart from the uncertainty ...about the validity of the judgment of taste) is based on the fact that the connection between the theory of taste and "aesthetics" in the sense of the "Critique of Pure Reason" is still recorded. Kant separates (according to Meier) aesthetic and

¹XVI. n. 683; B. 33 et seq.

²XV. N. 871.

³XV. N. 555.

⁴XV. n. 878; cf. Logic (ed. by Kinkel), p. 41.

⁵ In the letter of June 7, 1771 to Markus Herz (Ac. ed. I, 117), Kant brings together "Theory of Taste, Metaphysics and Morals"; on February 21, 1772 (to the same) he speaks of the "principles of feeling, taste and the power of judgment, with their effects, the pleasant, the beautiful and the good", and of the "general principles of feeling, taste and sensual desire". (I, 124 f.) The "power of judgment" is thus to be distinguished here from taste. It corresponds to desire and its goal, the good. Cf. Critique of Practical Reason p. 62: "In this judgment of the intrinsically good and evil..."

⁶ It is striking that it has not yet been utilized for this purpose. It was probably not thought possible that a student of Kant would publish Kant's pre-critical Theory of Taste 10 years after the appearance of the Critique of Judgment. However, Kane seems to have made entries only as long as he was still mentally occupied with the problem and stopped as soon as he was clear about the solution. Jäsche thus mainly found documents from the time when the ideas were still in the making. - The above (p. 167 f.) makes it understandable that we must learn about important currents in 18th century logic from Meier's *Anfangsgründe der schönen Wissenschaften* and about Kant's pre-critical aesthetics from his Logik.

logical perfection of knowledge. Aesthetic means knowledge that is perfect according to the laws of sensuality. What are these laws? They are laws of "coordination" - that is all we learn. They apply to the whole of humanity, even if not to all thinking beings. Beauty is the object of a general pleasure because the laws of perception are general laws of sensuality. What is later called "transcendental aesthetics" thus establishes the doctrine of beauty, i.e. the critique of taste or aesthetics in the narrower sense.¹

Kant expressed this idea in lectures and formulated it in ever new ways. But he did not have it printed. The earliest evidence that the printed writings contain about his aesthetics is a note in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.² The Germans are the only ones, it says, who use the word aesthetics for what others³ call the *Critique of Taste*. The praise that Kant lavishes on the "excellent analyst" Baumgarten here cannot conceal the fact that he endeavors to draw the sharpest possible dividing line. The ab-

¹ "What we like about an object, and what we regard as a property of it, must consist in what is true for everyone. Now the relations of space and time are valid for everyone, whatever sensations one may have. Accordingly, in all phenomena the form is universally valid; this form is also recognized according to common rules of coordination; therefore, what is according to the rule of coordination in space and time necessarily pleases everyone and is beautiful" (N. 672). The form of sensations also guarantees a certain objectivity in the region of reality not determined by the intellect. "Because space and time are the general conditions of the possibility of objects according to the rules of sensibility, the conformity of the appearance or sensation in the relations of space and time with the general law of subjects to produce such conception according to form, belongs to that which necessarily corresponds to every sensibility. Thus to taste. Whereas the correspondence with sensation is only accidental." (N. 702.)

²1st ed. p. 21; 2nd ed. S. 35.

³He means the English; especially Home ("Elements of Criticism"). Cf. Logic p. 16 f.

Kant's inclination against the word aesthetics (in the modern sense)¹ is not the only disconcerting aspect of this remark. Kant used the name "Aesthetica" in parallel with "Logica" in the spirit of its originator. (Transcendental aesthetics stands alongside transcendental logic.) There was now no name for the theory of taste. Perhaps he would nevertheless have found a way out other than Baumgarten's rebuke if he had not pursued a very specific purpose in detaching the theory of taste from "aesthetics". The misunderstandings of Meier and Mendelssohn had robbed aesthetics of its credit. Kant understood "aesthetics" to mean only a rationalistic doctrine of perfection, and he renounced it by rejecting the word "aesthetics". His aim is to free the aesthetic from rationalist shackles. Better English theory than "aesthetics" - that is the mood, as it were. However, the term Kant alludes to ("critique") is not specifically English. It encapsulates the entire aesthetic thought of the 18th century, as it were. It was valuable to Kant because the term "critique" did not predetermine anything about the nature of the judgment of taste; it did not rationalize the judgment of taste. For the same reason, the word "feeling" is so welcome to him: it expresses a tendency contrary to the rationalist (the "aesthetic", as Kant believes).

Kant's aversion to the word aesthetics for the theory of taste is historically understandable; the purely empiricist stance of the aforementioned remark on the question of the principles of taste is less so. It was a misguided hope² "to bring the critical judgment of beauty under principles of reason and to elevate the rules of the same to a science"⁽³⁾.

¹ Of course, Kant could not do without "aesthetic". His rejection applies only to the noun.

² "which the excellent analyst Baumgarten grasped," says Kant. With which, however, he met the school. Gottsched, Bodmer, Breitinger, Meier and Mendelssohn belong to this school.

³ When would Baumgarten have said this? Baumgarten probably described the artist's process ("pulcre cogitaturus").

Our judgments are only empirical and can therefore never serve as laws by which our judgment of taste should be guided. Taste is the judge, not the rules. - Likewise, logic says: aesthetics is a mere criticism of taste, which has no canon (no law), but only a norm (pattern or guideline)¹ for judgment. It can therefore never be science (doctrine).²

Kant was unable to get away from the opposition between empirical rules and a priori laws during the period of the "Critique of Taste". It is decisive. The period of the "Critique of Taste" lasted as long as Kant held on to this opposition. It is a constant groping and contradiction. Beauty is the object of a general pleasure, because it is formal, i.e. it is based only on the general laws of sensuality. But the principles of criticism are merely empirical, for - they are not laws a priori. It is no wonder that Kant could not get rid of the feeling of "a kind of contradiction".³ Something was missing in the opposition empirical - lawful. Again and again Kant attempts to delimit the logical and aesthetic principles, and again and again he confuses himself by opposing "empirical" and "lawful". This persistent effort (of which there are numerous repetitions) shows that he is not satisfied with something. For those who only pay attention to the published statements on taste, the first mention of a new a priori principle in the famous letter to Reinhold (dated December 28, 1787) must seem like something unexpected. In truth, it announces the solution to a problem with which Kant had been struggling for decades. This struggle is mentioned in the note on the transcendental

But he never said that one could learn to write or judge poetry according to this description. Aesthetics is indeed a science of beautiful performance; but Baumgarten gave examples, not rules. The principle of individualization is not a "rule", but rather a principle.

¹ Example!

² Logic. S. 16.

³ Logic. S. 41.

Aesthetics, however, was not to be felt. Until shortly before the turning point, Kant publicly and resolutely¹ advocated the empirical character of aesthetic principles. In the "Reflections" we see the thoughts moving towards the distant goal; Kant's consciousness, however, is only able to justify a critique of taste according to psychological principles. The idea of the third critique must, after long preparatory work, have suddenly descended before Kant. This critique was not born only at the moment when Kant classified the "Critique of Taste" within a "Critique of Judgment" (1788/89), but at the moment when he discovered the possibility of an a priori principle for feeling that does not fit into the empirical-legal scheme. This thought is new and decisive. Everything else is laid out, but not this one. Only something points to it: the eternal repetition of the opposition of "critique" and "doctrine".

The situation is thus roughly this: the judgment of taste strives out of the psychological environment. Sometimes it looks as if the a priori nature of the principle of taste is very close - then again there are emphatic references to the empirical character of generality. One can, as it were, judge a priori what others will like. But this taste can only be acquired through long experience.² Something, however, compels Kant to go beyond this result. It is probably not only the contradiction in this (how can one arrive at principles a priori through practice?), nor only the feeling for the humane value of taste in the forms of life. Rather, it is the enormous tradition of the

(A. Tumarkin, K. Vorländer, Schlapp) have sought to discover in the changes to the second edition of the Note an approximation to the standpoint of the third critique. For it now says: the rules are empirical only according to their noblest sources, and can never serve for certain laws a priori. - I can see nothing new in these two words that Kant has added. On the other hand, the final sentence, which has also been added, clearly states that one only has the choice of taking aesthetics either in the transcendental or in the psychological sense. This exactly repeats the old opposition of laws and merely empirical principles.

²XV, N. 818; N. 856; XVI, N. 1871.

It is only at the beginning of the twentieth century that the solution to the problem can be found. It is conceivable that in another century, under otherwise similar circumstances, the Critique of Judgment would have remained unwritten. In the 18th century it had to be written. The same difficulties that caused problems for König, Gottsched, Bodmer, Breitinger and Meier dragged out the Critique of Taste for a long time. It is always the same: the judgment of taste should be separated from the mere judgment of feeling; but it should not merge with the judgment of understanding. With Kant, what in the earliest beginnings of German aesthetics seems like terminological helplessness has matured into a conscious contradiction. A "sensation of the intellect" would now no longer be possible. The psychological opposition of "sensation" and "understanding"¹ becomes the epistemological opposition of "psychology" and "principles a priori". There is no evasion - except into that unknown land that first had to be discovered. The solution had to bring a systematic surprise, historically a tremendous concentration.

So far we have had no reason to talk much about Winckelmann. Our attention has been focused on the development of philosophical concepts in the narrower sense. The "school" had to be given its due. Winckelmann's influence on Kant concerns more the general mood towards art and taste than details of thought. In this general direction, however, the plotinizing idealism of the great "Antiquary" had the strongest effect.² In a note by Kant we read (after the ideal was mentioned): "Empirically true beauty cannot be found; for whence do we judge that it is beautiful?"³ The thought shows with

¹ We already found this alternative in Meier. But it was not carried out: in the "sensual" and the "rational" power of judgment the opposites only diverged, only to unite again all the more securely in the expression "power of judgment".

² In the historical introduction to Cohen's book on Kant's aesthetics one finds a masterly outline of Winckelmann's idealistic doctrine of beauty.

³ XV, N. 918.

fingers on Winckelmann. However, even Winckelmann's influence can only ever be assessed in the context of the general idealistic school of thought going back to Leibniz. And above all, it should not be forgotten how little even Winckelmann's speculation could help Kant to solve the problem he was struggling with. He hardly needed impulses in a rationalist-idealistic direction. Despite the psycho-logicism of the second half of the century, the entire tradition was still permeated by rationalist elements. The aim was to move beyond the opposition of psychology and rationalism. Apart from his genius, Kant had only the decades-long work of the school to accompany him on this path. It is no longer possible for us to trace this path in detail today. We can only emphasize those moments in the thoughts that occupied Kant for a long time in which there are germs of the final solution. Whether the solution took place directly by way of these concepts is a question of little importance. It is enough to know that thoughts have always been present from which clearly traceable threads run to the final solution.

c. Reflection

The most important concept of the "critique of taste" in view of solving its main problem is that of reflection.

We first encountered the term reflection in Wolff. For Wolff and his school, reflection means the deliberation and comparison that precedes the formation of a generic concept. (Above p. 202 f.) The development of this meaning of reflection in Kant will be dealt with below (p. 332 ff). In this section we are not dealing with the logical, but with the aesthetic concept of reflection. Reflective in Kant means the perception of an appearance according to its form, in contrast to the mere perceptual perception. (Below, p. 276.) Secondly, by reflection he means the judgment of certain things and actions from a point of view that overcomes the subjectively egoistic attitude. (Below p. 277 ff.)

This kind of reflective judgment is internally related to taste. It leads over to a third meaning of reflection, judgment under the form of wholeness. (Cf. below p. 288 ff.) This was no longer explicitly developed by Kant. In its place, since it marks the end point of his efforts on the aesthetic problem, the mature, systematic expression immediately took its place: judgment under the form of (subjective) expediency. His investigation belongs in the second volume of this work.

It is a view maintained by Kant throughout the whole period of the critique of taste that the aesthetic judgment is based above all on relations. The relation can consist in a relationship between the qualities of the senses (still apart from the actual order in space and time).¹ Then we have the lowest level of elevation above mere passive sensation: the sensory taste based on the comparison of true sensory qualities.² Joh. Ulrich König already sought the solution to the problem of taste in this way. He starts from the idea that there can be no dispute about the quality of a dish.³ A "sensuous writing" with its parables, descriptions, images and thoughts is like a composite dish. The judgment of what is beautiful in it is just as objective as the taste of a healthy tongue that tastes a food or drink "and judges it according to its true quality".⁴ But this avoids the problem.

¹ A comparison of mere differences in quality. The sensations always appear at least temporally ordered. But there is one view in which we do not pay attention to the moment of order.

² This taste goes to the quality of the sensation, apart from the way it touches us. I find a good example in Hellwag's letter to Kant (December 13, 1790). Hellwag tells of a chef who used to judge certain artful table dishes: "they taste good, but not pleasant to me." (Ac. ed. II, p. 224.) In other words, the objective quality of these dishes is impeccable, but I do not like them.

³ whether it is prepared in a healthy and tasty way, whether it is unspoiled, unburnt, etc.

⁴ Examination of good taste. S. 470.

The judgment about the length of a poem or its objectively ascertainable subject matter corresponds to the judgment of a dish as healthy, tasting good, sweet, sour, etc.; but not the aesthetic judgment, the judgment about beauty. Corresponding to this judgment is that of the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the food; in other words, something to which objective criteria do not extend. This is where the realm of subjective reaction begins. But it is precisely in this area that the problem lies.

Instead of their naked difference in quality, the sensations can now also be viewed in terms of their objectified relationship in space and time. This relationship is no longer valid to an even greater degree merely from the point of view of the perceiving subject. The quality of sensory objects can indeed be determined objectively. But how imperfect is this determination! Space and time, on the other hand, permit completely exact measurement of "relations". They are general conditions of the conception of things; therefore the relations observed in them are also objectively valid for everyone. Judgments about the phenomena in space and time are therefore not privately valid. Viewed in terms of their form, things are not pleasant but beautiful. Kant now calls this judgment of mere appearance reflection.¹ One might ask why Kant bothered further with the aesthetic problem; after all, the solution is already here.² But Kant did not allow himself to be pushed away from the line of the great problem of the irrational. The brilliant solution to the problem by means of "transcendental aesthetics"

¹Cf. n. 683: "the reflected appearance is the form..." N. 648: "Taste in appearance is founded on the relations of space and time, which are intelligible to everyone, and on the rules of reflection." Cf. n. 878: "What agrees with the general subjective laws of cognition... is beautiful, pleasing in reflection. ..." (cf. above p. 267 f.)

²The idea of basing aesthetics on the transcendental doctrine of space and time is so in keeping with modern ideas that an attempt could be made to rebuild Kant's aesthetics on it. (Lenore Kühn: Das Problem der ästhetischen Autonomie. Diss. Freiburg 1908.) This work is undertaken without the knowledge that it takes up this old Kantian thought.

would have led to a formalist theory of art. That might have been interesting, but it would have fallen outside the development we have followed up to this point. By basing beauty on the forms of perception, the universality of judgments of taste is so completely established that no problem remains. In König's solution, too, no question remained. The problem is shifted, the character of the judgment of taste as a judgment of feeling is lost. An awareness of this state of affairs has driven Kant beyond the standpoint of formalism. This brings us to a new concept of reflection.

Here, too, a "relationship" is important. But it is not a relationship of qualities to each other, but a relationship of the perceiving and judging subject to the other subjects. I hold my perception up to that of others, compare my judgment with the general one, improve or extend it, in short, I do not stop at the immediate impression, but reflect on a standpoint from which the perception of the moment can be judged, measured. This kind of "reflection" can be connected to any impression, any feeling (whereas in the formal observation all feeling was eliminated). Its result is the subjective awareness of the validity of what I feel in myself during an impression. How this consciousness arises is indicated in a transcript that deals with "substituted sensations". These sensations are to be distinguished from the immediate sensations of the senses. They arise "by transforming ourselves, as it were, into another person". Kant calls them "fictiones aestheticae and always pleasant".¹ - The core of this concept of reflection is thus something that appears to be related to empathy. Here, however, it is not a matter of a feeling, but of a purely mental transfer into the other. It is not, as with Herder, an intimate co-living and sympathy with the other, but rather a judgment from a point of view that also grasps the other. Following the concept of sympathy developed by Smith, Burke and Home, Kant would certainly have "26.

It would not have been difficult for Kant to expand the idea of "substituted sensations" into a kind of theory of empathy, if only he could have hoped to gain something for his problem. But what Kant suspected could not be justified by empathic processes. Such processes take place in the pathological part of the ego; they can only ever lead to a suffering, accidental sympathy, not to that universal sympathy which is the consequence of our raising ourselves to a "general standpoint".¹ This aesthetic displacement is related to a moral process; it is not an event in the emotional sphere, but an act of the conscious, responsible person. "We are ashamed when our taste does not agree with that of others."² In the case of taste, we must "renounce ourselves, as it were, to please others."³ It might seem as if the doctrine of taste were ethicized by such phrases. However, Kant is far from blurring the boundaries between ethics and aesthetics. He takes great care to separate these two areas. Taste belongs to the "talents", while that which is only related to virtue, such as good-heartedness, is to be counted among the "dispositions".⁴ The sharp dividing line that Kant draws between the truly good and everything that is only good in terms of success becomes particularly clear in the "Observations" on honor. The feeling for honor is also "fine". But what is done merely for the sake of appearances produces only something akin to virtue, which Kant also calls a "glimmer of virtue".⁽⁶⁾ True virtue, finally, can only be based on principles⁶ and is thus opposed to taste.

¹Cf. above p. 258 f.

²N. 640.

³N. 767. -

⁴Observations etc. Ac. ed. II. 218. n. 806, p. 356 - Cf. fragments from Kant's estate (Verm. Schriften. Philos. Bibl. vol. 50. p. 276): "One can be very virtuous and have little taste." These 'fragments' come from Kant's manuscript copy of the "Observations".

⁸Observations II, 218, but Kant assumes that appearance will gradually pass over into sentiment. (Anthrop. p. 153.) Here the fundamental idea of Schiller's aesthetic letters is indicated.

⁶Observations II, 217.

As clearly and surely as Kant's consciousness now distinguishes between "beautiful" and "good" - more in the interest of the good than, as usual, in the interest of the beautiful - it is, on the other hand, just as clear that the concept of reflection, which we are dealing with here, denotes a process that is common to the aesthetic and moral realms. Self-reflection reaches into a depth where the beautiful and the good have not yet separated, as it were. In taste behavior, as in moral behavior, egoism is overcome. Judgments of taste and moral judgment reach beyond the subject; they are not made from a private standpoint, but from a standpoint that encompasses all judges. This is the basis of their deeply hidden formal commonality. The only question is whether this view of aesthetic behavior does not cut off the tip of the problem of taste. Until now, taste has been presented as the ultimate subjective; only because it was regarded as the exponent of individuality was the development of the aesthetic problem significant to us. Now the essence of the judgment of taste is supposed to consist in the fact that it takes "others" into consideration. The judgment of taste thus seems to be transformed into a blurred "common judgment" and to lose all coloring and individuality. Its origin would not lie in the last, deepest layer of the human being, but higher up, in the social sphere. This seems to herald the onset of an externalization from which there is no escape. One looks at the other to see what he means - the result is a general lack of support. -- It cannot be denied that many notes from the period of the Critique of Taste serve well for such a caricature of Kant's true views. The external view that the thought that this or that impression is pleasing to the majority of people is sufficient for the judgment of taste is sometimes not far from Kant's mind. Nevertheless, this social interpretation would completely miss Kant's point. The "reflection" is not really on the "others", the accidental neighbor, the empirical generality of the judges. The general on which taste reflects does not lie outside, but inside: in the consciousness of the experiencing and judging aesthete.

The standard lies in the inner experience of the subject itself. In the "inner experience",¹ not in the opinion of others: the person who is to make a "generally valid choice" must listen within himself, not ask others. The general, what taste is looking for, is in our own breast, is ourselves. It is not the people (socially, as a countable quantity) - the humanity that each individual carries within himself (ideal) that is to be questioned if we want to make a true judgment of taste. The "general external judgment" of others serves our own inner judgment only as a "guide" and corrective to "test our own judgment". I hold the judgment that I make about the individual beauty to the procedure of the common sense, whether I am comprehensible to everyone.² The elevation to that general standpoint that comprehends the other judging parties in itself is based on this process. This is a general point of view not only with regard to others, but also with regard to myself. My feelings, moods, judgments change. By means of reflection I elevate myself to a constant and permanent self. I weigh the object or impression not only against my present feeling, but "against my whole feeling", the whole of the personality.³

It is not possible to prove in detail how this idea developed in Kant. In any case, the longer note on "spiritual feeling", which we have to refer to here - regardless of the time it may date from - is enlightening about the direction of his thoughts as a whole. "Spiritual feeling is based on the fact that one feels one's part in an ideal whole; e.g. the injustice that befalls one also befalls me in the ideal whole. The ideal whole is the fundamental idea of reason as well as of sensuality united with it; this is the concept a priori from which the judgment that is right for everyone must be derived. Moral feeling, even in its duties towards itself, sees itself in humanity and judges itself insofar as it has a share in humanity. The quality of the

¹N. 838.

²N. 1619.

³N. 856.

The ability to judge the particular only in general is sentiment. Sympathy is quite distinct from this and goes only to the particular, even though in others; one does not place oneself in the idea of the whole, but in the place of another.¹

"Spiritual feeling" is the translation of "moral sentiment". The combination remains with Kant until the end, but is transferred to the aesthetic (theory of the sublime - spiritual feeling). However, this omission is important for aesthetics not because of its connection with the doctrine of the sublime, but for deeper reasons. The displacement into an ideal whole of judges is a general, not a specifically ethical process, which must not be opposed to aesthetic or any other judgment, but only to actual theoretical behavior. With this I have no need of a general point of view, there is no shifting and choosing, here necessity prevails. Judgment is made from the theoretical standpoint, judgment is made from the "ideal whole". The general point of view² is a substitute for strict necessity and generality in the theoretical. It makes criticism possible. For what is criticism other than a judgment from a general point of view, which is that of a lawfulness, but not of the law? All criticism is based on the possibility of adopting a standpoint that can become common to all judges without being conceptually fixed. Kant expresses the non-conceptual with the word sentiment. Sentiment is the individual feeling that knows how to grasp the general without acting according to general laws. It does not need the "circumlocution of evidence", but comes from the heart.³ Kant associates sentiment with the "healthy

¹N. 782.

²N. 856; cf. Schlapp (Referat) p. 200: "The man of taste looks at things from a communal and social point of view . . ." (Anthrop.-Kolleg, Brauer 1779.) - Aristotle, soph. el. c. 9. and 11. Dialectic is a criticism from general premises which do not belong to any particular science.

³Ac. Iss. II, 311.

The fact that rules are lacking in abstracto constitutes the peculiarity of judgment, i.e. of criticism as opposed to doctrine. The principles of criticism cannot be taught, but only practiced. The rules of judgment are therefore always only empirical, abstracted from experience. For "practice" can only take place with regard to the judgments of others, presupposing external judgments as a yardstick and means of correction. This leads to laws in the aesthetic field that are general, but not a priori.² The term "comparative a priori" is also used for this type of lawfulness.³ The "rule of judgment by taste" is therefore only possible as an empirical rule of comparative validity derived from judgments of taste that have actually been made.⁴ This would make the "rule of judgment by taste" an empirical rule of comparative validity.

¹ XV, n. 433, where it even says, in line with Gracian and Dubos: "It is also safer to rely on sentiment than on general laws." It is reminiscent of Crousaz and König when it says elsewhere (after speaking of the "judgment of beauty"): "We recognize much before all formal conclusions, and reason only sets apart what we thought in sentiment." (N. 748) cf. also N. 436: "Sound and indivisible reason is taken for sentiment." Here we see sound reason, the faculty of judgment in concreto, identified with the feeling-like unanalyzed, confused inner state. Apparently, two different concepts of sentiment coexist in Kant's work. The word is sometimes to be read in English (moral sentiment), sometimes in French. We have to think of the English expression when it says: "the send' ment goes to that which is honorable." Honor is that which we like "because it is really generally pleasing" (N. 701); sentiment thus excludes "private feeling". (N. 710.) As much as this is reminiscent of the above-mentioned reflection (N. 782), the consideration of the aesthetic is already apparent; the reflections in N. 701 and 710 deal with taste. The two meanings of sentiment thus flow together. - Cf. also: Fragments from Kant's estate (Vermischte Schriften, Philos. Bibl. Bd. 50. 1922. p. 281): the beautiful does not refer to the useful, but to mere opinion. (Opinion = sentiment.)

²N. 983.

³ Kollegnachschrift von Pölitz (Logik u. Metaphysik), Schlapp, p. 162; 220. This by no means indicates an abandonment of the "empiricist standpoint" of the Critique of Taste (as Schlapp assumes).

⁴ N. 993; cf. N. 623. Külpe has described experimental aesthetics as a realization of the idea of reflection, N. 993.

However, aesthetics has become a doctrine, albeit an empirical one. It would be a science of (psychological) facts. But then all reflection on its "principles" would be pointless. The way out was found when Kant discovered a rule that was not empirical, but also not a priori law. A judgment had to be found that subjected something to a rule without legal force. What if criticism did not have a priori law-giving principles, but something comparable to doctrine? If it were based on rules of a priori validity without legal force? "Not empirical principles, not even a priori rules."¹ Here the secret of the "Critique of Taste" is revealed in a single line. The difficulty throughout the entire epoch (as for the whole of the preceding aesthetics) lay in finding that which was not a "rule", but also not an "empirical rule". As long as Kant did not have this middle ground, he had to be tossed back and forth between the rejection of aesthetics as a "doctrine" and the proclamation of empirical principles. The "Critique of Judgment" is born when Kant finds a way to maintain the standpoint of the "Critique of Taste" (the judgment of taste is empirical) without having to renounce an (indeterminate) principle a priori. The Critique of Taste is transformed into a Critique of Judgement: unrecognizable in the title - both works call themselves "Critique" - a profound transformation has taken place. In the original name, the word critique means an association of principles that stand in opposition to all a priori ascertainable regularity. They are "only" principles of critique, i.e. principles that are not sufficient for the validity of the doctrine. Their generality is merely empirical. In contrast, the new work takes the term critique in the sense that,

draws. (Kant. 3rd ed. 1912. p. 129.) Aesthetics thus becomes an entirely empirical science, an "attempt to explain the phenomena of taste". (N. 670; cf. N. 859.)

¹N. 989. In another reflection it says: "The rules serve to explain and criticize taste, not as precepts. The standards of taste are patterns, not of imitation (rules), but of judgment. (N. 1787.)

as it has been defined by the Critique of Pure Reason. The Critique of Judgment refers to a priori principles. Based on the mere synonymy of the titles, however, Kant speaks in the letter to Reinholt (December 28, 1787) of the "Critique of Taste" and its principles a priori as if it were something long familiar, whereas he means a completely new critique. But the old concept of criticism is irreplaceable in an aesthetic investigation that revolves around taste. Where has it gone? It is contained in the term "reflective power of judgment". In this expression we find both the term "reflection" and "power of judgment". However, both are aimed at the same thing (reflection taken in the latter sense): criticism. Reflection judges from a general standpoint, an ideal whole. For Kant, however, the power of judgment is not the faculty of judging value, as in Baumgarten and Meier, but likewise a faculty of judging a whole. It goes to "that which is proper, that which is appropriate to the thing in the idea".¹ Propriety is the harmony in what is next to each other.² Taste also goes to "that which is proper in the context". It cannot be brought under rules, because judgment "springs from the whole", and there are innumerable relations.³ Once Kant puts together "probability, propriety, propriety" as belonging to "sound reason".⁴ Propriety is connected with "comprehensibility", which (according to "logic"⁵) sensuality demands. "Without an idea, no arrangement is comprehensible; consequently, appearance lacks a point of relation."⁶ Kant calls this point of relation purpose; therefore, judgment is the ability to relate actions to an idea as the purpose.

¹ N. 858.

² N. 819. At the same time - a reference to "extensive clarity": propriety is only affected by sensual, not by intellectual clarity.

³ N. 905.

⁴ N. 1581. The "sound mind" is not to be confused with intellectus.

⁵ Edition Kinkel. S. 41.

⁶ Cf. the focal point; above p. 248®.

"Judgment goes beyond reason. (Judgment in the dress of a woman's room at home. The power of judgment in regard to the dignity of a building, in regard to the ornaments, which need not conflict with the purpose."¹ The power of judgment thus refers to a whole that is comprehensible to the mind, such as the clothing of a woman, the appropriate decoration of a building. The "harmony" of the garments with each other, with the person wearing them and with the purpose they are intended to achieve, is beyond the comprehension of the intellect. This kind of "whole" goes beyond what is attainable according to its rules. One can possess understanding and still not understand it. Only the power of judgment, the organ for the whole, can decide that certain ornamental elements fit a church, others do not, that some together with the purpose of the building make up a fitting whole, others contradict it. The concept of purpose arises of its own accord. The phenomenon must have a "point of relation" if it is to be "comprehensible". The law cannot be this point - then it would fall under the jurisdiction of the intellect. Meier already believed that he could assert "without error" that the "focal point" is a purpose. "The greater this purpose is, and consequently the more and greater the parts of which it is composed, the greater is the beauty."² Meier's statement points to the metaphysical background of Leibniz's concept of purpose: the harmony of the many in one, which is governed by the principe de convenance. The concept of harmony also appears in Kant's notes. By grasping the harmony of the manifold into a whole, which is inaccessible to the intellect, the power of judgment discovers a harmony in it. The expressions "decorous" and "decent", which are primarily aimed at the harmonious, clearly indicate the connection between the social and the aesthetic.³ Kant finds in fine behavior and

¹N. 814.

²Initial grounds. § 24.

³ "pretty, decorous, decent, harmonious, symmetrical". (N. 626.) Scaliger already calls the convenientia "causa pulchritu-

In beauty there is something in common: a wholeness and unity that defies intellectual judgment.

The whole cannot be approached through concepts; there is no doctrine of it. One can only collect judgments about it in order to arrive at a critique. But the critique of judgment based on wholes is not so different from that of taste. Where does Kant get the right to place the critique of judgment in a series with the critiques that have principles *a priori* as their object? We are faced with the crucial question of the transformation of the Critique of Taste into the Critique of Judgment.

It would be possible to imagine that this transition occurred when Kant had the idea of applying the concept of the regulative to the aesthetic realm. The judgments of taste do not coincide in experience; there are no rules of taste. But, one could say, the judgments of beauty should coincide, because beauty is more than a mere matter of the senses, and so on. Subjective taste has thus been given its right, but at the same time an *a priori* principle has been gained for aesthetics, even if only in the form of the ought. Without prejudice to the recognition of individual taste, the principle of ought preserves a higher dignity and a certain objectivity for the field of beauty. It prevents abstract regulation in the aesthetic realm as well as the confluence of the beautiful with the subjectively pleasant. For it would be absurd to apply the concept of ought to the realm of the pleasant. The regulative principle thus seems to unite all *requisita* in itself: it is *a priori*, without being rule-binding, it leaves room for the individual without abandoning the field as a whole to empiricism. The concept of an aesthetic ought, of a duty towards beauty in general, would be the sought-after middle term that settles and rewards all the efforts of the epoch of taste.

dinis". (Poet. IV. c. 1. p. 177.) *Convenientia* (cō[xp.7]TpJc), the fundamental condition of every whole, is a social as well as an aesthetic concept.

However profound and valuable the idea of an aesthetic duty may be, it is obvious that it is by no means sufficient to solve the complex problem. The dignity of the beautiful is indeed saved by it. It completely changes the view of the aesthetic field whether an ought is recognized in it or not. But what has been gained for the understanding of aesthetic phenomena, the aesthetic human being and the work of art through the new principle? Quite nothing really. The principle of the unity of taste judgments presented as a task detaches aesthetics from empiricism. But that is all it can do; it does not possess any power to construct aesthetics itself. The attitude that lives in it is fruitful, not the principle itself. It is the attitude of a moderate rationalism. The age of taste and feeling had destroyed the rationalist belief in one universal beauty. The idea of transforming the lost unity into a distant, unattainable ideal preserves in its own way the mood of rationalism under the sobering breath of the age of criticism. But in its abstractness it is neither sufficient to teach us to understand the living fullness of the aesthetic field, nor can it even be considered an aesthetic principle in the narrower sense. For the regulative principle as such also has meaning in other areas.

The mere notion of the regulative idea would not have been able to free the aesthetic problem from the entanglements in which we see it entangled during the epoch of the critique of taste. Nevertheless, the idea of applying the principle of the regulative to the aesthetic problem contains a clue to the solution. The idea of the regulative was developed by Kant in the transcendental dialectic; it is connected with the concept of the idea. Even if the concept of the regulative idea is too abstract to be fruitful for aesthetics, Kant's doctrine of ideas contains the redeeming thought for aesthetics as well. The faculty of ideas, reason, refers to an ultimate and supreme unity, to the unconditioned, which is connected with the totality of the Be-

¹ The concept of the world-whole is based on this unconditional totality.² The core of transcendental dialectics, the doctrine of antinomies, revolves around this problem. The concept of this unity closes and crowns the theoretical part of critical philosophy. It recedes completely in ethics, but reappears at a decisive point in the doctrine of beauty and the theory of organic life. Aesthetics and biology lead the last, highest concept of the theory of cognition, as it were, over into reality: the beautiful object, the aesthetic observer and the living bear the form of totality in themselves. This form of wholeness, which belongs to the unconditioned,³ is the concept through which the final and most difficult problems of critical thinking find their resolution.

We have already encountered the concept of wholeness in earlier sections and again most recently in the exposition of Kant's aesthetics.⁴ We were able to distinguish between two kinds of wholeness: the subjective ideal wholeness of all those who judge the same impression, to which I refer in the judgment of reflection, and the real objective wholeness of certain objects or actions, which is incomprehensible to the intellect and accessible only to taste. These objectively occurring wholes make criticism necessary because there are no rules for them; but the fact that there is a certain unity of those who judge subjectively according to taste is what makes criticism possible in the first place. For since, notwithstanding the independence of each individual reaction of taste, the judges form an ideal whole, the judgment of taste does not run aimlessly into the void; as an individual judgment it has at the same time a general meaning, it signifies something, i.e. it refers to a general. This general cannot take the form of

¹ B 379.

² B 434.

³) That the strong suppression of the idea of totality, which the Critique of Pure Reason shows, is connected with Kant's ethical metaphysics, will be shown in another book.

⁴) Cf. above p. 139 f. (Baumgarten) p. 242. (Tetens) p. 244 ff. (Moritz) p. 284 f. (Kant).

of the law, because the law does not preserve the particular, but destroys it. It must be a general of its own kind. One could call it the general of criticism. All concordant judgments of taste taken together result in only an empirical generality. However, this generality bears the stigma of the "comparative" only in relation to the strict, unconditional generality of the law. If we do not take the standpoint of number, if we look at the "critical" generality not from the outside but from the inside, a new perspective opens up. The number of concurring judgments of taste is only small because everyone follows themselves. If, however, each individual judgment is considered for its own form, then the disparaging moment of the larger or smaller number of concurring judgments falls away. The individual judgment of taste is related to the ideal whole of those judging, even if there is no real agreement with the judgments of others. This is what the generality of criticism means: it is internal, not external, a generality of form, not of quantity. Directly, the strict generality of the law has no relation to number. It has not arisen through generalization, but proceeds *a priori*, with necessity, to "all". Indirectly, however, the number is already contained in this "all": the generality of the law can only be realized by counting the individual cases. In contrast, the number has no meaning at all in relation to the epitome of all judges. For the realization of the generality of criticism, the enumeration of the corresponding cases is not necessary: the ideal whole is present in every single judgment. The problem of criticism, which lies in the relation of the particular to the general, is solved by the concept of the ideal whole. A new, peculiar relationship between the particular and the general emerges. Its expression is: the particular is the general.

The progress from the Critique of Taste to the Critique of Judgment is based on the recognition of this new, peculiar form of generality. There is an irreconcilable contrast between the two works

only if one stops at the opposition of the empirical principles of the Critique of Taste and the a priori principles of the Critique of Pure Reason and disregards the possibility of a distinction within the a priori principles themselves. But once it is recognized that the turn to the third critique consists in the introduction of a new form of generality and necessity, a new concept of the a priori, the gulf between the Critique of Taste and the Critique of Judgment no longer seems unbridgeable. The empirical principles of criticism look different in the light of the new generality than in the light of the generality of the law. From the point of view of the whole, number is meaningless; the instance of number is, as it were, invalidated by the concept of the whole. But it is precisely this that makes a new estimation of the generality of number possible. Compared to the strict generality of the law, the empirical generality of the cases remains irrelevant. It does not matter how many cases realize the law; the validity of the law goes beyond all actual cases. The law, which in its sense a priori includes a relation to the number ("all"), proves to be practically indifferent to the number. Conversely, the form of the whole, which has no essential inner relation to number, is by no means indifferent to the empirical cases. It is friendly towards comparative generality and gladly accepts it for confirmation. For the real judgments of taste, the cases of correspondence of judgments of taste, the empirical rules of criticism can be regarded as examples of that unity which is presented in the form of the whole. According to the Critique of Judgment, the necessity of relating beauty to pleasure is a necessity "of a special kind". It can be called exemplary, i.e. a necessity of the agreement of all to one judgment, "which is regarded as an example of a general rule that cannot be stated."¹ The general rule that cannot be stated is a necessity of a special kind.

¹Kr. d. U. § 18, p. 62 f. Cf. § 22, p. 67: "exemplary validity .

is precisely the ideal whole, that form of generality which is not identical with that of the law. The case of the law always remains a mere case. The general goes beyond it. The case of the law is not an example, but a fact. To the example belongs a quite definite kind of relation to the general: the example must be able to represent the general, i.e. contain the general entirely within itself in form. An individual statement of taste, however, can represent the totality of cases by virtue of its original relation to the ideal whole of all judges; but the individual case of a law can never do so. For it has no relation at all to the other cases. (This is also the deeper reason why empirical generality is meaningless before the generality of the law). The cases of the law are unrelated to each other. What holds them together, the necessity of the rule, is apart from them. They are not examples of the rule, but they realize the rule. The example does not realize a general, but it is the general in a particular case. Collecting and comparing these cases, determining their convergence or divergence and drawing empirical (generic) rules (of criticism) from them makes good sense, because each individual case is something existing in its own right, representing the whole in its own place. Collecting the cases of the law, on the other hand, is superfluous - they can tell us no more than what the law already contains in any case.

The "collection" of judgments of taste and the rules that result from them can never lead to an a priori principle. But that is not their purpose either. Philosophical aesthetics only seeks to prove that they are based on an a priori principle. It would be pointless to undertake this collection at all if the aesthetic judgment were not based on some unity, i.e. if it were just as random as that about the taste of an apple. There is no objective reason for a collection of judgments about the pleasant. These judgments are unrelated to one another, none represents the whole, and therefore their empirical generality has no value.

This generality can be given deeper meaning by way of the principle derived from aesthetics. The generality of hedonic judgments in itself, however, can never lead to a principle, because the individual hedonic judgment has no meaning beyond itself.

One must bear in mind the connection indicated here in order to understand the way in which the notes Kant made on "sound" or "common" reason during the period of the Critique of Taste are internally connected with the problem of aesthetics. Common reason leads to the question of empirical generality and induction. That there is a connection between these problems and aesthetics in general is already indicated by the term critique, which plays a decisive role both in the complex of notes dealing with judgment and reflection and in the one dealing with common sense. "The science of common sense is criticism, that of scholarship is doctrine."¹ Scholarly knowledge, doctrine, has strict generality. Alongside it, there is another kind of knowledge that is not capable of establishing general laws. We have this "common" cognition (Wolff's *cognitio historica*) when we do not yet clearly see the connection between the consequences and their causes.² It is the cognition of the empirici and the animals. Wolff had already held them in very high esteem. Baumgarten's aesthetics had increased this estimation by emphasizing "sensuality". Meier already says that most of our knowledge is merely historical. The argument with which he justifies this view is the same one that underlies aesthetics in general: nature makes no leap, *ex nocte per auroram meridies*. Common knowledge is indispensable to rational knowledge; from the night of confused concepts we arrive at rational knowledge through sensory knowledge.³ Kant

¹N. 1575.

² Meier, *Auszug- aus der Vernunftlehre* (the book on which Kant's lectures on logic were based). § 18.

³ Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, § 7. Meier, *Vernunftlehre* (not the excerpt), § 33 f.

unites the opposition of common and learned knowledge with the Baum- garten-Resewitzian idea of visual cognition neglected by Meier. The common sense judges like taste in *concreto*. It has rules borrowed from experience, like the latter, etc.¹ Common and sound reason ascends from experience to the general; the scholar proceeds from the general to experience.² The general alone is not sufficient for cognition. In order to recognize, one must also know how to apply the general rules. "The faculty of judgment, judgement, common sense, are one and the same, are the faculty of understanding in its application."³ In this moment of application, common sense or judgment are related to taste.⁴ Both originally proceed, as it were, aesthetically: by example. Examples are the "chariot" of the power of judgment - which some people cannot do without for the rest of their lives.⁵ The judgment of taste is a matter of judging from the concrete situation; likewise, the sound mind does not make its judgments on the basis of general propositions, but on the basis of its own insight into the peculiarity of the particular case at hand. Of course, these judgments are also based on a general principle; however, it is not determined according to

¹ N. 1614; N. 1850.

² N. 1578.

³ N. 1861.

⁴ Judgment and common sense are also equated in the Kr. d. r. V. are equated. (B. 171 f.) Cf. also Kr. d. U. p. VII; Anthrop. p. 28, 108 f., 140 (Ac. ed.); Logic p. 29 - This connection is already present in Gottsched's pre-Kantian aesthetics. Through taste, beauty is "only indistinctly, although very clearly, perceived", i.e. one is unable to indicate why something is pleasing, even if the idea of beauty itself is clear. According to Gottsched, the means to promote good taste is the "use of common sense". This stands in contrast to the belief in authority and law. "Nothing should be considered beautiful or ugly because you have heard it called so, or because all the people you know think it is: But examine it in and for itself, whether it be so." This procedure made the Greeks great; they were "the most sensible people in the world. Everything philosophized there; everything judged freely and followed its own head." (Gottsched, Krit. Dichtk. 2nd ed. 1737. p. 120, 123 f.)

⁵ B. 173 f.

The judgment is not merely deduced from a law, but is gained anew from the respective situation. In the "application" of the rules by the sound mind, the general is generated anew each time, so to speak. The "faculty of understanding in its application" is the faculty of understanding in its personal, original manifestation.

From this follows the insight into the connection between two important methods. Common reason ascends from experience to the general, and it is at the same time the understanding (i.e. the faculty of the general) in its application. The ascent from experience to a general, i.e. the process of induction, and the descent from a general to the concrete, i.e. actual judgment, are related methods. Both involve a relationship between the general and the particular, i.e. the actual problem of criticism. Both have something decisive in common with the judgment of taste: the aesthetic judgment is first of all the application of a general that remains hidden, as it were (the ideal whole of the judges) in a concrete case. But since I can never know whether I have really reached the opinion of the ideal whole, the judgment of taste is in reality only a reference to this higher unity and an invitation to discover it. Both express one and the same fact seen from different sides. In the language of the Critique of Pure Reason, the problem of the application of a given general is called that of schematism, but the problem of the ascent of experience to a higher unity is called that of reason in its hypothetical use.¹ Reason in its hypothetical use, however, is identical with the reflective power of judgment. The characteristic of its procedure is that the general is "only problematically assumed" and is a mere idea, while the particular is established as "certain". It is now a matter of finding the relationship of the particular to this general. To

¹B. 171; B. 175; B. 674.

For this purpose, "several particular cases, which are altogether certain, are tried on the rule to see whether they flow from it, and in this case, if it appears that all the particular cases to be stated follow from it, the generality of the rule is inferred, but from this, subsequently, all cases which are not given in themselves are inferred."¹ This use of reason, in contrast to the constitutive (apodictic) use, is called the regulative use.² The problem of induction and the idea of the regulative are thus indicated in their inner connection. It has been shown that it is not the general concept of the idea or of the regulative in general that is related to the problem of taste, but the regulative idea in its relation to the problem of induction. The concept, however, which critically solves the problem of induction is that of the system. Without the transcendental presupposition of the systematic unity of intellectual knowledge, there would be neither induction nor empirical generality. Criticism and taste, reflection, empirical generality and induction are connected. In induction, we reflect backwards, as it were, from the particular to a "problematically assumed" general idea; we are in search of the general. In aesthetic reflection we try to make a general judgment about the thing, to judge the part, i.e. the perceived moment, from the general, i.e. from the whole.³ In both cases the "general" is not given, but a mere idea, and this idea has the property of giving the individual a meaning which it does not have under the law. The judgment of the understanding does not include a consideration of the "others" any more than the case of the law includes the other cases. The necessity of the intellect is independent of the individual experience.

¹B. 674 f.

²B. 675.

³ "It would seem that everything that is judged from private feeling, i.e. from the part as principio, is subject to the criticism of that which is judged from the general, i.e. from the whole, and therefore the variable by the constant and unchangeable. From this latter comes the ought." (N. 1817.)

experience. There is no comparison of judgments, cases, objects among themselves under the general of the law. On the other hand, the method which has the general in the form of wholeness as its presupposition must be called the comparative method: taste, as the faculty of choosing universally, is nothing other than a faculty of comparing oneself with others. This comparing is not to be understood as an outwardly sideways attitude, or even a desire to be better. Rather, it means confronting oneself, an unbiased eye-to-eye look, self-criticism, knowledge.

"Compare Diehl recognize what you are."

Comparison in this sense belongs to a method of cognition which is entirely different from that which takes place under the general law. Taste begins with the comparison of sensations.¹ It is by comparison that the sound mind, which seeks to draw the general from the particular, obtains its judgments.² Comparison is the means of arriving at general concepts (not laws!). But we can only organize the similarities among things, which cause us to group them into species and genera, and only notice them at all, if we reflect from each individual to a presupposed system of relations within which it has a somehow definite place. In the same way, we cannot make a true judgment of taste without comparing our judgment with that of others, i.e. without referring inwardly to the whole of the judges. The method of aesthetic and the method of logical reflection is the same. - But it is not only to the method of logical reflection, which is similar to the method of induction, that the theory of the judgment of taste leads us. For the Kant of the 1960s, there is a final and highest analogy to "aesthetics": this is the

¹ Cf. above p. 266; 275.

² It is the method followed by Kant in his lectures of the 1960s to train the mind by "practicing it in judgments of experience and making it attentive to what the compared sensations of its senses can teach it." (Nachricht etc. Ak. Ausg. II, 306.)

Metaphysics. Kant's mood at this time was one of doubt about metaphysics as a science. His reservations are initially expressed in the form of a distinction between two different methods: the method of mathematics and that of philosophy. The definitions of mathematics arise synthetically through the "arbitrary combination" of concepts; the definitions of "worldly wisdom", i.e. metaphysics, on the other hand, arise analytically through "separation" (abstraction). There the concept first arises through the definition. Here, an indeterminate, confused concept is given from the outset, and it is a matter of making it "detailed and definite".¹ In mathematics, there are no indissoluble concepts. For "mathematics never explains a given concept by dissecting it, but by arbitrarily connecting an object whose thought is first made possible by this". In worldly wisdom, on the other hand, there are innumerable ones, since it is impossible "that general knowledge of such great variety should be composed of only a few basic concepts".² Therefore, the object of mathematics is easy and simple, but that of philosophy is difficult and complex.³ In the theory of magnitudes, the simplest and most general is also the easiest and occurs first. In the "main science", however, it is the most difficult and comes last. In metaphysics one cannot begin with definitions.⁴ Hence it is that philosophy can neither be learned nor taught. The sciences that can be learned can be divided into two categories: historical and mathematical⁽⁵⁾ (As examples of the former, Kant mentions, in addition to history proper, the description of nature, the study of language, and the study of the human mind.

¹ Inquiry into the clarity of the principles etc. 1763, Ac. Ausg. II, 276 f,

² A reference to quality in contrast to the quantity that prevails in mathematics. (Untersuchung etc. II, 280.) As an example, Kant mentions here the concepts of imagination, time, space, feelings (e.g. the sublime and the beautiful), pleasure, displeasure, desire and disgust.

³ Investigations II, 282.

⁵ Message II, 308.

⁵ Message II, 306.

and positive law). Philosophy belongs neither to the one nor to the other. It cannot be taught: "The reason is that in those sciences there is a common standard, but in this one everyone has his own."¹ In order to be able to learn philosophy, one would have to have one. But there is as yet no doctrine of metaphysics. "Metaphysics is undoubtedly the most difficult of all human insights; but one has never yet been written."² There is no metaphysics that could be taught, just as there is no dogmatic aesthetics whose rules can be memorized in order to become a judge of taste. In both cases, doctrine fails. What matters here is "one's own insight". The Organon of Metaphysics is on a par with the Organon of Beauty: everyone has their own standard here - both are subjective. Only philosophizing can be learned, not philosophy.³ In the opposition of "philosophy" and "philosophizing", the contrast between doctrine and criticism, rule and taste, general standard and individual judgment appears in a new sphere, as it were. Philosophizing requires a mind, a talent, a person - just as judging beauty requires more than a rule, namely taste.

The difference between philosophy and science also corresponds to a difference in the method of teaching. The peculiar method of teaching worldly wisdom is not dogmatic, but tentative, i.e. exploratory.⁴ "Only when reason is already more practiced" does it become dogmatic, Kant adds, "in various parts". Thus it need not originally be dogmatic. It follows from this qualification that not only the method of teaching worldly wisdom must be called dogmatic, but also the method of worldly wisdom itself. For the word zetetic, however, the word "critical" can be used, as is clear from the contrast to "dogmatic". The connection

¹ Message II, 308.

² Investigations II, 283. Similar passages against metaphysics: ib. 290. "Ground of proof, etc." II, 66; 71. note II, 307.

³ Message ü, 306 f.

* Message II, 307.

of the problem of aesthetics and the problem of metaphysics is thus clear: both "sciences", if one may say so, meet in the concept of criticism. They can only be practiced, not taught. There are philosophers, a philosophical genius, as one might say by way of explanation, but no philosophy, just as there is a subjective power of judgment, a feeling for beauty, but no doctrine of taste. This view cannot be called skeptical of philosophy in general, for the fact that there is philosophizing is not in the least doubted.

The consequence indicated here was not actually drawn by Kant; however, it lies at the bottom of the thoughts raised. Around the middle of the 1960s, the state of Kant's mind with regard to metaphysics was very precarious. One can see him wavering. The skeptical mood is already very strong, but he does not yet dare to question the whole thing. However, the suggestion of a "zetetic method" for worldly wisdom already contains the saving thought. Even if it looks dangerous when the source of metaphysics is shifted to the subject, the danger is eliminated as soon as the subject itself is no longer regarded as something merely "subjective". After all, recognizing the rational in the subjective is the entire endeavour of the epoch of taste. Doubts about the possibility of a scientific metaphysics, which of course could no longer be "dogmatic", were overcome as soon as a method was found that had the objectivity of the subjective as its basic idea. Such a method can be seen as a consequence of the idea of replacing philosophy with philosophizing, doctrine with criticism. When Kant says in the second edition of his main work that he is not giving "a system of science itself", but only "a treatise on method",¹ we see here the same opposition of dogmatic and critical (or zetetic) as in the 1960s. It is more than a coincidence that in the notice of the establishment of his lectures in the winter semester of 1765-66 the expressions "critique of reason" and "critique of method" are used.

¹B. XXII.

of taste, i.e. aesthetics"" can be mentioned side by side.¹ The Critique of Reason is by no means understood here as the Critique of Pure Reason. But as a symbolic indication of the connection between the aesthetic and the epistemological problem under the term critique, the passage is not without significance. Kant's critical business forms a unity, beginning and end are intertwined. It is still more correct to say that the Critique of Taste is the first of the three critiques² than to call the third critique a "systematically" generated conclusion of the first critique. But the critique of taste is still not the "first" critique. In the complex of ideas that the aesthetic-critical century presented to Kant, we have before us only the most important source of criticism with regard to the solution of the problem. The actual impetus for the critique of reason did not originate in the aesthetic field, but came from the conflict between metaphysics and natural science.³ Only in connection with mathematics and Newtonian natural science was Kant able to bring the basic philosophical problem to the clarity and sharpness of transcendental deduction. The theory of experience had to precede the theory of the beautiful. Only after the problem of knowledge had been solved could the brilliance of critical clarity spread into the depths where the critical problem actually has its home. The critique of taste is not yet the critique of judgment. But in the concept of reflection (critique) the deeper connection (reflective power of judgment) is implied. Only apparently does the word "critique" in the title of the Critique of Taste refer to a merely empirical generality, whereas in the second (Critique of Reason) it refers to an a priori principle. The empirical generality itself, as soon as it is seen in connection with the problem of taste, points to a new and separate a priori principle.

¹ Ac. Ausg.- II. P. 311.

² O. Schlapp, Kant's Doctrine of Genius. S. 74.

³ See below p. 311.

Having outlined the inner possibility of the transition from the Critique of Taste to the Critique of Judgment, we will now try to gain insight into the actual process of the emergence of the third Critique. Unfortunately, the available evidence is not sufficient for us to form a clear picture of the course of events. The clarification and summarization of the material compiled over a period of decades took place in a very short time. Schlapp correctly describes the whole epoch with the words: "A steady, consistent development since 1775 cannot be proven at any point. One can only see that the masses are in a state of flux, and something new and original is being prepared. The solution awaits, as it were, the external impetus of the foreign body thrown in, which is destined to lead to crystallization and definitive systematization."¹ Schlapp regards the concept of genius as this foreign body. From a systematic point of view, it is now quite possible to place the concept of genius at the center of Kant's aesthetics. However, as far as the process of the emergence of the third critique is concerned, Schlapp's view cannot be upheld. We have no evidence that the doctrine of formal expediency, of the general validity and necessity of the judgment of taste developed under the influence of the doctrine of genius.² If one places the concept of genius at the center of the work, one does not start from the individual aesthetic concepts, but from the overall intention of the Critique of Judgment. Then, however, the logical and epistemological side must also come to the fore. What makes the concept of genius philosophically significant is its relationship to the ultimate metaphysical problems. Schlapp has no sense of this side of the third critique.³ This is connected with his overestimation of the English influence. Whoever elevates the concept of genius to the center of the Critique of Judgment must be aware that this is the most important problem of German philosophy: the

¹ Kant's doctrine of genius, p. 302.

² Kant's doctrine of genius, p. 387.

³ Kant's doctrine of genius, p. 385.

contrast between nature and rule, fact and possibility, individuality and law. An account of Kant's aesthetics from the point of view of genius can only be undertaken on the basis of an overall view of the development of metaphysics in the 18th century, not on the basis of an external history of the concept of genius.

Schlapp's assumption that the "foreign body" that brought about the crystallization was the concept of genius is most strongly supported by the fact that the idea that is new in the Critique of Judgment in comparison with the Critique of Taste, the idea of the "play" of the faculties of knowledge, is historically (compare Baumgarten) as well as factually most closely connected with the concept of genius.¹ Nevertheless, it cannot be assumed that the concept of the play of the faculties gave the impetus for the crystallization. The concept of play, the final form that the concept of "judgment" assumes, only made it possible for Kant to develop the conception of the Critique of Judgment. It is a consequence of this conception, not its cause. One must not conclude from the fact that the concept of the play of the faculties in the finished work links the doctrine of taste with the doctrine of genius and teleology that this connection is the historical source of the whole work. The germ of the third critique is contained in the idea of applying the concept of the idea in the form of a system to the field of beauty. In the letter to Reinhold of December 28, 1787, which first announces the new critique, there is no mention of the "power of judgment". However, the basic idea of the work is already clear. Teleology, containing a special "kind of principles a priori", corresponds to the faculty of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. This is the basic systematic concept and at the same time the long-prepared historical act: the concept of purpose

¹ Schlapp's work was inspired by Windelband. Windelband traces the connection of the Critique of Taste with teleology, which produced the Critique of Judgment, back to the concept of the play of the faculties, and believes that the new insight grew out of Kant's investigations into the logical structure of aesthetic judgment. (Ac. ed. of the Kr. d. U. vol. V. 515 f.)

enters into a relationship with the problem of the irrational and, with the problem of taste, simultaneously solves that of induction, indeed that of the relationship between the "particular" and the "general" in general. The concept of system finds its own "domain".¹ Thus an empirical object is found for it - the individual in the form of the aesthetic human being and the organism - whereas the critique of pure reason only knows how to name the whole world as the object of the concept of system. Here lies the real progress of the third critique. It has been considered more important than necessary that the actual idea of the Critique of Judgment has only been documented since the letter of May 12, 1879 (at the end of 1787 the third Critique was still called the Critique of Taste)². The integration of the Critique of Taste into a larger context, which the expression of the reflective "power of judgment in general", which deals with the aesthetic and teleological powers of judgment, already lies in the idea of purpose.

Read with the necessary historical perspective, the letter to Reinhold (December 28, 1787) at least provides the general picture of the emergence of the third critique. "I may, without being guilty of self-conceit, assure you that the longer I continue on my path, the less anxious I become that a contradiction or even an alliance (which is not uncommon nowadays) could ever do considerable harm to my system. This is an intimate conviction, which only arises from the fact that, in the progress of other investigations, I not only always find it in agreement with itself, but also, if I sometimes do not know how to approach the method of investigation of an object properly, I may only look back to that general description of the elements of knowledge and the corresponding powers of the mind in order to obtain information of which I was not aware. Thus I now occupy myself with the criticism of taste, on which occasion another kind of principles a priori are discovered.

¹ "ditio". (Introduction to the Kr. d. U. p. XVI.)

² B. Erdmann, Einleitung- zu der Ausgabe der Kr. d. U. von 1880, p. XIX. Similarly C. Th. Michaelis, Zur Entstehung von Kants Kr. d. U. Programm Berlin 1802, p. 7.

than the previous ones. For the faculties of the mind are three: the faculty of knowledge, the faculty of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire. For the first I have found a priori principles in the Critique of Pure (Theoretical) Reason, for the third in the Critique of Practical Reason. I sought them also for the second, and although I thought it otherwise impossible to find them, the systematic nature which the dissection of the previously considered faculties had also led me to discover in the human mind, and which to admire and, where possible, to fathom, will still provide me with enough material for the rest of my life, I have nevertheless set out on this path, so that I now recognize three parts of philosophy, each of which has its a priori principles that can be counted and the scope of the knowledge possible in this way can be determined with certainty - theoretical philosophy, teleology and practical philosophy, of which the middle one is admittedly found to be the poorest in terms of a priori determinants. I hope to be finished with this, under the title of the Critique of Taste, in the Mskpt. towards Easter, although not in print." This passage in the letter is the most important evidence we have of the genesis of the Third Critique. We have no reason to distrust the account given here. Kant's words breathe the happiness of the finder.¹ Something has dawned on him. He himself is surprised by the new "part of philosophy" that he has so suddenly discovered. The words certainly sound tricky: he had sought principles a priori for the faculty of feeling, the "systematic" had set him on the path. Is this not an open admission of his drive to systematize? - It all depends on the correct understanding of the beginning of the sentence: "I also sought it for the second...". Kant does not say that the "systematic" led him to seek a principle a priori for the faculty of feeling, but only that it set him on the path of finding it. Kant searched for many years, and quite independently of "systematic" considerations. The fact that led him to

¹Only recognizable to those who are familiar with Kant's concise epistolary style. The 'elevated mood' is even clearer in the letter to Herz, written four days earlier. (Dec. 24, 1787.)

search was the problem of "taste". Now there is nothing in the letter to Reinhold to suggest that the problem of taste played a decisive role. But why did Kant search at all? Why was the faculty of feeling, to which he otherwise only turned the interest of the anthropologist, so important to him that he distinguished it as a separate "faculty"? Here lies the key to the genetic understanding of the third critique. It is not as if Kant had first possessed the "faculty" of feeling and then asked himself: where is the a priori principle belonging to it; rather, the faculty of feeling only emerges in relation to the aesthetic problem and its possibilities of solution. To the extent that Kant's feeling became problematic (i.e. significant), the possibility of a systematic answer also grew, because the existing aesthetic germs of thought had to grow to the same extent. The mere question of the principle a priori of the second faculty already presupposed the entire aesthetic thought work of the "Critique of Taste". The inconspicuous "I also sought it for the second" contains the continuity that the expression "the systematic led me to it" seems to deny. Feeling would never have become a faculty in its own right if it had not had something in advance, both personally and historically, through its relationship to taste. Only through the fact that feeling became the symbol of the problem of the irrational in general could the question of its principle become acute a priori. The relation to this general problem, however, had the most important consequences for the solution. Since the question of feeling was closely linked to that of taste, the problem of the irrational had to become an aesthetic problem. It had thus become comprehensible; at the same time, everything that Kant had thought about the problem of taste was set in motion to solve this general question.

Let us take another look at the changes that the transition from the "Critique of Taste" to the "Critique of Judgment" has brought about in the disposition of the existing masses of thought. The "systematic" has led to a completely new grouping and decisive arrangement of the available material.

the same time. The uniform emphasis on concepts in the anthropological and logical reflections has been replaced by a rhythmic accentuation. What belonged to the problem of taste was included in the sections of "Analytics" and "Dialectics" corresponding to the disposition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and, since it did not quite want to adapt to this framework, was stretched and stretched until it went in (with tiresome repetitions). Everything else was tacitly appended to the "dialectic of aesthetic judgment". The whole mass of material is illuminated by a central light source. The problem of the general validity of aesthetic judgments, a logical culmination of the questions inherent in the concepts of taste and criticism, takes center stage and determines the selection and grouping of thoughts. The logical moment takes precedence over the psychological one, so that in a certain sense one could say that the Critique of Taste and the Critique of Judgment relate to each other like the first and second editions of the Critique of Reason. The logical moments crystallize in the terms "power of judgment" and "expediency". The concept of the play of the powers of cognition, which establishes the connection with the concept of genius, is a new addition. It forms the focus of the first book of the Analytic (Analytic of the Beautiful). The concept of the sublime, taken from the literature of the time and corresponding to Kant's innermost inclinations, is developed in the second book of the Analytic. Valuable psychological details were dropped, such as the characterization of the different aesthetic values of the individual senses.¹ The anthropological remarks there

¹In the unfortunate polemic against Kant's aesthetics ("Kalligone"), Herder to a certain extent played off the psychology of the senses against Kant's aesthetic logicism. However, his fine characterizations of the individual sensory functions are only a continuation of what Kant used to give in his Kolleg. Kant's aesthetic ranking of the senses is based on the principle of communicability. Because sensations cannot be communicated (neither in understanding nor in perception), they have the lowest rank in aesthetic perfection... Contemplation can be described and is retained in the imagination." (N. 755.) The sense of sight stands highest. "The objects of the face alone are capable of beauty, because they come nearest to pure contemplation..." (N. 733.)

which are related to the problem of taste, were retained. Only now Kant separates precisely the anthropological moment, as belonging to the "empirical interest in beauty" ¹, from the philosophical justification. It is in the "Appendix" to the Dialectic, which contains the concept of genius and the doctrine of beauty as a symbol of morality, that the 18th century lives on most freely and powerfully. It is no wonder that the historical impact of Kant's aesthetics originated here: in this part Kant had done the least work of his own, he was the greatest mediator of precious historical goods. The logical work in the first half was initially lost. The second half showed Romanticism, Schiller and Schelling their century as if in a burning mirror. History has, as it were, undone Kant's editorial work on the "Critique of Taste". It is time to do justice to Kant's great achievement as a whole.

¹ Kr. d. U., § 41, p. 161 f.

B. Logic

a. The dissertation from 1770

Kant's critical mood towards metaphysics, which is unmistakable in the writings from the mid-1960s, changed towards the end of the decade. The "Dreams of a Spirit-Seer" leaves metaphysics alone; the irony of the work is not directed against metaphysical knowledge in general, but only against a metaphysics that speaks of spirits "which belong as parts to the whole of the world".¹ In the last and most important of the pre-critical writings, however, the dissertation of 1770, the realm of metaphysics, the mundus intelligibilis, is restored in all its splendor. The "fog of confusion" (con- fusionis nebulae, Diss. § 7), which always threatens to cloud metaphysical knowledge, recedes. For the first time, Kant takes the path of epistemological criticism, and it almost seems as if the separation of "sensory" and conceptual knowledge in the dissertation has given him new confidence in metaphysics. However, the importance of the treatise in this respect should not be overestimated. Although its structure is aimed at metaphysics, the dissertation should not be regarded as having been written to save metaphysics. Its interest is directed towards method. The aim is to free the intelligible world from the "contagion"² of sensuality. This means that not only metaphysics is recognized in its independence, but also the science of the sensible world. The method of cognitio sensitive is recognized as equal in principle to the method of cognitio intellectualis, even if it only refers to "appearances".³ The recognition and description

¹ Träume eines Geistersehers, Ac. Ed. II, p. 321 Anm.

² "sensitivae cognitionis cum intellectuali contagium." (Diss. § 23.) ³ "sensualium itaque datur scientia." (Diss. § 12.) Kant mentions geometry, arithmetic and pure mechanics.

of sensory cognition is what is new in the dissertation. The emphasis is on it, even if the *mundus intelligibilis* is still considered the main thing.

The satisfaction of having reached the boundary between metaphysics and empirical science did not last long. Slowly but steadily, Kant's thinking progressed towards the positions of the critique of reason. From the dissertation, the train of thought leads directly on to transcendental aesthetics and logic. At the same time, however, the dissertation is the most mature and purest product of the epoch of German philosophy characterized by Baumgarten's spirit. It is a work of indescribable historical magic, end and beginning at the same time. A breath of the morning blows through it. The work of 1770 relates to the *Aesthetica* of 1750 like the young day to the dawn. One could call the dissertation Baumgarten's aesthetics that has reached self-consciousness. And yet the treatise is at the same time highly personal, granular, condensed, a collection of important definitions. The overcoming of the idea of an "indistinct" intellectual cognition, to which Baumgarten makes the first approach, is complete. The "indistinct" intellectual conception is transformed into clear, sensual knowledge. "Confusion affects the mind as well as sensuality: obscure thoughts." The lower faculty of cognition is "not the faculty of obscure conception, but the faculty of perception."¹ "But sensual ideas can be very clear and intellectual ones very confused."² This is the ultimate contrast to Wolff. A new epoch of German philosophy begins.

'N. 217. N. 221

² "Possunt autem sensitiva admodum esse distincta et intellectualia maxime confusa." (Diss. § 7.) The "Versuch über das Genie" by the Baumgarten student Resewitz already contains the same thought. Not only the knowledge attained through the senses ("confused") is perceptive, but every knowledge that presents the thing itself to us ("real" knowledge). The indistinct knowledge obtained through the senses can be "highly distinct. (Sammlung vermischter Schriften. 3rd vol. 1760. p. 8; 38.)

The past initially lives in the terminology. The language of the dissertation is Baumgarten's.¹ Kant continues on the path that Baumgarten had taken in the *Meditations*: to penetrate the sphere of sensuality with philosophical concepts. The boldest and most consistent expression of the dissertation in this direction is that of the "laws of sensuality" ("leges sensualitatis", Diss. § 3). To reflect the historical coloring of the expression in the translation, one would have to say: the laws of sensuality. Baumgarten had distinguished the *cognitio sensitiva* *qua talis* as the place of origin of beauty. Kant uses the same phrase, as it were involuntarily, at the point where he first develops the general difference between sensual and intellectual cognition.² Baumgarten's terminological ingenuity also prepared the most important distinction that the dissertation makes in the doctrine of sensuality. Based on the expression *appetitus sensitivus*, he coined the term *repraesentatio sensitiva*.³ The word *sensitiv* is the dominant term in the *Meditations*. Kant's dissertation uses it to make the fundamental distinction between empirical-sensual ideas or sensations (*cognitiones sensuales*) and purely sensual ones (*repraesentationes sensitivae*).⁴

¹ It was an innovation when Baumgarten (in the *Meditations* he did not yet dare to do so) said *facultas cognoscitiva inferior* instead of *facultatis cognoscitivae pars inferior*. (Cf. above. p. 190.) Kant also makes the faculty of sensory cognition terminologically independent by daring to say *facultas cognoscendi sensitiva*. (Diss. § 1.) The expressions *sensualitas* and *cognitio sensualis* are coined in the same sense. - The expression *perfectio noumenon* appears as a parallel to Baumgarten's expression *perfectio phaenomenon* for beauty. (Diss. § 9.)

² Baumgarten, *Aesthetica* § 14; Diss. § 6.

³ "Repraesentationes per partem facultatis cognoscitivae inferiorem comparatae sint sensitivae." (Baumgarten, *Med.* § 5.) Cf. above p. 214².

⁴ Diss. § 5 - The translation: *empirisch-sinnlich* - *rein sinnlich* for "sensual" and "sensitiv" is from Tieftrunk. (Quoted in Vor- länder's translation of the dissertation. *Philos. Bibliothek* vol. 46 b, p. 97.) - Cf. diss. § 14, 3, where "non sensualis" and "purus" are used as synonymous.

The main idea presented in Kant's dissertation, however, grew out of an area to which Baumgarten had no access. It is an established fact of recent Kant research that the problem of antinomies had a decisive influence on the development of critical philosophy. There was a profound conflict between metaphysics and natural science in the 18th century. The cosmology of the school built up the world as a limited one consisting of ultimate simple parts; science, on the other hand, taught the infinite extension of space and the divisibility of matter into infinity. The question of how to resolve this conflict was the epistemological and metaphysical problem of the century. Kant had taken a decisive step towards a solution in the small treatise of 1768: "On the First Ground of the Difference of Regions in Space". In it, the originality of space from "apparent experience" was briefly and strikingly demonstrated in contrast to the misleading concepts of metaphysics. Absolute space is independent of the existence of all matter and has its own reality as the first reason for the possibility of its composition.¹ This clear insight into the originality of absolute space and, subsequently, of time, gained by means of an incessant thinking through of the antinomy between natural science and metaphysics, forms the gateway to the dissertation. The realization of the originality of the conception of space is the decisive factor. The difference, which lies in the fact that the dissertation no longer conceives of space as an objective reality, is not important here. Kant progressed very quickly from the idea of the original, absolute space to the idea of the original (sensual) view of space. It was the aesthetic-logical tradition of the school that put him in a position to so punctually conceptualize the notion of a *sui generis* sensory cognition as distinct from the intellectual one that suddenly appeared before him. He owes to it the conceptual means by which he was able to turn those insights into philo

¹From the first reason etc. Ac. ed. II, P. 378; P. 383.

of sophistical exactitude, which had become available to him on the way via the problem of antinomies. The progression from Baumgarten's aesthetics to transcendental aesthetics thus does not take place in such a way that thinking about the *facultas cognoscitiva inferior* would have led Kant to the conception of the idea of pure perception. Riehl rightly says that Kant did not start from sensuality as a psychological faculty, distinct from the faculty of thinking. "One could rather say that he went back to sensuality after he had previously investigated the nature of space and time, namely world space and absolute time, and had been enlightened about their nature by the antinomy."¹ However, between a subjective-psychological distinction between sensuality and understanding, as presented in certain parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the objective approach to the problem of antinomies, there is a third factor. Once space and time had been recognized in their objective originality, it remained to bring them to a precise definition as methods of knowledge. Kant would never have been able to accomplish this logical work without the preliminary work of the school. In the school's philosophy he found the concepts with whose help he succeeded in defining space and time as methods of perception. "*Anschauung*" is the decisive new term of the dissertation - and at the same time the term that leads directly into critical philosophy.² The

¹ A. Riehl, *Der philosophische Kritizismus I*, 2nd ed. S. 345.

² The prefixing of time to the description of the forms of perception in the dissertation led Riehl to attribute to time a significance for the development of critical philosophy that it does not have. After all, the contradiction in the conception of the temporal duration of the world may have been the first contradiction of reason that Kant discovered (Riehl, *Der philos. Krit. I*, 2nd ed. p. 360) - but this only proves that this was the way in which he arrived at the solution. The solution itself, however, followed his new insight into the nature of space. This is proven not only by the treatise of 1778, but also by the text of the dissertation. In the 1770 work, time is conceived as a form of coordination, like space. What is true of space is also true of time. The expressions of seeing that are used in the

The crystal clarity with which Kant already dissects this difficult term in the work of 1770, the certainty with which he avoids any provisionality and indeterminacy, any psychologism, is perhaps the most beautiful fruit of the logical culture of the 18th century. Baumgarten's aesthetics prefigured the procedure that Kant now used. It consisted of descending from the conceptual to the sub-conceptual. Baumgarten's school had already reached the word *Anschauung* in this way; but it did not possess enough logical ingenuity to make use of the discovery. This was Kant's work: his genius brought forth, as the culmination of the epoch of taste, that theory of the view and the concept which forms the epistemological foundation of the critique of reason. For it is not only transcendental aesthetics - transcendental logic is also rooted in that happy starting point of Baumgarten's method; the theory of perception could not be developed without this also having important consequences for the theory of the concept.

At first, of course, what the dissertation proclaims does not exactly seem to be great news. Wolff had already accorded a great deal to sensory knowledge, the *cognitio historica*, and with Meier, the knowledge of the senses was already threatening to gain epistemological predominance over that of the intellect. Locke's and Hume's philosophy of experience had fertilized German thought in the previous decades. What was the difference between Kant's theory of a dissertation play such an important role, are taken from the nature of space. However, as long as no distinction was made between space and time, they could also be related to time. If Kant therefore, perhaps for the reason given by Riehl, put time first in the dissertation, this does not in any case prove anything against the possibility that it was the nature of space which - always assuming the impulse of the time antinomy - would have brought him to the new theory of sensuality. On the other hand, the prefixing of space to time in the *Critique of Pure Reason* can be seen as a subsequent recognition of the relationship asserted here. In the order of the space and time arguments, the dissertation preserves the gratitude for the initial impulse, while transcendental aesthetics preserves the memory of the conception of the solution.

cognitio sensitiva and an emphasis on sensation and perception? - For Kant, "sensory cognition" does not merely mean empirical cognition through sensations. The old wisdom of empiricism is not reaffirmed by the dissertation; on the contrary, it is overturned and refuted. Empiricism thought it had said something when it emphasized the necessity of an extra- logically given sensation. Kant readily concedes sensualitas as a receptivitas subiecti at the beginning of experiential knowledge. The subject's imaginative state must be "affected by a present object. (Diss. § 3.) But then he continues the thought in a way that actually does away with empiricism. Within the cognitio sensualis he distinguishes one component, which he calls matter, from another, which he calls form. Matter is sensation (sensatio); according to it a conception is called sensual (empirical-sensual). Form, on the other hand, lies in the laws of sensuality; according to it, an idea is called sensitive (purely sensual). The sensitive conception, as distinct from the merely sensual, is the actual discovery of the dissertation. The cognitio sensitiva that Kant refers to is a process of the mind. It is based on a "lex quadam menti insita, sensa ab obiecti praesentia orta sibimet coordinandi". (Diss. § 4.) The sensations changing with the subjects and their constitutions are presupposed. Philosophy initially has nothing to do with the matter that underlies all knowledge. But sensations (sensationes) are related to one another, have a form, and even this form is still sensuous, sharply separated from all intellectual order. On the other hand, it is not sensual in the sense of lawless sensation. The "prototype" of the cognitio sensitiva is the clearest of all sciences, geometry. (Diss. § 7.) So even though the metaphysician may say that all that is sensually represented only represents things as they appear, whereas what is thought represents things as they are (Diss. § 4) - the epistemologist has discovered something in him that puts sensuality in a new light. The form of the sensually imagined is not itself something materially sensual. In the sensual sphere

is governed by a law of order *sui generis*. We cannot begin with sensation *per se*, but must start with what makes sensation possible in the first place. But these are the rules of coordination. They do not belong to the mind, but form a separate realm of mental activity. Two directions of this activity are to be distinguished; they correspond to the forms of space and time. Transcendental aesthetics later called them forms of perception.¹ The critique of reason has taken over all the essential definitions of this "perception" from the dissertation.

Kant's theory of perception is the mature result of the endeavors that the epoch of taste had triggered within German school philosophy. Sensuality, which Wolff admitted in abundance but only anonymously, finally gained recognition as a separate method of knowledge in Kant by way of the "lower faculty of knowledge". It is not easy to recognize the connection with "aesthetics" from the dissertation as we have it, with its strict focus on metaphysics, its armoured terminology and its rational methodology. Generally speaking, it is first of all given in the concept of sensuality. It must also be noted that in the explanatory notes to the dissertation, which Kant's student Markus Herz had published in 1771, reference is repeatedly made to aesthetics.² The

¹ "The pure form of sensory perception". (B 34 f.) The dissertation has only the expression form (§ 4) and the expression "pure intuition" ("intuitus purus", § 14, 3), not yet combining the two. *Intuitus sensitivus* (§ 2, III), *sensualitatis forma* and *sensitivae cogniti- onis forma* (§ 12) occur.

² It is an echo of the views of Frankfurt aesthetics, to which the young Kant had also paid homage, when Herz speaks in the introduction to his treatise of the "dark ages of the school ways", which surrendered to speculation without examining "the value it has in application". Our Germany, however, has Gottlob philosophers "who combine the utmost profundity with the most correct taste in works of beauty". (M. Herz, *Betrachtungen aus der spekulativen Weltweisheit*. Königsberg 1771. p. 95 f.) On pages 33-40, Herz then gives

not only stems from Herzen's personal interest in the theory of taste, but is also characteristic of the mood of the time from which Kant's dissertation emerged. The details of Kant's epistemological interest in the concept of perception, however, are also strangely parallel to the aesthetic aspirations of the generation to which he himself still belonged around the middle of the century.¹ The age of aesthetics had discovered individual reality. Although "taste" points to the inwardness of the subject, it is a subject that is alive and active in certain human relationships. Within German school philosophy, this tendency towards the real, the manifold and the sensual took the form of the question of how to move from the general and abstract to the individualized and specific. Baumgarten responded with the methods of example and comparison and the individualizing formation of concepts. His pupil Resewitz focused on the term "anschauende Erkenntnis", which is linked to the concept of genius. Flögel speaks of the "exercise" of the rules, for which the abstract system is not sufficient.² Genius is regarded as the ability that is able to take the step from the general to the particular, from the abstract to the concrete; it is the ability of realization. This function of genius is closely related to that of the power of judgment. The power of judgment decides whether a case in concreto belongs to the general seen in abstracto or not. The examples whose importance so strongly reminds the poetics and the aesthetics of Baumgarten that follow it of the separation of form and matter in the dissertation even attempt to solve the problem of taste. "The sensually beautiful object thus relates to the general rules of taste as the sensual object in general relates to those conditions which are prescribed to the soul when it is conceived, and which, as I shall show you below, consist in the concepts of space and time." (S. 36.)

¹ With his dissertation, Kant took the first decisive step out of the circle of his fellow scholars, which he had not yet left. The historical proof of this lies in the fact that the work was not fully understood by anyone.

² Cf. p. 164 f. above.

are therefore a "chariot of judgment, which he who lacks the natural talent of it can never do without"? The power of judgment cannot be learned, any more than genius.² I can know quite well in general, and yet fail in particular, in the application of the rule. The "application" is what aesthetics is all about. Generalities and rules do not help with beauty. The problem of aesthetics is actually that of representation in the view.

Beauty goes "to the sensual representation of the concept, not logically in abstracto, but aesthetically in concreto". The beautiful can serve to "make general concepts visible"? It is contemplation that gives back to the concepts "what the intellect has taken from them through abstraction." "Logical perfection is concerned with recognizing the particular in the general, the aesthetic with the general in the particular. The former reduces everything to concepts, the latter to views. They promote each other in form. The former abstracts, the latter unites much in one concept."⁴ If we add that the general belongs in concreto to the "common understanding",⁵ the connection between the concepts of contemplation, beauty and judgment (common understanding) is obvious.

¹ Cf. Kant's expression "mother wit" for judgment, a special talent, the lack of which no school, i.e. no possession of traditional rules, can replace. (B. 172.) - Above p. 293.

²B. 173 f.

³The aesthetic perfection becomes "as it were the vehicle of the logical". I only realize, so to speak, the general concepts. (Schlapp, p. 93.) Cf. b. 299: "to make sensuous a separated concept," i. e., to present to it the corresponding object in contemplation.

'N. 1935; N. 1794; N. 1806; N. 1884. Cf. also College of Logic (Philippi 1772) "Taste demands to see eye-probability and all propositions in sensuous cases in concreto." (Schlapp, p. 69; cf. p. 93, p. 223, p. 237.) - "Perfect sensuality is beauty. (All beauty consists in representation.) But sensuality consists in conformity with the subjective laws of execution, and form is co-ordination in obiectis sensuum, subordination in obiectis rationis." (N. 1799.)

⁶N. 2420.

This has given us a glimpse of the relationships that link the dissertation to the aesthetic movement of the mid-century. We can already recognize the problem of genius in one of its first sentences. It is something else, says the first paragraph, to imagine the composition of a whole in an abstract concept; it is something else to carry out this composition through the faculty of sensory cognition, i.e. to imagine it in *concreto* in a certain perception.¹ The first is a work of the intellect, the second depends on the conditions of time, is only possible through synthesis and belongs to the laws of perception.² By means of perception, however, the totality of the composition cannot be expressed. The senses are not capable of representing the intellectual concept of the world. From this follows that bias against sensual knowledge which the treatise of 1770, set on an intellectual world shining in magical splendor, still preserves despite its recognition of sensuality. If, of course, this Platonism were to collapse, then the view would take on a new value: the way would be clear for an investigation of what it is capable of achieving, after the dissertation had seen its main task as showing what the view could not achieve.

b. Coordination and subordination

1.

One of the most important reasons why the significance of Baumgarten's aesthetics for transcendental aesthetics could be overlooked for so long lies in a very specific difference in the terminology of the dissertation and the critique of reason. For the peculiarly new thing that the dissertation had to teach, the term

¹ "Aüud enim est, datis partibus compositionem totius sibi con- cipere, per notionem abstractam intellectus, aliud, hanc notionem generalem, tanquam rationis quoddam problema, exsequi per facultatem cognoscendi sensitivam, h. e. in *concreto* eandem sibi reprae- sentare intuitu distincto."

² "... pertinet ad leges intuitus."

minus coordination is characteristic. The closer definition of "form" by coordination and the corresponding definition of the logical use of reason by subordination cannot be removed from the conceptual world of the dissertation.¹ Equally, these terms are no longer to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason. By erasing them from his main work, Kant has, as it were, erased with his own hand the traces that still revealed the connection between his last results and the school's thinking.² Our task now is to rediscover these traces.

Baumgarten, sharpening the Cartesian-Leibnizian theory of concepts, distinguished between extensive and intensive clarity of concepts. The former was the result of an accumulation of characteristics, the latter of a separation of characteristics (analysis). One either adds one characteristic to another until the thing is completely determined (omnimode determinatum) and can be distinguished from all others, or one pursues each individual characteristic further into its characteristics. The former is a matter for the "beautiful", the latter for the "pure" (deep) understanding. The former procedure ends with "aesthetic" clarity; its extreme is overload, darkness. The second leads to logical clarity. Its extreme is subtlety.³ Meier, who was immediately followed by Kant, summarized this as follows: "A cognition which is clarified by the quantity of characteristics is called a vivid cognition (cognitio extensive cla-

¹ Diss. § 4, § 5. It is therefore not to be approved of that Vorländer in his translation of the dissertation transfers the term of coordination, which Kant also uses in his writings in the German text, and moreover not even consistently. Cf. Philos. Bibl. vol. 46 b 1905, p. 96, where Vorländer once puts "Zusammenordnung", once "Nebengeordnetes", whereas Kant uses coordinatio or coordinata. The translation in § 4 and in § 16 is just as erratic.

² The deeper reason for the abandonment of the term coordination in the theory of the view lies, which cannot be discussed in detail here, in Kant's later insights into the nature of time. He realized that the conception of time is in truth not a coordinating one.

³ Baumgarten, Met. § Cf. above p. 198 ff.

rior, vivida) . . . But which is clearer by the magnitude of the features and their clearer conception, that is clearer by intensity (cognitio intensive clarior)." ¹ Aesthetics deals with extensive clarity, logic with intensive clarity. This opposition of aesthetic and logical clarity, lower and upper cognitive faculties, beautiful and deep understanding, was sufficient for Baumgarten and Meier. Kant's real work consisted in pursuing the difference between the two approaches to its ultimate consequences.

The first and most important step on this path was that he defined the terms "extensity" and "intensity" more precisely using the terms "coordination" and "subordination". How important these two terms were for Kant can be seen from the numerous "Reflections" in which they appear. In this respect, the dissertation is a faithful reflection of the thoughts that moved Kant in the years when he was developing his critical point of view.

In the dissertation, coordination initially means an interchangeable term for "form".² The form of the sensible world is recognized by the view, but the law of the view is that of coordination.³ Nevertheless, Kant also speaks of a form of the intellectual world (§ 16). This gives rise to the contradiction that form and coordination are initially taken as moments of a non-sensible order in general (§ 2, II), whereas it later emerges that only the sensible world can be said to be coordinated.

The most important moment in the concept of coordination is the relationship of the coordinated parts to the unity that comprises them. Everything coordinated relates to its unity as the parts relate to the whole (complementa ad totum), while the subordinated relates to the higher as the caused relates to the cause.⁴ Subordination is

¹ Meier, Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, § 135.

² "Forma, quae consistit in substantiarum coordinatione, non subordinatione." (Diss. § 2, II; cf. § 4.)

³ Diss. § 10; § 4.

⁴ Diss. § 2, II; cf. § 14, 2; § 15, B.

the peculiarity of the logical use of understanding; coordination of the view of space and time.¹ The relation of whole and part evidently struck Kant from the beginning as decisive for the view, for already in the Treatise on the Difference of Regions in Space (1768) general space is defined as a unity "of which every extension must be regarded as a part".² From this definition it can also be concluded that Kant's insight into the essence of the conception of space was absorbed by space and that it was only the consideration of the antinomy of time (the origin of the world) that caused him to place time first in the dissertation dealing with the world.

The most important thing about coordination is the fact that it is an alogical principle of order. Only in contrast to the logical ordering principle of subordination can its peculiarity be fully recognized. "Extensive clarity through external characteristics. Intensive through inner ones. The former: through coordinated, the latter through subordinated. The former: extended, the latter: deep clarity. Lack of the first: dryness, this: logical. It is impossible to make knowledge perfect on one side without forfeiting it on the other."³ Logical clarity and aesthetic fullness grow in inverse proportion. If one goes further down this path, one finally arrives at the idea of the *infima species*, the individual. But this is precisely where mere logic is transcended. We are in the alogical - or in the trans-

¹Diss. § 4; § 5.

²Ac. Iss. II, P. 378.

³ N. 2368; N. 2407 etc. - Compare here the logic of Kant's teacher Martin Knutzen, where it says: "General ideas have a greater breadth (extensionem) than individual ones, although a narrower or smaller content (comprehensionem)." Individuals have the greatest content, but no breadth at all. (Elementa philo- sophiae rationalis seu Logicae. 1747. § 72, p. 74.) Here is expressed what is the unspoken basis of Baumgarten's aesthetics and logic: the law of the inverse relation of content and extent of ideas within the abstracting conceptualization. The passages in Knutzen and Kant are the only hint of this fundamental logical law that I have found on my way. Wolff's logic shows no trace of it.

zental. Transcendental philosophy means the abolition of the alogical, not into the logical, but into the critical. This abolition occurs through the term *Anschauung*. Kant's new logic begins with the theory of *Anschauung*. "The conception that can only be given by a single object, however, is the view", is the decisive sentence of the Critique of Pure Reason.¹ The expression "single object" is the objective correlative concept of inexpressibility. Logic, the science of the sayable, never deals with a "single object", with an individual. Its material are the concepts that denote what several objects have in common. Through the discovery of pure intuition as the original form through which "an idea that can only be given through an object" is possible at all, formal logic, whose peculiarity and limitation consists in the fact that it must stop at the individual, is overcome. The individual expresses itself in the view. *Anschauung* is the methodological term that Kant used for the metaphysical one of individuality. Although Baumgarten's mood is already completely turned towards the "individual object", methodologically he still remains caught up in rationalism, since he believes that he can reach the concrete through a conceptualization. His method goes back and forth between the general and the particular; it still remains within the conceptual mode of formal logic. With the concept of *Anschauung*, the spell that this way of looking at things cast on epistemology is broken. The opposition of the "particular" and the "general" is now replaced by that of concept and perception. However harshly transcendental and formal logic may be opposed to each other objectively, historically they are intimately connected. For the concept of perception has grown out of that of the "beautiful" understanding that coordinates the characteristics⁽²⁾.

¹B. 47.

² In the printed writings, the "beautiful mind" is mentioned only occasionally. Cf. the observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime. Ac. Ed. II, P. 229.

The idea of coordination is of revolutionary importance for the doctrine of the mind. A mind that coordinates characteristics cannot be called analytical. The mind proceeds synthetically in a coordinating way. The synthetic procedure makes a clear (i.e. individualized) cognition; the subordinating one makes a cognition clear. "Clarity through coordination is achieved by synthesizing. Through subordination per analyzin."¹ There, cognition is immediate; here, a given idea is only further dissected. The former activity is synthetic, the latter analytical = reflective. The Kantian concept of pure sensuality is thus originally identical with the concept of understanding (intellectus), the function that coordinates the characteristics; finally, with the synthetic coordination (association) of ideas in general, i.e. with pure contemplation. The concept of the synthetic has emerged from that of the "beautiful intellect". If we take Baumgarten's constant expression for artistic creation: pulchre cogitare (pulchre cogitaturus = the artist), we realize that the idea of synthesis, in contrast to that of analysis, is ultimately rooted in the aesthetic sphere. The Renaissance loved to call the artist "another creator". What of this notion, after deducting all enthusiasm, holds up before the forum of epistemological criticism, is preserved in Kant's concept of the coordinating, synthetic view.

The part of the dissertation that still seems fresh and lively today is dedicated to the characteristics of perception. Cognition through sensuality is an intuitive, not a discursive one.² We do not recognize through a majority of acts, but "per intuitum singularem", at a glance. (§ 15 C.) Thus he

¹N. 2357 - "A clear realization makes synthetic clarity. To make cognition clear is analytic." (N. 2358.) Vg-1. Schlapp, p. 102. "The distinctness through synthesis is the spread, that through analysin is the intensity."

² "Omnis enim intuitus noster adstringitur principio cuidam formae, sub qua sola aliquid immediate, s. ut singulare, a mente cemi et non tantum discursive per conceptus generales concipi potest." (Diss. § 10.)

we know in geometry. The proposition that there is only a straight line between two points is not deduced from a concept of space, but *velut in concreto cerni potest*. (ib.) Its truth is seen. There is no opposition here between the particular and the general. This new method of cognition receives its sharpest form through the juxtaposition of "in" and "under". "Pure perception (of man) is not a general or logical concept, under which, but a single one, in which all arbitrary sensible things are presented.¹ The sensory faculty sees a whole in which it distinguishes coordinated parts. Logical activity, on the other hand, proceeds from the superordinate to the subordinate, from the characteristic to the characteristic of the characteristic. It has already been mentioned that Kant tends to conceive of the relation corresponding to coordination as synthetic, and that corresponding to subordination as analytic. The extensive-coordinating activity relates to the intensive-subordinating activity like the extension to the explanation.¹ For every new determination of content extends our conception of an object; by way of the extending determination we should finally arrive at an all-round knowledge. On the other hand, no matter how precisely a concept is broken down into its characteristics, it adds nothing new to the concept and thus remains analytical. But only if one considers only the content of the concept can the activity of dividing, superordinating and subordinating characteristics appear analytical. If we look not at the content but at the nature of the activity, the subordination must also be recognized as synthetic. Subordinating, we establish a certain ordered connection of characteristics. Logically analyzing in relation to the given conception, we proceed synthetically in relation to the

¹ "Intuitus autem purus (humanus) non est conceptus universalis s. logicus, sub quo, sed singularis, in quo sensibilia quaelibet cogi- tantur.." (Diss. § 12, cf. § 14, 2. § 15, B and the footnote to § 27.)

² In the Critique of Pure Reason the analytic judgments are known as explanatory judgments, the synthetic extension judgments. (B. 11.)

Relationship of the concepts among themselves. In this sense, the subordinating activity is related to the process of reasoning. Rationalism called the conclusion the "concatenation of truths". Subordinating as well as inferring - the subordinability of concepts is, after all, the precondition of inference - we do not proceed analytically, but synthetically.¹

If a closer look reveals that coordination and subordination should not be juxtaposed as synthetically and analytically, then on the other hand there still remains a profound contrast between the two modes of procedure. It is linked to the already familiar difference between "in" and "under". The spatial part, the time distance, are imagined as contained in the all-encompassing whole of space or time. We do not ascend from a given particular (the parts) to a general empty of content or proceed by means of a principle from the ground to the grounded, but gain the particular by limiting the general. The particular is not lost in the process, as in the process of abstraction, but remains simultaneously preserved and present with the general. This concept of restriction is only mentioned in passing in the dissertation.² Only the third space argument and the fifth time argument of transcendental aesthetics give it the position it deserves.³ But the

¹ The dissertation recognizes an analysis and a vain synthesis of both the subordinating and the coordinating progress. In subordination, synthesis proceeds from the ground to the reasoned (a ratione ad rationatum), in coordination from the given part to the whole. Analysis, on the other hand, proceeds there from the reasoned to the ground, here from the whole to the part. (Diss. § I, Note I.) In comparison with what Kant calls the analytic activity of the intellect, the one and the other progress synthetically. The expressions analytic and synthetic denote only directions of procedure; they are equivalent to the expressions regressive and progressive. It is noteworthy that in the synthesis of subordination the progress proceeds from the ground which logically corresponds to the whole, whereas in the coordinating process the part which is the logical correlate of the rationatum forms the starting point.

² Diss. § 15, Corollarium; § 9.

³ B. 39; B. 48.

Dissertation already contains the fully developed thought on which the concept of limitation is based. In the ideas of space and time, says Kant, the parts do not, as the laws of understanding require, contain the ground of the possibility of the composite, but here the infinite contains the ground of every conceivable part. "For only when infinite space or infinite time is given can any particular space or time be indicated by limitando . . ."? The whole is not composed of parts that were there before, but is the condition of the parts. This thought, which actually crowns the theory of the view, first makes comprehensible the connection between the terms "generative" and "synthetic", which the first paragraph of the dissertation already touches on in passing. Under the conditions of time, it says here, the conception of the composite is only possible through the successive addition of part to part "in a generative way, i.e. through synthesis".² Here Kant touches on the old problem of genetic definition. We know that Tschirnhausen, who had attached great importance to the latter, had to put up with Wolff's objection that the genetic definition only occurs in mathematics after all. In so far as he limited the definition by means of "generation" to the realm of pure perception, Kant confirmed Wolff's objection, as it were. The construction of concepts in mathematics is later discussed in the Critique of Pure Ver-

¹ "En itaque bina cognitiones sensitivae principia, non, quem admodum est in intellectualibus, conceptus generales, sed intuitus singuläres, attamen puri; in quibus, non sicut leges rationis prae- cipiunt, partes et potissimum simplices continent rationem possibili- tatis compositi, sed, secundum exemplar intuitus sensitivi, infinitum continet rationem partis cuiusque cogitabilis ac tandem simplicis s. potius termini. Nam, non nisi dato infinito tarn spatio quam tempore, spatium et tempus quodlibet definitum limitando est assigna- bile, et tarn punctum quam momentum per se cogitari non possunt, sed non concipiuntur nisi in dato iam spatio et tempore, tanquam horum termini." (Diss. § 15, Coroll.)

³ "posteriori nititur condicionibus temporis, quatenus, partem parti successive adiungendo, conceptus compositi est genetice i. e. per Synthesin possibilis, et pertinet ad leges intuitus." (Diss. § I.)

reason. But Kant, by recognizing generative synthesis as the determinant of pure intuition, has at the same time shown the way that leads out of the mathematical sphere. Although pure intuition finds its clearest development in mathematics (its prototype is geometry, Diss. § 7), its significance extends far beyond all mere mathematics: it is the first factor of all valid knowledge. - The descriptive relation of whole and part is thus separated from the logical one by the fact that the synthesis that prevails in it is a genetic, generative one. We have thus arrived at a new concept of synthesis, in contrast to which a synthetic connection of concepts in form would nevertheless still have to be called analytical. For this presupposes the individual, the concept, it does not progressively generate it from a presupposed infinite whole. But only a process can be called truly synthetic if it not only joins together given parts summando, but also brings all the particulars from a given totality genetically to determination. In this sense, the view is synthetic: adding part to part (progrediendo) or dividing the part into parts (regrediendo), I always remain in the most intimate connection with the whole, which produces the parts from itself.

From the concept of the whole, the profound and artistic structure of the dissertation can be overlooked. As the title indicates, Kant wants to deal with the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world. The definition of the simple and the whole, "which is no longer a part", i.e. the world, forms the starting point for the development of thought in the treatise. After Kant, in the first section, has set forth the moments which belong to the definition of a world at all, and in the second has described in general terms the difference between sensuous and intellectual knowledge, he summarizes the problem of the whole treatise in a few terse propositions at the beginning of the third. (§ 13.) The results of the first and second sections now appear as premises of a concise conclusion. The common concept is that of the world. Here it is revealed that the real difficulty of the whole treatise is not to be found on the side of the *mundus sensibilis*.

is to be sought. The unity of the visual world is not a problem, since there can only be one space and one time due to the nature of perception. The unity of the mind is a different matter. This does not consist, like space, of parts that emerge by restriction from a given infinite, but of simple substances. The "respectus originarius" (§ 16) of the form of the sense world holds all phenomena together. But on what is the *relatio* of all simple substances based, which, understood graphically, is called space?

¹ This question is the pivot around which the problem of the principle of the form of the world of understanding revolves. In other words, where we are not dealing with simple substances, as with the *mundus sensibilis*, unity is not a problem; but it is with the *mundus intelligibilis*. A whole of representation (*totum repraesentationis*) could easily be obtained by combining several substances; but the representation of an (objective and real) whole (*repraesentatio totius*) is something else.² Under what conditions is the set of simple substances to be represented as a world? First, the substances must all be accidental, for a whole of necessary substances is impossible. (§ 18 f.) On the other hand, however, the form of the connection of the substances cannot be that of the part with its complementary parts to form a whole, for the connection of parts belonging together implies mutual dependence, but this cannot take place in an *ens necessarium*. (§ 19.) The concept of coordination, which ensures the form of the world of the senses, cannot be applied to the form of the intellect. A new principle of unity is therefore required. Each substance in the context of the world is necessary only as the cause to its effect; the fact of interaction proves that they are all dependent on a common cause - the otherworldly Creator. The unity in the connection of the universe is a consequence of the dependence of all sub-

¹ "quae intuitive spectata vocatur spatium." (Diss. § 16.)

² Diss. § 2, II.

(§ 20.) The totum reale of the world¹ has its final cause in God.

In a letter to Lambert, Kant himself described the fourth section of the dissertation, from which this train of thought is taken, together with the first section, as "irrelevant".² What mattered to him was the doctrine of the principles of sensuality and the concluding section on method. The elaborate structure of the dissertation, with its abbreviation of the problem in the introductory paragraph of the fourth section in particular, should therefore not be taken so seriously. But even apart from the consideration that Kant, in a letter to his most important colleague, could come to disparage the explanations of the first and fourth sections, which move along the lines of the school, in comparison with the newly developing paragraphs, we have reasons to qualify that judgment. The ideas aiming at the proof of an otherworldly God certainly share the value and the fate of all rationalistic constructions. But how significant the attempt of the dissertation to derive the concept of God from the idea of a real commercium of substances can become is shown by the concept of "omnipraesentia phaenomenon". The human mind, says Kant, perceives the external only through the presence of the common, sustaining cause. This cause, however, is not present to all and everyone because it is located in their places, but there are places, i.e. possible relations of substances, because it is intimately present to all. Space, the sensuously recognized condition of the co-presence of all things, can therefore be called the appearing omnipresence (of God).³ Because the world is created by God, the cause is not present in all places.

¹ Diss. § 17. cf. § 22 "commercium reale et physicum."

² To Lambert. Letter dated September 2, 1770.

³ "Hinc non sentit externas, nisi per praesentiam eiusdem causae sustentatricis communis, ideoque spatium, quod est condicio universalis et necessaria compraesentiae omnium sensitive cognita, dici potest Omnipraesentia Phaenomenon. (Causa enim universi non est omnibus atque singulis propterea praesens, quia est in ipsorum locis, sed sunt loca h. e. relationes substantiarum possibles, quia omnibus intimo praesens est.)" (Diss. § 22, Scholion.)

is created and preserved, it has unity and the form of a whole. Thus, space is the appearance of God's relation to the world. What matters to Kant is not the concept of God as such, but rather God's relationship to the universe. In this relationship lies the common mediating concept between the form of the senses far and the form of the understanding far. The form of the mind is the commercium of substances, which depends on the unified, creative and sustaining power of God. The form of the world of the senses is perception. Once perception is recognized as the manifestation of a divine attribute, it becomes understandable that the forms of the sensory and intellectual worlds coincide. The sensual totality of the perception of space is, as it were, an image of the supersensible totality of substances that can be traced back to God's omnipresence. In this way, the originality of space and time as perception is preserved, and yet space and time do not appear as objective, absolute realities. The mediation here also lies with the concept that we have already recognized above as the decisive one, the concept of the whole. All the threads of the treatise converge in it.¹ Its fundamental significance, however, only becomes clear when the inner connection between it and the concept of intellectus archetypus is fully taken into consideration.

There could be a mind (concludes the second note to the first paragraph of the dissertation) which, without successive application of a measure, clearly grasped the multiplicity at a glance.² Such a glance could be

¹ Herz's explanatory treatise makes this clear by beginning with the concept of the whole and grouping the content of the first section of the dissertation around it. (Betrachtungen aus der spekulativen Weltweisheit, 1771, p. 17 ff.) In what follows, Herz also reveals his understanding of the importance of this term. Herz's later aesthetic theories, briefly referred to in the first part of this volume (pp. 250 f. above), are, as can be seen, inspired by his dealings with Kant at the time of writing the dissertation.

² "qiri absque successiva applicatione mensurae multitudinem uno obtutu distincte cernat, dari possit intellectus, quanquam utique non humanus." (§ 1 note 2).

is certainly not a human one. For us humans, continues § 10, intellectual knowledge, i.e. precisely "clear" knowledge, is only possible through general concepts in abstracto, not through the individual case in concreto.¹ The logical use of understanding, to which all human science remains limited, is opposed to the process of pure perception like the subordination of coordination.² Logical concept, i.e. clear knowledge, and perception, i.e. "vivid", clear perception, always remain separated by a gulf. The Critique of Pure Reason has made this gulf the main problem of epistemology. The most important sections of the critique of reason (transcendental deduction and the chapter on schematism) deal with the relationship between view and concept. The problem is to a certain extent presented as solved in the concept that the critique of reason has taken over unchanged from the dissertation: in the concept of intuitive understanding. God nevertheless sees things with perfect clarity as individuals, because he is at the same time their author.³ In human cognition, the passive form of perception and the activity of the concept fall apart; in the divine there is undivided unity. "If that which is called conception in us were active with respect to the object, i.e. if the object itself were thereby produced, as one imagines divine cognitions to be the archetypes of things, then the conformity of these with the objects could also be understood."⁴ The basic form of the divine understanding always remains intuition, as described by Kant, only freed from the stain of passivity.

¹ " ... intellectio nobis tantum licet per conceptus universales in abstracto, non per singularem in concreto. Omnis enim intuitus noster adstringitur principio cuidam formae, sub qua sola aliquid immediate, s. ut singulare, a mente cerni et non tantum discursive per conceptus generales concipi potest." (§ 10).

² Diss. § 12; cf. p. 324 above.

³ "Divinus autem intuitus, qui obiectorum est principium, non principiatum, cum sit independens, est archetypus et propterea perfecte intellectualis." (§ 10.)

"The dissertation itself only emphasizes the passivity of our view: "Intuitus nempe mentis nostrae semper est passivus." (Diss. § 10.)

Intellectual contemplation is productive contemplation. However, a new principle of form is not thereby given; the perfectio noumenon is a principle that allows all the degrees contained under it to be determined only through limitation (limitando). The creative principle is identical with totality. The creative power of a conception with respect to its object is utterly mysterious except in the one case where the intellectual power is the conception which is regarded as the producer of objects (as parts). The parts, virtually contained in the whole, flow out of it by virtue of its activity. It will be shown in the second volume that the definition of intellectual conception given in the above-mentioned letter to Herz agrees with the definition of purposiveness, and that the concept of totality is nothing other than that of the system.

Perfect (divine) knowledge knows as little of passivity as it does of abstract activity. The dissertation has clearly described the passive character of sensual human perception. The insight into the active character of the concept developed at the same time. The theory of perception had to entail, with inner necessity, a transformation of the doctrine of the concept.

2.

The logic of the school was based on the idea of a difference of degree in the "distinctness" of concepts. It corresponds to this way of thinking when Kant assumes in the *Preisschrift* of 1763 that the certainty of which metaphysics is capable differs from that of mathematics only in degree.¹ Once insight into the nature of perception had revealed the fundamental difference between mathematics and metaphysics, such an assertion was no longer possible. With the insight into the gulf that is fixed between visual and conceptual knowledge

¹ "It is precisely a certainty necessary for conviction that metaphysics is capable of, as well as mathematics, only the latter is easier and more intuitive." (*Investigation into the clarity of the principles of natural theology and morality*. Ac. Ed. II. P. 296.)

the theory of the concept also had to change. The main task was to get out of the sphere of mere concepts of reflection, namely within logic itself, because "pure" concepts had long been present in metaphysics. The common concept of the school, however, was considered to be "deduced", obtained by comparing sense things with one another. This mode of conceptualization, which degraded the concept to a derivative of reality,¹ had to be overcome. Kant takes the first step towards overcoming this theory of the concept of reflection in the "Conclusion" to the paper on the false subtlety of the four syllogistic figures.² Here the clear concept is no longer characterized by the moment of dissection (to make clear means to analyse, i.e. to dissect into characteristics), but by the act of judging. "The distinctness of a concept does not consist in the fact that that which is a characteristic of the thing is clearly imagined, but that it is recognized as a characteristic of the thing³." Distinguishing things from one another (in the imagination) is quite different from recognizing the difference between things. The latter is only possible through judgments, not through sensations. It is important here to emphasize the logical act.⁴ "Distinguishing logically" is something different from "distinguishing physically", i.e. separating by judgment is something different from separating merely by sensation (or imagination).⁵ It would have been conceivable that Kant could have used this way, i.e.

¹ "Datis igitur cogitationibus sensitivis, per usum intellectus logicum sensitivae subordinantur aliis sensitivis" etc. (Diss. § 5.) There must always already be a sensory cognition somewhere before the concept is possible.

² These are just a few scattered remarks that Kant does not yet quite know how to accommodate. The thoughts are not yet fully developed. This explains why the (later) *Preisschrift* does not yet show any consequences.

³ i.e. judging.

⁴ "Action" says Kant, in contrast to the "clear concept itself." (Cf. Wolff, *Phil. rat.* § 39 "... actus iste mentis ... iudicium appellatur ...") See also above p. 84²).

⁵ It can be seen that Kant here abolishes the identification of representation and cognition that we still found in Meier and Reimarus (see p. 201² above).

had progressed beyond the predicating function to the discovery of the active character of the concept. In reality, he arrived at this decisive insight in a different way: by emphasizing the function of abstraction more and more emphatically. In contrast to Meier, Kant avoided an actual polemic against abstract knowledge. Admittedly, he once speaks in the essay on negative quantities of the "dark and difficult to test abstractions" of metaphysics in contrast to the "comprehensible and obvious insights of mathematics".¹ Anthropology also occasionally contrasts the "rich material" of sensuality with abstract concepts, which are "often only shimmering paltriness".² On the whole, however, Kant follows Baumgarten's path, not Meier's, i.e. he attempts to work out the positive aspects of abstraction. Abstraction is initially conceived, in the sense of its predecessors, as "negative attention".³ With this emphasis on "abstracting", a certain activation is already given. This spontaneousization of abstraction becomes completely clear in the phrase of the dissertation: one must say "abstract from something", not "abstract something", because the concept of understanding abstracts "from everything sensual" and is not abstracted from the sensual. It is therefore perhaps more correct to speak of abstracting concepts rather than abstract concepts.⁴ The concept of understanding, which abstracts from all sense, i.e. is free of it, is a spontaneously intellectual concept, not owed to any impressions. "Abstraction is a negative attentive; thus more than not attending."⁵ Metaphysics does not seek its concepts in

¹ Attempt to introduce the concept of negative quantities into worldly wisdom. Ac. Ed. II, P. 168.

² Anthropology, p. 145.

³ N. 2869: "not aliquid abstrahere, but ab aliquo abstra- here; it is negative."

⁴ "Hinc conceptus intellectualis abstrahit ab omni sensitivo, non abstrahitur a sensitivis et forsitan rectius diceretur abstrahens quam abstractus." (§ 6) cf. Logic. § 6.

⁵ Reflection N. 164. Elsewhere it says, happier in expression, the same thing (for abstracting and reflecting

of experience, but abstracts it from the laws implanted in the mind (by paying attention to its activity on the occasion of experience).¹ Psychologically, this appreciation of the activity of abstraction is explained by the consideration that abstracting from something proves a greater "freedom of the thinking faculty" than attending to it. It proves that one "has the state of one's ideas under one's control."²

With this deepened insight into the nature of abstraction, however, only the concept of a spontaneity of understanding has been gained. We still need to determine the specific form that logical activity as such has. In general terms, this form is the form of subordination. Abstraction is only the condition under which *conceptus communes* can become. The "logical form of the understanding" consists in the subordination of the general concepts.³ Through the concept of subordination, the understanding, which is only negatively determined by the activity of abstraction, receives positive determination. The logical use of the intellect, says the dissertation, is that by which we subordinate the cognitions to one another according to the law of contradiction.⁴ The essence of logical activity always remains subordination, just as the coordinating process remains constitutive for the view. The concepts of coordination and subordination remain, comparable to a *basso continuo*, in all changes of terminology under the work of thought that leads to the critique of pure reason. The definition of synthesis in the most general sense of the action of adding different ideas to one another is still based on the concept of synthesis through coordination, and

belong to the same process of concept formation): "No concepts are formed by abstraction, but by reflection: either, if the concept is given, only the form and is called reflective, or the concept itself: reflective." (N. 2865). The moment of action that is important is not expressed differently in "reflecting" than in "abstracting."

¹ Dissertation. § 8 cf. above "Act" in the judgment.

² Anthropology. § 3.

³ N. 2871.

⁴ Diss. § 23.

to comprehend their multiplicity in one cognition."¹ However, transcendental logic defines the counter-concept of function, which corresponds to the conception, with the help of the concept of subordination. "By function, however, I understand the unity of the act of organizing different ideas under a common one."² Accordingly, the critique of reason distinguishes the synthesis of coordination or of the view from the function, which gains closer definition through subordination. There the multiplicity of ideas in a cognition is emphasized, here the unity of the action by which they are brought under one concept. The school's doctrine of the understanding as the faculty of distinct concepts splits in Kant in two directions, so to speak: the idea of the coordinating accumulation of characteristics leads to the theory of intuition; the idea of the relationship of subordination of the finished concepts as a means of establishing a connection of truths leads to the theory of judgment. Kant's doctrine of judgment develops, with the participation of insight into the activity of abstraction, from the notion of the subordinating activity of the intellect. The logical function of judgment is that act of understanding "by which the manifold of given ideas, whether they be views or concepts, is brought under an apperception in general."³

To realize the idea of subordination, however, a further detachment from formal logic was necessary. This detachment takes place in that Kant calls the predicate the condition without which the subject is inconceivable (with which

¹B. 103 - It is the synthesis of the imagination which the first edition of the Critique of Reason called "the pure form of all possible knowledge". (A. 118. Compare with this the use of language in the dissertation, which identifies all "form" with the form of coordination). The productive imagination is the faculty of pure views (space and time).

²B. 93.

³B. 143 - The corresponding negation is in B. 153; the understanding is not a faculty of views and cannot take them into itself.

¹ The function of judgment remains objectively the same as the function of subordination: the predicate is superior to the subject, like the ratio to the rationatum, the condition to the conditional. But now it is no longer a matter of subordinating one concept to another, but of placing it in a context of conditions in general. Thus we have completely left the realm of what the school understood by intellectus as the capacity of clear concepts. If a model for the connection between the conditional and the conditioned, which is now meant by "subordination", were to be sought in logic at all, it could only be found in the rational connection that the inference procedure establishes.

It is the concept of "condition" that leads directly from Wolff's abstracting conceptualization to transcendental logic. Discursive cognition is cognition through characteristics, i.e. ideas that make that which is common to several things the ground of cognition.² Now that which is common to several things can be predicated of them. "The attribute as a ground of knowledge contains the things among itself"³ thus says the same as the doctrine of the subsumption theory of judgment: the predicate includes in its scope the things of which it is predicated.⁴ The predicate, as the more general, is the ground of knowledge of the things, as the particular. The judgment in which I attribute a predicate to the object is thus an "indirect cognition of an object",⁵ i.e. a cognition through a (general) characteristic.® "In every judgment there is a concept that is

¹ "Nam quia praedicatum in quolibet iudicio, intellectualiter enuntiato, est conditio, absque qua subiectum cogitabile non esse asseritur, adeoque praedicatum sit cognoscendi principium...." (Diss. § 24).

² Kant's Logic. Edition of the Philos. Bibl. vol. 43. p. 64.

³ Logic. S. 104.

* Cf. Erdmann, Logische Elementarlehre. 2nd ed. p. 343 f.

#B. 93.

⁶ Kant therefore calls it "the conception of a conception" of the object. (B. 93.) This explanation is similar to that in the paper on the false subtlety of the four syllogistic figures, where it is said: it is required for a clear concept that I have something

applies to many, and among these many also comprehends a given idea, which latter is then directly related to the object." The concept "which is valid for many" is the predicate; e.g. that of the divisible in the judgment: all bodies are divisible. Kant derives a more general function from the action of the judging faculty to subsume the given concept under the general predicate: the function of unification in general. He conceives the subsumption of the "immediate concept" under a higher one, which comprehends it and several others under itself (i.e. the predicate), as a function of drawing together "many possible cognitions" into one.¹ Therefore, when he defines understanding at this point as the "faculty of judging", the activity of subsuming is included in judging, but only the activity of subsuming in general as unification. In this illumination, concepts are not ideas of a certain scope (this is not what matters now), but "predicates of possible judgements", i.e. means of possible unifications. However, as soon as we have lost sight of the moment of scope, we have also escaped the realm of the logic of abstraction, for scope arises through omission. To bring under a general concept also means to unify. But the most powerful type of all unification is not subsumption under general concepts, but under general laws. It is precisely this transition, from unification through summarizing concepts to unification through rules, that Kant achieves through the concept of condition. The predicate, as the ground of knowledge, is the condition of the conceivability of the subject.² The most general predicates, i.e. the pure concepts (categories), are thus "nothing but conditions a priori to a possible experience."³ The notion of an all-embracing experience is a condition of the subject.

as a characteristic of a thing; but this is a judgment." Understanding and reason, i.e. the faculty of clearly recognizing and the faculty of reasoning, are not different basic faculties. Both consist in the faculty of judgment; when one judges indirectly, one concludes." (Ac. ed. II, 58 f.).

¹B. 94.

¹Dissertation. § See above p. 337 ^x.

³First ed. of the Critique of Pure Reason. (= A) P. 95.

But the general condition, according to which a certain manifold must be posited in a certain way, is called a law.¹ Thus, through the concept of condition, the generality of the "concept" is led into the generality of the law.² We stand before the final consequence of the transformation of concepts from abstract to abstract. The understanding is now, strictly speaking, no longer to be described as a faculty of concepts or as a faculty of judgment,³ but as a faculty of rules.⁴ Anthropology arrives at the same explanation by way of another concept. Clarity, it says here, is the awareness of the concepts that is sufficient to distinguish one object from another. "But that by which the composition of ideas also becomes clear is called distinctness."⁵ Composition turns a sum⁶ of ideas into cognition "in which then, because every composition with consciousness presupposes unity of the same, and consequently a rule for it, organization is thought in this manifold."⁷ As the "faculty of rules", the intellect is the originator of the continuous linking of phenomena according to necessary rules.

¹A. S. 113.

² A. p. 106. "All knowledge requires a concept . . . but this is always something general in its form and serves as a rule."

-These designations are, as it were, remnants from an earlier period in the development of transcendental logic.

⁴A. p. 126. The explanations as faculties of concepts or also of judgments, says Kant at this point, amount to one thing, "if one looks at them in the light. The obvious embarrassment of the phrase "when seen in the light of day" barely hints at the gulf that exists between the understanding as the faculty of clear concepts and the understanding as the faculty of judgment. Kant is quite averse to a fundamental discussion of the difference between formal and transcendental logic. This is one of the main causes of the difficulties of the Critique of Pure Reason.

⁵Anthrop. § 6 - We know this "composition": it is the subordination of characteristics.

⁸The extensive clarity, which is otherwise called "aggregate", is here called clarity = sum of ideas. Kant later no longer uses the terms clarity and distinctness in the strict sense of the school.

⁷In every cognition "the clarity is based on the order according to which the partial ideas are put together..." Again to be regarded as an indication of subordination.

laws and thus of the necessary connection "that one means when one calls nature."¹

As a faculty of concepts, the intellect (intellectus) is analytical, since concepts are obtained by processing sensory ideas. Through differentiation, it extracts the individual characteristics from the given overall concept and thereby makes them clear. Furthermore, he compares the characteristics of different ideas with each other and brings them (abstracting and reflecting) to more general ones. The common idea (the concept) therefore contains nothing new, but only that in one which is common to many individual ideas. If we look at the function of unification, which lies in the fact that the mind represents together what is distributed among many individual objects, then there can obviously be no question of a merely analytical activity.² Rather, there is a synthesis here, i.e. a function, for by function Kant understands "the unity of the act of arranging different ideas under one common one."³ However, if we look at what the common concept contains, the action of the understanding appears to be merely analytical. "Before all analysis of our ideas, they must be given beforehand, and no concepts can arise analytically according to their content."⁴ "General logic" expects to be given ideas elsewhere in order to transform them into concepts.⁵ The analytic process of this transformation is, generally speaking, reflection.⁶ The "ana-

¹A. S. 114.

²This is how Kant conceives of the abstracting formation of concepts when he says: Comparison is "the comparison of ideas with one another in relation to the unity of consciousness." (Logic. p. 102.) Here formal and transcendental logic are united on a knife-edge. Cf. also the sharp contrast A. p. 126 f.

³Cf. above p. 336.

⁴B. 103.

⁵"which proceeds analytically." (B. 102.) Cf. B. 104: "Analytically, various ideas are brought under one concept (a business of which general logic is concerned)."

⁶Kant's Logic enumerates as acts of the understanding, comparison, reflection, and abstraction. (p. 102.) Steckelmacher has shown that comparison and reflection constitute only one operation. (Die formale Logik Kants und ihre Beziehung zur transzendentalen. 1879. S. 18). Anthropology has attentio, abstractio, reflexio. (S. 27).

lytic unity", by means of which the mind "brings about the logical form of a judgment" \ is therefore a unit of reflection. As a unit of reflection it is necessarily analytical, because reflection is connected to given ideas On the other hand, it is a unit that the (analytical) mind brings about in the logical form of judgment. Since the content of the reflected concept is given, its unity is analytic; since a unity² exists in this given, it shows the form of the general logical function. The concept is "in its form always something general and something that serves as a rule."³ It is, we can briefly say, synthetic in its form, even where it only disassembles given ideas. For the connection is also the precondition of analysis.⁴ The analytic unity of judgment points through its form to the synthetic. Here is the origin of the critical opposition of content and form. According to content and origin, the concept (as a common notion) is empirical.* According to "form" it is a priori. The common concept, insofar as it presupposes the unity of understanding, stands in the middle, as it were, between concept and category. Like the latter, it is empirical; at the same time, however, it bears that which the category shows purely, at least as "form": unity. The common concept corresponds to this unit of reflection,⁶ the category to the functional unit. To determine the reciprocal relationship between the two, Kant has to

¹B. 105.

² This unity is based, as we saw (cf. above p. 340²), on the unity of consciousness, which comprehends various given ideas in itself.

³A. Cf. above p. 339*.

⁴ "For where the mind has not previously joined anything, there it can also dissolve nothing." (B. 130.)

⁵ Content in this (transcendental) sense also includes what is usually called "scope" in formal logic. The entire concept is meant.

⁶ Kant occasionally calls the concept a "general or reflected conception" (repraesentatio per notas communes, repraesentatio discursiva). (Logic. p. 98.) Cf. dissertation § 5: "Ab appa-rentia itaque ad experientiam via non est, nisi per reflexionem secun-dum usum intellectus logicum."

made. Only the second edition of the Critique of Reason brings complete clarity. The first contains the valuable suggestion that "raw and confused knowledge initially requires analysis. "Synthesis alone is that which actually gathers the elements into knowledge and unites them into a certain content; it is therefore the first thing we have to pay attention to if we want to judge the first origin of our knowledge."¹ For us, then, analytical unity is the first thing we have to establish in order to bring knowledge to a higher level. However, if we want to objectively "judge the origin of our knowledge", synthetic knowledge is "the first", i.e. it logically precedes reflection. The second treatment of the transcendental deduction expresses this idea as follows: the synthetic unity is to be sought in that "which itself contains the ground of the unity of different concepts in judgments, hence of the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical use."³ In other words, the analytic unity of reflection (the understanding in its logical use) presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception. Further elaborated, this reads as follows: The analytic unity of consciousness is attached to all common concepts (conceptus com- munes); if, for example, I think of "red" at all, I thereby imagine a quality that can be connected (as a characteristic = predicate) with other ideas. Only on the condition of this "presupposed possible synthetic unity" can I imagine the analytic (actual unity of judgment). "And so the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point to which one must attach all use of understanding, even all logic and, after it, transcendental philosophy; indeed, this faculty is understanding itself."³

"Understanding" therefore means both an analytical and a synthetic action. In the logical sense, understanding is merely an analytical faculty, the "faculty of concepts" (intellectus), which it was already described as by Wolff

¹B. 103.

²B. 131.

■B. 133 f.

was. These concepts are obtained by reflection from sensory ideas; the mind only gives them logical form. Is all logic therefore "formal" logic? However, the concept of "form" leads to a new concept of knowledge and to a new logic. In this, the question is no longer directed towards the mere processing of ideas given from somewhere, but towards the "origin" of knowledge in general. The Leibniz-Wolffian doctrine, says Kant, falsifies the concept of sensuousness (and of logic, one would have to add) by considering the difference between the sensuous and the intellectual merely in terms of the form of distinctness or indistinctness. The difference is not logical (i.e. a difference of greater or lesser reflective unity), but transcendental: it concerns "origin and content"? From a transcendental point of view, viewed in terms of its form, understanding is not a faculty of "concepts" (i.e. processed, reflected ideas), nor is it the faculty of "judgments" in the sense of subsumption logic (i.e. the subordination of one idea to a more comprehensive one), but it is the logical function of bringing the manifold under one concept? The pure function abstracts from every sensory condition under which objects of experience can be given at all. It is in the 11th section - synthetic. Does the transcendental deduction say "synthesis intellectualis" for it? As such, however, it is no longer intellectual (which is either contemplative-synthetic or logical-analytical), but rational. The idea of the pure, intellectual, synthetic function goes back to the ability to deduce. But the transfer of the rational function to the judging mind was facilitated by the fact that understanding and reason originally formed a basic faculty for Kant? The doctrine of

¹ Kant says "general logic". (B. 76 ff; 102) cf. above p. 340. ³ B. 60 ff.

³ A. In the same place, the "function" is equated with the "form of the concept".

"B. 151.

³ On false sophistry, etc. Ac. Ed. II, P. 59.

of the intellectual, synthetic function is thus, in the narrowest and most genuine sense, a piece of "rationalism" within critical philosophy. The true critical doctrine of view and concept knows nothing of pure intellectual synthesis. From a critical point of view, understanding is identical with the power of judgment, which is why an important part of the transcendental analytic (the analytic of principles) bears the title: Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgment.

We thus see the meaning of the word understanding fluctuating between two extremes. Sometimes understanding coincides with the form of perception, sometimes with the ability to connect concepts. The meaning "judgment" has nothing to do with either of these. However, it is precisely this that gives meaning to the understanding in the sense of the Critique of Pure Reason. When Kant defines understanding as the "faculty of knowledge" in the Critique of Reason "to speak generally",¹ one can see in this an echo of the older terminology, since perception and concept belong to knowledge. The true definition of understanding, however, which the transcendental deduction gives, agrees with the critical definition of judgment: it is the act of bringing the synthesis of the manifold to the unity of apperception. The critical definition of judgment is indeed: it is the way of bringing given knowledge to the objective unity of apperception.² In view of the decisiveness with which the transcendental deduction equates the function of understanding with the function of judgment, it must be noticeable that the second book of the Analytics assigns to the understanding the doctrine of the concepts

¹B. 137. The 'correspondence' of this definition with that of anthropology (§ 6) seems to indicate its age, since anthropology is mainly a reworking of pre-critical thought material.

² B. 145; B. 141. The small difference between the two definitions is characteristic. The understanding as a "faculty" is again contrasted with an activity, the synthesis of the manifold into unity (which the imagination accomplishes). The logical term judgment, on the other hand, is contrasted with a "given cognition". In its abstract logical meaning, the intellect has something "given" before it. (This given, however, is only pure perception).

can correspond. General logic, it is said here, is built on a ground plan that coincides exactly with the division of the higher faculties of knowledge. To the understanding correspond the concepts, to the power of judgment the judgments, and to reason the conclusions.¹ For concepts Kant immediately introduces "rules". The understanding becomes the faculty of rules in abstracto, and it now requires the power of judgment to apply them in order to arrive at a certain knowledge from them. The doctrine of this application is given by the schematism of the pure concepts of understanding. The power of judgment mediates between the general rule and the particular case; it decides whether something belongs under a rule or not.² It is obviously superfluous to assume such a faculty separately if one conceives of the intellect as a judging faculty, i.e. as an act of bringing given knowledge to the objective unity of apperception, as required by the transcendental deduction. Then the understanding is precisely the power of judgment. If cognition is only possible through the relationship between perception and concept, and once the point of unity of the two has been found in transcendental apperception, then no further function is required to bring perception and concept into union. For a mediating faculty to become necessary, a shift in the meaning of the word understanding must have preceded it. As we have seen, such a shift has indeed taken place. It is contained in the doctrine of pure intellectual synthesis developed from the subordination function, i.e. in the transition from the doctrine of judgment to the doctrine of inference. In connection with the ancient concept of the category, this doctrine has produced Kant's concept of the "pure" understanding, the faculty of the categories that spring entirely a priori from pure intellectual synthesis.[®] This doctrine is the remnant of the Platonic mundus intelligibilis of the 1770 work that remained in the critique of reason. The dissertation still left a realm of things in itself,

¹B. 169.

²B. 171 f. Like the judge.

³B. 162 Note.

which would only be accessible to the pure concept. According to the Critique of Pure Reason, there is no longer a mundus intelligibilis. But there is a purely intellectual synthesis. The concept of substance of the noumenon has been transformed into a concept of function. In the concept of pure intellectual synthesis, the archetype of the categories, we recognize the ultimate sublimation of the world of understanding in contrast to the world of the senses. The mundus intelligibilis, elevated to formal definiteness by the concept of the intellectual synthetic function, brings forth that problematic which the critique of reason cannot overcome despite all its efforts. Its tendency is to seek to dissolve this intellectual world of things in themselves. Again and again Kant emphasizes that only in relation to possible experience, i.e. contemplation, do the pure concepts of understanding produce knowledge. Nevertheless, he maintains a certain independence of these concepts. They have, if not a transcendental use without the formal conditions of sensuousness, at least a transcendental meaning.¹ The categories extend "further than sensuous perception, because they think objects at all, without still looking at the particular kind (of sensuousness) in which they may be given."² This is the mood, defying all restrictive remarks in favor of experience, from which the problem of the critique of reason emerges. The intellectual world³ of the dissertation has disappeared; but a reflection of that transcendental distance still rests on the methodological means that once served it, the concept.

c. Formal and transcendental logic

In its finished form, Kant's epistemological logic easily gives the impression that it is designed at a complete distance from the way formal logic is conceived. A glance at the thought-

¹B. 305.

²B. 309.

³"As it were a world conceived (perhaps even looked at) in the mind". (A. 250.)

material, from which the Critique of Pure Reason finally emerged through an act of unprecedented concentration, teaches us that formal logic, as the first edition of the Critique of Reason in particular still reveals, was of decisive importance for the development of transcendental logic, both factually and terminologically. We have shown that the conceptual world of formal logic can still be seen shimmering through in many places. Only the narrowing of the train of thought of the critique to scientific knowledge, beginning with the section on the principles of pure understanding, has been able to conceal this. In the struggle against school logic, which stopped at the generality of the generic concept, modern natural science developed, elevating the concept of law to the type of knowledge. Kant would not have been the philosopher of the classical epoch of knowledge of nature if he had not given the concept of law its rightful place in the logic of knowledge. Nor would he be the great historical thinker that he is, the careful preserver of traditional knowledge, if he had only written his logic in contrast to the formal logic of the school. Not only does the Critique of Pure Reason avoid polemicizing against formal logic,¹ we may also recognize in the fact that Kant continued to read about logic a recognition of the enduring value of school logic. He never underestimated the analytical activity of the mind. In his treatise On the Progress of Metaphysics he expressly refuses to call analytic judgments identical; the analytic explanation of concepts always remains for him "a very necessary business"/²

The definition of understanding as a faculty of rules now completely tears transcendental logic away from formal logic. A generality of the rule in the sense of law is alien to the latter. It only recognizes a generality of the concept. The concept, however, is created by way of reflection. If one defines the

¹ The passage B. 60 ff. is not directed against formal logic, but against Leibniz-Wölfian metaphysics.

² On the progress of metaphysics. Edition Vorländer, p. 153 f.

Understanding as a faculty of judgment, as Kant does,¹ can mean two things. If understanding is taken as a faculty of rules, then "to judge" means to subsume under rules. The use of understanding then consists in determining the particular by the general (the rule, the law). The determining rule corresponds to a subsuming, judging mind. The rule has taken the place of the concept; the law that applies to all has taken the place of the predicate as a concept "that applies to many."² Just as the concept gives its determination to the particular, so the rule gives its determination to the case. This understanding could therefore be called the determining one. - The second view is quite different. Reflection does not start from a general, but seeks the concept by comparing many individual concepts. In this case, understanding cannot be defined as a faculty of concepts or rules. After all, it is only on the way to the general. Its use points to the emergence of the concept through reflection. It could therefore be called the reflective mind.

Here we have reached the classification with which Kant opens the Critique of Judgment: "The power of judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the general. If the general (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment that subsumes the particular under it is determinative (even if, as transcendental power of judgment, it specifies a priori the conditions according to which alone it can be subsumed under that general). But if only the particular is given for which it is to find the general, then the power of judgment is merely reflective."³

What the determining and reflective powers of judgment have in common with mere reason is

¹B. 93.

² In logic, the ability to "bring the ideas of the senses under rules"⁴⁴ (Phil. Bibl. vol. 43, p. 13) is mentioned as a function of the understanding.

³Critique of Judgment, 3rd ed. p. XXV f.

the relationship to the particular. The intellect, as a faculty of rules, is utterly abstract. This abstractness has made it necessary to provide it with a faculty "to subsume under rules, i.e. to distinguish whether something is subject to a given rule (casus datae legis) or not"⁽¹⁾. The Critique of Pure Reason calls this faculty judgment *per se*; in the Third Critique, judgment in this sense is distinguished as determinative from reflective judgment. The determining power of judgment is the understanding "in its use", the full understanding, as it were, in contrast to the abstract understanding of the mere "faculty of rules". In certain respects, Kant places this abstract understanding on the same level as "general logic". Logic abstracts from all content of cognition and, by analyzing the form of cognition in concepts, judgments and conclusions, produces only formal rules for all use of the intellect. If it now wanted to show in general terms how one should subsume under these rules, this could only be done again by means of a rule. "But precisely because it is a rule, it requires a new instruction of the power of judgment."² Formal logic has a very strange characteristic here. Kant evidently has in mind a very specific historical form of it, a form that was content with the analysis of concepts, judgments and conclusions without even conceiving the idea of a relation to the particular. It is clear that this characteristic applies to Wolff's logic. His *Philosophia rationalis s. Logica* was indeed easy to reconcile with the concept of an understanding that was supposed to be exclusively a faculty of rules. It took the logical formulae in their petrification, liberating them from scholastic tendrils, but nowhere did it go back to the emergence of the concept. Empirical psychology dealt with the emergence of concepts. Baumgarten's new logic, which bore the name of aesthetics, grew out of this. Here we are no longer talking about an ana

¹B. 171.

²B. 172.

lysis of a fossilized material of concepts, judgments and conclusions: the process of concept formation is the focus of interest. Understanding is not a faculty of rules; rather, it is what Kant calls the power of judgment: it mediates between the particular and the general. The doctrine of the categories, as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason, cannot arise from a doctrine of judgment corresponding to this concept of understanding. Viewed as a function of the power of judgment, judgment could never have led Kant to purely intellectual concepts. For the derivation of the categories from the "functions of unity in the judgments" (B. 94.) became possible, the concept of understanding had to be transformed first: only after Kant had united the realization of the activity of the concept gained from the function of abstraction and the insight into the coherent character of understanding derived from the function of subordination into the concept of pure intellectual synthesis, whose model was the mundus intelligibilis, could he attempt to derive the categories, whose purely intellectual character was already established in the dissertation, from the table of judgments. From the doctrine of categories, however, as we now have it, followed the absolute separation of view and concept, the overcoming of which necessitated the doctrine of schematism - which doctrine is to be regarded as a return to the understanding in its original meaning as the faculty of judgment.

The real reason for the negative characterization of formal logic contained in the Critique of Pure Reason thus lies in Kant's interest in preserving understanding as a faculty of rules in abstracto. But if the understanding is only a faculty of rules, it requires the power of judgment and schematism; as soon as there is a separate power of judgment, formal logic must appear as a completely abstract science. In the interest of the pure concept of understanding, the category, Kant destroys the living relationship that exists in aesthetic logic between the general and the particular. In this way, the logic of aesthetics becomes secondary. The "power of judgment" only carries out what the rules contain. So important

whatever their function may be, the rules are always the first. In this view of the relationship between reason and judgment, the generation of "aesthetics" appears as the servant of Wolffian philosophy, as it were, instead of its overcomer, as history would have it. The fact that this was not only a historical error, but also a factual mistake, is demonstrated by the resulting entanglements indicated in the chapter on schematism in Reason. This will be dealt with in the second volume

draft, which in my mind bore the title of a "Logic of Individuality". In line with Kant's approach, the logic of individuality was transformed into a philosophy of totality. The extensive manuscript that emerged from my conception pursued the concept of totality within post-Kantian logic until the end of the 19th century. I was under the spell of a philosophy that recognized nothing that could not be traced back to basic logical forms. When I realized that nothing could be gained from the logical development of the categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive forms, I abandoned the work. Erich Rothacker advised me to publish the historical part, which was intended as an introduction, for myself. A commentary on Kant's dissertation of 1770 (pp. 308-351 above) concluded the study, which I would have done better to give an independent title instead of publishing it as the first volume of an impracticable conception.

It was not external circumstances but philosophical reasons that forced me to leave it at the first volume. Kant had still succeeded in uniting the critique of individual taste with the theory of the organic individual because he himself, as a critical philosopher, knew that the system of harmony was still behind him. The Critique of Judgment in particular proves that Kant did not see himself as the destroyer, but rather as the perfecter of Leibnizianism. From the modern basis, a critical logic of totality was no longer possible according to the systems of idealism.

Self-criticism taken too far prevented me from publishing the more extensive part of my manuscript, which was after all historically productive, under a noncommittal title such as "Logical Analyses". The manuscript perished in Berlin in 1945.

In the philosophical literature of the 18th century, which lay buried under the stone slab of "rationalism", I encountered thoughts during my investigations that were organized around the concepts of wit and discernment, ingenium and acumen. Detached from my systematic endeavors, the present work would have had the

The title could have been: "Taste and genius, wit and judgment in 18th century philosophy." Historians had failed to recognize "wit" as a source of invention, imagination and the recognition of similarities between things, processes and concepts. I succeeded in making visible the path that leads from Leibniz to the critique of judgment by showing the baroque character of thought in the first half of the century. What was later called spirit and genius was called "wit" in the language of the Baroque. That is why the core of my book can be found above on p. 146 ff. Paul Böckmann's criticism (Formgeschichte der deutschen Dichtung. I. 1949. p. 507) bypasses the Baroque phase of the term. "Wit" as a form that can be used at will has only existed since Friedrich Schlegel. In the 18th century, wit (ingenium) denoted the natural disposition and the way of proceeding of specifically gifted individuals, later referred to as "genius".

In poetry, similes and metaphors, which are called "abbreviated similes", correspond to wit. To say that all poetry depends on metaphor and simile (as I maintain on p. 145) is by no means inadmissible. The metaphorical mode of speech is universal; it brings to light the hidden unity of all things. In the seemingly scholastic talk of discovering "similarities", i.e. unknown relationships between things, processes or expressions, there is nothing less than a hint of the world view of analogy, which is opposed to the world view of rationalism. If one were to speak of analogies instead of "similarities", one would very quickly discover that the recognition of wit is a philosophically extremely fruitful trait within Baroque thought.

The system of monads perishes, but the world view of analogy, from which it originates, remains. In this way, Leibniz saved the ancient world view for modern thinking. To the witty mind, to the man of genius, the world, which seems to the mind to fall apart into isolated things, reveals the truth of the great harmony. A mind to which the similarities between things reveal themselves is secretly connected with the unity of the whole. Goethe's view of the world corresponds to ingenium. Kant thought Goethe with his immense acumen when he inserted the concept of genius into the outline of transcendental philosophy through the Critique of Judgment.

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